Assessing Cultural and Regime-Based Explanations of Russia’s
Foreign Policy: "Authoritarian at Heart and Expansionist by
Habit"?
By Andrei P. Tsygankov1
In Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 64, No. 4, June 2012.
Abstract
Scholars disagree on how to interpret Russia’s assertive foreign policy. According to
some observers, Russia’s authoritarian culture and political system have historically
required for the Kremlin to depend on the Western threat image at home and engage
in revisionist behavior abroad. These observers recommend that the Western nations
abstain from engaging Russia as an equal contributor to shaping the global system.
This paper assesses validity of the authoritarian expansionism theory by comparing it
to other prominent perspectives on foreign policy, realism and constructivism. The
paper argues that, by perceiving Russia’s historical and institutional distinctness as
fundamentally threatening to the West, the theory overlooks important sources of
foreign policy contestation at home and potentially varying directions abroad. In
addition to analyzing the theory’s propositions, intellectual roots, and biases, the
paper selects the historically important cases of the Crimean War, the Cold War, and
the Russia-Georgia War. These cases help to demonstrate the theory’s flaws and
highlight role of factors others than Russia’s authoritarianism in the nation’s foreign
policy.
1
The author thanks the editors of Europe-Asia Studies and two anonymous reviewers for their
comments and suggestions. The usual disclaimers apply.
1
Introduction
Russia’s international behavior continues to spark lively disagreements among
scholars and policy makers alike. While some view Russia as largely accomodationist
and non-threatening to the West, others perceive the Kremlin’s objectives as
expansionist and disrespectful of existing international rules.2 The arrival of Barak
Obama to power and his attempts to “reset” relations with Russia has yet to clarify the
question of the motives of the Kremlin’s international behavior. Those on the
skeptical side argue that the reset advocates misread Russia’s intentions and
undermine Western allies (Kramer 2010a; Kramer 2010b; Cohen 2010; LeVine
2010). According to this line of reasoning, Russia’s authoritarian culture and political
system require for the Kremlin to depend on the Western threat image at home and
engage in revisionist behavior abroad (Shlapentokh 2009; Cohen and Dale 2010;
Shevtsova 2010). It stands to conclude that the Western nations are better off trying to
contain or transform Moscow, rather than engaging it as an equal contributor to
shaping the global system.
Behind the policy debate about Russia’s intentions are profound theoretical,
historical and ethical questions. Is a more democratic Russia likely to act in accord
with the United States and Europe in international affairs? Does an authoritarian
Russia necessarily present a threat to the West? Should Russia’s cultural and regimebased difference serve as a sufficient basis for excluding the nation from the list of
partners and potential allies? More generally, should a difference in political system
and values – whether it concerns Russia, China, Iran or another country – be treated
by Western nations as potentially threatening their values and interests?
This paper seeks to assess the validity of the authoritarian/expansionist Russia
approach by comparing it to two other prominent perspectives on foreign policy,
realism and constructivism. Instead of focusing on Russia’s domestic
authoritarianism, realism and constructivism study the foreign policy impact of
international anarchy and norms, respectively. I argue that, as a guide to
understanding Russia’s international behavior, the theory of authoritarian
expansionism (TAE) is at best insufficient and at worst misleading. By emphasizing
Russia’s purportedly autocratic nature, it overlooks important sources of contestation
within the nation’s political system and the potentially varying directions of its
foreign policy. By perceiving Russia’s historical and institutional distinctness as
fundamentally threatening the West, the TAE also displays the tendency to deny
Russia its own interests and stakes within the international system. As a result, many
of the theory’s advocates blame Moscow for everything that has gone wrong in
relations with Western nations and invariably offer policy advise that amounts to
isolating or containing Russia.
The paper is organized in four parts. The next section reflects on the TAE’s
assumptions and historical evolution. After identifying the theory’s propositions and
intellectual roots, I offer an analysis of several biases from which it suffers. I then
move to an empirical analysis by selecting three cases of Russia’s foreign policy that
have been important to the progression of the TAE. My interpretation of these seminal
cases – the Crimean War, the Cold War, and the Russia-Georgia War – highlights the
role of factors other than Russia’s authoritarianism. The conclusion summarizes the
paper’s findings and calls for a more complex and dynamic understanding of Russia
than the TAE-based one.
2
For examples of scholarship on Russia’s foreign policy, see Trenin 2009; Mankoff 2009;
Tsygankov 2010; Lucas 2009; Bugajski 2009; Kanet 2009.
2
The Theory of Russia's Authoritarian Expansionism
Authoritarian Expansionism and Other Theories of Russia's Foreign Policy
The central claims of the TAE may be summarized in terms of main
propositions – one of a descriptive and one of a causal nature. The descriptive
proposition states that Russia's main foreign policy objectives include the preservation
and expansion of the country's imperial borders and institutions. The causal
proposition comes in two distinct versions. Version One links Russia's expansionism
to its authoritarian culture and propensity to impose itself onto other nations. The
latter is expressed through the political regime's overconfidence and readiness to act
unilaterally, rather than in the spirit of international cooperation. Version Two places
emphasis on the leadership's low confidence and internal insecurity. The regime’s
insecurity and preoccupation with political survival lead to diversionary form of
expansionism. This version assumes the public to be generally passive and
uninterested in the state's international activities.
The two versions assume diverse types of expansionism and have distinct
policy implications. While version One identifies what might be “called expansionism
from strength” or “missionary expansionism,” version Two describes expansionism
that is driven by weakness or desperation and seeks to divert the internal public's
attention from the regime's lack of legitimacy and effectiveness. The two versions
also differ with respect to the perception of cooperation of Western nations with
Russia. While both versions are skeptical of the possibility to develop a robust
relationship with Russia, version One – by highlighting broad authoritarian support
for international expansionism – is considerably more pesimistic than version Two.
Table 1 summarizes TAE’s propositions about Russia.
Table 1. Propositions about Russia's Authoritarian Expansionism
Descriptive Proposition
Russia pursues an expansionist foreign policy
Causal Propositions
1. Active authoritarian culture causes regime's confidence and
missionary expansionism
2. Passive authoritarian culture causes regime's insecurity and
diversionary expansionism
The description of Russia's international objectives and main causes of
behavior abroad by the TAE contrasts with other theories of Russia's foreign policy.
In particular, the TAE differs from realist and social constructivist theories. Realists
typically emphasize material capabilities and the status of a great power as state
international objectives. Scholars working in this tradition view the Russian state as
acting within the same constraints of an international anarchical system that define
choices of other states. Although internal factors, such as ideology, nature of
government, and political culture, matter as well, their role is to specify, and
sometimes to cover for, but never to contradict “genuine” national interest. Realists
view national interest as a geopolitically enduring reality, rather than something open
to interpretations, and define such interest as a preservation and enhancement of
power within the existing international system. For instance, realists have argued that
3
the Soviet leaders, while employing a revolutionary ideology and acting under a
totalitarian system of government, defended Russia’s traditional state interests.3
To social constructivists, what matters most is not power or material
capabilities objectively defined but what those may mean to the Self in terms of
acquiring recognition from its significant Other. In the Russian context, Europe and
the West in general played the role of the significant Other and prominently figured in
Russia’s debates about national identity by creating the meaningful environment in
which Russia’s rulers defended their foreign policy choices.4 Constructivists argue
that although state behavior is shaped by power calculations, such behavior can only
be understood in contexts of everyday interactions and socio-historical development.
Even if anarchy is out there somewhere, constructivists say, we ought to focus on
everyday interactions for understanding what anarchy means and how social contexts
of power are being formed and unformed. Constructivist scholars of the Soviet
foreign policy therefore view such policy in terms of signaling the Western nations
the Kremlin's desire for equality and recognition (Nation 1992; Ringman 2002).
Table 2 compares the TAE to other theories of Russia's foreign policy.
Table 2. Theories of Russia's Foreign Policy
Westernizing State
Great Power
Authoritarian
Expansionist State
Russia's
International
Objectives
Recognized part of
the Western world
Capabilities and
status of a great
power
Empire and
geopolitical
expansion
Main Causes of
Russia's Foreign
Policy
Western influences
International anarchy
Domestic
authoritarianism
Evolution of the TAE
The context and the long history of the theory of Russia's expansionism may
be traced to European reactions to Nicholas's suppression of Polish demands for
independence in 1830-1831. Russia did not limit itself to suppressing what was then
an internal revolt, but also played a prominent role during the 1840s nationalist
revolutions in Europe. In 1846, Russia led the way in suppressing Polish uprising in
Cracow, which was a part of the Hapsburg state under the Vienna’s convention. In
July 1848, Nicholas suppressed revolutions in the Danubian Principalities of
Moldavia and Wallachia – partly to assist Turkey in defeating the Rumanian
nationalist movement. In 1849, Russia provided Austria with financial and diplomatic
assistance to strengthen its position in Italy, and Nicholas committed almost 200,000
troops to help the Hapsburgs to suppress the revolt in Hungary (Riazanovsky 1959, p.
248).
By suppressing internal opposition to the monarchical rule, Nicholas acted
within the constraints of the Holy Alliance and had no hegemonic ambitions of his
3
For realist studies of Soviet foreign policy, see, for example, Ulam 1968; Wohlforth 1993;
Donaldson and Nogee 1998.
4
For a development of this argument, see Neumann 1996; English 2000; Hopf 2002; Clunan
2009; Larson and Shevchenko 2010.
4
own.5 Although Russia acted in a multilateral spirit and only did what the system
expected the Tsar to do, Nicholas was labeled the Gendarme of Europe. Such a
presentation of Russia was partly a product of the continent's power struggle. Britain
and France were not satisfied with the Vienna system, and each sought to challenge
Russia's rise as a great power competitor (Taylor 1954, p. 61). No less significant,
however, was Russia and Europe's growing divergence in values. European liberals
now associated Poland and other nations that challenged monarchies with progressive
values, and Russia with imperialism and repression. Russia was now deemed too
“barbaric” and “autocratic” (Malia 1999, p. 99). Today, scholars such as John
LeDonne, continue to argue that during the 1830s and 1840s the Russians were
“dangerously close to the establishment of their hegemony in the Heartland”, and that
Russia’s “expansionist urge” remained “unabated until 1917” (LeDonne 1997, pp.
314, 348).
Such was the political context for the emergence of the TAE in the liberal
West. The Polish question did not go away, and the Polish elite led another uprising in
1863, during which the European powers, again, opposed Russia's effort to manage
the issue and preserve existing territorial boundaries.6 Intellectually, the view of
Russia as a barbaric expansionist was assisted by foreign travelers, such as the
marquis de Custine, who began to promote this view even before the Polish uprising.
The United States begun to develop negative perceptions of Russia after the
assassination of Alexander II in 1881, as immigrant groups (especially Jewish ones)
engaged in anti-Russian lobbing in the United States to “liberate” Russia from
autocracy and anti-Semitism.7 Perception of Russia as a dangerous autocratic power
grew stronger as Alexander III and Nicholas II sought to preserve their influence in
the Balkans. As theories of authoritarian Panslavism began to develop,8 scholars
became convinced of the primacy of “Panslavist imperialism” in the Tsar’s
considerations in the early 20th century (Geyer 1987; Tuminez 2000).
The social revolution in Russia in October 1917 provided another powerful
impetus for developing the perception of the country as an expansionist autocracy.
The Soviet Union continued its departure from the Western institutions, and it
challenged the West's sense of military security. The Bolsheviks’ dissolution of the
Constitutional Assembly in January 1918, doctrine of world revolution and
establishment of the Communist International (Comintern) in 1919 in order to spread
communist ideas and set up new communist parties abroad all contributed to
perception of Soviet Russia as continuing – in the most dangerous way – in the mode
of authoritarian expansionism. Even after the Bolsheviks had renounced the idea of
world revolution and dissolved the Comintern, the majority of the West's politicians
and scholars could not change their mind about the Soviet system. Scholars became
convinced that the idea of peaceful coexistence was a Soviet cover for an ideological
expansion or an offensive war on the West. A classic statement of this position can be
found in George Kennan’s (1961, p. 179) condemnation of “a regime, the attitude of
which towards Western governments, psychologically and politically, was equivalent
5
While Prussia wanted to help Austria in exchange for dominating Germany, Russia had no
such conditions and was assisting Austria out of the Holy Alliance obligations (Taylor 1954, p. 30).
6
For example, in April 1863, Britain, France and Austria each sent similar notes to the Russia
government asking that Poland be independent and included Lithuania and Ruthenia (Seton-Watson
1967, p. 435).
7
In 1911 the American government even abrogated the commercial treaty with Russia
(Foglesong 2007, pp. 43-44).
8
For overviews of Panslavist theories, see Kohn 1953; Petrovich 1956; Duncan 2000;
Tuminez 2000.
5
to that which would prevail toward an enemy in time of war.” Authoritarian ideology
is the reason why many rejected the position according to which the Soviet leaders
pursued a defensive response to the equally hostile Western governments. To Kennan,
the latter came to hate the Soviet leaders “for what they did”, whereas the Bolsheviks
hated the Western states “for what they were, regardless of what they did” (Kennan
1961, p. 181). This distinction has become common in Western scholarship of Soviet
foreign policy since the Cold War.9
Despite the end of the Cold War, many have continued to interpret Russia as
an authoritarian state with expansionist instincts, and not normal or abiding by
acceptable rules of international behavior. Conservative representations of the Russiathreat argument tend to focus on the nation’s political culture (Pipes 1997; Odom
2001; Cohen 2007), while more liberal interpretations place responsibility for
Russia’s “anti-Western” policies on the Kremlin’s leadership (Russia’s Wrong
Direction 2006; Lapidus 2007; Legvold 2007), p. 98; Wallander 2008). Conservative
perception was especially visible in justifications of expanding NATO to the east by
incorporating former parts of Russia's sphere of influence. For example, the New York
Times columnist William Safire (1994) pursued the “window of opportunity”
argument by insisting on the need to extend the alliance membership for Poland,
Hungary, the Czech Republic, the Baltic States and ultimately Ukraine, because
“Russia is authoritarian at heart and expansionist by habit.” We must do it now,
“while Russia is weak and preoccupied with its own revival, and not later, when such
a move would be an insufferable provocation to a superpower” (Safire 1994). Richard
Pipes provided the perspective of an academic and historian. He reminded his readers
about Russia’s “heavy burden of history” and failure to make “a clean break with its
Soviet past” (Pipes 1997, p. 67). To Pipes, Russians are yet to “overcome not only the
communist legacy but also that of the czars and their partner, the Orthodox Church,
which for centuries collaborated in instilling in their subjects disrespect for law,
submission to strong and willful authority, and hostility to the West” (Pipes 1997, p.
70). The historian then cautioned against viewing the country as a potential ally, as
Russia may still return as an enemy “if those who guide its destiny, exploiting the
political inexperience and deep-seated prejudices of its people, once again aspire to a
glory to which they are not yet entitled” (Pipes 1997, p. 78).
The Kremlin's international assertiveness in the wake of the colored
revolutions in the former Soviet region has instilled additional fears in both
conservative and liberal Western analysts. Russia has been frequently viewed as
reviving the lost empire, backpedaling on democracy and challenging the West’s vital
interests in the world (Brzezinski 2004; Russia’s Wrong Direction 2006; Cheney
2006; Satter 2007; Lucas 2009; Bugajski 2009). Russia's intervention in Georgia in
August 2008 provided a fresh context for resorting to the TAE. Although Russia has
legitimate interests in the Caucasus, many scholars and commentators explained the
Kremlin's intervention either in terms of Russia's expansionist determination to secure
full control over Georgia’s territory and resources (Asmus 2010; Blank 2009; Cornell
and Starr 2009, p. 8; Sherr 2009) or the Kremlin's perceived insecurity in response to
the colored revolutions and its search for internal legitimacy reasons (Cohen 2007;
Lapidus 2007; Allison 2008; Ambrosio 2009; Filippov 2009). As a result, both
conservative and liberal perspectives are skeptical that Moscow would enter
9
For important exceptions, see revisionist scholarship on the West-Soviet relations (Holloway
1984; Gartoff 1985; Cohen 1985; Kolko 1994). For analysis of Western scholarship as reflective of an
enemy's perception, see Oren 2002; Foglesong 2007. For a recent study of Sovietologists, see
Engerman 2010).
6
cooperative arrangements with Western nations voluntarily. As an authoritarian
revisionist state, Russia is instead expected to use available opportunities to upset
American plans to remain the dominant world power. If this reasoning is correct, the
American policy makers would be wise to abandon any search for partnership with
the post-Soviet Russia and stay firm in resisting its power aspirations.
Critique
The TAE suffers from biases of essentialism, cultural ethnocentrism, and
political hypocricy.
Essentialism
The first problem concerns the TAE’s presentation of Russia as a never
changing entity that is constantly preoccupied with imperialist plans to subjugate and
occupy other nations. This tendency to essentialize Russia and its foreign policy
downplays the role of factors others than the nation's political culture or the regime's
strategic design. As a result, little serious consideration is given to the possibility that
Russia's international assertiveness may be designed as a response to actions by the
West and seek relatively limited objectives.
For example, despite frequent claims that St. Petersburg's 19th century policy
sought to topple the Ottoman Empire and conquer Constantinople,10 Russia's eastern
goals were far less ambitious. These objectives included protection of the Orthodox
Christians in the Balkans and the right to have a secure passage of Russian vessels
through the Black Sea. Although inside Russia there had been supporters of the drive
to Constantinople within intellectual and foreign policy circles, it would be a mistake
to view Russia’s foreign policy as driven by their views. Even after defeat in the
Crimean War, the government did not turn away from Europe, as Russia's hard-liners
had hoped. As Chancellor Alexander Gorchakov's activities demonstrated, St.
Petersburg wanted recognition of its interests in the Black Sea, which Russia was
prepared to defend even at the cost of German unification.
Even Soviet international policy had more limited goals than what many
Western scholars and politicians believed. With the exception of the brief period of
the world revolution drive, the Kremlin mainly sought to establish the Soviet Union as
a great power and recognized member of the international community, not to expand
the Soviet geopolitical boundaries. The Cold War, including the Soviet occupation of
Eastern Europe, the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 and the military intervention in
Afghanistan in 1979 also cannot be adequately understood without considering
actions by the Western nations. Western suspicion and mistrust toward the Soviet
Union served to strengthen its determination to act assertively. From the willingness
to work with Russia before and during the meeting at Yalta, Great Britain and the
United States soon moved to unilateral and potentially confrontational behavior.
Ideological differences notwithstanding, Stalin and his entourage did not abandon
their attempts to mend fences with the West until Truman had made public his
doctrine of globally containing communism on March 12, 1947, and the Marshall
Plan had been proclaimed in June of the same year.
It is equally problematic to present Russia's more recent assertiveness as a part
of a plan by the Kremlin to restore the empire and dominate its neighbors, even at the
price of confrontation with the West. Those accusing Russia of reviving the lost
10
For such claims, see, for example, Kissinger 1994, pp. 140-144; Geyer 1987, p. 65;
MacKenzie 1993, p. 220.
7
empire, backpedaling on democracy and challenging the West’s vital interests in the
world, oversimplify the extremely complex process of Russia’s transformation and its
relations with Western nations. In particular, much of Russia’s assertiveness was a
product of the United States’ regime change policy and the West’s post-Cold War
advancement into what Russia perceives as the sphere of its geopolitical overall
interests and efforts to achieve nuclear superiority.11 It is misleading to ignore the
interactive nature of Russia-West relations, presenting Russia as an essentialist entity
with once-and-forever formed values and behavioral patterns.
Ethnocentrism
The above-noted essentialist presentation of Russia's foreign policy in part
results from the TAE's cultural ethnocentrism. Rather than viewing other cultural
communities as a source of learning, ethnocentric theories tend to perceive them as a
potential threat precisely because of their difference from the self. Ethnocentrism
precludes the TAE from being able to appreciate Russia's historical, geopolitical, and
institutional distinctness because ethnocentric ideas assume the superiority of their
own culture and inferiority of others.
A good example of a Western ethnocentric theory is that of democratic peace,
according to which democracies do not go to war with each other.12 Critics of the
democratic peace theory pointed out that it reflects American values of what is
“democratic” and that and that those values themselves have been shaped by the
United States’ perception of external threats (Oren 1995, 2002). Upon closer
inspection, the theory of democratic peace is a mirror image of the authoritarian
expansionism theory. Simply put, the two theories say that by not fighting each other
Western-style democracies tend to act peacefully and cooperatively abroad, whereas
the non-Western authoritarian systems, such as Russia, are bullish and expansionist
exactly because they are non-democracies. Yet social structures and internal
conditions are far more complex than the two theories present. For example, in the
post-communist context, democratization is not infrequently accompanied by state
weakness, thereby allowing the re-emergence and the rise of a previously dormant
militant ethnic nationalism. As a result, not only do some of the newly established
democracies go to war against each other, but they may also do so in part as a result
of their moving away from authoritarianism (Mansfield and Snyder 2007). Similarly,
authoritarian regimes that lack popular legitimacy may be cautious enough and
abstain from assertive foreign policy if they perceive such policy as potentially
destabilizing. Just as authoritarian regimes may be compatible with building an
inclusive national identity and an efficient economy,13 such regimes may be
compatible with a moderate international behavior.
The highly simplistic treatment of Russia's political system becomes
especially problematic in the post-Soviet context. Indeed, if judged by the degree of
public support, rather than by institutionalization of effective checks and balances,
Russia's political system can hardly be called undemocratic.14 Yet Russia's system is
11
For development of this argument, see Tsygankov 2010, chap. 6.
For a summary of the debate, see Brown, Lynn-Jones, and Miller 1996. For other works
critical of Western ethnocentrism in analyzing Russia, see Malia 1999; Cohen 2001; Brown 2010.
13
For an argument against universality of economic and political openness for advancing
economic growth, see Bremmer 2006.
14
Public support for President Putin has been consistently high ranging from 70 to 80%. In
addition, some polls show that almost half, 47% of Russians, think that the country needs a distinct
kind of democracy that would correspond to Russia's national traditions and specific qualities, and only
17% are against a democratic form of government (Interfax, 18 December, 2007).
12
8
still emerging, and can hardly be labeled either as an established democracy or pure
authoritarianism. More nuanced categories and theories need to be developed if we
are to match Russia's domestic conditions to its foreign policy. Even within the West,
meanings of democracy change over time,15 and it makes little sense to analyze the
Russian post-communist “democracy” by comparing it to the model of Western
societies (McFaul 2001; Fish 2005; Baker and Glasser 2005), rather than to Russia’s
own history.
Hypocrisy
The essentialism and ethnocentrism of the authoritarian expansionism theory
also feed into questionable policy recommendations. Presenting Russia as an
autocratic power that invariably threatens the outside world leaves this world few
options regarding engaging Russia. If the nation – especially in presentation of
version One of the TAE – was, is and will remain an autocratic and anti-Western
imperialist state, then the West must either contain or confront it. Such
recommendations do not only tend to perpetuate the tense state of West-Russia
relations; they are also politically hypocritical because they deny Russia interests and
stakes that the Western nations themselves view as fundamental to their own
existence. Russia’s interests and values are not only perceived as incompatible with
those of the West; they are also viewed as illegitimate and not worthy of recognition.
An example of these kinds of recommendations for Western governments
might be the calls by many advocates of the TAE to punish and contain the Kremlin
following its assertive post-9/11 policy. Disappointed by Russia's unwillingness to
follow the United States' international agenda, analysts and members of the American
political class, such as Senator John McCain and Vice-President Dick Cheney, issued
multiple statements indicating their concerns with Russia’s new “imperialism” and
energy “blackmail.”16 Steps, such as revoking Russia’s membership in the G-8,
severing its ties with other Western institutions, banning private investments and
recognizing the independence of secessionist territories (Chechnya) were proposed
(McCain 2003; Frum and Perle 2003, p. 263; Pipes 2004; Edwards and Kemp 2006;
Russia’s Wrong Direction 2006) that would amount for a policy of containing Russia
or returning to where the two nations were during the Cold War.
Blaming Russia alone for the breakup of the post-9/11 international coalition
is insufficient at best and misleading at worst, and recommendations to contain or
punish Moscow are counter-productive. Denying it its political and energy interests
and the right to set an independent foreign policy is sure to come with large political
and economic costs. Such an approach is not likely to discipline a Russia that
continues to be in a position not to yield to external pressures. Continuous treatment
of Russia as a potential threat, rather than a legitimate member of international
society, may indeed bring to power in Moscow those who are interested in
exacerbating relations with the West. Politically, it may generate a prolonged cycle of
hostilities shaped by Russia and the West’s clashing perceptions of each other’s
intentions. NATO expansion, as well as military interventions in Kosovo and Iraq, has
already done its share of damage in this respect. Hard-line nationalists in Russia will
only be grateful to hawkish pundits and politicians for assisting them in constructing
an image of the West as a threat.
15
On contested meanings of democracy in the United States, see Foner 1998; Oren 2002.
For analysis of anti-Russian currents within the American political class and media circles,
see Tsygankov 2009; English and Svyatets 2010.
16
9
Three Illustrations
This section reviews several cases of Russia's assertiveness in order to
highlight empirical problems with employing the TAE for interpreting Russia's
behavior, I have selected cases across historical eras – The Crimean War, the Cold
War, and the Russia-Georgia War – which have served as critically important to the
theory’s establishment and progression.
Crimean War
The advocates of the TAE have advanced two assumptions regarding the
decision by Russia to go to war with the Ottoman Empire. First, they have argued that
the Tsar's ultimatum to the Sultan over the rights of Orthodox Christians was
predetermined by Russia's traditional desire to conquer Constantinople.17 Second,
they have assumed that the autocratic nature of St. Petersburg's decision-making
precluded any serious opposition to the Tsar's plan. Evidence for these assumptions
are far from conclusive.
Nicholas did not seek to topple the Sultan. The Tsar's objectives were more
limited and included the defense of the rights of Russia's co-religionists residing
within the Ottoman Empire, preservation of the prestige of a European power, and the
right to maintain a fleet in the Black Sea. More than a third of the Ottoman Empire’s
population – approximately thirteen million people – was Orthodox Christian, and the
Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardzhi provided Russia with special rights to protect Orthodox
Christians within the Ottoman Empire. Although these rights were not clearly defined,
Article 7 obligated the Porte to “give the Christian faith and its churches firm
protection,” and it granted “the Ministries of the Russian Imperial Court [the right] to
protect all interests of the church built in Constantinople.”18 As a member of the Holy
Alliance, Russia also viewed its commitment to the rights of Orthodox Christians as
consistent with its European obligations. In Nicholas’ perception, he was challenging
the Sultan on the issue of the Holy Places to return the Ottoman principalities to the
European Concert.19 Finally, the Tsar sought to confirm its control over the Straits of
the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, which was vital to Russia’s economic ties to
Europe. The Crimean War resulted less from Russia’s expansionism and more from
the West and Russia’s incorrect perceptions of each other’s motives, as well as from
Nicholas’ overconfidence.
It would be equally wrong to assume that Nicholas’ assertiveness met no
opposition at home. Advocates of a more restrained policy within the political class
included Nicholas’ most influential advisors, such as Count Nesselrode and Baron
Brunnow, who urged him to be cautious in negotiations with the Ottomans and
consultations with Austria and Prussia. On the other side of the political spectrum,
Slavophiles proclaimed the Crimean War to serve the “holy” purpose of reviving
Russia’s Christian mission and pressured the Tsar to extend military support for the
Balkan Slavs –advice that Nicholas never accepted.20
17
See sources listed in fn. 10.
For the text of the agreement, see Dmytryshyn 1974, pp. 97-107.
19
The Tsar’s stated objectives were that “all the Christian parts of Turkey must necessarily
become independent, must become again what they [formerly] were, principalities, Christian states, as
such reenter the family of the Christian states of Europe” (Vinogradov 1993, p. 170).
20
Part of it was that Nicholas was wary of Slavophiles’ insistence on abolishment of serfdom.
Domestic censorship for the Slavophiles remained tight, and the war objectives were kept as limited
and status quo-oriented. Disappointed in Nicholas and the course of the war, the Slavophiles soon
began to withdraw their support (For details, see Curtiss 1979, pp. 557-560). The Tsar also rejected
plans from his own court to attack Constantinople (Fuller 1992, pp. 235-236).
18
10
Cold War
The early Cold War is another seminal case of the TAE, which places
emphasis on the Soviet expansionist ideology and totalitarian structure of Josef
Stalin's decision-making (Kennan 1961, Kissinger 1994). Again, the reality is far too
complex to be adequately expressed by the TAE supporters.
The historical record shows that Soviet international objectives after World
War II were limited and shaped by the state perception of strategic interests, rather
than communist ideology.21 Before the end of 1945, Stalin acted with restraint and
generally in the spirit of Yalta-Potsdam agreements as he interpreted them. He was
willing to tolerate Poland’s independence, although not outside the Soviet area of
influence (Suny 1998, p. 344). He also planned no communist takeovers in Europe
and advised the leaders of communist parties in Italy, France, Hungary and Bulgaria
to cooperate with national governments and not to expect to assume power within the
foreseeable future (Roberts 1999, p. 19; LaFeber 1997, p. 20) – partly because he
wanted to prevent the strengthening of independent communist centers (Daniels 1985,
p. 220). In addition – and consistent with the division of influence agreement he had
devised with Churchill – Stalin refused to interfere in Greece (Pikhoya 2007, p. 146).
He further abstained from interfering in Finland, which he viewed as maintaining a
generally “friendly” international posture (Alperovitz 1971, p. 22). Outside Europe,
Stalin advised Chinese communists to enter into a coalition with their enemies, the
nationalists (Roberts 1999, p. 19). He also refused to defy the United States by
intervening in Japan and landing in Hokkaido, as some of his advisers encouraged
him to do after Truman had dropped two nuclear bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki
in August 1945 (Suny 1998, p. 345).
The really radical turn in the Soviet attitude toward the West did not arrive
until the Marshall Plan was officially proclaimed in June 1947. “There is little
evidence,” write Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, “that before the
Marshall Plan Stalin had any master plan for immediate expansion” (Zubok and
Pleshakov 1996, p. 130). Even after Truman had proclaimed his new doctrine in
March, Stalin was hoping to continue political ties and negotiations with the United
States and Great Britain. In April, during a long meeting with State Secretary George
Marshall, Stalin argued for a possible compromise on “all the main questions” and
insisted that “it was necessary to have patience and not become pessimistic”
(Kissinger 1994, p. 444). Marshall, however, was of a different opinion, and in his
radio address on April 28 he indicated that the United States was no longer in a mood
to deliberate and was planning to take decisive actions (Kissinger 1994, p. 445). On
June 5, he delivered his Marshall Plan speech, in which he pledged financial
assistance for the post-war reconstruction of European continent. In response, Stalin
and Molotov articulated their alternative to Western policy by creating a separate bloc
with the Eastern European states and suppressing any opposition to their policy within
the region. At home, the new course meant a return to the pre-war system of mass
mobilization and repressions.
In addition, the Soviet power structure, as highly centralized as it was, did
allow for opposition to the course of assertiveness. Immediately following the war,
Stalin’s most impatient comrades wanted him to cross the Elba and occupy some parts
21
This is not to say that ideology was unimportant. Yet, it was more important as “the internal
lens through which the state viewed the very legitimacy of its actions” (Gaddis 1997, p. 290) than as a
justification for hard-line actions toward the West.
11
of the Western European nations – the advise that he rejected as impractical.22 From
the other side of the political spectrum, a former Foreign Minister Maxim Litvinov
and the ambassador to the United States Andrei Gromyko defended the “liberal”
approach that included more respect for the choices of Eastern European states and
more extensive negotiations with the Western ones (Zubok and Pleshakov 1996, pp.
29-30; Pikhoya 2007, pp. 106-108). What exacerbated the situation, making it ever
more difficult to prevent a full-fledged political confrontation, was the two sides’
international ambitions and mistrust in each other’s intentions. Stalin’s geopolitically
limited “socialist imperialism” was met with the West’s global “democratic
imperialism.”23 Were the West to be less revisionist and fearful of the Kremlin’s
preparedness to penetrate the Western nations,24 there was a possibility that Stalin
would have continued with post-war cooperative security arrangements.
Russia-Georgia War
Similar problems exist with the TAE claims that an autocratic Moscow sought
to establish imperial control over Tbilisi and that the war with Georgia was a part of a
broader geopolitical plan to revive Russia’s hegemony in the former Soviet region and
Moscow’s ability to challenge the West globally (Asmus 2010, pp. 9, 14, 217-218;
Blank 2008, p. 104; Cornell and Starr 2008, p. 8; Sherr 2008, p. 224).25
Russia’s relationship with its Caucasian neighbor has evolved through several
increasingly unhappy stages, and Moscow’s objectives were defensive, aiming mainly
to prevent NATO expansion and the inclusion of Georgia and potentially Ukraine into
the alliance. Just as Tbilisi was angry with Moscow’s unwillingness to honor
Georgia’s independence and the right to choose a foreign policy orientation, Russia
was frustrated with lack of recognition by the United States and NATO. While it is
plausible to assume the Kremlin’s intention to gain full control over Georgia, it is at
least as plausible to interpret Russia’s motives as driven by defense and security
considerations. The interests of Russia’s security are at least as helpful in determining
its behavior and explaining why it limited itself to recognizing Abkhazia and South
Ossetia’s independence, but abstained from pursuing the more expansionist objectives
of removing Saakashvili from power and establishing a pro-Kremlin regime in Tbilisi.
The TAE lacks nuance and a sense of proportion and, by presenting Russia as
inherently imperialist and anti-Western, this theory is less inclined to seriously
consider the impact of contemporary developments and international interactions on
Russia’s behavior.
Western nations and Georgia too bear responsibility for Russia’s increasingly
assertive behavior in the Caucasus. By assisting Tbilisi with its power transition after
the Rose Revolution and not interfering with its efforts to restore control over Adjara,
the Kremlin expected Georgia to honor its interests in the Caucasus by not pressuring
for immediate military withdrawals, excluding the use of force from dealings with
South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and consulting Russia on vital security issues such as
membership in NATO. Soon, however, Tbilisi adopted a strategy of solving territorial
22
For example, General Semyon Budennyi advocated such intevention. Stalin reportedly
responded to Budennyi by posing the rhetorical questions “how are we to feed them?” (Akstyutin
1995).
23
The terms of “socialist” and “democratic imperialism” come from Zubok and Gaddis,
respectively (Zubok 2009, chap. 2; Gaddis 1997, pp. 284, 289).
24
See, for example, CIA 1948, pp. 4-7; NSC 1948, pp. 1-2. For analysis of the United States’
inflated assessments of the Soviet threat after the war, see Evangelista 1982.
25
Other scholars argued that the war assisted the Kremlin with the internal legitimacy (Allison
2009, p. 1169; Filippov 2009).
12
disputes without assistance from Russia and by relying on support from the United
States. Washington has provided $1.2 billion in aid in the past decade, and deployed
military advisors in Georgia. The United States was determined to secure its access to
Caspean oil and strengthen its geostrategic presence in the Caucasus, which the
Kremlin saw as evidence of America’s bias and lack of recognition for Russia’s role
in the region. The United States did little to restrain Georgia’s militarization and
ambitions to reign in its autonomies by force.26 While Russia was increasing its
support for Abkhasia and South Ossetia, NATO and the U.S. officials did not hide
their backing of Tbilisi, and rarely criticized Georgia’s actions in public. For example,
less than a month before the war, the U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice
traveled to Europe. She found no time to visit Moscow, but on July 9, Rice went to
Tbilisi to demonstrate support for Georgia’s territorial integrity and NATO
aspirations.
It is also not realistic to assume that the Kremlin’s decision-making system
was autocratic enough to exclude a serious debate within the ruling circles. According
to Gleb Pavlovski, one faction within the Kremlin wanted to march on Tbilisi in order
to challenge the West and fully revive Russia’s domination in the Caucasus
(Felgenhauer 2008, pp. 178-179). Another faction had more modest objectives, but
did consider the decision to remove Saakashvili. Prime-minister Vladimir Putin and
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov both indicated that they wanted the Georgian
President “to go” and at first considered this a condition for cease-fire (Asmus 2010,
pp. 199, 220). Still another faction seems to have been satisfied with achieving a
military victory over Georgia and recognition of its rebellious provinces.27 The ruling
structure was far from uniform or consolidated.
Toward a Better Understanding of Russia
This paper’s analysis suggests the TAE has a rather limited ability to
understand Russia and its foreign policy. Not only does the theory tend to
misrepresent the direction and scope of Russia’s international actions, but it is
potentially misleading regarding the sources of such actions. Because of its emphasis
on the role of the domestic “authoritarianism” in determining foreign policy, the TAE
tends to miss other important sources of state international behavior, such as security
conditions and actions by outside powers toward Russia. It is not that the TAE is
necessarily wrong, but it is biased and incomplete and therefore potentially wrong. To
apply the late Martin Malia’s (2009, p. 9) diagnosis, “the West is not necessarily most
alarmed when Russia is in reality most alarming, nor most reassured when Russia is
in fact most reassuring.” The theory’s tendency to essentialize Russia’s internal
conditions and exaggerate its international ambitions should therefore make analysts
pause before adopting the TAE framework and policy recommendations.
A better approach to Russia would have to devise a more complex
classification of Russia’s foreign policy. The historical record will show that since its
emergence as an independent centralized state, Russia has followed not one but
several distinct trajectories in relations with the West (Tsygankov 2011). From
opening a permanent mission in Rome in the early 17th century to the collective
security policy before World War II, Russia frequently sided with a coalition of
Western states against those whom it viewed as challenging Russian values of
security. The second distinct trajectory of Russia’s relations with the West has been
26
According to the former Defense Minister Irakli Oruashvili (2007), Georgia planned a
military invasion of South Ossetia in 2006.
27
This objective seems to have been favored by president Medvedev (2008).
13
that of defensiveness or balancing through domestic revival and flexible international
alliances. It included Russia’s periods of recovery after the Time of Troubles, the war
with Sweden, the Crimean War, the Communist Revolution, and the Soviet
disintegration. Finally, Russia has historically resorted to assertiveness in relations
with the West, as exemplified by the above considered cases of the Crimean War,
Cold War and the Russia-Georgia war in August 2008. The TAE is applicable only to
the third trajectory of Russia’s foreign policy, and to the specified limited degree.
A better approach to Russia would also have to strive to free itself of crude
biases and hypocritical recommendations. Such approaches should be eclectic and
draw from various theoretical traditions by incorporating ideas of domestic
institutions, considerations of national security and international recognition as
sources of the nation’s foreign policy.28 The first task ought to be to establish a
meaningful context in which Russia acts and seeks to achieve its goals. Scholarly
responsibility demands that we are to establish it by studying the relevant historical,
social, psychological and political contexts behind what ostensibly are “autocratic”
decisions. Proceeding from the two hundred years-old vision of Russia by the marquis
de Custine as the “essentially aggressive” nation, or engaging in reconstruction of the
Kremlin’s motives without sufficient evidence at hand is not likely to facilitate a
better understanding of the country or produce sound policy recommendations. How
the Russians themselves describe their system of commitments before relevant social
communities should give us a better clue as to what their actions’ purpose, legitimacy
and scope might be. The second task should be to analyze the level of power and
confidence that provides the state with the required platform for acting, and it
incorporates power capabilities, institutional capacity and the leadership’s perceptions
of actions necessary for implementing the vision. Even if the domestic belief system
supports assertive international behavior, Russia may lack resources to act on it.
Finally, a scholar of foreign policy must carefully monitor actions of the Western
states toward Russia. As constructivism teaches us, such external actions may serve
the purpose of external legitimization of Russia’s behavior on the international scene.
By providing various forms of support, the outside world may have the power to
encourage Russia not resort to revisionist behavior. Only such an eclectic approach,
sensitive to local systems of perceiving the outside world, national security interests,
and the behavior of outsiders, may get us closer to a better understanding of an
enormously complex country, such as Russia.
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18