Philosophy Unit 2: Tolerance
>>> TOPIC #1: THE TOLERANT INDIVIDUAL <<<
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the end of this topic you need to be able to:
Explain different conceptions of what tolerance involves.
To compare and contrast liberal and non-liberal justifications for tolerance.
Provide reasons why tolerance is an important political concept.
Understand how tolerance can involve apparent contradictions or paradoxes and the difficulties
this presents.
WHAT IS TOLERANCE?
GENERAL DEFINITIONS:
Intolerance: is a lack of respect for practices or beliefs of others. This is
shown when someone is not willing to let other people act in a different
way or hold different opinions. Intolerance can mean that people are not
treated fairly because of their religious beliefs, their sexuality, or even
their clothes or hairstyle. Intolerance does not accept difference. It lies
at the basis of racism, xenophobia and discrimination. It can often lead
to violence.
Tolerance: is respect, acceptance and appreciation of the rich diversity
of our world's cultures, forms of expression and ways of being human.
Tolerance is harmony in difference. It is fostered by knowledge,
openness, communication and freedom of thought, conscience and
belief. Tolerance is being yourself without imposing your views on
others. Tolerance is, above all, an active attitude prompted by
recognition of the universal human rights and fundamental freedoms of
others. The practice of tolerance doesn't mean toleration of social
injustice or the abandonment or weakening of one's conviction.
The above are general definitions for tolerance and intolerance, but on this course you need to
look at the concept of ‘tolerance’ in further detail.
The term ‘tolerance’ is not as clear-cut as the definition above, which are really how such
terms are used in everyday language, but not political philosophy.
As the philosopher Rainer Forst puts it:
In contemporary political discourse, the concept of toleration
plays an important role, ranging from questions of the toleration
of cultural and religious minorities within states to the alleged
global "clash of civilisations." But while for some toleration appears
to be the magic word invoking a peaceful and cooperative way of
living together in mutual recognition and political equality, for
others it is a word signifying power, domination and exclusion.
We will look at the reasons for such ambivalence later, but first we’ll examine Forst’s concept
of ‘toleration’.
THE CONCEPT OF ‘TOLERATION’:
For the exam you need to be able to explain how the concept of ‘toleration’ involves three main
components: objection, acceptance and rejection.
Objection:
First, it is essential for the concept of toleration that the tolerated beliefs or practices are considered
to be objectionable and in an important sense false or wrong or bad.
o If this objection component is missing, we do not speak of ‘toleration’ but of ‘indifference’ (not
caring) or ‘affirmation’ (finding truth in their belief, or goodness in their practice).
Acceptance:
Second, the objection component – the fact that there are views, activities and practices that we
dislike – needs to be balanced by an acceptance component. Acceptance does not involve being
weak-willed. One does not remove the negative judgment but gives certain positive reasons that
trump the negative ones in the relevant context.
o This means the beliefs or practices are wrong, but not intolerably wrong; it is better for us to
tolerate such beliefs than to reject or ban them outright.
Rejection:
Third, the limits of toleration need to be specified. They lie at the point where there are reasons for
rejection that are stronger than the reasons for acceptance.
o This means, if we are to avoid tolerating everything, there must be beliefs and activities that we
regard as intolerably wrong.
o And of these intolerably wrong beliefs and practices, we should try to persuade them to act or
think otherwise. (Though the question is open as to the appropriate means of a possible
intervention).
o It is acting on one’s objections.
TASK: Read the following passage, and explain whether the speaker is a ‘tolerant’
individual according to Forst’s concept of ‘tolerance’:
“I haven’t changed in the sense that I believe sexuality is a gift from
God to be expressed exclusively within the commitment of
heterosexual marriage and that all other expressions of that are
outside the boundaries of God’s creative intent as revealed in the
Scripture. However, I do not believe that gives you a license to hate
people, including homosexuals, and I think part of the struggle for
people is that it’s easy to beat up what you don’t understand. I have
sat and listened to story after story after story from gay people of
their journey and have cried with them and tried to listen to the awful
pain they go through. [It] hasn’t changed what I believe about the
practice of homosexuality, but it has reminded me that ‘whom you
would change you must first love’. Martin Luther King said that. And in
general, Christians have not been very good about loving gay people.
Oh, they’ll tell you hate the sin but they love the sinner, but I don’t
see much love for the sinner.”
– Ed Dobson, former VP of Moral Majority, Inc.
FOUR CONCEPTIONS OF TOLERATION:
Now that we have explored the actual concept of ‘toleration’, we will now look at conceptions of
toleration. While a ‘concept’ outlines a terms characteristics, by ‘conceptions’ we are referring to how
toleration is practised.
There are different conceptions of toleration because its concept is ‘essentially contested’, and this
means the appropriate practice of toleration is in dispute.
What makes a concept ‘essentially contested’?
W.B. Gallie outlined three conditions that a concept must meet in order to be essentially contested:
o The concept is an evaluative concept; it must signify that something is of value.
o The concept is complex, so that what is valuable is not immediately obvious and is open to different
interpretations.
o Those engaged in disputing the concept recognise that their use of concept is disputed, they have some
understanding of why others hold different views and are prepared to maintain and defend their own use of
the term.
Forst identifies four conceptions of what tolerance involves. These are different, historically developed
understandings of what toleration consists in that can all be present in society at the same time, so that
conflicts about the meaning of toleration may also be understood as conflicts between these
conceptions.
1. The permission conception:
The first one is the permission conception. Here toleration is a relation between an authority or a majority of
individuals (e.g. heterosexuals) and a minority group, or groups, who exhibit ‘difference’ (e.g. homosexuals).
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The key feature of this relation is that the minority group concerned would be tolerated insofar as
they limit their activities to the private sphere (e.g. their own homes) and do not claim equal social,
legal or political rights (e.g. the right to be recognised as a married couple or the right to adopt
children).
So, as long as the minority accept their inferior status and do not challenge the majority, they can be
tolerated.
Their activities would be seen as wrong but not as intolerably wrong.
The relationship is one of power and subordination: the dominant majority ‘permit’ the minority to
engage in the practices that signify their difference without interference as long as the minority ‘know
their place’ as it were.
In this conception, toleration means that the authority or majority, which has the power to interfere with the
practices of a minority, nevertheless ‘tolerates’ it, while the minority accepts its inferior position. Here the ‘terms of
toleration’ are hierarchical: one party allows another party certain things on conditions specified by the first one.
For example, in 16th century France – where Catholicism was the religion associated with political authority there,
politicians understood that the price to be paid for oppressing the Calvinist minority of the Huguenotes was too
high, economically, politically and morally. Political unity could only be saved if the aim of religious unity was to a
certain extent given up. In 1598 Henri IV issued the famous Edict of Nantes which clearly recognized the
Huguenots as French citizens, though as citizens of a second class. They were granted the liberty to practice
their religion only at specified places (not in Paris) and at certain times, and the Edict carefully explained which
public offices they could hold, where and what kinds of schools and universities they could found and where they
could build ‘security zones’ with armed forces.
Hence the Calvinist minority became recognized and was protected by law, but at the same time the law fixed their
position in a situation of being "merely" tolerated, being dependent upon the good-will of the authority and always
taking second place after Catholics in everyday life.
This kind of recognition/toleration, to be sure, was a great advantage compared to the prior situation (and later
periods of oppression), yet it also meant a certain form of cultural and social stigmatization, political
powerlessness and dependency.
This is why Forst notes that toleration is, to some, a word that signifies power, domination and exclusion. It is
this conception that Goethe had in mind when he said: ‘Tolerance should be a temporary attitude only: it must lead
to recognition. To tolerate means to insult.’
2. The coexistence conception:
The second conception, the coexistence conception, is similar to the permission conception insofar as
tolerance is viewed as a kind of peaceful coexistence which is preferred to conflict, but the relationship is
no longer between a dominant majority and subordinate minority.
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Rather, groups of individuals may be roughly equal in terms of size or social power, and who see
that for the sake of social peace and the pursuit of their own interests mutual toleration is the best of
all possible alternatives.
The relation of tolerance is a form of reciprocal compromise; tolerant subjects are themselves
objects of the toleration of others.
Such a situation might be found in a culture where there are a number of religious groups, for
example, none which is dominant.
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Here the relation of tolerance is no longer vertical but horizontal: the subjects are at the same time the objects
of toleration.
An example is the Peace of Augsburg Treaty of 1555, which provided the first legal basis for the co-existence
of Catholicism and Lutheranism in what is now Bavaria, Germany.
However, this may not lead to a stable social situation in which trust can develop, for once the
constellation of power changes, the more powerful group may no longer see any reasons for being tolerant.
3. The respect conception:
This goes beyond peaceful coexistence in the sense that, while groups of individuals may hold radically
different views about the morality of certain lifestyles and differ tremendously in terms of their cultural
practices, all recognise a set of values or principles that apply universally (e.g. that others are moral
equals and have the same rights as us).
There are two models of the respect conception, that of ‘formal equality’, and that of ‘qualitative equality’.
The ‘formal equality’ model maintains a strict division between the public and private sphere so
that universal values apply in the public sphere, where all are treated equally and the activities
associated with cultural identities and differences should be limited to the private sphere.
This version is clearly exhibited in the ‘secular republicanism’ of the French authorities who hold that
religious symbols have no place in public schools in which children are educated to be autonomous
citizens (meaning Muslim students are not allowed to wear headscarves to school just as Christians
aren’t allowed to wear a necklace with a cross).
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The ‘qualitative equality’ model on the other hand, recognizes that it is more difficult for some
groups to adopt a rigid distinction between the private and public spheres. This may be due to the
fact that the cultural practices and moral codes associated with their identities have a special
significance for them such that they cannot be abandoned in the public sphere. This may be seen as
sufficient grounds to exempt certain groups from the rules or behavioural codes that apply to
everyone else. If this is acceptable then a person may be respected both as a political equal and as
a person with specific needs (i.e. a certain distinct ethical-cultural identity) that should be tolerated.
An example could be that Sikhs are exempt from wearing motorcycle helmets.
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With the formal equality model we have the notion of assimilation of all cultural identities into one
secular public identity.
While with the qualitative equality model we have the notion that social and political equality and
integration are compatible with cultural difference — within certain (moral) limits of reciprocity.
Q. Which do you think is the better model for both tolerance and society?
4. The esteem conception:
The esteem conception goes beyond respect in that, while we do not fully accept the beliefs and
practices associated with another culture or lifestyle (if we did, the objection component would not be
present) we can nevertheless see value in them and admire aspects of them.
o In this sense, the kind of esteem characteristic of these intersubjective relations is something like
‘reserved esteem’, that is, a kind of positive acceptance of a belief that for some reason you still find
is not as attractive as the one you hold. As valuable as parts of the tolerated belief may be, it also
has other parts that you find misguided, or wrong.
o This conception of tolerance involves a minimal rejection of the practice / belief. Such a practice
/ belief is objected to, but is not held in contempt.
o An example could be one based in school, where pupils dislike the disruptive behaviour of their
peers as they believe education is a route to self-progression rather than showing off, yet they might
also admire aspects of their behaviour such as attempts to challenge and resist authority.
IN CONCLUSION
To answer the question which of these conceptions should be the guiding one for a given society, two
aspects are most important.
o The first one requires contextuality; an assessment of the conflicts that require and allow for
toleration, given the history and character of the groups involved.
o The second requires an adequate and convincing normative* justification of toleration in a
given social context. This is the question as to whether tolerance is itself a virtue or whether it is
only a valuable trait to possess if it can be shown to be useful by other normative reasons.
We will explore this second notion when we assess whether tolerance is a vital virtue of the (liberal)
good life.
*A normative (or ‘prescriptive’) claim is one that could be true only if someone or other ought to do
something, or something ought to be the case. As contrasted with (merely) descriptive claims/terms.
IMPORTANT FIRST HOMEWORK!
Your homework task is to:
o Re-read the Ed Dobson passage at the bottom of page 2.
o Write an essay explaining to what extent Dobson is tolerant according to Forst’s
three components of objection, acceptance and rejection.
o Including in the essay an analysis of to what extent Dobson’s form of tolerance fits
into each of the four conceptions of tolerance.
NOTE: This homework is very important as it will help you to get to grips with all this terminology
and will mean that you have reflected upon and explored these concepts. This should help you to
remember the different terms, the difference between concept and conceptions, and will let me see
how well you can write.