Principles 1-49
Principles 1-6:
Arguments to prove that
all the things we know of by means of
our senses are
collections of ideas that have
no existence outside of the mind
or apart from being perceived.
Principles 7-24:
Arguments to prove that there can be no
material things
(unthinking things that can exist
apart from being perceived by
thinking things)
Principles 25-33:
The distinction between real and unreal
things and the nature of scientific
knowledge.
Principles 34-49:
Replies to 6 objections.
Principles 1-6
Principles 1-2: Survey of the objects of
human knowledge.
Principles 3: Analysis of what it means to
say that a sensible thing exists.
Conclusion: The things we know by
means of the senses cannot exist
apart from being perceived.
Principles 4-6: Supplementary arguments
in support of Principles 3.
Principles 1-2
Sources of human knowledge (according to
Principles 1, 18, 89)
 sense
 “inward feeling or reflection”
 memory & imagination
 reason
What is known by sense, memory, &
imagination:
ideas
What sensible things are:
collections of ideas commonly
observed to go together and so
given one name.
Is this true?
Are (compound) things collections of ideas?
Or collections of the things ideas are of?
Phrases from Principles 1:
“ideas of light and colours”
“Other collections of ideas constitute
a stone”
Principles 49:
“[extension and figure] are in the mind only as they are
perceived by it, that is, not by way of mode or attribute,
but only by way of idea; and it no more follows that the
soul or mind is extended because extension exists in it
alone, than it does that it is red or blue, because those
colors are on all hands acknowledged to exist in it, and
nowhere else.”
Are ideas red or blue, extended and
figured, or of red and blue, extension and
figure?
If the mind is not red or blue, extended or
figured,
and ideas are not red or blue, extended or
figured,
but sensible objects are red and blue,
extended and figured,
then how can sensible objects be
collections of ideas, and how can it be said
that they are in the mind?
Dialogues III (p.82):
“when I speak of objects as existing in the mind or
imprinted on the senses; I would not be understood in
the gross literal sense, as when bodies are said to
exist in a place, or a seal to make an impression upon
wax. My meaning is only that the mind comprehends
or perceives them”
Two ways of making sense of ideas
Hume: ideas are literally
coloured, extended and figured. There is
no mind. There are just bundles of ideas.
Reid: An idea is an act
performed by the mind whereby the mind
refers to an object that exists independently
of that act.
Berkeley seems to want to have it both
ways.
Another problematic phrase:
“or else such as are perceived by attending
to the passions and operations of the mind”
(compare Principles 25)
Solution (following Principles 89):
“inward feeling or reflection” must supply us
with “notions” rather than “ideas” and must
be a distinct, non-sensory, form of intuitive
knowledge
restricted to self-consciousness
This is the source of knowledge we rely
upon in Principles 2.
Principles 3
Q.: What does it mean for an idea to exist?
A.: To be perceived by some mind.
(or to be such that it would be
perceived were some mind present)
This is obvious for thoughts, passions and
ideas formed by imagination.
It is also all that we can mean when we
speak of the existence of ideas imprinted on
the senses, however complex.
(See Dialogues I)
But sensible things are nothing more than
collections of ideas.
So, sensible things cannot exist apart from
being perceived.
Principles 4-6
Arguments against the view that sensible
objects exist apart from being perceived.
Principles 4: The view is self-contradictory.
Because sensible things are collections of
ideas and ideas cannot exist apart from
being perceived.
Principles 5-6: The view requires an
impossible abstraction
Namely, of the being of a sensation, idea or
impression on the sense from its being
perceived.
“It is impossible for me to see or feel
anything without an actual sensation of
that thing.”
“My conceiving or imagining power does not
extend beyond the possibility of real
existence or perception.”
“So it is impossible for me to conceive …
any sensible thing … distinct from the
sensation or perception of it.”
Principles 7-24
Arguments against the existence of matter
Principles 7-15: There is no known quality
that could be ascribed to matter.
Principles 8: The “likeness principle.”
Principles 16-17: There is no meaningful
way matter can be described.
Principles 18-20: There is no reason for
supposing that matter exists.
Principles 21: Supposing that matter does
exist leads to scepticism and irreligion.
Principles 22-23: The master argument.
Principles 24: The notion of matter is either
self-contradictory or meaningless.
Principles 7-15
There is no known quality that could be
ascribed to matter.
Principles 7
Matter could not have any of the
sensible qualities.
Because these are all ideas and no idea can
exist in an unperceiving thing.
Principles 8
Matter could not have any qualities that
are like any of the sensible qualities
Because these are all ideas and nothing can be
like an idea but another idea.
Principles 9-15
Matter could not have any of the primary
qualities.
Because the primary qualities are also sensible
qualities and hence only ideas.
Because the primary qualities could not exist
apart from the secondary qualities, and the
secondary qualities are granted by all to exist
only in the mind.
Because the same arguments (from perceptual
relativity) that are used to prove that the
secondary qualities exist only in the mind apply to
the primary qualities (which are also relative to
circumstances).
Matter could specifically not be:
Extended or mobile because the specific
degrees of extension and mobility are
relative to mental estimation and the notions
of extension in general and motion in general
are illegitimate abstractions.
Compounded from a number of parts
because unity and number depend on
arbitrary decisions made by the mind.
Principles 16-17
There is no meaningful way matter could be
described.
To say that it some substratum or support
of unknown qualities is to employ
metaphorical terms.
Principles 18-20
There is no reason to suppose matter
exists.
Because it is not known by the senses, which only
tell us about our ideas.
And not inferred by reasoning from our ideas,
considered as effects, to their causes.
Because in dreams our ideas do not have
material causes so there is no necessary
connection between ideas and a material
cause.
Because no one understands how a material
thing could affect a mind to give it ideas.
Because a “brain in a vat” (actually, “an
intelligence, without the help of external
bodies”) has as much reason to suppose
there are material objects as we do.
Principles 22-23
The “master argument”
“If you can but conceive it possible for …
any one idea or anything like an idea, to
exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving it,
I shall readily give up the cause.”
Note: Conceiving it possible involves more
than conceiving an object without
conceiving anyone standing in its vicinity
perceiving it.
It involves explaining what it is about the
idea in question that would make it possible
for it to exist apart from being perceived by
a mind.
No such explanation could ever be given
because it is a “manifest repugnancy” for an
idea to exist unperceived.
Hume’s response to the master argument
Each of our ideas is entirely complete in
itself and so capable of existing on its own,
apart from anything else.
Principles 25-33
Reality.
Principles 25: Ideas are inert.
Principles 26: But they continually change.
So there must be something or things
that produce and change them.
Principles 27: We cannot have any idea of
the things that perceive and cause ideas,
though we can form some “notion” of them
by reasoning from their effects.
(Principles 89: And by inward feeling
or reflection.)
Two Classes of Ideas.
Sense
produced
Metaphysical
independently of
Difference
my will
Phenomenal
strong, lively, and
Difference
distinct
Phenomenological steady, ordered,
Difference
and coherent
Imagination
produced by my
will
weak, dim, and
confused
excited at random
Ideas of sense are real things.
Ideas of imagination are “ideas” in the
proper sense or images of real things.
Both ideas of sense and ideas of
imagination only exist in our minds.
Ideas of sense must be produced by some
other, vastly superior, wise and benevolent
spirit.
The laws of nature are the rules this spirit
invariably follows in exciting ideas in us.
We mistakenly suppose that earlier ideas in
a regular sequence cause those that come
later.
Principles 34-49
5 objections:
1. Berkeley’s theory absurdly denies the
existence of a real world.
2. Berkeley’s theory absurdly rejects the
distinction between reality and
imagination.
3. Things must exist outside of the mind
because we see them at a distance from
us.
4. Berkeley’s theory absurdly entails that
things are constantly popping in and out
of existence.
5. If extension and figure exist only in the
mind, then the mind must be extended
and figured.
1. Principles 34-40
Berkeley’s theory turns the sun, moon, and
stars; houses, mountains, trees and stones
into mere chimeras and illusions.
Ans.: Ideas that are imposed on
your mind against your will are as
real as you could want anything to
be.
And only philosophers and
atheists look for anything
more in reality.
Berkeley’s theory denies the existence of all
corporeal substances.
Ans.: It does not deny the existence
of what ordinary people mean by
“corporeal substance”; it only denies
the absurd notion of a mindindependent support of accidents
and qualities.
It is absurd to say we eat and drink ideas
and are clothed with ideas.
Ans.: This only sounds absurd
because in common language “idea”
is only used in the proper sense, not
in the expanded philosophical sense.
Proper sense: an image made by the
imagination of a sensible object.
Philosophical sense: whatsoever is the object of
the mind in thinking.
As a matter of fact, we eat sensible
things and are clothed with sensible
things, and sensible things are
collections of ideas in the expanded
sense.
So we do eat and drink ideas and we
are clothed with ideas.
Berkeley’s theory is contrary to what our
senses tell us.
Ans.: The belief that things continue
to exist when not being sensed goes
well beyond anything the senses
could possibly tell us.
2. Principles 41
Berkeley ignores the distinction between
real things and illusions.
Ans.: (additional to what has already
been said on this topic) The
distinction between reality and
illusion has nothing to do with the
distinction between what exists
inside the mind and what exists
independently of the mind, as is
proven by the case of the distinction
between real pain and imagined
pain.
3. Principles 42-44
Berkeley’s theory is inconsistent with the
fact that we see things existing outside of
the mind, since what we see is at a
distance from us.
Ans. 1: Objects seen in dreams
appear to be outside of us, yet they
are not.
Ans. 2: Outwardness is not
immediately seen, but is rather
inferred from signs in what is seen,
as explained in the New Theory of
Vision.
Remark 1: These signs are nothing like the objects they
signify.
Remark 2: The objects signified by the signs are not in
fact external objects. They are actually just collections of
tangible ideas that we anticipate we would experience if
we were to perform certain acts of will that are regularly
followed by those collections of ideas that we call motions
of our bodies.
4. Principles 45-48
It is absurd to imagine that things are
constantly popping into and out of
existence.
Ans. 1: The absurdity is rather in
supposing that an idea or a
collection of ideas should exist
unperceived.
Ans. 2: In presenting this supposed
absurdity, I am saying nothing more
than is accepted by those
philosophers who accept the
doctrine of constant creation, which
is well founded in meditations on the
nature of time.
(What is past no longer exists, so the mere
passage of time is sufficient to annihilate the
universe from moment to moment,
necessitating its constant recreation if it is to
be preserved in existence)
Ans. 3: In addition to the reasons
already given for this conclusion, it
follows from the doctrine of infinite
divisibility that whatever it is that is
supposed to exist unperceived could
have none of the qualities we learn
of through our senses.
Ans. 4: Bodies that are unperceived
by us may still continue to exist as
long as they are perceived by some
other spirit.
But would these bodies perceived by others be
the same ones I perceive? How could a
collection of ideas in my mind be identified with a
collection of ideas in some other mind so as to
constitute the same body?
5. Principles 49
If extension and figure exist only in the
mind, then the mind must be extended and
figured.
Ans.: Extension and figure exist in
the mind “by way of idea” rather than
“by way of mode or attribute.”
Remark: Existing in the mind “by way of idea” is
in fact the only way extension and figure could
exist since the notion of existing “by way of mode
or attribute” involves the meaningless notion of a
substance.
What does it mean for extension and figure to
exist in the mind “by way of idea?”
Is the idea is an image of extension and
figure (hence something extended and
figured?)
If so, then since what is extended and
figured must be in some place and the
mind is not supposed to be extended
and figured it follows that ideas must
exist somewhere outside of the mind
contrary to what Berkeley has
maintained
If the idea is not an image then
Berkeley’s argument against abstract
ideas loses much of its force.
And we have to wonder what else it
would be. Whatever it is, since the
object the idea is of is extended and
figured, it must be in some place,
and if the idea is not extended and
figured the object must exist outside
of it contrary to what Berkeley
maintains.