Political Liberalism
Justice as Fairness – principles of justice.
1. Each person has an equal right to a fully adequate scheme
of equal basic rights and liberties, which scheme is
compatible with a similar scheme for all.
2. Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two
conditions,: first they must be attached to offices and
positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of
opportunity, and second they must be to the greatest
benefit of the least advantaged. (JFPM 227)
Justice as Fairness – Political not Metaphysical.
So what does he mean by saying that a conception of justice is
political?
1.
The first of the question of scope. A political conception
justice applies to the basic structure of society
“The framework of basic institutions and the principles,
standards, and precepts that apply to it, as well as help those
norms are to be expressed in the character and attitudes of the
members of society who realise its ideals.” (PL 11)
2.
The second is the mode of presentation of the conception
has a freestanding view.
“The political conception is a module, and essential
constituent part, that fits into and can be supported by
various reasonable comprehensive doctrines that endure in
the society regulated by it.” PL 12
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3.
The third feature of a political conception of justice is that
it is expressed in terms of certain fundamental ideas. The
fundamental idea "of society as a fair system of co-operation
over time" along with the idea “of citizens as free and equal
persons” and the idea of how well ordered society as a society
effectively regulated by political conception of justice.” PL 13
.
Comprehensive metaphysical doctrine.
= a conception of the good life for man or a theory about how a
life should be lived. It is rich in substantive values and regulates
every part of the person’s life.
= a philosophical theory of how to live life, a moral theory.
Liberalism is a comprehensive doctrine (Kant Mill) v liberalism
as a political conception.
= any controversial philosophical theory or doctrine.
Freestanding conception of the political avoids any possibly
controversial theory whatever. This is what he calls the "strategy
of avoidance ".
The Problem of Diversity
“How is it possible for there to exist over time and Justin stable
society of free and equal citizens who remain profoundly
divided by reasonable religious, philosophical, and moral
doctrines?” PL 4.
The ‘fact of reasonable pluralism’ is that we live amid a jumble
of distinct and competing ‘comprehensive metaphysical
doctrines’ all of which are compatible with a political
conception of justice, and we do not know which is the right one
(if any).
Theory of justice forms a module, which can appeal to any of
several “comprehensive metaphysical doctrines”.
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According to rules of society is well-ordered when the
following three conditions are met.
1.
Everyone in the society accepts, and knows that
everyone else accepts and publicly endorses, the very
same principles of justice.
2.
Its basic structure is publicly known or with good
reason believed to satisfy those principles.
3.
Citizens have a normally effective sense of justice
How can the theory of justice as fairness produce social stability
and unity under conditions of reasonable pluralism?
Idea of an overlapping consensus.
In denying that justice as fairness is a comprehensive he doesn't
deny that it is a moral conception.
The political conception of justice is also amoral conception – as
it were for specific political context – namely for ‘political,
social and economic institutions’. PL p. 11
“In saying that a conception is moral. I mean, among other
things, that its content is given by certain ideals, principles and
standards; and that these norms articulate values, in this case
political values.” PL p.11 n.11
Moreover these values have a certain priority over all other
values.
“The values of the political are very great values and hence not
easily overridden: these values governed the basic framework of
social life -- the very groundwork of our existence -- and specify
the fundamental terms of political and social co-operation.” PL
89
Moral priority and political priority.
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To the extent that it is based on values (albeit a subset thereof –
the political values) justice as fairness is a moral ideal. Idea of
the person on which it is based is a ‘moral ideal’. However the
political conception of justice not a moral in the substantial
sense of being a comprehensive doctrine.
The Right and the Good
‘The right draws the limit; the good shows the point.’ . PL174
1.
The priority of the right over the good.
The right – justice as a political conception – exerts constraints
on the role that notions and conceptions of the good can play in
politics. This is not to say that TJ has no room for the idea of the
good.
These include:
a.
The good of rationality.
b.
Primary goods as all purpose means.
c.
Permissible comprehensive doctrines or conceptions of the
good.
d.
The good of political society.
What it rules out is that the good, understood as a
comprehensive doctrine, play a role in the justification of the
basic structure of society.
Neutrality
To what extent does this mean that Political Liberalism must be
neutral with respect to conceptions of the good?
‘complete neutrality.’
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a. that the state is to ensure for all citizens equal
opportunities to advance any conceptions of the food they
freely affirm.
According to Rawls however it does conform to the following.
Neutrality of intention
b. That the state is not to do anything intended to favour or
promote any particular comprehensive doctrine rather than
another, or to give greater assistance to those who pursue
it.
Kymlicka gives a slightly different variant of b.
Neutrality of justification
The state should not appeal directly or indirectly to any
one conception of the good in justifying its policies and
laws.
And Rawls argues that it is not sociologically possible for the
state to be neutral in the following very strong sense.
Outcome Neutrality
c. that the state is not to do anything that makes it more
likely that individuals accept any particular conception
rather than another unless steps are taken to cancel, or to
compensate for, the effects of policies that do this.
So it is important to note that political liberalism may well
imply and “affirm the superiority of certain forms of moral
character and encourage certain moral virtues. Thus justice as
fairness includes an account of certain political virtues – the
virtues of fair social cooperation such as the virtues of civility
and tolerance, of reasonableness and the sense of
fairness…the crucial point is that admitting these virtues into
a political conception does not lead to the perfectionist state
of a comprehensive doctrine.” P. 194
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Raz’s Criticism
Raz attacks Rawls’s strategy of avoidance. He accuses Rawls
of being indifferent to the truth of his theory of justice.
‘If it is argued that what makes it the theory of justice for us
is that it is built on an overlapping consensus and therefore
secures stability and unity, then consensus based stability and
unity are the values that a theory of justice, for our society is
deemed to depend on…’ p. 70
As a matter of fact, Raz argues, it is exactly the other way
around. Stability and consensus based unity are useful by
products of societies that rest on the liberal values of fairness
and free and equal cooperation between citizens.
‘Once we are rid of the epistemic abstinence…we can reverse
the connection between the goal of consensual stability and
unity and that of achieving a fair system of co-operation
between free and equal people….[T]he achievement of
consensual unity and stability is worthwhile because (at least
in part) without them there can be no fair co-operation
between free and equal people.’ P. 72
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