John Rawls’s Political Liberalism (1993).
1.
Political Justification
The question of political justification is a central topic in Modern
Political Theory.
What are the questions to which political justification is the
answer?
Q1Why is it better that the state exists rather than not?
(Question of existence.)
Q2.
What makes it alright for the Govt. to coerce citizens,
for example in order to exact compliance with law, in ways
we do not ordinarily allow citizens to do? (The question of
justified coercion.)
Q3.
The question of why I should obey the law, irrespective
of the reasons in 2 above. What independent reason do I
have to obey the law, apart from the fact that others do, and
that I might get caught and punished if I do not? (Question
of political obligation, question of compliance.)
Note that these are not the questions which Rawls’ early work,
notably A Theory of Justice, sets out to answer. That question is
more like:
Q4.
What is Social Justice?
or more specifically
Q4a. What principles of justice should we choose for
evaluating and if necessary redesigning the basic
structure of a society of free and equal persons?
N.B. Hence A Theory of Justice can be read as providing an
answer to a different set of questions to Political Liberalism
rather than as providing a different answer.
However, it can be read as providing a different kind of
answer to questions 1 and 2 above. On this view PJ 1 and 2
furnish the criterion of a just society.
The validity of PJ 1 and 2 are established on the basis of
familiar conceptions of human nature, personhood and
rationality.
Suppose we establish that our society – say the US – more
or less conforms to PJ 1 and 2. Now we ask the questions of
political justification.
Q1.
Q2.
Q3.
Question of existence.
Question of justified coercion.
Question of compliance or political obligation.
A1.
Because the principles according to which the basic
structure of society conforms are
a)
the ones you would voluntarily choose
b)
fair, and the ones you would have chosen if you were
fair minded
A2
Because this is necessary to the maintenance of the basic
structure, which conforms to the principles of justice which
are
a)
the ones you would voluntarily choose
b)
fair, and the ones you would have chosen if you were
fair minded
A3.
Ditto.
Now there is a problem with this answer, and it is the problem
from which Political Liberalism but not A Theory of Justice sets
out.
Rawls calls this problem: the fact of reasonable pluralism.
…the serious problem I have in mind concerns the unrealistic
idea of how well ordered society as it appears in Theory. An
essential feature of how well ordered society associated with
justice is fairness is that all its citizens endorse this conception
on the basis of what they now call a comprehensive philosophical
doctrine. They accept as rooted in this doctrine, its two principles
of justice…Now the serious problem is this. A modern democratic
society is characterised not simply by a pluralism of
comprehensive religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines but
by pluralism of incompatible yet reasonable comprehensive
doctrines. No one of these doctrines is affirmed by citizens
generally. Nor should one expect that in the foreseeable future
one of them, or some other reasonable doctrine, will ever be
affirmed by all, or nearly all, citizens. Political liberalism pursues
that, for political purposes, a plurality of reasonable yet
incompatible comprehensive doctrines is the normal result of the
exercise of human reason within the framework of the free
institutions of a constitutional democratic regime political
liberalism also supposes that a reasonable comprehensive
doctrine does not reject the essentials of a democratic regime. Of
course a society may also contain unreasonable and irrational,
and even mad, comprehensive doctrines. In their case the problem
is to contain them so that they do not undermined unity injustice
of society. PL xvi
In Theory “the social contract tradition is seen as part of moral
philosophy and no distinction is drawn between moral and
political philosophy. In Theory a moral doctrine of justice
general in scope is not distinguished from a strictly political
conception of justice. Nothing is made of the contrast
between comprehensive philosophical and moral doctrines
and conceptions limited to the domain of political. PL xvi
What he is admitting here is that as presented in Theory the
principles of justice, and thus the conception of justice as
fairness, rests on comprehensive moral and philosophical
doctrines, that given the fact of reasonable pluralism, not
everyone can be expected to affirm or accept. But if not everyone
accepts the premises, then not everyone can be expected to accept
the conclusions.
There are two ways of reading this change of directions.
a) As a retreat from theory.
Richard Rorty’s in “The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy” in
Rorty, Objectivity, Relativity and Truth (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1991).
Chastened by his critics (Sandel among others) Rawls has
retreated from the grand theoretical ambitions of Theory. He now
offers a contextual defence of modern Western constitutional
democracy, rather than a theoretical defence on the basis of
slender assumptions and weak, but widely acceptable premises.
b) As an argument to the same conclusions from a different
set of premises, that are not open to objection, since they
are not based on comprehensive moral and philosophical
doctrines.
Anyway Rawls frames the question of political justification in the
light of the problem of reasonable pluralism.
“How is it possible that there may exist over time a stable
and just society of free and equal individual citizens
profoundly divided by reasonable though incompatible
religious, philosophical, and moral theories. Put another
way: How is it possible that deeply opposed and thought
reasonable comprehensive doctrines may live together and
all affirm the political conception of a constitutional
regime? PL xviii.
2.
Reasonable.
About truth or validity of political principles PL must be silent.
Rawls calls this the ‘strategy of avoidance’, and Raz calls it
‘epistemic abstinence’.
Persons are reasonable
a)
to the extent that they are motivated and willing to abide by
the idea of fair social cooperation, that is, will abide by fair
terms so long as others will do likewise.
Reasonableness lies between impartiality and rationality
action, between altruistic and self interested action.
b)
they accept that even after free and full discussion on moral
philosophical and religious matters people are unlikely to
reach agreement, and conflicting reasonable judgments are
possible.
c)
therefore are committed to toleration of other reasonable
doctrines
3.
Comprehensive doctrine.
“A moral conception is general if it applies to a wide range
of subjects and in the limit to all subjects universally. It is
comprehensive when it includes conceptions of what is
value in human life, and ideals of personal character, as well
as ideals of friendship and of familial and associational
relationships, and much else that is to inform our conduct
and in the limit to our life as a whole.” PL 13, 175.
It is a scheme of thought that unites some or all values, including
importantly non-political values.
Not all moral, philosophical and religious doctrines are fully
comprehensive.
“Comprehensive doctrines…belong to what we may call the
“background culture” of civil society. This is the culture of
the social, not the political. It is the culture of daily life, of
its many associations: churches and universities, learned
and scientific societies, and clubs and teams, to mention a
few…Society’s main institutions and their accepted forms of
interpretation, are seen as a fund of implicitly shared ideals
and principles.” PL p.14
A CD is a non-public basis of justification.
A CD is a conception of the good, and implies or contains a way of
living.
4.
Political not metaphysical. (Justice as Fairness – Political
not Metaphysical.)
So what does he mean by saying that a conception of justice is
political?
1.
The first of the question of scope. A political conception
justice applies to the basic structure of society
“The framework of basic institutions and the principles,
standards, and precepts that apply to it, as well as help those
norms are to be expressed in the character and attitudes of the
members of society who realise its ideals.” (PL 11)
2.
The second is the mode of presentation of the conception
has a freestanding view.
“The political conception is a module, and essential
constituent part, that fits into and can be supported by
various reasonable comprehensive doctrines that endure in
the society regulated by it.” PL 12
Principles of justice do not depend on any comprehensive
moral philosophical or religious doctrine – or the contents
thereof. Note even comprehensive liberalism (i.e. liberalism
as a scheme of values such as the “liberalisms of Kant and
Mill”. PL 135)
3.
The third feature of a political conception of justice is that it
is expressed in terms of certain fundamental ideas. The
fundamental idea "of society as a fair system of co-operation
over time" along with the idea “of citizens as free and equal
persons” and the idea of how well ordered society as a
society effectively regulated by political conception of
justice.” PL 13
These fundamental ideas are part of an overlapping
consensus of reasonable doctrines.
Overlapping consensus of reasonable doctrines is not a modus
Vivendi. A modus vivendi is an agreement to abide by a treaty, not
because its terms are fair and because each party is motivated by
fair terms of cooperation, but because for each party it would not
be wise to violate and to be seen to violate the treaty. This is
sometimes the case between states.
But in general both states are ready to pursue their goals at
the expense fo the other, and should conditions change they
may do so. This background highlights the way in which
such a treaty is a mere modus Vivendi. A similar background
is present when we think of social consensus founded on
self- or group interests, or on the outcome of political
bargaining: social unity is only apparent, as its stability is
contingent on circumstances remaining such as not to upset
the fortunate convergence of interests. PL 147
With the transition from A Theory to Political Liberalism the idea
of the person also changes
“The idea of the person as having moral personality with the
full capacity of moral agency is transformed into the idea of
the citizen.” xlv.
5.
The Priority of the Right over the Good.
Overlapping consensus of reasonably doctrines provides a fund of
public reasons that can form the basis of public justification.
There is, then, no public justification for political society without a
reasonable overlapping consensus, and such a justification also
connects with the ideas of stability for the right reasons as well as
legitimacy. (RH PL 388-9)”
The idea of public justification is a close cousin of the idea of
political legitimacy
The idea of public justification is the key idea in
contemporary liberal-democratic political theory. The idea is,
roughly, that no regime is legitimate unless it is reasonable
from every individual's point of view.” (D’Agostino 1996:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justification-public/)
Rawls’s idea of the priority of the right over the good is that the
right has priority for functional reasons, namely its demonstrable
capacity for producing stability for the fright reasons. It can give
rise to public agreement because it is based in an overlapping
consensus of reasonable doctrines.
Three Levels of Justification
A) Pro tanto – based on the coherence and completeness of the
political conception e.g. justice as fairness.
B) Full justification – each citizen checks whether or not they
can embed the political conception (whose content is worked
out in A above) in their comprehensive doctrine.
C) Public justification – establishing and mutually assuring that
all citizens or a sufficiently large number thereof can
complete B) such that the political conception is supported
by an overlapping consensus.
In order for C) to happen priority must be assigned to all and only
political values i.e. all and only contents of an overlapping
consensus of reasonable doctrines.
Why should priority be assigned.
i.
political values are “very great values and hence not
easily overridden
ii.
value conflicts are much reduced because the political
conception