Michal Rozynek, University of Edinburgh, Politics as Pluriverse. The limits of the
political and bounded rationality.
Politics As a Pluriverse.
Michal Rozynek
This is a work in progress. Not to be cited without author’s permission.
It might seem strange that in the time when politics seems omnipresent, it is also
perceived by many to be in peril. I fact the sole statement that politics is something that
can be in crisis or in need of defence is a sign of our time. If we were to point out the
causes of this phenomenon, among these we would have to list: the crisis of participation
and political trust, privatisation of public life, and the increasing complexity of political
knowledge. These three factors in particular pose questions about both the nature and
value of contemporary liberal democracy as well as about the state of contemporary
political culture in relation to the processes of globalisation, multiculturalism and social
atomisation. Particularly an interesting line argument comes from a strand of thought
characteristic to the second half of the 20th century. It is represented by a group of
otherwise unrelated thinkers, such as Schmitt, Oakeshott, Arendt or Mouffe, who argue
that the threat to politics now allegedly comes from the way we conceptualise political
life. They warn us about the danger of perceiving politics as universal. According to
them, politics rests on certain distinctions between private and public, moral and political,
which cease to exist as a result of a universalist view.
The aim of this paper is to show that the universality of political action we
experience in contemporary liberal democracies should not be treated as grounds for
interpreting politics as a universal activity. The argument is divided into three sections.
Section one investigates the notion of politics as a limited activity defined through the
concept of ‘the political’. Drawing mainly on Arendt and Schmitt will I show the perils of
extending the notion of politics to the non-political. However, I also will criticise their
models as insufficient in explaining the universality of political action brought by the
idea of nationalism. In section two I also examine the problem of the limits of politics,
although from the perspective of the concept of bounded rationality. I show that in fact
the idea of political community relates us to a specific form of common experience that
conditions it. I use the concepts of phronesis, and sensus communis to explain what I
mean by bounded rationality. This leads me in the final section to investigate how this
form of bounded political rationality finds its place in the modern form of political
community – ‘the nation’. I conclude by arguing that universality of political action is
meaningful only in a bounded model of the political.
Politics and Its ‘Enemies’
The term ‘politics’ in its original sense - just like all other political notions – is
polemical. Aristotle clearly uses it to distinguish the Greek way of life from barbarians.
The latter are in fact defined by him as those who do not know politics and because of
that can exist only as slaves1. By this Aristotle means two things. Firstly, they are not free
because their lives do not belong to them but to the despot. Secondly, they cannot become
free because in Aristotle’s view they are incapable of speech (logoi). Hence violence is
the only way that can guarantee their obedience. Politics, by opposition, is defined as the
realm of free word and deed2. For Aristotle it is a uniquely human way of life3, which he
lists among its highest forms4. This teleological understanding of politics has been
criticised in our times as being overly ambitious at the price of forming a highly
exclusive political model. The exclusiveness of politics in Aristotle’s theory is a product
of a strong distinction between the private and the public. Or in other words, it is a result
of a restriction on what and who can appear publicly.
In the more contemporary context however, the political is no longer that clearly
defined. Politics is not an exclusive activity and because of that, the traditional ways of
defining it through the distinction between private and public are no longer productive. In
fact the problem of what can be considered political and what cannot, became itself one
1
Aristotle, Politics, London, Penguin Books, 1992, Book III
2
Arendt Hannah, The Human Condition, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press, 1998
Ibidem, p. 13
Ibidem, p. 13
3
4
of the key political questions that distinguishes various ideological and theoretical
positions5. In other words, even though we can all agree what politics in it’s broadest
sense is, we find it problematic to determine which areas of human action should be
present in the political domain.
Hannah Arendt describes this process as the invasion of the social onto the
political. Drawing on Aristotle’s understanding of politics as something radically
different from the affairs of the household, the author of The Human Condition shows
how the later becomes politicised. The household (oikos) is described by Aristotle as the
most basic natural human organisation – the family. It is based on need and necessity.
And this is why the relations within the household are hierarchical – based on the natural
notion of paternal power and subordination6. Polis, on the contrary, is the sphere of those
who are free. Member of such a community are called citizens because they are not
related to each other by means of blood or subordination7. They are equal and thus can
enjoy the freedom of speech. The equality of public speaking (insegoria) was what
distinguished the political system of Athens. Arendt argues that it is exactly speech and
the ability to persuade that defines the political relationship between citizens8. Household,
as a natural relationship is the domain of subordination and violence.
This allows Arendt to show how with the birth of the concept of society, this
classical distinction between ‘natural’ and ‘political’ is destroyed. We can see this most
explicitly in the classical social contract theory. Both for Hobbes and Locke, the contract
is a product of a strive for survival in the need of protection or co-operation9. Arendt
argues that with the coming of ‘society’ as a key political concept, private interests
gained public significance. This analysis shows how the growing scope of the private
sphere in early modernity, has changed the way we perceive politics. The purpose of
government became to secure and provide for the basic needs of the individual.
According to Arendt the consequences of this phenomenon are dangerous both for the
5
6
perhaps mention a few of them?
Arendt Hannah, The Human Condition, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press, 1998,
p. 20
7
8
9
Ibidem, p. 21
Ibidem, p. 25
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan; John Locke, Two Treaties of Government
individual as well as for ‘politics’. The reasons for this are twofold. Firstly the growing
scope of the state and society means that it is no longer possible for the individual to
maintain a holistic perspective in his decisions and actions10. The knowledge that is
required to solve most political or social problems is so complex, we cannot expect the
individual to be able absorb it. And it is in this world or dissociation and specialisation,
that becomes characterised by anomie11. Secondly, according to Arendt, the modern
concept of politics as management of the affairs of society leaves the political sphere
empty and neutral. The decisions become impersonal and bureaucratic12. And in this
sense they become similar to the laws of nature. For Arendt, the invasion of the social
onto the political ultimately threatens to destroy the latter through privatisation of the
public and the reduction of politics to economy and social management.
We can find a somewhat similar argument about the danger of losing the
distinction between public and private in Carl Schmitt’s political thought. Schmitt
criticises liberalism for constructing a language that confuses state and society. He claims
that as a result the political enemy becomes confused with a economic competitor, private
adversary or a partner in a discussion13. In this process, Schmitt argues, everything
becomes political and consequently nothing is no longer specifically political14.For
Schmitt, the political existence of a community rests on its ability to distinguish itself
from others. The only distinction strong enough to legitimise political power is one
between friend and enemy. It is only in these categories that we can conceptualise the
state’s constant readiness to engage in conflict15. The distinction between friend and
enemy is for Schmitt existential – it cannot be solved or erased by means of persuasion.
The difference in terms of which this distinction is drawn is not necessarily a substantive
difference of interests or values. Schmitt argues that political enemies need not be hated
10
Arendt Hannah, The Human Condition, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press, 1998,
Book II
11
Ibidem
Ibidem
13
Schmitt Carl, The Concept of the Political, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press,
1996, p. 71
14
Ibidem, p. 20
15
Ibidem, p. 27
12
personally16 or be defined in terms of conflict of interests. In the most crude sense,
political enemies are just those who do not belong to ‘us’. The concept of the political in
the form which Schmitt proposes is closely linked with the concept of the modern state.
Firstly this is because the existence of a state presupposes the existence of other states 17.
Hence in Schmitt’s view the existence of the state presupposes the ability of a political
people to define their enemies – which is translated into the right of the state to wage war.
This is what distinguishes the state from all other types of organisations, which exist in
society, such as tennis clubs, political parties or churches.
According to Schmitt, it is the lack of this crucial distinction that makes modern
liberalism unable to incorporate radical conflict in its political language. As a
consequence in liberal democracy, as Schmitt writes, the “adversary is not an enemy but
a disturber of peace”18. But this results in a redefinition of the way we understand and
tackle conflict in general. The language of peace is dangerous because it does not leave
scope for war. So if a radical conflict emerges, the political people do not have the tools
to see it or to react to it. In other words, for Schmitt liberalism fails to see that political
language is in fact antagonistic and polemical19. All political notions have the ability to
turn the world into the dichotomy of friend and enemy20.
“Every religious, moral, economic, ethical, or other antithesis transforms into
a political one if it is sufficiently strong to group human beings effectively
according to friend and enemy.”21
Schmitt’s theory is problematic perhaps most visibly because of the onedimensional explanation he offers of the way the political people are constructed. One
16
17
18
19
20
21
ibidem, p. 29
Ibidem, p. 25
Ibidem, p. 79
Ibidem, p. 30
Ibidem, p. 32
Ibidem, p. 37
does not have to engage with nationalism studies literature to be suspicious of the
limitations of Schmitt’s theory. However, his criticism of the liberal concept of politics is
persuasive. Like Arendt, Schmitt believes that the eradication of the distinction between
the private and the public –and consequently between a personal and political enemy – is
destructive to the concept of politics itself.
Why Politics Cannot Be Universal
Let us now move to the problem of universality of politics itself. This issue seems to be at
the heart of both Arendt’s and Schmitt’s arguments. For Schmitt politics presupposes the
real existence of an enemy and therefore coexistence of at least two political entities22.
Politics cannot be universal. It is a pluriverse23. For Arendt this is even clearer because
for her politics can only be understood as a bounded activity. It is conceived as a limited
sphere of human action, where we choose to appear publicly among others. But the
creation of this public space is always conditioned by the forms in which we are able to
appear to each other.
The question of universality of politics has become particularly significant in the
context of the contemporary globalised world. Globalisation does not only mean a change
in the way we perceive our place among
other nations. It also transforms our
understanding of political action. This is due to two phenomenon. Firstly, our lives are
increasingly affected by global factors such as global warming or rising oil prices. These
are phenomenon that are universal because they affect us all. As a consequence the
national perspective becomes insufficient to tackle many of the most significant issues on
the political agenda of Western countries. Secondly with globalisation comes awareness
of certain issues that even though do not affect us all in the same way, they evoke a sense
of compassion or solidarity in us. Issues such as poverty, human rights abuses, genocide
and other types of mass suffering are increasingly perceived on the grounds of common
humanity that transcends national or racial boundaries. The universalist view can be
22
23
Ibidem, p. 53
Ibidem, p. 53
summed up by saying that with this notion of humanity, politics should enter a new era
which makes traditional state boundaries obsolete.
The claim to universality of politics is not new. It has originally been at the heart
of the Enlightenment project along with the idea of universal knowledge. The two ideas
are connected because it is only through knowledge that the differences between people
may disappear from the political space. According to the universalist view the limitation
of political community to a specific ethnical or cultural entity has to be based on
prejudice. It rests on an irrational attachment to what is ours and what David Miller calls
ignorance of the outside world24. The position I am advocating comes then just like in
David Miller’s case from an assumption that there is no universal language and that our
rationality is based on sentiments and practices which originate from our living together
as political people25. In philosophy this is a Humean position. In fact this does not
necessarily lead to a strictly conservative or a nationalist political philosophy. The point
about nationalism will be examined in the next section. But what I wish to highlight here
is that the claim about limited rationality can be compatible with a concept of citizenship
based on a formal and not substantial relationship.
Perhaps the most powerful argument against universality of politics is that the
term ‘universal’ belongs to the moral and not political order. This is especially clearly
argued by Chantal Mouffe26. Drawing on Schmitt in her reconstruction of the concept of
the political, Mouffe shows that politics requires an underlying antagonism without
which pluralism becomes an empty slogan. She argues that if we are to take democracy
seriously, we need to encourage a higher level of meaningful difference.
“A healthy democratic process calls for vibrant clash of political positions and
an open conflict of interests. If such is missing, it can too easily be replaced by
24
25
26
Miller David, Citizenship and National Identity, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2000, p. 25
Miller David, Citizenship and National Identity, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2000, p. 25
Mouffee Chantal, The Return of the Political, London and New York, ,Verso, 1993, p. 1
a confrontation between non-negotiable moral values and essentialist
identities”27
To say that pluralism depends on antagonism is to say that politics is not only a way of
transforming conflict, but a that radical conflict is a condition of politics in general. This
is why Mouffe has to be critical about liberal democracy. As I have mentioned before,
according to Schmitt liberalism is unable to internalise radical conflict.
Mouffe’s argument rests on the concept of bounded rationality. She argues that
politics is the domain of practical reason and not universal moral values28. Drawing on
Arendt and Aristotle she restores the distinction between episteme and doxa. To place
politics within episteme would be the same as to accept Plato’s political utopia. But
politics is not the domain of truth or being. It is constituted by the world of appearances.
Hence to have an opinion means to choose to appear in a certain way in the public sphere.
The problem of practical reason and bounded rationality in general is in the European
tradition of thought particularly connected with the notion of phronesis or in early
modern sense – sensus communis. The latter concept became central to hermeneutics, but
it’s roots can be easily tracked to antiquity. Sensus communis is a descendant of the
Greek word ‘logoi’, which means language as well as reason. By this ancient Greeks
understood the existence of an rationally ordered world [kosmos] that is accessible to us
through language. It is our ability to participate in this common world, which makes
politics possible.
However, this ability to engage in the common world is not at all obvious or
natural. On the contrary, our natural dispositions cannot take us above the particular
without the help of reason. This is implicit in the classical differentiation between doxa
and episteme29. For classical philosophy doxa is identical with opinion. It does not
provide us with true knowledge, but allows us to make practical judgements about the
27
28
29
1979.
Ibidem, p. 6
Ibidem, p. 14
Giovanni Reale, Storia della filosofia antica Vol. 2, Platone e Aristotele, Milano, Vita e pensiero,
world. Episteme, on the other hand, undermines the validity of doxa and consequently
can be a threat to ordinary practical life. In the metaphor of the cave, Plato illustrates this
by the figure of the philosopher who cannot stand the light of the sun30. There is nothing
in pure thought that can relate us to the world. On the contrary, pure conceptual validity
can be achieved only if we retreat both from the world and from ourselves to a domain of
abstract thought31.
As a result, it what is common in thinking becomes problematic. If doksa is
limited and there is no link with the common world, than episteme must be just another
isolated world. In other words - is there a type of thinking or a feature of human mind
that affirms our being in the world? Maybe, as Klaus Held suggests, we can reconstruct
the openness of our natural disposition by referring to the notion of practical reason
(Greek phronesis)32. This is part of a wider tradition that refers to what Kant has called in
the Critique of Judgment “a broader type of thinking”33 – a type of reflection that allows
us to move between epistemic horizons. The ability to take the position of someone else
can allow us to make judgments and make them intelligible to others 34. Political Theory
since Aristotle has resisted claims to found politics on universal knowledge. Although
truth remains an important issue, especially in normative political theory, true knowledge
is anti- political as it negates the plurality of opinions and horizons.
Where does this ability to move between epistemic horizons come from? The
humanist tradition, represented especially by Vico, Shaftesbury, and Hume will look for
it in what they refer to as sensus communis or common sense. Its origins are twofold. On
one hand there is the notion of phronesis which means an ability to apply general notions
to particular situations and in other words is responsible for practical reasoning. On the
other hand we have the Aristotelian common or sixth sense which represents a combined
action of all the other five: sight, smell, touch, taste and hearing. Altogether they
constitute our ability to perceive the world as given – as ours. And it is only under the
30
31
32
33
34
Plato, The Republic, book 6
Hannah Arendt, The Life of the Mind, New York, Harvest, 1978.
Klaus Held, Fenomenologia swiata politycznego, Warsaw, IFiS PAN, 2003, p. 23.
Immanuel Kant, The critique of judgement, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1952, para. 4.
Klaus Held, Fenomenologia swiata politycznego, Warsaw, IFiS PAN, 2003, p. 27.
combination of these two powers that we can understand what sensus communis means.
Contrary to popular opinion, sensus communis is not necessarily a group of shared
beliefs. It is common, because unlike sensual data it perceives things as examples of
general types (a brick a stone, a stick) but unlike pure reason it does not undermine the
sensual world. In short, sensus communis is an ability to recognize particular standpoints
as equal in their relation to truth.
The analysis of sensus communis, shows that the concept of bounded rationality
reaches far deeper than the conservative liberal (Oakeshottian) concept of a practice or
tradition. It is in fact rooted in the conditions of possibility of the political community
itself. Based on my previous discussion of Mouffe’s argument, we can now see why the
universalist position cannot be accepted. In the next section I will discuss the problem of
bounded rationality in the context of the modern nation.
Nationhood and bounded rationality
Even if we agree that politics is a bounded activity, this still does not eliminate the
normative question about what is the appropriate way of setting limits to political
community. For instance we can evaluate the model of the Ancient Greek Polis from the
perspective of justice. And there is no doubt that we will see it as an exclusive
community. As a result, even with our admiration of this model, we would not choose to
live in it. In the contemporary context, a similar analysis has to be made concerning the
nation-state. It can be argued that setting the limits of political association according to
ethnical or historical boundaries is problematic. Particularly it might seem strange why
the benefits of universality of political action that has recently been achieved in most
liberal democracies, should not be extended to all.
One answer to these problems is offered by David Miller. His argument can be
briefly summarised as follows: Nationality relates us to a particularist perspective, where
‘my place’ becomes more valuable than the outside world. This view is based on an idea
of bounded rationality which gives preference to subjective knowledge based on
sentiment and practice rather than reason. As a result the nationalist view produces the
distinction between us and them understood in the framework of what is known and
tamed, and the wilderness of the outside world35. However, this distinction is in fact key
to producing the kind of community of responsibility that modern state requires36. In this
sense the statement ‘mine is better’ should not be considered in relation to truth. It is in
fact a solely normative statement about the nature of our obligations.
Miller distinguishes what he calls the three dimensions of nationality. The first
one is that nationality is always part of personal identity37. This is the most evident level
of nationality, as it relates to the way we understand ourselves as member of a concrete
historical community. The second dimension is ethnical, which means that as far as the
nation embodies the historical continuity38, it is based on a set of shared values or beliefs
that broadly constitute an ethnical group. But the third dimension is specifically political
and is key to understanding the previous two39. This is an assertion that a nation is
constituted and maintained by belief and not a substantively understood set of shared
features or values40. The historical continuity of a political people is mythical and its
perception changes constantly throughout history. What constitutes nation as a political
community is then not common identity but a shared attachment to a mythically defined
homeland which is linked to a geographical place41. And this is exactly this notion of a
homeland that is the source of the nation’s claim to self-determination.
Miller’s argument is however still an incomplete expression of the political
dimension of nationhood. By claiming that a shared national identity is necessary for
mobilizing people to provide collective goods, he seems to be placing the nation still
within a contractual theory of society. Miller argues that a contractual understanding of
citizenship as an exchange of public goods is impossible if we were to base it on the idea
of a shared humanity. However, it seems that the two other dimensions that he has listed:
personal identity and ethnicity require a further exploration.
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
Miller David, Citizenship and National Identity, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2000, p. 24
Ibidem, p. 29
Ibidem, p. 27
Ibidem, p. 27
Ibidem, p. 27
Ibidem, p. 28
Ibidem, p. 29
One way of doing this can be found in Benedict Anderson’s reconstruction of the
concept of the nation. For Anderson, to understand nationalism in terms of what he calls
an ‘imagined community’ is to imagine it as both inherently limited and sovereign 42.
Nation is an imagined community because none of the citizens will ever be able to know
all of its members43. The relationship with others is thus ‘imagined’. In this sense nation
is not the only type of an imagined community. All types of political peoples could be
understood in that way. In fact, it was only in the case of the ancient Greek polis that the
political space was limited to a hill where all citizens could meet. Since then, as Robert
Dahl describes, political space changed dramatically. It becomes mediated through the
idea of representation44.
What for Anderson distinguishes nations from other types of imagined community
is the idea of time characteristic to national consciousness. Nations are understood as
historical entities moving through time45. Anderson’s analysis is set to spell out the
conditions under which such an act of imagining became possible. He argues that with
the collapse of the religious paradigm, history lost its eschatological character. It is no
longer understood as part of the divine plan46. And now we have to find the meaning of
our worldly existence in the homogenous and empty time. Anderson argues that
nationalism responds to our need for the divine and transcendent because even though we
are individually mortal - nations are not.
This brings us back to the point that David Miller also made: That the origins of
national identity are always mythical. Nations from the beginning are not supposed to
have births or deaths47. Anderson attempts to show that only through this ‘immortality in
history’ could rulers demand their citizens to sacrifice their lives in the name of the
nation. Nationhood postulates is than an imagined community between the past, present
and future. This relation is symbolic and can be found in institutions and monuments
42
43
44
45
46
47
Anderson Benedict, Imagined Communities, London and New York, Verso, 2006, p. 6
Ibidem, p. 6
Robert Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics, Yale University Press, 1991
Anderson Benedict, Imagined Communities, London and New York, Verso, 2006, p. 8
Ibidem, p. 10
Ibidem, p. 25
such as the tomb of the unknown soldier48. However, it is also narrative in the sense that
in the empty homogenous historical time in which nations exist and develop the meaning
of our actions is determined by their order in time. In this sense, history is the same form
of organising meaning as a 19th century novel49. The kind of continuity that this notion of
history presupposes allows us to think of ourselves as part of a collective historical entity
moving through time.
Conclusion
To summarise my argument, I have discussed the main reasons against a universalist
view of politics. In the first part I have reconstructed the narrow concept of politics as
public activity. Drawing on Schmitt and Arendt I showed the key problems that this
concept encounters in contemporary world. In the second section I examined the reasons
why politics in this narrow sense cannot be a universal activity. Finally, in the third
section I argued that the nation can be seen as an adequate embodiment of the political
principle of bounded rationality. This is not a decisive solution to the problem of
nationhood. The opposite standpoint still has to be examined. However I believe that I
have successfully shown that politics cannot be understood as an universal activity. The
political community can exist only in the tension between the universal and the particular.
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48
49
Ibidem, p. 15
Ibidem, p. 26
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