The 4th International Seville Conference on
Future-Oriented Technology Analysis (FTA):
12 & 13 May 2011
FTA and Grand Societal Challenges:
Shaping and Driving Structural and Systemic
Transformations
THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF TECHNOLOGICAL FORESIGHT
Authors: Dr. Sandra M. Dingli (Sandra.m.dingli@um.edu.mt)
The Edward de Bono Institute, University of Malta,
Malta http://www.um.edu.mt/create
Keywords: Epistemology, knowledge, futures, foresight, theoretical
underpinnings.
A theoretical underpinning for what counts as valid knowledge in foresight
and FTA is urgently required. A clear deliniation of the epistemology of
foresight could provide the justification required for increased legitimacy to
the knowledge claims made by practitioners with the consequence that
‘buy-in’ from experts, policy makers, funding agencies and stakeholders
would posses increased conviction and augment integrity.
A theoretical and interdisciplinary
approach to exploring issues
related to the epistemology of
foresight is adopted. This is a
relevant issue for foresight practice
as the ‘scientific quality and
validity of outcomes is still an
issue’ (Theme 3, call for papers), in
spite of the fact that the results of
foresight practice often inform key
policy decision making. The aim is
to provide a ‘better understanding
of ... epistemological positions that
practitioners and theorists of FTA
might adopt implicitly or explicitly’.
Helmer and Rescher (1959)
provided an interesting discussion
on the possibility of knowledge and
the inexact sciences in a paper
entitled ‘On the Epistemology of
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<Title>:
the Inexact Sciences’. They had
acknowledged that :
While the value of scientific
prediction for sound decision
making is beyond question, it
can hardly be claimed that the
inexact sciences have the
situation regarding the use of
predictive expertise well in
hand. Quite to the contrary, it
is our strong feeling that
significant improvements are
possible in the predictive
instruments available to the
decision maker. These
improvements are contingent
on the development of
methods for the more effective
predictive use of expert
judgment. (1959, p.41)
One of the main considerations
which Helmer and Rescher (1959)
address is the use of ‘experts’, a
concept which often plays a key
role in foresight activities where
‘experts’ in particular areas are
engaged to provide input and to
assist with either scenario building
or with creating visions. One
example which Helmer and
Rescher (1959) provide is the
prediction of presidential elections,
where statistical information may
be attributed less relevance than a
holistic insightful outlook, as they
state that ‘For instance, in
assessing the chances of a
Republican presidential victory in
1960, a knowledge of the record of
past election successes matters
less than an insight into current
trends and tendencies ...’ (1959:
38)
Experts, for Helmer and Rescher,
do not look into a crystal ball to
create predictions. Rather, their
role is as ‘predictors’. The role of
experts is clearly spelt out as they
‘anticipate ... some of the major
critical junctures (‘branch points’)
on which the course of these
developments will hinge, and ...
make contingency predictions with
regard to the alternatives
associated with them.’ (1959: 412)
Contingency is a key issue here.
The type of imaginative ‘leap’ into
the future which both foresight and
innovation require involves risk
taking and it is always considered
to be a contingent prediction. No
amount of assurance or evidence
could possibly allow for certainty,
since the future is always unknown
and wild cards or unexpected
events (such as a a financial crisis,
political uprisings, terrorist attacks,
tsunamis or earthquakes, which
should be considered if and when
relevant) may disrupt the best
strategy design.
Helmer and Rescher claim that ‘The
use of experts for prediction does
not constitute a line of demarcation
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The Epistemology of Technological Foresight
between the social and the physical
sciences, but rather between the
exact and the inexact sciences.’
(1959: 41) Experts have at their
disposal: ‘a large store of (mostly
inarticulated) background
knowledge and a refined sensitivity
to its relevance, through the
intuitive application of which he is
often able to produce trustworthy
personal probabilities regarding
hypotheses in his area of
expertness.’ (1959: 38)
How can the advice and predictions
which experts provide be
considered as objective data?
According to the judgement which
Helmer and Rescher provide,
Our ‘data’ are supplemented by
the expert's personal
probability valuations and by
his judgments of relevance
(which, by the way, could be
derived from suitable personal
probability statements), and
our ‘theory’ is supplemented by
information regarding the
performance of experts. In this
manner the incorporation of
expert judgment into the
structure of our investigation is
made subject to the same
safeguards which are used to
assure objectivity in other
scientific investigations. The
use of expertise is therefore no
retreat from objectivity or
reversion to a reliance on
subjective taste. (1959: 43)
According to Helmer and Rescher,
there are various degrees of
certainty where predictions by
experts are concerned:
In domains in which the flux of
events is subject to gradual
transitions and constant
regularities (say, astronomy),
a high degree of predictive
expertise is possible. In those
fields, however, in which the
processes of transition admit of
sharp jolts and discontinuities,
which can in turn be the effects
of so complex and intricate
causal processes as to be
‘chance’ occurrences for all
practical purposes, predictive
expertise is inherently less
feasible. (1959: 44)
It is important to seriously explore
a number of arguments, both for
and against the possibility of
legitimizing knowledge claims.
Philosophical sources that argue
against the legitimacy of
epistemology provide a valuable
input to this topic.
Some questions which arise
include:
 Is it possible to argue for an
epistemology of foresight?
 Is it possible to provide
epistemological justification
for knowledge obtained from
foresight?
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<Title>:
 Does technological foresight
give rise to knowledge?
 Does ‘learning’ constitute
‘knowledge’?
 Is truth merely indicative? Or
could it be considered as
‘socially constructed’?
 Does this apply to all
disciplines or only to
disciplines which are
‘uncertain’ because of their
future orientation?
are numerous socially constructed
concepts which we take as
providing valid knowledge claims in
many spheres of life.
What are the implications which
emerge for an epistemology of
technological foresight, particularly
where evaluation and
dissemination issues are
concerned?
Reflection on epistemological
aspects implies a metacognitive
perspective which could inform and
improve practice. This perspective
gives rise to the view that
knowledge claims which result
from foresight practice possess
elements of validity, in spite of the
fact that they may also be viewed
as ‘socially constructed’, yet there
References
Acceleration Watch (2006) DL
011110 Futurist (definition):
Common Types of Futures
Thinking
http://www.accelerationwatch.
com/futuristdef.html.
Helmer, O. And Rescher, N. (1959)
‘On the Epistemology of the
Inexact Sciences’, Management
Science, Vol. 6, No. 1, October
1959, pp. 25-52.
Rubel, R.C. (2006) ‘The
Epistemology of War Gaming’,
Naval War College Review,
Spring 2006, Vol. 59, No. 2
pp.108-128.
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