Next General Topic: Scientific Realism/Antirealism
Main Question
Do the “unobservable” entities that scientific theories
postulate (subatomic particles, black holes, etc.) actually
exist? Or are they just “convenient fictions”?
Scientific Realism – the view that the “unobservable” entities
that scientific theories postulate are real
Scientific Antirealism – the view that the “unobservable” entities
that scientific theories refer do not actually exist
observable/unobservable—problematic concepts
 no sharp boundary between the “observable” and the
“unobservable”
 To what extent does technology increase “observability”?
(e.g., Are individual atoms observable because we can “see”
them with the aid of very powerful, sophisticated
microscopes?)
Some Metaphysical Concepts and Theses
Primary Qualities vs. Secondary Qualities
 primary qualities – the properties of an object that do not
depend on the manner in which it is perceived
 secondary qualities – the properties of an object that do
depend on the manner in which it is perceived
Three metaphysical views about the fundamental nature of the
universe:
1. materialism – The universe is entirely physical/material in
nature.
2. idealism – The universe is entirely mental in nature.
3. dualism – The universe has more than one fundamental
component (e.g., physical and mental)
Metaphysical Realism – the view that the words and phrases of
ordinary language refers to a mind-independent world
Reality and Perception
 direct realism – the view that there are external (mindindependent) objects that we directly perceive
 ideaism – the view that we do not directly perceive external
objects but that rather mental representations (e.g., visual
images) of those objects
 causal realism – the view that there are external (mindindependent) objects that cause us to have mental
representations (e.g., visual images) of them
Questions—
1. Is metaphysical realism correct?
2. How can we know of the existence of external (mindindependent) objects?
3. Which of direct realism and ideaism is correct?
4. Is causal realism correct? How could we ever know that
external objects cause us to experience mental
representations of them?
5. If we directly perceive our own mental representations of
external objects rather than the objects themselves, how
similar are those mental representations and the objects they
represent?