Magic, Science and Religion
Part II, Lecture 6
The Rationality of Primitive Thought
1. Two conceptions of rationality
Jon Elster distinguishes between the ‘thin’ and ‘broad’ theories of rationality.
(i) Thin rationality: formal consistency between systems of belief, systems of desires
and actions.
(ii) Broad rationality: Rationality of substantive beliefs and desires. To be rational
these should be based on the available evidence and should involve rational
judgement.
2. Evans-Pritchard and the rationality of the Azande
We may see EP as saying that the Azande are thinly rational, broadly rational, and
broadly irrational when it comes to their beliefs in witchcraft, oracles and magic.
3. Universality of ‘thin’ rationality?
Is it the case, then, that all societies possess the ‘thin’ conception of rationality?
Winch argues that something like this must be the case:
‘Rationality is not just a concept in a language like any other; it is this too, for, like
any other concept it must be circumscribed by an established use: a use, that is,
established in language. But I think it is not a concept that a language may, as a matter
of fact, have and equally well may not have, as is, for instance, the concept of
politeness. It is a concept necessary to the existence of any language: to say of a
society that it has a language is also to say that it has a concept of rationality’
(‘Understanding a Primitive Society’, p. 99).
‘Rationality’ may then be thought to be a feature of all natural languages as without it
language could not convey meanings (which is what we usually understand to be its
main function) consistent with our beliefs about the world and our desires.
What implications does this have for our understanding of other cultures? How is
translation of an alien language possible? W. V. O. Quine, claimed that we could
never be certain that our translations of other languages captures the meanings held by
the language speakers (‘indeterminacy of translation’) while Donald Davidson
defended the thesis of ‘radical interpretation’ and the ‘principle of charity’.
4. The ‘broad’ rationality of primitive societies?
In some respects, Winch is sympathetic to EP. But he points to a number of problems
with this approach.
First problem – EP suggests that scientific notions are superior to mystical notions
because they are ‘in accord with objective reality’. Scientific notions can be checked
by reference to an independent reality, with what really exists. But for Winch:
1
(i)
It is not just scientific notions that check themselves against an
independent reality. For religion, god(s) can be understood as
independently real, real beyond our belief in him (them);
(ii)
‘Reality is not what gives language sense. What is real and unreal shows
itself in the sense that language has’ (p. 82). The use of the concepts of the
real and unreal occur in language and only in language.
For Winch, the Zande’s system of belief operates in much the same way that a
modern science like particle physics does. That is, it is an internally coherent body of
beliefs about a reality that is constructed by it and which checks itself against that
reality. Again, Winch is not interested here in the question of whether what these
different bodies of knowledge say exist does ‘really’ exist. Rather, why should we
consider internally coherent systems of belief that clearly play a social role of some
significance (as witchcraft beliefs do in Zande society and scientific beliefs in western
societies) to be ‘irrational’ or ‘wrong’?
5. The problem of the broad conception of rationality
Available evidence and rational judgement: what counts as evidence what counts as a
rational judgement?
i.
‘Available evidence’ is not given. What is to count as ‘available’
depends on the kinds of evidence that the system of beliefs admits
as relevant.
ii.
From Winch’s point of view, there can be no ‘autonomous’ rational
judgements. All judgements are made within language according to
a system of beliefs.
6. Rationality/ Relativism
The kind of argument that Winch puts forward worries some people because it is an
example of relativism. In other words, Winch appears to make our judgements of the
world a function of our beliefs without providing us with any means of determining
whether our beliefs are true or false. In the end, truth appears as a product of the
beliefs we possess and the social relations that generate them.
But should we be worried?
2