Individual Research Program – 2015
Regina Queiroz
Postdoctoral Researcher
Main Topic of Research
My individual research program in ethics and political philosophy focuses on practical
rationality, in general, and in economics and politics in particular. The program
highlights the Aristotelian conception of practical rationality — phronesis or the right
reason — as a conception of rationality that offers sounder approaches to ethical
issues in economics, and politics than: a) narrow or broad conceptions of economic
rationality; b) Kantian and Utilitarian conceptions of rationality; c) pre-classical
conception of rationality, mainly metis.
Expected Publications / Submissions
- “Publicity and economic rationality in Rawls’ theory of justice” (To be Submitted: May
2015).
Since Rawls’ theory of justice is inspired in a narrow conception of economic rationality,
the public principles of justice as fairness are in A Theory of Justice lastly based on the
sense of justice. We wonder, however, that not only we can base any public ethical and
political principle on an economic conception of rationality, but also on a sense of
justice. The problems with the conceptualization of stability and justice, as well as the
shift from rationality to reasonableness in Rawls’ Political Liberalism testifies both
difficulties. Accepting that publicity is an indisputable feature of any political legislation
Rawls’ theoretical difficulties on his approach to publicity can clarify that not every
conception of rationality is compatible with the requirement of publicity, in general, and
political legislation, in particular. Accordingly, by inquiring under what conception of
rationality can any ethical requirement of publicity be consistently conceptualized, we
sustain that the Aristotelian conception of rationality or phronesis offers a suitable
approach to the political ideal of publicity.
- “Phronesis as the appropriate political rationality to deal with the sovereign debt
crisis in Europe” (To be Submitted: September 2015).
The fiscal and budgetary policy conditions imposed to Portugal during the sovereign
crisis debt have been discussed as an economic and financial problem and not a political
one. Nevertheless, although sovereign debt crisis is mostly a political crisis, whether at a
financial, economic or political level, the conflict between creditors and debtors in a
democratic European Union has been solved from the privileged perspective of
creditors. Actually, the undisputable negotiation power of the IFM, Commission and
ECB, who always stressed the need of fiscal and budgetary policy of austerity, was based
on their peculiar status of creditors.
This overwhelming power of creditors evidences that the political reason of European
agents is lacking in what concerns the prudential rule of phronesis. Actually, phronesis is
a conception of reason that not only would prevent that the solving of the sovereign
debt crisis debt through the privileged interests of creditors, but also is the rule of
reason for any democracy. In reality, even if the peculiar nature of European Union
democracy can hardly be understood under the criteria of sovereign states, the almost
lack of negotiable right of debtors does not allows stating that the sovereign debt crisis
is led by a democratic rule of reason. In our paper we aim then to show: a) how the
overwhelming power of creditors (IMF, European Commission and ECB) would be
reduced if they would reason under the quest for a political rationality capable of
conciliating the rights and duties of creditors and debtors; b) the way in which an
apolitical regime at a national or international level democracy requires a way of
reasoning (phronesis) that avoids the unilateral power of the powerful.
- “Is metis a sound conception of rationality for organizations?” (To be Submitted:
December 2015).
The ethical value for organizational change, meaning-making, and responsiveness of
metis, a pre-classic conception of rationality, has been invoked as a more appropriate
conception of rationality than scientific rationality. Indeed, metis or cunning rationality
empathizes personal tactics instead of strategies, which allows personal transformation
towards adversative organizational environments. However, since metis is also related
to deception and pitfall, we not only wonder that those tactics reinforce the ethical
responsiveness of persons inside organizations, but also we sustain that they can
intensify personal distrust, and unresponsiveness. Moreover, if the deceptive nature of
cunning rationality is transferred to organizations strategy, metis can be seriously
harmful for persons, organizations and societies, as it happens with terrorist
organizations.
Planned Talks
- “Racionalidade Política: Phronesis ou Métis?” EPLAB's Monthly Seminar, 13 April
2015, New University of Lisbon.