Beyond Reason? The limitations of
rationality – a tautological and asocial
concept
Patrick Brown
School of Social Policy, Sociology and Social Research, Giles Lane,
University of Kent, Canterbury, CT2 7NF, UK. p.r.brown@kent.ac.uk
Abstract
Notions of rationality are frequently applied by social-scientists as a basis of
describing, understanding and evaluating the actions of individuals and
organisations in relation to risk-contexts. This paper will critically examine
the utility of this contested concept for risk research. The gradual shift away
from the invocation of rationality in a dogmatic sense has culminated more
recently in approaches which consider multiple rationalities or understand
certain action as functioning between the rational and non-rational. From
such a starting point this paper goes further to argue that analyses of
organisational, and especially individual, decision-making and behaviour are
often hindered by considerations of rationality. It is suggested that the
usefulness of rationality in describing and explaining action is limited in a
number of ways, not least because of the tautological nature of the concept.
Moreover a conclusive evaluation as to whether an action is ‘rational’ must be
made ex-post the outcome – thus ignoring the multiplicity of contingencies,
potential outcomes and limited knowledge apparent at the time of action. At
the centre of the paper is the assertion that no action is irrational, and that
ascriptions of such a label are merely indications of a limited grasp of the
salient social variables. Three specific risk contexts are used by way of
illustration.
Introduction: The problem of rationality as dogma
The concept of risk, and the range of policy and academic responses to it, has
shifted many analytical lenses away from social structures and towards the
individual. Spurred on by the emancipatory possibilities of progress and
reflexivity, scientific and indeed many social-scientific approaches to risk
have reinvigorating considerations of appropriate or effective human action
in the face of future ‘unknowables’ (Keynes 1921). Whether it is in relation to
entrepreneurial and investment decisions (ibid), criminal behaviour
(Kemshall 2006), or the pension decisions taken by those reaching retirement
(Vickerstaff et al 2008), analyses abound as to the nature and process of
correct and less-than-correct – rational and irrational – courses of action. In
the midst of an apparent demise of left-right politics (Giddens 1994) and
related concerns of rationality at a more meta-system level (eg Habermas
1984), risk has emerged as a dominant political and intellectual ideology
(Furedi 2005) which instead focuses attention on the behaviour of specific
communities (meso) and moreover individual actors and institutions (micro).
Of course the scrutinising of decision-making and action as rational or
otherwise is in many senses timeless. From the concerns of Heraclitus with
the lack of reflexivity amongst the ignorant hoi polloi (Sandywell 1996:236), to
the new public health of recent NHS policy (Department of Health 2004),
societies have been rife with assumptions over the progressive potential for
reason to illuminate and rectify the unfounded and/or flawed. The
Enlightenment bolstered confidence in the possibilities of reason to
progressively elucidate and refine approaches to human problems.
Importantly, the vigour by which the Enlightenment thinkers such as Voltaire,
Hume and Montesquieu sought to replace a single-dominant metaphysics
(Porter 2001:26) seemingly imbued its successor with a similarly dogmatic
presumption about the existence of a single reality - around which one
undisputable reason could be honed (Gray 2009).
The hegemonic position of scientific reason makes possible the elevation of
generalisable knowledge (Habermas 1981; Adorno and Horkheimer 1973) and
a corresponding deprivileging and debasement of subjectivity (O’Neill 1995).
Such ontological and epistemological gerrymandering (Woolgar and Pawluch
1983) which this dogmatic rationality facilitates is very much the contextual
basis of this article. From here the next section will rehearse positions which
note a multiplicity of rationalities at work within social systems and lay
society (eg Weber 1968; Habermas, 1987; O’Neill, 1995). Yet the difficulty for
any one of these forms to offer a satisfactory account of human action amidst
uncertainty has led more recent work (Zinn 2008) to suggest decisions take
place across a spectrum spanning the rational (calculative), non-rational
(belief, hope), and in between these ideal-types (trust, intuition, emotion). A
positive critique of this position will begin by problematising the demarcation
between rationality and alternatives. The phenomenology of Schutz (1972)
will be used to illustrate that calculative and emotive responses are similarly
grounded in prior socialised experiences.
It will be contended that the obscuring of ‘the social’ by the application of
rationality hinders understanding – blinding analyses to structural factors.
These limitations, alongside the tautological nature of the concept, form the
backdrop to the central thesis of this paper: that social scientific accounts of
action amidst risk contexts would be more complete by moving beyond
notions of rationality. The final three sections will explore and expand on this
theorisation through brief, specific, policy-focused case-studies: restorative
justice, pension planning and financial markets. These examples underline the
significance of multiple layers of social experience in determining the manner
by which knowledge is both accessed and processed. The decisive influence
of the social on how knowledge is communicated and received illuminates
the structural factors which bear on actors. Conversely notions of rationality
would seem to fetishise the utility of refined or generalisable knowledge, at the
expense of comprehending the inherent rationality in all agency and the social
structures which bear upon this.
From one rationality to many: the multi-dimensionality of human
action
The dogma of rationality which Gray (2009) sees as emblematic of the
Enlightenment, epitomised for him within the works of Saint-Simon and
Compte, has come under considerable and sustained critique. Kant was a
contemporary of the Enlightenment who, in his concerted attempt to free
humanity from a dogma of metaphysics (Kant 1929: 30), builds on the work of
Leibniz and Hume to distinguish between different types of judgement and
their relation to human experience. In differentiating between knowledge
forms, and moreover reinforcing the limitations of the knowable, Kant lays
the groundwork for a contestation of rationality.
In a not dissimilar fashion to Kantian dualisms between the theoretical and
the practical, Weber (1968) distinguishes between purposive/instrumental
rationality and other formats relating to norms and values, emotions and
tradition/habit. Whilst Weber’s use of the term rationality has been criticised
as imprecise and fluid (Swidler 1973), his description of human action as
motivated by combinations of differing rationalities nevertheless facilitates a
more nuanced understanding of behaviour. One that is more open to
acknowledging the groundedness of that which would appear untenable
from a purely purposive-rational perspective. This perspective is central to
Weber’s analyses of religious affiliations, yet his work on bureaucracy also
has much light to shed on the nature of 'rational' decision-making.
For Weber, the form of rationality that develops within bureaucracies is very
much driven by their social structures - thus reflecting a more general
consideration of rationality as a socio-pathological trait1. Yet whilst Weberian
accounts of subjective and moral reason tend towards the pessimistic and at
times pejorative, two positive critiques of his work (Habermas 1984; Schutz
1972) more readily acknowledge the inherent value and utility of
communicative and inter-subjective (as opposed to instrumental-scientific)
rationality. Habermas (1987: 204-234) traces a line of thought which
illuminates the limitations of Hobbesian (1968) understandings of man as
solely driven by purposive-rational tendencies. Building on the empiricism of
Locke and Simon and then the extra-contractual emphases of Durkheim and
Parsons, a conceptualisation of communicative rationality is developed which
understands the socialised bases of action flowing out of socialised norms and
values as much as strategically-reasonable interests (see Brown 2008).
Perhaps more importantly for the concerns of this article, Habermas (1971)
draws a clear distinction between different types of knowledge as they relate
to human experience - as determined by their respective social contexts.
Public experiences are those which can be expressed by generalisable validityclaims - therefore accessible to many, and moreover to institutional
bureaucracies. Meanwhile knowledge generated from 'private experiences' is
barely utterable, with the accessibility of these therefore restricted to a much
smaller number of actors more immediately present. Whilst publicly available
knowledge, through its generalisability, is capable of having its rationality
validified/contested, private or experiential knowledge is often beyond such
acknowledgement. Thus critical theory makes clear two key limitations in
contesting the rationality of behaviour: a) human action is oriented around
multiple-considerations2 (rationalities) and therefore should not be evaluated
on a single, instrumental basis; b) an important part of human experience is
beyond generalisability, with this 'invisibility' obstructing empirical
examinations concerned with rationality and reason.
Between the rational and the non-rational? Or inherently rational?
Phenomenological insights into human action (Schutz 1972) represent a
further challenge to rationality-oriented understandings of human action. The
possibility of an actor understanding any notion, or any projected action, is
grounded in their direct experiences as it is only via these, the building blocks
of cognition, which make possible the inferential constructions required to
comprehend the attitudes of others or indeed more abstract notions (ibid).
This means of comprehending how actors appropriate knowledge is
significant in that direct experiences are typically more concrete for individual
actors than more abstract ideas - as the latter require multiple inferential leaps
and are accordingly more tentative. So whereas confidence in scientific
progress and the Enlightenment of society fetishises the emancipatory
possibilities of knowledge and its public communication (as too does
Habermas – eg 1984:333) - phenomenology makes evident that human action,
and understandings thereof, are decisively rooted in private, socialised,
experiential contexts.
O'Neill (1995:179-182), drawing on the work of Schutz (1943), argues against
distinctions between what he calls "common-sense" action and a scientific
rationality. Given that everyday human behaviour meets the criteria of being
'reasonable' and 'deliberative', and that the ideal-type of rational action is "so
idealised that it cannot be found anywhere in the world" (O'Neill 1995: 181;
Keynes 1936), it seems that the only aspect which sets lay behaviour apart
from its generalisably rational counterpoint is the formers causal complexity.
This points towards the tautological nature of the ascriptions of rationality:
How do we know actor a is rational actor? Because s/he follows action x
given context D. Why does s/he follow path x? Because s/he is a rational
actor3.
A recognition of this system-specific, self-referential and circular
conceptualising of rationality in analyses of human decision-making is the
first stage in illuminating its problematic nature. If, as implied by O'Neill
(1995), lay decisions are set apart by their socially structured complexity then defining their multi-dimensional manifestations as irrational is merely
erecting a schematic obstacle to effective understandings of behaviour;
making for a lazy social science. Zinn (2008) posits behaviour as often taking
place between the rational and 'non-rational' (via intuition, trust and affect)
and in so doing seeks to avoid privileging one over the other. Following
Wynne (1996) and Gigerenzer (2007), Zinn acknowledges the mutual
effectiveness and necessary complimentarity of the two approaches - even
highlighting the superiority of the non-calculative (2008: 444). This
recognition of similar utilities and effectual outcomes is doubtless a step
forward, yet continued references to two ideal-typical positions within
decision-making processes ignore significant commonalities.
All decision-making, whether more calculative, affect-based or 'innate'4, is
profoundly shaped by prior socialised experiences (the biographical).
Comprehension of more formal or systemised knowledge systems functions
through a number of inferential steps rooted in direct experiences of the
individual actor (Schutz 1972). Their continued application is based on
previous positive feedback from their use and/or socially constructed
confidence in their epistemic authority (eg bio-medicine). The very enactment
of the science, and moreover its refinement, would be impossible without
common-sense judgements (O'Neill 1995: 160). Thus science, as an imperfect
analogy useful in interpreting the natural world (Popper 1959; Archer,
Bhaskar et al 1998), is simply a more generalisable configuration of the
heuristical judgements of/by which it is composed.
Means of making judgements through less generalisable inferences – for
example as intuition, trust, and/or affect (Zinn 2008) - are similarly refined
strategies learnt through prior socialised experiences (Schutz 1972). The postLondon-bombing experiences of John Tulloch5 (2008) illustrate how even the
most innate reflexes and reactions are learnt/adopted via prior direct
encounters. Once again perceptions of the continued appropriateness of
intuition, trust or affect are configured around ongoing feedback in social
settings and their constructed validation by the lifeworld (eg through
interactions with close acquaintances, social networks, socio-cultural norms,
habitus and personal reflexivity). The preceding and current paragraphs
make evident therefore that all decision-making can be said to be neither
perfectly rational nor irrational. Rather all human agency is inherently, and in
many senses similarly, rational. Focusing on the nature of this agency in terms
of its rationality/irrationality/non-rationality however obscures the decisive
social structures which determine the type and extent of knowledge available
to the particular actor, and the way such knowledge is accessed/recognised/
processed.
Practical context 1: Restorative justice and offender rehabilitation
Thus far it has been noted that decision-making, both in relation to risk and
more generally, is best described as: oriented by values rather than mere
instrumentalism (Habermas 1987); driven by far more than purposive-rational
efficacy (Weber 1968); and informed by experiential knowledge as derived
from private experiences and/or in a more generalisable sense (Schutz 1972;
Habermas 1971). The multi-dimensionality and complexity of these processes
- not to mention the social contexts they are embedded in - represent a
significant challenge to the social scientist and policy-maker; one which
should not be explained away by rational, irrational or between-rational
labelling.
Whereas the discussion up to this point has been at a relatively abstract level,
the arguments developed will hopefully become more clearly formed and
nuanced through the practical policy contexts explored from here onward.
Three examples are briefly outlined which deal with a variety of 'risk'
relationships in terms of how institutions engage with individuals: the
institutional management of risky individuals in society (restorative justice);
institutions trying to persuade members of the public to change the way they
consider risk (extending working-life and pension deferral); individuals
working within institutions dealing with risk (investment finance).
The multi-dimensional structuration which bears upon action, as referred to
above, is patently evident within the context of restorative justice. This
approach – to the criminal behaviour often characterised as a risk to society in
many senses – is a more relational, social contextualising approach amongst
stakeholders than some alternative approaches to crime (McLaughlin et al.
2003). Yet by its future-orientated, conciliatory approach the criminal act is
still posed as deviant (irrational) and correctable through effective
communicative action and knowledge exchange (Marshall 2003). The limited
effectiveness of restorative justice may be partly explained by its failure to
comprehend criminal activity as inherently rational agency, thus blinding
itself to the potency of structuration.
Conceptualising agency through the multi-layered socialisation of the actor is
central to its effective analysis6. The capacity for actors to think about the
consequences (social and otherwise) of their actions and to make decisions in
a more general sense is vitally dependent on the effective maturation and
integrity of their prefrontal cortex (Anderson et al. 1999). Impairment to such
neurological functioning inhibits moral judgement and makes ‘anti-social’
and/or violent behaviour more likely (Greene and Haidt 2002). Prima facie
this might lead analyses towards decidedly psychological or even
phrenological avenues. However the work of Schore (1999; 2001) highlights
the extent to which social environments and stimulation during infancy drive
the development of this and other parts of the brain’s decision-making
apparatus. Hence what might be construed as malevolent or psychopathology is in fact socio-neurologically-influenced decision-making.
By recognising the manifold ways in which prior social experiences influence
the 'innate', and moreover the ways in which socially-mediated information is
processed, the problematic disjuncture between the psychological and the
social is bridged. Thus the primary layer of social structuration, which bears
on the maturation of the prefrontal cortex, is followed by a complex lattice of
further experiential learning and stimulation within an array of social
contexts – from the familial to the institutional. These socialisations form the
proverbial classrooms in which ideal-typical assumptions are formed as to the
dependability (or otherwise) of authority figures/groups and the outcomes
(positive or negative) of certain actions towards these. Of course the nature of
these very experiences is determined by both the qualities of the persons
involved as well as the inclusion/engagement or exclusion of the actor within
these learning contexts. Amidst these ongoing experiences a range of
attitudinal positions are determined (Schutz 1972) at both cognitive and
affective levels.
Such experience-based formulations of societal expectations (rooted in class,
gender, ethnicity and age) and the actor’s cognitive and emotional responses
to these, in relation to others, are the basic apparatus on which certain modes
of decisions/behaviour (labelled by society on occasions as ‘criminal’ or
‘benevolent’ – flawed or appropriate) might be understood. These social
factors (alongside other socially influenced mitigators such as substance
misuse or mental health problems) thus determine the way information
regarding certain environmental contingencies is processed. Meanwhile the
contemporaneous socio-economic factors which influence the comparative
appraisal of certain avenues of behaviour and understandings around these
underline the extent to which ‘the social’ bears on the availability and nature
of information. This multi-layered lattice of social experience will thus
determine the ex-post attitudinal position of the (criminal) actor.
Practical context 2: Pensions and planning for later life
The extent to which consequences are recognised and considered in a
particular sense, and the stance of the actor towards other stake-holders, will
be very much driven by prior, biographical experiences. The potential
effectiveness of restorative justice programmes, or other forms of policymaking such as pension reforms, is thus very much contingent not only on
the quality and content of the communication (ie the transfer of knowledge)
but the way this knowledge is interpreted, entertained (or ignored) and
processed by the actor (eg perpetrator or retirement planner). Once again this
reception and processing of knowledge (or ambivalence) is perfectly rational
given the socio-biographical experiences of the actor, but may be far from
satisfactory for the policy programme. This understanding makes clear that
affecting behavioural change is not as simple as reorienting misaligned or
inappropriate behaviour by the impartation or exchange of knowledge. As
suggested above, the fetishisation of knowledge is problematic as it is
relatively ineffectual in resonating with attitudes and behaviour – for human
actors are experiential rather than cognitive beings.
That lived experiences are more potent and concrete bases of knowledge for
actors than abstract notions (Schutz 1972) is clearly apparent in decisionmaking in later life regarding pensions. Policy makers such as the UK
Department of Work and Pensions are keen to encourage the extension of
working life amongst older adults and the deferment of claiming statepensions. Yet recent research suggests that in spite of statistics showing that
life expectancy is steadily increasing, planning around older age and
retirement is beset by a ‘health pessimism’ (Vickerstaff et al 2008). The desire
to maximise short-term income due to concerns about death shortly following
retirement precipitates short-termist or fatalistic approaches rather than the
long-term view which actuarial analyses would commend (ibid).
On the face of it, this ignorance of generalisable data would appear irrational.
Yet the qualitative responses within the research underline the concreteness
of lived experiences. Respondents referred to former colleagues or relatives
who had died shortly after retiring and these more direct experiences proved
more compelling than abstract population trends (ibid). The application of
this more private, anecdotal knowledge would seem unscientific, yet the
problem with actuarial models for individual actors is that they are
probabilistic. In the same way that an individual smoker could be the
exception and live well past one hundred years (Alaszewski and Brown 2007),
the pensioner who (against the ‘odds’) does not defer their pension and dies
at 66 may be making an exceedingly 'rational' decision. For definitive
ascriptions of substantive (rather than procedural) rationality or irrationality
can only be made ex-post the outcome. That health pessimism or cynicism
towards state and financial institutions was more prevalent amongst lower
socio-economic strata reaffirms the importance of experiential knowledge –
and indeed its probable validity given inequalities in life-expectancy and
marginalisation of poorer older people. Pre-learnt attitudinal positions
towards the reliability of state institutions for positive outcomes (in terms of
pensions and indeed more generally) may thus be decisive and negate the
possibilities for ‘knowledge’-led behavioural change.
Practical context 3: Investment decisions within financial
institutions
Further limitations of rational techniques for decision-making in the face of
uncertainty are highlighted by Zinn (2008), who cites research conducted by
Borges et al (1999) which found that lay people making stock market
decisions based on ‘recognition heuristics’ (the companies with which they
were familiar) were more successful than the more ‘refined’ approaches of
mutual funds. Furthermore it is clear that those working within financial
institutions rely on instinct (Keynes 1936) and emotions (Pixley 2004) due to
the time-constraints and inherent ‘unknowables’ latent within investment
decisions. Thus foci within the public sphere on the irrational or irresponsible
processes of recent decision-making within a newly uncertain financial climate
provide only limited understandings (Pixley 2008) due to the impossibility of
purely calculative decisions.
Whilst appraisals of decisions are able to be critical of actor-'rationality'
retrospectively, as with pension planning this ignores the extent of ex-ante
uncertainty, multiple potential modes of problem solving, and the
multiplicity of potential outcomes which might have resulted. The difference
between ‘good’ decisions (with positive outcomes) and ‘bad’ ones (leading to
negative consequences) can thus be seen as less contingent on the nature of
the decisions being made but once again the social contexts of these decisions.
The social construction - and subsequent demise - of investment confidence or
trust in the likelihood of positive outcomes highlights the extent to which
financial decisions are innately and fundamentally social endeavours (Simmel
1990; Ingham 1996), the outcomes of which are socially rather than
individually contingent.
Concerns with the rationality, irrationality or between-rationality of financial
decision-making thus distract from the social systems and norms (eg of
confidence or scepticism - bullishness or bearishness) which drive these
decisions and indeed their outcomes. The way social/relational structures are
under-girded by the institutional and legal frameworks, and in turn come to
legitimate their enactment or modification (Habermas 1976; Black 2008), bears
extensively on the form and content of decision-making. Yet this is obscured
by the focus on individual actors which rationality-based considerations of
risk engender. The historical fluctuations between the lifting and reimposition
of restrictions around the short-selling of financial instruments (FSA 2008)
make apparent the influence of social constructions of confidence on
behavioural controls which in turn affect legal and social norms and
expectations.
That the Chief Executive of the UK Financial Services Authority describes the
current economic context as having "given rise to disorderly markets" (ibid: 1)
underlines the social embeddedness of beliefs as to what is orderly (markets
are never truly orderly) and what is uncertain (Polanyi 1944; Pixley 2008). The
perceived reliability and predictability of markets, and corresponding
investor confidence, is constructed via prior experiences, interactions and
familiarity within the institutions, alongside positive feedback regarding the
dependability of an array of ‘signs’ (Schutz 1972). These communicative signals
– in the form of linguistic or more abstract (eg price) phenomena – are
interpreted by the actors to have specific meaning (ibid) and implications for
action. Yet which signs are focused upon, how these are interpreted, and how
these are then related to meaningful action are very much socially determined
and beyond the control of any individual or group of actors (ibid; Habermas
1987).
Conclusion: to know all is to consider all as rational
The independence, fluidity, unpredictability, contingency and potency of this
‘lifeworld’ (Schutz 1972; Habermas 1987), as it bears on individual action,
represent an immense challenge to both public institutions charged with
governing risk – as well as social scientists. Institutions are innately hampered
in managing how individuals experience or create contexts of risk and
uncertainty due to the primacy and complexity of (socialised) experience for
human action. These bases of action are more nuanced and ‘private’
(Habermas 1971), and thus beyond the instrumental and generalisable
understandings of bureaucratic organisations (Brown 2008). A corresponding
mutual incomprehensibility makes plain the utility of the social scientist in
bridging and interpreting between the two.
The basic thesis of this paper is that ventures to adequately understand
human action (in order to be able to fulfil this interpreting role) within risk
contests are often impeded by labels of rational, irrational, non-rational or
between-rational. Descriptions, analyses or evaluations of individual
decision-making/action in terms of rational/irrational/non-rational criteria
have been seen to be problematic at philosophical, logical and sociological
levels. The superiority of instrumental applications of scientific knowledge for
purposive-rational interests has been seen to be untenable and indeed
inaccurate in assessing behaviour. This renders ascriptions of rational or
irrational as tautologies – self-referential, analytical cul-de-sacs which offer
little explanatory contribution. Most importantly these labels have been seen
to hinder effective analyses of the modes by which ‘the social’ bears on
behaviour. It has been argued that by considering all human behaviour as
inherently rational the tautological problem is overcome and moreover
research stands to illuminate the manner in which prior and current social
structures and contexts influence human agency.
Whilst ideal-typical distinctions between more cognitive or affective
components of decision-making may be analytically useful (in terms of their
specificity) in some senses, focusing on rationality/non-rationality as a basis
for considering how actors behave in relation to risk and uncertainty obscures
the multi-layered structural influences on their agency through prior and
more immediate experiences. The knowledge applied within decision-making,
alongside the more affective or innate reactions which facilitate this, are all
acquired through prior socialised experiences. Hence what might be
misconstrued as psychological determinants – of how stimuli are responded
to – are in fact learnt tendencies and capacities acquired from previous
socialisation. Social structures (not least class, gender, ethnicity and age) will
determine the variety, nature and extent of these learning contexts from
which complex formations of ideal-typical assumptions - in forms of
experience-formed knowledge, habitus and more innate reactions - are
derived. Social structures not only determine (independent of the current
experience) the potential reception and processing of information but also the
availability and format of knowledge in the specific risk context.
The greater extent to which both these aspects of structuration are
comprehended, the more the inherent rationality of the agency will be
accessible. Hence any ascription of irrationality can be simply interpreted as
indicative of a limited grasp of the salient social variables. In a not dissimilar
fashion by which Rothstein (2006) suggests that the application of risk tends
towards assisting institutions rather than society, considerations of the
rational, irrational or non-rational would seem to enable relatively
straightforward explanations for government, media, and other institutions at
the expense of effectual understanding how individuals act within society.
Rationality is in this sense a 'civilising' tool - in an Eliasian (1982) sense which drives conformity in line with Enlightenment goals and scientific
generalisability (by stigmatising deviation), whilst at the same time robbing
social actors of the purpose, meaning and understanding of their own actions.
There are of course a number of limitations to the argument set out here, not
least in that by criticising the ontological and epistemological position of
certain analyses a similarly precarious philosophical position is being
assumed. However this paper does not seek to offer a philosophically robust
assessment so much as to foster a discussion and reflexivity towards the
unproblematic way in which rationality is often applied. By highlighting
these assumptions and indeed the socially-blinkered analytical positions they
encourage, a more complete and effective analysis of human action in relation
to risk becomes possible.
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Habermas (1984) offers a succinct review of Weber’s work in this regard – p. 164-8.
Schutz (1943: 133) refers to the conceptualisation, formulated by William James, of those notions
which exist around the fringes of our concepts. In other words our actions are never purposeful in
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For example Mersault, the main character in Camus’s ‘The Outsider’, notes that "De toute façon, on est
toujours un peu fautif" – one’s motives are never pure or straightforward.
3
This basic schema for illustrating the circularity of reason within tautological concepts is borrowed
from Pilgrim (2007).
4
Innate is applied here in quite a broad sense: including those actions which as Tulloch’s (2008)
account makes clear are basic reflexes – and other behaviour which might best be represented by
Bourdieu’s notion of habitus, conceptualising the agent outside of mere objectivism and subjectivism
but rather between voluntary and deterministic.
5
Tulloch, an established social-scientist carrying out research related to risk, was a casualty of the
bombing of a tube train in London on 7 July, 2005. He gives an account of his post-trauma experiences
in this illuminating Health, Risk and Society article.
1
2
6
NB The interaction between the social environment and genes is also vital, as made evident by the
work of Michael Rutter amongst others, however this is beyond the remit of the present paper.