Business Case and Intervention Summary
Title: Enhancing Resilience in Karamoja, Uganda
What support will the UK provide?
The UK will provide a total of £38.5 million over 3 years (2013/4 – 2015/6). This includes a £4
million Internal Risk Facility which will ensure that DFID can make a timely response in the event
of a significant increase in vulnerability.
Why is UK support required?
Climate extremes and other weather and climate events are becoming increasingly frequent and
severe in Karamoja while the natural resources on which the population depends are increasingly
degraded. The 1.2 million population of Karamoja is the most food insecure and amongst the
most vulnerable in Uganda, furthermore the traditional pastoralist livelihood, which has provided a
natural adaptive approach to climate change, is becoming marginalised.
Based on available data a major climate related impact is likely to happen within the next three
years. This will further undermine the livelihoods of the population, increase current levels of
vulnerability, and negatively impact development oriented strategies. Given the high vulnerability
of the population, and the lack of preparedness and response plans, DFID would then be called
upon to support a humanitarian response which risks being both late, and based on food relief.
The high incidence of poverty and levels of vulnerability, malnutrition, and disaster risk make a
strong case for DFID intervention to build longer term resilience.
What will we do to tackle this problem?
DFID has gained a significant understanding of the issues affecting Karamoja, influencing the shift
from humanitarian assistance to sustainable development, and developing programmes with a
social and livelihood protection focus. Focussing on resilience provides a framework for both the
development of a new programme, and for influencing the plans, policies and programmes of
other development partners.
The programme will mitigate risk, increase the resilience and capacity of the population, and
provide value for money through:



Scaling up nutrition programmes targeting malnourished children under 5, pregnant and
lactating women - the majority of funds provided in support of these programmes will be
spent on essential nutrition supplies.
Delivery of strengthened food security and livelihoods for vulnerable households through
support to public works and livelihood programmes – DFID funds for this component will
mainly be spent on asset creation and the provision of food / cash transfers through public
works programmes.
Strengthened early warning and response systems: the majority of DFID funds will be
used to develop more effective early warning and response systems, and provide animal
disease surveillance and veterinary services.
Capacity building components will address key challenges such as the limited technical and
administrative capacity of government and local partners to manage and coordinate, laying the
ground for a more sustainable approach in the mid to long term.
Circa 5% of the programme budget has been allocated for design, monitoring, research and
evaluation. The majority of these funds have been allocated across implementing partners in
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support of independent monitoring and evaluation and specific formative research and analysis.
Strengthened evidence and lesson learning will complement programme activities, formative and
operational research informing implementation, future programme design and maximising impact
and value for money.
What are the expected results?
The programme will contribute to an increase in the resilience of communities to climate extremes
and weather events by directly supporting 700,000 people to cope with the effects of climate
change. In a context of chronic food insecurity and seasonal peaks in malnutrition, the programme
will stabilise the prevalence of Global (GAM) & Severe Acute Malnutrition (SAM) in children aged
6-59 months (GAM <10%; SAM < 2%). Key outputs include: strengthened early warning and
response systems; increased food and livelihood security; improved development co-ordination
and strengthened evidence and learning. The main outputs directly attributable to UK support will
be:





200,000 women & men with improved food security through participation in public works
programmes.
6,000 agro-pastoralists & pastoralists with access to improved animal nutrition
Severe acute malnutrition (SAM) reduced by treating 37,500 children under five.
Global acute malnutrition (GAM) reduced by treating 175,000 children under five, and
pregnant & lactating women.
800,000 cattle vaccinated against epidemic diseases.
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Business Case
Strategic Case
A. Context and need for a DFID intervention
1. Poverty and Social Indicators
Karamoja is located in the northeast corner of Uganda and flanked by Kenya to the east and
Southern Sudan to the north. The region spans 10,550 square miles with approximately 1.2
million inhabitants, predominately from pastoral and agro-pastoral ethnic groupsi. Karamoja faces
a number of development challenges. Historical marginalization, local and cross-border conflicts
(most typically in the form of cattle raiding) and a lack of capacity development and investment in
the region have contributed to underdevelopment. Insecurity has also hindered economic
development, limiting the scope of successful interventions, the region suffering perennial
conflicts underpinned by high levels of insecurity, cattle raiding and inter-ethnic violence.
Social indicators for Karamoja are generally poor. The incidence of poverty is 76 percent,
compared with 24.5 percent nationally1ii while Karamoja has the highest prevalence of food
insecurity in Uganda2. Local government structures are weak, and acute gaps exist in access to
basic services. The prevalence of acute under-nutrition among children under five fluctuates
between 9% and 12% to 15% over the course of a year3. Approximately 45% of children less
than 5 years of age are stunted compared with a national average of 33%4. Just over 10% infants
in the region are born low birth weight5.
Gender relations are shifting in Karamoja, reflecting changes in pastoralist and agro-pastoralist
livelihoods. Women generally have less control than men over productive resources, and
consequently limited control over both the products of their labour, and ability to engage in
productive economic activities6. However, a number of factors mean that pastoralists are finding
it increasingly necessary to supplement livestock-based activities through livelihood
diversification. Women are playing a key role in this diversification, sometimes becoming primary
household providers7. Patterns of sexual and gender based violence have changed in recent
years, violence against women, including rape and violence associated with alcohol abuse
becoming more prevalent8. The role of women has been highlighted as an under researched
area, although women have been recognised as a potential focus for alternative livelihoods
interventions9.
2. Changing Disaster Risks
There is strong evidence that globally climate change is leading to more frequent extreme climate
events (e.g. droughts and floods) in the short-term10 and to significant increases in temperature in
the medium-term11. There is also strong accumulated evidence that poor countries, societies and
households are most vulnerable to extreme climate events and to the changing climate.12 Figure
1iii illustrates how exposure and vulnerability to weather and climate events determine impacts
and the likelihood of disasters. Natural climate variability and climate change influence climate
extremes and other weather and climate events that can contribute to disasters, as well as the
i
The principal ethnic groups in the region are the Dodoth in the north, the Jie in the central
region, and the Karamojong (subdivided into the Bokora, Matheniko, and Pian groups) in the
south. The Pokot, an unrelated tribe from a separate linguistic group, are located near the
border of Kenya in the southeast of the region.
ii If wealth accumulated (i.e. increase in herd size) is included as income, household incomes
are broadly comparable to those of equivalent economic groups in other parts of rural
Ugandaii.
iii See Annex A, Glossary of Terms for key concepts referred to in the text.
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exposure and vulnerability of populations and natural ecosystems. Disaster risk management and
adaptation to climate change can reduce exposure and vulnerability to weather and climate
events and thus reduce disaster risk, as well as increase resilience to the risks that cannot be
eliminated.
Picture 1: Inter linkages between Climate Change and Disaster Risk13
Climate change, through its impact on climate extremes and other weather and climate events, is
expected to increase disaster risk in many countries. Weather related hazards negatively impact
the productive assets and coping capacities of vulnerable poor communities14, threatening
development gains. Closer integration between disaster risk management (DRM) and climate
change adaptation is needed to mitigate the impact of these changes, with effective DRM in the
short term facilitating adaptation of climate change in the long term.
Uganda is vulnerable to the impacts of climate change and climate variability. Since 1960, mean
countrywide annual temperatures have risen by 1.3o C15. Climate projections developed by the
Climate Systems Analysis Group (CSAG)16 suggest increased temperatures of between 2°C and
2.5°C by 2046-2065, together with increased levels of rainfall. The Uganda NAPA estimates that
up to 90 percent of the country’s natural disasters are climate related.
Karamoja is one of the most vulnerable regions in Uganda. The arid and drought-prone
environment of much of Karamoja has always made food security and survival difficult and
challenging. There is anecdotal evidence that the weather in Karamoja has become more
variable in recent years17. There were seven droughts between 1991 and 2000, and droughts
also occurred in 2001, 2002, 2005 and 200818, with extended dry spells reported every second or
third year. In arid areas, as in large areas of Karamoja, there is overwhelming evidence that
pastoralism is a well-adapted response to unreliable weather, and more resilient than that of
settled households19.
3. Conflict and Insecurity
Key drivers of conflict and insecurity in Karamoja have included economic and political
marginalization; degradation of the local environment and ecology, and cattle raiding. A number
of surveys have provided significant insight into the importance of security for the Karamojong
people, and the challenges that insecurity presents for economic development. In a survey of 337
individuals in Karamoja, 84% listed insecurity/armed conflict as the greatest problem affecting
4
their communities20.
The Ugandan national army, the Ugandan People’s Defence Force (UPDF), has long been active
in Karamoja because of this insecurity, focusing during the last 10 years on conducting a number
of disarmament campaigns aimed at restoring security to the region via the removal of arms from
the civilian population, through both voluntary and forceful arms appropriations. The most recent
disarmament campaign was embedded within the Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and
Development Programme (KIDDP 2007-11), and was considered to be part of a broader process
addressing the roots of conflict.
Physical insecurity has a number of damaging effects on food security, including loss of livestock,
access to land for cultivation and property and human life. It has been reported that the
disarmament campaign disrupted livelihoods, the protection provided by the UPDF in the kraal /
manyatta mobility systemiv causing numerous difficulties for pastoralist communities, including
access to their cattle21. Because of insecurity, animals have tended to overgraze designated safe
areas accelerating environmental degradation, and there is a problem of overgrazing in areas
adjacent to “protected Kraals”v. Over the past few decades, greater pressure has been put on
pastoralist mobility, and conflicts over pastures have escalated, limiting access to some of the
wetter areas. This has contributed to destruction of the grass cover by serious overgrazing, bush
encroachment and soil erosion22.
Karamoja continues to be affected by conflict and insecurity at different levels. While progress
has been made in reducing the availability of small arms and light weapons, there are still many
structural and underlying issues that need to be addressed. Social structures and traditional
means of decision-making have been affected, as most clearly seen in changing relations
between generations and genders23. While open conflict (cattle raiding) has been reduced,
violence against individuals (violent robbery, rape, domestic violence) and petty crime appear to
be on the increase24. Redundancy among youth and men together with resulting high rates of
alcoholism are a contributing factor25. In their conflict analysis of northern Uganda, the Advisory
Consortium on Conflict Sensitivity (ACCS)26 identified the following issues as affecting the region:
conflict over land and natural resource management; youth frustration and lack of livelihood
options; sexual and gender-based violence; and deficits in transitional justice and peace building.
4.
Livelihoods, Chronic Food Insecurity, and Vulnerabilityvi27
Although poverty is the underlying cause of chronic food insecurity and vulnerability, these are
exacerbated by extreme climate, and other weather events. Relatively small climate events
(erratic rains, dry spells, late / excessive rains) can have a serious impact on livelihoods. There is
a two-way relationship between poverty and changes in the climate: poverty increases the
vulnerability of individuals to shocks, which in turn can exacerbate poverty and inequality
triggering a vicious cycle. Climate extremes and other weather and climate events are likely to
become even more important as causes of food insecurity and vulnerability, exacerbating other
underlying factors.
Karamoja is unique within Uganda in terms of its environmental and socio-economic
characteristics. The regional climate consists of arid and semi-arid agro-ecological zones with
rainfall ranging between 350-1000 mm per annum, although this varies widely throughout the
year and by region28. Unlike other areas of Uganda, the region has a mono-modal rainfall pattern,
with rainfall occurring sporadically from April to September and a prolonged dry spell from
iv
Kraals are mobile camps employed by pastoralists, often fortified to protect against raids. Manyattas
are semi-permanent family dwellings, often including huts and granaries.
v
Areas gazetted by the UPDF within settlements where all the livestock are kept overnight for
protection.
“’the degree to which a population, system, community, household, or individual is
susceptible to and unable to cope with hazards and stresses, including the effects of climate
change”
vi
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October to March. Since the rainy season does not begin and end at the same time in all zones,
pastoralists need to be highly mobile in search for areas with sufficient productive resources while the rainy season facilitates the growth of pastures, it is also associated with a higher
prevalence of livestock diseases.29
The region is composed of six livelihood zones, each falling broadly within one of three livelihood
systems: a predominantly ‘agriculture-based livelihood system in the western part of the region, a
largely ‘agro-pastoral’ system in the region’s midsection, and a mainly ‘pastoral’ system in much
of the east of the region30 (Figure 1). The pastoral and agro-pastoral zones to the east are more
arid, whilst in the agricultural belt
to the west; rains are more
reliable and frequent. The
majority of the population pursue
pastoralist or agro-pastoralist
livelihoods combining livestock
management and opportunistic
cultivation31. Livelihood strategies
are however shifting. One key
reason for this is that insecurity
has limited people’s ability to
engage in traditional pastoralism,
as their mobility has been
restricted and they have been
unable to access rangeland
resources.
The pastoral and agro-pastoral
zones are particularly prone to
droughts.
The
four
major
droughts in Karamoja in the past
ten years32 have each affected a
minimum of 600,000 people - half
the region’s population33. Settled,
crop-based farming is a vulnerable livelihood strategy in these areasvii. The vulnerability of
sedentary agriculturalists and agro-pastoralists with a significant dependency on seasonal crop
production has resulted in external assistance generally being targeted to these areas. Settled
and agro-pastoral communities are easier to reach on a consistent basis than constantly moving
pastoralists, while the targeting of programmes to these areas is consistent with the
government’s approach of encouraging settlements.
A nomadic way of life is a natural response to an unreliable climate, and is more resilient than
that of settled households34353637. Droughts in Karamoja are localised, with crop failures caused
by both poor rain distribution and excess rain. Pasture and browse are not affected in the same
way as crops. Recently there have been no years where pasture or water for livestock has been
unavailable. Cattle raiding, personal insecurity and policies supporting increased settled farming
in traditionally agro-pastoral and pastoral areas are however undermining pastoralist
livelihoods38. Restricted mobility limits access to dry season pasture, compounding
environmental challenges, as settlements become increasingly concentrated and exploitation of
natural resources intensifies. This contributes to overgrazing of the remaining rangelands,
deforestation and land degradation39 further depleting the natural resource base40.
Pastoralists are also suffering from a decline in the numbers and health of cattle41 due to cattle
vii
Agricultural production is also negatively impacted by plant pests and diseases, weak postharvest handling practices and storage, and difficult access to agricultural inputs and markets.
6
raiding, animal diseases, restricted mobility, extreme weather conditions and reduced land and
water availability. The 2011 FAO Karamoja Food Security Assessment reported a reduction in
herd sizes over the previous two years despite high rainfall and improvements in pasture and
browse availability, attributing this to disease outbreaks and poor feeding due to mobility
restrictions. Animal disease leads to both fewer productive household assets and, through
diseases that can be transmitted from animals to humans, to increased human morbidity and
mortality42. Reduced cattle numbers, combined with low calving rates (due to brucellosisviii43) and
shorter grazing hours, have resulted in a fall in milk production to less than one litre per cow per
day – this is generally not enough to support the daily milk requirements of a family. The
combination of declining cattle numbers and milk production has a direct impact on household
nutrition, given that the main food sources of pastoralists and agro-pastoralists are from meat,
milk and purchased food / food assistance44.
The decline in pastoral livelihoods is leading to an increase in extreme vulnerability and poverty,
with a move to a sedentary lifestyle. Other drivers towards more settled livelihoods include
insecurity, and the absence of productive male labour within the household - most settled
households are headed by women.45 There are few pull factors in Karamoja in terms of
alternative livelihoods, beyond casual labour and gaining access to targeted livelihoods and
nutrition programmes46.
5. Policy and Programming Context
Peace, Recovery and Development Plan (PRDP): Following security improvements in northern
Uganda, the Government of Uganda (GoU) developed a comprehensive Peace, Recovery and
Development Plan (PRDP), which sought to promote peace and reconciliation to eradicate
poverty and improve welfare in Northern Uganda and Karamoja. Phase 1 started in July 2009
and was completed in June 2012. Phase 2 will last until June 2015. The PRDP has offered a
path to more sustainable development through a centralised national plan and budget, with the
potential for improved planning and harmonisation. PRDP 2 has provided the possibility for an
extended period of transition planning, which will inform, and be integrated into regular
government development planning processes by 2015.
The Karamoja Integrated Development Programme (KIDP) (2011-2015) forms part of the PRDP,
and aims to address the unique development challenges in Karamoja. The KIDP is coordinated
by the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) with political leadership and oversight provided by The
Minister for Karamoja Affairs. The OPM has also developed the Karamoja Action Plan for Food
Security (KAPFS) (2009-2014), to assist in the implementation of the livelihood component of the
KIDP. The KAPFS aims to ensure sustainable food security and support increased household
incomes, by, for example, increased crop and livestock production, restoring degraded natural
resources and capacity building.
PRDP, KIDP and KAPFS provide a framework for donor support to Karamoja. However,
implementation of PRDP 2 was affected in 2012 by a freeze in development partner support
following a report by the Auditor General on the misappropriation of funds earmarked for
Northern Uganda. Ring-fenced budget support and special programmes, including those
supported by DFID, are currently on hold.
Other Relevant Government Policies: The Government has taken steps to strengthen disaster
risk reduction (DRR) policies through the National Policy for Disaster Preparedness and
Management and institutionalized DRR at the national level and at local levels though District
Disaster Management Committees. Capacity to implement and develop disaster risk
management plans however remains weak. There are also gaps in policies concerning dry land
environments and pastoral livelihoods, the Rangeland Management Policy and the Pastoral
Code, currently do not provide supportive foundations for the sustainable management of
viii
The prevalence of Brucellosis is reported to be increasing in the region
7
rangelands for mobile livestock production systems.
Uganda’s adaptive capacity is currently low, ranking 7th in terms of the highest levels of
unpreparedness among the 28 most vulnerable countries in the world47. A Climate Change Unit
(CCU) was created in 2008 within the Ministry of Water and Environment (MWE), with the
objective of strengthening implementation of the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC). The Ministry has recently developed a Climate Change policy, and
is currently developing a road map for policy implementation. The CCU is currently receiving
support from a number of development partners, including in the area of adaptation.
The Uganda Nutrition Action Plan (UNAP) (2011 to 2016) sets an ambitious agenda to reduce
malnutrition levels among women of reproductive age, infants and young children. The plan aims
to scale up cost-effective, community-based initiatives that emphasise prevention and control of
malnutrition; establish an enabling legal environment and strong institutional capacity; strengthen
food security and nutrition programmes; and conduct operational research. Programme activities,
working at district level, aim to ensure that nutritional interventions work towards building longerterm community resilience. The UNAP acknowledges the current weaknesses in capacity,
coordination and nutrition-related services in Uganda; it does not however address disaster
preparedness and risk management issues. A plan is currently under development for the roll out
of a comprehensive package of interventions in three priority regions, including Karamoja.
Implementation is due to start in mid to late 2013, although to date only a limited amount of
additional finances have been received to enable implementation.
The Shift from Humanitarian Response to Sustainable Development: Since 2010 there has
been a major shift in development partners’ programmes from humanitarian assistance to
livelihood protection and promotion. The shift was reflected by the phase out of European
Commission Humanitarian Aid (ECHO) and the United Nations Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) in 2011, and was supported by the main humanitarian donors
(ECHO; USAID; DFID)48. Karamoja had received relief assistance for more that forty years,
meeting short-term needs but with a limited focus on development. General food distributions
peaked in 2009 with 90% of the population receiving food rations. Changes in the food
assistance strategy to direct assistance to extremely vulnerable households, and support via
public works programmes followed a change in the phase of the Integrated Food Security and
Humanitarian Phase Classification System (IPC)49 to moderate food insecurity.
During the phase out period OCHA continued to support coordination via support to OPM and the
introduction of an integrated UN coordination system. Support was also provided for the
development of district contingency plans, although the emergency response fund (ERFix) was
phased out in 2011. OCHA’s final recommendations included: a strengthening of early warning,
emergency preparedness and response planning, the scale up of existing livelihood programmes,
further support to soil, water, and rangeland management and the control of crop and animal
diseases.50.
ECHO involvement in Karamoja was phased out at the end of 2011, with only limited activities
continuing until 2013 via ECHO’s Regional Drought Preparedness Decision, and Regional
Learning and Advocacy Programme for Vulnerable Dryland Communities (REGLAP). These
included: the development of a Drought Early Warning System by ACTEDx; IPCxi, and food
security and livelihoods analysis (FAO); support to the Integrated Management of Acute
Malnutrition (IMAM) and nutritional surveillance system (UNICEF, ACF, Concern Worldwide); and
ix
ERF was established in 2009 by the Humanitarian Coordinator to support rapid responses
at the onset of a new emergency, with a financial ceiling of one million $ US.
x DEWS was based on the Arid Lands Resources Management Programme (ALRMP) Kenya
xi IPC is a standardised, transparent and consensus-based classification of acute and chronic
food insecurity.
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development of community based disaster risk reduction programmes and livestock disease
surveillance (through an NGO consortium led by Dan Church Aid).
FAO’s IPC and food security and DRR assessments have helped generate an improved
understanding of food security and livelihoods in Karamoja, enabling the shift from food relief to
more effective programming options, including the design of the EC’s Karamoja Livelihood
Improvement Programme (KALIP)51. Although KALIP complements previous programmes, it
does not have the necessary size or flexibility to match all the elements of the ECHO
programmes52.
What are we and others doing?53 The EC and USAID have both developed livelihoods and
food security programmes. KALIP (2011-5) covers a limited geographical area, and is focused on
building productive assets; increasing farmer productivity, food security and income generation
and strengthening local government. USAID, via a Food for Peace programme (US$ 100 M
2012-7), is sponsoring Mercy Corps and ACDI / VOCA programmes in agribusiness, financial
services, enterprise development, community development and food security and nutrition. A
clear objective of these programmes is agriculture and livestock productivity, including expansion
of market access and diversification.
The GoU’s Expanding Social Protection Programme ((ESP 2009-15), supported by DFID, is
piloting a cash transfer system for senior citizens and vulnerable families, including in four
districts in Karamoja. DFID also funds specific components of the Northern Uganda Social Action
Fund (second phase - NUSAF II), a World Bank (WB) programme that seeks to improve access
in Northern Uganda to income-earning opportunities and better basic socio-economic services.
DFID is also funding the public works (PWP) component of NUSAF II in Karamoja via the World
Food Programme (WFP), and has previously funded the supplementary feeding component of
WFP’s Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation (PRRO). The PRRO and PWPs have recently
been evaluated, with recommendations to continue support contingent on the adoption of
changes to programme objectives and design54 55.
DFID also provided nutritional assistance through WFP and UNICEF (2011-2013) in response to
drought and poor harvestsxii. Support was provided to WFP’s community based supplementary
feeding programme (CBSFP) under the PRRO, and to UNICEF’s Integrated Management of
Acute Malnutrition (IMAM), nutritional surveillance and water, sanitation and hygiene promotion
(WASH) programmes. The Project Completion Report56 (PCR) noted that although the
programme had a considerable impact, malnutrition rates had not been maintained within WHO
emergency thresholdsxiii, and recommended that stabilisation of the nutritional situation should be
considered a priority in the short term.
6. Enhancing Resilience is a High Priorityxiv
It will take many years to reduce chronic food insecurity and vulnerability in Karamoja. The shift
from humanitarian assistance has been accompanied by declining levels of external assistance,
with a primary focus on livelihood promotion without adequate attention to programmes that
target the most vulnerable57. It is highly likely that the people of Karamoja will require
humanitarian assistance in the short term given both the level of vulnerability of the population
and the likelihood of an extreme or other weather and climate event.
There is an immediate need to scale up programmes that address the vulnerability of agro
pastoralists and pastoralists while maintaining and improving emergency preparedness and
xii
Sustaining Nutritional Assistance in Karamoja Programme
10% Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) and 2% Severe Acute Malnutrition (SAM).
xiv Disaster resilience is the ability of countries, communities and households to manage
change, by maintaining or transforming living standards in the face of shocks or stresses such as earthquakes, drought or violent conflict – without compromising their long-term
prospects (Defining Disaster Resilience: A DFID Approach Paper, 2012).
xiii
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response capacities. Livelihood programmes, programmes which target the vulnerable, and
disaster risk management and early warning and response systems require immediate support.
In the short to medium-term programmes will need to more effectively address challenges such
as the limited technical and administrative capacity of government and local partners to manage
and coordinate these programmes. Immediate needs can be considered in terms of four broad
categories:
a) Strengthened early warning preparedness and response systems: good local data and a
functional early warning system are essential for effective response. However, many of the
former early warning programmes were discontinued in 2011 due to lack of funds – this
includes the IPC and livelihood analysis.58 The ACTED supported drought early warning
system (DEWS), nutritional surveillance and animal health surveillance systems are due to
end in 2013. Previous efforts have not been well coordinated, and the system is in need of
rationalisation.
District contingency plans need updating, along with the development of preparedness and
response plans. Institutionalisation of the contingency planning processes remains a critical
challenge. In the short term programmes should support district authorities, building stronger
links with other implementing partners and developing national programmes. An evaluation
of previous programmes and a district capacity needs assessment are required.
Rapid access to funding is central to the effective functioning of early warning systems and
response plans. Despite the regular and predictable occurrence of both spikes in need, and
disasters, these funding mechanisms are not in place. In the short term, an emergency
response fund is needed, along with a risk facility to enable a rapid call down of additional
funds. In the medium term the possibility of developing centralised response funds should be
considered. There are currently no early pre-planned responses to reduce the impact of the
next disaster event. These need to be researched, developed and piloted. Given the
centrality of market failure as a cause of food insecurity, work on developing emergency
market interventions should be prioritised.
b) Strengthening livelihoods: the public works component of KALIP is based on cash for work,
with a focus on soil and water production and management, and agricultural production and
storage.59 Although public works programmes (PWPs) are implemented across Karamoja,
coverage is insufficient to reach all vulnerable households who could and would be interested
in participating. In addition to the creation of assets PWPs provide an important consumption
smoothing function, which could be scaled up in the event of shock / disaster. A wellcoordinated programme, incorporating the lessons from recent evaluations could add
significant value60.
A key issue highlighted in the evaluation of the WFP NUSAF II programme, was the need to
reconsider the current approach to supporting pastoralist livelihoods. The mid-term review of
KALIP61 noted that Agro Pastoral Field Schools (APFS) are effective in promoting knowledge
and best practises in agriculture and livestock management, as entry points for village
savings and loans groups and animal health programmes. Given the contribution of animal
disease to morbidity and mortality, scaling up animal health and surveillance interventions
would provide a good return on investment62. The livestock value chain includes improved
pastureland productivity and water supply. Water is essential to the resilience of livestock and
pasture, and programmes should be informed by the development of an integrated watershed
management approach.
c) Improving nutrition status: there is a high level of nutritional vulnerability among young
children and women in Karamoja63. Addressing the various forms of undernutrition involves
tackling the immediate, underlying and root causes of the problem. It also involves building
resilient strategies and contingencies to ensure that people are able to maintain their
10
nutritional status throughout the year and when more severe shocks arise. This process will
take years. The objective in the short term should be to stabilise acute undernutrition, in the
medium term to reduce acute undernutrition and in the long term to reduce chronic
undernutrition whilst continuing to protect gains from shocks and disasters.
d) Improving coordination, analysis and lesson learning: the inefficiencies caused by poor
coordination in Karamoja between different agencies, donors and governments cannot be
overemphasised. Government has taken over the responsibility of coordination since the
departure of the humanitarian agencies (led by UN OCHA), however capacity for coordination
is limited and in need of strengthening. Any engagement in Karamoja should ensure that
effective strategies are developed which will improve coordination structures, both through
effective analysis and the sharing of information, and capacity support to the relevant
agencies, and district and national government partners. A more co-ordinated approach
amongst development partners is likely to increase the possibility of influencing relevant
national policies, including those on settlement and pastoralism. There is an opportunity to
influence the development of climate resilient growth related programmes in the medium to
long term given that most programmes supported by the Government and other development
partners are due to end in 2-3 years. (Table 1).
Table 1. Summary of Relevant Programmes Timelines
PROGRAMME
This project
PRDP 2 / KIDP
Post-PRDP
KALIP
NUSAF11
ESP
WB
Regional
Pastoral
Livelihood
Resilience Project
IGAD
Drought
Resilience
DONOR/COUNTRY
DFID Uganda
GoU OPM
GoU OPM
EU Uganda
Karamoja
WB Uganda
Northern
DFID Uganda
WB Regional
<2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016>
IGAD
Developing more rigorous evidence, together with the consideration and application of lessons
from relevant DFID and regional programmes (see Table 2) will assist in the design and
development of more effective and efficient programmes in the mid to long term. Although it is
important to be realistic in terms of what can be achieved in the short term, given the
opportunities to influence the development of future programmes, it will be important to make a
significant investment in action learning and analysis to ensure evidence based engagement.
Challenges that will need to be considered when designing resilience strategies in Karamoja646566
include:

The perception in Government that pastoralism is unsustainable and incompatible with
development67

Expansion of settled agriculture in dry areas is a risky strategy for farmers; reduces
pastoralist mobility and increases levels of cattle raiding and personal insecurity6869.

The increasing degradation of the natural resource base70

The high prevalence of chronic and acute malnutrition71

The lack of effective early warning and response systems
11

The increase in the number of vulnerable settled communities. The scope and scale of
existing programmes is currently inadequate to meet growing demand72
7. Rationale for the DFID Intervention
Climate extremes and other weather and climate events are becoming increasingly frequent and
severe in Karamoja while the natural resources on which the population depends are increasingly
degraded. Based on available data a major climate related impact is likely to happen within the
next two to three years. Given the high vulnerability of the population, and the lack of
preparedness and response plans, DFID will otherwise be called upon to support a humanitarian
response which risks being both late, and based on food relief. This will further undermine the
livelihoods of the population, increase current levels of vulnerability, and negatively impact
development oriented strategies. Activities proposed in the programme aim to mitigate against
this risk, increase the resilience and capacity of the population, and provide value for money.
There is now compelling evidence that the impact of disasters can be significantly mitigated by
building the resilience of countries and people, and addressing the root causes of vulnerability.
The right combination of humanitarian, development and political action can reduce unnecessary
loss of life and suffering, in the long-term reducing the need for humanitarian aid. Investing in
resilience is much better value for money. A DFID CHASE funded study in Kenya and Ethiopia
comparing the costs of a late humanitarian response with early response and longer term
resilience investments, found that, over a 20 year period, every $1 spent on resilience resulted in
$2.9 saved in the form of reduced humanitarian spend, avoided loses and development gains73.
The high incidence of poverty and levels of vulnerability, malnutrition, and disaster risk make a
strong case for DFID intervention. The scale and depth of need suggests prioritising livelihoods
and public works programmes. There is also a funding gap in a number of other critical areas due
to the withdrawal of humanitarian support, for example in the areas of early warning and
response systems, nutritional surveillance and nutrition. Other development partners, particularly
USAID and the EC, have developed programmes based on development instruments which are
unable to meet the shortfall, or scale up, in the short term.
DFID has gained a significant understanding of the issues affecting Karamoja, influencing the
shift from humanitarian assistance to sustainable development, and developing programmes with
a social and livelihoods protection focus. DFID also has a long history of funding humanitarian
responses in Karamoja, including recent support to a scale up of nutrition and WASH
programmes. Building on this experience and further developing existing relationships is a basis
to move forward.
Focussing on resilience provides a framework for both the development of a new programme,
and for influencing the plans, policies and programmes of other development partners. Given that
a number of key programmes are due to end in the next 2-3 years, there is an opportunity to
influence the future development of GoU and development partner programmes and policies
through improved coordination, engagement, and by developing more rigorous evidence. The
application of lessons from regional and global DFID programmes will greatly assist DFID
Uganda in meeting these objectives.
12
The Strategic Case is Coherent With:
DFID Uganda’s Operational Plan: the plan identifies the need to work in Karamoja and to
support the process of moving from humanitarian aid to development planning. This business
case provides the opportunity to move forward with government and partners in the region,
linking DFID Uganda’s current work on social protection, disaster risk reduction and climate
change.
UK Government and DFID Uganda’s priorities towards embedding resilience: the June
2011 response to the Humanitarian Emergency Response Review (HERR) presented disaster
resilience as ‘a new and vital component to the UK Government’s humanitarian and development
work74. Building on this, the UK Government’s Humanitarian Policy75 puts resilience at the centre
of its approach to disasters, both natural and man-made. This includes commitments to embed
resilience-building in all DFID country programmes by 2015, integrate resilience into work on
climate change and conflict prevention and improve the coherence of development and
humanitarian work. The programme is also coherent with Uganda’s Strategic Programme Review
of Climate Change (July 2012), and draft Resilience Strategy (March 2013).
UK Government priorities on nutrition: these are described in ‘Scaling Up Nutrition: The UK’s
Position Paper on Undernutrition’ (September 2011) which commits the UK to scale up on global
undernutrition and in particular to “build longer term capacity to respond to nutritional crises
through multi-year funding”. The UK Government’s Humanitarian Policy (2011), also commits the
UK to address “the root causes of vulnerability”76 and improve links between development and
humanitarian work. This programme will also make a contribution towards meeting the first
Millennium Development Goal (MDG), to end extreme poverty and hunger, and to DFID’s
priorities, as outlined in its Business Plan for 2011-15 to ‘Improve the coherence and
performance of British international development policy in fragile and conflict-affected
countries’77.
UK Government priorities on climate change
Financing for the programme is from the International Climate Fund (ICF) - a dedicated crossgovernment fund for developing countries to support projects related to climate change. The
Enhancing Resilience in Karamoja programme was endorsed by the ICF to work up a Business
Case after the April 2012 ICF competitive bidding process based on the ICF selection criteria. It
was regarded as sufficiently transformational, and in line with the ICF’s strategy, in particular the
strategy’s objective of supporting poor and vulnerable people in developing countries to respond
effectively to existing climate variability and the future impacts of climate change. The programme
is in line with a number of the priority sectors and interventions identified by the ICF for support.
These include:






Disaster risk reduction and early warning systems;
Addressing the impacts of climate change on girls and women;
Social protection measures and their integration with disaster risk reduction initiatives;
Support to health systems and deepening knowledge and action on specific impacts (e.g.
malnutrition);
Scaled up delivery of programmes in a range of key vulnerable sectors that are critical to
poor people’s livelihoods and growth;
Building knowledge, capacity, institutions and evidence.
This programme has been designed taking into consideration other similar DFID programmes in
the region and globally. The programme will both contribute to the evidence base developed
through implementation and draw upon lessons and evidence for other programmes, including
the expertise of DFID staff.
13
Table 2. Summary Relevant DFID Programmes
Programme
Country / Time
Period
Potential for cross-learning.
Productive Safety Nets Programme
(PSNP)
DFID Ethiopia, World
Bank (2010 – 2014)

Climate Smart Initiative (CSI)
integrates resilience into PSNP
Building Resilience through Asset
Creation & Enhancement (BRACE)
DFID South Sudan
(2013 – 15)

Moving from humanitarian to
development environment
Livelihoods and Food Security
Programme (LFSP)
DFID Zimbabwe
(2013 – 7),

Ethiopia Peace & Development
Programme (DDP)
DFID Ethiopia (2013
– 18)


PSNP component, innovative
links with markets, strong focus
on nutrition
Pastoralist Somali Region
Moving from humanitarian to
development
Building Resilient & Adaptive
Livelihoods In Kenya’s Arid & SemiArid Lands (ASAL)
Strengthening Adaptation and
Resilience to Climate change in Kenya
(StARCK)
DFID Kenya (201122015)

DFID Kenya (20122014)



Community-level climate change
adaptation
Risk Financing Mechanism
Catalyses private sector
investment
Invests also in civil society
capacity
B. Impact and Outcome that we expect to achieve
The programme will directly contribute to the achievement of the following targets set out in the
UK’s position paper on undernutrition, and those of the International Climate Fund (ICF):


The number of people supported to cope with the effects of climate change
Number of children under five and pregnant women reached through DFID's nutritionrelevant programmes.
The overall impact of the programme will be increased resilience of the population of Karamoja
to climate extremes and weather events.
Potential indicators include:
 Number of people indirectly supported to cope with the effects of weather and extreme
climate events through early warning and preparedness systems (ICF indicator 1)
 Extent to which the Programme is likely to have a transformational impact (ICF indicator
15). For example through the integration of resilience into other development partners
programmes; use of evidence and lessons developed by the programme; impact on
coordination and planning structures.
The specific outcome of the programme will be increased resilience of target communities to
climate extremes and weather events.
Potential indicators include :
 700,000 people directly supported to cope with the effects of climate change
(community nutrition, animal health, public works) (ICF indicator)
 Stabilisation in prevalence of Global (GAM) & Severe Acute Malnutrition (SAM) in
children aged 6-59 months: GAM <10%; SAM < 2%
14
Programme results will provide a platform which will inform and influence programme and policy
development based on a better understanding of what does and what doesn’t work. This will
inform DFID’s future engagement in the region, and support improved coordination with other
development partners and the Government of Uganda.
15
Appraisal Case
A. General overview: Theory of Change
The following Theory of Change (TOC) shows how the programme’s outcome and impact,
described in the Strategic Case, may be achieved by a series of potential outputs and activities to
be identified in a preferred option.
Impact
Increased resilience of the population of Karamoja to climate extremes and weather events
Expected Step change 3: 1.2 million people – the population of Karamoja are made more climate resilient
(longer term) through strengthened early warning and response systems and the integration of resilience
into government and development partner’s policies and programmes.
Outcome
Increased resilience of targeted communities to climate
extremes and weather events
Expected Step Change 2: Up to 700,000 people directly benefit from programme interventions that reduce
short term vulnerability and increase their resilience.
Outputs
1) Implementation
and delivery of
programmes
targeting
vulnerable
groups.
2) Implementation
and delivery of
strengthened
food security and
livelihoods
programmes
3) Strengthened
early warning,
preparedness
and response
systems
4) Improved
development
coordination in
Karamoja
5) Strengthened
evidence and
lesson learning
that further
improve
resilience in the
longer-term
Expected Step Change 1: Funding targeted on high VfM inputs maintains current resilience and
builds evidence base for the future
Inputs
Community
based nutrition
Cash and food
transfers
Rebuild
community assets
through public
works
Strengthen
pastoralist
livelihoods
Natural resource
management
Nutrition, animal
health and food
security
information
systems
Support to
existing
coordination
structures
Technical
assistance
Innovative pilots
Robust analysis
Risk
management
financing
Emergency
preparedness
and response
The Strategic Case provided the context regarding climate change, climate variability and
livelihoods in Karamoja. It showed that Karamoja is moving from a situation of humanitarian
support needs to one where long term support to sustainable development can and must be
provided, and it argued that building resilience is a high priority.
16
A number of conditions that would facilitate this change were detailed: firstly, that building
resilience requires strengthening programmes targeting vulnerable groups; secondly, that it
requires livelihoods to be strengthened; thirdly, that effective early warning and response
systems be developed; and finally, that in Karamoja the entire process requires improved
coordination, analysis and lesson learning. It further outlined the policy context, provided detail
about DFID’s national and regional programmes, as well as those of other development
partners. It provided evidence underpinning the intervention, and gave a justification for DFID
to adopt the business case.
A number of factors will guide the selection of a preferred option for meeting the programme
outcome of increased resilience to climate extremes and weather events in Karamoja these are:
1. High rates of malnutrition and the risk of an extreme or other weather and climate event
make an early start to the programme important;
2. There are funding gaps in key programme areas, and in the support to vulnerable groups,
increasing current vulnerability. For example funding will be required in early 2013 for
effective implementation of public works programmes given seasonal planning and the
need to pre- position food and other programme inputs.
3. The proposed time line for the programme is broadly in line with partner programmes
including the Government of Uganda, World Bank and the European Commission. This
underlines the importance of the transformational and evidence-gathering components of
the programme.
4. Recognising that investment in Karamoja will be required in the medium and long term, the
programme should identify and develop analysis that will inform longer term investments.
5. DFID has frozen financial aid until adequate fiduciary measures have been taken to
guarantee the intended use of UK Aid. This impacts both the proposed use of DFID funds,
and the choice of delivery partners.
6. The need for better coordination to ensure cost effective programming and the
development of a more effective approach to reducing vulnerability in Karamoja. This will
need to take account of the limits to support as a result of the freeze on financial aid.
7. All programmes are designed to build the capacities of local authorities and local
communities, and should develop strategies for sustainability in the mid to long term that
take account of capacity, finance, resource and political constraints.
8. Given instability in the cultural and security context in Karamoja, conflict sensitivity analysis
will need to be mainstreamed into the programme.
9.
Options considered will also take account of the need for equitable distribution of benefits.
17
B. Feasible Options and their Strengths
B1. What are the feasible options that address the needs set out in the strategic
case
The strategic case identified four broad areas of intervention for building resilience and achieving
the outcome and impact statements. These are:

Strengthening programmes targeting vulnerable groups, particularly nutrition programmes
(TOC Output 1)

Strengthening livelihoods and food security (TOC Output 2);

Strengthening early warning, preparedness and response systems (TOC Output 3); and

Improving coordination (TOC Output 4), analysis and lesson learning (TOC Output 5).
The appraisal asks two questions:

Which approach would best achieve the outcome and impact? and;

Which partner(s) are best placed and resourced to implement the recommended
approach? (Section B4)
Two options have been identified based on the strategic analysis, the theory of change, DFID’s
recent programming experience in Karamoja and the key factors influencing design. Both options
are based on the premise that disaster risk reduction and resilience requires a substantive shift
away from emergency food relief in Karamoja, towards interventions that improve livelihoods in the
medium to long term whilst protecting the most vulnerable in the short to medium term. They also
both address the problem of poor coordination in intervention areas and provide for lesson
learning and innovation to inform interventions (for DFID and others) that strengthen resilience in
the longer-term. The two options are appraised against a “do-nothing counterfactual” option.
OPTION A: Food Security
This option is effectively a continuation of the work DFID has been supporting in Karamoja through
the WFP NUSAF II programme, building in lessons and recommendations from the formative
evaluation conducted in 2011 and scaling up support to the public works (PWP) component of the
programme. This approach would help strengthen food security for 200,000 vulnerable but
productive poor people (those with labour capacity) through continued DFID support to public
works programmes, but with a greater focus on soil and watershed management. The programme
would enhance food security through consumption smoothing, providing a food or cash transfer in
return for work, at appropriate times in the season, when food stocks but also labour demand on
own farms is low. In addition, it would contribute to building longer term food security through refocusing PWP asset creation on soil conservation and watershed management, thereby increasing
resilience to climatic conditions and events.
OPTION B: Resilience and Risk Reduction.
This option combines activities described in Option A with those that specifically target vulnerable
women and children, and agro pastoralist and pastoralist livelihoods. It also incorporates early
warning and response systems to reduce the impact of any future disasters which would inevitably
undermine developmental efforts. Specifically Option B would:


Provide development support to the Integrated Management of Acute Malnutrition (IMAM)
and supplementary feeding programmes. This would include therapeutic feeding to 37,500
acutely malnourished children
Strengthen the food security of up to 200,000 productive vulnerable people and protect
environmental assets through public works;
18


Improve animal disease control systems with 800,000 cattle vaccinated against epidemic
diseases.
Strengthen early warning and response systems: with a focus on contingency planning and
response, system coherence, market systems and early response (livelihood protection)
options.
OPTION C: ‘Do Nothing’ Counterfactual
No other sources of finance have been identified to support or scale up the outputs included in this
business case. It may be assumed, therefore, that without DFID assistance there will be an
unchanged, if not reduced, level of development assistance to Karamoja for the next few years.
As such, there is a very high risk that DFID will be asked to contribute to an emergency response
in Karamoja in the short to medium-term, raising questions as to the cost effectiveness of not
supporting programmes that would increase resilience. In the absence of effective early warning
and response systems there is a risk that the response to an impending emergency will be
delayed leading to a major food crisis, a sharp increase in malnutrition and stunting in children and
a return to large scale general food distributions.
DFID would also lose the opportunity to leverage its experience from similar programmes in the
region into the design of future programmes in Karamoja. This would greatly reduce DFID’s ability
to influence the design of future programmes and ensure that resilience and vulnerability are
mainstreamed more broadly into growth and development strategies for the region. This is
considered a high-risk option.
Table 3: Summary of Outputs and Activities for Options A & B.
#
Project Outputs
Activities
1
Implementation and
delivery of
programmes
targeting vulnerable
groups.
Implementation and
delivery of
strengthened food
security and
livelihoods
programmes
Strengthened early
warning and
response systems
Management of Severe Acute Malnutrition
Community Based Supplementary Feeding
(CBSF) moderately malnourished children
& pregnant & lactating women
2
3
4
5
Improved
development
coordination in
Karamoja
Strengthened
evidence &
lesson learning
No. of
beneficiaries /
Level of focus
Option A
No. of
beneficiaries /
Level of focus
Option B
-
40,000
175,000
200,000
200,000
-
Up to 500,000
N/A
Up to 1.2mn
indirectly
District Government capacity
Integrate disaster risk reduction into district
development plans
Low
N/A
High
Medium / High
Baseline food security analysis
Action research on watershed management
Short-term studies and reviews
Innovation Fund
N/A
N/A
Low
PWP focus
High
High
High
Focus on a range of
programme /
research options
Public Works Programme
i.
ii.
iii.
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
v.
Animal health (disease control &
vaccination)
Animal nutrition
Agro-Pastoralist Field Schools
Strengthen existing EWS
Pilot new ‘chronic’ IPC
Animal disease surveillance
Nutrition surveillance
Contingency Fund
19
B2. Programme Output: assessing the strength of the evidence base of feasible
options
This section provides an overview of the expected outputs, and asks the question “on the basis of
the evidence available which approach would achieve the impact and outcome?” It looks
individually at all of the outputs proposed in the Theory of Change. Table 4 provides a summary of
the potential impact on resilience of the various options appraised and the strength of the evidence
supporting this assessment.
Table 4. Option Programme Areas: Summary of Resilience Impact and Evidence Ratings
TOC Outputs
1
2
Implementation and
delivery of
programmes
targeting vulnerable
groups
Implementation and
delivery of
strengthened food
security and
livelihoods
programmes
Options
Resilience
impact
1.Reduced vulnerability of the
most food insecure and
poorest households through
transfers (food, cash,
vouchers) via existing
programmes
2. Increase the nutritional
resilience of children, pregnant
women through community
based nutrition and
supplementary feeding
High in the short term,
but unlikely to
increase resilience in
the mid to long term in
the absence of long
term commitment /
social protection
High – strong links to
nutrition and
resilience especially
in children.
High – we know the impact food aid /
direct transfers. If not a comprehensive
nutrition bundle it will not increase
resilience of the beneficiary.
.
1. Public Works Programmes
Medium/low for
PWPs.
Medium globally but low in Karamoja.
Limited evidence of the long-term impact
of public works programmes in isolated
areas.
1. Animal health (disease
control & vaccination)
2. Animal nutrition
3
Strengthened early
warning and
response systems
Potentially medium to
high in the mid to
short term; depending
on quality and
relevance of the
intervention
High for animal health
Medium
1. Strengthen existing EWS
work via DG
2. Pilot new ‘chronic’ IPC
3. Animal health (disease
surveillance/ diagnosis)
4. Nutrition surveillance
High – directly
contributes to DFID,
government and other
donors future
investments
5. Contingency Fund / Internal
Risk Facility
High as a response to
extreme climate
events
High – will directly
contribute to DFID,
government and other
donors future
investments
High
4
Improved
development
coordination in
Karamoja
1. Building District capacity
2.Integrate disaster risk
reduction into district
development plans
5
Strengthened
evidence and
lesson learning
1. Baseline survey of Karamoja
2. Action research on
watershed management
3. Short-term studies, reviews,
Pilots
4. Innovation fund
Potentially high
Evidence Rating
High – proven results, strong impact
globally.
Medium Karamoja - requires improved
programme effectiveness, capacity
building and commitment to ensure
sustainability.
High; strong Value for Money
Limited evidence for rangeland
management
Medium – evidence that early warning and
response plans improve resilience is
strong. Evidence of what works in
Karamoja is weak.
High; evidence that animal disease
surveillance of limited value without ability
to respond promptly.
High; strong evidence on impact.
Medium – coordination can improve
impact. However effectiveness depends
on implementation capacity.
High. Evidence forms the basis if effective
policies and programmes
As above
20
Output 1. Nutritional Programmes for Vulnerable Groups.
A recent study on resilience in the Sahel noted that “there is no better single indicator of
resilience…than the level of child malnutrition’. It went on to propose that “‘nutrition security’ be
placed at the apex of the pathways to resilience78. People who are well-nourished and who have
been well-nourished from birth are less sick less often, achieve more at school and go on to earn
more during adulthood. Meanwhile, chronically undernourished children are disadvantaged
throughout life and are more likely to have children of their own who are trapped in a cycle of
poverty and under-nutrition79.
Research from crisis prone regions demonstrates the impact of shocks on nutrition outcomes.
Studies in the Gambia have revealed that women who are pregnant during the hunger gap give
birth to smaller babies80. In Ethiopia and Niger, children born during a drought are more likely to be
chronically malnourished later in childhood than those who are not81. The prevalence of chronic
under-nutrition has been found to increase among Bangladeshi children following flooding82. It has
been estimated that more than 20% of adult height variation in developing countries (the physical
sign of having experienced chronic under-nutrition in childhood) is determined by environmental
factors, in particular drought.
Integrated treatment of severe and moderate acute undernutrition
Community-based management of acute malnutrition (CMAM) xv has been shown to be a costeffective strategy for treating life-threatening acute undernutrition83. An effective CMAM
programme in Karamoja will assist in stabilising and reducing the severity of acute undernutrition.
The WFP PRRO and public works programmes (PWPs) have both recently been evaluated,
recommendations indicating the need for continued support based on the adoption of key changes
to programme objectives and design84 85.
Targeted nutritional support for pregnant and lactating women and children < 2 years
Provision of nutritional supplements for pregnant and lactating women and children <2 years has
been shown to be effective for improving the nutritional status of women and children in vulnerable
contexts86. Given the prevalence of under-nutrition among women and very young children, a
specific supplementary ration for these groups could be important to protect nutritional status in
the short and medium term. WFP has been providing a supplement to these groups on condition
that women attend antenatal services and other essential health-related activities, reporting that
this strategy has improved uptake of health services and has reduced incidence of low birth weight
– this area requires further research and analysis.
Expand promotion of optimal infant and young child feeding practices (IYCF)
It is well established that improvements in breastfeeding and complementary feeding practices
have positive impacts on child growth and reduce the risk of both chronic and acute undernutrition. Interventions that promote improved IYCF practices in Karamoja could achieve a
stabilisation in acute under-nutrition. There is a lack of evidence of the most effective strategies for
improving IYCF practices in Uganda, and a lack of understanding of the barriers to improved IYCF
in Karamoja. A global review of IYCF promotion did identify that a combination of messaging
through health staff, community health workers as well as through peer-to-peer community groups
can be effective. As part of a preventative strategy support could be provided to the development
of IYCF promotion on the basis of formative research into the barriers in Karamoja.
There is good international evidence for interventions which directly address undernutrition, in
xv
CMAM is also referred to as IMAM (Integrated Management of Acute Malnutrition) or CTC
(Community-based Therapeutic Care).
21
particular those delivered through the health sector87. Given the lack of investment in health
service capacity in Karamoja, and lack of clarity on the responsibilities of Village Health Teams
(VHTs), there is a high risk of poor delivery. Effective technical assistance, capacity building, and
coordination between implementing agencies will be essential.
Summary of Evidence Output 1: There is strong evidence that nutritional support to children,
pregnant women and lactating mothers will deliver increased resilience. Option B preferable to
Option A.
Output 2: Strengthened Food Security and Livelihoods Programmes
2.1. Public Works Programmes (PWPs)
Public works programmes are seen as making an important contribution in the shift away from
emergency assistance to longer-term support for development. However a 2009 study of PWPs
across Sub-Saharan Africa concluded that “the limited availability and poor quality of primary data
from 167 public works programmes on programme cost, outputs, outcomes and the socioeconomic profile of programme participants limit the potential for addressing questions of cost,
targeting or impact in the region”88.
In 2012/3, evidence of the impact of PWPs was still limited. The formative evaluation of the
NUSAF II WFP programme, which targets vulnerable households with labour capacity, found
evidence of a positive impact on short term food security through consumption smoothing89
however, there was little evidence of a wider impact on long term resilience. The latter has proved
more elusive in general with few notable exceptions. The Ethiopian Productive Safety Nets
Programme (PSNP) provides valuable evidence on how to support governments in moving away
from annual humanitarian emergency appeals90. It combines labour intensive public works with
direct food or cash transfers to the most vulnerable households. Relevant lessons for PWPs in
Karamoja include:



Regular and predictable cash transfers (whether from public works or directly to
households) are crucial to success;
Graduation criteria (5 years) were overambitious; and
It is important to tailor the interventions to two types of beneficiary; those with the long-term
capacity to graduate out of poverty and others with chronic challenges.
The formative evaluation of the Uganda NUSAF II WFP PWP recommended that re-orientation of
the asset creation component would be needed to increase value for money, building longer term
resilience through a focus on quality assets which address under-lying barriers to food security91.
Evaluations of the WFP NUSAF II PWP and PRRO92 recommended the need for:





Improved focus and delivery mechanisms
Greater focus on the PWP component of NUSAF II.
Improved targeting and analysis of underlying causes of food insecurity
Evidence of the impact, and monitoring of nutrition outcomes
Incorporation of gender and conflict sensitivity analysis
The evidence suggests that strengthening livelihoods, and building assets, poses significant
challenges for PWPs. The high cost of the WFP NUSAF II PWP is largely due to the cost of food
distributions, and the possibility of a transition to cash / voucher systems should therefore be
assessed. PWPs play an important role in providing assistance to vulnerable households in
Karamoja. Given the high levels of vulnerability, and in the absence of alternatives, there is a
strong case for funding to PWPs to continue. However, funding should be contingent on the
implementation of evaluation findings, and the development of evidence. The implementation of
PWPs should also inform and be informed by relevant reviews and evaluations, and feed into the
22
development of the GoU’s Social Protection Policy.
2.2. Strengthened settled and agro-pastoralist livelihoods.
WFP NUSAF II and the Karamoja Livelihoods Improvement Programme (KALIP) aim to strengthen
and diversify livelihoods. The Household Income Support Programme (HISP) component of WFP
NUSAF II also provides inputs and training to individual and small groups of poor households and
aims to enhance productivity and diversify livelihoods. The formative evaluation of the WFP
NUSAF II programme however recommended that WFP focus on PWPs and transfer the HISP, or
improve the links, with the livelihood programmes of KALIP / FAO.
KALIP is focused on building productive assets, increasing farmer productivity, food security and
income generation. Amongst its components KALIP includes programmes to improve livestock
health and nutrition. Similar programmes are also supported by a Dan Church aid led NGO
consortium. The USAID funded Mercy Corps and ACDI / VOCA programmes are focused on
agribusiness, financial services, enterprise development, community development and food
security and nutrition. A clear objective of these programmes is to support agriculture and livestock
productivity, including through expanded market access and diversification. It will be important for
the DFID supported programme to effectively coordinate with and learn lessons from these
programmes. Mercy Corps intend to pilot a number of innovative market and livestock
development approaches which could be supported through the innovation fund component of this
programme.
KALIP includes support to Agro-Pastoral Field Schools (APFS), which could also be scaled up
under this programme. APFS have been developed from the Farmer Field School (FFS)
methodology introduced into Uganda in 1999. There is some evidence that the FFS approach has
imparted skills and technologies to households which have enabled an increase in production,
productivity and incomes9394. APFS aim to improve livestock and crop production through a
combination of water harvest technologies, participatory extension and use of the Community
Animal Health Worker (CAHW) system. The KALIP Mid Term Review95 concluded that APFS are
effective tools to strengthen livelihoods, and provide an effective entry point to address livestock
nutrition, rangelands, environment conservation and soil and water management.
2.3. Animal Health
Livestock production has been neglected in development programmes in Karamoja, despite the
fact that pastoralism and agro-pastoralism are the dominant livelihood strategies. Surveys in
Karamoja confirm that animal disease control is a high priority of livestock owners96.
The World Organization for Animal Health97 concluded that the benefits of preventing transboundary animal diseases (surveillance and vaccination before an outbreak) greatly exceed the
costs of controlling an outbreak (vaccination after an outbreak and/or slaughter). In Africa it has
been estimated that an investment of Euro 14.7 million to control contagious bovine
pleuropneumonia (CBPP) could save Euro 30 million in losses from morbidity/mortality, leading to
a net benefit of Euro 15.3 million98.
Support is currently provided to government production departments and the CAHW system by
KALIP, and the ECHO supported NGO consortium. FAO has been building the Government’s
capacity to control animal diseases for a number of years, including in Karamoja, where it has
supported vaccination campaigns (2010) which led to the removal of a livestock movement
quarantine.
2.4. Soil, water and rangeland management
Studies implemented as part of KALIP have noted a serious degradation of Karamoja rangelands.
Changes in weather patterns, and the possibility of an increased frequency in extreme climate
23
events, underline the importance of effective rangeland and water shed management. The KALIP
MTR noting that upgrading rangelands should be a priority for future programming. Household
livelihoods depend on sustainable access to water and soil resources, and although evidence on
the benefits of soil and water management at household level is not extensive there are examples
of high returns:



A DFID-funded project in Malawi supporting crop diversification, soil and water
conservation, and provision of drought-resistant livestock, has yielded a Benefit Cost
Ratios (BCR) of between 24.30 and 37.32 depending on the underlying assumptions99:
The DFID-funded Protracted Relief Programme (PRP) in Zimbabwe has shown that small
scale projects (conservation farming; seeds, fertilisers and small stock distribution; crop
diversification) which aimed to increase food security showed a BCR of between 1.6 and
17.2100 depending on the intervention;
A small water-shed project in Rajasthan assessed by Sahu (2008)101 showed BCR of
2.14102.
The scaling-up of watershed management programmes present particular challenges. A World
Bank Paper103 highlighted two major concerns:


Watershed management programmes have not always been demonstrably pro-poor; and
Watershed management programmes have focused on micro-level activities and
institutions upstream but have produced little or no evidence of impacts on downstream
areas. This concern is of particular relevance to pastoralist livelihoods in Karamoja.
Benefits from rangeland improvement practices can be even more difficult to estimate104. The
prolonged time scale and number of externalities make it difficult to assess the economic benefits
of rehabilitating natural resources, particularly those with intrinsically low value, with limited (or
largely social) benefits, and with high rehabilitation costs.
Summary of Evidence Output 2. The evidence on PWPs is strong in terms of aiding
consumption smoothing but low to medium in terms of impact on poverty and resilience outcomes,
depending on the relevance and quality of the assets. Animal health evidence, by contrast, is
considered strong. Settled agriculture over much of Karamoja is high risk – the priority for these
communities is to diversify livelihoods. A focus on this area should be considered a priority in the
programme. A review of programmes that enable livelihood diversification should be implemented
as part of the programmes learning component. Soil and water, and rangeland management are
important in building resilience but the evidence is weak – this area could be piloted under the
programme and included in the learning and evidence component. Overall, Option B is preferred
given its stronger focus on lesson learning and improving performance on PWPs, the importance
of animal health to pastoralists and agro pastoralists, and its stronger VfM (see Economic
appraisal).
Output 3: Early Warning, Preparedness and Response Systems.
Surveillance and early warning systems are promoted as important elements of a coherent
approach to under-nutrition in shock prone contexts. There is strong global evidence of the
benefits of weather services and early warning systems for natural disasters. They provide good
value for money and positive benefit/cost ratios, typically in excess of four and often higher in the
case of floods and cyclones105. However, they may not pay in the case of high cost “over-built”
specialized early warning systems designed to reduce risks from low-frequency events106’107.
The value of nutritional data, information and analysis in galvanising action, strengthening
approaches and preventing nutritional emergencies has been demonstrated in a number of
contexts. Timely/regular data collection to monitor changes in nutrition is recommended in the
Uganda Nutrition Action Plan (UNAP). The nutritional surveillance system established by UNICEF
24
and Action Against Hunger (ACF) has produced some extremely useful information. However
weak analysis, a lack of collaboration with government institutions and other actors, and limited
linkages with drought and food security surveillance systems has meant that this system has been
largely under-utilised.
The Uganda Drought Early Warning System (DEWS) was established in 2008, funded by
European Commission Humanitarian Affairs and Civil Protection Office (ECHO). Its main objective
was to build resilience to drought, implemented in seven districts of Karamoja by ACTED in
collaboration with local and national governments, international organizations and UN agencies.
The DEWS is largely implemented by the district local government, with all activities from data
collection to analysis and production undertaken by district officials. A recent review of the system
considered it to be cost-effective, have effective methods of collecting, analysing and
disseminating information, and to provide credible and much needed advance information on
drought risk. However problems were noted in the ability to link the information to a timely
response due to constraints in preparedness and response systems108. ACTED is also supporting
the Uganda Meteorological Department to operate its own local stations to record rainfall,
temperature and wind speed, and has begun the process of developing a national coordination
system. ECHO funding to DEWS programme will be discontinued in mid- 2013.
The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) aims to provide an objective, evidencebased and transparent analysis of food insecurity issues. The aim of the IPC is to provide a
common classification, comparable over space and time, with early warning triggers calibrated to
identify crises of similar severity in different circumstances. IPC uses all available information
including classic early warning and conflict indicators. It produces high quality maps for the
Greater Horn of Africa and is active in several other African countries, as well as parts of Asia.
These maps are now the agreed global standard with the US-funded Famine Early Warning
Systems Network (FEWS NET), the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), the World Food
Programme (WFP), other United Nations agencies and most large NGOs. The IPC food security
severity classification was the agreed standard in the analysis and response to the recent Horn of
Africa famine.
National food security analysts of government and regional agencies, UN, and non-governmental
organisations work together in an institutionalised IPC technical working group. Following an
encouraging initial rollout in Uganda under the leadership of FAO, the IPC has come almost to a
standstill, largely due to a lack of funding. FAO plans to initiate new work on the programme in
2013, using core funds provided by DFID centrally. Additional funds are required for a full roll out
of the programme, and the piloting of a chronic vulnerability methodology in Karamoja.
Support to early warning and vulnerability systems should include a review to ensure coherence in
use and planning, and an analysis of sustainability options given weak and poorly resourced
government systems.
Preparedness and response
OCHA previously provided assistance in the development of preparedness and response systems,
including the development of contingency plans and management of an early response fund. This
responsibility now lies with OPM and the District Disaster Management Technical Committees
(DDMTC) which is operational in Karamoja. Both OPM and the DDMTCs are under resourced,
and require assistance and additional financing to perform their functions. FAO has been piloting
early response mechanisms including irrigated fodder production, the creation of feed banks and
the production of Livestock Emergency Guidelines (LEGS) which set out standards for livestock
interventions in humanitarian crises.
The development of effective contingency and preparedness plans, and funds to operationalize
these plans, are essential components of disaster risk management. There is little incentive to
25
draft detailed plans if there is no money to implement them. Contingency plans and funds are not
available outside of the operational plans of implementing agencies – WFP is probably best
prepared to implement a response in Karamoja. The programme should fund, and develop
preparedness and response systems and capacity, and develop links to programmes with similar
objectives, for example those of the Uganda Red Cross, and UNDP.
Contingency funds & internal risk financing
As outlined in the strategic case, Karamoja is highly susceptible to weather related shocks. The
likelihood of rain failure leading to drought and failed harvests during the implementation period is
high. While it is impossible to predict what will happen over the three years of the programme,
recommendations from ICAI suggest that flexible funding arrangements should be in place to deal
with such challenges109. Recent research undertaken in Kenya and Ethiopia110 suggests that
providing assistance before a crisis reaches maturity is more economical and results in better
outcomes for people than provision of emergency aid. Rapid response humanitarian aid is often
expensive and does not provide the time needed to properly plan and develop initiatives that build
sustainability.
An internal contingency fund would allow additional resources to be rapidly channelled through the
programme to respond to spikes in need, while additional sources of predictable funding through
an internal risk facility (IRF) would ensure that DFID can release funds in a timely way in the event
of significant increases in vulnerability. The amount to be included in the IRF should be a
proportionate amount that would enable the UK to plan a significant catalytic role in funding early
action. Based on preliminary analysis, if a similar scenario to 2008/9111 was to occur approximately
$5m would be required to urgently scale up emergency food, nutritional security and human and
animal health interventions.
Summary of Evidence Output 3: The evidence for the value of EWS if they are not overdesigned
and use good data is considered to be strong. A combination of the IPC, DEWS and nutrition and
animal health surveillance would provide an essential and comprehensive EWS for Karamoja. The
programme should also contain a contingency fund for immediate response; develop an internal
risk facility and support and pilot programmes that are developing early response options. Option
B preferred to Option A.
Output 4. Improved Coordination
There are many examples in the literature which highlight the need to develop mechanisms which
strengthen coordination and minimise duplication112113 while the central role of governments in
successful transition from short to longer term responses is widely acknowledged in fragile and
conflict affected states114. Evidence of the impact and sustainability of short term capacity building
to enhance coordination in Karamoja is low, while government capacity is weak. Programmes that
assist coordination objectives should also provide analysis that enables the development of more
effective mechanisms in the medium to long term.
The programme is operating in a political climate where, particularly following the suspension of
financial aid following the corruption case in OPM, it is difficult to work directly with key parts of
government. Collaboration and capacity building of district government should be a short term
priority, developing links to relevant national and regional coordination structures. Assistance to
local government should include:
i)
ii)
iii)
iv)
Building capacity to optimise the contribution to achieving specific outputs e.g. PWPs,
community nutrition; animal health;
Consulting and liaising with local government, including presentations to Chief
Administrative Officers (CAOs);
Help to minimise the current duplication of effort and unaligned activities;
Analysis of programme coverage to inform more effective coordination and development
26
planning
The assumption is that district governments are willing to work closely with implementing partners
and that there is adequate common ground among development partners to collaborate. The main
risk will be the willingness of government to fully engage with implementing partners in developing
more effective coordination given that the programme is not providing funds directly to government
coordination structures given current restrictions on the use of financial aid.
Summary of Evidence Output 4: the evidence for the importance of coordination to achieving the
outcome and impact is judged to be medium; it is qualitative and based on empirical evidence115
116
.
Output 5. Strengthened Evidence & Lesson Learning.
This area of work will complement the activities and programmes outlined above, and includes:
1. Formative and operational research: designing and researching specific analysis to inform
implementation and future programme development to maximise impact;
2. Compiling lessons learnt and testing new approaches, with the aim of informing future
interventions, and strengthening resilience in the medium to long-term;
3. Policy dialogue and strategic influencing: in order to support sustainability and leverage
greater impact.
Activities under component 1 may include:
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
v.
Research and analysis on whether the provision of a nutritional supplement could act as an
artificial incentive for women to attend essential health services, masking the underlying
reasons why they do not use these.
Formative research into the barriers to improved infant and young child feeding practices.
Support to the nutrition surveillance system to strengthen understanding of how to support
the nutrition security of women and children more effectively throughout the year.
Development of a comprehensive food security baseline and the implementation of
seasonal assessments to provide actionable knowledge for decision-making and response
at both community and district levels, for use by district government and development
partners.
Action research in watershed management encompassing both technical and social
research. This will assess the suitability and relevance of implementing a communitybased integrated watershed management programme.
Activities under component 2 include:
i.
A general lesson learning function, built around key partnerships at both national and regional
level
ii. Management of an innovation fund, which will create opportunities for new ideas to be
developed and piloted.
The immediate priorities for the innovation fund will be refined through an inception phase in
consultation with partner agencies, development partners and the Government. Priorities may
include:
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
Political economy analysis.
Gender analysis across all programme components.
Conflict sensitivity analysis across all programme components
An impact evaluation of the targeting and contribution of public works programmes in
rebuilding assets, strengthening livelihoods and protecting environmental services.
v. A review of the application and use of low carbon technologies.
vi. A review of environmental and natural resource management programme approaches.
27
vii. A review of capacity building programmes.
Policy dialogue and strategic influencing is one of the most important aims of the programme.
Summary of Evidence Output 5: Option B is considered preferable over Option A given the
increased focus on action research and learning.
B3. Appraisal of each option: the evidence base
This answers the question: “on the basis of evidence above, which is the best option?”
Option
A
B
Evidence rating
Medium
Strong
On the strength of the evidence Option B is the preferred option. It will make a developmental
impact in the short-term whilst having greater potential for addressing the fundamental challenges
faced in building resilience in Karamoja over the mid to long term. The programme will also
explore options for the vulnerable, dependent poor in Karamoja to receive long-term support from
social protection programmes.
Evidence is considered strong for Option B because of inclusion of:
i)
ii)
iii)
iv)
Community nutrition - there is strong evidence that nutritional support to children, pregnant
women and lactating mothers will deliver increased resilience.
Animal health – there is strong evidence that support to animal health programmes will
increase resilience given the importance of animal health to pastoralist and agro pastoralist
livelihoods.
EWS - the evidence for the value of EWS if they are not overdesigned and use good data
is considered to be strong
The increased emphasis on learning and evidence, and innovative pilots.
B4. Assessment of delivery routes
This section of the appraisal answers the question: “Which partner(s) would best
implement the recommended approach?”
The programme is designed to support government services. This is in line with the PRDP and
KIDP, is consistent with both the programme’s resilience and influencing objectives, and offers
better value for money than creating new delivery systems. Given that DFID had suspended direct
funding to the Government of Uganda during the development of the business case, the
programme’s design was based on implementing partners delivering outputs on behalf of
government. This remains the preferred deliver option given both limited government capacity and
the high levels of fiduciary risk, effective delivery of programme outputs and objectives requiring
implementing partners to help improve and fill the gaps in government capacity and coverage.
Given the range of outputs, a number of sub-projects will be needed to deliver the programme.
Forming a strategic partnership with one agency, either in the form of a consortium or joint
programming approach, is considered preferable to a multiple partner approach given the need to
implement the programme expediently, and the reduced transaction and administration costs
associated with a single partnership. The following three single partnership options have been
considered:
Option 1: An international consultancy company;
28
Option 2: A consortium of NGOs;
Option 3: Joint Approach by United Nation Agencies.
These options were ranked against the criteria in Table 5, where: 1= best, 2= second best, and 3
= third best.
Table 5: Ranking of Options
Appraisal criteria
Option 1
International
company or
consortium
2
Option 2
NGO
consortium
Option 3
UN consortium
2
2
1
Demonstrate an understanding of different
approaches to building resilience
2
Regional/global experience of managing
complex projects
1
3
2
3
Recent experience and track record of
working in Karamoja on complex
programmes, preferably working with DFID
3
2
1
4
Ability to field a team “on the ground” in
Karamoja rapidly and scale up
3
2
1
5
Flexibility and responsiveness
1
3
3
6
Access to technical expertise
1
3
2
7
Potential to influence policy
3
3
1
8
Overhead and staff costs
3
1
3
Overall ranking
2
3
1
i.
Criterion 1: Approaches to resilience: although crucial, it is not generic to the different
types of organisation. Understanding of resilience varies across individual companies,
NGOs and (to a lesser extent) individual UN agencies. The criterion can only be assessed
on a case by case basis.
ii.
Criteria 2 and 3: Managing complex programmes / local experience: Karamoja is
unique within Uganda in terms of its environmental and socio-economic characteristics. It is
a difficult place to work- isolated, insecure prone to extreme weather events with poor
social indicators. Any organisation setting up in Karamoja will have a steep learning curve.
With prior emphasis on humanitarian assistance, the UN agencies and international NGOs
have been active in Karamoja for many years, whilst private sector companies have been
less involved. Although international consultancy groups score highly both globally and
regionally in managing complex programmes, they lack experience in Karamoja.
iii.
Criteria 4: Ability to field team “on the ground” in Karamoja rapidly, scale up and
operate in a hostile environment: given their existing programmes in Karamoja, UN
Agencies and NGOs score more highly than consultancy groups. However, if the time to
develop a consortium is taken into account, (scale up could be protracted) UN agencies
are considered the best option. UN agencies also have in house security and logistical
capacity.
iv.
Criteria 5: Flexibility and responsiveness and 6; Access to technical expertise:
Private sector consultancies score highly in both areas. Access to technical expertise is
critical for programmes in Karamoja.
v.
Criteria 7: Potential to influence policy: the UN agencies score highest in this area.
Developments related to the corruption case in OPM, and subsequent aid freeze, mean
29
that implementing partners will be working in a complex political environment. The UN
agencies are best placed to engage with government in this situation, and have appropriate
systems that will enable support to sectors and district governments. Although not
weighted separately in the selection criteria, the ability to work with government at all levels
in the current operational environment is a key consideration informing the choice of
implementing partner.
vi.
Criteria 8: Overhead and staff costs: an initial assessment indicated that NGOs have the
lowest costs - 6% of total costs for the management of nutrition programmes in Kenya, and
between 5-7% for NGO consortia implementing a resilience programme in Malawi. This
does not take account of the possible additional costs of operating in a fragile insecure
environment.
Preferred Option: Option 3 Joint Approach by United Nation Agencies.
UN agencies currently have a number of advantages in terms of implementing the programme in
Karamoja when compared to commercial suppliers and NGOs. These are chiefly in terms of their
ability to build upon previous programmes with national and local government, to effectively
implement at scale in a timely manner, and to operate effectively in an insecure environment. An
approach based on NGO consortia or a commercial supplier may be feasible as the operational
context in Karamoja develops, but was considered not to be feasible given the current operational
and political environment.
This section of the appraisal answers the question - Which Agencies to Partner?
Considerations informing the choice of individual agencies are presented below, and take account
of both experience in the areas relevant to the specific outputs, and experience in Karamoja.
The World Food Programme (WFP)
WFP is the preferred implementer for key components of Outputs 1 and 2 based on its
programming experience and the findings of the PRRO and NUSAF II programme evaluations.
WFP has experience of operating at scale in Karamoja, has developed good relationships with
local government, and is able to negotiate effectively with national sectors and coordination
bodies. WFP’s continued presence in Karamoja is also considered critical at this time from a
preparedness perspective given its capability to scale up quickly to support a humanitarian
response. Based on the findings of recent evaluations it will be important for WFP Uganda to put
resilience theory into practice117 by demonstrating:





Focus on sustainable development and resilience
Improved technical capacity
Development of alternative transfer modalities - vouchers, cash, combined transfers
Improved targeting and knowledge of household vulnerability
Incorporate conflict and gender sensitivity in programme design
The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)
FAO is the preferred implementing agency on the animal health and nutrition components of
Output 2, overall implementation of the EWS (Output 3), local government coordination (Output 4),
and two of the components of the evidence and learning component (Output 5). Based on its
previous work on livelihoods and vulnerability, FAO should also address climate integration and
awareness issues in the programme.
FAO is one of the main partners of KALIP, and leads on the IPC in Uganda. FAO has existing
capacity to implement the programme, and has illustrated that it is able to scale up quickly to
support additional programmes. FAO’s main strength in Karamoja lies in its relationship with local
government. It also has long-standing relationships with international and local NGOs that
30
implement its field programmes.
The UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF)
UNICEF is the preferred implementing agency for Output 1. The recent programme completion
report on the IMAM and nutritional surveillance programmes recommended that they be
continued, albeit with significant changes in programme implementation. UNICEF has a field office
in Karamoja, and will be able to scale up quickly to implement the programme. UNICEF also has
good relationships with government at the district and national level. The agency has been
supporting capacity building activities in Karamoja and these could be taken forward by the
programme.
Table 6 summarises the key partners that have the capacity to deliver, and the components that
they should implement. In terms of priority links between government and UN agencies Table 6
also identifies the key relationships that need to be developed by the programme.
Table 6; Key Relationships
#
Project Outputs
1
Implementation
and delivery of
programmes
targeting
vulnerable
groups
2
3
4
5
Implementation
and delivery of
strengthened
food security
and livelihoods
programmes
Strengthened
early warning
and response
systems
Improved
development
coordination
Strengthened
evidence and
lesson learning
Agency
GoU Partner
Activities
UNICEF +
implementing
NGOs
MoH
District government
1.
2.
3.
Capacity building esp of DG118
Therapeutic feeding (SAM)
Monitoring, learning
WFP PRRO+
implementing
NGOs
WFP NUSAF
II +
implementing
NGOs
MoH
District government
4.
Supplementary feeding (GAM) and
pregnant and lactating women.
District government,
Production Dept, MAAIF
1.
Public Works Programme
FAO +
implementing
NGOs
FAO
UNICEF
District government,
Production Dept, MAAIF
2.
3.
4.
1.
2.
3.
3.
Animal health & nutrition
Animal nutrition
Agro-Pastoralist Field Schools
Strengthen existing EWS work via DG
Pilot new ‘chronic’ IPC
Animal health (disease surveillance
and diagnosis)
Nutrition surveillance
Contingency Fund
Build District Government capacity
Integrate information into District Devt
Plans
Link with central coordination agencies
District government,
Production Dept, MAAIF
1.
2.
Baseline survey of Karamoja
Action research on CBIWM119
DG CAO
3.
4.
Short-term studies, reviews, pilots
Innovation Fund
DFID
All agencies
per sector.
FAO
All agencies
TBD [DFID
TA-led]
District government,
Production Dept
MAAIF, MoH
District government,
Production Dept, MAAIF
MoH
4.
5.
1.
2.
B5. Climate change and environment assessment
What is the likely impact (positive and negative) on climate change and variability and
environment for each feasible option?120 Five feasibility criteria were developed and weighted
to provide guidance on the selection of the most relevant options. Standard DFID climate and
environment sensitivity analysis was applied to the options, and potential positive and negative
impacts assessed and analysed.
31
Option
A
B
Climate change & environment
risks and impacts Category
B
B
Climate change & environment
opportunities Category)
C
B
The greatest risk to the programme is either an escalation of conflict / insecurity or an extreme
weather event (drought / flood). This risk applies to all options equally and is considered a medium
risk. Option A was considered to offer limited climate and environment opportunities, the additional
activities proposed under Option B offering a enhanced opportunity to reduce vulnerability and
improve resilience in the short term, and also preparing the ground for potentially extended longer
term investment and impact. Option B also scored more highly against climate change and
environment feasibility criteria, derived from the ICF success criteria.
Significant risks and opportunities were considered as:




Programme may be negatively impacted by extreme climate, or weather events;
DFID is able to place a degree of reliance on the risk management systems and processes of
implementing partners to monitor and manage intervention;
Potential to positively impact on climate change / the environment;
Potential to improve vulnerable community’s ability to adapt to climate change and / or deal
with environmental shocks and disasters.
B6. Social Appraisal
Women are central to the programme. They are direct beneficiaries, and important actors in
programme implementation. This is particularly the case in the nutrition component where women
make up a significant proportion of the staff and local agents delivering the programme. Gender
inequality and other forms of social exclusion are some of the basic causes of undernutrition. As
the primary carers of children reaching out to women is critical to improving the nutritional status
and providing services to under-fives. In addition, interventions such as providing micronutrient
supplements to women benefit the women directly as well as their children.
Equality, Gender, Women and Girls
Gender relations in pastoral societies are changing due to a number of endogenous and
exogenous factors. These are having an impact on how pastoral societies and livelihoods currently
function and will continue to develop in the future. Patterns of sexual and gender based violence
have changed in recent years, violence against women, including rape and violence associated
with alcohol abuse becoming more prevalent121.
Gender determines the different roles that men and women play in pastoral society, as well as the
power relations in the household. Pastoral women are members of a pastoral grouping most
commonly, a clan. Though women’s position may be viewed as subservient, marginalised and
disempowered the clan can offer many benefits including social protection. Customary rules and
regulations govern access and ownership of clan assets including livestock. Both men and women
have access to livestock as ‘owners’ and/or as ‘users’. Often terms of access to livestock are
complicated and depend upon a number of factors including the status of the man or woman and
stage in his/her lifecycle.
Access to livestock does not necessarily mean control, and it may be the case that women play a
role in the management of livestock and use products such as milk, but are not able to dispose of
them – such decisions are likely to be made by both husband and wife. Unilateral decisions
concerning the use of livestock assets are considered uncustomary. Commonly however, the
husband will have the final word and in some cases a subordinate situation exists where women
32
have little say. A pastoral woman is likely to be dependent upon the presence of males in the
family to enable an effective livestock-based production system: female-headed households may
find this particularly challenging. Women often manage sheep and goats as they tend to be kept
closer to the homestead. Women also tend to be left responsible for the home herd of cattle when
men take others on migration. As such, women’s roles in livestock management should not be
underestimated and often their knowledge of livestock as well as grazing areas, migration routes
and water points is rich.
The gender division of household tasks and reproductive activities around food production and
cooking means that women have a very high labour burden both in terms of agricultural production
and as collectors and users of firewood (the latter is done by adolescent girls as well as women).
A number of factors mean that pastoralists are finding it increasing necessary to supplement
livestock-based activities through livelihood diversification. This can include employment
opportunities, trading of goods, and sale of natural resources including firewood and charcoal.
Women play a key role in this diversification, sometimes becoming primary household providers,
and making decisions about which crops are planted and will take the crops to market for sale.122
Collecting firewood and selling charcoal is one of the few economic activities open to women in
Karamoja and is carried out by the poorest women, who can spend over three hours per day
gathering fuel and carrying heavy loads. Combined with the heavy burden of unpaid domestic and
subsistence labour, this leaves them with little time for productive activities with an economic
reward. Chronic energy deficiency in women is the highest in the country and has increased in
recent years123. Approximately one-third of women have a low Body Mass Index (BMI). Iron
deficiency among women and children is also the highest in Uganda with nearly 70% of these
groups affected by mild, moderate or severe anaemia.
Gender identity will play a large role when looking at the barriers to men and women participating
and benefiting from different aspects of the programme. There are different challenges in ensuring
participation from both men and women and girls and boys and from pastoralists, and different
ethnic groups. Barriers to entry and opportunities to promote equality need to be identified and
worked on through representation, voice and behaviour change. However, care needs to be taken
as undermining male and tribal identities and over-emphasizing women’s involvement and
empowerment may cause further conflict including in intra-household relationships.
Understanding gender is vital to the development of appropriate interventions in pastoral areas
that are more likely to ‘do no harm’ to current positive gender relations, and have more chance of
initiating further positive change. This includes understanding the processes of change that are
already underway in pastoral areas and why they are occurring.
The role of women has been highlighted as an under researched area in Karamoja, although
women have been recognised as a potential focus for alternative livelihoods interventions 124. An
in-depth gender and contextual analysis including gender sensitivity analysis of the main
components of the programme should be undertaken to ensure that barriers to participation are
fully considered, for example by ensuring that women, particularly hard-to-reach female-headed
households are able to participate in livelihoods programmes, access nutrition programmes, and
by ensuring that public works programmes do not inadvertently disadvantage women, for example
by excessive physical workloads. Options for improving female participation in public works
programmes include providing crèches and supplying lunch for participants should also be
investigated.
Conflict and Insecurity
Karamoja continues to be affected by insecurity and intra-Karamojong tensions, which tend to
mask underlying and less well known processes - mineral exploration; land-gazetting; the
decentralisation processes - which also intensify conflicts between pastoralist and agro-pastoralist
33
groups and livelihoods. These tensions, and changes in livelihoods, are expressed in gender
conflict and youth unemployment.125
Conflict sensitivity is not just about minimizing negative impacts of development interventions but
also about recognizing new opportunities and directions for development policy and programming.
In developing programmes that look to stimulate local economic activities there is always a risk of
grievances emerging, for groups to feel marginalized or left out and for these feelings to escalate
into conflict at a number of levels including intra-household (gender and age related), intracommunal, communal and wider.
The programme will need to be transparent about why certain groups are targeted or receive
benefits. It will also need to invest in understanding and monitoring local perceptions and conflict
dynamics, as the basis for informed decision making. Attention to access to land and water will be
fundamental to the success of interventions within these areas and the programme will need to
gain a greater understanding of these issues.
C. What are the costs and benefits of each feasible option?
Annex B provides a detailed economic appraisal. The appraisal uses a qualitative and a semiquantitative cost effectiveness and cost benefit analysis against a baseline counterfactual “do
nothing” scenario. The evidence suggests that the outputs are likely to deliver significant
development benefits, with some more cost effective than others, Option B providing better value
for money than Option A.
C1. Summary VfM findings for Options A and B
Table 7 summarises the VfM findings for both options.
Option B scores better on VfM, with a rating of medium/high. Option A has a VfM rating of
low/medium.
Table 7: VfM Summary Findings for Option A and B
Outputs
Total budget
VfM findings
Option A
£17m
VfM findings
Option B
£ 34.5mxvi
VfM: Medium/High
Output 1:
Implementation
and delivery of
programmes
targeting
vulnerable groups
Nutrition / Supplementary feeding: A cost per beneficiary
($39) compares favourably when benchmarked against
other similar programmes to assess cost effectiveness.
Evidence on efficiency and effectiveness is inconclusive
and not strongly positive from the evaluation. But strong
positive impacts of programme relative to counterfactual
(good preventative measure of SAM)
Nutrition / Therapeutic feeding: Debatable value for money
based on cost per Disability-Adjusted Life Year (DALY)
figures (£70), but appears to be highly cost effective.
Output 2:
Implementation
and delivery of
strengthened
food security and
xvi
VfM: Low / Medium
WFP Public Works
Programme (PWP):
VfM: Medium/High
WFP PWP: Same as Option A.
Animal disease control: Livestock vaccination programme
Does not include Internal Risk Facility (IRF) £4m during the life of the programme
34
livelihoods
programmes
VfM
findings
are
debatable,
admin
costs appear to be
high, there is some
evidence of good
efficiency,
but
effectiveness
has
been poor in the past.
Information
and
evidence
is
very
limited to draw firm
conclusions.
The
programme
will
benefit
from
evaluation
lessons
learnt.
modelling provides a benefit to cost ratio of 7.2 – thus
highly cost effective.
Agro Pastoralist Field schools: good VfM with
strengthened household incomes and water access for
livestock farming giving rise to a positive NPV
VfM: High
Output 3:
Strengthened
early warning and
response
systems
IPC / Drought Early Warning System (DEWS): Good
benefits, and good VfM.
Surveillance: effective VfM outcomes for disease and
nutritional control.
VfM: Medium
Output 4:
Improved
development
coordination in
Karamoja
Coordination: Likely to show good benefits in terms of
economy, efficiency and effectiveness. Detailed evidence
and information to make VfM conclusions is not available.
VfM: High
Output 5:
Strengthened
evidence and
lesson learning
Likely to show improve programming in the future, thus
improving effectiveness and efficiency. Action research
pilots are likely to have good returns, with example BCR
of 3.6 in watershed management. This will give rise to
excellent outcomes if such pilots are scaled up.
Overall Performance on 3Es
Economy
Efficiency
Effectiveness
Low
Inconclusive
evidence, but with
WFP showing
relatively high costs
(high proportion of
budget)
Medium
Per option A but with UNICEF performing better
historically.
Inconclusive evidence
at this stage to
comment on individual
programme efficiency.
Inconclusive evidence at this stage to comment on
individual programme efficiency. Evaluation evidence on
PWPs and supplementary feeding questions efficiency.
Application of performance incentives could improve this.
Low
High
Ineffective
programming, over
emphasis on PWP.
Equity
Low/Medium
Medium
Medium
Much more efficient mix of interventions, with better
incentives for performance, nutrition and animal disease
control follow up with high VfM and more emphasis on
pilots and research
Medium / High
35
Key difference
between
the
options
Overall
VfM
conclusion
Summary
quantified VfM
findings
Emphasis on settled
households. Evidence
weak on ability to
“target” most
vulnerable HHs,
including hard to
reach female headed
households.
Will improve resilience of mobile as well as settled
communities. Increased spending on lesson learning
should assist with better targeting of the most vulnerable
households.
No early warning,
preparedness,
nutrition components
and limited support for
strengthening agropastoralist and,
specifically, pastoralist
livelihoods.
Low/Medium
Early warning and response, coordination, nutrition and
animal disease control components. Greater expenditure
on lesson learning.
Output 2: Public
works – cost per HH
per year of £24; total
cost of transferring £1
in net wage benefit to
a food insecure
person is £5.37, which
includes the £1 in net
wage.
Output 1: Therapeutic feeding preventing 1,448 deaths at
£70 per DALY, Wider nutritional benefits reaching 280,000
mothers and children Wider nutritional benefits reaching
280,000 mothers and children
Medium/High
Output 2: Animal disease control Cost benefit of 7.2
(£7.2 gained for every £1 invested); Public works – cost
per HH per year of £24; total cost of transferring £1 in net
wage benefit to a food insecure person is £5.37, which
includes the £1 in net wage.
Agro pastoralist field schools – likely to give an NPV of
£0.7m
Output 5: Example of a watershed management pilot
likely to give a BCR of 3.6 (£3.6 gained for every £1
invested)
C2. Detailed Appraisal
Option 0: Counterfactual scenario - refer to page 17/18 which states the counterfactual scenario
outcomes. In the absence of the project society would lose net benefits.
Incremental costs: Options A & B: Table 8 indicates the budgets for Options A and B.
Table 8: Budget figures for Options A and B
Programme Activity
Option A (£)
1. Implementation and delivery of programmes targeting
vulnerable groups
UNICEF Integrated Management of Acute Malnutrition (IMAM).
WFP Community Based Supplementary Feeding Programme
(CBSFP)
2. Implementation and delivery of strengthened food security
and livelihoods programmes
WFP PWPs; FAO animal health & nutrition.
3. Strengthened early warning and response systems
Option B (£)
10,850,000
16,600,000
16,400,000
1,850,000
36
IPC Pilot; strengthening existing EWS via District Government
4. Improved development coordination
Improved district contingency and response capacity; climate
awareness & integration.
5. Strengthened evidence & lesson learning
Action research; specific studies
6. HR to manage the programme
1,340,000
1,660,000
300,000
1,200,000
7. Contingency Funds
1,000,000
Grand Programme total
16,900,000
34,500,000xvii
Discounted costs (at 10% discount rate)
15,218,802
31,050,054
D. What measures can be used to assess Value for Money for the intervention?
This section identifies Value for Money measures that could be used throughout the life of the
programme. Value for money for the programme will be assessed against:
•
The achievement of performance targets stipulated in the log frame.
•
Indicators / benchmarks of economy, efficiency, effectiveness. Suggested indicators are
outlined for each component, and should be refined during implementation.
1. Nutrition Programmes: VfM indicators for therapeutic feeding and supplementary feeding
directly related to costs and that should be assessed within the programme are: cost per
beneficiary (cost effectiveness ratio); cost per DALY (cost effectiveness ratio); admin
overheads as a % of total programme costs (economy). Other VfM indicators are presented
in the Table 9 with baselines for reference.
Table 9 Value for Money Indicators & Benchmarks for Nutrition Programmes
Activity/ Item
Unit
Economy - Unit cost of key inputs:
Ready to Use
Per child treated for
Therapeutic food
SAM
(RUTF)
Ready to Use
Per child treated for
Supplementary
MAM
Food (RUSF)
Efficiency: cost of outputs
Management of
Per child treated
SAM in OTP,
excluding supplies
Management of
MAM in SFP,
excluding supplies
Per case treated
Unit cost (US$)
Unit cost
comparator
(US$)
Source
US$ 56
US$ 88
Save the Children
UK (SCUK) Kenya
2010
UNICEF Somalia
2011
US$26 –
US$30126
depending on
geographical
location
US$ 27
US$ 115
US$ 115 - 142
Coffey 2011
report, Kenya NE
province
US$ 35
DFID Pakistan
US$ 45
US$ 45
Islamic Relief
2010 Wajir, Kenya
US$ 20,000
US$ 35
US$ 12,539
DFID Pakistan
SMART Nutrition
xvii
Per survey
SCUK 2010
Does not include Internal Risk Facility (IRF) - £4m during the life of the programme
37
Survey
Coverage survey
Per survey
Effectiveness: cost per outcome
Treatment of SAM Per life saved
Per DALY
Treatment of MAM Per life saved
Per DALY
NE Province
Kenya
SCUK 2010
NE Province
Kenya
US$ 10,000
US$ 9,041
US$ 1,005
US$ 30
To be confirmed
within first 12
months of
programme..
Current data not
sufficiently robust.
US$ 1,351
US$ 41
US$ 500 to 1000
per DALY averted
Lusaka, Zambia
(Bachmann 2009)
World Bank 2010
2. Animal Surveillance and Control Indicators
Table 10; Suggested Indicators for Animal Surveillance & Control
Dimension
A. Productivity
1 Natural
Capital
Assets
2
3
4
Financial
capital
Physical
Capital
Criteria
Indicators
Livestock production
Livestock production
Livestock mortality
Livestock productivity
Forage production
Average ton of dry matter/ ha per year
Household income
Household income deriving from livestock products sales
Veterinary laboratory
Surveillance equipment
and systems
Number and type of analytical work available/performed
Number and type of surveillance data transmitted and analysed
in real time
Human
capital
Adaptive capacities:
Knowledge, skill,
institutional and
economic, etc.
5 Social
Organized local
capital
institutions, groups and
networks
Ecosystem services
Provisioning Increased rangeland
function
productivity
No of people (community, district officials) trained, with
knowledge and skills on livestock health, nutrition, surveillance
Number of institutions and communities trained and skilled on
livestock health, nutrition, surveillance and on LEGS (Livestock
Emergency Guidelines and Standards)
Fodder production available to livestock
3. Public Works Programmes
Table 11; Suggested Indicators for Public Works Programmes in the 3E framework.
Economy



Admin: cash transfer
ratio
Admin cost per
household per year
Wages as a proportion
of total budget
Efficiency





Cost per £1 of cash delivered
Targeting inclusion/exclusion
errors
No. HH targeted in the poorest
quintile
Total cost per HH
Cost per job
Effectiveness




No. poor HH with improved
poverty status
No. HH with greater access
to schooling
No. HH with greater
nutritional status
Changes in HH poverty
38
In their proposals, partners will be required to complete a Value for Money annex which will
include:
i.
ii.
iii.
A narrative describing the partner’s internal budgeting, management information,
procurement, and supply chain management (economy and efficiency):
Cost per output metrics for each of the main outputs as defined in the log frame
Justification of the costs in terms of the particular context. Partners will be asked to
reduce their costs over time, as we try to move towards a more sustainable approach.
The economy of the intervention will be assessed by measuring the unit costs of key inputs into
the intervention, standard products and services.
The efficiency of the intervention will be assessed through monitoring the output levels against
the log frame milestones and measuring cost per beneficiary before the start and at the end of
project and comparing against established benchmarks for similar operational environments.
The effectiveness of the programme is measured through the results it achieves and an
assessment of its impact. The programme is ambitious and aims for a large number of
beneficiaries for relatively low unit costs in a highly complex context. The evidence base for
these interventions in other contexts is strong, as explained in the appraisal case, however
assessing effectiveness of implementation in Uganda is limited. In addition to the robust set of
indicators in the log frame, the programme will support formative evaluation / research to allow
interventions to be tailored to the context, and support improvements in programme
effectiveness. The programme will also collect evidence through the evaluation.
E. Summary Value for Money Statement for the preferred option
Based on analysis and empirical evidence, cost benefit and cost effectiveness analysis, a
qualitative analysis of the benefits and a risk assessment, Option B is likely to offers better VfM
compared to Option A, and it offers good VfM. In terms of evidence, this option has a “strong”
rating because of its inclusion of community nutrition support and animal health at an output level
and increased emphasis on learning and analysis.
Commercial Case
Direct Procurement
The programme will be delivered under a separate Memoranda of Understanding with the UN
agencies (FAO, UNICEF, and WFP). Procurement of all goods and services will be done
indirectly through these agencies. The majority of costs therefore fall under indirect procurement.
A. Clearly state the procurement/commercial requirements for intervention.
A monitoring, evaluation and learning (ME&L) consultant, and studies to be implemented as part
of the innovation fund, will be procured locally via mini-competitions or via existing framework
agreements (e.g. Global Evaluation Framework Agreement (GEFA); Professional Evidence and
Applied Knowledge Services (PEAKS) Climate, Environment, Infrastructure and Livelihoods
(CEIL); the Wealth Creation Framework) DFID procurement supervising a limited tender. Should
there be a need to undertake a process outside of the above the Official Journal of the European
Union (OJEU) procedures will be adhered to.
B. How does the intervention design use competition to drive commercial advantage for
DFID?
When using a framework agreement, the programme will benefit from pre-negotiated economies
of scale on fee rates and administration, and the ability to rapidly mobilise. Technical Assistance.
39
Framework arrangements allow for member firms to submit alternative CVs and fee rates,
thereby driving down costs through internal competition.
C. How do we expect the market place will respond to this opportunity?
High interest is likely for the ME&L consultant position, and for consultancy work to be
implemented via the innovation fund. The market is competitive at the local, regional and
international levels, with a large number of firms potentially able to put forward suitable
candidates. As noted, existing framework agreements are also in place that can provide these
services.
D. What are the key cost elements that affect overall price? How is value added and how
will we measure and improve this?
The majority of costs fall under indirect procurement. The only costs incurred under direct
procurement are staff and consultancy costs. Other than salaries, the most important cost
drivers will be direct operating costs, overheads fee-rates, travel expenses and accommodation.
DFID will conduct regular reviews of performance, and appropriate safeguards and sanctions will
be written into contracts to ensure performance. Payments will be linked to agreed deliverables
or achievement of contract outputs.
E. What is the intended Procurement Process to support contract award?
The services of consultants, staff and other goods and services will be procured through open
and transparent procurement processes. Mini competitions for consultancy services will be
undertaken in country if the anticipated budget is not above the local competition threshold.
Above this threshold procurement will either be through a restricted competitive process with
organisations registered on existing framework agreements, or if above the competitive
threshold for these services via a standard OJEU processes.
F. How will contract & supplier performance be managed through the life of the
intervention?
Competitive tendering / mini-competition. Individuals or firms tendering for consultant positions,
or work to be implemented as part of the innovation fund will be required to describe how they
will deliver programme results. Contracts / terms of reference (TORs) will be output focused this will encourage suppliers to propose innovative and workable proposals, and ensure value for
money. For local contracts, DFID Uganda will directly negotiate fee rates and request
consultants provide references on past payments to justify quoted fee rates. All procedures will
comply with DFID internal procurement rules and regulations.
Performance Monitoring. DFID will review and monitor performance of contracts with
consultants.. DFID will enter into performance-based contracts with consultants. This will require
the development of an inception report, and a work plan linked to expected results and outputs.
Suppliers will be required to submit six-monthly reports providing (i) summaries of progress
against work plan deliverables and log frame outputs, and (ii) the work plan and deliverables for
the next six months. Regular review meetings with DFID will be held throughout the contract to
ensure satisfactory performance. Break clauses will be developed after year 1 to maintain
competitive tension and incentivise suppliers to perform. Key performance indicators, milestones
and reporting requirements linked to payments will also be developed.
Monitoring & evaluation. Programme design requires the ME&L consultant to work with the
partners to develop a comprehensive monitoring and evaluation framework.
40
Indirect Procurement
A. Why is the proposed funding mechanism/form of arrangement the right one for this
intervention, with this development partner?
Procurement of all goods and services will be done indirectly through UN agencies (FAO,
UNICEF, and WFP). Alternative delivery channels were considered as part of the appraisal case,
which also outlined the criteria informing the choice of agencies.
Framework arrangements have been developed with UNICEF and WFP centrally, and represent
DFID’s position on value for money. These apply to all funding arrangements established with
any DFID office. As agreed in the framework agreements, the procurement of goods and
services will be done in accordance with agency procedures and regulations.
Funds will be dispersed via memoranda of understanding (MoUs) established and agreed with
each agency. MoUs will be in line with central DFID funding policy, and designed to ensure the
efficient and effective delivery of programme results. MoUs will specify reporting requirements
and projected results to be procured with UK funds
Base line due diligence assessments will be undertaken on all agencies prior to programme start
upxviii. Comprehensive assessments will be applied to selected components per the
recommendations of the base line assessments. Assessments will seek assurance of: local
commercial / procurement capacity & capability; use of centrally negotiated contracts where
beneficial; validate application of centre policies; test if positive MAR results are mirrored locally
and where not, jointly develop improvement plans. The due diligence exercise will also be used
to assess the justification for varying overhead costs and to determine acceptable rates.
UNICEF
In DFID’s Multilateral Aid Review (MAR), conducted in 2010, UNICEF was assessed as
delivering very good value for money for UK aid127. UNICEF has a strong poverty focus and a
critical role in meeting UK and international development objectives. It demonstrates delivery in
fragile situations and works well with partners, although concerns were raised regarding its
response to humanitarian and emergency situations, particularly in terms of deploying the right
staff at the right time and its management of costs
UNICEF was selected based on a number of factors including its central role in nutrition
programming in Uganda, previous programming history in Karamoja, and its capacity to start up
swiftly. UNICEF has a sub-office in Karamoja headed by senior staff reporting to the Chief of
Emergency / Field Coordination. The Kampala office has a Maternal and Child Survival section
with advisors in health, nutrition, and water, hygiene and sanitation, the emergency & field
coordination section supporting the government in emergency preparedness and response.
The DFID programme completion report128 (PCR) on the Community Managed Acute
Malnutrition (CMAM) and nutritional surveillance programmes recommended that these
programmes be continued, albeit with significant changes in programme implementation. The
nutrition component of this programme will also have an increased focus on community
outreach, and capacity building. During programme development, DFID will work with UNICEF to
mitigate the concerns identified in the PCR and the MAR. In particular, we will make sure that
the right staff are in place to manage and monitor the programme and that UNICEF continues to
take positive steps on cost control.
xviii
FAO and UNICEF have agreed to participate in due diligence pilots in country; WFP to
work with DFID locally on key elements of the base line assessment.
41
WFP
DFID’s MAR highlighted WFP’s ability to deliver results at scale in humanitarian and fragile
contexts, although concerns about the effectiveness and VfM of some of WFP’s recovery tools,
including food-for-assets / PWPs was noted. WFP is a critical humanitarian partner for the UK,
and is becoming a more important developmental partner in countries where it is successfully
managing the transition to a strategic and capacity building role. WFP has commissioned some
excellent climate change analysis, and is developing strategic partnerships to develop software
and planning tools to integrate climate and weather into emergency response preparation and
disaster risk management. WFP’s ability to operate in conflict-affected and fragile contexts is one
of its key comparative advantages, reflected in the quality of its staff and systems.
WFP has been present in Karamoja for 40 years, and has developed a good working
relationship with district government officials. The programme will be based initially on continued
support to the NUSAF II programme, and hence will be ready to start immediately. WFP’s
continued presence in Karamoja is also considered critical at this time from a preparedness
perspective. DFID will work with WFP to ensure that findings from recent evaluations 129 are
applied in the design of the programme, including recommended improvements in technical
capacity.
FAO
DFID’s MAR noted that FAO’s mandate was highly relevant to meeting UK and international food
security, hunger and nutrition objectives, also developing policy and providing technical advice to
help countries adapt to climate change. Overall the MAR assessed FAO as a ‘poor performer’.
FAO was however found to perform well in fragile contexts, and to be increasingly effective
player in emergency response.
FAO has strong experience in food security programming and analysis in Karamoja130131132. It
has a comparative advantage in agro-pastoral field schools (APFS), rangeland rehabilitation,
land and water management, watershed management and animal health. FAO’s strong
presence on the ground and good relationships with local government has made it a leading
player in designing and implementing early warning systems, including the Integrated Phase
Classification system. It regularly coordinates and exchanges information and best practices with
other FAO offices in the East Africa sub-region. Given its existing capacity, including an existing
team in Karamoja, FAO will be able to ensure an almost immediate project start-up. DFID will
work with FAO to ensure that findings from recent mid-term reviews are applied in the design of
the programme, and that it has the required technical and staff capacity to scale up the
programme. Including recommended improvements in technical capacity.
B. Value for money through procurement
The key cost drivers and VfM through procurement is considered for each implementing agency.
UNICEF Procurement Processes
The DFID Multilateral Aid Review (MAR)133 concluded that there is good country level evidence
for value for money for UNICEF, UNICEF reducing its administration to programme ratio and
playing a leading role in reviewing procurement. UNICEF does not however comprehensively
report on the cost efficiency of its operations and it is hard to assess cost efficiency gains from
UNICEF’s field operations. UNICEF is taking positive steps to improve cost control, building on
some good work at country level.
All procurement will be done in line with UNICEF’s central policy, which employs competitive
tendering with clear procurement guidelines according to the UNICEF supply manual. Any
procurement above US$ 30,000 is subjected to a Contracts Review Committee (CRC), which
reviews the transparency in the process, assesses “value-for-money” and makes a
42
recommendation to the UNICEF Representative for approval. There are checks and balances
built into the system: an international member of staff heads the supply unit; there is an audit
every two to three years, and an internal committee, headed by the Chief of Operations
oversees procurement.
UNICEF develops an annual Supply Plan based upon the supply component included within
partners annual work plans. Health and nutrition supplies will be procured through UNICEF’s
global supply division, in Copenhagen based on agreements made with reputable pre-qualified
suppliers. Procuring supplies globally in bulk means that UNICEF can ensure that all products
are of good quality (critical in the case of medicines and nutritional supplies); take advantage of
economies of scale and get better value for money.
UNICEF’s Supply Division establishes Long Term Arrangements (LTA) with specialized
companies globally where all country offices can procure directly using already
negotiated/discounted prices. This reduces on the lead times for standard quality supplies
across different countries. Through competitive bidding, local LTAs have been established to
cater for regular supplies and emergency supplies, UNICEF thereby avoiding costs related to
repetitive bidding and having stable prices for supplies for an average time of two years.
Key Cost Drivers
Table 12 indicates the key cost drivers for the UNICEF programme component in terms of % of
the budget total. The key cost driver is activity (1) – the scale up of high nutrition activities.
Table 12; Budget Summary for UNICEF Programme Component
Activities
1. Scale up of nutrition activities
2. Coordination and partners interaction for nutrition and
capacity to respond
3. Knowledge understanding and timely information for
nutrition programming
Operational technical assistance
Operational costs: UNICEF Uganda 10% of above lines
Programme total
UNICEF HQ recovery costs: 7% of above lines
Total
% of total
budget
49%
11%
8%
17%
8%
93%
7%
100%
A further breakdown of Activity 1 - Scale up of Nutrition Activities – in the table below highlights
the procurement of supplies and equipment as the most expensive component.
UNICEF Activity 1: Scale up of Nutrition
Activities
Budget breakdown
£
% of total
programme
budget
Transfers to District Health Offices (DHO) for
family health days
288,750
9%
Research on Infant & Young Child Feeding (IYCF)
32,500
1%
Development/testing educational materials
48,150
1%
43
Community support and operational support for
DHOs and NGOs
562,000
17%
On the job training and aids for community
workers
450,984
13%
Supplies, commodities, equipment
1,964,483
59%
Total (% of total programme)
3,346383
63%
A significant proportion - 59% - of the budget for the UNICEF component is spent on the
procurement of essential nutrition supplies. This includes the purchase of medical supplies /
supplements, growth monitoring equipment and therapeutic foods. Freight costs are 15%,
making a total of circa £2m of programme spend on supplies, commodities and equipment.
There are two aspects to administrative costs. Firstly the framework arrangement between DFID
and UNICEF sets UNICEF’s indirect cost recovery rates for interventions at 7%. UNICEF
Uganda has additional programme management costs, which for this programme have been set
at 10% of the total programme. These fees cover programme management services that
UNICEF is undertaking on DFID’s behalf, including coordinating partners; procurement of
services; payments to contractors; monitoring, review and oversight; and financial reporting and
audits. The programme management fee is within the normal range for UNICEF programmes,
and similar to that charged for other DFID Uganda support projects. However to benchmark this
figure, a DFID Yemen programme with UNICEF on treatment and prevention of nutrition has
programme management costs of 5%. The ICAI report on UNICEF stated that there is some
flexibility on cost recovery negotiation134. DFID should negotiate these fees with the Uganda
UNICEF office to achieve better VfM through the baseline due diligence process.
Supply chain risks, monitoring and processes
Together with programme staff, the Supply Unit in Uganda engages in end-user monitoring to
evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of the supplies delivered and to ascertain if they were
received by the right people, end-user monitoring also influencing future procurement practices.
UNICEF is also rolling out mTracxix an SMS-based health systems strengthening tool designed
to improve Health Management Information System (HMIS) reporting on disease surveillance
and medicine tracking in all health facilities in Uganda.
The level of risk associated with UNICEF’s procurement process will be reviewed as part of the
baseline due diligence process. Despite strong checks and balances, the area of greatest risk is
the delivery chain, where, given the fragile operating context and use of government systems,
there is a high possibility of corruption and / or mismanagement. There are a number of benefits
to using the Government distribution system as explained in the appraisal case. While DFID
assesses that these gains currently outweigh the risks, it will monitor this part of the programme
closely to make sure it is operating well, identifying risks and developing appropriate mitigation
measures. Possible risks and mitigation measures are outlined below:
-
-
Fraud and Corruption: there are opportunities at all stages of the delivery chain for goods to
go astray due to fraud and corruption. This risk could be mitigated by close monitoring, and
agreeing with UNICEF the responses that will be made to the discovery of fraud and
corruption for example: the return of funds and goods; appropriate responses at the district
level; development of contingency plans to maintain service delivery in the event of large
scale fraud and corruption.
Delays: due to lack of vehicles or lack of fuel. Where there are problems with transportation,
UNICEF could collaborate with districts to get supplies to facilities, supplying transportation in
xix
System Strengthening using Mobile Phone Technology
44
emergency situations.
Risk of diversion or selling of Ready to Use Therapeutic Food: measures should be
developed to ensure greater control of supplies with programme participants.
WFP: Procurement Processes
-
In the MAR WFP scored very well, on organisational strength, demonstrating good partnership
behaviour, transparency and accountability, cost and value consciousness, and strong financial
resource and strategic and performance management. It was noted however that WFP needed
to further strengthen its performance on results, value for money, transparency and
accountability. The MAR also noted that WFP’s cost-recovery model provides incentives for
managers to maximise volume rather than minimise costs; that there are specific issues around
direct support costs, and concerns about the effectiveness and VfM of food-for-assets / PWPs.
Globally, WFP state that they use competition at various stages of procurement to drive costs
down. WFP Uganda compares costs across its portfolio of partners to ensure conformity.
Partners are selected through a competitive tendering process, with proposals submitted and
forwarded to the districts. District officers in collaboration with WFP make recommendations,
based on performance, cost and quality of delivery of the intervention in Karamoja. WFP
Kampala assesses the bids, scrutinising budgets and comparing internal costs.
WFP have responded to the NUSAF II evaluation by agreeing to improve the coordination of
their PWPs, revisit their food and cash pipeline to improve delivery modalities, supplement the
technical capacity of partners to improve monitoring of projects, and proactively encourage
coordination with other agencies. Key issues identified in the programme completion report of
the supplementary feeding programme, and those recommended in the evaluation of the
supplementary feeding component of the Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation (PRRO) will
also be incorporated in the final programme design.
Key Cost Drivers
Tables 13 and 14 below outline the main costs for the WFP programmes.
Table 13; WFP : Public Works Programme (PWP) Budget Summary
OPERATING COSTS
Asset creation
Cash Transfers
Food transfers
Learning & Evaluation
% of Total Budget
PWP inputs
36.6%
Admin (Partners)
6.8%
Transfers
2.5%
Transactions costs
0.2%
Transfers
17%
Transport
4.3%
Distribution
3.1%
5.7%
Admin overhead costs
25% Operational cost in Uganda
17.6%
7% WFP HQ overhead
6.2%
Total
24%
Grand total
100%
45
PWP administration costs (all non-transfer costs) appear to be relatively high compared to other
similar programmes (see appraisal case). These are related both to the high cost of food
transfers and “building” the community assets, and high administrative overheads. There are two
aspects to the administrative costs: the HQ overhead (WFP’s Indirect Support Costs (ISC)), and
the Uganda office Direct Support Costs (DSC). ISC covers WFP core functions, is currently set
at 7%, and is non-negotiable. DSC cover costs that are directly linked with the provision of
support for an operation and which would not be incurred should the activity cease. These
include staff, duty travel, training, office rent and running costs, communication, vehicles, etc.
This rate has been fixed at 25% for the PWP component.
Table 14; WFP Community Based Supplementary Feeding Programme (CBSFP)– Budget Summary
OPERATING COSTS
Commodity costs (food supplies)
Total Direct operating costs (transport, handling etc. excl.
commodities)
ADMIN OVERHEADS
19% Direct support costs (DSC)
7% Indirect support costs (ISC) - HQ overhead
Total costs
Cost per tonne of food (not including transport)
Cost per beneficiary
% of total budget
58%
14%
US$
21%
7%
100%
$550
$39
DSC is lower for the supplementary feeding component than for the PWP component – set at
19%. WFP’s procurement process has strong checks and balances on implementing partners,
and the level of risk associated with the programme will be reviewed as part of the base line due
diligence process. The main risk to the programme is delays due to pipeline breaks and lack of
access during the rainy season. WFP have implemented a risk registry, with triggers and
recommended mitigation actions, including actions to be implemented in the case of delays in
food deliveries, and the establishment of prepositioning centres across Karamoja.
WFP administration costs
The current WFP Uganda PRRO has a DSC of 15%, similar to that of the previous PRRO. The
WFP Uganda County project has a very high DSC at 36%. In terms of benchmarking, DSC rates
in the following countries were: Ethiopia PRRO (6%), Kenya PRRO (10%) DRC PRRO (18%),
Zimbabwe PRRO (15%), Kenya Country Programme (21%), Somalia Food and Nutrition (26%);
Country Plan Rwanda (28%).. The DSC rate is therefore high, although 19% is not
unprecedented in terms of the WFP country programme DSC rate. 25% for the PWP
component, although equivalent to that previously supported as part of NUSAF II, is very high.
These rates will be assessed and reviewed as part of the MoU negotiation process.
WFP reports that it has a high DSC rate for its programmes in Karamoja because of its field
presence, its capacity and costs associated with a shift from relief to development. WFP has four
field offices in the Karamoja, and has invested in ensuring staff capacity to implement and
monitor its programmes. DSC includes costs related to travel for monitoring, assessments, staff
training, etc. Finally the shift from large-scale relief approaches to developmental approaches
costs more in DSC terms because the latter are more staff-intensive to implement. Managing
development-oriented programmes and engaging in the associated partnerships requires solid
WFP staff capacity at field level.
46
FAO Procurement Processes
FAO was rated in the MAR as showing weak VfM. Country reports indicate that value for money
is not systematically taken into consideration by staff. Inefficient processes have been identified
by evaluations and, whilst plans are in place to address the issues, results have yet to be
achieved.
Key Cost Drivers
Table 15 summarises the budget breakdown for FAO and shows that Output 2 has the highest
costs. Direct Operating Costs (DOC) (10%) have been calculated in accordance with FAO’s
policy relating to the charging and distribution of Project Servicing Costs (PSC). A standard rate
of 13% PSC/DOC to cover Administrative and Operational Support applies for development
projects throughout FAO’s operations; however, the FAO Support Cost Policy provides flexibility
on setting PSC rates, as long as AOS costs of 13% are fully recovered - 7% for HQ costs and
6% is for country office costs. The PSC rate for the programme is in line with the ceiling for nonemergency projects, and can be negotiated as part of the MoU..
FAO have charged 3% of the AOS for the Uganda country office directly to the project budget
lines – this includes the costs for key personnel and the security budget. The remaining 3% AOS
has been included in the 10% DOC budget.
Table 15: FAO Budget Summary
FAO Budget
Output 1: Adaptation planning and response strengthened through
improved learning: assessments, action research, early warning
systems and IPC
% of Total Budget
24%
Output 2: Livestock disease surveillance, diagnostic capacity,
veterinary services and animal nutrition strengthened
32%
Output 3: Agro-pastoral production systems strengthened through
support to DLG, Agro-Pastoral Field Schools and improved access
to water
16%
Technical Support Services
Travel
GoE (General Operating Expenses)
Equipment and supplies
Personnel : TA
Other Costs
Total
Direct Operating Costs (10% of Programme budget excluding admin)
Grand Total
1.8%
1%
1%
2%
11%
1%
91%
9%
100%
Financial Case
A. What are the costs, how are they profiled and how will you ensure accurate
forecasting?
The cost of this programme will be £38.5 million including an internal risk facility allocation of
£4m, over 3 years (2013/4 – 2015/6). The provisional allocation of funds to the individual
agencies and programme components is provided in Table 16.
47
Programme costs have a near equal split of £9 million for the first and third years, and a cost of
£15 million pounds during the second year. Main cost contributors to the higher spend for the
second year are in relation to programme scale up - this includes direct programme costs,
increases in staffing levels, equipment, supplies, and learning and evaluation costs. Programme
spend has been forecasted from April 2013 following a request from WFP for immediate support
to its public works programme. Based on advice from FCPD, DFID CHASE and the DFID WFP
liaison office, DFID U has informed WFP of its intention to support WFP’s programme following
Ministerial Approval of the business case and that upon confirmation, the contribution can be
used to repay WFP internal advances to the operationxxxxi.
£25 million has been allocated to the programme by the ICF board for the period 2013/4 -15/16.
Approval for additional funding to meet the shortfall of £9.5 million and for clearance to spend
beyond the current spending review period has been requested from the ICF board. Final
approval will be sought following Ministerial Approval of the business case.
Table 16: Programme Budget
Activity Description
April 2013 March 2014
April 2014 March 2015
April 2015 March 2016
Total
1) FAO Livelihoods & Early Warning and Preparedness Programmes
1,020,000
4,475,500
1,560,500
7,056,000
102,000
447,500
157,000
706,500
1,122,000
Subtotal
2) UNICEF Vulnerable Group / Nutrition Programme
4,923,000
1,717,500
7,762,500
1,716,000
2,198,500
1,890,000
5,804,500
UNICEF Uganda operational costs (10%)
171,500
220,000
189,000
580,500
UNICEF HQ Recovery Cost (7%)
132,000
169,000
145,500
446,500
2,019,500
Subtotal
3) WFP Vulnerable Group / Nutrition Programme
2,587,500
2,224,500
6,831,500
1,547,500
2,065,000
516,000
4,128,500
Direct Support Costs
294,000
392,000
98,000
784,000
Indirect Support Costs
129,000
172,000
43,000
344,000
Subtotal
4) WFP Public Works Programme
1,970,500
2,629,000
657,000
5,256,500
Implementing Public Works
1,687,000
1,687,000
1,687,000
5,061,000
Cash transfers
108,000
108,000
108,000
324,000
Food transfers
948,000
948,000
948,000
2,844,000
Direct Support Costs
685,500
685,500
685,500
2,056,500
Indirect Support Costs
240,000
240,000
240,000
720,000
Learning & Analysis
350,000
314,000
Subtotal
4,018,500
3,982,500
3,668,500
11,669,500
Subtotal Partner Programmes
9,130,500
14,122,000
8,267,500
31,520,000
30,000
300,000
200,000
530,000
Total programme Costs
Direct Operating Costs (10%)
Total programme
Community Based Supplementary Feeding
Programme
512,000
5) Innovation / Learning Fund
Analysis & learning
xx
xxi
Document: (3868078) Intention to fund confirmation - WFP programme.
Document: (3868070) Approval of disbursement to WFP - 1st 6 month advance.
48
150,000
100,000
250,000
30,000
450,000
300,000
780,000
9,160,500
14,572,000
8,567,500
32,300,000
510,000
510,000
1,200,000
Conflict sensitivity
Subtotal
Total Programme
6) DFID Programme Management - PM & ME&L
Subtotal
180,000
5,000,000
7) Contingency Fund & Internal Risk Facility
GRAND TOTAL
9,340,500
15,082,000
9,077,500
38,500,000
To ensure accurate forecasting, forecasts will be further reviewed during the finalisation of
partner proposals. Costs will also be monitored against forecasts, which will be adjusted to
reflect near time realities during programme implementation. Close contact will be maintained
between the programme management team, DFID and implementing partners to ensure that
concerns over forecasting are noted and mitigating actions taken.
Table 17 summarises the administrative charges of the different UN agencies. UNICEF and
FAO’s country office administration costs are within the normal range for both agencies and will
be negotiated to ensure value for money. WFP’s costs, although within the historical range for
operations within Uganda and Karamoja, are high when benchmarked against operations in
other countries. These will be specifically reviewed, and more closely benchmarked against
comparative programmes, particularly DFID supported programmes in Ethiopia and Kenya. The
review will develop a set of acceptable rates, beyond which DFID support to the programme will
need to be reconsidered.
Table 17: Administration Overheads for all Agencies
WFP
HQ overhead (non-negotiable)
Uganda country office administration
costs
7%
19% (nutrition) /
25% (PWP)
FAO
UNICEF
% of programme activity budget
7%
7%
6%
10%
The contingency fund will initially be managed by the DFID programme manager pending design
and possible integration into partner’s programmes. The £4m allocated to the facility will enable
a significant, and proportionate, catalytic role in funding early action throughout the life of the
programme. DFID Uganda is engaged with DFID CHASE and the Africa Regional Department
(ARD) regarding the design of an internal risk facility. A review will be undertaken early in the
programme, which will provide a more detailed review of past humanitarian responses in
Karamoja, and ensure that triggers identified for early action are developed in collaboration with
the GoU, implementing partners and other development partners, particularly USAID and EC.
B. How will it be funded: capital/programme/admin?
Funds will be drawn from the International Climate Fund, and managed by DFID Uganda as part
of its overall resource allocation. All funds are programme spend.
C. How will funds be paid out?
The funds will be paid via a Memorandum of Understanding to the UN agencies. Payments will
be made in advance on a three (FAO) or six monthly basis (UNICEF/WFP), with a requirement
that accountability for the previous period needs to be submitted before the next tranche can be
disbursed. Funds will be transferred as described in the Contribution Arrangement, which is
based on the centrally agreed framework agreement between DFID and UNICEF/WFP that
governs all financial transfers.
49
D. What is the assessment of financial risk and fraud?
Financial risks and the risks of fraud and corruption are judged to be medium. The selected
agencies have systems in place to manage corruption, fraud and financial risks, conducting risk
and institutional assessments of partners prior to funding. Baseline due diligence assessments
will be undertaken on all the selected agencies prior to implementation, which will enable a
reassessment of the risk rating for the programme. There is a need to review the level of
reporting and audits. MoUs will also need to clearly stipulate measures that will be taken in the
event of poor performance, failure to deliver on expected results or to optimise value for money.
UNICEF: The MAR concluded that UNICEF has clear financial allocation criteria and processes
with good processes for audit, risk and accountability. UNICEF Uganda implements finance
micro-assessments (detailed audits) of all partners, including government. These include an
assessment of the adequacy of partner’s financial management systems and internal controls
(for partners that receive more than US$100,000 per year). UNICEF also conducts regular
Programme Quality Assurance checks and financial spot checks of all implementing partners.
WFP: The MAR reported that WFP’s financial accountability systems and processes were
strong, but that more effective risk management was required at the country level. WFP requires
all partners to submit monitoring and programming reports, and undertakes regular audits and
spot checks of partner programmes. As part of this programme WFP will increase their capacity
to monitor programmes at the district level.
FAO: The MAR concluded that FAO had improved its budgeting process, but that programming
and financial accountability processes at country level were weak. However, disbursements to
government and other partners in Uganda are subject to stringent controls, and linked to agreed
deliverables certified by programme staff, supported by the FAO Kampala M&E Unit.
E. How will expenditure be monitored, reported, and accounted for?
Detailed six monthly financial reports and interim quarterly reports of progress will provide the
basis for monitoring of all expenditures. The funds disbursed will be subject to the internal and
external auditing procedures laid down in each agency’s financial regulations and rules.
Accurate forecasting will be ensured through routine quarterly meetings to review written reports,
disbursement rates, challenges currently being faced and likely to be faced in the future.
Partners will also be encouraged to contact DFID on an ad hoc basis if any issues arise that
represent a challenge to agreed forecasts.
Management Case
A. What are the Management Arrangements for implementing the intervention?
Criteria used in the selection of the implementing agencies are outlined in the appraisal section –
(B4 assessment of delivery routes).
Programme Management Options
It is important to establish strong management capacity in a context where co-ordinating the
activities of several implementing agencies and learning lessons will be central to success. DFID
will provide strong oversight and programme management support. The three management
options considered below were informed by the need to ensure optimal DFID oversight of the
programme.
1. Management Option 1: A Joint Programme with UN management: UN Joint
Programme based on UN programme management and a single DFID MoU. This would
reduce DFID’s administrative burden, and full responsibility for managing the programme
50
would rest with the UN. A recent DFID Uganda review (2012) of three joint UN
programmes found mixed results: lack of a shared approach; absence of rigour in M&E;
poor joint reporting structures. This option would provide limited direct DFID oversight, and
is not recommended based on past experience.
2. Management Option 2: Programme management by UN agencies: DFID would enter
into a separate contract with each agency. Agencies would develop a joint proposal based
on a common analysis, results framework, risk framework and summary budget, and
would be responsible for programme management, including contracting and managing
the programme manager. This option would reduce DFID’s oversight and ability to
influence the strategic direction of the programme. Experience to date in Uganda is that
effective delivery using this model requires dedicated oversight and entails high
transaction costs. This option is not recommended based on past experience.
3. Management Option 3: DFID management and reporting arrangements: DFID enters
into a separate contract with each agency per option 2. However the programme would be
managed by a DFID advisor or externally contracted manager. This will address the need
for strong DFID oversight and dedicated management capacity, and has the additional
advantage of a dedicated focus on results, coordination and lesson-learning. Given the
funding definition, the DFID advisor / manager will be based outside of the DFID Uganda
office. The advisor / manager could be placed within one of the implementing agencies or
with a third party partner or agency. This is the recommended option since it retains strong
DFID oversight and financial management.
The Preferred Management Option – Option 3 :
Appoint a DFID A2 Advisor, sourced internally, as Programme Manager (PM), who is familiar with
DFID financial management and reporting requirements. The PM will have overall responsibility
for making sure that the programme delivers results. The PM will work closely with the UN staff in
Kampala and Karamoja, be responsible for overall programme management, coordination,
learning and monitoring and evaluation.
The PM will be supported by a monitoring, evaluation and learning consultant (ME&L); a DFID U
B1 programme officer (30%) and the DFID U Climate Change Advisor (20%) with additional
support from the Social Protection, Health, and Governance Advisors. This team will manage UN
partner programmes and the contingency and innovation funds, the ME&L consultant directly
managing the innovation fund. Contract management, administration and finance will be provided
by the programme officer.
Management Arrangements Under the Preferred Option (see diagram below)
A Programme Management Committee (PMC) comprised of the programme managers from
WFP, UNICEF and FAO, a DFID programme officer, and led by the DFID-appointed PM will meet
every quarter to ensure full strategic and operational coordination. In the first 6 months of the
programme DFID and the UN agencies will also consider expanding membership of the
committee to include other key programme stakeholders, including government representatives
and participating NGO partners. Discussions are also being held with the UN Resident
Coordinator regarding further UN engagement in the PMC, as this may provide an additional layer
of accountability
51
The Programme Advisory Committee (PAC) will be led by the DFID Uganda Head of Growth and
Resilience, and include representatives from the UN agencies and Government of Uganda
partner Ministries. The PAC will meet yearly to oversee and provide programme guidance,
focussing on the strategic direction of the programme. It will receive reports and provide feedback
to the Programme Management Unit. Oversight and guidance from the PAC will include:







Review progress against milestones
Identify any new measure that may be required to meet targets and improve efficiency
Review disbursements and expenditure
Provide general guidance to programme implementation through the Programme
Management Unit (PMU)
Ensure participation and buy-in of key partners.
Promote the sharing of evidence and lesson learning from the programme and
Ensure coordination and alignment of programme activities with the broader development
plan of the GoU and other donors.
Table 18 below summarises the management arrangements that each agency already has in
place for its component of the programme.
52
Table 18; Management Arrangements UN Agencies
Project
Management
WFP
P4 international Karamoja
Regional
Coordinator,
based in Karamoja. This
person has been recruited
and will start in August
2013.
FAO
An FAO Program Manager,
reporting
to
the
FAO
Representative through the
Senior Disaster Response
Coordinator;
the
program
manager will spend over half
his/her time in the field in
Karamoja. Already in place
Northern
and
southern
Karamoja sub-office. Field
teams supported by the
Program Manager and by a
Kampala-based technical team
(50% of its time in Karamoja).
Team
of
5
people,
permanently
based
in
Karamoja.
These
include
veterinary/livestock
officers,
water
resources
officers,
rangeland
rehabilitation,
officers and GIS/data analysis.
Sub offices and
their
management
Four
sub-offices
in
Karamoja, headed by one
international and three
senior national officers.
Capacity in each
of
the
suboffices
(this
capacity already
exists)
5 programme staff and an
additional 8 support staff
(logistics, finance)
Role
of
the
Kampala office
Coordination and technical
guidance: Food & nutrition
security coordinator; two
national officers; head of
Programme.
Coordination and technical
guidance includes: Karamoja
program
manager,
food
security advisors, M&E, GIS,
and gender officers in the
Karamoja technical unit.
Final
project
responsibility
and
accountability
WFP Country Director
A Project Task Force, chaired
by the FAO Representative in
Uganda.
UNICEF
Senior Manager with strong
background in programming
based in the Karamoja field
office. Already in place
One field office in Karamoja,
headed by a Senior Manager
and Field Programme Officers.
Focal
District
Programme
Officers interact daily with the
district authorities.
A team of Field Programme
Officers
with
technical
expertise in various areas of
maternal and child survival,
permanently
based
in
Karamoja.
Focal
District
Programme Officers ensure
close technical assistance and
monitoring of interventions.
Coordination and technical
guidance from Health and
Nutrition section.
Deputy
Representative
in
collaboration
with
the
Field/Emergency Coordinator.
Programme Management Framework
The Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) with the UN agencies will provide the framework for
management of the programme. The key points are:







Day to day programme management will be the responsibility of the UN agencies.
Implementation will be based on proposals for the use of funding that will be reviewed,
and if necessary revised with DFID annually.
Proposals will capture the importance of forward planning, improved coordination, capacity
building monitoring and accountability. Preparedness and contingency planning will also
need to be reflected.
Funding will be monitored through six monthly and annual progress and financial reports,
with interim quarterly results reports.
DFID will continue to use its participation in the Karamoja Development Partner Group,
and other relevant coordination groups on social protection, climate change, and disaster
reduction to seek system and partner performance improvements. DFID will continue to
work especially closely with USAID, the EC and Irish Aid.
The DFID PM and climate change advisor will also work closely with DFID’s governance,
health and social development advisors to ensure that efforts to seek improvements in
relevant sectors are integrated into central sector discussions.
DFID lobbying with implementing partner headquarters and regional offices to support
effective programme implementation.
Annual reviews will closely assess the case for continued funding and agreements will provide for
53
support to be curtailed, including if the context in which the programme is being implemented
changes significantly. Triggers for suspending the programme, together with notice periods, will
be agreed with the agencies prior to the first disbursement. Tranche release decisions will provide
a mechanism for adjusting funding according to performance.
B. What are the risks and how these will be managed?
Identified risks will be reviewed quarterly. The risk probability in many of the categories below is
high, reflecting the operational environment in Karamoja. Clauses in the MoUs will enable DFID to
review its assistance in the event that implementation is significantly compromised.
Description of risks
Impact
Probability
Mitigating Actions

Deterioration in security
situation
High
Medium


Programme negatively
impacted by floods, droughts
other weather events.

High
High - Medium


The risk of corruption within
the UN agencies
Medium
Low


Agency technical capacity and
leadership is below
expectations, leading to badly
measured, poor quality results

Medium
- High
Medium
- low


Weaknesses in PWP and
nutrition programme
performance.
Medium
UNICEF is unable to effectively
enhance capacity in the
management of acute
Medium
malnutrition at national and
sub-national levels of
government
Lack of political support from
central Government Institutions
High Medium
Medium


Medium
- low

Medium
- low

Partners implement appropriate security
guidelines, with advice from UN
Department of Safety and Security and
other inter-agency coordination
mechanisms.
Programme activities are temporarily
scaled back during specific periods of
insecurity.
Partners develop effective contingency
plans.
Partners ensure implementation plans and
timeframes are realistic
Partners develop effective mitigating
measures - pre-positioned stocks, remote
planning for short periods of inaccessibility
and increased use of alternative transport.
Agencies have standard financial
procedures in place (including financial
tracking, auditing, reporting and field
monitoring visits)
DFID is undertaking base line due diligence
assessments and based on findings will
consider implementing comprehensive
analysis of key part of the supply and
delivery chains of the programme.
The programme has identified the UN
agencies that have the greatest capacity to
scale up quickly.
Due diligence assessments focus on staff
capacity and downward management
processes.
Proposal development and inception period
ensuring that agencies have the
management capabilities and quality
assurance measures in place.
The likelihood of pipeline disruptions for
UN agencies is deemed to be quite high
based on previous difficulties experienced
in 2011 / 12
DFID will seek assurance from senior
management that shortcomings have been
addressed and previous recommendations
taken forward.
UNICEF requested to produce a robust
programme proposal that addresses this
concern by showing how they will ensure
how sufficient UNICEF staff technical
capacity will be used to mentor national
counterparts
All programmes are aligned with the KIDP
and include capacity building objectives at
the district level.
UN agencies are working closely with the
Government in relevant policy and
programme areas.
54
C. What conditions apply (for financial aid only)?
D. . How will progress and results be monitored, measured and evaluated?
£1,860,000 has been allocated for design, monitoring, research and evaluation. Of this £580,000
is allocated to the innovation fund, of which 250,000 is allocated to the Post Conflict Development
Programme managed by the DFID U Governance & Security team, in support of the development
of conflict sensitive approaches. The remaining funds have been allocated across implementing
partners in support of independent monitoring and evaluation (mid- term reviews and final
evaluations), and specific formative research and analysis. Funds allocated to partners for
independent evaluation should be ring-fenced, and appropriate governance structures will be setup in due course. The programme will also be subjected to a summative evaluation towards the
end of the cycle, which will draw together the evidence generated through the decentralized
evaluations managed within each component, and assess the overall coherence and results of
the initiative.
The key tool that DFID will use for monitoring programme delivery will be the logframe, which has
been jointly developed with the partners. This includes a set of output, outcome and impact
indicators which aim to capture the key steps in the theory of change underlying the programme
design in order to monitor programme delivery in detail and with appropriate frequency, DFID has
agreed a more comprehensive programme monitoring framework with each agency, which
focuses on a wider set of output and activity indicators, which will inform quarterly meetings
between DFID and the implementing agencies. This will allow DFID to identify any operational
challenges being faced by the agencies or their partners at an early stage, and feed into the
annual review process..
Implementing agencies will be responsible for the day-to-day monitoring of the programme. UN
agencies will quality assure information from partners with field monitoring and spot checks
carried out through their field offices. The ME&L consultant will provide further quality assurance,
undertaking regular visits to verify data collection and analysis method and systems. VfM
indicators will be incorporated into the quarterly reporting and assessed alongside the logframe.




Selected indicators are in line with the International Climate Fund Key Performance
Indicators and are readily verifiable and generally SMART.
Output indicators defined within the log frame will be monitored from data on programme
performance, and regular reporting by the agencies to the programme advisor. Partner
interim and final reports will provide additional information on progress and results.
Outcome indicators will be reported on from monitoring data from implementing agencies,
and survey data as appropriate.. Nutrition data will be monitored via regular Standardized
Monitoring and Assessment of Relief and Transitions (SMART) surveys. Rates of global
and severe acute malnutrition will be also be monitored (UNICEF / Makerere University
School of Public Health).
Impact indicators will be monitored on data from UN agencies and from surveys as
appropriate. A qualitative index will be developed to measure the extent to which the
programme has had a transformational impact (ICF indicator 15).
An in depth output to outcome review will be conducted by DFID at the end of year 1 and annual
reviews thereafter will provide the key basis for management decisions, and programme design
changes. These will be conducted in close consultation with programme partners. A final external
evaluation is planned for the middle of year 3 to inform future programme development Partners
will be responsible for analysing and sharing lessons learned that can be fed into the annual
reviews and the external evaluation.
Formative and operational research to inform programme implementation and future
55
development, will be undertaken in the following areas:
i.
Research and analysis on whether the provision of a nutritional supplement could act as
an artificial incentive for women to attend essential health services, masking the
underlying reasons why they do not use these.
ii. Formative research into the barriers to improved infant and young child feeding practices.
iii. Support to the nutrition surveillance system to strengthen understanding of how to support
nutrition security of households, women and children more effectively throughout the year.
56
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1
2009/10 Uganda Bureau of Statistics
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4 Uganda DHS 2011
5 Ibid
6 A Situation Analysis of the Challenges and Opportunities for addressing Gender Based
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7 The changing nature of gender roles in the drylands of the Horn and East Africa:
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8 Advisory Consortium on Conflict Sensitivity (ACCS); Northern Uganda Conflict Analysis.
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9 Knaute D and Kagan S, Issues of Pastoralism: Proceedings of the 2008 International
Conference. Luneburg; University of Luneburg, 2008.
10IPCCSREX Extreme Events Report (2012) Summary for Policymakers
11 Ibid
12 Burke and Lobell (2010) Food Security and Adaptation to Climate Change; What do we
know? Climate Change and Food Security; Advances in Global Change Research 37
(Springer Science).
13IPCCSREX Extreme Events Report (2012) Summary for Policymakers
14 UNDP/NEMA/UNEP Poverty Environment Initiative, 2009. Enhancing the contribution of
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15 McSweeney, C; New, M and Lizanco, G (2007). UNDP climate Change Country Profiles:
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17 Foundation for Environmental Security and Sustainability (FESS) (2011), ‘Climate Change
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by the United States Agency for International Development).
18 Uganda National Climate Change Policy, Ministry of Water and Environment, 2012.
19 Pastoralism and Climate Change; Humanitarian Policy Group Synthesis Paper, ODI (2009)
20 Saferworld. Karamoja conflict and security assessment. September 2010.
21 Stites, Elizabeth & Darlington Akabwai, "Changing Roles, Shifting Risks: Livelihood Impacts
of Disarmament in Karamoja, Uganda." Feinstein International Center, July 2009.
22 Kagan, s., Pedersen, L., Ollech, S., and Knaute, D., (2009) ‘The Karamoja Syndrome:
Transdisciplinary Systems Research Informing Policy and Advocacy’
23 Pastoralists, Peace and Livelihoods: Economic interventions to build peace in Karamoja,
Uganda. Elliott School of International Affairs for Mercy Corps 2012
24 A Situational Analysis of the Challenges and opportunities for addressing Gender- based
Violence in Karamoja, UNFPA 2009.
25 Dancause KN, Helen A. Akol, Sandra J. Gray Beer is the cattle of women: Sorghum beer
commercialization and dietary intake of agro pastoral families in Karamoja, Uganda. Social
Science & Medicine, Volume 70, Issue 8, April 2010, Pages 1123-1130
26 Advisory Consortium on Conflict Sensitivity (ACCS) Northern Uganda Conflict Analysis
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27 Pasteur, K. 2011. From vulnerability to resilience: A framework for analysis and action to
build community resilience. Rugby: Practical Action.
28 Nalule, A.S. "Social management of rangelands and settlement in Karamoja." Food and
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29 Ibid.
30 Karamoja Seasonal Assessment, FAO, 2010-2011
31 Swift J (1988) cited in Rass N. (2006) in "Policies and Strategies to address the
Vulnerability of Pastoralists in Sub-Saharan Africa";
32 Data Source: Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED).
33 World Food Programme PRROs
34 Pastoralism and Climate Change; Humanitarian Policy Group Policy Paper; ODI (2009)
3535 Karamoja Seasonal Assessment; FAO 2010-2011;
2
57
36
Gray. S. (2000) A memory of loss; Ecological Politics, Local History and the Evolution of
Karamojong Violence; Human Organisation.
37 What to do about Karamoja? A food security analysis of Karamoja 2010;
FAO/ECHO. Simon Levine
37 Data Source: Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED).
37 World Food Programme PRROs
37McKinney, P. (2009) Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis: Uganda,
WFP, Kampala
38Karamoja; Changing the Lens; A human rights research project in Uganda's Karamoja subregion; OSIEA (2012).www.karamojainfo.org
39What to do about Karamoja? A food security analysis of Karamoja 2010; FAO/ECHO.
Simon Levine
40 FAO November 2011; Karamoja Food Security Seasonal Assessment
41Markets for livestock and food crops in Karamoja subregion. Ezaga, O.P. July 2010
42 FAO (2012) Karamoja Livelihoods Programme; Quarterly Progress Reports
43 Livestock disease surveillance records at Karamoja Veterinary Laboratory operated by the
International Institute for Cooperation and Development (C&D) in partnership with MAAIF,
2012
44 Baseline Household Economy Assessment of Karamoja, FAO, EC, May 2010,
45 Social Management of Rangelands and Settlement in Karamoja Sub-Region, A,SNalule,
2010, Maquere University, FAO
46 IOD PARC Formative evaluation of the World Food Programme’s Livelihoods Programme
Karamoja Uganda. 2012.
47 Action Aid (Oct 2011), Scorecard - Who is best prepared for a climate and hunger crisis
48 Evaluation of DG ECHOs action in Uganda. Aguaconsult Ltd. Evaluation Report
May 2011.
49 Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry and Fishery / FAO 2010.
50 UN OCHA Uganda Humanitarian Profile, 2011
51 Evaluation of DG ECHOs action in Uganda Aguaconsult Ltd. Evaluation Report
May 2011.
52 Mid Term Evaluation of DG ECHO’s Regional Drought Decision in the Greater Horn of
Africa March - May 2009. John Wilding, Jeremy Swift and Hans Hartung. AGEG Consultants
53For comprehensive details and an analysis of all other programmes – regional and national see the Influencing Strategy.
54 Bernard Broughton, Gaston A. Tumuhimbise, Richard Basalirwa (May 2012),
Decentralized Operation Evaluation of the Uganda, Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation
(PRRO) 101213: Protracted Relief for Internally Displaced Persons and Refugees, Evaluation
Report commissioned by WFP
55 IOD PARC (June 2012), Formative evaluation of World Food Programme’s Livelihoods
Programme, Karamoja, Uganda.
56 Project Completion Review - Sustaining Nutritional Assistance in Karamoja. DFID Uganda
Draft April 2013
57 Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium; (2012); Livelihoods, basic services and social
protection in Northern Uganda and Karamoja; Working Paper 4;
58 For an overarching analysis see: Mohammed Kadi, Leonard Njogu Njau, John Mwikya,
Andre Kamga (August 2011), Working Paper no. 5, The State of Climate Information
Services for Agriculture and Food Security in East African Countries, available at
http://ccafs.cgiar.org/resources/working-papers USAID (Feb 2011), USAID Climate Change and
Conflict in Uganda: The Cattle Corridor and Karamoja, available at http://www.fessglobal.org/Publications/Other/Climate_Change_and_Conflic_%2520in_Uganda.pdf
59 Strongly recommended by most vulnerability and development needs assessments,
including for example Mercy Corps (May 2011), Pastoralists, Peace and Livelihoods:
Economic interventions to help build peace in Karamoja, Uganda, available at
http://elliott.gwu.edu/assets/docs/acad/ids/capstone-2011/mercy-corps-uganda.pdf
60 IOD PARC (2012) Formative evaluation of World Food Programme’s Livelihoods
Programme, Karamoja, Uganda; Final Report.
61 Karamoja Livelihoods Programme (KALIP) Mid-Term Review March 2012
58
62Tambi
et al. (1999) cited by Roeder P and Rich K in “The Global Effort to Eradicate
Rinderpest” “Proven Successes in Agricultural Development” An IFPRI 2020 Book; Published
2010
63 Save the Children and World Vision. 2012. Ending the everyday emergency.
64 Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium; (2012); Livelihoods, basic services and social
protection in Northern Uganda and Karamoja; Working Paper 4;
65 What to do about Karamoja? A food security analysis of Karamoja (2010); FAO/ECHO.
Simon Levine
66 Powell, J. (2010) Karamoja; A Literature Review; Saferworld
67 What to do about Karamoja? A food security analysis of Karamoja (2010); FAO/ECHO.
Simon Levine
68 Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium; (2012); Livelihoods, basic services and social
protection in Northern Uganda and Karamoja; Working Paper 4;
69 Oxfam (2008)Turning up the heat: Climate change and poverty in Uganda
70 FAO November 2011; Karamoja Food Security Seasonal Assessment
71 Uganda DHS 2011
72 IOD PARC (2012) Formative evaluation of World Food Programme’s Livelihoods
Programme, Karamoja, Uganda; Final Report.
73 The Economics of Early Response and Disaster Resilience: Lessons from Kenya and
Ethiopia. Courtenay Cabot Venton, Catherine Fitzgibbon, Tenna Shitarek, Lorraine Coulter,
Olivia Dooley. June 2012.
74 www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/publications1/hum-emer-resp-rev-uk-gvmtresp.pdf?epslanguage=en
75 Saving lives, preventing suffering and building resilience
76 DFID (2011) Saving lives, preventing suffering and building resilience.
77 DFID Business Plan 2011-15, http://www.dfid.gov.uk/About-DFID/Finance-andperformance/DFID-Business-plan-2011---2015/
78 Save the Children and World Vision. 2012. Ending the everyday emergency
79 Lancet Nutrition Series paper 1. 2008
80 Prentice et al. 1983
81 Fuentes, R. and Seck, P. 2007. The Short-Term and Long-Term Human Development
Effects of Climate-Related Shocks: some Empirical Evidence. New York, UNDP
82 Del Ninno, C., Dorosh, P.A. and Smith, L.C. 2003. ‘Public policy, markets and household
coping strategies in Bangladesh: Avoiding a food security crisis following the 1998 floods’.
World Development 31(7): 1221–1238.
83 Emergency food security interventions by Daniel Maxwell, Kate Sadler, Amanda Sim,
Mercy Mutonyi, Rebecca Egan. ODI Good Practice Reviews, 2008
84 Bernard Broughton, Gaston A. Tumuhimbise, Richard Basalirwa (May 2012),
Decentralized Operation Evaluation of the Uganda, Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation
(PRRO) 101213: Protracted Relief for Internally Displaced Persons and Refugees, Evaluation
Report commissioned by WFP
85 IOD PARC (June 2012), Formative evaluation of World Food Programme’s Livelihoods
Programme, Karamoja, Uganda.
86 Lancet paper 3: what works
87 Silventoinen, K. 2003. Determinants of variation in adult body height. Journal of Biosocial
Sciences, 35:263–285.
88 McCord A and Slater, R. (2009) Overview of Public Works Programmes in Sub-Saharan
Africa. ODI Report to World Bank
89 For details see Bernard Broughton, Gaston A. Tumuhimbise, Richard Basalirwa (May
2012), Decentralized Operation Evaluation of the Uganda, Protracted Relief and Recovery
Operation (PRRO) 101213: Protracted Relief for Internally Displaced Persons and Refugees,
Evaluation Report commissioned by WFP; IOD PARC for DFID (June 2012), Formative
evaluation of World Food Programme’s Livelihoods Programme, Karamoja, Uganda
90 Slater R and Evans A. (2011) World Bank, Project Performance Assessment Report.
91 Gayfer, J. et al (2012) Formative Evaluation of World Food Programme’s Livelihoods
Programme in Karamoja,
92 For details see Bernard Broughton, Gaston A. Tumuhimbise, Richard Basalirwa (May
2012), Decentralized Operation Evaluation of the Uganda, Protracted Relief and Recovery
Operation (PRRO) 101213: Protracted Relief for Internally Displaced Persons and Refugees,
59
Evaluation Report commissioned by WFP; IOD PARC for DFID (June 2012), Formative
evaluation of World Food Programme’s Livelihoods Programme, Karamoja, Uganda
93 Report on the Results Assessment of the Farmer Field School Program in Uganda, FAO
August 2012
94 Impact of Farmer Field Schools on Agricultural Productivity And Poverty In East Africa, May
2010 (IFPRI: K. Davis, E. Nkonya, E. Kato, D.A. Mekonnen, M. Odendo, R. Miiro, J. Nkuba,
and J. Okoth)
95 KALIP mid-term review, February 2012
96 Simon Levine, 2010 “What to do about Karamoja?” Livelihoods Support Strategy Report,
FAO/ECHO
97 The World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) 2007 Prevention & control of animal
diseases worldwide; Economic analysis Prevention versus outbreak costs; Final Report.
98 The World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) 2007 Prevention & control of animal
diseases worldwide; Economic analysis Prevention versus outbreak costs; Final Report.
99 Tearfund Report; Investing in Communities; The benefits and costs of building resilience for
food security in Malawi (2010)
100 Some projects’ benefits were not possible to quantify. The highest cost-benefit ratio was
found for crop diversification (sweet potato), 17.2.; a BCR of 1.6 was found for conservation
farming.
101 Sahu Cost Benefit Analysis of Participatory Natural Resource Management; A study of
Watershed Development Initiative in Indian Village; Munich Personal RePEc Archive (2008).
102 Ibid.
103 World Bank Water Sector Board Discussion Paper Series; Paper No 11;
May 2008; Watershed Management Approaches, Policies, and Operations:
Lessons for Scaling Up
104
John Tanaka (2012); Economic Feasibility of Range Improvement
Practices
105 “Background Paper on the benefits and costs of Early Warning Systems for Major Natural
Hazards”; GFDRR Paper; Teisberg, T J and Weiher, R F (2009)
106 Mechler, R. and The Risk to Resilience Study Team, (2008): The Cost-Benefit Analysis
Methodology, From Risk to Resilience Working Paper No. 1, eds. Moench, M., Caspari, E. &
A. Pokhrel, ISET, ISET-Nepal and ProVention, Kathmandu, Nepal
107 Moench, M. and The Risk to Resilience Study Team, (2008): Understanding the Costs and
Benefits of Disaster Risk Reduction under Changing Climatic Conditions, From Risk to
Resilience Working Paper No. 9, eds. Moench, M., Caspari, E. & A. Pokhrel, ISET, ISETNepal and ProVention, Kathmandu, Nepal,
108 Study on Lessons Learnt from Drought Early warning Systems in Uganda and Kenya
CIP Consult Uganda Ltd. Feb.2012.
109 ICAI DFID’s Humanitarian Emergency Response in the Horn of Africa, 2012.
Recommendation 2: DFID should build on existing good practice to develop, within six
months, a new model for flexibly addressing recurring crises in the Horn of Africa.
110 The Economics of Early Response and Disaster Resilience: lessons from Kenya and
Ethiopia June 2012. Courtenay Cabot Venton, Catherine Fitzgibbon, Tenna Shitarek, Lorraine
Coulter, Olivia Dooley.
111 UN OCHA Consolidated Appeal for Uganda 2009
112 Lessons learned from complex emergencies over past decade. Prof Peter Salama
MBBS,Paul Spiegel MD,Leisel Talley MPH,Ronald Waldman MD The Lancet - 13 November
2004 ( Vol. 364, Issue 9447, Pages 1801-1813 ) DOI: 10.1016/S0140-6736(04)17405-9
http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(04)17405-9/fulltext
113 Burcu Balcik, Benita M. Beamon, Caroline C. Krejci, Kyle M. Muramatsu, Magaly Ramirez,
Coordination in humanitarian relief chains: Practices, challenges and opportunities,
International Journal of Production Economics, Volume 126, Issue 1, July 2010, Pages 22-34,
ISSN 0925-5273, 10.1016/j.ijpe.2009.09.008.
(http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S092552730900365X)
114 WB – HDR 2011, DFID policy re fragile states, HERR
115 Davies F, Gregory Smith and Tim Williamson. Coordinating post-conflict aid in Southern
Sudan. September 2011. ODI Background Notes
116 Brickell E, Will McFarland and David M. Mwayafu. Unlocking progress on REDD+: sector
coordination in Uganda. November 2012. ODI Background Notes
60
Confirmed through all recent Karamoja-specific evaluations of WFP’s work funded by
DFID, but also by other evaluations of WFP’s work in the wider Uganda, e.g. ODI for WFP
(2011), WFP's Agriculture and Market Support (AMS) in Uganda (2009-2014) A Strategic
Evaluation (Mid-Term), available at http://www.wfp.org/content/wfps-agriculture-and-marketsupport-uganda-2009-2014-strategic-evaluation-mid-term Note that P4P is a sub set of the
AMS programme.
118 District government
119 Community-based Integrated Watershed Management.
120 Compiled according to DFID Technical Note on Climate & Environment Assessment for
the Business Case (How-to-note, a DFID Practice Paper, November 2012.)
121 Advisory Consortium on Conflict Sensitivity (ACCS); Northern Uganda
Conflict Analysis; October 2012.
122 The changing nature of gender roles in the drylands of the Horn and East Africa:
implications for DRR programming. REGLAP 2011.
123 FANTA-2 2010. The analysis of the nutritional situation in Uganda.
124 Knaute D and Kagan S, Issues of Pastoralism: Proceedings of the 2008 International
Conference; Luneburg; University of Luneburg, 2008.
125 Advisory Consortium on Conflict Sensitivity (ACCS); Northern Uganda Conflict Analysis.
October 2012.
126 Based on average 60 days in SFP
127 DFID Multilateral Aid Review 2011.
128 Project Completion Review - Sustaining Nutritional Assistance in Karamoja. DFID Uganda
Draft April 2013
129 Bernard Broughton, Gaston A. Tumuhimbise, Richard Basalirwa (May 2012),
Decentralized Operation Evaluation of the Uganda, Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation
(PRRO) 101213: Protracted Relief for Internally Displaced Persons and Refugees, Evaluation
Report commissioned by WFP; IOD PARC for DFID (June 2012), Formative evaluation of
World Food Programme’s Livelihoods Programme, Karamoja, Uganda.
130 Karamoja Livelihoods Programme (KALIP) Mid-Term Review March 2012
131 Evaluation of DG ECHO’s action in Uganda Aguaconsult Ltd. Evaluation Report
May 2011.
132 Baseline Household Economy Assessment of Karamoja, FAO, EC, May 2010,
133 DFID Multilateral Aid Review - UNICEF 2011
134 DFID’s work through UNICEF. Report 21 – March 2013
117
61