1NC
K (binary/hate arg)
The systems of signification and political economy operate according to a Code that
creates meaning. The AFF attempts to challenge particular manifestations of this
Code instead of attacking its underlying logic—the AFF’s strategy can only create
simulated forms of progress instead of a radical upending of the system.
Pawlett, Wolverhampton Media, Communications and Cultural Studies senior lecturer,
2013
(William, Violence, Society and Radical Theory : Bataille, Baudrillard and Contemporary Society, pg
132- 138, ldg)
In recent sociological literature, hatred is understood as the result of an entrenched structure of difference
which imposes a normative and hierarchical order on those who appear- to be 'different". Those who
benefit most from established social and economic structures: white, middle-class heterosexual males,
exercise and reinforce their position of dominance through a wide range of oppositions with each pan
consisting of positive and negative terms. Hence black, female, gay, become the negative terms by which
white, male and straight define and maintain their identities as superior. Since such identity positions are
not naturally superior they require the maintenance of boundaries separating them ideologically from their
opposite term. Identity and difference are mutually reinforcing and difference tends to be reduced to a
subordinate, supplementary or supporting role. Further, such accounts assert, in times of stress, loss of
status (such as loss of employment, or difficulty in securing meaningful employment) those in a
privileged position will vent their frustrations on those who are 'different' (Perry 2001). More recently,
sociological accounts have stressed the importance of the emotional bonds which link the hater with
whomever or whatever they hate (Afford 1998; Scheff and Retzinger 2001). The hater is thereby revealed
to be in a situation of weakness and dependence which tends to further enrage them. Many writers then
enjoin a celebration of' difference' or 'diversity’ such that difference can be either revealed as really*
rather similar to identity - as in many multiculturalist arguments - or alternatively 'difference' is
celebrated as 'different' but not lesser. In both of these accounts there is usually some appeal for
greater education or information on 'cultural difference' and better or more positive media representations
of 'difference'.
This section examines how the ideas of Bataille and Baudrillard depart from these trends. Hatred, for
Bataille, is a powerful, enduring though derivative and mobile psychological attitude. Hatred is not an
affect or drive, but a restricted, accumulated rag-bag of sentiments. Such sentiments parallel capitalist
values in that they consist of ideological and representational claims which are extremely reductive, in
particular, they reduce human being to the state of a productive instrument, and further in their
accumulative form and refusal of generosity and reciprocity. For Baudrillard, hatred is a far more supple
relation than the term ‘bond’ suggests; it is so readily channelled, re-directed, switched or substituted. In
the destructured, implosive and limitless system that dominates contemporary life the hater does not
necessarily even require an object or ‘other’ to hate, or an identity position to protect or affirm. In his rethinking of hate Baudrillard asks, provocatively, is it some version of difference or otherness that suffers
the rage of haters, or is it rather those who are perceived and positioned as “dangerously similar”
(1993b: 129). The category of the “dangerously similar” includes those who have been forcibly deprived
of their difference by the globalising of simulatory Western values. For Baudrillard, we are all haters,
not because of some innate ‘badness’ of human nature, but because we live in a system that
encourages hate and thrives upon its channeling. Both Bataille and Baudrillard then take hatred very
seriously, aiming to theorize it in its intensity and power and avoiding facile social prescriptions
concerning social progress through better representation or education.
In For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign (1981, orig. 1972) Baudrillard began to describe
various codes of meaning (or signification) as integrated by what he called ‘the code’ ( le code, la grille,
le Code du signes, la matrice ). By “the code” Baudrillard intended not particular codes of meaning
(English, French, Morse) or particular modes of the interpretation of meaning (dominant, resistant, plural)
but rather the condition of possibility of coding . 2 For an effective critique of the consumer society to be
made, Baudrillard suggests, we must focus analysis on the form of the Code, not its contents or
representations which are, of course, extraordinarily open, malleable and diverse. The Code as form is
preconscious, or, in Baudrillard’s terminology, has the effect of “precession”; that is, as grid or network
it precedes individual experience, perception and choice. The medium of this grid is the abstract,
arbitrary sign. Signs, visual and linguistic, are the medium of coding, of the ordered exchange between
coded elements. Composed to two sets of inter-locking relations, the sign-referent and signifier-signified,
the sign is the universal form constructing the oppositions of subject and object, of real and
representation, of self and other: the building blocks of ‘reality’ itself.
The ordered exchange of signs produces identity and difference: every ‘thing’ is semiotic; every ‘thing’ is
a ‘thing’ because it is not some other ‘thing’. Signs produce social meanings and values on a scale or
grid whereby all points can be measured and compared. To clarify, it is not that every ‘thing’ can be
converted into sign form, it is rather that the very process of transcription or coding produces ‘things’
within a scheme of identities and differences. Though the Code encompasses every ‘thing’ it cannot
process symbolic exchange, seduction, the ambivalence (or becoming) of life which consist not ‘things’
with identity but of volatile relations, always “in transit” or metamorphosis.
The Code then does not merely express particular aspects of the consumer capitalist system such as
media, fashion or advertising: it is far more fundamental. At the fundamental level the Code is what
prevents symbolic exchange by breaking its cycles or by seizing and diverting its potential. Symbolic
exchange now occurs or rather “effracts” only when the Code and its value systems are annulled,
reversed or suspended. Symbolic exchange traverses all oppositions, challenging fixed or stable
positions or power relations. Baudrillard’s major example of symbolic exchange is, of course, the gift and
counter-gift discussed in Chapter 2. To reiterate, the meaning of the gift never settles into fixity or
identity, it is not structured by a logic of difference, its meaning can be transformed at any moment in the
on-going relation or “pact” between parties – indeed this relation is of the gift and the gift is of this
relation: relation and gift flourish together, and die together.
Baudrillard defines the Code as a “generalised metaphysics” synthesising social values, social production
and social identities, and this system ends any sense of the social as dynamic, symbolic form. The Code
enacts an “obligatory registration of individuals on the scale of status” (1981: 68), producing a
“hierarchy of differential signs” which, crucially, “constitutes the fundamental, decisive form of
social control – more so than acquiescence to ideological norms” (ibid.). It makes no difference
whether we, as individuals, endorse the consumer capitalist system or not, since we are all positioned
by the Code, and are positioned through it by others: the game of ideological critique takes place
within the terms set by the Code. The Code breaks, blocks and bars ambivalence producing the structure
of difference – the play of identity and difference characterised by oppositions such as true/false,
good/evil, self/other, black/white, male/female. The standard dimensions of consumer status
positioning flow from this source: rich/poor, young/ old, fat/thin, attractive/unattractive. While structural
or dialectical oppositions are characteristic of the first and second orders of simulacra, in the third order
the Code simulates choice, difference and diversity through binary “modulation” by allowing the
privileged terms of its oppositions to switch, fuse or “implode” (1983: 95-110). For example ‘fat’,
‘poor’ and ‘old’ can be beautiful too – if only within the confines of fashion, cosmetics advertising or pop
music video. The Code operates in “total indifference” to content; everything is permitted in sign
form; that is as “simulation”.
The Code also performs a pacifying effect on society: the once clear-cut, structural divisions such as class
and status are made less visible by registering all people as individual consumers on a single, universal
scale. Everyone becomes a consumer, though some, of course, consume far more than others. As
universal form the status of consumer confers a kind of democratic flattening of social relations, but an
illusory one. If class conflict was, to some extent, pacified, Baudrillard does not contend that society as a
whole is pacified; indeed other forms of violence and dissent emerge and cannot be deterred. Baudrillard
wrote of the emergence of new “anomalous” forms of violence, less intelligible, less structured, postdialectical or implosive (Baudrillard 1998a: 174-85; 1994: 71-2)). He refers to the Watts riots of 1965 as
an example of new violent rejections of the consumer system. Later, Baudrillard proposed the term
“disembodied hate” or simply “the hate” to express aspects of this process (1996a: 142-7).
The Code then is a principle of integration producing everything and everyone as a position on the scale
of social value . With the last vestiges of symbolic orders around the world being eliminated by neoliberal economic globalisation how is the Code to be challenged or defied? 3 Departing from the form but
not the intent of Marxist theory, Baudrillard argued that the apparent distinction between use value and
economic exchange value is produced as a “code effect”. In other words, use value is a simulatory form
produced by the capitalist system as justification and grounding for its trading of economic exchange
values (1981: 130-42). For Baudrillard the illusion of use value, like the illusion of signified meanings
and the illusion of the stable solid reality of the referent, are produced by the Code as structural
groundings, shoring up the unstable ‘reality’ of signs and preventing the emergence of ambivalence
(1981: 156 n.9). To challenge, defy or breach the Code then it is not sufficient to ‘return’ to use value.
Indeed such strategies, shared by some Marxists, environmentalists and anti-globalisation movements
actually feed the capitalist system: the market’s semiotic assimilation of environmentalism as the ‘green’
brand choice is an obvious example.
But if Marxist theory fails to engage with and challenge the system of signs, so too, for Baudrillard, do
many Structuralist, Poststructuralist and Postmodernist theorists of desire, difference and
liberation. To defy the system it is never sufficient to ‘play with signs’ , that is, to play with plural,
‘different’ or multiple identity positions. Here we encounter Baudrillard’s total rejection of what would
later be called ‘identity politics’ and also a central misunderstanding of his position on signs. 4 For
Baudrillard to play with signs – signs of consumption and status, signs of gender, sexuality or
ethnicity is simply to operate within the Code . It is an unconscious or unwitting complicity with the
Code’s logic of the multiplication of status positions; it is, in a sense, to assist it in the production of
‘diversity’ and ‘choice’. It is deeply ironic that some of Baudrillard’s critics have claimed that Baudrillard
himself merely ‘played with signs’ and that he advocated a playing with signs. Yet Baudrillard is clear, in
order to oppose the system “[e]ven signs must burn” (1981: 163). In his controversial work Seduction
(orig. 1979) Baudrillard draws an important distinction between the “ludique” meaning playing the game
of signs, playing with signification (to enhance one’s status position or to assert one’s identity through its
‘difference’), and “mise enjeux” meaning to put signs at stake, to challenging them or annul them through
symbolic exchange (1990: 15778). 5 For Baudrillard signs play with us, despite us, against us; any radical
defiance must be a defiance of signs and their codings.
Unfortunately, the distinction between ‘playing with signs’ – playing with their decoding and recoding,
and defying the sign system has not penetrated the mainstream of Media and Cultural Studies. Eco’s
influential notion of “semiotic guerrilla warfare” (Eco 1995) and Hall’s even more influential notion of
“resistant decoding” place their faith in the ability of the sovereign, rational consumer to negotiate
mediated meanings. For them the citizen-consumer confronts media content as the subject confronts the
object. Hall does not consider that much media content is now ‘pre-encoded’ in an ersatz ‘oppositional’
form which renders the moment of ‘oppositional decoding’ merely one of conformity or ironic
recognition (see Hall et al. 2002: 128-38). In other words, the terms for ‘resistant’ readings can be
pre-set as positions within the Code. Critique is rendered uncertain, even meaningless by coded
assimilation because the system sells us the signs of opposition as willingly as it sells us the signs of
conformity; it sells signs of inclusion and empowerment as eagerly as it sells signs of affluence and
exclusion. Can we even tell them apart? In which category would we place the phenomenon of Sex and
the City , for example? 6 Today, millions of people manage, archive and share signs of their designated
identity through social media platforms, in Baudrillard’s terms holding themselves hostage to the system
of signs.
The realm of symbolic exchange or seduction does not come about when individuals ‘play with
signs’ but when (signs of) individuality, identity, will and agency are annulled through an
encounter with radical otherness. Radical otherness, or radical alterity, for Baudrillard, refers to
otherness not ‘difference’, that is otherness beyond representation, beyond coding – including
‘oppositional’ or assertive de/re-codings. A system of “total constraint” the Code does not merely
produce identity but also difference, diversity and hybridity: indeed each of these now describe marketing
strategies. Of course, the system does not seek to promote passivity or apathy among consumers but quite
the contrary: to thrive and expand the system requires active, discriminating, engaged consumers, jostling
for position, competing for advancement. The Code exists “to better prime the aspiration towards the
higher level” (1981: 60), delivering diversity and choice at the level of signs or content (the goods that we
choose to eat, the products and services that we choose to wear, watch, download) and it requires in return
… nothing much at all – merely that we understand ourselves as consumers . The aim of the system is to
make ‘the consumer’ the universal form of humanity yet within this form an almost infinite variety of
differential contents or positions are possible; homogenisation and diversification become
indistinguishable. Since ‘humanity’, for Baudrillard, as for Nietzsche, is already constituted as a
universal form by the Enlightenment (1993a: 50) this task is close to completion, though the final
completion, the “perfect crime” against Otherness will never, according to Baudrillard, come to pass
(Baudrillard 1996a). 7
Interp
Interpretation – the roll of the ballot is to answer the resolutional question – should
one or more of the activities in the topic be legalized
1.Legalization requires state regulation – its distinct from negative action which is
decriminalization
Dr Elaine Mossman, Honorary Research Fellow Victoria University of Wellington, 2007,
International Approaches to Decriminalising or Legalising Prostitution, Prepared for the Ministry of
Justice by Crime and Justice Research Centre Victoria University of Wellington,
http://prostitution.procon.org/sourcefiles/newzealandreport.pdf
The Ministry of Justice commissioned the Crime and Justice Research Centre to examine overseas legalised and decriminalised models of
prostitution law reform. The work is to inform the statutory review of the Prostitution Reform Act 2003 (PRA) to be completed in 2008. There
have been developments in the legal approach to prostitution adopted by different countries, with a significant shift away from prohibition,
towards legalisation and decriminalisation. But it became evident in preparing this review that there is much confusion over the main legislative
approaches to prostitution in different jurisdictions. There was often misinterpretation – or at least it could appear so. One difficulty was the
variation in the terms used to describe the legislative position, and how they were defined. We clarify the main three approaches used to classify
the jurisdictions covered by this review. These are (i) criminalisation; (ii) legalisation; and (iii) decriminalisation. Criminalisation For the
purposes of this review, we classified countries as criminalised regimes where it is not legally possible to engage in prostitution, because
prostitution or its associated activities would be contravening some law, regardless of the level of tolerance existing. (In some criminalised
regimes, there can be a tolerant climate. Prostitution is known by enforcement agencies to exist, but prosecutions are rarely made.)
Criminalisation makes prostitution illegal with related offences appearing in the criminal code. It seeks to reduce or eliminate the sex industry and
is supported by those who are opposed to prostitution on moral, religious or feminist grounds. Jurisdictions that have criminalised prostitution
subdivide into two groups: i. Prohibitionist – where all forms of prostitution are unacceptable and therefore illegal. This is the approach taken in
most states of the USA and countries in the Middle East. ii. Abolitionist – a modified form of prohibition which allows the sale of sex, but bans
all related activities (e.g. soliciting, brothel keeping, and procurement). Making these related activities illegal effectively criminalises prostitution
as it is virtually impossible to carry out prostitution without contravening one law or another. The abolitionist approach often focuses on
eliminating or reducing the negative impacts of prostitution. It is one currently operating in countries such as England and Canada. Sweden is the
only country so far to criminalise the buyers of sex rather than sex workers. The aim was to end prostitution, rather than regulate it – since it was
Legalisation
where prostitution is controlled by government and is legal only under certain state- specified
conditions. The underlying premise is that prostitution is necessary for stable social order, but should nonetheless be subject to controls to
protect public order and health. Some jurisdictions opt for legalisation as a means to reduce crimes associated with prostitution. Key
indicators of legalised regimes are prostitution-specific controls and conditions specified by the
state. These can include licensing, registration, and mandatory health checks. Prostitution has been legalised
viewed as violence against women and a barrier to gender equality. Norway and Finland are now considering this approach.
This is
in countries such as the Netherlands, Germany, Iceland, Switzerland, Austria, Denmark, Greece, Turkey, Senegal, the USA state of Nevada, and
many Australian states (Victoria, Queensland, ACT and Northern Territory). Decriminalisation Decriminalisation
involved
repeal of all laws against prostitution, or the removal of provisions that criminalised all aspects of
prostitution. In decriminalised regimes, however, a distinction is made between (i) voluntary prostitution and (ii) that involving either force
and coercion or child prostitution – the latter remaining criminal. The difference between legalised and criminalised regimes has been described
as often largely a matter of degree – a function of the number of legal prostitution-related activities, and the extent of controls and restrictions that
The key difference between legalisation and decriminalisation is that with the latter there
are no prostitution-specific regulations imposed by the state. Rather, regulation of the industry is
predominantly through existing ‘ordinary’ statutes and regulations covering employment and
health for instance. The aims of decriminalisation differ from legalisation in their emphasis. While the
are imposed.
protection of social order is also relevant to decriminalisation, the main emphasis here is on the sex worker – respecting their human rights, and
improving their health, safety and working conditions. Decriminalisation is also recognised as a way of avoiding the two-tier reality of legal and
illegal operations, with the latter operating underground. Currently, only New South Wales (Australia) and New Zealand have adopted
decriminalisation. But there are elements of legalisation in both jurisdictions – for instance, brothel operators in New Zealand require
certification; and street-based work in New South Wales is still prohibited. Unregulated
regimes There are some
jurisdictions where prostitution is entirely unregulated. A review of 27 countries in Central and Eastern Europe and
Central Asia found this was the case in eleven of them. These countries are not included in this review, as there are no reforms intended or
legislative recognition of prostitution as either legal or illegal. Categories of prostitution offences The legality of different aspects of prostitution
varies across different jurisdictions, with some being legal (e.g. prostitution in a state-regulated brothel), and others not (e.g. soliciting on a
street). Prostitution involving a seller and buyer may be legal, but the involvement of third parties such as brothel managers or pimps illegal – as
in Denmark and Iceland for instance. Prostitution-related laws vary greatly, but can generally be grouped into three categories: (i) laws aimed at
the sex worker; (ii) laws aimed at third parties involved in the management and organisation of prostitution; and (iii) laws aimed at those who
purchase commercial sex. The two most significant criminal prohibitions relate to either soliciting in a public place and brothel keeping. The acts
of advertising prostitution services or the premises used for prostitution have also been made an offence in many jurisdictions.
2.“Resolved” before a colon reflects a legislative forum
Army Officer School 2005
(“# 12, Punctuation – The Colon and Semicolon”, 5-12, http://usawocc.army.mil/IMI/wg12.htm)
The colon introduces the following: a. A list, but only after "as follows," "the following," or a noun for which the list is an appositive: Each scout will
carry the following: (colon) meals for three days, a survival knife, and his sleeping bag. The company had four new officers: (colon) Bill Smith, Frank Tucker, Peter
Fillmore, and Oliver Lewis. b. A long quotation (one or more paragraphs): In The Killer Angels Michael Shaara wrote: (colon) You may find it a different story from
the one you learned in school. There have been many versions of that battle [Gettysburg] and that war [the Civil War]. (The quote continues for two more paragraphs.)
c. A formal quotation or question: The President declared: (colon) "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself." The question is: (colon) what can we do about it? d.
A second independent clause which explains the first: Potter's motive is clear: (colon) he wants the assignment. e. After the introduction of a business letter: Dear Sirs:
(colon) Dear Madam: (colon) f. The details following an announcement For sale: (colon) large lakeside cabin with dock g. A
formal resolution, after
the word "resolved:" Resolved: (colon) That this council petition the mayor.
Mossmon – legalization means state regulation – distinct from the state taking a
hands off approach – that is decriminalization! Their imprecise interpretation both
makes regulary change harder by confusing advoates and makes specific debate
impossible – the best counter advocacy to legalization is to use the sweedish model
and the sex trafficking industry da, that is a valuable VITAL intellectual discussion
they not only PRECLUDE but ACTIVLY SUPPRESS by dis-incentivizing neg
research on the area and forcing us to first find cards about laughter…
Leigh-Activist-99 10 Hastings Women's L.J. 59
ARTICLE: A First Hand Look at the San Francisco Task
Force Report on Prostitution
There is no "official' definition of legalized or decriminalized prostitution. Often
those who are not familiar with the "activist'
discussion about prostitution law reform use the term "legalization' to mean any alternative to absolute
criminalization, ranging from licensing of brothels to the complete absence of laws regulating
prostitution. Most references to law reform in the media and in other contemporary contexts use the term
legalization to refer to any system that allows some prostitution. These common definitions of
legalization are extremely broad. Conflicting interpretations of this term often cause confusion in a
discussion of reform. Many (or most) societies that allow prostitution do so by giving the state control over the lives and businesses of
those who work as prostitutes. For prostitutes, legalization often includes special taxes, requirements that they work in brothels or in certain
zones, licenses, registration requirements and government records of individuals, and health checks which often means punitive quarantine. The
term legalization does not necessarily refer to the above sorts of regulations. In fact, in one commonly accepted definition of legalization, "legal'
can simply mean that prostitution is not against the law, which others refer to as decriminalization. Legalization From an activist perspective the
term legalization as applied to prostitution usually refers to a system of criminal regulation and government control of prostitutes. In this system,
certain individuals or specific prostitution practices (work venues, etc.) are explicitly recognized and "legitimized' by law, and practices or
individuals outside those boundaries are illegal. These systems usually "legalize' a minority of individuals, and/or a narrow range of practices, so
that many prostitutes and prostitution activities remain criminalized. Examples of such systems are seen in Switzerland, Nevada and a recently
dismantled system in Taiwan. Although the term legalization may be understood to imply a [*61] decriminalized, autonomous system of
prostitution, activists use this term to describe the reality of its use: police regulating prostitution through criminal codes. Laws regulate
prostitutes' businesses and lives, prescribing health checks and registration of health status (enforced by police and, often corrupt, medical
agencies), controlling where they may or may not reside and prescribing full time employment for their lovers (France) to give a few examples.
Prostitute activists use the term legalization to refer to these systems of state control defining the term by the realities of the current situation
rather than by the broad implications of the term itself.
A2: Definitions Arbitrary
All definitions are somewhat arbitrary-the only solution is contesting reasonable
interpretations of terms-debates solve their offense
Kemerling, Newberry philosophy professor, 1997
(Garth, “Definition and Meaning”, http://www.philosophypages.com/lg/e05.htm)
We've seen that sloppy
or misleading use of ordinary language can seriously limit our ability to create and
communicate correct reasoning. As philosopher John Locke pointed out three centuries ago, the achievement of human knowledge is often
hampered by the use of words without fixed signification. Needless controversy is sometimes produced
and perpetuated by an unacknowledged ambiguity in the application of key terms. We can distinguish disputes of three sorts:
Genuine disputes involve disagreement about whether or not some specific proposition is true. Since the people
engaged in a genuine dispute agree on the meaning of the words by means of which they convey their respective positions, each of them can propose and assess
logical arguments that might eventually lead to a resolution of their differences. Merely verbal disputes, on the other hand, arise
entirely from ambiguities in the language used to express the positions of the disputants. A verbal dispute disappears entirely once the people involved arrive at an
agreement on the meaning of their terms, since doing so reveals their underlying agreement in belief. Apparently verbal but really genuine disputes can also occur, of
course. In cases of this sort, the resolution of every ambiguity only reveals an underlying genuine dispute. Once that's been discovered, it can be addressed fruitfully
by appropriate methods of reasoning. We
can save a lot of time, sharpen our reasoning abilities, and communicate with
each other more effectively if we watch for disagreements about the meaning of words and try to resolve
them whenever we can. Kinds of Definition The most common way of preventing or eliminating differences in the use
of languages is by agreeing on the definition of our terms. Since these explicit accounts of the meaning of a word or phrase can be
offered in distinct contexts and employed in the service of different goals, it's useful to distinguish definitions of several kinds: A lexical definition
simply reports the way in which a term is already used within a language community. The goal here is to inform
someone else of the accepted meaning of the term, so the definition is more or less correct depending upon the accuracy with which it captures that usage. In these
pages, my definitions of technical terms of logic are lexical because they are intended to inform you about the way in which these terms are actually employed within
the discipline of logic. At the other extreme, a stipulative definition freely assigns meaning to a completely new term, creating a usage that
had never previously existed. Since the goal in this case is to propose the adoption of shared use of a novel term, there are no existing standards against which to
compare it, and the definition is always correct (though it might fail to win acceptance if it turns out to be inapt or useless). If I now decree that we will henceforth
refer to Presidential speeches delivered in French as "glorsherfs," I have made a (probably pointless) stipulative definition. Combining
these two
techniques is often an effective way to reduce the vagueness of a word or phrase. These precising
definitions begin with the lexical definition of a term but then propose to sharpen it by stipulating more
narrow limits on its use. Here, the lexical part must be correct and the stipulative portion should
appropriately reduce the troublesome vagueness. If the USPS announces that "proper notification of a change of address" means that an
official form containing the relevant information must be received by the local post office no later than four days prior to the effective date of the change, it has
offered a (possibly useful) precising definition.
Limits are not exclusionary – the AFF can contest how we have mapped the
deliberative space – BUT their counter-interpretations embrace of anything and
everything being allowed on the affirmative leads to relativism which backdoors in
exclusion and domination – their refusal to have stable definitions leads to the worse
form of pluralism where no consensus can ever be reached which breaks the
foundations of deliberation by severing collective ties required to take action –
saying there is no definition is not helpful at all for people that are currently
suffering – we have to try to make some sort of definition to
Dahlberg 13 Lincoln is Visiting Fellow at the Centre for Critical and Cultural Studies, University of
Queensland A“Exclusions of the Public Spere Conception: Examining Deliberative and Discourse Theory
Accounts,” Javnost the Public: Volume 20, Number 1: pp 21-38,
https://www.academia.edu/3503839/Exclusions_of_the_Public_Spere_Conception_Examining_Deliberati
ve_and_Discourse_Theory_Accounts
Following discourse theory, deliberative public sphere criteria and practice can be said to be discursively constituted. A hegemonic system of
discourse defines, at any one time, what it means to be deliberative, and thus the boundaries of public sphere interaction. In order for
deliberation to be carried out in a "rational" way, order must be brought to chaotic social space via
normative deliberative criteria , and in the process certain forms and contents of communication
discursively excluded (explicitly or as unnamed excess). I will focus here on how discourse theory understands such exclusion and
associated politics in relation first to the deliberative public sphere conception and then to deliberative practice. In terms of the deliberative public
sphere conception, we can say from post-Marxist discourse theory that the (or any) deliberative norm is constituted through the articulation of a
range of elements drawn from various democratic traditions, including autonomy, critique, equality, inclusion, inter-subjectivity, participation,
reasoning, reciprocity, and reflexivity. These elements become hegemonically articulated into a discursive whole and their
meaning modified in the process -through being represented by, and as such identified as having a
common relation to, the signifier "deliberative public sphere" (or "rational-critical debate"). As a result, the
deliberative public sphere conception assumes a (seemingly) universal identity. However, different
articulations will change the meaning of both part and whole, demonstrating the particularity of the
discourse. For example , "autonomy" will change its meaning , as will the discourse as a whole , if
articulated with "free markets" rather than with "equality." Articulation is, of course, not random but influenced by
the sedimented meanings of elements. For example, "deliberation" is clearly associated in modem Western thought with "reflexivity" and
"reason," while "public" is associated with "openness," and "inclusion." As a result we see family resemblances amongst different understandings
of, and offshoots from, deliberative democracy and the deliberative public sphere. The hegemonic raising to universal status of a particular
deliberative public sphere conception, obscuring other possible articulations, is supported by the drawing of an antagonistic frontier, that is, by
defining "deliberation" against what it is not: any communication signified as "coercive," "unreasoned," "instrumental-
strategic,"12 "unreflexive," "hierarchical," "closed," and so on. These signifiers, in discourse theory terms, are framed as the
"enemys" of deliberation, to be excised from the deliberative public sphere. The explicit exclusion of these elements
operates to mythically suture the deliberative discourse: their exclusion makes the discourse seem whole/universal in that it seems to represent
both democratic and undemocratic aspects of communication. In the process, the deliberative discourse ideologically obscures the exclusion of
other, unnamed, elements (and thus voices) that exceed, and would tell the lie to, its neat boundaries and universal normative claims, excessive
elements such as aesthetics, embodiment, and passion, as feminist critics in particular have pointed out (Squires 1998; Young 2000; Mouffe
2002; Nor-val 2007). Such excess is an always potential threat to the norm's universal claim, the basis for contestation and re-articulation of the
boundaries of the deliberative public sphere conception (including the basis for the poststructuralist critiques of the conception, and also for the
deliberative revisions). This discourse theory reading can be considered a radicalisation of the deliberative
public sphere conception in both ontological and democratic terms due to "deliberation" and "the public
sphere" being based upon particular discursive (hegemonic) articulations and associated inclusions and
exclusions, rather than upon a universal rational-critical norm of communication (however hypothetically
conceived). The public sphere conception becomes radicalised ontologically through being understood as radically contingent (a hegemonic
construction). And as such it is radicalised democratically: "the public" must explicitly decide their own deliberative norms without reference to
any other ground, including to universal rational-critical debate. This radicalisation - the public sphere norm (and hence "the public" and
"sovereignty") as hegemonically constituted - also means the deconstruction of any theory-practice divide. Public
sphere norms, and thus legitimate definitions of deliberation and exclusion, are made and re-made on
the basis of hegemonic practices, whether within "everyday" communication or (specialised)
"scientific-theoretic" investigation. Hegemonic politics is also seen as applying to the contents of
everyday deliberative practice. Post-Marxist discourse theory suggests that, just as with the struggle over
the public sphere deliberative norm, at any one time there are likely to be a number of discourses vying to
define what particular contents are more and less legitimate for public deliberation (inclusion/exclusion).
This hegemonic struggle to define both deliberative norms and contents will be dominated by taken-for-granted discourses. With respect to
the defining and institution of deliberative norms, participants within particular debates (including
academic ones) will draw upon socio-culturally available interpretations and criteria of deliberation.
With respect to the contents of deliberation, one discourse (e.g., media self-regulation) may come to dominate public sphere
deliberations on a particular issue (e.g. media regulation) by explicit exclusion of other discourses (e.g., state control and regulation), setting up
an antagonistic frontier that is itself constituted upon the occlusion of unnamed (excessive) others (e.g., community, citizen, and autonomous
options). Sophisticated deliberative democrats, as noted earlier, would agree that norms and contents of
deliberation are structured by social context. However, discourse theory provides a means - a coherent conceptual
framework - for theorising the logic and politics of the deliberative exclusions involved, without recourse to
an extra-political ground. To recap, given a post-Marxist discourse theory reading, we can talk about deliberative public
sphere boundaries as discursively constituted and politically struggled over. In any theorisation and practice of
deliberation, the defining or policing of boundaries of what can and cannot be said will be subject to
ideological moves, including the setting up of antagonistic frontiers that institute explicit exclusions and
obscure alternative conceptions of the public sphere excessive to the hegemonic conception. But since
excess is radical , there is always the possibility of political contestation of the boundaries of
hegemonic deliberation and hence re-articulation of the public sphere conception. This paper has examined
and clarified two approaches to a radical democratic conception of exclusions resulting from deliberative public sphere boundary drawing.13 I
first outlined how deliberative public sphere theory takes exclusion into account much more extensively than poststructuralist-influenced critics
claim. However, I also argued that the poststructuralist critique does raise concern about the public sphere conception being (finally) determined
extra-politically in deliberative theory, and hence concern about limits to its radical democratic status. Given this concern, I turned to the
poststructuralist critics, specifically to post-Marxist discourse theorists, and asked how they might contribute - on the basis of radical contingency
- to theorising the deliberative public sphere exclusions in such a way as to ensure the radical democratic value of the conception. I showed that a
post-Marxist discourse theory reading of the deliberative public sphere offers a comprehensive conceptual
framework for taking account of the exclusions and associated politics that not only define but also
challenge and re-articulate the (discursive) boundaries of the public sphere conception in theory and practice.
In the process, the discourse theory reading could be argued to ontologically and democratically radicalise the
public sphere conception. This conception is ontologically radicalised as it is conceived as radically
contingent, and it is democratically radicalised as this poststructuralist ontology means that the public
sphere norm (and the public sphere itself) is defined only by hegemonic/political struggle and not by any extrapolitical ground. However, instead of a democratic radicalisation, the embrace of radical contingency could be read as
undermining the democratic status of the conception , thus turning the table on the poststructuralist
critique . The concern is that, given radical contingency, there is no ground outside power and
sedimented cultural understandings upon which to base public sphere norms and contents, and for
judging the legitimacy of any deliberation, exclusion, and associated forms of politics. Deliberative
democrats, amongst others, would argue that a poststructuralist (and discourse theory) reading does not radicalise but
relativise the public sphere conception - giving it over to power, domination, and exclusion - by
basing it on pure politics (radical contingency)- The pressing question then is, given a discourse theory (and poststructuralist)
ontology and hegemonic logic, (how) can evaluation of the democratic value of any deliberative public sphere practice and associated
exclusions/politics (or of anything else, for that matter) be undertaken? Can we recover the public sphere's critical purchase so important to its
deployment, particularly by media-communication theorists and researchers? Or is the idea that the discourse theory reading democratically
radicalises the public sphere conception because conceiving it as achieved purely through hegemonic struggle fatally undermined by its own
logic? These questions, developing from concern about the radical democratic status of the discourse theory reading of the public sphere
conception with respect to exclusion, provide the starting point for future research.14
Delib
Vote NEG
1. Deliberation – topical plans guarantee predicable stasis – this is key to keep
debates focused on normative points of clash rather than competing truth claims –
the focus must be placed on topical, propositional content first and foremost
Steinberg and Freeley, Miami communication studies lecturer and Boston based attorney, 2008
(David and Austin, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making, pg 45)
Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before
there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate : the matter
can be settled by unanimous consent . Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved:
That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential
prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate .
In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or
questions to be answered . For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal
immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their
impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem
that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the
opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling
to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are
their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican
border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely
you
can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal
immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely
to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line
demarcating sides in the controversy . To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly .
Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions , frustration, and emotional distress, as
evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate
during the summer of 2007 . Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths
might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers
can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful
decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups
of concerned citizens
worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations , anger, disillusionment,
and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions , they could easily agree about the sorry
state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would
follow . But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable
area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step.
One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary
debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter
schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with
educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They
provide specific policies to be investigated and aid
discussants in identifying points of difference. To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective
decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be
clearly defined . If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but
not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the
sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation . If we take this statement to mean that
the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force
for a specific purpose. Although
we now have a general subject , we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad , too
loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents,
website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists,
dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in
assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The
basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such
as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treaty with Laurania." Negative
advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to
say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good
debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of
debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by
focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.
Deliberation requires the debate be focused on implementation – not just moral or
philosophical theories – the process determines the product
Gutmann and Thompson, former Princeton professor and Harvard political philosophy professor,
1996
(Amy and Dennis, Democracy and disagreement, pg 1-3)
Neither the
theory nor the practice of democratic politics has so far found an adequate way to cope with conflicts about
fundamental values. We address the challenge of moral disagreement here by developing a conception of democracy that secures a central
place for moral discussion in political life. Along with a growing number of other political theorists, we call this conception deliberative
democracy. The core idea is simple: when citizens or their representatives disagree morally, they should continue to reason
together to reach mutually acceptable decisions. But the meaning and implications of the idea are complex. Although the idea has a long
OF THE CHALLENGES that American democracy faces today, none is more formidable than the problem of moral disagreement.
history, it is still in search of a theory. We do not claim that this book provides a comprehensive theory of deliberative democracy, but we do
hope that it contributes toward its future development by showing the kind of delib-eration that is possible and desirable in the face of moral
disagreement in democracies. Some scholars have criticized liberal political theory for neglecting moral deliberation. Others
have analyzed the philosophical foundations of deliberative democracy, and still others have begun to explore institutional reforms that would
promote deliberation. Yet nearly all of them stop at the point where deliberation itself begins . None has
systematically examined the substance of deliberation—the theoretical principles that should guide moral
argument and their implications for actual moral disagreements about public policy. That is our subject, and it takes us into the
everyday forums of democratic politics, where moral argument regularly appears but where theoretical analysis too rarely goes. Deliberative
democracy involves reasoning about politics, and nothing has been more controversial in political philosophy than the nature of reason in politics.
We do not believe that these controversies have to be settled before deliberative principles can guide the practice of democracy. Since on
occasion citizens and their representatives already engage in the kind of reasoning that those principles recommend, deliberative democracy
simply asks that they do so more consistently and comprehensively. The best way to prove the value of this kind of reasoning is to
show its role in arguments about specific principles and policies, and its contribution to actual political debates. That is also ultimately
the best justification for our conception of deliberative democracy itself. But to forestall possible misunderstandings of our conception of
deliberative democracy, we offer some preliminary remarks about the scope and method of this book. The aim of the moral reasoning that our
deliberative democracy pre-scribes falls between impartiality, which requires something like altruism, and prudence, which demands no more
than enlightened self-interest. Its first principle is reciprocity, the subject of Chapter 2, but no less essential are the other principles developed in
later chapters. When citizens reason reciprocally, they seek fair terms of social cooperation for their own sake; they try to find
mutually acceptable ways of resolving moral disagreements. The precise content of reciprocity is difficult to determine in theory, but its
general countenance is familiar enough in practice. It can be seen in the difference between acting in one's self-interest (say, taking advantage of a
legal loophole or a lucky break) and acting fairly (following rules in the spirit that one expects others to adopt). In many of the controversies discussed later in the book, the possibility of any morally acceptable resolution depends on citizens' reasoning beyond their narrow self-interest and
considering what can be justified to people who reasonably disagree with them. Even though the quality of deliberation and the conditions under
which it is conducted are far from ideal in the controversies we consider, the fact that in each case some citizens and some officials make
arguments consistent with reciprocity suggests that a deliberative perspective is not Utopian. To clarify what reciprocity might
demand under non-ideal conditions, we develop a distinction between deliberative and nondeliberative disa-greement. Citizens
who
reason reciprocally can recognize that a position is worthy of moral respect even when they think it morally wrong.
They can believe that a moderate pro-life position on abortion, for example, is morally respectable even though they think it morally mistaken.
(The abortion example—to which we often return in the book—is meant to be illustrative. For readers who deny that there is any room for
deliberative disagreement on abortion, other political controversies can make the same point.) The presence of deliberative
disagreement has important implications for how citizens treat one another and for what policies they
should adopt. When a disagreement is not deliberative (for example, about a policy to legalize discrimination against blacks
and women), citizens do not have any obligations of mutual respect toward their opponents. In deliberative disagreement (for
example, about legalizing abortion), citizens should try to accommodate the moral convictions of their opponents to the greatest extent possible,
without compromising their own moral convictions. We call this kind of accommodation an economy of moral disagreement, and believe that,
though neglected in theory and practice, it is essential to a morally robust democratic life. Although both of us have devoted some of our
professional life to urging these ideas on public officials and our fellow citizens in forums of practical politics, this book is primarily the product
of scholarly rather than political deliberation. Insofar as it reaches beyond the academic community, it is addressed to citizens and officials in
their more reflective frame of mind. Given its academic origins, some readers may be inclined to complain that only professors could be so
unrealistic as to believe that moral reasoning can help solve political problems. But such a complaint would misrepresent our aims. To begin
with, we do not think that academic discussion (whether in scholarly journals or college classrooms) is a model for
moral deliberation in politics. Academic discussion need not aim at justifying a practical decision, as
deliberation must. Partly for this reason, academic discussion is likely to be insensitive to the contexts of ordinary politics: the pressures of
power, the problems of inequality, the demands of diversity, the exigencies of persuasion. Some critics of deliberative democracy show a
similar insensitivity when they judge actual political deliberations by the standards of ideal philosophical
reflection. Actual deliberation is inevitably defective, but so is philosophical reflection practiced in politics. The appropriate comparison is
between the ideals of democratic deliberation and philosophical reflection, or between the application of each in the non-ideal circumstances of
politics. We do not assume that politics should be a realm where the logical syllogism rules. Nor do we expect even the more appropriate standard
of mutual respect always to prevail in politics. A deliberative perspective sometimes justifies bargaining, negotiation, force, and even violence. It
is partly because moral argument has so much unrealized potential in dem-ocratic politics that we believe it deserves more attention. Because its
place in politics is so precarious, the need to find it a more secure home and to nourish its development is all the more pressing. Yet because it is
also already part
of our common experience, we have reason to hope that it can survive and even prosper if
philosophers along with citizens and public officials better appreciate its value in politics. Some readers may still wonder why
deliberation should have such a prominent place in democracy. Surely, they may say, citizens should care more about the justice
of public policies than the process by which they are adopted, at least so long as the process is basically fair and at least minimally
democratic. One of our main aims in this book is to cast doubt on the dichotomy between policies and process that this concern assumes.
Having good reason as individuals to believe that a policy is just does not mean that collectively as citizens we have
sufficient justification
to legislate on the basis of those reasons. The moral authority of collective judgments
about policy depends in part on the moral quality of the process by which citizens collectively reach those
judgments. Deliberation is the most appropriate way for citizens collectively to resolve their moral disagreements not only about policies but
also about the process by which policies should be adopted. Deliberation is not only a means to an end, but also a means
for deciding what means are morally required to pursue our common ends.
Deliberation is the best model-continual testing bolsters advocacy and inclusion-this
means we create better methods of engagement to resolve the AFF but they don’t
resolve this offense-only switching sides on a limited point of stasis maximizes this
potential
Talisse, Vanderbilt philosophy professor, 2005
(Robert, “Deliberativist responses to activist challenges”, Philosophy & Social Criticism, 31.4, project
muse)
Nonetheless, the deliberativist conception of reasonableness differs from the activist’s in at least one crucial respect. On the deliberativist view, a necessary
condition for reasonableness is the willingness not only to offer justifications for one’s own views and
actions, but also to listen to criticisms, objections, and the justificatory reasons that can be given in favor of alternative proposals. In light of this further
stipulation, we may say that, on the deliberative democrat’s view, reasonable citizens are responsive to reasons, their views are ‘reason tracking’. Reasonableness,
then, entails an acknowledgement on the part of the citizen that her current views are possibly mistaken, incomplete,
and in need of revision. Reasonableness is hence a two-way street: the reasonable citizen is able and willing to offer justifications for her views and actions, but is also
prepared to consider alternate views, respond to criticism, answer objections, and, if necessary, revise or abandon her views. In short, reasonable citizens do not only
believe and act for reasons, they aspire to believe and act according to the best reasons; consequently, they
recognize their own fallibility in
weighing reasons and hence engage in public deliberation in part for the sake of improving their views.15
‘Reasonableness’ as the deliberative democrat understands it is constituted by a willingness to participate in an ongoing public discussion that inevitably involves
processes of self-examination by which one at various moments rethinks and revises one’s views in light of encounters with new arguments and new considerations
offered by one’s fellow deliberators. Hence
Gutmann and Thompson write: Citizens who owe one another justifications
for the laws that they seek to impose must take seriously the reasons their opponents give. Taking seriously the
reasons one’s opponents give means that, at least for a certain range of views that one opposes, one must acknowledge the possibility that an opposing view may be
shown to be correct in the future. This acknowledgement has implications not only for the way they regard their own views. It imposes an
obligation to
continue to test their own views, seeking forums in which the views can be challenged, and keeping open
the possibility of their revision or even rejection.16 (2000: 172) That Young’s activist is not reasonable in this sense is clear from the ways
in which he characterizes his activism. He claims that ‘Activities of protest, boycott, and disruption are more appropriate means for getting citizens to think seriously
about what until then they have found normal and acceptable’ (106); activist
tactics are employed for the sake of ‘bringing
attention’ to injustice and making ‘a wider public aware of institutional wrongs’ (107). These characterizations suggest the presumption
that questions of justice are essentially settled; the activist takes himself to know what justice is and what its
implementation requires. He also believes he knows that those who oppose him are either the power-hungry beneficiaries of
the unjust s tatus quo or the inattentive and unaware masses who do not ‘think seriously’ about the
injustice of the institutions that govern their lives and so unwittingly accept them. Hence his political activity is aimed exclusively at
enlisting other citizens in support of the cause to which he is tenaciously committed. The activist
implicitly holds that there could be no reasoned objection to his views concerning justice, and no good
reason to endorse those institutions he deems unjust. The activist presumes to know that no deliberative encounter could lead him to
reconsider his position or adopt a different method of social action; he ‘declines’ to ‘engage persons he disagrees with’ (107) in discourse because he has judged on
a priori grounds that all opponents are either pathetically benighted or balefully corrupt . When one holds one’s view as the
only responsible or just option, there is no need for reasoning with those who disagree, and hence no need to be reasonable. According to the
deliberativist, this is the respect in which the activist is unreasonable. The deliberativist recognizes that questions of
justice are difficult and complex. This is the case not only because justice is a notoriously tricky philosophical concept, but also because, even
supposing we had a philosophically sound theory of justice, questions of implementation are especially thorny. Accordingly, political
philosophers, social scientists, economists, and legal theorists continue to work on these questions. In light of much of this literature, it is difficult to
maintain the level of epistemic confidence in one’s own views that the activist seems to muster; thus the deliberativist sees
the activist’s confidence as evidence of a lack of honest engagement with the issues. A possible outcome of the kind of encounter the
activist ‘declines’ (107) is the realization that the activist’s image of himself as a ‘David to the Goliath of power
wielded by the state and corporate actors’ (106) is naïve . That is, the deliberativist comes to see, through processes of public deliberation, that
there are often good arguments to be found on all sides of an important social issue; reasonableness hence
demands that one must especially engage the reasons of those with whom one most vehemently disagrees
and be ready to revise one’s own views if necessary. Insofar as the activist holds a view of justice that he is unwilling to put to the test of
public criticism, he is unreasonable. Furthermore, insofar as the activist’s conception commits him to the view that there could be no rational opposition to his views,
he is literally unable to be reasonable. Hence
the deliberative democrat concludes that activism, as presented by
Young’s activist, is an unreasonable model of political engagement. The dialogical conception of
reasonableness adopted by the deliberativist also provides a response to the activist’s reply to the charge
that he is engaged in interest group or adversarial politics. Recall that the activist denied this charge on the grounds that activism is
aimed not at private or individual interests, but at the universal good of justice. But this reply also misses the force of the posed objection. On the deliberativist view,
the problem with interest-based politics does not derive simply from the source (self or group), scope (particular or universal), or quality (admirable or deplorable) of
the interest, but with the concept of interests as such. Not unlike ‘preferences’, ‘interests’ typically function in democratic theory as fixed dispositions that are non-
Insofar as the activist sees his view of justice as ‘given’ and not open to
rational scrutiny, he is (they are) engaged in the kind of adversarial politics the deliberativist rejects. The
cognitive and hence unresponsive to reasons.
argument thus far might appear to turn exclusively upon different conceptions of what reasonableness entails. The
deliberativist view I have sketched
degree of what we may call epistemic modesty. On this view, the reasonable citizen seeks
to have her beliefs reflect the best available reasons, and so she enters into public discourse as a way of testing her views against the
objections and questions of those who disagree; hence she implicitly holds that her present view is open to reasonable critique and that
holds that reasonableness involves some
others who hold opposing views may be able to offer justifications for their views that are at least as strong as her reasons for her own. Thus any mode of politics that
presumes that discourse is extraneous to questions of justice and justification is unreasonable. The activist sees no reason to accept this. Reasonableness for the activist
consists in the ability to act on reasons that upon due reflection seem adequate to underwrite action; discussion with those who disagree need not be involved.
According to the activist, there are certain cases in which he does in fact know the truth about what justice requires and in which there is no room for reasoned
objection. Under such conditions, the deliberativist’s demand for discussion can only obstruct justice; it is therefore irrational. It may seem that we have reached an
impasse. However, there is a further line of criticism that the activist must face. To the activist’s view that at least in certain situations he may reasonably decline to
engage with persons he disagrees with (107), the deliberative
democrat can raise the phenomenon that Cass Sunstein has
called ‘group polarization’ (Sunstein, 2003; 2001a: ch. 3; 2001b: ch. 1). To explain: consider that political activists cannot eschew deliberation
altogether; they often engage in rallies, demonstrations, teach-ins, workshops, and other activities in which they are called to make public the case for their views.
Activists also must engage in deliberation among themselves when deciding strategy. Political
movements must be organized, hence those involved must decide upon targets, methods, and tactics; they
must also decide upon the content of their pamphlets and the precise messages they most wish to convey to the press. Often the audience in both of these deliberative
contexts will be a self-selected and sympathetic group of like-minded activists. Group polarization is a well-documented phenomenon that has ‘been found all over the
world and in many diverse tasks’; it means that ‘members of a deliberating group predictably move towards a more extreme point in the direction indicated by the
members’ predeliberation tendencies’ (Sunstein, 2003: 81–2). Importantly, in groups that ‘engage in repeated discussions’ over time, the polarization is even more
pronounced (2003: 86). Hence
discussion in a small but devoted activist enclave that meets regularly to strategize
and protest ‘should produce a situation in which individuals hold positions more extreme than those of
any individual member before the series of deliberations began’ (ibid.).17 The fact of group polarization is relevant to our
discussion because the activist has proposed that he may reasonably decline to engage in discussion with those
with whom he disagrees in cases in which the requirements of justice are so clear that he can be confident that he has the
truth. Group polarization suggests that deliberatively confronting those with whom we disagree is
essential even when we have the truth . For even if we have the truth, if we do not engage opposing views, but instead deliberate only
with those with whom we agree, our view will shift progressively to a more extreme point, and thus we lose the
truth . In order to avoid polarization, deliberation must take place within heterogeneous ‘argument pools’ (Sunstein, 2003: 93). This of course does not mean that
there should be no groups devoted to the achievement of some common political goal; it rather suggests that engagement with those with
whom one disagrees is essential to the proper pursuit of justice. Insofar as the activist denies this, he
is unreasonable.
Effective deliberative discourse is the key to solving existential social and political
problems
Lundberg, UNC Chapel Hill communications professor, 2010
(Christian, Tradition of Debate in North Carolina” in Navigating Opportunity: Policy Debate in the 21st
Century, pg 311-3)
The second major problem with the critique that identifies a naivety in articulating debate and democracy
is that it presumes that the primary pedagogical •outcome of debate is speech capacities. But the democratic
capacities built by •debate are not limited to speech—as indicated earlier, debate builds capacity for critical
thinking, analysis of public claims, informed decision making, and better public judgment. If the picture of
modern political life that underwrites this critique of debate is a pessimistic view of increasingly labyrinthine and bureaucratic
administrative politics, rapid scientific and technological change out pacing the capacities of the citizenry to
comprehend them, and ever-expanding insular special-interest- and money-driven politics, it is a puzzling
solution, at best, to argue that these conditions warrant giving up on debate. If democracy is open to re-articulation, it is open to
re-articulation precisely because as the challenges of modern political life proliferate, the citizenry's capacities can change, which is one of the primary reasons that
theorists of democracy such as Dewey in The Public and Its Problems place such a high premium on education (Dewey 1988,63,154). Debate
provides an
indispensible form of education in the modem articulation of democracy because it builds precisely the skills
that allow the citizenry to research and be informed about policy decisions that impact them, to sort through and evaluate the
evidence for and relative merits of arguments for and against a policy in an increasingly information-rich environment, and to prioritize their time and political
energies toward policies that matter the most to them. The merits of debate as a tool for building democratic capacity-building take on a special significance in the
context of information literacy. John
Larkin (2005, 140) argues that one of the primary failings of modern colleges
and universities is that they have not changed curriculum to match with the challenges of a new
information environment. This is a problem for the course of academic study in our current context, but perhaps more important, argues Larkin, for the
future of a citizenry that will need to make evaluative choices against an increasingly complex and multi-mediated information environment (ibid.), Larkin's
study tested the benefits of debate participation on information-literacy skills and concluded that in-class
debate participants reported significantly higher self efficacy ratings of their ability to navigate academic
search databases and to effectively search and use other Web resources: To analyze the self-report ratings of the instructional
and control group students, we first conducted a multivariate analysis of variance on all of the ratings, looking jointly at the effect of instruction/no instruction and
Instructional [debate] group were significantly
more confident in their ability to access information and less likely to feel that they needed help to do
so.... These findings clearly indicate greater self-efficacy for online searching among students who
participated in [debate] These results constitute strong support for the effectiveness of the project on students' self-efficacy for online searching in the
debate topic ... that it did not matter which topic students had been assigned... students in the
academic databases. There was an unintended effect, however: After doing ... the project, instructional group students also felt more confident than the other students
in their ability to get good information from Yahoo and Google. It may be that the library research experience increased self-efficacy for any searching, not just in
academic databases. (Larkin 2005, 144) Larkin's
study substantiates Thomas Worthen and Gaylen Pack's (1992, 3) claim
that debate in the college classroom plays a critical role in fostering the kind of problem-solving skills
demanded by the increasingly rich media and information environment of modernity. Though their essay was written
in 1992 on the cusp of the eventual explosion of the Internet as a medium, Worthen and Pack's framing of the issue was prescient: the primary question facing today's
student has changed from how to best research a topic to the crucial question of learning how to best evaluate which arguments to cite and rely upon from an easily
accessible and veritable cornucopia of materials. There are, without a doubt, a number of important criticisms of employing debate as a model for democratic
deliberation. But cumulatively, the
evidence presented here warrants strong support for expanding debate practice in
the as a technology for enhancing democratic deliberative capacities. The unique combination of criticalthinking skills, research and information-skills, oral-communication skills, and capacities for listening
and thoughtful, open engagement with hotly contested issues argues for debate as a crucial component of a
rich and vital democratic life. In-class debate practice both aids students in achieving the best goals of college and university education and
serves as an unmatched practice for creating thoughtful, engaged, open-minded, and self-critical students
who are open to the possibilities of meaningful political engagement and new articulations of democratic
life. Expanding this practice is crucial, if only because the more we produce citizens who can actively and
effectively engage the political process, the more likely we are to produce revisions of democratic life that are
necessary if democracy is not only to survive, but to thrive and to deal with systemic threats that risk our
collective extinction. Democratic societies face a myriad of challenges, including: domestic and
international issues of class, gender, and racial justice; wholesale environmental destruction and the
potential for rapid climate change; emerging threats to international stability in the form of terrorism,
intervention, and new possibilities for great power conflict; and increasing challenges of rapid
globalization, including an increasingly volatile global economic structure. More than any specific policy or
proposal, an informed and active citizenry that deliberates with greater skill and sensitivity provides one of the best
hopes for responsive and effective democratic governance, and by extension, one of the last best hopes for
dealing with the existential challenges to democracy in an increasingly complex world . Given the challenge of perfecting
our collective political skill, and in drawing on the best of our collective creative intelligence, it is incumbent on us to both make the case for and, more important, to
do the concrete work to realize an expanded commitment to debate at colleges and universities.
Dialogue
2. Dialogue – untopical AFFs allow the AFF to monopolize the free market of ideas –
they can find the least contestable advocacy, they have strategic incentives to defend
as little as possible, and infinite literature to create specific advocacies that are
outside the predicable literature base and defeat generics
Maintaining even division of ground and contestability is key to maintain debate’s
unique potential for educational dialogue-alternative interpretations-guarantee
uneducational monologues.
Hanghoj, Aarhus education assistant professor, 2008
(Thorkild, “Playful Knowledge An Explorative Study of Educational Gaming”,
http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information_til/Studerende_ved_SDU/Din_uddannelse/phd_hum/afha
ndlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf)
Debate games are often based on pre-designed scenarios that include descriptions of issues to be debated, educational goals, game goals, roles, rules, time frames etc.
In this way, debate
games differ from textbooks and everyday classroom instruction as debate scenarios allow
teachers and students to actively imagine, interact and communicate within a domain-specific game space.
However, instead of mystifying debate games as a “magic circle” (Huizinga, 1950), I will try to overcome the epistemological dichotomy between “gaming” and
“teaching” that tends to dominate discussions of educational games. In short, educational gaming is a form of teaching. As mentioned, education and games represent
two different semiotic domains that both embody the three faces of knowledge: assertions, modes of representation and social forms of organisation (Gee, 2003;
Barth, 2002; cf. chapter 2). In order to understand the interplay between these different domains and their interrelated knowledge forms, I will draw attention to a
central assumption in Bakhtin’s dialogical philosophy. According to Bakhtin, all forms of communication and culture are subject to centripetal and centrifugal forces
(Bakhtin, 1981). A
centripetal force is the drive to impose one version of the truth, while a centrifugal force
involves a range of possible truths and interpretations. This means that any form of expression involves a duality of centripetal and
centrifugal forces: “Every concrete utterance of a speaking subject serves as a point where centrifugal as well as centripetal forces are brought to bear” (Bakhtin, 1981:
272). If we take teaching as an example, it is always affected by centripetal and centrifugal forces in the on-going negotiation of “truths” between teachers and
students. In the words of Bakhtin: “Truth is not born nor is it to be found inside the head of an individual person, it is born between people collectively searching for
the dialogical space of debate games also embodies
centrifugal and centripetal forces. Thus, the election scenario of The Power Game involves centripetal elements that are mainly
determined by the rules and outcomes of the game, i.e. the election is based on a limited time frame and a fixed voting procedure.
Similarly, the open-ended goals, roles and resources represent centrifugal elements and create virtually
endless possibilities for researching, preparing, presenting, debating and evaluating a variety of key political issues. Consequently, the
actual process of enacting a game scenario involves a complex negotiation between these centrifugal/centripetal forces that are inextricably linked
truth, in the process of their dialogic interaction” (Bakhtin, 1984a: 110). Similarly,
with the teachers and students’ game activities. In this way, the enactment of The Power Game is a form of teaching that combines different pedagogical practices (i.e.
group work, web quests, student presentations) and learning resources (i.e. websites, handouts, spoken language) within the interpretive frame of the election scenario.
means that game facilitation
requires a balance between focusing too narrowly on the rules or “facts” of a game (centripetal
orientation) and a focusing too broadly on the contingent possibilities and interpretations of the game
scenario (centrifugal orientation). For Bakhtin, the duality of centripetal/centrifugal forces often manifests itself as a dynamic between
“monological” and “dialogical” forms of discourse. Bakhtin illustrates this point with the monological discourse of the
Socrates/Plato dialogues in which the teacher never learns anything new from the students, despite Socrates’
ideological claims to the contrary (Bakhtin, 1984a). Thus, discourse becomes monologised when “someone who knows and
possesses the truth instructs someone who is ignorant of it and in error”, where “a thought is either affirmed or repudiated”
Obviously, tensions may arise if there is too much divergence between educational goals and game goals. This
by the authority of the teacher (Bakhtin, 1984a: 81). In contrast to this, dialogical pedagogy fosters inclusive learning environments that are able to expand upon
students’ existing knowledge and collaborative construction of “truths” (Dysthe, 1996). At this point, I should clarify that Bakhtin’s term “ dialogic”
is both
a descriptive term (all utterances are per definition dialogic as they address other utterances as parts of a chain of communication) and a normative
term as dialogue is an ideal to be worked for against the forces of “monologism” (Lillis, 2003: 197-8). In this project, I am
mainly interested in describing the dialogical space of debate games. At the same time, I agree with Wegerif that “one of the goals of education, perhaps the most
important goal, should be dialogue as an end in itself” (Wegerif, 2006: 61).
Dialogue is the best way to resolve competing truth claims – it’s a prerequisite to
ethics and existence
O’Callaghan 10 Patrick, Lecturer, Newcastle Law School, “Monologism and Dialogism in Private
Law,” The Journal of Jurisprudence, http://www.jurisprudence.com.au/juris7/ocallaghan.pdf
This essay challenges the notion that the decisions of the highest common law courts can be reduced to mere monologues. Drawing on the work of Martin Buber,
courts should
be on their guard against monologue-creep, a process in which an ‘authoritatively persuasive voice’, once
embraced, begins to exert a stronger hold over the person or persons who have embraced it; thus, it
becomes ‘internally persuasive’ .263 Gradually, the voice attaches itself to those individuals and becomes part of their self-identity. As a
Mikhail Bakhtin, Isaiah Berlin and John Rawls, the essay argues that dialogism is the dominant feature of common law decisions. Nevertheless,
phenomenon, monologue-creep is relatively common and can be partly explained by reference to various anthropological and psychological processes and pressures.
In academic law, monologue-creep manifests itself in the desire to belong to a particular school of thought, even if that simply means describing one’s approach as
‘black-letter.’ But the desire to ‘belong’ highlights another reason why scholars resort to monologue: more often than not, academics pursue an ideal; they latch onto
the notion that they have found the ‘correct answer’ or, at the very least, that they are on the path to finding this answer. These
ideals often encourage
a utopian outlook in those who embrace them and Utopianism, with a capital ‘U’, thus pervades
academia . This essay does not object to this practice in academic law; far from it – the pursuit of an ideal should be encouraged. For, as Berlin wrote, ‘[u]topias
have their value – nothing so wonderfully expands the imaginative horizons of human potentialities.’264 But he goes on to say that utopias are not quite as
useful as ‘guides to human conduct’.265 On his account, a ‘perfect solution’ is not possible in practice and ‘any
determined attempt to produce it is likely to lead to suffering , disillusionment and failure .’266 In order to
illustrate this point, this essay examines the views of a group of lawyers we might label ‘Strasbourg enthusiasts’ and argues that their optimism concerning the impact
of the ECHR and ECtHR judgments on English private law is misguided. Private law, as Hutchinson and Morgan recognise, is fundamentally dialogic and if human
rights are to influence private law they must do so in a way that allows space for multiple voices, including those that are incommensurable. Before we move on to a
discussion of these points, however, we must first carefully consider the meaning of ‘monologue’. Is the sceptical civilian right to regard the decisions of the highest
common law courts as collections of uncompromising judicial monologues? In response to this charge we must first carefully consider the meaning of monologue.
Consider the word itself: monos (singular/alone) and logos (voice/word). It is the singular voice or the lonely word, depending on one’s etymological persuasion, but
can be understood as both: a monologue is at once singular and lonely (einzig und einsam).267 The Austrian-born philosopher, Martin Buber, attached significance to
the loneliness evident in the monologist’s life.268 In his short book, Ich und Du, first published in 1923, Buber regards man as having a ‘twofold attitude’269 and
hence makes a distinction between the Ich-Du and the Ich-Es relationships.270 In the Ich-Du relationship, the ‘speaker has no thing for his object’,271 the Du is not
merely ‘a thing among things’272 but a unique Other. This relationship is ‘open’273 and ‘direct.’274 By contrast, Ich-Es is a subject-object relationship where the
object is to be ‘experienced’ and ‘used’.275 Understood in these terms, the Ich-Du relationship represents dialogue whereas Ich-Es constitutes monologue. According
to Buber, ‘[g]rowth
of the self does not take place...through our relationship to ourselves but through being
made present by the other and knowing that we are made present by him.’276 Friedman explains that this process is
called ‘confirmation’: one becomes confirmed as a unique person when one experiences ‘the other side of
the relationship so that one can imagine quite concretely what another is feeling, thinking, perceiving and
knowing.’277 When I fail to ‘open myself to the otherness of the person I meet’, I engage not in dialogue but in monologue, the Other exists ‘only as a content
of my experience’.278 Because the monologist refuses to experience the ‘wholeness’, ‘unity’ or ‘uniqueness’279 of the Other as is experienced in an Ich-Du
relationship, he himself is never confirmed as a unique person. He remains a lonely, unheard individual rather than a confirmed, unique person. Martin Buber’s work
inspired the Russian literary theorist, Mikail Bakhtin, to develop his own ideas on monologism and dialogism. He regarded Buber as ‘the greatest philosopher of the
twentieth century’ and admitted that he was ‘indebted’ to him, especially for ‘the idea of dialogue’.280 The necessity of dialogism was the dominant feature of
Bakhtin’s work and he associated monologue with the single-mindedness found in authoritarian and
totalitarian forms of government.281 In what was arguably his most famous work, Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, he contends that
monologue: ‘denies the existence outside itself of another consciousness with equal rights and equal
responsibilities, another I with equal rights (thou). With a monologic approach (in its extreme or pure form) another person remains wholly and merely an
object of consciousness, and not another consciousness. No response is expected from it that could change everything in the world of my consciousness. Monologue is
Monologue manages without the
other, and therefore to some degree materializes all reality. Monologue pretends to be the ultimate word . It closes down the
represented world and represented persons.’282 Understood in this way, monologue is a wholly negative and destructive exercise
because dialogue is vital for man’s very existence . For Bakhtin, ‘[t]o be means to communicate dialogically...Two voices is the minimum for
finalized and deaf to the other’s response, does not expect it and does not acknowledge in it any decisive force.
life, the minimum for existence.’283
Topic Edu
Topic education – detailed debate on government policy regarding crime is key to
liberalizing the penal system – the impact is sustained inequality
Barker 9 Vanessa, Assistant Professor of Criminology Florida State University, “The Politics of
Imprisonment How the Democratic Process Shapes the Way America Punishes Offenders,”pp 182-188
This study has some important and potentially unpopular policy implications. First, I think the public needs to be more not less involved
in crime control policy. Second, I think it is a mistake for penal policy makers to retreat behind bureaucratic insulation or expert commissions. The
public is not stupid, cultural dupes, nor a uniform source of vengeance and irrationality. That relationship
is dependent on specific historical conditions and political configurations , none of which are universal across the
American states. Given the opportunity for deliberative discussion , ordinary people can support more rational
and pragmatic responses to crime. Given the opportunity to interact with one another, debate a range of policy
proposals , learn from experts, and hold state lawmakers and policy makers accountable , citizens
can make informed decisions about crime control policy . Deliberative forums can promote compromise. Consider, for example,
that Jason Barabas has shown how deliberative forums can alter a person's deeply held views even on such
sensitive policy issues as Social Security.4 David Green found that citizens' participation led to more “liberalizing”
views on crime and punishment and decreased their demands for vengeance and custodial sanctions .5
Likewise, Gerry Johnstone has argued that public participation can (p.182) expose more people to the negative
effects of penal sanctioning and expand their views of the public interest.6 Moreover, public support is necessary for state
legitimacy. Public support is especially critical in policy areas fraught with emotional and moral dilemmas. Crime and punishment raise unresolved moral questions
about pain, suffering, the value of human life, the limits of freedom, justice, and the principles of safety and security in highly complex democracies that value
personal liberty. How these problems are temporarily resolved depends on the nature and character of collective agency. This means that attempts to block public
access to crime control policy can backfire, creating legitimacy problems for the state. Purely technocratic responses to crime, generated by bureaucratic insulation,
may provoke more populist and punitive responses. The public may feel that their concerns, insecurities, and anxieties about their own safety and security are either
taken for granted or deemed irrelevant by policy makers. When people feel excluded, they may withdraw their trust and confidence in government, intensifying their
moral outrage and redirecting it against more vulnerable and less integrated social groups. This is what happened in California. By contrast, in Washington, state
officials consistently incorporated citizen input into policy making. Washington created its Sentencing Commission through a high‐profile and highly public process
and included citizen representatives on the commission itself. The findings of this study are limited. It would be useful to be clear about their generalizability. The
small number of cases raises doubts about whether we can extend the findings to other times and places. It is entirely possible the findings may only account for the
penal regime variation in California, Washington, and New York and may not explain the full range of penal sanctioning in the United States. There is good reason,
however, to think that the findings may be applicable to other cases. First, these three cases are certainly not the same thing as three observations. Comparing the
policy‐making process spatially and temporally in cases that represent common patterns rather than extreme cases substantially increases the number of observations
and improves analytical leverage. Because the findings are grounded in empirical detail, prior research, and comparative methodology, the core theoretical framework
developed here may provide some insight into other contexts within the United States and beyond. To be sure, more research is necessary to (p.183) assess these
claims, but the point here is to highlight implications for future thinking about penal sanctioning. The selected cases represent major democratic traditions in the
United States: populism, pragmatism, and deliberative democracy. The arguments developed here have relevance for other American states steeped in those traditions.
Texas and many other western states grew up with populist politics and retributive penal policies; Pennsylvania and
Illinois may provide further examples of pragmatic politics and its associated managerial penal regime;
whereas Maine and Vermont may provide examples of deliberative democracy with its associated less
coercive penal sanctioning. Minnesota may represent the corporatist type (illustrated in Table 6.1) with a high degree of civic engagement, high social
trust, and relatively high degree of centralization and associated low imprisonment rates. States that fall along the top tier in Table 6.1 with higher rates of civic
engagement tend to have less coercive penal regimes; state
that fall along the bottom dimensions with lower rates of civic
engagement, more social polarization, or more elite dominated politics tend to have more coercive penal
regimes. To get a preliminary look at how this study might help explain differences across the fifty states, we can graph the relationship between the democratic
process and penal regimes. Figure 6.1 maps the relationship between social capital (as a composite measure of social trust and civic engagement taken from Putnam)
and imprisonment rates across the nation. Of course, this is only a crude illustration and reduction of a much more complicated process, but the figure provides a
visual reference point to an intriguing finding. In states with a high degree of social capital, like Vermont and Minnesota, we tend to see lower rates of imprisonment.
In states with low degrees of social capital, like Alabama, Texas, and Louisiana, we tend to see higher imprisonment rates. More research is needed to assess the
degree to which this is a significant relationship across the states given varying degrees of crime, economic inequality, and ethnic diversity. I suspect that this
relationship will be important because social trust underpins more general social processes of inclusion and exclusion. From this configuration, I suggest a further
argument about the general upward trend in American punishment. Despite the important differences we continue to see across the states, the United States as a whole
has increased its reliance on imprisonment. If
we extend the findings from the case studies, (p.184) it may be
dedemocratization, the retrenchment of American democracy, that partially accounts for high rates of
imprisonment in the U nited S tates. Americans by and large have retreated into the private sphere, becoming
detached from a sense of mutual obligation and civic responsibility, instead experiencing social isolation
and social polarization. They have weakened the emotional and political support necessary to sustain inclusive
public policies, policies that are responsive to public welfare and not just private interest. Concomitantly, they
have failed to restrain the repressive powers of the state, especially as they have been directed at the most
vulnerable social groups—the poor and racial and ethnic minorities. Of course, more research is needed to confirm this claim.
It is nevertheless a provocative claim worth exploring in further detail. What about the South? Some readers may argue that the South has high imprisonment rates
because southern states continue to maintain racial hierarchies and rely on the criminal law to repress African Americans. The racial dynamics in the cases were much
more complicated and perhaps more insidious than a strict racial social control perspective allows. This book does (p.185) not dispute the importance of race, but it
tries to connect racial dynamics to the democratic process. To fully account for penal regime variation in the South, this study suggests that we trace out the effects of
black incorporation and black exclusion. In the aftermath of the civil rights movement, some southern states did incorporate African Americans politically and
economically, whereas others continued to resist with force. Where
we see higher rates of civic engagement, white and black,
we might see greater social trust across diverse social groups, increasing norms of mutual obligation and
reciprocity, forces that undermine punitiveness and may support more lenient penal regimes. Southern states as a
whole tend to have lower rates of civic engagement and social capital, but where we see variation, we may see variation in imprisonment rates. On a related point, we
would want to further investigate the extent to which racial diversity can generate or limit social trust, especially across social groups. This study also suggests that the
structure of political power plays an important role in shaping penal outcomes. It suggests that we take a look at how modes of governance facilitate the provision of
public welfare or private self‐interest. In the southern states, I expect that some are more or less centralized and more or less open to public participation. Unlike the
western states, the southern states, except Florida, do not allow for the initiative or direct democracy measures. But neither are the southern states especially
centralized like their northeastern counterparts. At the same time, many southern states have historical roots in more feudal‐like political orders in which a group of
In these types of
underdemocratized polities, state officials are more likely to reaffirm their political authority and
legitimacy through the criminal law and penal sanctioning. Here penal sanctioning is visible,
forceful, and a brutal reminder of unequal power relations . It is also one of the few policy
mechanisms available to states that fail to invest in public goods and public welfare. According to this perspective, it
power elites (landowners, planters) dominate governing, using public office for private gains rather than the general welfare.
is not all that surprising that many of these underdemocratized southern states have relatively high imprisonment rates. Most American criminological research has
been focused on the United States. However, since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, many researchers have been forced to take a look at crime control,
policing, and other security (p.186) concerns beyond the U.S. border. Those tragic and bloody events may spark some much‐needed comparative criminology,
opening up the field to global trends, international justice, and nation‐specific particularities of criminal justice. This book may provide some groundwork for future
comparative research, despite its focus on American states. European governance is being transformed in real time. Governments there are facing increased
immigration and ethnic diversity, rising crime, economic restructuring, and changing political borders. These post‐cold war developments have raised questions about
the nature and character of national sovereignty and citizenship. They have raised questions about group membership and social classification, pushing nation‐states
into a rapid process of social incorporation and exclusion. An understanding of the criminal law and penal sanctioning will be key to explaining the remaking of
European nation‐states. Take the case of Sweden, for example. This is a country with one of the highest levels of social trust, intensive civic engagement, a corporatist
or power‐sharing political structure. This is also a country with a historically lenient approach to crime and punishment. Yet it also has a long history of social
engineers, a moralizing civil society, and strict prohibitions against alcohol. Sweden now has one of the largest foreign‐born populations in Europe. Swedish
criminologists have tied the country's zero‐tolerance approach to drugs to fear of outsiders, especially those coming from former Soviet satellites and the Balkans.7
Given the country's historically generous social welfare state and inclusive notions of citizenship, it is an interesting and pressing empirical question as to how or to
what degree Swedes will mobilize the criminal law and penal sanctioning to resolve new questions of social order. Sweden is not alone in this dilemma. France and
Germany, among many others, have experienced rapidly changing social orders, particularly the confluence of crime and immigration. France recently watched its
suburbs burned by second‐ and third‐generation North African immigrants frustrated by their social exclusion and conflicts over policing. France provides an
interesting counterpoint to Sweden because it has a highly centralized government but weak civil society, weak ties between civil society and the state, and relatively
low social trust. So far, France has responded to these changing social conditions with much more stringent police regulation and state coercion. Germany may
provide another contrasting case; it has a decentralized government, much more local input, and mid‐level social trust, but it has created exclusionary conditions
(p.187) of citizenship, especially for its Turkish “guest workers” and other immigrant groups. Its period of imprisonment liberalization may be under threat. Given
these historical conditions, some democracies more than others will come to rely on the criminal law and penal sanctioning to reestablish social order, redefining
group membership and collective identity through coercive means. These responses most likely will be filtered and made meaningful through culturally distinct legal
traditions, political institutions, and forms of collective agency as well as by global trends. By focusing on the diversity of democratic processes across Europe,
researchers may be better able to explain cross‐national penal regime variation.8 By focusing on the nature of collective agency and the intensity of social trust,
researchers may gain some insight into the way criminal law and penal sanctioning bring societies together and tear them apart. A
comparative focus on
other Western democracies may also illustrate that there is nothing inevitable about democratization and
punitiveness. This book has pointed to the long‐term institutional and cultural differences in American democracy as the explanation for the long‐term
differences in American penal sanctioning. This kind of argument raises some troubling questions about the nature and possibility of change. If current patterns of
punishment are inextricably tied to past policies, how can we change them? Can California become more like Washington or New York? Or vice versa? Can the
United States as a whole reverse its prison boom? The response is both yes and no. From
a pessimistic view, penal reformers, social activists,
and state officials cannot just shake off past policies, cultural legacies, or entrenched political structures because these are
overriding causal forces that continue to shape penal sanctioning today. It is difficult to undo enduring political traditions and years of harsh punishment. Even under
the best conditions, reformers cannot focus exclusively on revising the criminal law, lessening or abolishing penal sanctions, because they also need to consider
broader social support. In policy areas such as crime and punishment—areas that generate moral and emotional struggles about life and death, justice, and group
membership—public engagement and public support are necessary to develop and sustain legitimate public (p.188) policies. Prison populations are dependent on both
immediate events like legislative reform and long‐term processes like cultural values and democratic institutions. Both aspects are hard to change but necessary for
meaningful reform. To reverse the U.S. case, we would need to see serious legislative activity coupled with significant increases in social trust across diverse social
groups and sustained efforts at social integration, including efforts to reincorporate the most marginalized people, like ex‐offenders, the poor, the undereducated, and
On the more optimistic side, reformers can take advantage of this particular
political moment, which offers a rare opportunity for change. State governments are indeed faced
with tough budget choices, and many have been forced to rethink their approaches to crime control. Many
state officials are coming to realize that imprisonment has tended to generate more social problems than
its resolves, creating a revolving door of social exclusion that brings with it tremendous economic and
social costs. Plus, crime rates are down. Reformers can try to leverage the institutional and cultural tools
available at this moment and in particular places to bring about change. By being cognizant of how
racial and ethnic minorities.
institutional environments frame policy debates and policy problems, reformers can better develop
proposals that resonate rather than repel state officials and the public . Taking examples from the
case studies, in New York reforms that highlight crime and punishment as a public health issue with
pragmatic solutions may be more effective than mobilizing moral outrage. In California, reformers could
channel populist fervor against the prison itself as a failed institution and graphic reminder of the excesses
of state power. In Washington, reforms that come from below may be more effective than reforms from above. In other words, reformers can use
the institutional environment to change existing policies . Moreover, the history of American social
movements tells us that sustained collective action that is strategic and morally pressing has successfully
brought about radical social change in American public life, as it could be with American penal sanctioning.
Topical discussions solve the AFFs method better – it combines theory with praxis –
in the criminology context, that is vital to prevent cooption
Edwards and Sheptycki 9 Adam, is Senior Lecturer in Criminology at Cardiff University School of
Social Sciences. He is director of the European Society of Criminology’s working group on the
Governance of Public Safety James, is a Professor of Criminology at York University, Toronto, Canada.
“Third Wave criminology: Guns, crime and social order,” Criminology and Criminal Justice 9(3): pp 379397 http://www.cf.ac.uk/socsi/contactsandpeople/harrycollins/expertiseproject/EdwardsSheptycki3rdWave.pdf
What we have tried to do here is engage in some ‘third order’5 reflection about the role of academic criminologists in public discourse about
guns, crime and social order. Drawing on some recent trends in thinking about the sociology and philosophy of science more broadly we
distinguished three waves in the development of scientific language games. Logico-postivist thought exemplified the crest of the
first wave, just as deconstruction did for the crest of the second. Third Wave criminology is interdisciplinary and has a
commitment to ‘upstream’ explanation-building in order to influence thoughtful policy action . The
distinction between internal and external language games, and the intrinsic and extrinsic political aspects this implies, gives coherence to the
notion of Third Wave science generally.
This article has been especially concerned to ground reflection on the nature of contemporary criminology by reference to the problematic of
guns, crime and social order. Here the global politics of gun-crime were exemplified with an account of the circumstances surrounding a public
referendum in Brazil concerning laws about the sale of firearms to the public. The account showed that gun-crime is sustained in that country by
a cycle of fear, which is perhaps not surprising given the staggering effects that the pistolization of everyday life has had for social order there.
We then briefly examined a series of state-of the-art criminological studies concerning gun-crime and criminal markets. Although
methodologically sophisticated and meticulously carried out, the science suffers from paradigmatic thinking, often in support of law enforcement
operations that serve merely to displace the phenomenon it purports to control.
Conversely, the scholarship presented elsewhere in this Special Issue of Criminology and Criminal Justice broadens discussion of gun-crime and
control by re-framing the issue in terms of the social relations of ‘weapon-ization’ and their consequences for research and policy. In addition,
and although other contributors may not recognize or accept characterization of their contributions in terms of ‘Third Wave criminology’, we
think they all share a commitment to ‘upstream’ explanation-building, an aetiological approach that is self-consciously fallible but nonetheless
concerned to construct clear analytical categories that address the problem of how to act on crime in the face of scientific uncertainty. As such,
they retain an intellectually consistent approach to the particular contribution that social scientists, as contrasted with party politicians, pressure
group activists and other political and moral actors (including, we would insist, those labelled as gun criminals), can make to the problem of guncrime and control and this has broader relevance for thinking about the implication of criminology and criminologists in public controversies. In
the terms advocated here, the ‘formative intentions’ of contributors to this Special Issue arc an acknowledgement of their involvement in the
intrinsic politics of social science but a detachment from the competing causes that constitute the politics of gun-crime and control that are, and
should be, extrinsic to their science.
The critical distinction between the intrinsic and extrinsic politics of criminology adds a further dimension to our understanding of how crime and
control are mediated by specific social contexts or ‘geo-histories’ (Edwards and Hughes, 2005). ‘First Wavers’ are able to generalize theory
failures about the causal relations between licit firearms availability and patterns of gun-related criminal offending—from ‘stateside’ to the
favelas of Brazil and back—because they abstract these relations from the particular social contexts in which they are accomplished. The
historical, political, cultural and economic conditions of firearms acquisition are indispcnsible in developing understanding in the round. Put
simply, context is important in understanding the consequences of pistolization in Rio dc Janeiro, Brazil and Binghamton, New York.6 Of course
intrinsically controversy rages about these issues.7 Meanwhile ‘Second Wavers’ observe the constructions of ‘gun crime’
by perpetrators, agents of social control and academic observers, whose language games can be generalized as:
‘perp talk’, ‘control talk’ and ‘don talk’. The deconstruction is useful in cracking open the paradigmatic
limitations of scientistic criminology, but since Second Wavers only use scientific shortcomings as a
sociological resource for their own practice of de-construction—they operate downstream—the discourse, critical
though it is, does not really change the circumstances that gave rise to the problematic in the first
place.
Criminologists of the Third Wave are interested in the findings of positive science and they are interested
in particular constructions of the world, whether ‘perp talk’, ‘control talk’ or (other) ‘don talk’. They are interested to
understand the historical, geographical and cultural background to the contingent relations of gunviolence. We expect differences between Brazil (sec previous section), North America (Cook et al.; Sheptycki, this issue), the West Indies
(Agozino et al., this issue) and the UK (Hallsworth and Silverstonc; Roberts and Inncs, this issue). Third Wave criminology strives
for a deeper understanding of these differences in an interdisciplinary way so as to contextualize properly
and think about the criminological problematic. The criminological problematic in this instance involves the interactions
between armed and motivated offenders, suitable (and possibly armed) targets and—sometimes momentarily absent—(but probably armed)
guardians. It is facility with particular aspects of ‘contributory expertise’, together with the ‘interactional expertise’ that makes interdisciplinary
work in the field of criminology possible, and it is that possibility which distinguishes Third Wave criminology from other discourses about crime
and control. The products of Third Wave criminology are fallible. It is to be hoped that future researchers will produce a better understanding
than the one we have at present. Of course, any current claims to social scientific ‘truth’, including criminological
ones, should at least be capable of corroboration by other independent observers. But in the meantime,
they are the product of the intrinsic deliberation of a community of researchers and thinkers: they are a
‘good enough’ basis to make suggestions for piecemeal social engineering . In the realm of politics
extrinsic to academic criminology—where special interest groups, moral entrepreneurs and a variety of
other political actors are equal players—individual criminologists would do well to be mindful that their
intellectual strength and persuasive power is intrinsic to membership in a community of experts. All
the other players in public language games about crime and crime control expect to make history—to change
things—and they expect academic criminologists to behave similarly. After all, it would be odd if the
criminological experts had nothing to say in answer to the question: What is to be done about law
and order? (Lea and Young, 1984).
Knowing the law is powerful – legal education prevents state coercion and improves
enforcement
Jananeethi 8 Non-Profit Organization, “Legal Literacy: Social Empowerment for Democracy and
Good Governance,” http://www.hurights.or.jp/archives/asia-pacific/section1/08Jananeethi.pdf
Knowledge of law is power and helps self-realization. India, the largest democracy in the world, has an
emergent need for generating awareness of rights as knowledge so that people live in consonance with the
true dictates of democracy and rule of law. Legal literacy is commonly understood as knowing the
primary level in law. When citizens, particularly marginalized or underprivileged groups, know what the
law has to offer them, they can recognize and challenge injustices much more forcefully. The first step
towards that knowledge of law, which can transform people's lives, is legal literacy.
Around 35% of India’s population have no formal education.1 Most of them live in rural areas, where
social and economic barriers play an important role in keeping the lowest strata of society illiterate.
Literacy is an indispens' able means for effective social and economic participation, contributing to
human development and poverty reduction. Even those who are literate are helpless and confused when
there is a violation or infringement of a right enforceable in law. Government programs alone, however
well intentioned, may not be able to break these barriers, due mainly to the social vulnerability of the
people writ large. Ignorance of legal rights, human rights, civil liberties, constitutional mandates and
several other laws of the land that defend the people and protect their dignity, freedom, right to equality
and access to justice, etc., are manifestations of their vulnerable existence. Major social reformation
efforts are required to bring about a change in the rural scenario. Non-governmental agencies that have
deeper contacts at the grassroots level than official government machineries play crucial role in this
regard. Legal literacy and human rights education are effective and practical means to strengthen the
social fabric for a successful democracy.
Article 39A2 of the Constitution of India requires the State to ensure that the operation of the legal system
promotes justice on the basis of equal opportunity. It directs the State to provide free legal aid with the
support of suitable legislation or schemes. The State is also directed to ensure that opportunities for
securing justice are not denied to any citizen for reason of economic or other disabilities. If people are
aware of their rights and duties, the delivery of justice and balancing of various interests in a society
become so much easier. Increase in legal literacy ultimately develops into a transparent and accountable
government truly based on the ‘Rule of Law’. Since the fundamental postulate of the Indian Criminal
Procedure Code3 is "ignorance of law excuses no one from compliance therewith,” the need for legal
literacy is undisputable.
Legal literacy, therefore, is a tool for bringing about qualitative change at the grassroots level.
Experience shows that better awareness of laws helps people work more effectively in diverse spheres.
The non-implementation of many laws is partly attributed to the beneficiaries' lack of awareness.
Empirical studies prove – State penal polices change based on fluctuations in public
deliberation – violence is not inherent to the system
Barker 9 Vanessa, Assistant Professor of Criminology Florida State University, “The Politics of
Imprisonment How the Democratic Process Shapes the Way America Punishes Offenders,” pp 9-12
Informed by political sociology, particularly the work of Theda Skocpol and Robert Putnam, this book
develops an analytical framework of the democratic process based on two theoretically and empirically
significant features: political structures and collective agency.14 Political structures refer specifically to
the institutional and administrative organization of the state; collective agency refers to the mobilization
of ordinary people in the policy‐making process. These features shape how people take action in
politics and how people understand the nature and meaning of their actions. Taken together, these two
dimensions form modes of governance. They create an underlying texture of political life in a particular
place. They form the organizing principles, classification schemes, the taken‐for‐granted assumptions, the
routines and habits of political interaction, or, in Pierre Bourdieu's terms, a habitus of political action.
They significantly shape the way people make sense of political conflict and the ways they try to
resolve it. This means that we are likely to see variation rather than uniformity in the ways people
understand the very nature of political problems and how they try to solve, avoid, escalate, or defuse
them.15
The subtle but crucial differences in the political institutions and democratic traditions of the American
states help account for penal regime variation. When we see significant changes in the political order, we
are likely to see transformation in penal regimes; likewise, when we see variation or differences
between political orders, we are likely to see correlative differences in penal regimes.
(p.10) The second major claim of this book is that penal regime change, continuity, and difference are
significantly shaped by place. Penal regime variation is shaped by local and state‐level institutional
configurations as well as national and global trends. Crime and punishment tend to be experienced and
made meaningful on a more local level even as these institutions are subject to and agents of broad social
and cultural changes. People tend to experience and understand the common conditions of contemporary
life in ways that are reflective of their immediate context, their past traditions, and in ways that help them
make sense of the changing world around them.16 Moreover, people tend to take action with the tools,
schemas, and resources available to them in their particular contexts. As a consequence, we tend to see
variation rather than uniformity in state‐level responses to crime and other perceived problems of
social order.
Comparative and historical methodology is used to develop these arguments, the first study of American
punishment to do so.17 This study not only takes into account the broad social conditions that underlie
the development of particular penal regimes, it takes seriously the longlasting and cumulative effects of
the cultural and political differences that give expression to the unique punishment practices in each state.
For each case study, I analyze and compare a wide variety of data sources, including archival material,
citizens' letters to political leaders, internal government reports and memos, written and oral public
testimony, newspaper accounts, extensive secondary literature, and survey and statistical data. By taking
advantage of underutilized data sources and the analytical leverage provided by a small number of cases,
this study closely examines the dynamic interface between the state and civil society in the policymaking
process.
Case Studies
In the California case, political actors operate within a neopopulist mode of governance with a high
degree of democratization but intensive social polarization. Here, key actors such as the governor, state
officials, and social activists are more likely to view crime as a result of moral depravity, individual
failing, and social indecency. With their depressed sense of mutual obligation and heightened
contentiousness and uncompromising, winner‐take‐all politics, citizens tend to support and often demand
that state elites pursue a more retributive penal regime. California's retributive penal regime (p.11) not
only mandates penal sanctioning across crime categories, it changed the moral calculus of justice in the
state, dramatizing the pain and suffering of crime victims as the justification for increased sanctions. It
intensifies the repressive powers of the state to resolve social conflict, creating more exclusionary
conditions of citizenship.
By contrast, in the Washington case, political actors operate within a more deliberative democracy, a
mode of governance that emphasizes citizen participation, discussion, compromise, and self‐governance.
Here key actors such as state officials and public participants are more likely to view crime as a result of
failed socialization and a common but unfortunate condition of affluent societies. With their well‐
developed norms of reciprocity and sense of mutual obligation, they tend to be reluctant to impose the
repressive powers of the state on others, seeking at various times to de‐escalate imprisonment. At the
same time, the legacy of cooperatives and self‐governance provide the cultural and institutional support
necessary for officials to pursue noncustodial community sanctions based primarily on the discipline of
labor and the perceived virtues but coercive powers of civil society. Taken together, these policies and
practices restrain state coercion, creating more inclusionary but normalizing conditions of citizenship.
In the case of New York, political actors operate within a mode of elitist pragmatism. With its depressed
democratization and heavy reliance on expertise, state officials are more likely to portray crime as a threat
to public health, a contagion to be quarantined, defusing the emotional and moral dimensions of both
crime and punishment. They develop a managerial penal regime, a triage approach to penal sanctioning
that sorts and classifies perceived risks and allocates resources accordingly. This apparently reasonable
and pragmatic approach to crime with its strategic use of state power nevertheless tends to suppress
individual autonomy and liberty in favor of the perceived public good, creating restrictive conditions of
citizenship.
Key Findings: Deep Democracy, Less Coercion; ThinDemocracy, More Coercion
By focusing on the complex political processes at the subnational level, this book challenges a taken‐for‐
granted assumption about the democratic process and punishment. As this study shows, the apparent link
between public participation, punitiveness, and rough justice is not only historically (p.12) contingent but
dependent on specific state structures and patterns of civic engagement, patterns that tend to vary within
the United States and across liberal democracies. Public vengeance depends on certain political
institutions and collective agency to give it a legal and political expression.
Perhaps more important, the research suggests a counterintuitive claim: increased democratization can
support and sustain less coercive penal regimes. This study offers an analysis of an understudied and
countervailing practice of de‐escalation, a practice that should certainly be of interest to those challenging
the massive prison build‐up over the past thirty years. At the same time, the analysis suggests that at the
aggregate level, depressed civic engagement, withdrawal from public life, and lack of public participation
in the political process may underpin mass incarceration in the United States. Consider that fewer people
vote in national and state elections, fewer people get involved in civic affairs and local politics,
congressional and state‐level elections are less competitive, and elite‐driven professional organizations
have replaced many of the locally run grassroots organizations that once buoyed American democracy for
most for the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.18 These trends have coincided and share affinities with
the increased reliance on imprisonment and other coercive forms of state power, especially as it has been
used against those who are the least politically and socially integrated, the poor, undereducated, and racial
and ethnic minorities. We may be witnessing the retrenchment of American democracy and its
repressive aftermath.
Debates about reform of the CJS are critical to social progress – starting with
rejecting it now trades off with security and gets coopted by elites – we should
reform now with a focus on historical inequalities
Wilkinson ‘14
Judge Wilkinson serves on the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, “In Defense of
American Criminal Justice,” Vol. 67:4:1 (2014). pp. 1099-1172,
http://www.vanderbiltlawreview.org/content/articles/2014/06/In-Defense-of-American-CriminalJustice.pdf
The solution to the problem of race and criminal justice is not a total overhaul of the system. That just
renders the criminal justice system the scapegoat for a much larger set of social problems. The
criminal justice system feels the effects of those problems; it does not cause them. Drug and gun crimes are not any
less a blight upon society because of the racial makeup of the offenders; indeed, as Robinson noted, “[N]owhere will you find citizens more
supportive of tough law-and-order policies than in poor, high-crime neighborhoods.” 370 Our criminal justice system rightly aims to reduce
dangerous behavior, and the beneficiaries of success in that endeavor may be those less advantaged citizens for whom basic safety will make for
greater opportunity, not to mention better prospects for a brighter life. To cast ceaseless blame on America’s criminal justice
system is to ignore the enormity of the problems it has been asked to solve. It only diverts attention from
the larger ways in which America has failed its underclass . As Michael Gerson recently noted, “The problem of African
American boys and young men is a complex mix of lingering racial prejudice, urban economic dislocation, collapsing family structure, failing
To chastise criminal justice when many levers of upward mobility
are so compromised is an inversion of priorities . A complete “fix” of what the critics allege ails
criminal justice will do nothing to restore shattered family structures, improve failing schools,
impart necessary job skills, restore religious and community support groups, or provide
meaningful alternatives in deprived neighborhoods to the gangs and drug rings that steer young
people toward lifelong addictions and lives of crime . Society doesn’t create opportunity by sacrificing
the basic social need for order. To the contrary, improvements in communities and institutions will only take
root in the kind of safe environment that, at its best, a strong criminal justice system can provide . And
schools and sick, atomized communities.” 371
when we provide opportunity, we in turn reduce the pressure on the criminal justice system and lessen the monumental task that lack of
opportunity for the poorest Americans has left it to perform. How a society chooses to balance justice and safety with
rights and liberties will invariably be the subject of vigorous debate. Our criminal justice system is no
exception. Many good and intelligent people will disagree passionately about the contours of our criminal law. That is all to the good. We
should not grow complacent in the face of particular problems, both for the sake of individual defendants and for the rule of law itself. But
instead of engaging in a constructive debate about the American approach to criminal justice, legal
elites largely have condemned the entire enterprise . The system, we are told, is broken, and only
sweeping reforms imposed from on high can save it. But the rhetoric that fuels the wholesale assault upon
the system not only will fail to achieve any meaningful change, it obscures the many strengths of our
institutions. By focusing so much on what is wrong, we inevitably forget what is right. The terms of engagement must
change . My call is not for scholars to whitewash our system’s failings but to realize the picture is far more nuanced and complex than they
have presented it. Given the volume of matters it is asked to address and immensity of the task it is asked to perform, our criminal justice system
functions rather well. It is both unrealistic and uncharitable to portray the system as an engine of oppression and injustice. Ironically, many
of the features that critics claim operate one-sidedly against defendants often work to their benefit. The
American criminal justice system strikes a valuable front-end note. It strikes difficult balances between protecting the innocent and convicting the
guilty, between procedural protections and administrative realities. It rightly allows these contestable choices to be made democratically, but only
to a point. Such qualities are hardly the hallmarks of a failed system. Indeed, those who have been among the most persistent critics of the
criminal justice system were among the first to call for its utilization in the aftermath of the September 11th terrorist attacks.372 And since that
time, the refrain has often been that acts of terrorism are crimes that should be dealt with in the customary way through enforcement of federal
criminal law.373 I recognize that this plea for criminal trials does not constitute an acknowledgment of the system’s perfection, but it sdoes
indicate that the system imparts a legitimacy for the deprivation of liberty that other routes of trying suspected terrorists may lack. This is no
place to explore the complicated question of whether alleged terrorism is more aptly regarded as a criminal offense or as an act of war.
Separation of powers concerns and the need for action to prevent mass casualties make the
question an exceptionally complicated one. I note only the irony that many who reject the considerable
virtues of the American criminal justice system are at least prepared to look upon it as a preferred solution
when the values of liberty and security are in epochal tension. To be sure, there is plenty of room for reform, and all parts
of the legal profession should head for the front lines. But let us not forget our system’s virtues as we seek to correct its vices. Otherwise, any
legitimate concerns will be lost in the din of diatribe . We have gone too long without a degree of balance or moderation
in our assessment of the American criminal justice system. It is time we gave our institutions a fair trial.
Politics Good/Use State
Excess of laugher is not a shock to the system – flipping syntax doesn’t do anything political because a.)
it retains the phallocentric order because it defines itself through and against it b.) it doesn’t inform
WHAT action to take at the MACRO political level – INFACT IT MAKES MACRO POLITICS
IMPOSSIBLE – overwhelimg empirics
Pugh, Newcastle Postcolonial Geographer, 2010
(Jonathan, “The Stakes of Radical Politics have Changed: Post-crisis, Relevance and the State”,
Globalizations, March-June, ebsco)
some from the radical Left
were incapable of being able to respond to the new stakes of radical politics. In particular, they were not
found at the state, where the passive public turned to resolve the crisis. I will now go on to examine how
in recent years significant parts of the radical Left have also tended to prioritise raising awareness of our
ethical responsibilities, over capturing state power. I am going to say that it is important to create this awareness. However, in an effort to
In this polemical piece I have just been talking about how, following an ethos of radicalism as withdrawal from the state,
draw attention to the stakes of politics as we find them now, post-2008, I will also point out that we should not place too much faith in this approach alone. Against the
backdrop of what I have just been saying, it is important to remember that while much attention is focused upon President Obama, in many other parts of the world the
Right and fundamentalism are gaining strength through capturing state power. The perception that the USA has changed is accompanied by a sense of relief among
many radicals. However,
the European Elections of 2009, the largest trans-national vote in history, heralded a
continent-wide shift to the Right (and far Right) in many places—in Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus,
the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Estonia, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Poland, Portgual, Slovenia, Spain, Romania, as just some examples (Wall Street Journal, 2009). Despite
Obama’s election and a near depression, neo-liberalism continues to be implemented through a world spanning apparatus of governmental and intergovernmental
organisations, think tanks and trans-national corporations (Massey, 2009; Castree, 2009). The power of the Right in countries like Iran, while checked, remains
unchallenged by the Left. Albertazzi
et al. (2009) draw attention to how a disconnected Left is leaving power in the
hands of the Right in many other countries nationally, like Italy for example. Reflecting upon contemporary radical
politics, the British Labour politician Clare Short (2009, p. 67) concludes: In the fog of the future, I see a rise of fascistic movements . . . I am afraid it will all get
nastier before we see a rise in generous, radical politics, but I suspect that history is about to speed up in front of our eyes and all who oppose the radicalisation of fear,
ethnic hatred, racialism and division have to be ready to create a new movement that contains the solutions to the monumental historical problems we currently face.
So, the stakes of politics are clear. The Right is on the rise. Neo-liberal ideology is still dominant. How is the Left responding to these stakes? I have already discussed
how some from the radical Left are placing too much faith in civil society organisations that seek to withdraw from the state. I will now turn to how others have too
the increasing popularity of David Chandler’s
(2004, 2007, 2009a, 2009b) work reflects the sense that radicals too often celebrate the ethical individual
as a radical force, at the expense of wider representational programmes for change. His central
argument is that this leaves radicals impotent . Chandler (2009a, p. 78–79) says that many radicals argue that there is nothing passive or
much faith in the power of raising awareness of our ethical responsibilities. Post-crisis,
conservative about radical political activist protests, such as the 2003 anti-war march, anti-capitalism and anti-globalisation protests, the huge march to Make Poverty
History at the end of 2005, involvement in the World Social Forums or the radical jihad of Al-Qaeda. I disagree; these
new forms of protest are
highly individualised and personal ones— there is no attempt to build a social or collective movement .
It appears that theatrical suicide, demonstrating, badge and bracelet wearing are ethical acts in
themselves: personal statements of awareness, rather than attempts to engage politically with society. In one
way, Chandler’s reflective insight here is not particularly unique. Many others also seem to think that radicals today are too isolated and disengaged (Martin, 2009).5
Neither is it particularly original to say that there is too much emphasis upon creativity and spontaneity (what Richard Sennett, 2004, calls ‘social jazz’), and not
enough upon representational politics. Indeed, go to many radical blogs and you find radicals themselves constantly complaining about how it has become too easy to
sign up to ethical web petitions, email complaints, join a variety of ethical causes, without actually developing the political programmes themselves that matter. So it
is not Chandler’s point about radicals being disengaged from instrumental politics that concerns me here. It is his related point—that there has been a flight into ethics,
away from political accountability and responsibility that I find intriguing. Personal statements of ethical awareness have become particularly important within radical
politics today. It is therefore interesting to note, as I will now discuss, that we have been here before. In his earlier writings Karl Marx (1982) criticised the German
Idealists for retreating into ethics, instead of seizing the institutions of power that mattered for themselves. Unwilling
to express their selfinterests politically through capturing power, the Idealists would rather make statements about their
ethical awareness. Such idealism, along with an unwillingness to be held accountable for political power,
often goes hand in hand. For Marx, it is necessary to feel the weight, but also the responsibility of power. Chandler argues that, just as when the early
Marx critiqued German Idealism, we should now be drawing attention to the pitfalls of the flights to ethics today. He says: In the case of the German bourgeoisie,
Marx concludes that it is their weakness and fragmentation, squeezed between the remnants of the ancien re´gime and the developing industrial proletariat, which
explains their ideological flight into values. Rather than take on political responsibility for overthrowing the old order, the German bourgeoisie denied their specific
interests and idealised progress in the otherworldly terms of abstract philosophy, recoiling from the consequences of their liberal aspirations in practice. (Chandler,
Fragmented, many radicals retreat into
abstract ethical slogans like ‘another world is possible’, ‘global human rights’, or ‘making poverty
2007, p. 717) Today we are witnessing a renewed interest in ethics (Laı¨di, 1998; Badiou, 2002).
history’. As discussed above, we are also of course seeing the return of Kant’s cosmopolitanism. While I think we should not attack the ethical turn for its values,
as many of these around environmental issues and human rights are admirable, it is equally important to say that the turn to ethics
seems to reflect a certain lack of willingness to seize power and be held accountable to it. For the flight to ethics, as
it often plays out in radical politics today, seems to be accompanied by scepticism toward representational politics. Continuing with this theme for a moment, Slavoj
Zizek (2008) also sheds some more light upon why ethics (when compared to representational politics) has become so important to the Left in recent years. He
says that many of us (he is of course writing for the Left) feel that we are unable to make a real difference through
representational politics on a larger scale, when it comes to the big political problems of life. Zizek (2008, p. 453) talks of this feeling that ‘we cannot ever predict the
consequences of our acts’; that nothing we do will ‘guarantee that the overall outcome of our interactions will be satisfactory’. And he is right to make this point.
Today, our geographical imaginations are dominated by a broader sense of chaos and Global Complexity (Urry, 2003; Stengers, 2005). These ways of thinking, deep
in the psyche of many radicals on the Left may be one other reason why so many have retreated into ethics. When we do not really believe that we can change the
world through developing fine detailed instruments, capturing the state, or predictive models, we are naturally more hesitant. It is better to try and raise ethical
awareness instead. Whereas in the past power was something to be won and treasured, something radicals could use to implement a collective ideology, today, with
the risk posed by representation in fragmented societies, top-down power often becomes a hazard, even an embarrassment, for many on the Left (Laı¨di, 1998). This
is, as I have already discussed, where the Right and neo-liberal ideologues are seizing the opportunity of the moment. Putting
what I have just said
another way, there is a need to be clear, perhaps more so in these interdisciplinary times—ethics and
politics (particularly representational politics) are different. Of course they are related. You cannot do politics without an ethical
perspective. But my point here is that the Right and neo-liberal ideologues will not simply go away if the
Left adopt or raise awareness of alternative ethical lifestyles. The Right are willing to capture state
power, particularly at this time when the state is increasingly powerful. When we compare the concerted political programme of
neo-liberalism, first developed by Reagan, Thatcher, the IMF, the World Bank, NATO, multi-national banks, and the G20, as just some of many examples, ethical
individuals across the world offer some counter-resistance. But
the 2008 crisis, and the response of protests like the Alternative
G20, demonstrated how weak ethical resistance is in the face of the institutions of the neo-liberal
economy. Another reason for this is because the ethical individual contributes so much to neo-liberal
societies themselves. To explain how, we must briefly step back. The new social movements of previous decades have, in general, been effectively
recuperated by the existing system of capital, by satisfying them in a way that neutralised their subversive potential. This is how capital has maintained its hegemonic
position in post-Fordist societies. Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello (2005) explain how capitalists have worked with, rather than against, the characteristics of new
social movements. They
say the new social movements desire for autonomy, the ideal of self-management, the
anti-hierarchical exigency, and the search for authenticity, were important in developing post-Fordism.
These replaced the hierarchical framework of the Fordist period with new forms of networked control. And so, in this way, we see that the relationship between new
social movements and capital has been productive. In turn, and this is the important point I want to make about the present moment, clearly the stakes of radical
politics have now changed once more. As discussed earlier, it would now seem that post-Fordist society is actually more hierarchical and controllable than many
previously thought. Without
the neoliberal state, and the public’s subordination to its actions, it would not now
exist in anything like its present form. Our subordination to the state has stopped a post-crisis implosion
of neo-liberalism. And this is of course where one of the central characteristics of the ethical individual
has been so productive. Endemic individualism, so dominant in liberal societies, has been recuperated by
the ethical individual who is unwilling to seize the state. So the salient point here is that the ethical
individual is reflective of the conservative forces in society today.
Empirically proven extra-legal individual approaches fail-the progress of the
conservative agenda via institutional routes prove our argument
Lobel, UCSD law professor, 2007
(Orly, “The Paradox of Extralegal Activism: Critical Legal Consciousness and Transformative Politics”,
http://www.harvardlawreview.org/media/pdf/lobel.pdf
the practical failures and the fallacy of rigid boundaries generated by extralegal activism rhetoric permit us to
broaden our inquiry to the underlying assumptions of current proposals regarding transformative politics — that is, attempts to produce meaningful changes
in the political and socioeconomic landscapes. The suggested alternatives produce a new image of social and political action. This vision rejects a shared theory of social reform, rejects formal
programmatic agendas, and embraces a multiplicity of forms and practices. Thus, it is described in such terms as a plan of no plan,211 “a
Both
project of projects,”212 “anti-theory theory,”213 politics rather than goals,214 presence rather than power,215 “practice over theory,”216 and chaos and openness over order and formality. As a result, the contemporary message rarely
includes a comprehensive vision of common social claims, but rather engages in the description of fragmented efforts. As Professor Joel Handler argues, the commonality of struggle and social vision that existed during the civil rights
movement has disappeared.217 There is no unifying discourse or set of values, but rather an aversion to any metanarrative and a resignation from theory. Professor Handler warns that this move away from grand narratives is self-
“[T]he opposition is not playing that game . . . . [E]veryone
else is operating as if there were Grand Narratives . . . .”218 Intertwined with the resignation from law and policy, the
new bromide of “neither left nor right” has become axiomatic only for some.219 The contemporary critical legal consciousness informs the
defeating precisely because only certain parts of the political spectrum have accepted this new stance:
scholarship of those who are interested in progressive social activism, but less so that of those who are interested, for example, in a more competitive securities market. Indeed, an interesting recent development has been the rise of
conservative advocacy groups
have rapidly grown both in number and in their vigorous use of traditional legal strategies to promote their causes.221
“conservative public interest lawyer[ing].”220 Although “public interest law” was originally associated exclusively with liberal projects, in the past three decades
conservative advocacy is particularly salient in juxtaposition to the decline of traditional
progressive advocacy. Most recently, some thinkers have even suggested that there may be “something inherent in the left’s conception of social change —
focused as it is on participation and empowerment — that produces a unique distrust of legal expertise.”222 Once again, this
conclusion reveals flaws parallel to the original disenchantment with legal reform. Although the new extralegal frames present themselves as apt
alternatives to legal reform models and as capable of producing significant changes to the social map, in practice they generate very limited improvement in existing social
arrangements. Most strikingly, the cooptation effect here can be explained in terms of the most profound risk of the typology — that of legitimation. The common pattern of extralegal
scholarship is to describe an inherent instability in dominant structures by pointing, for example, to grassroots strategies,223 and then
to assume that specific instances of counterhegemonic activities translate into a more complete transformation. This
celebration of multiple micro-resistances seems to rely on an aggregate approach — an idea that the multiplication of
practices will evolve into something substantial. In fact, the myth of engagement obscures the actual lack
of change being produced, while the broader pattern of equating extralegal activism with social reform
produces a false belief in the potential of change. There are few instances of meaningful reordering of social and economic arrangements and macro-redistribution. Scholars
This growth in
write about decoding what is really happening, as though the scholarly narrative has the power to unpack more than the actual conventional experience will admit.224 Unrelated efforts become related and part of a whole through mere
reframing. At the same time, the elephant in the room — the rising level of economic inequality — is left unaddressed and comes to be understood as natural and inevitable.225 This is precisely the problematic process that critical
theorists decry as losers’ self-mystification, through which marginalized groups come to see systemic losses as the product of their own actions and thereby begin to focus on minor achievements as representing the boundaries of their
micro-instances of activism are often fundamentally performative, obscuring the distance between the descriptive and the
extralegal activism — the law and organizing model; the proliferation of informal, soft norms and norm-generating actors; and the celebrated, separate nongovernmental
sphere of action — all produce a fantasy that change can be brought about through small-scale, decentralized
transformation. The emphasis is local, but the locality is described as a microcosm of the whole and the audience is
willed reality. The explorations of
prescriptive. The manifestations of
national and global. In the context of the humanities, Professor Carol Greenhouse poses a comparable challenge to ethnographic studies from the 1990s, which utilized the genres of narrative and community studies, the latter
including works on American cities and neighborhoods in trouble.226 The aspiration of these genres was that each individual story could translate into a “time of the nation” body of knowledge and motivation.227 In contemporary
legal thought, a corresponding gap opens between the local scale and the larger, translocal one. In reality, although there has been a recent proliferation of associations and grassroots groups, few new local-statenational federations
have emerged in the United States since the 1960s and 1970s, and many of the existing voluntary federations that flourished in the mid-twentieth century are in decline.228 There is, therefore, an absence of links between the local and
social movements have for the most part failed in
sustaining coalitions or producing significant institutional change through grassroots activism. Professor Handler concludes that
this failure is due in part to the ideas of contingency, pluralism, and localism that are so embedded in
current activism.230 Is the focus on small-scale dynamics simply an evasion of the need to engage in broader substantive debate? It is important for next-generation
progressive legal scholars, while maintaining a critical legal consciousness, to recognize that not all
extralegal associational life is transformative. We must differentiate, for example, between inward-looking groups,
which tend to be self-regarding and depoliticized, and social movements that participate in political
activities, engage the public debate, and aim to challenge and reform existing realities.231 We must differentiate between
professional associations and more inclusive forms of institutions that act as trustees for larger segments of the community.232 As described above, extralegal activism tends to operate on
a more divided and hence a smaller scale than earlier social movements, which had national reform agendas. Consequently,
within critical discourse there is a need to recognize the limited capacity of small-scale action. We should question the
the national, an absent intermediate public sphere, which has been termed “the missing middle” by Professor Theda Skocpol.229 New
narrative that imagines consciousness-raising as directly translating into action and action as directly translating into change. Certainly not every cultural description is political. Indeed, it is questionable whether forms of activism that
groups are situated in opposition to any form of
institutionalized power, they may be simply mirroring what they are fighting against and merely
producing moot activism that settles for what seems possible within the narrow space that is left in a
rising convergence of ideologies. The original vision is consequently coopted, and contemporary
discontent is legitimated through a process of self-mystification.
are opposed to programmatic reconstruction of a social agenda should even be understood as social movements. In fact, when
No system is perfect – finding flaws in liberalism/modernity does not prove it needs to be
rejected – it has created qualitative improvement in people’s lives – their impacts are
false correlations
McJohn 8 McGowan is the Ruel W. Tyson, Jr. Distinguished Professor of the Humanities in the
Department of English & Comparative Literature at the University of North Carolina. “The Possibility of
Progress: A Pragmatist Account,” The Good Society 17(1): 2008.
James admits that a fully inclusive order will never be attained, but still believes we can measure our
progress toward more inclusive orders. Any achieved order will be unstable, because the excluded will always agitate for a
different arrangement, one that gives their "interests" and "ideals" better satisfaction.20 "Pent in under every system of moral rules are
innumerable persons whom it weighs upon, and goods which it represses; and these are always rumbling and grumbling in the background, and
ready for any issue by which they may get free" (MP, 611). Still, James and Dewey both insist progress can be measured because some orders are
demonstrably more inclusive than others, offer a wider range of individuals the opportunity for a meaningful life. Yet, because perfection on this
score is never reached, no final state is achieved. Change
is still the rule; no social or moral system is above criticism
and beyond improvement . Every single one "pinches" someone somewhere. If we indulge ourselves with stories about how far we have
come, James thinks we will incline toward the "easy-going" sense that things right now are pretty commendable; but if are attuned to how far we
still fall short of satisfying the legitimate demands of all for a fully meaningful life, we will adopt the "strenuous mood" of ever aiming toward
making things better (MP, 615).
But even the strenuous social or moral reformer must be modest. Metaphysically, the pragmatists object to various nineteenth-century
narratives of progress because they assume a holism that pragmatist pluralism is at pains to refute . History is
not of one piece. Modernity does not, for example, necessarily entail secularization or a movement toward more
democratic forms of government. A country might become democratic but remain technologically
unmodern. There is no necessity linking change on one front to change on another. Processes of change are both more
complicated and more contingent than that . Arguments that capitalism must lead to political liberalization
are specious—and once again write out any impact made by actual human actions on the ground. Any
number of similar false correlations have figured into narratives of modernization and the
inevitable changes it will bring . Pluralism as a philosophical position works to disconnect processes
and outcomes that holism regards as necessarily intertwined. The pragmatist reformer understands that improvement
at this local scene does not entail systematic transformation elsewhere.
Politically and ethically (as contrasted to philosophically), pragmatic pluralism attends to the empirically
demonstrable fact that ends-in-view, that "demands" (to use James’s term), that visions of what is
"meaningful," vary widely. Improvement is not going to entail getting everyone to be part of the program.
Instead, the goal is to create a political order capacious enough to enable the widest diversity of actual onthe-ground activities. Progress, then, is not about moving the world, or a whole society, toward a
certain substantial good. Rather, goods are plural, and progress involves creating the conditions for the
pursuit by individuals within varying social associations of those multiple goods.
No wonder modesty seems advisable. It is not just that we have to find the right trade-offs between our responsibilities to the larger order that
enables varying choices on the ground and those actual choices. It is also that we have to offer fine-grained analyses of how and when different
actions do have impacts beyond their local enactment. That I was late to work today because my car broke down is unconnected to the fact that
my neighbor is putting in a new garden. Yet my reliance on a car to get to work and my neighbor’s replacement of his water-thirsty lawn with
drought-resistant plants have far-reaching consequences for people we do not even know. Eschewing holistic narratives does not mean denying
complicated relationships of causation, interdependency, and correlation. Similarly, a pluralism that takes seriously the
enhancement of the pursuit of different goods cannot ignore the consequences of various such pursuits.
No one plans a traffic jam, but it certainly disrupts the ability to act effectively. We have many problems,
but this one of figuring out how to balance desirable local freedoms with an adequate understanding of
how they must be limited in order to prevent larger, systematic, harms is high on the list. I don’t think jumping
immediately to claims that everything is interrelated is justified empirically, politically, or morally. But denying such systemic interconnections is
also untenable. Getting it right will require all the intelligence that Dewey longed for.
Shorn of global narratives of progress or of inevitable decline, we are left with the daunting task of trying out how we can make things better here
and now, right in front of our noses first, more widely second. The task, with all of its uncertainties, does impart a meaning to our present actions.
But it may also appear overwhelmingly difficult. Modesty about our capacity to meet its challenges is salutary in relation to grandiose claims
But a modesty that encourages a sauve-qui-peut., cultivate-myown-garden shortsightedness will hardly suffice to counter the doomsday narratives that currently seem
more persuasive than narratives of inevitable progress . To achieve an invigorating sense of the possible
it certainly would help if we had a few good examples of collective intelligence to celebrate. Here are a
few candidates, tentatively offered: the end of apartheid in South Africa, the creation and dissemination of the polio
vaccine, the establishment of social insurance programs in various countries. None of them is perfect, but
each represents the enactment of a possibility that was an improvement over what came before. None
of these brought utopia, but they do suggest that some actions can improve the quality of life for
some human beings. None of these is uncontested, or a completely secure fait accompli. I don’t think we can
expect more than such complicated and ambiguous examples, but I also think they are sufficient to prevent us from
throwing in the towel.
about the direction in which history is necessarily moving.