UNION INTERPARLEMENTAIRE
INTER-PARLIAMENTARY UNION
Association of Secretaries General of Parliaments
COMMUNICATION
from
Mr. P. SCHWAB
Secretary General of the Council of States and Deputy Secretary General of the
Federal Assembly of Switzerland
on
Role of the Swiss Parliament in monitoring the effectiveness of public policy
Quebec Session
October 2012
‘Neither ought the representative body to be chosen for
the executive part of government, for which it is not so fit; but for the enacting of laws,
or to see whether the laws in being are duly executed, a thing suited to their abilities,
and which none indeed but themselves can properly perform.’
Montesquieu1
1. Origin and definition
The Swiss parliament was given the task of evaluating the effectiveness of public policy at the
end of the 1980s. It came about as a result of two developments:
(i)
the modernisation of the state spurred on by the introduction of new public
management, on the one hand,
(ii)
the professionalization of parliamentary control demanded by the growing
complexity of tasks devolved to the state on the other.
In 1990, parliament decided to set up a specialised body whose task would be to carry out
mandates relating to the results and performance of public policies and services2 :
Parliamentary Control of the Administration (PCA).
A number of years later, during the revision of the Federal Constitution, parliament conferred
constitutional status to the role of evaluating policy effectiveness: as such, under Art. 170 FC,
parliament has to ensure that federal measures are evaluated with regard to their effectiveness.
The constitutional provision concerns not only measures taken to apply the law, but also the
legislative process itself. Its addressees are therefore the government and implementing
bodies (administration, cantons), as well as parliament.
Art. 170 of the Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation, of 18 April 1999
Evaluation of effectiveness
(The Parliament) shall ensure that federal measures are evaluated with regard to their effectiveness.
The constitutional provision was subsequently enshrined in the new Parliament Act in 2002.
This act lists effectiveness among the criteria for parliamentary control3 and tasks
parliament’s standing committees with conducting evaluations to gauge effectiveness within
their areas of competence4.
Art. 27 of the Parliament Act of 13 December 2002
Evaluation of effectiveness
The organs (of the Parliament) designated by law shall ensure that the measures taken by the
Confederation are evaluated as to their effectiveness. To this end, they may:
a. request the Federal Council (government) to have impact assessments carried out;
1
The Spirit of Laws by Montesquieu (Halcyon Classics) (Kindle Locations 2430-2432). Halcyon Press Ltd.
Creation of a parliamentary body with oversight over the administration, parliamentary initiative of the Control
Committees of 12.2.1990, Federal Gazette, 1990, Volume I, pp. 1029 ss.
3
Article 26 paragraph 3 letter d, Parliament Act (ParlA), of 13.12.2002 (RS 171.10).
4
Article 27 and article 44 paragraph 1, letter e, ParlA.
2
2
b. examine the impact assessments carried out on the instructions of the Federal Council
(government);
c. instruct impact assessments to be carried out themselves.
The term ‘effectiveness’ should be understood in a broad sense which covers both
effectiveness in its true sense and efficiency:
-
effectiveness is the extent to which an activity fulfills its intended purpose or function
-
efficacy in the narrow sense measures the extent to which the result obtained corresponds
to the result sought and
-
efficiency examines the relationship between the result obtained and the resources used to
achieve it5.
The concept of evaluation, which has Anglo-Saxon origins6, is intended to measure the effects
of measures taken by the state and to assess whether the means put in place produced the
expected outcomes. As such, evaluations are designed to highlight difficulties and
shortcomings in implementing legislation or a public programme with the aim of correcting
them.
2. Current organisational structure
The PCA is a specialist body with answerable to both chambers. On an administrative level, it
is part of the Parliamentary Services, but it works totally independently. The PCA acts solely
when mandated to do so by the parliamentary committees and does not have the right to act
on its own initiative. The PCA is a multidisciplinary unit with a six-strong specialist staff. It
also has a budget which allows it to commission studies from external experts such as
university institutes or private consultants.
By outsourcing a part of the evaluation work, the PCA is able to gain access to specialist
knowledge which extends beyond its own resources. This form of collaboration does have its
limits, particularly when the evaluation concerns high political levels and involves access to
sensitive information. Another limitation derives from the fact that Switzerland is a small
country and that it is not always possible to find an expert specialised in a particular field who
has the necessary independence with regard to the administrative services concerned.
The PCA has extensive rights to information. It is entitled to contact directly all services of
the Federal Administration and to request all the information it needs; professional secrecy or
data protection rules are no grounds for requests to be refused. The PCA guarantees to protect
its sources and evaluation results are treated confidentially until the formal decision is taken
to publish by the relevant committee.
See MORAND, C.-A., « Formes et fonctions de l’évaluation législative », in : LeGes – Législation &
Evaluation, Bulletin de la Société suisse de législation (SSL) et de la Société suisse d’évaluation (SEVAL), n°
1999/2, Bern, pp. 86-88.
6
While some authors place the origins of evaluation processes back to the New Deal period in the US, it is
widely accepted that the decisive impulse came about in the 1960s under the Great Society project of President
Johnson and the numerous programmes designed to consolidate it. The General Accounting Office (GAO) and
the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) in the US and the National Audit Office (NAO) in the UK have a long
tradition of public policy evaluation.
5
3
Since it was set up, the PCA has conducted evaluations on subjects covering all aspects of
state activity, such as cultural or social policy, development aid or the Confederation’s real
estate management (see table).
Evaluations conducted by the PCA
In
progress
2011
-
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
-
Free movement of persons: principle of gainful employment
Interdepartmental collaboration in Switzerland’s foreign policy
Authorisation and appraisal of therapeutic products covered by health insurance
External staff in the Federal Administration
Selection of senior management by the Federal Council (government)
Strategic steering of social insurance by the Federal Council (government)
Federal practice in the governance of Swiss Post, Swiss Federal Railways and Swisscom
Evaluation of the Swiss Chairmanship of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of
Europe
Evaluation of the Confederation’s consultation and hearing practice
Evaluation of the monitoring and effects of the accompanying measures related to the free
movement of persons
Federal Tax Administration: Strategic steering, task and resource management
Management audit of the Federal Office for the Environment
Steering of federal personnel policy
Collaboration between the Federal Administration and non-governmental organisations
Management audit of the Federal Veterinary Office
Definition and supervision of medical services in compulsory healthcare
Running and supervision of federal unemployment insurance
Arms procurement in the Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sport
(ministry of defence)
Role of the Confederation in the quality assurance of medical insurance
Management audit of the Federal Office of Sport
Management of natural hazards at federal level
Management of real estate by the Confederation (civilian domain)
Use of external experts by the Federal Administration
Evaluation of the culture promotion agency (Pro Helvetia)
Coherence and strategic management of activities by the Swiss Agency for Development
Cooperation
Research conducted by the Federal Administration: evaluation of the politicaladministrative arrangement and research master plans and their implementation
The PCA works closely with organisations tasked with oversight and evaluation roles within
the various government departments. The aim here is to benefit as much as possible from
existing analyses and to avoid duplication.
The PCA has a special relationship with the Swiss Federal Audit Office (SFAO) which is the
body charged with supreme oversight of the Confederation’s finances. Its role is similar to a
court of audit in other countries. The SFAO ensures that the administration uses the
Confederation’s resources economically and in compliance with the law. The SFAO also
conducts performance audits in fields with large financial impacts. The SFAO is attached for
administrative purposes to the Federal Department of Finance (ministry of finance), but it is
answerable both to the government and to parliament, and assists these bodies in their
supervisory tasks. The SFAO has a staff of around ten specialists in the field of efficiency
audits.
Lastly, the government regularly informs parliament about the major political evaluations it
plans to conduct so that the relevant committees are able to plan their own evaluation work
accordingly.
4
3. Operation and methodology
The effectiveness audits conducted by the parliamentary committees consist of five main
phases.
Phase 1: Choice of themes
The committees begin by selecting the areas to be subjected to evaluation according to an
iterative process. The proposals are put forward by the committees, other parliamentary
bodies, the PCA or third parties (cantons, citizens, media, etc.). During this phase, the PCA
supports the committees by assessing the proposals according to pre-established criteria (such
as topicality, problems arising or the possibility of obtaining more information, etc.). On that
basis the committees retain two to five subjects for evaluation and incorporate them into their
annual programme.
Phase 2: Project outline
During this phase, the PCA drafts an outline of the project for each chosen evaluation theme.
This document provides an overview of the issues to be dealt with. As a rule, the PCA puts
forward a number of methodological approaches. Based on the project outline, the committees
define the formal evaluation mandate which they give to the PCA.
Phase 3: Realisation of the evaluation by the PCA
The third phase consists of the audit itself by the PCA. In order to do this, the PCA works in a
scientific manner and bases its procedures on empirical data gathered and analysed according
to methods used in the economic and social sciences. The PCA draws on standards used by
the Swiss Evaluation Society (SEVAL) as well as international societies and organisations
specialising in this field. This phase concludes with the submission of two reports: a short
version which summarises the most important findings and a detailed technical report
containing all of the information and data on which the findings are based.
The PCA conducts its evaluation entirely independently. The reports are drafted solely by the
PCA and the parliamentary committees are excluded from this phase of the process.
Phase 4: Political conclusions and committee recommendations
The committees then study the PCA’s evaluation report and draw political conclusions. In
general, the committees draft their own based on the findings of the PCA. In their reports, the
committees formulate recommendations; the government is then required to state its position.
If they are not satisfied by the government’s response, the committees they can as kit to
provide further information, which often results in a dialogue between parliament and the
government. If they deem that the results of the evaluation show that significant measures
need to be taken, the committees can demand that the government submit to parliament plans
to revise the law or that they themselves propose such amendments in the form of
parliamentary initiatives.
Phase 5: Follow up
Two or three years after the conclusion of an evaluation, the committees carry out a follow-up
control. In general, they request the government to submit a report on the implementation of
the recommendations. The PCA also supports the committees during this phase, particularly if
it is necessary to measure or assess the reality and relevance of progress made.
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4. Appraisal
After almost twenty years, it is possible to draw a generally positive assessment of the
evaluations conducted by parliament. The structure and procedures put in place have proven
their worth and delivered good results, both in the short and long term. The evaluations have
allowed the parliamentary committees to formulate numerous recommendations which have
often given rise to legislative amendments. In other cases, they have led the government to
adapt certain administrative practices or modify certain regulatory texts within its
competence.
Evaluations have also had a positive effect on the perception of parliamentary control in the
administration. Over a number of years, there has been a shift from a feeling of being
stigmatised, characterised by distrust and sanctions, to a ‘conciliatory concept of
parliamentary control’7 based on dialogue between the auditors and audited. It is more a case
of seeking to convince rather than constrain.
Thanks to the evaluations, parliament provides government with a tool to assist with decisionmaking and to manage legislation and public policy. The goal is not, or rather, no longer to
criticise mistakes and shortcomings in their application, but to understand and correct with a
view to improving the functioning of the state, in line with the motto, “The most important
purpose of evaluation is not to prove, but to improve.”8
This generally positive assessment has to be moderated slightly in that evaluations have
remained largely confined to committees charged with parliamentary control without
managing to flow into the legislative process.
In addition, there are difficulties in implementing legislation associated with our federal
structure. In numerous areas the implementation of federal law is delegated to the cantons
which are sovereign9. In such cases, practice shows that parliament exercises a great deal of
restraint with regard to the measures taken by the cantons in applying federal public policy.
Federalism therefore acts as a very solid barrier against the curiosity of federal evaluators and
parliamentarians. Nevertheless we would note that certain cantons have also accorded
themselves evaluation mechanisms: General evaluation clause in the constitution of canton
Bern, establishment of an independent body tasked with evaluation in canton Geneva, etc.10
5. Keys to success
Due the special nature of the evaluation as a tool, its use presents certain inconveniences in a
parliamentary context. An evaluation of high quality requires a good deal of time and longterm planning, whereas the pace of political affairs which dictates parliamentary activity is
fast moving. Furthermore, conducting evaluations and making use of the resulting findings
7
BECANE, J.-C., « Le contrôle parlementaire », in : FAVOREU, L., MAUS, D. et PARODI, J.-L. (sous la
direction de), L’écriture de la Constitution de 1958, Economica, Paris, 1992, p. 409.
8
STUFFLEBEAM, D. L., SHINKFIELD, A. J., Systematic evaluation : A self-instructional guide to theory and
practice, Kluwer-Nijhoff Publishing, Boston, 1985, p. 191.
9
This is the case for example in the area of judicial and administration organisation in civil and criminal law
(Art. 122 and 123 FC), of the environment (Art. 74 FC), spatial planning (Art. 75 FC) or energy policy (Art. 89
FC).
10
See JACOB, S., Institutionnaliser l’évaluation des politiques publiques. Etude des dispositifs en Belgique, en
France, en Suisse et aux Pays-Bas, Presses Interuniversitaires Européennes-Peter Lang S.A., collection « Cité
européenne », n° 35, Bruxelles, 2005, p. 97.
6
requires large amounts of resources, which are sometimes lacking in a semi-professional
parliament such as Switzerland’s. In addition, the scientific reasoning underlying the
evaluations can easily conflict with political rationality11.
If evaluations have established themselves as essential for parliament despite these sizeable
obstacles, it is due to three key factors.
First key factor: Establishment of a specialised internal service
The creation within parliament of a specialised service has been a vital success factor. The
PCA has enabled parliament to fulfil its legal mandate in a consistent and credible manner. By
basing its work on scientific bases and goals, parliament has succeeded in rationalising its
discourse vis-à-vis government. The existence of a specialised service which works
exclusively for parliament is also a guarantee of independence. The staff of the PCA have the
advantage that they are familiar with the workings of parliament and are in a position to
deliver results which can be put to use on a parliamentary level.
It is worth pointing out here that parliamentary evaluations clearly fall under the category of
applied research, which distinguishes them from scientific studies; while their methodological
aspects may draw on empirical procedures, their purpose is not to verify theories, but to
respond to questions set by lawmakers. That is why it is very important that a close
relationship develops between deputies and evaluators, and that evaluators are aware of the
expectations and logic behind deputies’ actions.
Second key factor: Clear process and appropriate responsibilities
A special feature of evaluations is that they should reconcile scientific rationality and political
rationality without one being subordinate to the other. Responsibilities are clearly defined:
political actors assume responsibility for the mandate and for assessing the results and the
experts conduct the study in a independently and in accordance with recognised scientific
criteria.
Third key factor: Codification of access to information
The law guarantees PCA staff extensive access to information. This prevents an asymmetry of
information between parliament and the government. That way, it is for the PCA and not the
body being evaluated to decide what information may or may not be passed on at the end of
the parliamentary evaluation. In return, the PCA undertakes to limit its requests for
information to what is necessary and to protect information obtained from being accessed by
unauthorised parties. In general, evaluation reports are published, as long as there are no
legitimate grounds for not doing so12. The committees are required to consult the government
before publishing the results and conclusions of an evaluation.
6. Challenges for the future
First challenge: To assure the long-term effect of evaluations, their continuity and
effectiveness
For a more detailed explanation on this subject, see SCHWAB, P., « L’évaluation au service du Parlement ? »,
in : LeGes – Législation & Evaluation, Bulletin of the Swiss Law Society (SSL) and the Swiss Evaluation
Society (SEVAL), No 2005/1, Bern, pp. 39 ss.
12
Article 10 paragraph 6 of the Parliamentary Administration Ordinance, SR 171.115.
11
7
In order to be effective, the evaluations carried out by parliament have to have a relatively
long timeframe.
That requires time and patience and means that deputies have to be available over an extended
period to achieve results which are difficult to translate into votes. That is despite the fact that
deputies’ time is limited and that their work often revolves around speeches and short term
action rather than detailed and scientific long term analysis. In short: re-election is more likely
to be secured by preparing the ground or appearing on the evening news than by drafting an
evaluation report.
In other words, if the parliamentary evaluation in itself is an ambitious exercise, it is made all
the more so by the fact that thematic priorities change very rapidly in parliament.
Furthermore, the deputies who follow-up on evaluations are rarely the same ones who
selected the subject areas, or who were involved in their realisation.
Second challenge: Competent performance-based steering
At parliament’s initiative, the Swiss government is developing a harmonised management
model for the administration. In future, beyond its own resources (such as personnel),
parliamentary steering should give increasing attention to performance and results.
Consequently, if parliament wishes to steer efficiently, it will have to show greater interest in
the effectiveness of political measures. It will have to ensure in advance that the goals set by
the government are realistic and that they are measurable. Moreover, in politically important
fields, it will have to demand that the government evaluates the impact of its measures even if
it means incorporating evaluation clauses in legislation13.
Third challenge: To make evaluations an all-encompassing parliamentary function which
reconcile supervisory control and the legislative process14
In the classic tradition of representative systems, parliament has at least two roles: the
legislative role, that is to say the task of initiating, debating and passing laws, and the role of
exercising oversight.
In practice, the aspect of reflecting on how measures are implemented by the state is
secondary to the legislative process. This can be explained by the fact that the political
process which precedes the passing of legislation is not necessarily about making the best
choices or worrying about the best effects, but about taking decisions likely to receive the
backing of a majority in both chambers. In the process of horse trading and jostling for
influence, priority is given to political acceptability leaving questions of effectiveness on the
sidelines. The upshot at times is imprecise legislation, ambiguous or vague public policy
which is then difficult to implement15.
13
Over a hundred laws and ordinances currently contain clauses on evaluation. This is the case for example in
areas ranging from agriculture, public health, climate, environmental protection, development cooperation,
telecommunications, energy, transport, migration, scientific research and social security. See report of the
SFAO, Umsetzung der Evaluationsklauseln in der Bundesverwaltung (Application of evaluation clauses within
the federal administration), report in German with summaries in French, Italian and English, Bern, October
2011 (www.efk.admin.ch).
14
See TÜRK, P., Le contrôle parlementaire en France, L.G.D.J, lextenso éditions, collections « Systèmes »,
Paris, 2011, p. 202 and p. 209.
15
Sometimes ambiguity serves as a guide to action allowing decision-makers to pass the buck to others. See on
this question MENY, Y., THOENIG, J.-C., Politiques publiques, Presses universitaires de France, collection
Thémis-science politique, Paris, 1989, pp. 245-246.
8
As Jean-François Aubert points out in his commentary on the constitution: ‘There is no point
working fastidiously to produce a poor law; neither is there any point in producing a good law
which is poorly implemented; it is unwise not to worry about the perverse effects that a
measure, which may be good in principle, can produce and that are unforeseen; it is also
unwise to neglect the resources spent, which can no longer be put to better use’.16
With the new constitution, evaluation was given an all-encompassing character and was to
become a sort of all-encompassing parliamentary function. Evaluation overarches the
legislative process and parliamentary control17 ; it is therefore no coincidence that in the
scheme of the constitution, the constituent gave a special place to article 170, distinct from
articles on legislation (Art. 163-165 FC) and supervisory control (Art. 169 FC)18.
It is essential to reconcile these two functions – which in reality are inseparable – in a
recursive process in which deputies come to question the effects of the programmes they
design and to modify them on the basis of the results achieved and study the underlying
causes and links19 – as one would place a ship in dry dock to fix the faults that have arisen
while at sea. The age of grand legislative works, in which the beautifully crafted text was a
guarantee of its good application has passed. Today, state action takes the form of small steps,
trial runs and corrections; it requires a constant capacity to adapt which can only be
guaranteed by interactive mechanisms between evaluation and legislation20.
In order for this convergence to become reality, deputies first have to alter their way of
thinking and accept to demythologise their legislative role21. In fact, state measures decided
by parliament no longer draw their legitimacy exclusively from the fact that they were passed
by elected representatives and according to a democratic process, but increasingly from the
fact that they achieved the intended results22.
We are left with one conclusion: the content of a public policy is conditioned as much by its
content as by its execution. A former president of the French National Assembly said today
that ‘the true power of a parliament lies less … in initiating legislation … than in controlling
16
AUBERT, J.-F. ; MAHON, P., Petit commentaire de la Constitution fédérale de la Confédération suisse du 18
avril 1999, Schulthess Médias Juridiques SA, Zurich/Bâle/Genève, 2003, p. 1291, ch. 6.
17
See THIERS, E., « Le contrôle parlementaire et ses limites juridiques : un pouvoir presque sans entraves », in :
ARTHUIS, J., DELCAMP, Al., et alii (collectif), Le contrôle parlementaire, Seuil, collections « Pouvoirs », n°
134, Paris, p. 72.
18
The same distinction appears in Art. 24, al. 1, of the French Constitution which cites parliament’s triple role.
‘Parliament shall pass statutes. It shall monitor the action of the Government. It shall assess public policies’.
The evaluation role was added in the constitutional revision of 2008 in favour of proposals of the Balladur
committee (Comité de réflexion et de proposition sur la modernisation et le rééquilibrage des institutions de la
Ve République, Paris, 2007).
19
See MOOR, P., « Du modèle de la séparation des pouvoirs à l’évaluation des politiques publiques », in : ZENRUFINEN, P., AUER, A. (éditeurs), De la Constitution. Etudes en l’honneur de Jean-François Aubert,
Helbling & Lichtenhahn, Bâle, 1996, p. 641.
20
DELLEY, J.-D., « L’évaluation législative, instrument de l’action parlementaire », in : SERVICES DU
PARLEMENT, Le Parlement – autorité suprême de la Confédération ?. Mélanges sur l’Assemblée fédérale à
l’occasion du 700e anniversaire de la Confédération, Paul Haupt, Bern/Stuttgart, 1991, p. 348 s.
21
See Jacob, S., op. cit., p. 143.
22
See MASTRONARDI, P., « Zur Legitimation des Staates durch die Wirkungen seines Handelns », in : LeGes
– Législation & Evaluation, Bulletin de la Société suisse de législation (SSL) et de la Société suisse
d’évaluation (SEVAL), n° 1996/1, Bern, pp. 25 ss.
9
government action and in evaluating public policies, with a view to reducing the divide
between often laudable intentions and the sometimes less glorious reality.’23
********
*****
23
Laurent Fabius, closing address at the IV EUROSAI conference in Paris, 3.6.1999, in : MIGAUD, D.
(rapporteur général), Rapport d’information en conclusion d’une mission d’évaluation et de contrôle,
Assemblée nationale, Paris, 1999, p. 67.
10