Paper to be presented at the Multinational Conference on Improving the
Quality of Public Services and Public Management (27-29 June 2011)
Title
The bureaucracy under the inclusive government in Zimbabwe
Author
Ricky Munyaradzi Mukonza
Tshwane University of Technology (South Africa)
Department of Public Management
Contact Details
Cell: +27745037780
Email addresses: tsanomunya@yahoo.com
Or
ricky.mukonza@gmail.com
Abstract
In the recent past African countries that experienced disputed elections such as Kenya and
Zimbabwe ended up with inclusive governments, also commonly referred to as governments of
national unity (GNUs). A lot has been written on the subject and most of the literature
generated focuses on the merits and demerits of this political phenomenon in general terms.
This paper however, seeks to analyze how top public servants in Zimbabwe have reacted to the
change in the country’s political terrain brought about by the inclusive government. It is a given
in public administration and political theory that the administrative stratum of government
follows the direction given by the political stratum. The paper, however argues that top public
servants in Zimbabwe have taken time to transform to meet to the demands of the new political
order and this has had a negative impact on the operations of the inclusive government, thus to
service delivery. It is further contended that until there is harmony between political and
administrative heads, particularly in ministries manned by former opposition political parties,
squabbles will continue to bedevil the inclusive government and service delivery will not improve
as anticipated. The notion of a politically neutral public service is interrogated to ascertain
whether it is feasible in Zimbabwe or elsewhere in the world for that matter. A qualitative
research approach is employed through the analysis of different texts on and by the inclusive
government and on the basis of the findings, a conclusion is reached. Experiences from other
countries will also be utilized to further give weight to the arguments. A history of public service
as well as a survey of the constitutional and legislative frameworks in Zimbabwe is given to give
context to the arguments advanced in this paper.
Introduction
The signing of a power sharing agreement in 2008 between the Zimbabwe African National
Union Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) and the two formations of the Movement for Democratic
Change (MDC) resulted in the formation of the inclusive government in February 2009. This
development brought about fundamental changes in the politics of Zimbabwe. Since 1980
when Zimbabwe attained independence from colonial rule to 2008, the country’s political
space, particularly in government has been dominated by ZANU (PF). The inclusive government
meant ZANU (PF) had to share governmental power on almost equal terms with the two MDC
formations. All this was done on the basis of a power sharing document, the Global Political
Agreement (GPA) which inter alia, redistributes power among the different political players in
the inclusive government. The GPA also implores all players in government work together for
the benefit of the people of Zimbabwe. The paper among other things explores one of the key
variables in the policy process and ultimately in service delivery namely the relationship
between the bureaucrats and political officials. It is argued that the relations particularly
between top public officials in some ministries manned by MDC ministers are poor and this
impacts negatively on service delivery and thus militates against the letter and spirit of the GPA.
The paper further interrogates whether the idea of a politically neutral public servant is
possible under the inclusive government or any other government system. Lastly,
recommendations are proffered on how best relations can be improved between political and
administrative heads in the inclusive government. As a point of departure, an attempt is made
to explain and contextualize the term top public official.
Top public officials explained
The terms top public official, top bureaucrat and top civil servant are sometimes used
interchangeably as if they mean the same. For the purpose of this paper it is important to
interrogate the meanings attached to all the three for clarity. Venter and Landsberg (2011:82)
define public officials as people manning government offices; these could be employed by
either the national or provincial governments of a country. Put in other words it refers to a
component of a state’s management and public administrative apparatus which is sometimes
referred to as the bureaucracy (Venter and Landsberg, 2011:82). It therefore can be derived
that top public officials are those tasked with heading the different government departments.
Closely linked with top public official is the term top bureaucrat. It might be plausible to trace
the origins of the word bureaucracy. The word is derived from a compound Greek word bureau
which means rule and kraten which refers to table. According to Hanekom and Thornhill
(1983:117) the word bureaucracy conjures up different images but in its original sense means
rule from the table and was used to refer to rule by public officials. Venter and Landsberg
(2011:84) understand bureaucrat, which is a derivative of bureaucracy to refer to non-elected,
professional staff and normally life long government employees. From the explanations
provided, it seems the two terms means one and the same and any attempt to differentiate
them has no real value. In some cases top public officials are referred to as top civil servants.
Cloete (1995:20) defines civil servant as members of the public service. It is however important
to observe that top civil servant refer to top public servants other than uniformed forces
appointees
In the context of this paper, top public official refers to administrative heads in government
departments or ministries and assume different titles from one country to another. In
Zimbabwe, they are referred to as secretaries and differ from South Africa where they are
called Director Generals while in Britain they are known as permanent secretaries. Irrespective
of these semantic differences these top officials are in most cases the accounting officers of the
entities they head. It is these functionaries who are the centre of discussion of this paper.
Before focusing on them, an overview of the history of Zimbabwe’s public service is presented
to give context to proceeding discussions.
A historical overview of public service in Zimbabwe
The advent of independence in 1980 presented the government of Zimbabwe with a number of
challenges. From a public administration perspective transformation of the public service
delivery system from a settler colonial administration that favoured a white minority to one
that accommodates the majority black population was a priority (Chimhowu, 2010: 111). The
Growth and Equity document and the Three Year Transitional Plan outlined government’s
vision and agenda to of a socialist transformation in the society. One of the major challenges
faced at the point was shortage of skills, particularly at the strategic levels of government.
Jenkins (1997:581) argues that new Black ministers whose recommendations were critical in
the appointment of permanent secretaries were not willing to work with top public servants
from the previous government. The main reason was suspicion that these top officials were
likely to sabotage government policies and programmes. Agere (1997:86) cites the example of
the Ministry of Transport where resistance was demonstrated after the appointment of a black
minister. This prompted the minister to go ahead and appoint a black permanent secretary and
in other key positions in the ministry (Agere, 1997:86). The approach had its own problems;
firstly in most cases the appointees did not have requisite skills to lead critical government
projects. Secondly, where they had skills they did not have the experience to quickly fit into the
vision of the new government. Although the government organised training programmes to
assist public servants acquaint them with how government operated and to understand the
rules and procedures guiding service delivery, still there were serious challenges in the
implementation of government policies in key government sectors (Chimhowu, 2010: 111).
Towards the end of the first decade of black rule in Zimbabwe, government through the 1989
Public Service Commission Kavran Report identified some of its weaknesses. The Report, inter
alia, revealed a bureaucracy characterized by ; lack of a performance management culture,
arrogance, poor work attitudes, high staff turnover, a bloated and secretive (Chimhowu, 2010:
112). The other important findings were that there was general poor communication of
decisions from top management to the lower strata of government as well as to the general
public and there was duplication of functions. In other words the Report painted a gloomy
picture of the Zimbabwe’s public service at the time. However what the Report did not say but
is apparent in its contents is that there was general lack of leadership in the public service. The
state of affairs portrayed by the Report called for reforms in the country’s public service.
Nevertheless, no reforms were introduced until 1997 arising from a Customer Satisfaction
Survey in 1996 showed that there were no changes in the manner in which the bureaucracy
behaved. The situation was worsened by the negative effects brought about by the Economic
Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) introduced in the early 1990s.
From 1996 to 2002 reforms in the public service were focused on making it result-oriented, in
other words, maintain expenditure while at the same time address socio-economic challenges
such
as
poverty,
unemployment
and
service
delivery
as
much
as
possible
(Chimhowu,2010:114). Efforts were made to borrow private sector approaches such as
entrepreneurship, this was combined with restructuring which focused on streamlining
functions to eliminate duplication as well as achieve speedy decision making by compressing
the top level grades (Chimhowu, 2010:114).
Between 2002 and 2008, the socio- economic and political crisis that hit the country did not
spare the public sector. This however did not stop further public service reforms from being
instituted and this time they were aimed at enhancing performance, service delivery and good
governance (Chimhowu, 2010:115). Chimhowu (2010:115) further states that values such as
integrity, honesty and ethical standards diminished in the public sector particularly from 2003
onwards as a result of the economic and political crisis. This prompted government to reform
its ethical approach in 2005 and this included, inter alia, performance agreements with
administrative heads. Administrative heads were in turn expected to conduct performance
reviews for their staff to ensure that objectives of their ministries are met. Leadership was also
an important component in the public sector reform. In that regard, executive management
programmes were introduced at the Zimbabwe Institute of Administration and Management
(ZIPAM) and these were targeted at middle managers and above (Chimhowu, 2010:115). A brief
discussion on the constitutional and legislative framework guiding top public officials in
Zimbabwe follows.
Constitutional and legislative framework for top public officials
Legislatively and constitutionally, top public officials in Zimbabwe are guided by the
Constitution of Zimbabwe, 1979 and the Public Service Act, 1995. According to the Public
Service Act, 1995, top public officials are referred to as secretaries and they are heads of their
respective ministries. It must be noted that many official and non-official documents including
the Global Political Agreement and different Southern African Development Community (SADC)
Communiques wrongly refer to them as permanent secretaries. According to a Member of
Parliament, Mr. Felix Magalela, the use of the term permanent secretary, though wrongly so,
carries connotations of officials who are permanently employed by government irrespective of
their
performance
(http://zimvest.com/there-are-no-E2%80%98%&permanent-secretaries
accessed on 03/05/2011).
Constitutionally, Section 20.1.7 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe, 1979 as amended through
Constitutional Amendment 19 gives the President power to appoint (permanent) secretaries.
This position has however been contested by the MDC-Tsvangirai formation which argues that
all top government positions including the appointment of secretaries, ambassadors and
Provincial Governors should be done with the consultation of all the Principals in the GPA, that
is, all the leaders of political parties in the agreement. In the past, the President appointed top
public officials with recommendations from the minister of the concerned ministry and in
consultation with the Public Service Commission (Agere, 1997:86). With the brief overview of
the legislative and constitutional framework, the paper proceeds to look at the politicaladministrative interface in the inclusive government.
Political- administrative interface in the inclusive government
The importance of the relationship between top public officials and political heads in the
execution of government responsibilities can not be overemphasized .Thornhill and Hanekom
(1995:2) aptly put across the point when they wrote “An important phenomenon affecting the
administration of public affairs is the relationship between the political head of a state
department – the minister and top public officials his/ her department…”. In general terms
general roles of the Minister are inter alia; providing political direction, leadership, motivation,
control and accountability for the department they are in charge of. On the other hand public
managers act as advisors to ministers with regard to technical and political matters, policy and
resource management (Thornhill and Hanekom, 1995:2). The above implies that top public
officials need to strongly identify with the policies of the government they serve. Given the
above background it is important that an analysis of the relationships between ministers and
top public officials in Zimbabwe’s inclusive government be done. This is particularly important
in ministries manned by the Movement for Democratic Change.
The coming into being of the inclusive government in Zimbabwe brought in some changes on
the political landscape notably the ministers from the two formations of the Movement for
Democratic Change. The ministers, some of whom did not have experience in government were
faced with the challenge of working with experienced top public officials appointed from the
previous government. The initial unilateral appointment of these top officials by the President
without prior consultation with Principals from the other political parties as prescribed by the
Global Political Agreement did not inspire a spirit of trust and cooperation necessary for good
working relations between ministers and their top officials. The mistrust partly explains the
widely reported disagreements that rocked the inclusive government on the appointment of
(permanent) secretaries. The argument put forward by the Movement for Democratic Change,
particularly the formation led by Morgan Tsvangirai is that (Permanent) Secretaries in MDC led
ministries must be appointed by the concerned party. Logically, this would lead to a workable
relationship between the permanent secretaries and ministers and subsequently enhance
implementation of government policies and service delivery. In resolving the issue, the parties
agreed to let the appointed permanent secretaries serve their terms. The mistrust and power
struggles between some MDC ministers and their permanent secretaries proved retrogressive
for the inclusive government faced by the challenges of transforming the economy, achieving
political stability, spearheading constitutional reform and delivery of services.
A prominent example of a struggle between an MDC minister and his permanent secretary was
exposed by the Court case between a company bidding to supply electricity meters, Solhart
Zimbabwe and the Minister for Energy and Power Development. The Minister in his opposing
affidavit wrote “… in any event I need to set the record straight. I as the Minister for Energy and
Power Development set policy and directions and not the permanent secretary. He (permanent
secretary) can only write concerning parastatals on my say-so, not on his own initiative. He has
no part except what I ask him to do…” (News Day, 2011:1). Firstly, what is striking in the
statement is the tone with which the Minister uses in reference to his top public official. The
tone does not reflect a close relationship between the concerned minister and the (permanent)
secretary. Secondly, there appears to be a confusion of the roles of the two. The Ministers
appears to be at pains to clarify his duties and authority and the question is; if there is a good
relationship between him and his secretary, why could this not be done in the offices?
The other example of political-administrative discord in the inclusive government is evident
when the secretary of Information and Publicity, George Charamba publicly castigated the
Prime Minister for signing a bilateral agreement with the South Korean government (CISOMM,
2010:17). The former argued that the later did not have jurisdiction to preside over such
matters. Although in this case the secretary could have been right in line with the GPA, the
issue was supposed to have been handled by the President of the country, it is was against
protocol for the secretary to publicly criticize the Prime Minister. This is because according the
same GPA, the Prime Minister is the head of government business which means, not only is the
Prime Minister a superior to the secretaries but also to the ministers in the inclusive
government.
The International Crisis Group (ICG) (2010:5) states that (permanent) secretaries have taken
advantage of the inexperience of MDC ministers to acquire free reign in determining the pace
and implementation of government policies and decisions. The ICG (2010:6) further cites
example in the Ministry of Education and Ministry of Public Service where the (Permanent)
Secretaries overturned decisions with regard to new school and structures and manpower audit
of civil servants respectively. In an interview capture by the ZimOnline, 27 August 2009 the
Minister of Education alluded to a perception of two centres of power in his ministry (him on
one side and his secretary on the other), however he attributed this to the process of transition
that the country was undergoing (Interview: ‘Education sector still very fragile’ Available on:
httpwebcahe.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:TrkdF8jkJfAJ.www.zimonline.co.zw
accessed on 27/05/2011)
It is however worth to note that conflicts between political and administrative heads is not only
confined to the inclusive government. The fall out between the then Minister of Information
and Publicity, Jonathan Moyo and his secretary, Charamba in 2005 is a case in point. In this case
the later boasted of his experience in government which spanned over two decades against the
minister’s less than five. Closely linked to this example is that between the then Minister of
Agriculture, Joseph Made and his secretary, Pazvakavambwa who had a fall out as a result of
disagreements on a deal that led to the purchase of substandard fertilizer from a South African
company (Chimhete, 2005:1).
It is important to explain why some of these conflicts arise in the political administrative
interface. Firstly, the issues of expertise in which in most cases top public officials are more
knowledgeable about a ministry’s line functions than their political heads (this is not always the
case). According to Thornhill and Hanekom (1995:28) while ministers provide political direction
and leadership to officials and the public, public officials weigh in with their expertise on policy
and management issues. Secondly, public officials tend to be more experienced on government
business than their political superior. This gives them an advantage in solving what could be
complex matters and if there is poor rapport between the top official and the minister conflicts
could arise. Lastly the personality variable particularly in policy making can not be under
estimated. In some cases the minister in spite of his shortcomings might want to be seen as the
leader of the process which might not augur well with his or her top public official thus
resulting in a clash.
The importance of a good relationship between administrative and political heads in
government is important for good policies and ultimately service delivery. This is particularly so
given the important roles which both play in the running of ministries. Examples have been
cited of poor working relations between administrative and political heads in the inclusive
government and the period before it with the aim to show how this has derailed the smooth
operations of government for the benefit of the people of Zimbabwe. Suggestions for politically
neutral top public servants have been suggested as a solution to these conflicts between
secretaries and ministers in the inclusive government, it is therefore critical to interrogate the
possibility of having politically neutral top public servants.
Politically neutral public servant: A myth or reality?
The challenges that rocked the appointment of permanent secretaries in Zimbabwe prompted
suggestions for politically neutral public servants. When the matter was resolved, Prime
Minister Morgan Tsvangirai in his statement remarked “… We do not believe that civil servants
should be appointed on a partisan basis, so there will be no civil servant from MDC or ZANU PF.
Any civil servant who participates in partisan politics will have no place in our public service, and
I urge the Minister of Public Service to ensure that the appropriate measures are put in place to
that effect” (Prime Minister, 2009:1). In the statement, the Prime Minister appears to envisage
a public service that is neutral in its operation. The question is whether or not neutrality is
possible particularly for top public servants given the environment within which they execute
their duties.
Dolan (2003) as cited in Kalema (2009:550) alludes that the concept that public officials must
serve members of the public impartially or should be recruited on the basis of competency
rather than any partial considerations is neither new nor unique. The point is further given
weight by a manuscript on the ancient Egyptian civil service which advises public officials to:
Be courteous and tactful as well as hones and diligent: all your doings are publicly known and
must therefore be beyond complaint or criticism. Be absolutely impartial: always give reason for
refusing a plea: complainants like a kindly hearing even more than plea. Preserve dignity but
avoid inspiring fear. Be an artist in words, that you may be successful strong, for the tongue is a
sword (Civil service Manuscript from Egyptian Pharaohs – c. 3000 B.C. as cited in Kalema,
2009:550).
Furthermore, works of early Greek philosophers such as Aristotle in Politics and Plato in
Republic emphasise the importance of impartiality and competence in public service. According
to O’Toole (2006:3) these philosophers were advocating for an ideal public official who regards
the interests of the whole society as being the guiding influence in public decision making that
their personal or other partial interests are to be set aside. Plato in the Republic succinctly puts
the idea, he refers to holders of public officers as “philosopher rulers” who ‘ will be those who,
when we look at the whole course of their lives, are found to be full of zeal to do whatever they
believed to good for the commonwealth and never willing to act against its interest” (O’Toole,
2006:3). The above shows that early philosophers viewed politically neutral and duty conscious
public servants as key in advancing societal goals.
European and American experience
Influenced by early philosophers, the principle of neutrality is argued to have evolved in the
Western industrial economy and is widely associated with the emergence of multiparty politics
(Kalema, 2009:550). Page (1992) as cited in Kalema (2009:550) asserts that Britain, France and
Germany instituted reforms in their recruitment systems to include examinations. The need for
neutrality and impartially in public servants was dire in England and later in America as ruling
parties lost elections to opposition parties. The situation required a non-political and more
permanent civil service for stability and continuity of governments (Paris, 1969:36). According
to Dang (1966:67) in France the need for separation of administration and politics has long
been entrenched in the French political-administrative culture and is further supported by the
old French adage “le government change, la’ administration reste” , meaning that government
change but the administration remains the same. In Britain, the Northcote-Trevelyn Report of
1854 influenced key changes in Britain’s public service including, recruitment to civil service
based on merit and nonpartisan, permanent civil service (Whincop, 2002 as cited in Kalema,
2009:550). O’Toole (2006:194) however dismisses the notion of portraying public servants in
Europe as neutral, disinterested and anonymous saying it was only an ideal. He further
contends that public officials were only human beings who had ambitions and aspirations like
all people and they actually viewed their jobs as platforms to achieve these aspirations (O’
Toole, 2006:195).
Experiences in Zimbabwe and South Africa
On paper, Zimbabwe envisages a merit based and non-political public service and this is
reflected in Section 18 of the Public Service Act, 1995 which reads;
The Commission shall—
(a) have regard to the merit principle, that is, the principle that preference should be given to the
person who, in the Commission’s opinion, is the most efficient and suitable for appointment to
the office, post or grade concerned; and
(b) ensure that there is no discrimination on the ground of race, tribe, place of origin, political
opinions, colour, creed, gender or physical disability.
The above applies to members of the public service other than secretaries. According to the
GPA, permanent secretaries are appointed by the President of the Republic, this makes them
political appointees. The political nature of top public servants explains why a majority of them
end up occupying political positions in government. Examples include, current Minister of
Justice Patrick Chinamasa who was once a secretary in the ministry, former Minister of Labour
and Manpower Development, July Moyo who was once a secretary in the same ministry and the
current Minister of Higher Education, Stanely Mudenge is a former secretary in the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. In fact a closer look at the current ZANU (PF) cabinet ministers reveals that a
majority of them were once occupants of top administrative positions in government. This gives
credence to O’Toole (2006:195) ‘s assertion that public officials were only human beings who
had ambitions and aspirations like all people and they actually viewed their jobs as platforms to
achieve these aspirations
South Africa has adopted a combination of British, French and American systems both during
and post apartheid. Kalema (2009:551) however states that although top public officials
adhered to liberal principles, they were highly politicized. The post of Director General was held
by National Party members only (Venter and Landsberg, 2011:85). In terms of policy, post
apartheid South African government envisaged a public service that is “faithful to the
Constitution, non-partisan and loyal to the government of the day” (Republic of South Africa,
1995:9). South Africa has also established a neutral body, the Public Service Commission to deal
with personnel issues in the public service. Currently appointment of top public officials in
South Africa is a prerogative of the President. It is however worth to note that this approach
caused disagreements between former President Thabo Mbeki and the then Minister of Home
Affairs Buthelezi (Kalema, 2009:551). The latter did not agree to the Director General appointed
to his department. Kalema (2009:551) citing Esau (1997) concludes that public servants in South
Africa are political appointees who are expected to play neutral roles.
Conclusion
To conclude, reviewed literature has shown that there are challenges in the relations between
some ministers and there top public officials in the inclusive government. This has the potential
to derail progress in the attainment of the goals set for the inclusive government. It has also
been argued that politically neutral top public officials exist in a utopian world; in the real world
they are political. The nature of their roles, particularly in interacting with elected political
officials requires that they engage in political activities. Peters (1995:91) argues for a mixture of
political disposition and administrative talent in top public officials and he refers this as
responsive competence as opposed to neutral competence. The major question on political
versus merit appointment is that of degree, in other words, the extent to which political
appointments can be made (Peters, 1995:91). In finding the right mixture, the question of what
must be done to ensure that relations between ministers and top public official effectiveness of
government, needs to be addressed.
Given the conflicts identified between ministers and top public officials in the inclusive
government, it is recommended that the President reverts to the earlier system of consulting
with concerned ministers when appointing administrative heads. This will foster a spirit of trust
that is necessary for the two to work together in advancing the goals of the inclusive
government. The danger of this approach however is that it might deteriorate into a political
patronage system in which top public officials act as the minister pleases instead of giving their
expert advice as objectively as is required in performing their roles. The inclusive government is
faced with a mammoth task of transforming the Zimbabwean socio-economic and political
environment for better and this requires unity of purpose among political and administrative
heads.
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