Chapter 10
Emotions of Protest
Dunya van Troost, Jacquelien van Stekelenburg, Bert Klandermans
Introduction
Politics—and especially politics of protest—are full of emotions. People are angry about
austerity measures, thrilled or fearful about the Arab Spring and indignant because they want
real democracy now!1 Clearly, there is an emotional side to how people react to their social
and political environment (Conover & Feldman, 1986; Lyman, 2004; Marcus, 2003; Marcus et
al., 2000; Way & Masters, 1996). Politics of protest are imbued with emotions. In fact, protest
is inconceivable without emotions. It is emotions which “give ideas, ideologies, identities and
even interests their power to motivate” (Jasper, 1997, p. 127). Social movements are carriers
of meaning and organizers do their utmost to create moral outrage and to provide a target
against which this can be vented. They must weave together a moral, cognitive, and emotional
package of attitudes. Organizers appeal to ‘attack emotions’ such as anger to create ‘fire in the
belly and iron in the soul’ (Gamson, 1992, p. 32). However, ‘just’ being angry is not enough, as
Martin Luther King aptly stated: ‘It is not enough for people to be angry - the supreme task is to
organize and unite people so that their anger becomes a transforming force’. Social
movements use their power, resources and creativity to turn individual grievances and
emotions into collective claims and to stage opportunities to act upon these claims.
Emotions have become a popular research area in the study of contentious politics.
Such was not always the case. Classic breakdown theories on collective action used emotion
terms as explanatory variables but equated emotion with irrationality. As rational approaches
like resource mobilization theory (for example, McCarthy & Zald, 1976) or political process
theory (for example, McAdam, 1982) became the state of the art, protesters were seen as
‘rationally’ motivated actors, and emotional aspects were left out the explanatory models
(Goodwin & Jasper, 1999). Nevertheless, around the beginning of the 21st century, the
previously held implicit assumption that emotion and rationality contrast each other has been
refuted (Aminzade & McAdam, 2002; Emirbayer & Goldberg, 2005; Gould, 2009).
Organizers of protest do not feel constrained by whatever paradigmatic shift. ‘Emotion
work’ has always been a key to the organization of protest. Take the following quote from
Malcolm X: “Usually when people are sad, they don't do anything. They just cry over their
condition. But when they get angry, they bring about social change.” Malcolm X points to an
important characteristic of emotions; that is, that emotions propel behavior, but perhaps even
more important, different emotions propel different behavior. This is the basic tenet of
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appraisal theory of emotions. A second central tenet of appraisal theory is that people can
evaluate―or appraise―the same event differently and consequently have different emotional
responses. This chapter will lay out a theoretical framework that links individuals’ appraisals of
the socio-political context to emotions of protest. Appraisals―particularly group-based
appraisals―play a crucial role in that respect. As people categorize themselves as group
members, individual emotions turn into group-based emotions; “I feel for us”. Group-based
appraisals shape group-based emotions, and consequently collective behavior. Our theoretical
model― as depicted in Figure 1―holds protest emotions dependent on the socio-political
context in which a contested issue emerges. This relationship between context and emotion is
mediated by appraisals―evaluations―of the social and political context. The resulting
emotions interact with the motivation to participate in protest or to abstain from it.
Socio-political
context
Group based
appraisal
Protest behaviour
Emotion
Action tendency
Figure 10.1 Model of the socio-political context, emotions and protest behavior
Emotions are socially constructed. In other words, the experience of emotions is influenced by
norms, values and culture. Goodwin et al. (2001) argue that “some emotions are more socially
constructed than others, involving more cognitive processes” (p. 13). In their view, emotions
that are politically relevant are―more than other emotions―at the social construction end of
the scale. For these emotions, cultural and historical factors play an important role in the
interpretation of the state of affairs by which they are generated. People might be puzzled by
some aspects of reality and try to understand what is going on. They may look for others with
similar experiences and a social movement may provide an environment to exchange
experiences, to tell their stories and to express their feelings. In the pages to come we will first
define emotions and then theorize about appraisal theory of emotions. In that context we will
outline appraisals deemed to be important in the context of protest and the related emotions.
Next, we discuss emotions and the related behavioral intentions before, during and after
protest. The chapter closes with a section in which we assess where we stand and propose
directions to proceed.
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Defining emotions of protest
Emotions can be distinguished from mere feelings or moods by their relation to a specific object
or idea. Our description on emotions of protest distinguishes between three objects of emotion:
the opponent, the in-group, and contentious issues (Jasper, 1998). Protesters are likely to
experience negative emotions towards their opponent and the contentious issue, while they
most likely feel positive emotions towards the group they identify with (Goodwin & Jasper,
2006). Yang (2000) for instance found negative emotions, anger, outrage, shame and fear
elicited by interactions with opponents (in this case Chinese authorities), while positive
emotions as joy, compassion and pride were elicited in the interaction with other activists
inside the movement (1989 Chinese student movement). The fact that moods and feelings are
not related to a specific object or idea does not imply that they have no impact on protest
behavior. Contrary to that, public mood―mood resulting from group membership (Rahn,
2004)― provides feedback to people about how the group (namely, the political community) is
faring. Research has demonstrated that people in a positive mood display more self-efficacy,
are more optimistic, and show more associative cognitive processes, while a negative mood, on
the other hand, is related to higher risk perception, pessimism, and more rule-based cognitive
processes (Forgas, 2001). In other words, the ‘emotional barometer’ in a country might trigger
different (risk) perceptions, cognitive styles and emotions. This suggests that public mood might
influence the claims social movement organizations make, the way problems are framed, the
emotions that are experienced and the motivations to participate in protest.
Multiple protest emotions. People evaluate similar events differently and consequently
have different emotional responses. Protesters in the same event can thus experience different
emotions. To illustrate the multiple emotions triggered by grievances and the variety of motives
for participation in an event we draw on the Belgian Dutroux case. This case revolved around
Marc Dutroux, who was arrested in August 1996, and later convicted for the kidnapping,
hostage taking, rape and murder of several young girls, acts which on their own violate many
social norms. However, it became a politically contested issue because the Belgian
authorities―police and judicial courts―made gross mistakes while investigating this case.
These mistakes undermined citizens’ trust in legislative enforcement (Fijnout, 1999), and
triggered a protest of 300.000 citizens (Walgrave & Manssens, 2005; Walgrave & Rihoux, 1998).
The motives for people to participate in this so-called ‘White March’ were very diverse, varying
from the expression of solidarity with the parents of the victims, disapproval of pedophilia, or a
plea to reform the Belgian justice and/or political system (Walgrave & Rihoux, 1998). The
example of the White March illustrates how in real life settings people experience multiple
emotions. Dutroux is met with outrage, the justice system is resented and the parents of the
victims receive solidarity and empathy (Walgrave & Verhulst, 2006).
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People can experience multiple emotions at the same time or in very close “temporal
proximity” (Barbalet, 2002; Benski, 2011; Flam, 2005). In fact, people hardly ever experience a
single emotion, instead they display a mixture of emotions. Benski (2011) suggests using the
concept of emotional constellation to explore these mixtures of emotions. She presents an
overview of emotions as they are experienced by female peace activists in Israel. Her findings
indicate that protesters are likely to display combinations of emotions in response to
multifaceted social and political situations. Emotional constellations may induce congruent or
incongruent action tendencies. In case of congruent action tendencies, the behavioral
intentions are expected to be strengthened. Anger and frustration, for example, both motivate
aggressive behavior; the White March protesters may have been outraged, wishing to retaliate
Dutroux, and frustrated with the inability of the authorities to properly fulfill their tasks. Both
emotions and action tendencies reinforce each other and enhance an individual’s motivation to
take onto the streets. However, in case of incongruent emotions and action tendencies there is
a conflict (Benski, 2011). Incongruent emotions―like fear which activates escape and flight
behavior and anger which activates attack behavior―may induce a tendency to flight and fight
at the same time. This incongruence―or cross pressure―can neutralize the inclination to flight
and may lead to protest participation (Benski, 2011, p. 29).
Appraisal theory of emotion
People are continuously evaluating or appraising the relevance of their environment for their
well-being and these appraisals help account for different emotions (Arnold, 1960). Lazarus
proposed the distinction between primary appraisal, that is the assessment of an event’s
implications for one’s well-being and secondary appraisal, the assessment of one’s ability to
cope with the situation (Lazarus, 1966). After a fast and automatic evaluation of these first
appraisal dimensions, other dimensions are evaluated on a more thought-process basis: How
does the event influence my goals? Who or what caused the event? Do I have control and
power over the consequences of the event? Are the consequences of the event compatible
with my personal values and (societal) norms? It is thus the personal meaning we give to
ambiguous stimuli through appraisals that determines emotions we feel. Hence, emotional
experiences are a function of characteristics of the situation and the person (Kuppens & Tong,
2010). This implies that it is a person’s perspective at the situation, not the situation per se,
which results in an emotional response. This emotional response is a combination of physical
arousal, associated feelings and thoughts (Scherer, 2000; Scherer & Peper, 2001) leading to
emotion expression and an action tendency (Clore & Ortony, 2000; Smith & Lazarus, 1990).
A major claim made by appraisal theorists is that objectively similar situations or events
can elicit, in different individuals, highly dissimilar emotional reactions depending on
idiosyncratic subjective appraisals. A number of empirical studies has confirmed this and has
shown that a limited number of appraisal dimensions are sufficient to explain emotional
differentiation. Scherer and Ceschi (1997), for example, tested cognitive appraisal theory in a
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field study. In a major international airport, passengers reporting their luggage lost to the
baggage retrieval service were interviewed after their interaction with an airline agent. They
were asked to rate their emotional state before and after the interaction with the agent and to
provide information on how they had appraised the situation. The results show that the goal
conduciveness check is by far the most important predictor: perceived high obstructiveness of
the loss was leading to anger and worry while low obstructiveness led to indifference and good
humor. After goal conduciveness coping potential was the most important predictor. Travelers
who thought that they had sufficient coping potential to deal with the lost luggage event were
angry whereas travelers with low coping potential experienced sadness. Two persons can thus
appraise the same event―the experience of lost luggage―differently and have different
emotional responses resulting in different action tendencies.
Action tendencies are the inclination to respond to a situation with particular behavior.
Frijda et al., (1989) suggest that behavior is organized in two systems. To take advantage of a
beneficial situation appetitive behavior, such as care giving, is activated. In threatening
situations the defensive system is activated, stimulating behavior such as escape, attack and
withdrawal (Bradley et al., 2001; Frijda, 2007). When feeling afraid people experience the urge
to run away while sadness induces inactivity (Roseman, Wiest, & Swartz, 1994). Anger, on the
other hand induces aggressive behavior like the urge of wanting to hurt someone. This
aggressive aspect provides a reason why particularly anger appears to be able to mobilize
aggrieved individuals to fight for what they believe is right.
Nerb and Spada (2001) conducted three experimental studies to investigate the relation
between the cognitive appraisal of environmental problems, the development of distinct
emotions (anger and sadness), and the resulting action tendencies. The participants in their
studies read a fictitious but realistic newspaper report about an environmental problem (a
tanker running aground in a severe storm and spilling oil into the North Sea). Different
experimental conditions were realized: (a) the tanker did not fulfil the safety guidelines; the
damage could have been avoided (high controllability); (b) the tanker did fulfil the safety
guidelines; the damage could not have been avoided (low controllability). It turned out that the
more controllable the event the more angry people were and, important for our discussion, the
more willing to participate in a boycott (Nerb & Spada, 2001). However, if the participants were
to believe that the damage could not have been avoided, they were sad, which did not
translate into action preparedness.
Group-based appraisal theories of emotions. Appraisal theory was developed to explain
personal emotions experienced by individuals. Yet, “the self” implicated in emotion-relevant
appraisals is clearly not only a personal or individual self. If group membership becomes part of
the self, events that harm or favor an in-group by definition harm or favor the self, and the self
might thus experience affect and emotions on behalf of the in-group. With such considerations
in mind Smith (1993) developed a model of intergroup emotions that was predicated on social
identification with the group. Since collective action is by definition a group phenomenon and
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group identification an important factor in determining collective action we will elaborate on
the possible implications of group-based emotions on protest behavior.
The main postulate of intergroup emotion theory (as spelled out by Smith in 1993) is
that when a social identity is salient, situations are appraised in terms of their consequences for
that in-group, eliciting specific intergroup emotions and behavioral intentions. In three studies
Mackie et al. (2000) tested this idea. Participants’ group memberships were made salient and
the collective support enjoyed by the in-group was measured or manipulated. The authors then
measured anger and fear (Studies 1 and 2) and anger and contempt (Study 3), as well as the
desire to move against or away from the out-group. Participants who perceived the in-group as
strong were more likely to experience anger toward the out-group and to desire to take action
against it. Participants who perceived the in-group as weak on the other hand, were more likely
to experience fear and to move away from the out-group. The effects of perceived in-group
strength on offensive action tendencies were mediated by anger. Results of these three studies
confirm that when a collective identity is salient, appraisals of events in terms of consequences
for the salient in-group lead to specific emotional responses and action tendencies towards the
out-group.
Smith and colleagues investigated how identity predicted social emotions. Recent
studies address the role of social identification in a more explicit way (Dumont et al., 2003;
Gordijn et al., 2001; Yzerbyt et al., 2002). It is argued that “people can, under certain conditions
feel for the group, ‘I feel for us’ (Yzerbyt et al., 2003, p. 533), meaning that they are ‘connected
to others in such a way that they are likely to experience emotions even though they
themselves are not directly confronted with the triggering situation’ (p. 535).
These studies suggest that the same emotion processes (that is, appraisals, emotions
and action tendencies) operating at the individual level and in interpersonal situations operate
in intergroup situations. Moreover, people do experience emotions on behalf of their group
membership. Since intergroup emotion theory is based on the presumption that the group is
incorporated in the self (‘the group is in me’, thus ‘I feel for us’) one would assume that the
more the group is in me (that is, the higher the group identification) the more people
experience group-based emotions. Yzerbyt et al. (2003) showed that indeed emotional
reactions fully mediated the impact of categorization context and identification on action
tendencies. In other words, the salience of similarity was found to generate angry feelings
among participants only to the extent that they strongly identified with the relevant category.
Thus people will experience group-based emotions when the social category is salient and they
identify with the group at stake.
Appraisals, emotions, protest
A growing body of appraisal theories of emotions has emerged, each specifying a set of
appraisal dimensions in an attempt to better predict the elicitation and differentiation of
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emotions (see Roseman, Antoniou, & Jose, 1996 for a theoretical overview and integration).
Given the high degree of convergence between different appraisal theories we will depart from
the improved appraisal theory of Roseman and colleagues (1996), since this theory is an
evaluation, revision and integration of the till then proposed appraisal theories of emotions.
Roseman et al. (1996) intended to provide a systematic account of appraisal-emotion
relationships. It is systematic in that: (a) it specifies how a small number of appraisal
dimensions combine to elicit a large number of emotions; (b) it identifies the particular
emotions that result from all possible combinations of these appraisals; and (c) it shows how
these emotions are related to each other within an emotion system. The theory specifies which
emotions are closely related (for example, guilt and shame) and which are more distantly
related (for example, hope and pride); identifies families of related emotions whose eliciting
conditions differ in a single appraisal dimension; and predicts which changes in appraisal are
necessary to transform one felt emotion into any other.
Inspired by appraisal theory of emotion, we develop an ideal typical framework which
delineates how (group-based) appraisals of aspects in the socio-political environment result in
emotions of protest. Appraisals deemed important in the context of protest are: goal
facilitation /obstruction, control and responsibility. Appraisals of goal facilitation elicit positive
emotions while appraisals of goal obstruction elicit negative emotions. Emotions motivating
protest behavior are in all likelihood caused by events or situations perceived as goal
obstruction. Emotions experienced during protest activity, on the other hand may be goal
facilitative because participating in protest can be seen as a way “of saying something about
oneself and one’s morals, and of finding joy and pride in them” (Jasper, 1998, p. 415). However,
pessimistic protesters who are afraid that the protest activity won’t make any difference may
experience goal obstruction, and consequently feel frustrated rather than proud. The appraisal
of control refers to the comparison of one’s own power or control to the potency or
controllability of the stimulus. It refers to whether one could “do something about an event”
(Roseman et al. p. 262). Roseman et al. show that “it is not the ability to cope with an event,
but rather the perceived ability to control or do something about its goal incongruent aspects
that elicit an emotion which will contend with a situation (such as frustration or anger) rather
than an emotion which will accommodate to it (such as sadness)” (p. 262). An additional
appraisal important in the context of protest is responsibility. A situation can be caused
intentionally or unintentionally by the individual self, others or circumstances beyond human
control (Moors, 2010). The dimension of responsibility provides direction to what
circumstances or which actors are accountable for the harm or benefit that the situation poses.
We draw on concepts used within the social movement literature to translate these
appraisals into a framework predicting emotions in the context of protest. We argue that issues
or events may be appraised in terms of being facilitative or obstructive for collective goals. An
event or socio-political situation may facilitate citizens to pursue their interests and principles.
Events may also threaten citizens’ interests and principles and accordingly elicit appraisals of
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goal obstruction. These appraisals of goal facilitation and obstruction are visualized in the two
middle panels of Table 1. The right hand panel of Table 1 differentiates between appraisals of
control based on collective efficacy and political trust. Collective efficacy pertains to the shared
belief in the power to produce desired effects and forestall undesired ones. Collective efficacy
transcends individual political efficacy as it does not just reflect the agency of group members
but also an assessment of their combined strength (Bandura, 2000). The reasoning is as follows:
in the context of politics the more people have the idea that they can do something about an
event, the more efficacious they are. Additionally, the more trustworthy they regard their
political authorities, the more control they perceive to have through their political
representatives. The left hand panel, finally, differentiates between the attribution of
responsibility for the issue at stake. Threats to interests and principles, can be caused by
circumstances—take for instance a natural disaster—additionally the out-group can be hold
accountable or in case of self-blame the in-group is held responsible.
Table 1 identifies particular emotions that result from all possible combinations of these
appraisals and it reads as follows: austerity measures, for instance, obstructs the goal the
movement strives for (middle right panel), in case people attribute this goal obstruction to be
caused by circumstances―the global economic crises―and have the idea that they cannot do
anything about it, they will be fearful. However, if their coping potential is high―strong
efficaciousness and trust in politics―the situation is likely to elicit a sense of frustration. In case
austerity measures obstruct people’s collective goals―collective salary raise―but they hold an
out-group―
for
example
government―accountable
and
have
high
coping
potential―efficaciousness and trust in politics―they will be angry. In case of low coping
potential― weak efficaciousness―feelings of contempt arise. Anger is mainly observed in
normative actions were efficacious people protest. However, in non-normative violent actions
contempt appears to be the more relevant emotion (Fischer & Roseman, 2007; Tausch et al.,
2008).
This suggests two emotional routes to protest (cf. Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans,
2010): an anger route based on efficacy leading to lawful street demonstrations etc. and a
contempt route when legitimate channels are closed (Wright et al., 1990) and the situation is
seen as hopeless invoking a ‘nothing to lose’ strategy leading to more violent protest (Kamans
et al., 2011).
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Responsibility
Caused by
circumstances
Out-group
responsible
In-group responsible
Collective Goal
Facilitative
Obstructive
Hope, Joy, Relief
Solidarity
Pride
Fear, Sadness
Frustration
Contempt
Anger
Regret
Guilt, Shame
Coping potential
Low
High
Low
High
Low
High
Table 10.1 Protest emotions and their appraisals
Protest emotions and their action tendencies
In this section we identify the behavioral consequences of the emotions mentioned in Table 1.
Following Jasper (1997, p 127) we assume that emotions “give ideas, ideologies, identities and
even interests their power to motivate” and as such play a key role in the whole campaign.
Protest emotions thus function as accelerators or amplifiers. Accelerators make something
move faster, and amplifiers make something sound louder. In the world of protest
‘accelerating’ means that due to emotions motives to enter, stay or leave a social movement
translate into action faster, while ‘amplifying’ means that these motives are stronger. We
discuss emotions of protest along a chronological time line, that is, before, during and after
protest events. The implications of emotions and their action tendencies―to either impair of
fuel protest behavior―will be an important aspect of our discussion.
Prior to protest
Emotions prior to protest are mostly caused by goal obstruction, emotional responses
and the related action tendencies are further differentiated by appraisals of responsibility, that
is do people believe that the events is caused by circumstances, the out-group or the in-group?
If goal obstruction is attributed to circumstances, fear sadness and frustration are the most
likely emotions, however, when goal obstruction is attributed to the out-group, anger or
contempt will prevail, while in case the in-group is blamed, emotions as regret, guilt and shame
are expected.
Anger is deemed to be a pivotal emotion in the emotional constellation of protest
participants (Leach et al., 2006; Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2007; Van Stekelenburg &
Klandermans, 2010; van Zomeren et al., 2004). Anger is associated with the action tendency to
attack, it moves people to adopt a more challenging relationship with authorities than
subordinate emotions such as shame and despair (Taylor, 2009) or fear (Klandermans et al.,
2008). Anger motivates people to seek justice and retribution or revenge, and act against the
actor held responsible for their grievances (Smith & Lazarus, 1990). Precisely these action
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tendencies are important qualifiers in the context of protest, it will therefore not come as a
surprise that organizers do their utmost to evoke feelings of anger in their constituency.
Empirical evidence confirms this relationship. In Dutch street demonstrations, for instance,
anger amplified and accelerated motives to participate (Van Stekelenburg et al., 2011). In Spain,
subjects were asked whether they supported or rejected the negotiations of their government
with terrorist organisation ETA and how they felt about this. Angry participants were motivated
to participate in protest against this decision while those who were worried chose to not
participate (Sabucedo et al., 2011).
Anger, as experienced by protesters, is mainly observed in the context of actions that
conform to the norms of the existing social system (such as taking part in lawful
demonstration). In actions that violate existing social rules (such as illegal protests and violent
actions) contempt appears to be the more relevant emotion (Fischer & Roseman, 2007; Tausch
et al., 2008). During the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, public discussion in
the U.S. focused on the question ‘why do they hate us?’ (Ross, 2010). Violent action that
becomes so destructive is seen to indicate an intensity that transcends the experience of anger.
Or at least the amount of anger that is socially accepted to display in the common political
discourse (Ost, 2004). Different shades of anger become visible once the intensity of the
emotion increases and anger grows into bitterness and indignation and eventually moral
outrage, or hate (Shaver et al. 1987). In less intense forms, emotions such as anger and
contempt are likely to be nurtured by social movement organizations for their oppositional
action tendencies. These action tendencies are useful to counteract the inward and safety
seeking tendencies of emotions such as fear and anxiety or replace vulnerability, guilt or shame
(Flam, 2005, p. 26).
Appraisals of control also shape emotions prior to protest: people who perceive the ingroup as strong are more likely to experience anger and desire to take action; people who
perceive the in-group as weak are more likely to feel fearful and to move away from the outgroup (Devos et al., 2002; Klandermans et al., 2008). Fear is thought to be an emotion that
protesters need to overcome before they can participate in collective action (Flam, 2005).
Although this does not immediately prompt protest behaviour, fear can―under the right
conditions― persuade individuals to change their behaviour (Turner 2007; Witte and Allen
2000; Leach et al., 2006). One such condition is that organizers of protest successfully attribute
responsibility to the out-group rather than to circumstances. Hence, a natural disaster such as
the tsunami in Fukushima may evoke fear, however, as authorities are blamed for neglected
maintenance to the reactor, fear converts into anger. Another condition is when fear is
accompanied by high coping potentials. Aminzade and McAdam refer to such a condition. They
argue that even intense fear, in the face of extreme risks and seemingly no hope for payoff, can
motivate action (2002, p. 17). What is needed for this to occur is that fear is accompanied by
other emotions that have a high coping potential such as anger which will lead motives to
participate to prevail over motives to withdraw.
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Guilt, shame and regret are social emotions, intertwined with our attachment to other
in-group members. The action tendency of emotions like guilt and regret is to approach in an
effort to make amends. The action tendency associated with shame is to distance faults made
by an individual or his group in the past from the individual or his group at present (Fischer,
2010). These emotions are not likely to lead to protest, but are more likely to caution an
individual to not transgress social norms and values. People become motivated to correct their
own behaviour which indirectly yields them to prevent future transgression and thus change
the social situation. An example of the role these emotions play has been provided by Leach
and colleagues. Although individuals who were part of the dominant society in Australia
expressed guilt and shame in reaction to the suppression of aboriginals, it did not instigate a
strong willingness to engage into action on behalf of the aboriginals. Guilt and shame are
therefore considered as relatively weak predictors of willingness to act (Leach et al., 2006).
Perhaps because there are more suitable ways, than protesting, to show remorse over past
events, for instance the Truth and Reconciliation Commission as was initiated in South Africa
after the apartheid (Zebel et al., 2008).
During protest.
So far, we have discussed emotions resulting from goal obstruction, related to the contentious
issue and/or the out-group. When it concerns actual participating in protest “the focus of
attention becomes a mutual focus of attention” (Collins, 2001, p. 28). By the physical copresence of other participants, protesters realize that they are part of greater whole. “This is a
crucial process, the shared sense of a group as focusing together, that creates what Durkheim
called “conscience collective”, fusing cognitive, [emotional] and moral unity (Collins, 2001, p.
28). According to Collins there are two kinds of emotional transformations in collective
gatherings. One involves the amplification of the initiating emotion. The second kind involves
“the transmutation of the initiating emotion into something else: the emotion which arises out
of being entrained within a collective focus of attention” (p. 29). A successful collective
gathering of a social movement is a process of transforming emotions as anger into others as
hope, enthusiasm and solidarity.
Most people do not protest every day, on the other hand, protest activity can be quite a
powerful sometimes even transforming experience (Corrigall-Brown, 2012; McAdam, 1988).
Protest events offer a possibility for social movements to create or strengthen emotional bonds
between their adherents and to establish or strengthen a collective identity (Eyerman, 2005).
Collective identities are forged by solidarity. Solidarity forges bonds and a feeling of
togetherness; together we are stronger than the sum of our parts. Protesters who identify with
others involved, share the feeling of ‘we–ness’, ‘your problem, is my problem, is our problem’,
thus evoking solidarity. Bonds between movement members are likely to be strengthened by
the shared experiences leading to greater commitment to and solidarity within the group. In
terms of action tendency, solidarity instigates a need to come together and stay close to each
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other. Social movements aimed at affirmative action, foster feelings of solidarity amongst group
members.
The type of goal protesters strive for, influences how they feel about the event itself. If
the main motivation is identity based, protesters can be proud of ‘their’ in-group. Salvadorian
protesters were found to be proud of their in-group by asserting a ‘claim to dignity’ (Wood,
2001, p. 268). Ideologically motivated protesters may feel proud of themselves, as they stand
up for what they believe in. It could be a moment, so to speak, you tell your grandchildren you
were there. Instrumentally motivated protesters get exited if they see that the demonstration
attracts a large turnout which will help to pressure politicians and may bring the movement
closer to the realization of its goal. A protest event that unfolds as planned provides a sense of
accomplishment and instills pride or relief among group members. Successful events, however,
do not self-evidently equate to goal attainment. Activist meetings are therefore also organized
as a strategy to cope with frustrations regarding unrealized movement goals (Benski, 2011).
Expressing one’s emotion in public space is a way to visualise the size of the public
dismay to a wider audience (Eyerman, 2005, p. 48) perhaps in the hope of arousing sympathy
and respect from bystanders (Goodwin and Jasper, 2006, p. 623). The White March we referred
to earlier in this chapter had for many participants this purpose (Walgrave & Verhulst, 2004).
Expressing emotions may work as an individual catharsis. Raising one’s voice can be seen as
emotional coping in that it offers people the opportunity to regulate the emotions tied to the
social or political event (van Zomeren et al., 2004). Emotional display in a group environment
furthermore is helpful to achieve emotional reflexivity, identifying emotion, as people together
give meaning to ambiguous feelings (King, 2006; Rosenberg, 1990). Interestingly, this individual
emotional catharsis releases an energizing force if and only if one participates and therefore
makes free-riding less likely. Hence, one might take a free-ride on the production of a collective
good, but one cannot take a free-ride on one’s own emotions (Van Stekelenburg, 2012).
After protest
Literature addressing emotions of protest mainly focuses on the role of emotions in processes
of mobilization and participation―in other words, emotions as antecedent or byproducts of
protest. Emotions as consequences of protest, however, are an untouched area in the
literature. Yet, precisely in this aftermath of participation we may be able to find the answers to
one of the most intriguing questions in protest participation: that is the paradox of persistent
participation (Louis, 2009). Follow-up studies of New Left activists of the 1960s show important
biographical and personal consequences of social movement engagement on the later lives of
activists (McAdam 1988; Corrigall-Brown, 2012). Activists tend to continue to espouse leftist
attitudes, continue to define themselves as liberal or radical in orientation, and remain active in
contemporary movements and other forms of political activity. Indeed, activism frequently
persists despite pessimism and frustration regarding the action’s ostensible goals (Louis, 2009).
173
Why do people continue participating in protest even if it does not effectuate their demands?
And what role do emotions play in that context?
When the excitement has settled down protesters will have some time to reflect on
their collective efforts to bring about change. Disappointment and frustration about not
achieving collective goals, or from having unrealistic goals are debited as causes of activist
burn-out’s (Goodwin & Jasper, 2006). Despair about AIDS activism under depressive
circumstances was reported by Gould (2009) to result in conscious decisions to leave the
movement. Or alternatively, people switched to other causes within the larger movement that
seemed more attainable at the time. This emotion strategy avoided desperation about the
movement’s failure to reach its goals and by switching to other causes activists did not have to
face the guilt of giving up. Faced with disappointing results and without the energy to continue
some activists even reported bitter feelings. Gould notes that once despair and bitterness got
hold among a number of members it spread through the organisation and depleted its member
and their energies (Gould, 2009). These emotions provided information about how protesters
felt about themselves and their protest activities; their objections and anger were to no avail
and they blamed themselves rather than an out-group for their failure of not being taken
seriously (Campbell, 1994, p. 55).
Failure of movement organisations to reach a collective goal, however, does not mean
that the movement will always wither away. When individuals are angry about their failure, this
can still promote willingness to engage in future collective action (Becker et al., 2011).
Experimental results have strengthened the notion that progress instills pride among
movement members and pride therefore indirectly affects willingness to continue and stay
engaged. This relationship was found to be mediated by the perceived efficacy of the social
movement. Gould also strongly emphasizes the importance of feeling proud for a movement to
be able to move forward (2009). One of many examples that she gives in her book on Act Up,
the social movement organization fighting against AIDS, for instance refers to a movement
communiqué which states ‘We as an entire community can be proud… of the cooperation
within all segments of the gay and lesbian community’ (Gould, 2009, p.69). In fact, organizers of
protest will always attempt to claim a success, after all, to provide their activists with a strong
and positive group identification. Success breeds success, for social movements alike.
Discussion
We provided a framework of appraisals of protest emotions and elaborated this framework on
emotions before, during and after protest. In what follows we will discuss where we think the
lacunas are. We will mention a few and there might be more. Probably, the most important
challenge is to integrate emotions in contemporary theoretical paradigms of protest. Neglect of
emotions impairs our understanding of the dynamics of protest, which, first of all, leads to
scientific misinterpretation. Indeed, emotions might be more important than cost/benefit
calculations. In that regard, moving from static to more dynamic explanations of emotions in
174
the context of protest participation is important. A more dynamic integrated approach would
provide the opportunity to study emotions in relation to concepts like identification,
participation motives, efficacy, and feelings arising from a sense of injustice as antecedent, byproducts and consequence of protest.
Secondly, the relation between individual and collective emotion processes is begging
for exploration. Take for instance, socially shared cognitions, group-based emotions, contagion,
or emotional resonance. The idea that emotional reactions are strongly affected by social
factors, and that emotions can be examined at the group level in addition to the individual level
has gained wide acceptance in the last decade. We described various studies that have shown
that individuals make group-based appraisals resulting in group-based emotions. Additionally,
previous research has shown that emotional contagion more readily occurs between individuals
with strong and intimate bonds. Emotional contagion may therefore explain the increase of
emotions within a group. But what about emotional contagion in intergroup conflicts? Are both
in- and out-group related emotions dispersed via emotional contagion? Or just in-group related
emotions? How individual and collective emotion processes relate to each other and influence
protest behaviour is far from clear.
Social movement organizations work hard to design collective action frames that touch
upon already existing concerns among potential participants, thereby strengthening their
concerns and instigating action tendencies. This process is referred to as frame alignment
(Snow et al., 1986). Whether frame alignment is done successfully can be concluded from the
degree in which a frame actually resonates with pre-existing belief systems and symbolism and
evokes shared emotions thereby gaining significance among the audience (Cadena-Roa, 2002;
Snow & Benford, 1988). Snow and Benford speak of frame resonance when there is cognitive
alignment between a movement’s ideology and the beliefs of an adherent (Snow & Benford,
1988). But there is more to frame alignment, frames are “value-loaded”, and supposedly evoke
emotions (Gamson, 1992) as frames generally work only when they have an emotional impact
on people (Goodwin et al., 2000). Research of the emotional appeals made by Social Movement
Organizations is scarce. Scholars who have examined this aspect of framing introduced the term
emotional resonance to refer to the emotional alignment between a movements ideology and
the emotional lives of a potential recruit (Robnett, 2004; Schrock et el., 2004).
Emotions permeate protest at all stages: recruitment, sustained participation and dropping out
(Jasper, 1998). However, the literature focuses mainly on the motivating power of emotions to
enter the movement or to participate in protest. We suggest to investigate the motivational
power of emotions at different moments during an activist career (that is, a life course
perspective). This could be examined by conducting a comparative longitudinal field study
among movement members. People move, for instance, from indifference to sympathizer, from
sympathizer to member, from passive to active member, or leave the organization. It is
expected that different (group-based) emotions spur the motivation to move from one stage to
another. Moral indignation, for instance, spurs entering a social movement, whereas solidarity
175
or hope might be the emotional glue to stay in a movement, and, feelings of disappointment or
regret might make people decide to quit.
Studies on ‘exiting’ and emotions remain scant. Investigating the process of leaving an
organization and the influence of emotions on such a decision, is a process that would benefit
from a longitudinal study. A point of interest could be the interaction between a general
movement decline with consequential attrition among members and the individual process of
disengagement, what emotions influence disengagement and which emotions make people
stay in abeyance? Movement decline is often characterized by despair (Gould, 2009). Because
member attrition is a known risk for the longevity of social movement organizations, emotion
work within movements is geared toward keeping people in good spirits when facing defeat.
Despair can however also lead groups to pursue a different strategy. Powerless movements in
dire circumstances use confrontational—sometimes radical―strategies because members will
feel they have nothing to lose in the confrontation (Kamans, 2010). Contempt plays a role in
those transitions from conventional to radical strategies (Kaman et al. 2011). Individual
disengagement can be explained through a decrease in affective commitment because a
relationship between member and movement is no longer gratifying. Summers Effler (2010)
noted that emotional bonds harness members against negative feelings over failure to achieve
collective goals. Frustrations over the efficacy of the movement can be overcome if social and
emotional bonds between members are maintained to generate joy and support. However if
these benefits (versus costs) of participation wane participation loses its appeal (Klandermans,
1997). This can trigger a further process of emotional disengagement as indication that a
member is no longer committed resulting in movement exit.
In sum, we see a future for a systematic dynamic approach to emotions of protest
exploring both individual as well as collective processes in how emotions affect social
movement participation that goes beyond a static individual level of analysis. All stages of social
movement participation are pervaded by emotions. Knowledge about the influence of
emotions on political behavior will provide a more complete, and accordingly, more accurate
picture of the reality of political protest.
176
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Note
1
Cf. The Spanish Indignados who claim Democracia real ya!
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