I negate.
The resolution is a truth statement question of moral permissibility, thus the value is morality. Without
limits on the extent of when a soldier stops being a soldier and becomes a civilian, we cannot say with
conviction what is ethically correct.
Labossiere1 says:
the general principle that it is morally acceptable to target and kill bad people
seems to be morally and practically problematic. This sort of principle would seem to take us
back to the state of nature (to be philosophical about it) or to the mythical Wild West (to be dramatic about it) and does
not seem to be one that should be adopted within the context of civilization. After all, one
key distinction between civilization and the state of nature is that civilization has a system of
law rather than mere vigilantism.
On the face of it,
One obvious reply is that Bin Laden was operating outside of civilization and had, in Lockean terms, placed himself into a state of war with the
United States and other countries. On this view, Bin Laden can be regarded as an enemy combatant (and hence a legitimate target under the
ethics of war).
The enemy combatant approach does have considerable appeal. After all, Bin Laden certainly seemed to regard himself as engaged in a war
If killing in war is morally
acceptable, then it would seem to follow that the killing of Bin Laden was morally acceptable.
Killing him would be on par with killing any other soldier on the field of battle.
with the United States and the United States certainly seemed to accept this state of war as well.
It might,
however, be contended that Bin Laden was not killed while on the field of battle. Rather, his
home was invaded and he was shot to death within its walls. If this is morally justified as an
act of war, then presumably it would be morally acceptable for Qaddafi to order hit squads to
kill NATO soldiers and leaders in their homes in America, France, the UK, and so on. However,
the general principle that it is acceptable to send hit teams to kill soldiers at home seems to
morally questionable, at least. After all, it would seem to erase the distinction between the
soldier acting in the role of a soldier in war (which would make him/her a legitimate target)
and the soldier as a person living his/her life outside of the domain of war.
In reply, it might be argued that the sort of war being waged by and against Bin Laden admits of no such distinction. Combatants are always
The idea that everyone is a legitimate target is, of
course, a common tenet of the terrorist and there seems to be a certain justice in applying
their own principle to them. Of course the terrorists are supposed to be evil largely because
they do not make such distinctions and hence accepting this principle as justifying the killing
of Bin Laden comes with a moral risk.
combatants, even when at home, and hence legitimate targets.
This risk can be offset by arguing that there is no need to accept the terrorist’s lack of distinction. Rather, it can be argued that the terrorist’s
failure to accept the distinction means that they themselves are in a constant state of being combatants. As such, they are always legitimate
1
Mike Labossiere, Prof. of Philosophy at Florida A&M University, “Targeted Killing” from Talking Philosophy Blog,
2011
targets because they are always on the field of battle. Combatants that do make such distinctions (and follow them) are entitled to also be
treated with such distinctions and, as such, targeted killings of such soldiers at home would be murder rather than acts of war. As such, killing
Bin Laden at home would be justified.
Furthermore, targeted killing causes collateral damage that cannot be justified. Morality necessitates
respecting human dignity.
Sulmasy2 says:
Consistency is at least a necessary condition of a valid moral argument,
even if one would quickly add that consistency is not sufficient. In discussions about its fundamental moral
meaning, the word ‘dignity’ can be defined as the value or worth that a human being has either:
(a) in terms of some property, or (b) in terms of simply being human. I will show, however, that defining the
fundamental moral meaning of dignity as the value human beings have by virtue of their
possession of any particular candidate property leads to gross inconsistencies in our
universally shared, settled moral positions. Therefore, one is led to the alternative: that
dignity, in its fundamental moral sense, is defined in terms of simply being human. This kind
of argument depends on the exhaustiveness of the list of candidate properties and is not decisive. But at least it puts the burden
of proof on those who oppose assigning moral priority to the intrinsic sense of dignity to
come up with an alternative property (such as age, size, or IQ) to define fundamental human
worth or value.
The argument is simple in its form.
Thus, the standard is protecting innocent life.
I contend that targeted killings cause unnecessary loss of innocent life. It is immoral to kill innocents in
so-called “self-defense.”
Murphy3 says:
What I suggest is the following: If
one believes (as I do) that the only even remotely plausible justification for
war is self-defense, then one must in waging war confine one's hostility to those against
whom one is defending oneself, i.e., those in the (both causal and logical) chain of command or
responsibility or agency, all those who can reasonably be regarded as engaged in an attempt to
destroy you. If one does not do this, then one cannot be said merely to be defending oneself.
2
Daniel P. Sulmasy, “Human Dignity and Human Worth” in “Perspectives on Human Dignity: A
Conversation.” 2007
3
Jeffrie G. Murphy, Regents' Professor of Law & Philosophy at the Arizona State University
College of Law, The Monist, Vol. 57, No. 4 (1973).
http://www.ditext.com/murphy/innocent.html
And insofar as one is not defending oneself, then one acts immorally in killing one's fellow
human beings. The enemy can plausibly be expanded to include all those who are "criminal" accomplices -- those who, in Judge
Learned Hand's phrase, have a "stake in the venture."14 But it cannot be expanded to include all those who, like
farmers, merely perform actions causally necessary for the attack -- just as in domestic law I
cannot plead self-defense if I kill the one (e.g., the wife or mother) who feeds the man who is engaged
in an attempt to kill me.
Thus, I negate.