Cuba---Condition Shell 1NC Cuba Condition CP Text: The United States federal government should _________ if, and only if, Cuba agrees to release Alan Gross. Solvency QPQ on economic engagement for Gross’s release solves Piccone 12/10/12 – (Ted, “WHAT ROLES FOR FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE NEW CUBAN ECONOMY?” The Brookings Institute, Senior Fellow and Deputy Director, Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institute, Available online @ http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/events/2012/12/10%20cuba/20121210_cuban_ec onomy.pdf) SPEAKER: Thank you. Back to the stalemate in which we now find ¶ ourselves with the Alan Gross case. There is growing pressure on Cuba to release Alan ¶ Gross. And good; we all want to see him released. But there’s going to have to be some ¶ kind of quid pro quo . And of course, not the Cuban 5 for Alan Gross; that’s not going to ¶ work. But what about some kind of economic arrangement that the U.S. would come up ¶ with to facilitate engagement as the quid pro quo? They want to increase trade, ¶ economic relations with us, and this would work in that direction. Isn’t there some -- so ¶ far it’s really disappointing with the United States insisting that Alan Gross be released or ¶ there won’t be any movement, there won’t be any improvement in U.S.-Cuban relations. ¶ But you don’t see the United States making any effort to come up with some quid pro ¶ quo , some arrangement that would lead to his release. We need to do that, but we can ¶ do it in such a way that would facilitate economic relations between the two , if would ¶ seem to me. ¶ MR. FEINBERG: Yeah, terrific questions all around. Maybe I’ll leave it ¶ to Ted to mainly handle the Alan Gross question Conditioning engagement on Gross release ensures strong bilateral relations Herrero 12/27/12 – (Ricardo, “Getting Serious about Alan Gross” The Huffington Post, Ricardo Herrero is Deputy Executive Director of the Cuba Study Group, Available online @ http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ricardo-herrero/getting-serious-aboutala_b_2370767.html) Earlier this month, USAID subcontractor Alan Gross began his fourth year in a Cuban prison. Ever since his incarceration, a debate has raged over whether the United States should halt further efforts to engage with the Cuban people until the Cuban government releases Gross. Both Alan and his wife Judy have repeatedly called on the U.S. and Cuba to engage in a dialogue without preconditions. Sadly, like all things Cuba-related, the debate over Gross' incarceration has since devolved into an ideological three-ring circus where finding a solution has become a secondary objective behind not appearing to be making concessions to the enemy.¶ The Washington Post perfectly captured the tone deafness of the current debate in a recent editorial: " better relations between Cuba and the United States must be conditioned on real steps toward democratization by Havana. But until Mr. Gross is release d, they ought to get worse." This position reflects exactly the sort of stale, inside-the-box thinking that has long plagued the discourse over U.S.-Cuba policy.¶ For years we've known that the Cuban government is incredibly adept at manipulating U.S. policy choices. Time and again, any attempt by the U.S. to increase its engagement with the Cuban people has been met with confrontation and repression by Cuban officials, which in turn emboldens hardliners in the U.S. to call for the tightening economic sanctions. This pattern has become all too predictable, and the Gross case is its latest example: arrested in Havana for bringing communication devices to the island less than three months after President Obama relaxed family travel and remittance restrictions in 2009 and only two weeks after the U.S. House held hearings on lifting the Cuba travel ban for all Americans. In response to Gross' arrest, U.S. hardliners blocked any further normalization efforts in Congress, though they weren't able to stop the Obama Administration from further loosening restrictions on people-to-people travel and remittances in January, 2011. Shortly thereafter, Gross was sentenced to 15 years in prison.¶ Secretary of State Hillary Clinton once said "It is my personal belief that the Castros do not want to see an end to the embargo and do not want to see normalization with the United States, because they would lose all of their excuses for what hasn't happened in Cuba in the last 50 years." If we believe this to be the case, then why don't we use this insight to steer our efforts in securing the release of Alan Gross?¶ The Cubans have often stated that they are willing to swap Gross for five Cuban spies who were arrested in Florida in 1998 for infiltrating a U.S. Navy base and several anti-Castro groups in Miami. The U.S. has refused to accept the swap, and the negotiations have remained stalled for almost three years.¶ So what can be done? There are three opportunities for securing Gross' release that could also help improve relations between the U.S. and Cuba:¶ 1. Introduce alternative terms to the negotiation. The Cubans have dictated the terms of the negotiation from day one, and hardliners in the U.S. government have seemingly been too happy to play along. However, just because the U.S. won't agree to the spy swap doesn't mean negotiations should stop there. U.S. sanctions on Cuba remain a decades-old morass of congressional actions, presidential directives and executive orders, resulting in an entrenched and inflexible foreign policy that is as incoherent as it is ineffective. There are plenty of outdated sanctions on the books that the United States could repeal or amend in exchange for Gross' release .¶ 2. Pursue Gross' release and economic engagement concurrently. In 2011, the Obama Administration announced a shift in the focus of U.S.-Cuba policy toward empowering civil society and supporting independent economic activity. If Cuba's burgeoning private sector is to grow into a viable alternative to the Island's top-down economic system, it will need a deeper economic relationship with the American private sector. By conditioning all further efforts to engage with the Cuban people on Gross' release , we are playing by the rules of those who benefit from the prolonged confrontation and mutual isolation between the two countries. Denying these private individuals an economic relationship with the United States only serves to further delay the kind of changes that policies like Helms-Burton were ill-designed to accelerate.¶ 3. Look to the Angel Carromero case as a model. We don't know what deal the Spanish government struck with the Cubans to secure the release of Angel Carromero, the Popular Party's pro-democracy activist who was charged with the negligent homicide of Oswaldo Payá and Harold Cepero and will now serve his sentence in Spain. What is clear is that through direct diplomacy, the Spanish have been far more successful at liberating political prisoners, democracy advocates, and businessmen from Cuban jails than any other country, all while promoting democracy inside the island through direct support to pro-democracy groups. On the other hand, our confrontational approach has only perpetuated the conflict without any progress to show for it.¶ The United Nations recently condemned Cuba's arbitrary detention of Alan Gross for the first time and the U.S. Embargo on Cuba for the 21st year in a row. By pivoting negotiations for Gross's release away from a spy-swap and toward win-win alternatives, both the United States and Cuba stand to gain credibility within the international community. The United States could finally pave the road to a future where it can lead an effective multilateral policy toward Cuba focused on the advancement of human rights and helping the Cuban people. Just as importantly, Alan would finally come home. Conditioning the bill on Gross release is best Rush 5/9/13 – (Bobby, “RUSH REINTRODUCES LEGISLATION URGING CONGRESS TO LIFT TRADE EMBARGO ON CUBA” House.gov, Bobby Rush is a current Congressman, Available online @ http://rush.house.gov/pressrelease/thursday-may-9-2013-rush-reintroduces-legislation-urging-congress-lift-tradeembargo) Congressman Bobby L. Rush reintroduced legislation to lift trade restrictions on Cuba. Improved U.S. relations with Cuba have been a longtime goal of Congressman Rush and this legislation follows in the footsteps of the United States-Cuba Trade Normalization Act that he initially introduced in 2009. ¶ Specifically, Rush’s current legislation lifts the embargo, travel and parcel restrictions, normalizes trade relations, and removes Cuba from the State Department’s State Sponsors of Terrorism list. The key component of Rush’s bill calls for the release of Alan Phillip Gross , a U.S. international development professional arrested in Cuba in December 2009, and makes implementation of this legislation contingent on the Cuba governments compliance.¶ “Lifting the trade embargo with Cuba is long overdue,” said Rush. “Cuba has a rich history and is a close neighboring country that offers access to cultural growth and learning for many Americans. We have shut the door on our two nations coming together to work to build a strong alliance. Cuba is no longer a threat to the United States and the continuation of the embargo on trade between the two countries declared in 1962 is not fulfilling the purpose for which it was established. We are the only nation in the Western Hemisphere that still maintains an embargo and its removal is long overdue.”¶ Rush’s bill asks for a major point of contention between the countries to come to end by asking for the release of Alan Phillip Gross . Gross was arrested while in Cuba working as a U.S. government subcontractor for the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) as part of a program funded under the 1996 Helms-Burton Act. He was prosecuted in 2011 after being accused of crimes against the Cuban state for bringing satellite phones and computer equipment to members of Cuba’s Jewish community without the permit required under Cuban law. After being accused of working for American intelligence services in January 2010, he was ultimately convicted for “acts against the independence or the territorial integrity of the state" in March 2011, and is currently serving a 15-year prison sentence in Cuba AT: Aff Args Say Yes Increased pressure and QPQ means Cuba caves in Piccone 12/10/12 – (Ted, “WHAT ROLES FOR FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE NEW CUBAN ECONOMY?” The Brookings Institute, Senior Fellow and Deputy Director, Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institute, Available online @ http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/events/2012/12/10%20cuba/20121210_cuban_ec onomy.pdf) On the negative sides, pretty much since then any further progress has ¶ been frozen largely because of the arrest of a USAID contractor named Alan Gross -- I’m ¶ sure you’ve heard of this case -- which is getting a tremendous amount of attention lately. ¶ And I don’t know if anyone has been noticing, but the U.S. Senate just adopted a ¶ resolution condemning the arrest, calling for his immediate release. Secretary Clinton ¶ has just issued a videotape Q&A in which she calls Alan Gross a political prisoner. The ¶ U.N. working group on arbitrary detention has declared the detention of Alan Gross to be ¶ arbitrary and that he should be released. And folks here in Washington, particularly on ¶ the Hill who were moderately open or friends of a new approach to Cuba, are starting to ¶ turn away from that position. And so I think the pressure is really on Cuba to start looking ¶ differently at this case. ¶ Up until now it’s been a matter of trying to get a swap going with five ¶ Cubans who were arrested in the United States and tried on espionage charges and ¶ have in some of those cases very long prison terms still to serve. And this has been ¶ tabled for some time now as a possible exchange, which I think for most of us who have ¶ worked in the U.S. government and understand the way our legal system works, it’s really ¶ not in the cards. And Secretary Clinton made that very clear in her last interview. CUBA-2012/12/10 ¶ ANDERSON COURT REPORTING ¶ 706 Duke Street, Suite 100 ¶ Alexandria, VA 22314 ¶ Phone (703) 519-7180 Fax (703) 519-7190 ¶ 25¶ So I think the pressure is on to come up with some new formulas to get ¶ past this case. I think both governments recognize that they’ve dug themselves into a ¶ hole , painted themselves into a corner and need to get out of it, and the economic ¶ opportunities probably provide a way out of this dilemma because I think if you look at it ¶ from the point of view of traditional U.S. policy of trying to support change in Cuba, the ¶ economic reforms are really an effort, a possibility to empower the Cuban people to ¶ become more independent of the state. And this is certainly within U.S. interest, ¶ proclaimed interest. ¶ So I think there is an opportunity given the state of the Cuban economy ¶ and the assistance that they need, and the United States’ own policy goals in supporting ¶ the Cuban people, to set forth a whole set of steps that the president could take under his ¶ executive authority, would not require congressional action but would allow the president ¶ to set forth a number of measures, for example, supporting the small business ¶ community by allowing U.S. businesses and citizens to interact with them directly through ¶ technical assistance, through pooled remittances, through actual trade that we could buy ¶ products from companies, small businesses that are certified to be small businesses ¶ independent of the state. There are a number of things that could be done to support ¶ that sector and have ramifications more broadly for -- positive ramifications for our policy ¶ goals. So I wanted to mention those ideas as well. Cuba will say yes to the condition Sweig 2/28/12 – (Julia, “The Frozen US-Cuba Relationship” Nelson and David Rockefeller Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies and Director for Latin America Studies, Council on Foreign Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, Available online @ http://www.cfr.org/cuba/frozen-us-cuba-relationship/p27510) Fifty years after the United States enacted an embargo on all trade and commercial transactions with Cuba, relations between the two countries remain at a standstill. Julia E. Sweig, CFR's director of Latin American studies, says the Obama administration has prioritized domestic politics over foreign policy in its relationship with Cuba, even as Cuban President Raul Castro has been "moving in the direction of the kind of reforms that every administration over the last fifty years has called upon Cuba to make." The case of American USAID contractor Alan Gross, currently serving a fifteen-year prison sentence in Cuba (CubanTriangle) on charges of attempting to upend the regime through a U.S.-authorized democracy promotion program, has also heightened tensions, she says. Meanwhile, Sweig adds, Cuba is strengthening ties with global powers like Brazil, as well as the Catholic Church, as the Castro administration seeks to open up new economic and social spaces for its citizens.¶ We've passed the fifty-year mark of the breakdown of diplomatic ties between Cuba and the United States. Where do we stand now? Is normalizing relations even remotely on the table on either side?¶ Let me start by talking about three geographical points on the map that are relevant to the answer. In Washington, the Obama administration, consistent with the approach of the Bush administration, has made a political decision to subordinate foreign policy and national interest-based decisions to domestic politics with respect to its Cuba policy. There is a bipartisan group of members of Congress--Democrats and Republicans, House and Senate--who represent Florida, a state where there are many swing votes that deliver the electoral votes for any president. Those individuals not only deliver votes, but they deliver campaign finance, and generally make a lot of noise, and that combination has persuaded the White House that reelection is more of a priority than taking on the heavy lifting to set the United States on the path of normalization with Cuba for now.¶ "Brazil is clearly stepping into a space where the United States should be, and the United States has made a decision to watch as that happens."¶ The second point is what's happening in Cuba. It's not realistic to expect the United States to undertake a series of unilateral moves toward normalization; it needs a willing partner . I believe we have one in Havana but have failed to read the signals . Raul Castro has now been in office since the beginning of 2008. Raul holds the reins on both foreign policy and domestic policy, and, domestically, the politics of implementing a fairly wide range of economic and political and social reforms are his priority. In a deal that was coordinated with the help of the Cuban Catholic Church and Spain, he released all of the political prisoners in Cuba. He also is taking a number of steps that imply a major rewriting of the social contract in Cuba to shrink the size of the state and give Cuban individuals more freedom-economically, especially, but also in terms of speech--than we've seen in the last fifty years. He has privatized the residential real estate and car market[s], expanded much-needed agrarian reform, lifted caps on salaries, and greatly expanded space for small businesses. He also is moving to deal with corruption and to prepare the groundwork for a great deal more foreign investment. He's moving in the direction of the kind of reforms that every administration over the last fifty years has called upon Cuba to make, albeit under the rubric of a one-party system. There's a broad range of cooperation-neighborhood security in the Gulf of Mexico, as Cuba has just started drilling for oil, counternarcotics, and natural disasters--between the two countries that is still not happening, and that gives me the impression that the United States has been unwilling to take "yes" for an answer and respond positively to steps taken by Cuba .¶ The third geographic part of the story is south Florida. When they're polled, the majority of Cuban-Americans say that the embargo has failed, and support lifting the travel ban or loosening the embargo or some steps along that continuum of liberalization and normalization. The one most significant step that Obama did take when he took office was to eliminate the restriction on Cuban-American travel and remittances to Cuba. CubanAmericans are now voting with their feet. If you go to the Miami airport, you will see thirty, forty flights to Cuba a week just out of Miami. Cuban-Americans are now investing in their families' small businesses on the island. The politics of this are strange because we are told by the Obama administration that we can't rock the boat of the Cuban-American vote, but those very voters are in fact demonstrating that they support a radically different set of policies than, in fact, the Obama administration has supported.¶ The ongoing case of USAID contractor Alan Gross (AP) has stoked tensions between the United States and Cuba. At the heart of the matter is the U.S. democracy promotion program that authorized Gross' travel to Cuba. What impact does this case have on U.S.-Cuba relations?¶ Precisely because we have no overarching framework for diplomacy in place and no political will to establish it for now, the Alan Gross case casts a huge shadow over U.S.-Cuban relations . The heart of the issue is the context in which those [pro-democracy] programs were being implemented. We have a full-blown economic embargo with extra-territorial dimensions that are felt in the banking and finance world--a very comprehensive and well-enforced sanctions program. The democracy programs sound very mom and apple pie--USAID has them around the world, its officials will tell you. But having them in Cuba is an extraordinary provocation. They were inherited from the previous administration's concept of regime change, and under Obama, they remain largely intact. The programs are purposely kept secret from the American public. There is no public information about the private and not-for-profit subcontractors in the United States and around the world, and Cuban institutions and individuals who may be targets of the programs are likewise not told they are part of such U.S. government programs. The democracy promotion programs have been deliberately politicized in order to provoke, and they have succeeded in provoking.¶ What's key is the context. There's been no real diplomacy; there's no negotiating framework that I've seen for a very long period of time, and again, that has to do with domestic politics. It's very hard to understand otherwise why this guy's still in jail. The United States has repeatedly asked the Cuban government to release Gross unilaterally, with no commitments on our end. Asking for unilateral gestures, having rebuffed or ignored or failed to read the signals from Cuba, has created this impasse. Having said that, there can be a diplomatic, humanitarian solution, and I see no value to keeping Gross in jail and hope he will be released as soon as possible. But we will need real diplomacy and a framework for negotiating a range of issues both countries care about. Give-and-Take approach means Cuba says yes CBS 2/24/13 – (Associated Press, “Senator: `Give And Take’ Needed To Free Md. Prisoner In Cuba” Available online @ http://baltimore.cbslocal.com/2013/02/24/senator-give-and-take-needed-to-free-mdprisoner-in-cuba/ ) WASHINGTON (AP) — A senator just back from Cuba says it will require “give and take on both sides” and “quiet negotiation” to secure the release of an American man imprisoned in Cuba.¶ it’s time to re-examine the overall U.S.Cuban relationship and move on from the “Cold War mentality” of the 1960s and 1970s.¶ Leahy met last week with Gross and raised his case during a meeting that a congressional delegation had with Cuban President Raul Castro.¶ Gross, who’s from Maryland, is serving a 15-year-sentence for bringing communications Democratic Sen. Patrick Leahy of Vermont says that Alan Gross isn’t going to be released by the Cuban government because of pressure from the United States.¶ Leahy tells CNN’s “State of the Union” that equipment to the island illegally while on a USAID-funded democracy-building program. Cuba has agreed to free Gross in return for economic programs in the past, but the US pulled out at the last minute Tamayo 1/7/13 – (Juan, “Sen. John Kerry reportedly met with Cuban officials over Alan Gross” McClatchy News, Available online @ http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/01/07/179138/sen-john-kerry-reportedlymet.html#.Udh4Zvm1Fsk) Sen. John Kerry, nominated as the next secretary of state, held a secret meeting with Cuba’s foreign minister in 2010 in a failed bid to win the release of jailed USAID subcontractor Alan Gross, according to a published report.¶ A senior state department official also met in secret with Foreign Minister Bruno Rodríguez to discuss the Gross case, but the foreign minister lectured the U.S. official for an hour, added the report in the respected magazine Foreign Affairs.¶ José Cardenas, a former top official at the U.S. Agency for International Development, wrote that the article amounted to a “lesson on the folly of attempting to appease dictators.”¶ A knowledgeable Senate aide also challenged the article’s description of the role that Fulton Armstrong, a senior staffer in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and former CIA analyst, played in the campaign to free Gross.¶ Gross was arrested in Havana in late 2009 and sentenced to 15 years for giving Cuban Jews sophisticated communications equipment paid for by USAID’s “prodemocracy” programs, outlawed by Cuba as designed to bring about “regime change.” His continued detention has been a key block in efforts to improve U.S.-Cuba relations.¶ The report authored by R.M Schneiderman, an editor at Newsweek, includes previously unknown details of a U.S. effort to win Gross’ freedom by cutting back funding for the pro-democracy programs and making them less provocative to Cuba.¶ In September of 2010, Spanish government officials helped arrange a secret meeting between thenAssistant Secretary of State Arturo Valenzuela and Rodríguez to discuss a possible release of Gross, according to Schneiderman.¶ “The Cubans were far less flexible than the Americans expected. The U.S. … wanted Cuba to release Gross, and only then would it press ahead on any other policy changes,” he wrote. “Rodríguez allegedly lectured Valenzuela for roughly an hour on Cuba’s history of grievances.”¶ A month later, at the request of Cuban diplomats in Washington and with State Department approval, Kerry met with Rodríguez at the home of Cuba’s ambassador to the United Nations in New York, according to the report.¶ “There was no quid pro quo, but the meeting seemed to reassure the Cubans that the democracy programs would change, and the Cubans expressed confidence” that Gross would be freed after his trial, which was held in March of 2011, the report noted.¶ President Barack Obama has nominated Kerry, a Massachusetts Democrat and backer of improving relations with Cuba, to succeed Hillary Clinton. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which Kerry chairs, is expected to easily approve the nomination.¶ Schneiderman wrote that in early 2010, the State Department and USAID asked Armstrong, who had long criticized the programs as inefficient and wasteful, to help them make the programs less offensive to Havana — hoping Cuba might then free Gross.¶ And that summer, “at State’s behest,” Armstrong began meeting with officials at the Cuban diplomatic mission in Washington to tell them about the changes that were being made to the programs, Schneiderman wrote.¶ “We said, ‘Look, message received,’ ” he quoted Armstrong as saying. “‘These [programs] are stupid. We’re cleaning them up. Just give us time, because politically we can’t kill them.’” The Cubans seemed appreciative. “We asked them, ‘ Will this help you release Alan Gross?’ ” Armstrong went on. “And the answer was yes .’”¶ But Sen. Bob Menendez, a powerful Cuban American Democrat from New Jersey, stepped in to defend the programs in the spring of 2011 and persuaded the White House to roll back most of the changes, Schneiderman wrote.¶ Havana grew chary at the same time , he added, as Raúl Castro faced domestic opposition to his economic reforms and a U.S. jury acquitted Luis Posada Carriles, a Cuban exile blamed for several Havana bombings, of lying to U.S. immigration officials.¶ “Mired in mistrust and miscalculation, each side seemed to be waiting for the other to blink,” he wrote. “Eventually, however, the United States appeared to step back from an opportunity to free Gross from jail and strike a blow against the antiquated politics of the Cold War … The Cuban-American lobby had won.” Cuba will say yes to a QPQ AP 9/12/12 – (“Cuba prepared to negotiate fate of jailed American Alan Gross” Fox News, Written by the Associated Press, Available online @ http://www.foxnews.com/world/2012/09/12/cuba-prepared-to-negotiate-fate-jailedamerican-alan-gross/) HAVANA – A senior Cuban diplomat said Wednesday her country is prepared to negotiate a solution in the case of a jailed American contractor, but is awaiting a U.S. response.¶ Foreign Ministry official Josefina Vidal also rejected allegations by the wife of 63-year-old Maryland native Alan Gross that her husband's health is failing after more than 2 1/2 years in custody.¶ "Cuba reiterates its willingness to talk with the United States government to find a solution in the case of Mr. Gross and continues to await an answer," Vidal, who heads the ministry's Office of North American Affairs, said in a statement sent to The Associated Press.¶ She gave no details. It was the first time a Cuban official has hinted that a specific proposal has been made and indicated that the ball was in Washington's court.¶ Previously, senior officials in President Raul Castro's government have raised the case of five Cuban agents sentenced to long jail terms in the United States, though they have not spelled out publicly that they are seeking an exchange.¶ U.S. officials say privately, however, that Havana has made it increasingly clear they want a quid pro quo, something Washington has repeatedly rejected.¶ Gross's wife, Judy, traveled to Cuba and visited her husband in custody several times last week. She said upon her return to the United States that she feared he would not survive his ordeal.¶ Gross, who was obese when he was arrested in December 2009, has lost more than 100 pounds in custody. His wife and lawyer say he also suffers from arthritis and has developed a mass behind his right shoulder blade that is not believed to be cancerous.¶ Vidal said the American's physical condition is fine.¶ "Mr. Gross's health continues to be normal and he exercises regularly," she said in the brief statement.¶ Gross was working on a USAID-funded democracy building program when he was arrested at Havana's Jose Marti airport. He says he was only trying to provide internet service to the island's small Jewish community.¶ Cuba says the multimillion dollar programs are an effort by Washington to undermine the government, and has noted that Gross was carrying sophisticated communications equipment.¶ Gross was sentenced to 15 years, and has lost his final appeal, leaving him out of legal options. AT: Perm Both Unilateral engagement makes Cuba unwilling to compromise Latell 4/28/9 – (Brian, “Beware of Unilateral Concessions” CIA National Intelligence Officer of Latin America, Available online @ http://www.capitolhillcubans.com/2009/04/beware-of-unilateral-concessions.html) observation from the CIA's former National Intelligence Officer for Latin America, Brian Latell, in today's Miami Herald:¶ ¶ Regional demands for the end of the U.S. economic embargo, readmission of Cuba to the OAS and an end to the years of hostility have become deafening. Innumerable calls have also been heard from leading members of Congress, influential Washington think tanks and commentators of many stripes who argue that the time finally has come for the impasse with Cuba to end. From Castro's perspective at least, unilateral concessions by Washington, such as lifting the travel ban or all of the embargo, now seem within the realm of the possible. With so much now converging in Cuba's and his favor, Fidel sees no need to make compromises. AT: Spy Trade US will not trade 5 spies for Gross Tamayo 7/6/13 – (Juan, “Secretary of State: No swap of Cuban spies for Alan Gross” The Miami Herald, Available online @ http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/04/18/3352048/secretary-of-state-no-swapof.html) Secretary of State John Kerry has declared the U.S. government will not swap five Cuban spies held in the United States for American Alan Gross, serving a 15-year prison term in Havana, but is pushing to win his release as a “humanitarian gesture.”¶ “They were and have been attempting to trade Alan Gross for the five spies that are in prison here in the U.S., and we’ve refused to do that because there’s no equivalency,” Kerry testified Wednesday before the House Foreign Affairs Committee.¶ “Alan Gross is wrongly imprisoned, and we’re not going to trade as if it’s spy for spy,” Kerry added in response to a question from Rep. Albio Sires, a Cuban-American Democrat from New Jersey.¶ But the U.S. government is “trying to find whether there is a humanitarian capacity or not” in Cuba to free Gross, a subcontractor for the U.S. Agency for International Development.¶ Kerry did not detail those efforts but noted he himself had tried to help Gross before he became secretary of state in February, and Sen. Patrick Leahy, D-Vermont, visited Cuba recently, met with Gross, “and talked to the government.” US says no to spy trade - only economic engagement is a mutual condition Herrero 12/27/12 – (Ricardo, “Getting Serious about Alan Gross” The Huffington Post, Ricardo Herrero is Deputy Executive Director of the Cuba Study Group, Available online @ http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ricardo-herrero/getting-serious-aboutala_b_2370767.html) So what can be done? There are three opportunities for securing Gross' release that could also help improve relations between the U.S. and Cuba:¶ 1. Introduce alternative terms to the negotiation. The Cubans have dictated the terms of the negotiation from day one, and hardliners in the U.S. government have seemingly been too happy to play along. However, just because the U.S. won't agree to the spy swap doesn't mean negotiations should stop there. U.S. sanctions on Cuba remain a decades-old morass of congressional actions, presidential directives and executive orders, resulting in an entrenched and inflexible foreign policy that is as incoherent as it is ineffective. There are plenty of outdated sanctions on the books that the United States could repeal or amend in exchange for Gross' release.¶ 2. Pursue Gross' release and economic engagement concurrently. In 2011, the Obama Administration announced a shift in the focus of U.S.-Cuba policy toward empowering civil society and supporting independent economic activity. If Cuba's burgeoning private sector is to grow into a viable alternative to the Island's top-down economic system, it will need a deeper economic relationship with the American private sector. By conditioning all further efforts to engage with the Cuban people on Gross' release, we are playing by the rules of those who benefit from the prolonged confrontation and mutual isolation between the two countries. Denying these private individuals an economic relationship with the United States only serves to further delay the kind of changes that policies like Helms-Burton were ill-designed to accelerate.¶ 3. Look to the Angel Carromero case as a model. We don't know what deal the Spanish government struck with the Cubans to secure the release of Angel Carromero, the Popular Party's pro-democracy activist who was charged with the negligent homicide of Oswaldo Payá and Harold Cepero and will now serve his sentence in Spain. What is clear is that through direct diplomacy, the Spanish have been far more successful at liberating political prisoners, democracy advocates, and businessmen from Cuban jails than any other country, all while promoting democracy inside the island through direct support to pro-democracy groups. On the other hand, our confrontational approach has only perpetuated the conflict without any progress to show for it.¶ The United Nations recently condemned Cuba's arbitrary detention of Alan Gross for the first time and the U.S. Embargo on Cuba for the 21st year in a row. By pivoting negotiations for Gross's release away from a spy- swap and toward win-win alternatives, both the United States and Cuba stand to gain credibility within the international community. The United States could finally pave the road to a future where it can lead an effective multilateral policy toward Cuba focused on the advancement of human rights and helping the Cuban people. Just as importantly, Alan would finally come home. AT: Keeping Gross Good Costs outweigh benefits to detaining Gross for Cuba Alfonso 12/24/12 – (Haroldo, “Cuba: What to do About Alan Gross?” The Havana Times, Available online @ http://www.havanatimes.org/?p=84034) HAVANA TIMES — Alan Gross should be released soon and unilaterally. Not because he’s innocent or because he’s some martyr of democracy, because obviously he’s not.¶ His case involves an agent employed by a hostile foreign government to engage in illegal operations in Cuba. His actions were in line with a US law (the embargo) whose repudiation today is one of the issues with the greatest consensus around the globe.¶ This was within the framework of an interventionist program that as a Cuban I oppose, because I reject everything that turns the US or any other foreign country into a domestic political actor beyond what is essential in this globalized and asymmetric world.¶ Speaking directly, Alan Gross should be released because that would be a very low cost but high impact gesture for generating understanding with the United States. This is because Cuba desperately needs a normal access to the US market, tourists and capital to boost its faltering economy.¶ Cuba also needs a normal political relationship with the US . Though this would have all the contradictions and conflicts that are expected of such an unequal relationship, it needs open channels for communications and negotiations.¶ If to achieve this, to begin exchanging steps in the lukewarm minuet proposed by Obama in his second term, Mr. Gross will have to be taken to the airport. It’s time to do so.¶ To raise this issue to the level of the five imprisoned spies (The Cuban Five) seems a serious mistake, and also a sign of political immaturity. There’s no comparison between a network of spies, some of whom have been credited with the loss of human lives, and the case of Alan Gross.¶ This is especially when we know that these Cuban agents, who have lost significant portions of their lives locked up, were political pieces sacrificed by Fidel Castro to maintain policies to keep alive his exhausting nationalist campaign after the return of Elian Gonzalez.¶ Cuba has spies imprisoned in the US with many more stripes and records than the “five heroes in the empire” about which nothing is said, simply because in the world of espionage the rule is to look to the side and find surreptitious solutions.¶ This isn’t a personal position. I think the American government would be doing itself a favor and one for all of us if it were to take steps towards returning the Cuban Five to the island. But it’s also time that the Cuban government understand that their relationship with the US is asymmetric.¶ Faced with this asymmetry, what is required is an intelligent policy that sets aside the typical bravado of a schoolyard bully to make way for a constructive and negotiated policy about the real reasons behind the dispute.¶ Again, Cuba requires access to the US market and to guarantee its national integrity through negotiations, which today are exposed to great fragility given in its dependence on Venezuelan oil, and the militarization and internal repression at home.¶ If it is needed to release Alan Gross to obtain a nation whose sovereignty rests in the national consensus, on the prosperity of its inhabitants, and the full dignity of its people, then Cuban leaders should put aside their neutered machismo, and release him.¶ I repeat: Having Alan Gross in prison is more costly and less promising than releasing him . Keeping him locked up is to continue pursuing the bad politics of the anti-imperialist show. Good politics suggests taking him to Havana’s Jose Marti International Airport tomorrow. AT: Unilateral Action Better Unilateral American Concessions impirically legitimize Castros regime to end pro-democracy activists Newsmax 4/13/9 – (“GOP Lawmakers: Obama's Cuba Policy Helps Castro Regime” Newsmax Independent News, Available online @ http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/obama-cuba-castroregime/2009/12/14/id/342167) GOP lawmakers most familiar with Cuba criticized President Obama’s decision Monday to allow more travel by Cuban-Americans to the island, warning that it could end up buttressing the island’s ailing Communist regime with a huge infusion of American dollars.¶ The criticism ran the gamut across the GOP, though, as some lawmakers recognized that many Cuban-Americans long to visit families and help loved ones with medicine, food and other needs.¶ Reps. Lincoln Diaz-Balart, R-Fla. and Mario DiazBalart, R-Fla., called Obama’s move a “serious mistake” and a reward to a dictatorship that has recently increased its repression of pro-democracy activists. Besides lifting the travel restrictions, Obama said he would allow Cuban-Americans to transfer money to relatives in Cuba.¶ “President Obama has committed a serious mistake by unilaterally increasing Cuban-American travel and remittance dollars for the Cuban dictatorship,” the two congressmen, who are brothers, said in a joint statement.¶ “ Unilateral concessions to the dictatorship embolden it to further isolate , imprison and brutalize pro-democracy activists, to continue to dictate which Cubans and CubanAmericans are able to enter the island, and this unilateral concession provides the dictatorship with critical financial support ,” the two said in their statement.¶ But U.S. Sen. Mel Martinez, who is also Cuban-American, praised Obama’s plan.¶ "It's going to bring families together," Martinez, R-Fla., told the Associated Press. But Martinez, too, said he was concerned some in the United States might abuse the open door travel policy as a guise to conduct business in Cuba.¶ "It would be good if the remittances had some boundaries. Otherwise it could be a windfall to the Cuban government," he said.¶ "Will they now curtail the 20 percent they take on remittances? Will they now allow more of the Cuban families who are denied permission to travel abroad?" he asked, according to the AP. Relations NB 1NC shell Alan Gross freedom key to relations -- Top Officials agree Luxner 2/24/11 – (Larry, “Gross Release Crucial to Better US-Cuba Ties” Luxner News was founded in 1995 and covers exclusively Latin American developments, Available online @ http://www.luxner.com/cgi-bin/view_article.cgi?articleID=1956) The United States and Cuba won't see any improvement in their hostile relationship until Alan Gross is freed from his Havana jail cell and allowed to come home.¶ That's the word from Bill Richardson - former member of Congress, U.S. ambassador to the United Nations during the Clinton administration and two-term governor of New Mexico who's just been named U.S. envoy to the Organization of American States.¶ Richardson, speaking at a Brookings Institution seminar on Cuba last week, has been to the island three times in the past 18 months as part of troubleshooting missions that have taken him to hot spots from North Korea to Iraq to Sudan throughout the years.¶ During his most recent trip to Cuba, in August, Richardson, who 10 years ago managed to secure the release of three prisoners from Cuba, specifically lobbied the Castro regime to free Gross, 61, a Jewish telecommunications expert from Potomac, who was arrested in December 2009 at Havana's airport as he was about to fly out of the country.¶ "The Cubans need to free Alan Gross," Richardson said of the man whom political analysts have labeled a "pawn" and a "human bargaining chip" in deteriorating relations between Washington and Havana. "He's been in prison 14 months, his family is not well, and the charges are dubious.¶ Nonetheless, there's a legal process going on, but for humanitarian reasons, I believe this man should be released. That should be the next step. Beyond that, there are other steps the United States should consider taking." Among them: removing Cuba from the State Department's list of state sponsors of terrorism; expanding cooperation on oil spills and other common environmental threats; lifting restrictions on U.S. citizens opening bank accounts for their families in Cuba; and letting U.S companies export telecom equipment to the island.¶ In fact, it was telecom equipment that landed Gross in prison in the first place. The Cuban government insists Gross - whose company had a $690,000 contract with Bethesda-based Development Associates Inc. through the U.S. Agency for International Development - had entered Cuba on a tourist visa and was illegally distributing satellite phones to dissidents. Both DAI and the U.S. government counter that he was only helping the island's tiny Jewish community get online.¶ Earlier this month, Cuban prosecutors announced they'd attempt to put Gross behind bars for 20 years for "actions against the independence and territorial integrity of the state" - a euphemism for spying.¶ Reaction from both the administration and Congress was swift and furious.¶ "We deplore the Cuban government's announcement that Cuban prosecutors intend to seek a 20-year sentence for Alan Gross. His imprisonment without charges for more than a year is contrary to all international human rights obligations. He should be home with his family now," Gloria Berbena, spokesperson at the U.S. Interests Section in Havana, said in a statement.¶ "The news that the Castro brothers are seeking a 20-year imprisonment of Alan Gross for distributing cell phones to the Jewish community of Havana - after he has languished in a Cuban cell without access to medical care for 14 months - is outrageous," Rep . Debbie Wasserman Schultz (D-Fla.) said in a statement.¶ "This affront is magnified by the recent announcement by the Obama administration that the United States will be loosening travel restrictions, which will pump much-needed money into the desperate Cuban economy, boosting the Castro regime."¶ Yet Richardson said President Barack Obama is doing exactly what must be done - and that the latest development isn't necessarily bad news.¶ "On the one hand, it's good that the prosecution has moved forward with this charge of 20 years that is totally absurd. At least the judicial process has been started," he explained in response to a question.¶ "The next step is for the courts to hand out whatever sentence emerges. My hope is that the court says 'Mr. Gross, you can go,' and that there's a political process involved. My understanding is that after charges have been filed, the court is obligated to move fairly soon, but this case has become very significant with the American public, with the Obama so."¶ Richardson added: "If they let Gross go, it will open a huge panoply of potential discussions that will lead to continued progress. Without administration, and rightly talking about a quid pro quo, the last good move was the president's [relaxing of] travel restrictions. Hopefully someday, there'll be a total lifting of the travel ban so everybody can go to Cuba. I believe the Cubans are moving in that direction by settling it with this charge."¶ Gross, a longtime member of Congregation Am Kolel, has reportedly lost 90 pounds in detention, and is said to be suffering severe health problems. His daughter, Shira, 26, has been diagnosed with breast cancer , and his wife, Judy, visited him in Cuba last year, and was even allowed to accompany him to the beach.¶ Peter Kahn, the Gross family's attorney, did not return messages left at his D.C. law firm of Williams & Connolly LLP.¶ Joe Garcia, former executive director of the Cuban American National Foundation who ran for Congress in both times to Republicans opposed to any change in U.S.-Cuba ties - agrees Washington could be doing more to win Gross' freedom. "I've spoken to almost every American official involved in U.S.2008 and 2010 on the Democratic ticket but lost - Cuba policy, even tangentially, and they all say the Gross case is a central stumbling block to open thinking," Garcia said.¶ "The Cubans clearly should not have put him in jail. We saw the charges. They've had Gross in custody for 14 months, but if there's something that distinguishes Raul from Fidel, it's pragmatic response to crisis. Fidel responds with charisma. Raul has to make the charisma work on a daily basis." Raul Castro succeeded his ailing brother, Fidel, as president in 2008.¶ Nick Miroff of Global Post has his own take on the case. "If the Internet is the new battlefield in the long, simmering standoff between Cuba and the United States, then jailed American contractor Alan Gross is the conflict's first POW," he wrote. "No trial date has been set, but the Gross case, along with several other web-related developments, has offered the best insight yet into the Castro government's evolving views of the Internet, as Cuban authorities cautiously attempt to introduce modern technology while pushing back against U.S. efforts to wield it against them." [insert US-Cuba relations impact] 2NC Internals Gross is the only impediment to bilateral relations Orsi 3/23/13 – (Peter, “US on verge of momentous Cuba decision: Whether to take island off controversial terror list” The Associated press, Fox News Online, Available online @ http://www.foxnews.com/world/2013/03/23/us-on-verge-momentous-cubadecision-whether-to-take-island-off-controversial/) HAVANA – A normally routine bit of Washington bureaucracy could have a big impact on U.S. relations with Cuba, either ushering in a long-stalled detente or slamming the door on rapprochement, perhaps until the scheduled end of the Castro era in 2018. ¶ U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry must decide within a few weeks whether to advocate that President Barack Obama should take Cuba off a list of state sponsors of terrorism, a collection of Washington foes that also includes Iran, Syria and Sudan.¶ Cuban officials have long seen the terror designation as unjustified and told visiting American delegations privately in recent weeks that they view Kerry's recommendation as a litmus test for improved ties. They also hinted the decision could affect discussions over the release of jailed U.S. subcontractor Alan Gross, whose detention in 2009 torpedoed hopes of a diplomatic thaw.¶ Inclusion on the list means a ban not only on arms sales to Cuba but also on items that can have dual uses, including some hospital equipment. It also requires that the United States oppose any loans to Cuba by the World Bank or other international lending institutions, among other measures.¶ U.S. officials agree the recommendation, which Kerry must make before the State Department's annual terror report is published April 30, has become ensnared in the standoff over Gross. The American was sentenced to 15 years in prison after he was caught bringing communications equipment onto the island illegally while working for a USAID-funded democracy-building program.¶ Cuba has been on the terror list since 1982, and is also the target of a 51-year U.S. economic embargo — the reason why the island of beaches, music and rum is the only country Americans cannot visit as tourists. Removal from the list would not change that.¶ Critics say Cuba's inclusion on the list has little to do with any real threat posed by the Communist-run Caribbean island, and they say the list has become so politicized it's useless. North Korea was removed in 2008 during nuclear negotiations that ultimately failed, and was never put back on. Pakistan, where Osama bin Laden had been hiding out, is not on the list in large part because of its strategic importance.¶ Longtime Cuba analyst Philip Peters of the Virginia-based think tank the Lexington Institute said removing Cuba from the list "makes sense ... just because it's been a specious allegation that the United States has repeated for many years ... It would improve the atmosphere."¶ Others argue against rewarding Havana unless it releases Gross.¶ "I have long believed it's in our interest to see an improvement in relations with Cuba," said Rep. Chris Van Hollen, a Democrat from Gross's home state of Maryland who traveled with a congressional delegation to Havana last month. But " the first step needs to be resolving Alan Gross's situation. "¶ Voices calling for a change in the policy are growing louder, however.¶ Last month, The Boston Globe cited administration sources saying high-level diplomats determined Cuba should be dropped from the list. That prompted State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland to say there were "no current plans" to do so, though she did not explicitly rule out the possibility.¶ Last week, a Los Angeles Times editorial called for Cuba's removal from the list, and other newspapers have voiced similar opinions. The Cuba Study Group, a Washington-based exile organization that advocates engagement to promote democratic change, issued a white paper in February calling for an "apolitical" reexamination of the terror designation.¶ While Kerry can review the designation even after the State Department's report comes out, Cuba's continued inclusion on the list in April would almost certainly rule out its chances of removal in 2013.¶ A U.S. official involved in deliberations told The Associated Press that Kerry will ultimately decide and nobody under him is in a position to predict what will happen. "It's very much up in the air," he said.¶ But another administration official said that lifting the terror designation will be a hard sell while Gross remains imprisoned.¶ "It's very unlikely," the second official said. "There is no consensus. And if you are on (the list), you stay on as long as there is no consensus on taking you off."¶ The officials spoke on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to discuss the matter publicly.¶ Ostensibly, Cuba has been designated a terror sponsor because it harbors members of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) rebel group, the Basque militant organization ETA and a handful of U.S. fugitives, many of whom have lived here since the 1970s.¶ But much has changed in recent years.¶ Late last year, peace talks began in Havana between Colombia and the FARC, and even Washington has voiced hope that the negotiations will end Colombia's half-century old conflict.¶ ETA announced a permanent cease-fire in 2011, and Madrid has not openly called for the return of any Basque fugitives. Cuba has enjoyed improved relations with Spain and Colombia in recent years, and both countries routinely vote at the U.N. against continuing the U.S. embargo.¶ Under President Raul Castro, Cuba has freed dozens of dissidents and has begun opening its economy and society, though it remains a one-party political system that permits no legal opposition. Castro announced in February that he would step down in 2018 and signaled a likely successor.¶ The time might also be ripe in terms of U.S. politics.¶ While in the Senate, Kerry was an outspoken critic of America's policy on Cuba, saying it has "manifestly failed for nearly 50 years." He called for travel restrictions to end and held up millions of dollars in funding for the type of programs Gross worked with.¶ His boss, President Obama, no longer has to worry about reelection or pleasing Cuban-Americans, an all-important voting bloc in the crucial swing state of Florida.¶ Ann Louise Bardach, a longtime Cuba observer and the author of "Without Fidel: A Death Foretold in Miami, Havana and Washington," said all the political winds would seem to point toward a reboot in relations — except for Havana's decision to hold Gross and try to swap him for five Cuban agents in the U.S.¶ "In a way they cooked their goose with Alan Gross," she said. "The Cubans thought, 'Gee what a brilliant idea, we'll have a chit to trade.' Little did they know that they would be at this moment where you have considerable momentum to move on in Washington, and politically, because of the Gross mess, Washington can't act." Alan Gross imprisonment destroys relations EFE 12/4/13 – (“US Lawmakers Demand Cuba Free Alan Gross” EFE is a Spanish International News agency created in 1939 to monitor Latin American developments, this report was sent to Fox and the American-storyline was incorporated, Posted on Fox News Online, Available online @ http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/politics/2012/12/04/us-lawmakers-demand-cubafree-alan-gross/) The imprisonment in Cuba of U.S. contractor Alan Gross is an obstacle to better relations between Havana and Washington, senators said Tuesday, demanding the Maryland man's immediate and unconditional release.¶ The prisoner's wife, Judy Gross, was joined by Sens. Ben Cardin and Barbara Mikulski - both Democrats from Maryland - and Jerry Moran, a Kansas Republican, at a press conference.¶ "Mr. Castro, a message from the U.S. Senate: let Alan Gross go, let him go today, let him go now," Mikulski said, addressing Cuban President Raul Castro.¶ "Mr. Castro, you are illegally holding him on a trumped up charge against his own will to the devastation of his health," she said.¶ "I'm one who since July of 2000 have been engaged in trying to create greater opportunities for American agriculture, farmers and ranchers to deal with Cuba and have the opportunity to sell our products," Moran said.¶ "I'm no longer willing to pursue this further engagement until Alan Gross is released," the detention is preventing any progress in bilateral Republican added.¶ Cardin stressed that Gross' relations.¶ "We are all looking forward to a better relation bet Cuba and the us ... and we all hope that Cuba will do the right thing," he said.¶ Now 63, Gross was detained in Havana three years ago in possession of satellite communications equipment he said he was planning to distribute among Cuba's Jewish community.¶ Havana says he was illegally aiding dissidents and inciting subversion on the Communist-ruled island. Last August, Cuba's highest court upheld the 15-year jail sentence imposed on Gross five months earlier.¶ "We have to start on a clean slate, meaning let's forget about the five (Cuban intelligence officers held in the United States), let's forget about what's happened in the past, let's just sit down and talk," Judy Gross said Tuesday in comments to Efe.¶ Cuba says the five intelligence officers were sent to Florida in the wake of several terror bombings in Havana allegedly masterminded by anti-Castro militant Luis Posada Carriles, a former CIA operative.¶ The five were arrested in 1998 and convicted three years later by a federal jury in Miami.¶ One of the spies is free on probation, but must remain on U.S. soil. The others are still behind bars. EFE Politics NB 2NC Key Senators Durbin and Moran support the CP Tamayo 6/19/12 – (Juan, “Senators who favor more trade with Cuba plan halt advocacy to push for Alan Gross release” The Miami Herald, Available online @ http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/06/19/2856278/senators-who-favor-moretrade.html) The senators from Kansas and Illinois say they want to put pressure on Cuba to free U.S. government subcontractor Alan Gross.¶ Two U.S. senators who have long pushed to ease restrictions on trade with Cuba say they have put their advocacy on hold in hopes of pressuring Havana to free jailed U.S. government subcontractor Alan P. Gross.¶ The decisions by Sens. Jerry Moran R-Kansas, and Dick Durbin D-Il., underlined how the case of Gross, serving a 15-year prison sentence, has become a persistent roadblock in almost any attempt to warm up U.S.-Cuba relations.¶ “I have tried to change the trading relationship with Cuba. I am taking a hiatus from that effort,” Moran told the congressional newspaper The Hill. “I hope that this will put pressure on Cuba to release him.”¶ Durbin, who as the Senate majority whip is the second-highest ranking Democrat in the chamber, declared that his meeting with Gross in his Havana cell this spring convinced him that more needs to be done to free him, according to The Hill report Sunday¶ Durbin has been an advocate of using trade to open up closed societies like Cuba, and along with Moran has submitted several legislative proposals over the years to ease the U.S. trade embargo on the island.¶ Calls to Moran and Durbin’s Washington spokespersons on Monday seeking additional comment for this story were not returned.¶ Gross, 63, a development specialist working for a U.S. government pro-democracy program, is serving a 15-year sentence for acting against Cuba’s sovereignty when he delivered three illegal satellite phones to Cuban Jews that allowed them independent access to the Internet, bypassing government controls. Cuba has outlawed cooperation with the programs, arguing they are designed to topple the government.¶ The Obama administration has demanded his release as a humanitarian gesture, arguing that he is in ill health, that his mother has inoperable cancer and that one of his daughters is undergoing treatment for breast cancer.¶ Havana has made it clear Gross will be freed only in exchange for the five Cuban intelligence officials convicted in Miami in 1998. Four are serving long sentences and the fifth completed his prison term but is on parole somewhere in the United States.¶ The White House has repeatedly said that it will not swap Gross for the Cuban spies, and that it can make no major effort to improve bilateral relations until the Maryland man is released.¶ Moran and Durbin, both from farm states, have been trying for years to ease U.S. trade sanctions on Cuba in order to make it easier for the island to buy U.S. food and other agricultural goods — which totaled $347 million in 2011. Durbin is critical to legislation passage The Washington Post 3/12/13 – (“Richard D. Durbin” Who Runs Gov, The Washington Post, Available online @ http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/richardj-durbin-d-ill/gIQArl8V9O_topic.html) "Dick" Durbin is the second most powerful Senate Democrat, but he could easily be described as his party's unofficial spokesman .¶ The majority whip sells the party's agenda on cable news shows and on the Senate floor. An incisive questioner and skilled debater, Durbin has won several high-profile legislative victories.¶ The St. Louis native worked for an Illinois Senator during his senior year of college and fell in love with politics, accepting a series of staff slots before winning a House seat in 1982.¶ Once in Washington, Durbin proved a skilled legislator. He sponsored a bill that banned smoking on airplanes. He is considered a true liberal and led the effort to block many of the Bush administration's judicial appointments while promoting sweeping consumer protection reforms.¶ Durbin is one of President Barack Obama 's closest advisers and his most important Congressional ally . Long before his colleagues were willing to climb aboard the Obama bandwagon, Durbin was stumping for his junior Senate colleague and was instrumental in helping him lock up key support in the superdelegate race during the bitter primary battle with Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton (D-N.Y.). Expect Durbin to be a key Hill liaison for Obama. No Chance of a link – 73 House Members support Gross’s release PRIOR to engagement Hollen 12/1/11 – (Van, “Van Hollen leads Bipartisan Congressional Letter Urging Release of Alan Gross” House.gov Official Government Press Release, Available online @ http://vanhollen.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=270870) Van Hollen Leads Bipartisan Congressional Letter Urging Release of Alan Gross ¶ Letter Calls Gross’s Continued Incarceration a Major Setback in Bilateral Relations ¶ Washington, Dec 1, 2011 -¶ Today Maryland Congressman Chris Van Hollen and 72 Members of the House of Representatives sent a letter to the Cuban Government urging the immediate and unconditional release of Alan Gross. Mr. Gross, who has dedicated his life to providing humanitarian assistance and was in Cuba as part of a USAID contract to provide support to members of the Cuban Jewish community when he was arrested, has been held in prison Cuba since December 3, 2009. ¶ The full text of the letter is below:¶ December 1, 2011¶ Mr. Jorge Bolaños¶ Chief of Mission¶ Cuban Interests Section¶ Embassy of Switzerland¶ 2639 16th Street, NW¶ Washington, DC 20009¶ Dear Mr. Bolaños,¶ It is with deep concern that we write to you regarding the ongoing imprisonment by your government of Alan P. Gross. On the eve of the second anniversary of his arrest and detention in Cuba, and with the legal process having formally concluded, his fate and that of his family now lie in the hands of your president, Raúl Castro. The Cuban Government has indicated that it would be open to resolving Mr. Gross’s case through diplomatic channels. We hope that you will honor that commitment and release Mr. Gross on humanitarian grounds immediately.¶ After two years in a Cuban prison, Mr. Gross and his family have paid an enormous personal price for his actions in Cuba. Mr. Gross has lost 100 pounds and suffers from numerous medical conditions. In addition, the Gross family situation is one that warrants compassion. As you know, Mr. Gross’s daughter and mother are both fighting cancer, and his wife is struggling to make ends meet. We respectfully urge the Cuban Government to immediately release Mr. Gross on humanitarian grounds and allow him to be reunited with his loved ones. ¶ As Mr. Gross explained to both the trial Court and Cuba’s Supreme Court, his intention was never to harm the Cuban Government in any way. In fact, Mr. Gross spoke in court of his affection for the Cuban people and respect for the island’s sovereignty. As we mark two years since Mr. Gross has been in Cuban custody, we hope that your government will release Alan so he may return to his family.¶ In light of the above, Mr. Gross’s continued incarceration is viewed by all Members of Congress, regardless of their political views on Cuba, as a major setback in bilateral relations. It is unlikely that any further positive steps can or will be taken by the Obama Administration or this Congress as long as Mr. Gross remains in a Cuban jail. We urge your government in the strongest possible terms to immediately and unconditionally release Mr. Gross so that we can move forward.¶ Sincerely,¶ Chris Van Hollen¶ Sander Levin¶ Jared Polis¶ Charles Rangel¶ Marcy Kaptur¶ John Culberson¶ Rush Holt¶ Scott Garrett¶ Sheila Jackson-Lee¶ Bill Pascrell, jr.¶ Kathy Hochul¶ Charles Dent¶ Edward Markey¶ Mike Quigley¶ Anna Eshoo¶ Ted Poe¶ Jerrold Nadler¶ David Cicilline¶ James Himes¶ Peter Welch¶ Rodney Frelinghuysen¶ Joe Courtney¶ Jesse Jackson, Jr¶ Leonard Lance¶ Steny Hoyer¶ Lois Capps¶ Sam Farr¶ William Keating¶ C. A. Dutch Ruppersberger¶ Frederica Wilson¶ Adam Kinzinger¶ Adam Schiff¶ Steve Israel¶ Steven LaTourette¶ Joe Heck¶ Carolyn Maloney¶ Michael Capuano¶ Eliot Engel¶ Jan Schakowsky¶ Eldolphus Towns¶ Corrine Brown¶ Heath Shuler¶ Henry Waxman¶ Brian Higgins¶ Gary Ackerman¶ Gerald Connolly¶ Tim Ryan¶ John Shimkus¶ Dan Burton¶ James McGovern¶ Bob Filner¶ Gary Peters¶ Aaron Schock¶ Allyson Schwartz¶ John Olver¶ John Sarbanes¶ Steve Cohen¶ James Moran¶ Howard Berman¶ Alcee Hastings¶ Ted Deutch¶ Nita Lowey¶ W. Todd Akin¶ Barney Frank¶ Steve Stivers¶ Paul Tonko¶ Luis Gutierrez¶ Robert Dold¶ Joseph Crowley¶ Jerry Costello¶ Daniel Lipinski¶ Timothy Johnson Huge Bipartisan Senate Coalition Supports Freeing Alan Gross Reuters 9/25/12 – (“Senators urge Cuba to release American Alan Gross” Reuters, Available online @ http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/25/us-cuba-grosscongress-idUSBRE88O0ZU20120925) (Reuters) - A bipartisan group of U.S. Senators has sent a letter to Cuban President Raul Castro urging the release of an American contractor jailed in Cuba for nearly three years, saying his detention is "a major obstacle" to improving relations.¶ The letter, signed by 44 senators, is the strongest appeal yet by members of Congress in the case of Alan Gross, who is serving a 15-year sentence for illegally setting up Internet networks in Cuba.¶ In the letter, the senators urge Cuba to release Gross, 63, on humanitarian grounds, saying he has lost 105 pounds (47.63 kg) since his arrest and suffers from degenerative arthritis and an untreated mass behind his shoulder.¶ "He also suffers from mental anguish because of separation from his family, several of whom have serious medical conditions," the letter states, noting that his daughter is being treated for breast cancer and his 90year-old mother has also been diagnosed with inoperable cancer.¶ Gross' imprisonment has halted efforts by President Barack Obama to improve long-hostile relations between the two countries just 90 miles apart.¶ "Mr Gross's ongoing detention in your country presents a major obstacle to any further actions to improve our bilateral relations," the letter states.¶ His wife, Judy Gross, said earlier this month she feared for her husband's life because his health is deteriorating. Cuba has said, however, that his condition is "normal," noting that he is being held in a military hospital and not a prison.¶ The Jewish Community and Key Leaders support Gross Release Swerdlow 12/28/11 – (Deborah, “Alan Gross to Remain Imprisoned in Cuba” Action Center News, Available online @http://blogs.rj.org/rac/2011/12/28/alan-grossto-remain-imprisoned-in-cuba/) In a speech to Cuban lawmakers shortly after last week’s announcement, President Raul Castro said the 2,900 prisoners to be released are mostly inmates who are older than 60, ill, female, or young people with little or no previous criminal activity. Gross fits into the first two categories, but Cuban authorities still refuse to release him.¶ The Jewish community, along with U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, former President Jimmy Carter and former Cabinet Secretary and New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson, has been a vocal advocate for Gross’ release. For nearly two months, Jews and other people of faith in the D.C. area have been holding weekly vigils outside the Cuban Interests Section to call for Gross’ release. Ext---Sen. Rush pushes the CP Congressman Rush Pushes the CP Rush 5/9/13 – (Bobby, “RUSH REINTRODUCES LEGISLATION URGING CONGRESS TO LIFT TRADE EMBARGO ON CUBA” House.gov, Bobby Rush is a current Congressman, Available online @ http://rush.house.gov/pressrelease/thursday-may-9-2013-rush-reintroduces-legislation-urging-congress-lift-tradeembargo) Congressman Bobby L. Rush reintroduced legislation to lift trade restrictions on Cuba. Improved U.S. relations with Cuba have been a longtime goal of Congressman Rush and this legislation follows in the footsteps of the United States-Cuba Trade Normalization Act that he initially introduced in 2009. ¶ Specifically, Rush’s current legislation lifts the embargo, travel and parcel restrictions, normalizes trade relations, and removes Cuba from the State Department’s State Sponsors of Terrorism list. The key component of Rush’s bill calls for the release of Alan Phillip Gross , a U.S. international development professional arrested in Cuba in December 2009, and makes implementation of this legislation contingent on the Cuba governments compliance.¶ “Lifting the trade embargo with Cuba is long overdue,” said Rush. “Cuba has a rich history and is a close neighboring country that offers access to cultural growth and learning for many Americans. We have shut the door on our two nations coming together to work to build a strong alliance. Cuba is no longer a threat to the United States and the continuation of the embargo on trade between the two countries declared in 1962 is not fulfilling the purpose for which it was established. We are the only nation in the Western Hemisphere that still maintains an embargo and its removal is long overdue.”¶ Rush’s bill asks for a major point of contention between the countries to come to end by asking for the release of Alan Phillip Gross . Gross was arrested while in Cuba working as a U.S. government subcontractor for the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) as part of a program funded under the 1996 Helms-Burton Act. He was prosecuted in 2011 after being accused of crimes against the Cuban state for bringing satellite phones and computer equipment to members of Cuba’s Jewish community without the permit required under Cuban law. After being accused of working for American intelligence services in January 2010, he was ultimately convicted for “acts against the independence or the territorial integrity of the state" in March 2011, and is currently serving a 15-year prison sentence in Cuba 1NR – Aff Links Hardliners hate Unilateral Concessions Center for Democracy 7/22/11 – (Center For Democracy in the Americas, “Cold Warrior Counterattack against Travel to Cuba Grows into Combat with Entire Hemisphere!” Available online @ http://cubacentral.wordpress.com/2011/07/22/coldwarrior-counterattack-against-travel-to-cuba-grows-into-combat-with-entirehemisphere/) There is a systematic effort in the U.S. Congress by hardline legislators to redraw U.S. relations with Latin America along Cold War lines, a campaign that starts but clearly does not end with Cuba; one that is accompanied by a world view that is ossified, ideological, and not always connected with reality.¶ From the very beginning, these hardliners of both parties opposed President Obama’s policies to gradually increase U.S. engagement with Cuba. Modest decisions liberalizing travel and remittance rules were met, at first, with simply extreme rhetoric.¶ But their angry words – rewarding the terrorist Castro dictatorship with unilateral concessions, comparing some Cuban Americans who visit family on the island to welfare cheats –are now accompanied by some rather significant threats to those policies and other developments in Cuba.¶ They’re for cutting off family travel and remittances. Blocking U.S. airports from serving the Cuban market. Browbeating civil servants to stop the Treasury Department from issuing travel licenses that are totally permissible under the law. Threatening oil companies who help the Cubans drill with economic sanctions and withdrawing their rights to drill in U.S. waters because “We cannot allow the Castro regime to become the oil tycoons of the Caribbean.” *Aff* US Says No US says no The Washington Post 12/7/2012 – (Written by the Editorial Board, “U.S. shouldn’t hand Cuba an Alan Gross-for-spies deal” The Washington Post, Available online @ http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-12-05/opinions/35639087_1_alangross-castro-regime-cuban-president-ra-l-castro) There is no equivalence between Mr. Gross and the five prisoners, as Havana itself acknowledges. It agrees the Florida prisoners were its spies, but it has never charged Mr. Gross with espionage. But Mr. Castro sees Mr. Gross as the leverage to spring his agents, whom the state propaganda apparatus portrays as heroes. More significantly, by arranging an exchange, the regime believes it can reshape U.S.-Cuban relations on its own terms, without having to make concessions on human rights.¶ The Gross family has appealed to Mr. Obama to send a high-level envoy to Cuba and to do what is necessary to obtain his release. That’s understandable, but the administration ought to stick to its refusal to countenance such a bargain. On the contrary, Mr. Obama should consider new steps to punish the Castro regime for the continued imprisonment of Mr. Gross, and the administration should do more to raise his case in international forums. Cuba Says No Cuba only wants to swap Gross for its 5 Spies The Washington Post 12/7/2012 – (Written by the Editorial Board, “U.S. shouldn’t hand Cuba an Alan Gross-for-spies deal” The Washington Post, Available online @ http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-12-05/opinions/35639087_1_alangross-castro-regime-cuban-president-ra-l-castro) WITH THE presidential election over, supporters of better U.S.-Cuban relations are calling on President Obama, who won a majority of the Cuban American vote, to seek accord with the Castro regime. They forget the case of Alan Gross, the American development contractor who this week began his fourth year in a Cuban military prison.¶ Mr. Gross, of Potomac, was arrested on Dec. 3, 2009, after he delivered satellite telephones to members of Cuba’s tiny Jewish community. He had been hired to provide the equipment by the U.S. Agency for International Development; the aim was to help Cuban Jews connect to the Internet.¶ In 2011, Mr. Gross was convicted of crimes against the state and sentenced to 15 years in prison. There the now-63-year-old has remained, despite health problems that include a severe loss of weight, arthritis and a growth on his shoulder. His appeals to visit his gravely ill, 90-year-old mother have been denied. Cuban president Raúl Castro has repeatedly turned down proposals to release Mr. Gross on humanitarian grounds, despite visits from envoys ranging from U.S. senators to former U.N. ambassador Bill Richardson.¶ The Castro government says it wants to repair relations with the United States, win the lifting of what remains of the U.S. trade embargo and attract investment from American companies. So why keep Mr. Gross in prison? The answer, unfortunately, is relatively simple. Cuba wants to swap its prisoner for five Cuban spies who were arrested in Florida in 1998. The network infiltrated a U.S. Navy base and anti-Castro groups and provided information that facilitated Cuba’s 1996 shoot-down in international airspace of two planes carrying members of one of the groups. Four U.S. citizens died. The head of the network was sentenced to life in prison after a 2001 trial, while others were given lesser terms. One is now out on probation.¶ There is no equivalence between Mr. Gross and the five prisoners, as Havana itself acknowledges. It agrees the Florida prisoners were its spies, but it has never charged Mr. Gross with espionage. But Mr. Castro sees Mr. Gross as the leverage to spring his agents, whom the state propaganda apparatus portrays as heroes. More significantly, by arranging an exchange, the regime believes it can reshape U.S.-Cuban relations on its own terms, without having to make concessions on human rights. Venezuela---Pressure Shell 1NC Venezuela Pressure CP Text: The United States federal government should threaten to implement economic sanctions if the government of Venezuela does not [ ]. Economic engagement fails absent a demand for corruption reform—only the counterplan solves relations in the long-term Christy 3/15/13 – (Patrick, “Obama Must Stand Up for Democracy in Post-Chavez Venezuela” US News, Senior policy analyst at the Foreign policy Initiative, Available online @ http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blo/world-report/2013/03/15/after-chavezus-must-encourage-democratic-venezuela) What's perverse is how the Obama administration's move to "reset" relations with Maduro is doing more to legitimize him as the rightful heir to Venezuela's presidency than to resuscitate relations between the two governments. The move showed itself to be even more naive after Maduro accused the United States of plotting to poison Chavez shortly after the strongman's death.¶ [Check out our editorial cartoons on President Obama.]¶ Washington must realize that a strategy of engagement alone will not ensure a renewed and improved partnership with Caracas. Failure to realize this will not only undermine whatever influence America has in the months ahead, but also send a troubling signal to Venezuela's increasingly united political opposition. The Obama administration should instead pursue a more principled policy towards a postChavez Venezuela. In particular, it should: Pressure Caracas to implement key election reforms . Venezuela's opposition faces formidable obstacles. Interim President Maduro will use the government's near- monopoly control of public airwaves, its established networks of political patronage and last-minute public spending programs to bolster his populist agenda.¶ Washington should stress publicly and privately that any attempts to suppress or intimidate the opposition runs contrary to Venezuela's constitution and the principles defined in the Inter-American Democratic Charter, which was adopted by Venezuela in 2001. To this point, José Cárdenas, a former USAID acting assistant administrator for Latin America, writes, ¶ The Venezuelan opposition continues to insist that the constitution (which is of Chavez's own writing) be followed and have drawn up a list of simple electoral reforms that would level the playing field and better allow the Venezuelan people to chart their own future free of chavista and foreign interference.¶ Demand free, fair and verifiable elections. Although Venezuela announced that a special election to replace Chavez will be held next month, it is important to remember that elections alone do not make a democracy. Indeed, Chavez long embraced the rhetoric of democracy as he, in reality, consolidated executive power, undermined Venezuela's previously democratic political system and altered the outcomes of election through corruption, fraud and intimidation. ¶ [Read the U.S. News Debate: Given The Current Deficit Crisis, Should Foreign Aid Be Cut?]¶ The Obama administration should make clear that free and fair elections, properly monitored by respected international election observers, are essential to Venezuela's future standing in the hemisphere and the world. Likewise, Secretary of State John Kerry should work with regional partners—including (but not limited to) Brazil, Canada, Colombia and Mexico—to firmly encourage Maduro's interim government. A unified regional voice would send a powerful signal to Chavez's cronies in Caracas and longtime enablers in China, Iran and Russia.¶ Economic sanctions work and force Maduro to reform Halabi ’13 (Sammy Halabi—London School of Economics, co-founder of Global Risk Insights; “Reasons for Optimism in Venezuela”; May 3, 2013; http://globalriskinsights.com/2013/05/03/spring-is-coming-we-should-be-optimisticabout-venezuela/) Though Venezuela will continue to be able to export oil, slightly mitigating some of Chavez’s more disastrous economic policies, Maduro sits on a ticking time bomb. Inflation is sky high, moving past 30%. Murder rates are skyrocketing while foreign investment continues to plummet due to past expropriations. And with increased American energy independence the era of $100 oil may be coming to an end.¶ Chavez had both the ideological conviction and public support necessary to withstand pressures to liberalize and integrate the Venezuelan economy in the face of such terrible indicators. Yet given his weakened mandate, and the fractured political climate under which he operates, Maduro will not be able to withstand pressures for long.¶ Already there have been signs that Venezuela is inching towards change, with Maduro going so far as to temporarily open a back-channel with the US State Department such during Chavez’s cancer treatments. While it would be difficult to see an overnight reversal of USVenezuelan relations, these subtle steps are more indicative of a pragmatist than an ideologue. This is cause for optimism, and may be the root of better ties with Venezuela’s biggest export market in the medium term.¶ In the short term, expect Venezuela to pursue its liberalization on a more regional basis. Importantly, Brazil very quickly recognized Maduro’s government in spite of the electoral controversies. Additionally, Brazil and Peru have shown that there is a viable “third way” through which Venezuela can integrate into the international system. States like these have contributed to the general decline in anti-American sentiment, and give Venezuela a workable model for change.¶ For all the fever and emotion associated with Latin America, the logic of Venezuela’s economic problems remains cold and calculating. Maduro is not the reincarnation of Chavez and attempts to analyze Venezuela’s future on its Chavismo past are superficial at best. In short, spring is coming. Solvency 2NC---Solvency Cards Sanctions are justified and empirically work in Venezuela— forces them to promote US interests GPO ’11 (the Committees on Oversight and Government Reform and Foreign Affairs; “VENEZUELA’S SANCTIONABLE ACTIVITY”; June 24, 2011; http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112hhrg71297/pdf/CHRG-112hhrg71297.pdf) Venezuela continues to extend a lifeline to Colombian¶ narcotrafficking organizations by providing significant support and safe haven along the border, and it remains one of the most preferred trafficking routes for the transit of cocaine out of South¶ America. U.S. sanctions have successfully targeted and applied financial measures against narcotic traffickers and their organizations in Venezuela, helping to ensure regional security. Venezuela¶ has proven that it cannot be trusted and the United States should¶ take the necessary measures to stifle its powers and ensure regional security, but we must do so in a tactful manner, as not to¶ further empower Chavez. The national security threats posed by¶ Venezuela are complex. We must implement the appropriate measures to protect the people of Venezuela and promote U.S. interests Edward Snowden case proves economic sanctions are an effective threat in Venezuela—relations and economics Gaist 7-8-13 (Thomas Gaist, editor for Global Research; “US escalates threats against governments considering asylum for Snowden”; http://www.globalresearch.ca/usescalates-threats-against-governments-considering-asylum-for-snowden/5342042) Top US officials escalated their threats over the weekend against any government that grants asylum to Edward Snowden, the source of leaks detailing illegal government surveillance programs directed at the population of the United States and the entire world.¶ On Friday, Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro said that the country would offer Snowden “humanitarian asylum,” and the leaders of Nicaragua and Bolivia both indicated that Snowden could receive asylum in those countries as well. The statements came in the wake of the forced grounding of Bolivian president Evo Morales’s plan last week under suspicions that Snowden may have been on board.¶ An anonymous State Department official said over the weekend: “There is not a country in the hemisphere whose government does not understand our position at this point.” The official asserted that granting Snowden asylum “would put relations in a very bad place for a long time to come.” The official continued, “If someone thinks thin would go away, it won’t be the case.”¶ Representatives of both Democrats and Republicans jumped in with threats. “Clearly such acceptance of Snowden to any country…is going to put them directly against the United States, and they need to know that,” Senator Robert Menendez, Democrat of New Jersey, declared on NBC’s Meet the Press Sunday.¶ Congressman Mike Rogers, the Republican head of the House Intelligence Committee, told CNN that the US should consider responding to asylum-granting governments with economic sanctions, so as “to send a very clear message that we won’t put up with this kind of behavior.”¶ These threats are in line with the international campaign of thuggery and intimidation launched by the Obama administration in response to the revelations of secret programs that involve the collection of communications on hundreds of millions of people all over the world.¶ Regarding the downing of Morales’s plane, more information has emerged making clear that the US was behind the action. Latin American media have reported that a US diplomat spread rumors that Snowden was on board the flight, prompting the efforts to force a landing. The Austrian newspaper Die Presse reported that US Ambassador to Austria William Eacho “claimed with great certainty that Edward Snowden was onboard.”¶ Maduro reported that he was personally informed by a European minister that “it was the CIA that gave the order to the air traffic authorities, which gave the alert that Snowden was going in the plane.” While the details surrounding the forced landing remain unclear, it is in blatant violation of international law.¶ The downing of Morales’s plan makes clear that Snowden will face enormous obstacles as he attempts to travel to any asylum-granting country, even if he receives approval from its government.¶ If he accepts asylum in Venezuela, Snowden would still need to get there from his current location in the Russian airport. The commercial flight from Moscow to Venezuela stops in Cuba and passes through European airspace. It would thus be in danger of being forced to land by European governments acting at the behest of the United States. ¶ For its part, Russia is pushing for Snowden to leave quickly. Prominent Russian parliamentarian Alexei Pushkov, who is very close to the Kremlin, tweeted Sunday: “Venezuela is waiting for an answer from Snowden. This, perhaps, is his last chance to receive political asylum.”¶ “He needs to choose a place to go,” said Russian deputy foreign minister Sergey Ryabkov.¶ Maduro said late Saturday night that Snowden has until today to contact the Venezuelan government in response to the asylum offer.¶ Russia has made clear that it is unwilling to sour relations with Washington over the issue, and that Snowden would have to accept censorship—an end to his exposures of mass spying—as a condition for staying in Russia. Russian President Vladimir Putin offered asylum to the whistleblower, but Snowden declined after Putin demanded that he cease “harming our American partners.”¶ Moreover, any asylum granted from Venezuela or any other Latin American country must be seen highly conditional. Latin American heads of state are using the occasion to burnish their images as opponents of US imperialism. However, all these countries are heavily susceptible to US pressure and dependent on the US economy.¶ In spite of his tough talk, Maduro has made clear that he wants to improve relations with the United States. At the same time, the leader of the main opposition party in Venezuela, Henrique Capriles, has denounced the offer of asylum. 2NC---Solves Corruption/Democracy A pressure strategy will democratize Venezuela and put an end to corruption Walser and Zuckerman ’13 (Ray Walser and Jessica Zuckerman—Senior Policy Analyst for Latin America and Research Associate in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies; “Venezuela After Chavez: U.S. Should Rally to Democracy”; http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/03/venezuela-afterdeath-of-chavez-us-should-rally-to-democracy) A principled U.S. policy toward Venezuela should be guided by continued commitments to broad-based—not just electoral—democracy enshrined in the 2001 Inter-American Democratic Charter. Preservation of the constitutional order in Venezuela requires new elections that are not only free but fair. The interests of the U.S. will be best served with the return of fully functioning democracy (separation of powers, rule of law, protection of individual rights and liberties) in Venezuela. To achieve these objectives, the Obama Administration should:¶ Deliver by public diplomacy channels a comprehensive report on the costs and consequences of the Chavez regime;¶ Insist on maintaining the 30-day electoral timetable and press for real international electoral observation;¶ Signal clearly that anything other than free and fair elections will open the door to possible diplomatic and economic sanctions;¶ Continue to investigate narco-corruption and collect intelligence on criminal, terrorist, and Iranian activity in Venezuela; and¶ Refrain from restoring relations at the ambassadorial level without a firm Venezuelan commitment to cooperate in fighting drug trafficking and international terrorism.¶ Too Big to Ignore¶ The weeks and months ahead are a period of opportunity and peril in Venezuela. The Obama Administration should not be content with leading from behind or claiming more pressing engagements. From defending democracy to preserving stability, a post-Chavez Venezuela is too big to ignore. Economic sanctions effectively promote democracy— comparative study Collins ‘9 (Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science and International Affairs at Kennesaw State University; December 2009, “Democracy Sanctions: An Assessment of Economic Sanctions as an Instrument of Democracy Promotion”; http://www.tfd.org.tw/docs/dj0502/069-096%20Stephen%20D.%20Collins.pdf) Democracy promotion is often dismissed as a futile American foreign policy endeavor. Economic sanctions conventionally are derided as ineffective and counterproductive. Consequently, one might predict that the use of economic sanctions to promote democracy would represent a hopelessly inept strategy. This study finds, conversely, that sanctions represent a relatively effective instrument of democracy promotion. The idea that sanctions were futile was minted in the bipolar era, when the structural attributes of the international system limited the effectiveness of superpower sanctions. After the marked shift in the polar configuration of power upon the disappearance of the Soviet Union, however, the structural attributes of the system presented a more benign environment for the sanctions efforts of the United States. A comparative analysis of the use of democracy sanctions in the bipolar era versus those implemented in the 1990s reveals that sanctions became significantly more effective. This essay examines the causal origins of the increase in the effectiveness of democracy sanctions, and considers whether the high success rate for the approach can be sustained into the near future in light of recent challenges to American hegemony. Threatening economic pressure solves democratization— Guatemala proves Collins ‘9 (Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science and International Affairs at Kennesaw State University; December 2009, “Democracy Sanctions: An Assessment of Economic Sanctions as an Instrument of Democracy Promotion”; http://www.tfd.org.tw/docs/dj0502/069-096%20Stephen%20D.%20Collins.pdf) In a number of instances, democracy-promotion sanctions delivered deep and rapid results. In 1993, when Guatemalan President Jorge Serrano dissolved Congress and the judiciary, and attempted to establish an autocratic government, the United States led a coalition of states in terminating all nonhumanitarian aid, and threatening sharp trade sanctions if democracy was not immediately restored. The grave threat of worked to drive a wide number of sectors in Guatemalan society-including business, the military, and civil society-to abandon Serrano. The disgraced Serrano was ousted by the military, Guatemala’s human rights ombudsman took over as president, and the country’s democratic institutions were restored. The coup was reversed within days.26 comprehensive sanctions Maduro is already implementing minor corruption reform— more economic pressure solves Reuters 6-20-13 (Reuters- a CNN news site; “Venezuelan anti-corruption drive snares senior tax official”; http://news.yahoo.com/venezuelan-anti-corruption-drivesnares-senior-tax-official-215330610.html) CARACAS (Reuters) - Venezuela's President Nicolas Maduro announced the arrest of a senior tax official on Thursday in the latest move in what he says is a concerted effort to stamp out corruption in the South American OPEC nation.¶ Maduro said the local director of the SENIAT tax authority in the coastal city of La Guaira had been caught by state intelligence agents with more than 4 million bolivars in cash (about $635,000 at the official exchange rate).¶ "We raided the luxury apartment in eastern Caracas where this bandit was doing business. He was caught in the act with his accomplices," said Maduro, who won a presidential election in April after the death of his mentor, Hugo Chavez.¶ "He was walking around freely, personally taking bribes ... I call on everyone, the revolutionaries, the honest people, to support me in the fight against corruption."¶ So far, Maduro's new drive against graft has snared several senior officials from state companies, organizations and government ministries. None have been heavyweight leaders of the leftist "Chavismo" movement forged by his late mentor.¶ That has prompted opposition leaders such as Henrique Capriles, who lost April's election to Maduro, to accuse his administration of only going after smaller, less politically connected targets.¶ "Our country is governed by a cartel which has a boss, or various bosses, who use Venezuelans' resources like a network of extortion," Capriles said in an interview with local media.¶ Under pressure because of economic woes, Maduro has hit back with the launch a government program called "Efficiency or Nothing," which involves undercover state inspectors investigating claims of corruption in publicly funded projects and organizations.¶ Among those caught in the latest dragnet have been a former president of a state mining company of and various senior figures at the state's consumer protection body, Indepabis. Maduro was due to launch a restructured Indepabis later on Thursday.¶ "Some people are underestimating this fight," Maduro said in his televised comments. "We will catch them red-handed!" 2NC---Anti-Americanism Only the counterplan would resolve anti-Americanism in Latin America via pressure—appeasement fails Walser et al ’12 (Ray—Senior Policy Analyst for Latin America at the Heritage Foundation; “Time Is Ripe for U.S. Policy to Address Anti-Americanism in Latin America”; http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/09/us-policy-to-addressanti-americanism-in-latin-america-needed) No sensible person advocates a return to gunboat diplomacy or trading verbal barbs and insults with Chávez and the Castros. The U.S. therefore should do the following:¶ Cancel or suspend all beneficial commercial arrangements with ALBA countries. These would include, among others, waivers of the type granted to Nicaragua and all trade preferences in whatever form.¶ Oppose grants and concessionary loans to ALBA countries from the Inter-American Development Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank.¶ Fund, where possible, nonpartisan pro-democracy groups in ALBA countries.¶ Push back with public diplomacy in response to particularly egregious statements from ALBA presidents to point out the many failin, inane statements, and erratic behavior of these very leaders.¶ End diplomatic appeasement by ceasing to court ALBA governments at a senior level. The U.S. should make no attempt to send ambassadors to those countries that have rejected or expelled U.S. envoys in the recent past and should not negotiate cooperative or framework agreements with ALBA countries.¶ Standing Against Anti-Americanism in the Americas¶ Until the U.S. begins to send a clear message that there will be genuine consequences for undemocratic, anti-American actions, the Bolivarian anti-American alliance will continue to run roughshod over its own people and fan the flames of anti-Americanism in the Western Hemisphere. Anti-Americanism in Venezuela threatens American hegemony—ALBA and Iran pose serious threats Walser et al ’12 (Ray—Senior Policy Analyst for Latin America at the Heritage Foundation; “Time Is Ripe for U.S. Policy to Address Anti-Americanism in Latin America”; http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/09/us-policy-to-addressanti-americanism-in-latin-america-needed) Anti-Americanism is not a new phenomenon in the Western Hemisphere. Because of U.S. military interventions in the past century, anti-Americanism got a head start in the region.¶ In the post–Cold War era, anti-Americanism has staged a substantial comeback owing to persistent tyranny in Cuba and the emergence of Chávez and the Bolivarian movement in Venezuela and elsewhere. The narcissistic Chávez, a cashiered lieutenant colonel and failed coup plotter, burst onto the international scene in 1999. As president of Venezuela, he inherited a corrupt, oil-rich democracy with yawning disparities in wealth. Since April 2002, when Chávez was nearly toppled by internal opposition, he has blamed the U.S. for nearly all of his nation’s ills. Like the has likened a U.S. President (George W. Bush) to Satan and called the U.S. “the greatest terrorist nation.”¶ But Venezuela proved too small a country to contain Chávez’s ambitions. He launched a Latin American unity campaign in emulation of his hero, the great liberator Simon Bolivar, recasting Iranians, Chávez the historic Bolivar as primarily an anti-U.S. nationalist. Chávez fashioned an alliance with his other great hero, Fidel Castro, importing Cuban doctors and teachers in exchange for billions in financial aid. He worked with Cuba to launch the ALBA alliance in 2002 to contest U.S. “hegemony” in Latin America. Chávez threatened neighboring Colombia, the U.S.’s closest ally in the region, and offered aid and safe haven to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, a ruthless terrorist group that derives much of its funding from drug trafficking, extortion, and kidnapping.¶ Using discounted oil as an enticement and rallying like-minded leftists to his cause, Chávez enlisted Nicaragua, Bolivia, Ecuador, and several Caribbean islands under ALBA’s banner. In turn, ALBA has become the fulcrum for anti-Americanism in the Americas. It defended the regime of Libya’s Muammar Qadhafi until his death. While the Venezuelan foreign ministry regretted the recent deaths of U.S. diplomats murdered in Libya and denounced the terrorist attack, it was quick to blame the attack on “colonialist aggression” by NATO and demanded an “end to interventionism and campaigns of hatred against Arab and Muslim peoples.” In advance of the October 7 presidential elections in Venezuela, Chávez has sought to portray his rival as a puppet of U.S. imperialism.¶ Chávez and his Bolivarian partners continue to offer diplomatic and economic support for the murderous, Iranian-backed Bashar alAssad regime in Syria. ALBA members hosted Iran’s President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad this year and promised to forge closer political, economic, and security ties with Iran. Reports of secretive financial deals with Iran and other sanctions-busting actions appear regularly. And just last month, Ecuador’s Rafael Correa offered diplomatic asylum to the notorious Julian Assange, founder of WikiLeaks, who is now holed up in Ecuador’s embassy in London.¶ Domestic assaults on private property, rule of law, and individual rights continue unabated among the Bolivarian states. There is an aggressive campaign against media freedom in the region, from virtually absolute control in totalitarian Cuba to increasing curbs on free speech and the imposition of gag rules on those who investigate and criticize government malfeasance in Venezuela. Similarly, the Bolivarian states have increasingly blocked outside assistance to pro-democracy civil society, replicating democracy backlash tactics from Cairo to Moscow. [Insert Heg Impact] 2NC---Economy Corruption reform solves the economy—Maduro key Helios Global 6-4-13 (Independent news agency covering Latin American affairs in conjunction with Fair Observer; “Change in Venezuela Yields Political and Economic Uncertainty”; http://www.fairobserver.com/article/change-venezuela-yields-politicaland-economic-uncertainty) Nicholas Maduro’s narrow electoral triumph over opposition leader Henrique Capriles Radonski in Venezuela’s April 14 elections — to serve out the remainder of the late president Hugo Chavez’s current presidential term — signifies a turning point in Venezuelan politics. Maduro’s victory has also reverberated beyond Venezuela’s borders. Due to its role as a major source of oil, the course of political events in Venezuela also has important implications for the world economy . The death of Chavez has also raised concerns about the prospects of social, political, and economic stability in Venezuela. The victory of Chavez’s heir apparent – Chavez and his supporters went to great lengths to ensure the survival of the Bolivarian Revolution launched by Chavez’s United Socialist Party of Venezuela (known by its Spanish acronym PSUV) – in a politically charged and polarized climate has already resulted in unrest and violence between Maduro’s supporters and his opponents. Venezuela’s increasingly dire economic predicament has further exacerbated tensions across the country.¶ Despite a contentious bilateral relationship, Venezuela remains the fourth-largest supplier of imported oil to the United States. Given the peculiarities of its oil, namely, the category of relatively low quality heavy crude oil that represents the bulk of its oil capacity, Venezuela relies heavily on US refineries located in the Gulf of Mexico that were designed to refine oil from Venezuela (and Mexico). Roughly 40 percent of Venezuela’s oil exports are delivered to the United States. Consequently, the United States is Venezuela’s top trade partner. This is the case even as US imports of Venezuelan oil have steadily declined in recent years. In 1997, the United States imported about 1.7 million barrels of oil per day (bpd) from Venezuela. In contrast, only about one million bpd of Venezuelan oil makes its way to the United States today. Venezuela also boasts major natural gas reserves, possibly the second-largest natural gas reserves in the Western Hemisphere. At the same time, Venezuela’s oil production capacity continues to deteriorate due to mismanagement, corruption , and antiquated infrastructure. Maduro will reform the economy—dire economic situation necessitates a shift in strategy The Economist 4-20-13 (“Maduro’s lousy start”; http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21576399-narrow-tainted-election-victoryfitting-epitaph-his-rotten-predecessor-venezuela) There is at least some justice that the mess created during the Chávez years now falls to a fellow chavista. The economy is in ruins. Growth has stalled, the currency is digesting a 32% devaluation in February and inflation is likely to reach 30%. Price controls, the expropriation of farms and anti-business policies have created food shortages. The appearance in Caracas of sugar or cooking oil can create queues and excitement otherwise seen only in Cuba.¶ Chávez loyalists, of whom there are many millions, will tell Mr Maduro to be more chavista: more populist, more profligate, more authoritarian. He has already aped his predecessor, and fawned on his memory, to the point of parody. Describing Chávez as a “Christ of the Americas”, he referred to the election as “Resurrection Day”.¶ Yet chavismo’s bill is now due. Last year the budget deficit was 8.5% of GDP. Even with oil at over $100 a barrel, Venezuela’s public spending is unsustainable. Power cuts are frequent and roads are crumbling. Under an ineffective police force, the murder rate has soared to twice that of Mexico.¶ Reap what you sow¶ Now is the time for Mr Maduro to unite his country, not crush dissent. He should agree to recount the ballots. The state’s institutions, above all the judiciary and armed forces, need to regain their neutrality. And the weak economy will grow only if the government seeks rapprochement with the private sector and scraps controls on prices and foreign exchange . Mr Maduro’s tainted, wafer-thin victory suggests that Venezuelans want less chavismo, not more. That is certainly what their unfortunate country needs. 2NC---Relations Pressuring Maduro solves relations—now is key Pagano 3-18-13 (James Pagano, contributing editor for Truman National Security Project, “Moving Venezuela to the Center”; http://trumanproject.org/doctrineblog/moving-venezuela-to-the-center/) After over a decade in power, Hugo Chavez is now dead, providing U.S. policy makers an opening to mend fences and steer Venezuela’s next president towards the center. With smart policy and a light touch, the United States can help Venezuela ’s next president lead his country out of the mess that Chavez built.¶ Chavez won the presidency in 1999 on a promise to “sow” the oil wealth of Venezuela into its social program. Bolstered by record high oil prices, Chavez spent billions on such programs. While millions of Venezuelans were able to obtain healthcare and an education, the poorly designed programs left little money to reinvest in oil exploration; output in Venezuela declined threatening the longevity of all Chavez’s initiatives.¶ Meanwhile, Chavez became an increasingly authoritarian leader, consolidating power in the executive. He blacklisted opposition figures, altered the constitution and unevenly enforced laws for personal benefit. By creating a steeply slanted playing field, Chavez was able to retain power.¶ Venezuela’s next president will have to decide whether to reverse these trends, or continue the slide to outright authoritarianism. The United States can and should influence this decision.¶ The United States must support the democratic process and engage the likely winner of April’s election, Chavez’s chosen successor, Nicolás Maduro. He will have a real opportunity to put Venezuela back on the path to a freemarket democracy.¶ The next president will face an extremely politicized Supreme Court and military and reforms are likely more palatable if made by Maduro. Changes to apportionment, food subsidies or tax rates coming from Enrique Capriles (the opposition candidate) could spark a legal challenge from the supreme court; or worse, opposition from the military.¶ What should the U.S. role be? It must work with its Latin American allies in the region, Chile, Brazil, Colombia and Mexico to gently pressure Maduro into making the types of institutional and economic changes necessary for Venezuela to prosper. Failure to do so could lead to the reemergence of authoritarianism in Latin America, instability in world oil markets and serious regional security repercussions.¶ Chavez was infamous for his anti-American tirades. George W. Bush’s poor global standing gave Chavez an easy target. With a more positive global image, the most important step President Obama can take is to normalize relations with Cuba. As Venezuela’s closest ally, Cuba has remained a persistent problem in U.S.-Latin American relations.¶ By normalizing relations, Obama would take a huge step in reducing anti-Americanism in Venezuela. Simultaneously, Obama would ingratiate himself to the rest of the region by ending the dated embargo. Perhaps most importantly, eliminating this issue would give Venezuela’s next president the political cover necessary to mend relations with the United States.¶ The U.S. should push for economic reform with the help of Brazil which seeks a greater role in international and regional politics. Former Brazilian President Lula da Silva has close ties to Venezuela, and touting the recent successes of his center-left government in Brazil could help persuade Maduro to moderate his government.¶ Brazil has made huge societal gains without suffering the kind of economic setbacks seen in Venezuela. Friendly cajoling, along with the promise of closer economic ties could help lead Maduro onto a path of economic reform necessary to extend certain “Chavista” social programs.¶ Colombia, Brazil and the U.S. also have a shared interest in improving Venezuelan security. Under Chavez, Venezuela became on the most violent countries in Latin America, as drug related crimes skyrocketed.¶ Violence is the number one concern of Venezuelans, and significant reductions would be a major political victory for whoever is in power. Brazil and Colombia together should pressure Venezuela to accept sorely needed D.E.A assistance with the tacit acceptance of modest political reforms, most importantly freer press.¶ The death of Chavez is a critical juncture in U.S.-Latin American relations and it is important the United States not miss this opportunity. Having a stable trustworthy Venezuela would allow the United States to continue to draw down operations in the ever-volatile Middle East, fight narcotrafficking and expand trade.¶ Careful, well thought-out overtures and policy changes will help quell lingering anti-Americanism while also improving regional stability. Ending the Cuban embargo would provide absolute economic gain for all parties, while providing cover for Maduro to thaw relations with the United States and receive aid to stop uncontrollable violence. Strategic engagement with regional allies could help spur the economic and institutional reforms necessary for Venezuela to prosper moving forward.¶ The situation in Venezuela could be potentially destabilizing to the region. The United must act deliberately to make Hugo Chavez’s passing an unmitigated positive development. 2NC---Drug Trafficking Reform critical to ending drug trafficking—judicial system Coronel ’08 (Gustavo Coronel, as president of Agrupacion Pro Calidad de Vida, was the Venezuelan representative to Transparency International from 1996-2000. He was a member of the board of directors of Petroleos de Venezuela from 1976- 79; March 2008; “The Corruption of Democracy in Venezuela”; http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/corruption-democracy-venezuela) Drug trafficking. Venezuela has become a haven for Colombian guerrillas who move dru across the country with impunity due to the absence of border controls. A report by Andy Webb-Vidal for Jane’s Intelligence Review in May 2006 reveals that cocaine operations are shifting to Venezuela; he notes that drug volumes going through the country have skyrocketed during the last 10 years. Prominent drug traffickers of Colombian origin live without fear of prosecution in Venezuela.¶ Chavez obviously has failed to live up to his electoral promises to end corruption. The record is clear. The Corruption Perception Index, published by Transparency International, has shown a progressive deterioration of the ranking of Venezuela, both in Latin America and the world. The latest index shows Venezuela in position 138 among 163 countries. This is the worst ranking of all Latin American nations with the exception of Haiti. Vice Pres. Jorge Rodríguez, expressing the official position of the government, claims that Transparency International “was a discredited institution since it charges a tariff for positioning countries favorably in the rankin.” Transparency International is headquartered in Berlin, Germany, and has chapters in more than 100 countries, including Venezuela. It is a highly respected organization and its corruption rankin are accepted by the international community as the best source of information on this global problem.¶ Meanwhile, the Venezuelan ranking in the Economic Freedom of the World Index is 126 out of 130 nations, above only the Republic of Congo, Zimbabwe, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. This ranking has been declining steadily since Chavez came to power. It has been established that countries with little economic freedom, characterized by exchange controls, military influence in government, and predominance of state-owned enterprises display the highest levels of corruption. Moreover, the Human Development Index produced yearly by the United Nations also charts Venezuela in free-fall. The country has lost 30 places in this index in the last six years. 2NC---Human Rights A pressure strategy has empirically solved human rights issues Sikkink ’93 (Kathryn Sikkink, Arleen C. Carlson Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota; “Human Rights, Principled Issue-Networks, and Sovereignty in Latin America” – The MIT Press, Summer 1993, http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2706982.pdf?acceptTC=true) To become effective, the means had to be found to translate the human rights ideals of the declaration and treaties of the postwar period into widely shared understandin and practices. The human rights network helped foster these means in two ways. International organizations developed formal procedures to discuss and investigate human rights situations in member states. But formal procedures are ineffective if not used. The work of NGOs made states' repressive practices more visible and salient, thus forcing states that otherwise would have remained silent to respond. As they became more aware of human rights violations, some states demanded explanations from others. Faced with increased pressures , repressive states tried to provide justifications. In the give-and-take of exposing violations, demanding explanations, providing justifications, and changing practices, states and NGOs gradually questioned traditional understandin of sovereignty and began constructing the elements of a modified sovereignty. When a state recognizes the legitimacy of interna- tional interventions on the topic of human rights and changes its domestic human rights practices in response to these international pressures, it reconsti- tutes the relationship between the state, its citizens, and international actors. To make the argument about the transformation of sovereignty more precise, I will specify a continuum of state actions and declarations that move from reinforcing traditional understandin of the scope of sovereignty to revealing a reconceptualized sovereignty in which a state accepts that gross violations of human rights will no longer be an issue solely within its domestic jurisdiction Economic pressure solves Human Rights—Cold War proves Collins ‘9 (Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science and International Affairs at Kennesaw State University; December 2009, “Democracy Sanctions: An Assessment of Economic Sanctions as an Instrument of Democracy Promotion”; http://www.tfd.org.tw/docs/dj0502/069-096%20Stephen%20D.%20Collins.pdf) Economic sanctions were applied by the United States on numerous occasions during the Cold War to promote democracy abroad. Washington levied trade and aid sanctions on states in Latin America , Africa, Asia, and Eastern Europe to foster democratic political rights and civil liberties. The goals of democracy promotion sanctions during the bipolar era were less grandiose, however, than those levied in the unipolar era. With a few notable exceptions, sanctions were not designed to stimulate major changes in foreign states’ political systems; that is, they were not designed to foster genuine democratization. Rather, the objective of economic pressure was to compel states to improve human rights practices. Rhodesia and South Africa represent exceptional cases in which sanctions were designed to force those states to enfranchise their black populations and provide them with a role in the political system commensurate with their majority status. Genuine enfranchisement for the black populations of Southern Africa would have constituted a sweeping democratic reform. Sanctions applied against other states strove to produce more modest political changes, such as dissuading specific human rights abuses. These objectives, while valuable, constitute more limited requirements than the demands for democratization that Washington would make in the unipolar era. 2NC---Prolif/Terrorism Pressure is key to solve prolif and terrorism DeMelfi ‘6 (Christy M. DeMelfi, New York Lawyer and author for the Journal of International Business and Law; 1/1/2006; “Nothing But The Facts: An In-Depth Analysis Of The Effects Of Economic Sanctions Against Cuba”; http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1064&context=ji bl)// The exact purpose of economic sanctions varies by situation.¶ According to Richard N. Haass, director of the Foreign Policy Study of the¶ Brookin Institute in Washington, D.C., there are four basic purposes of¶ economic sanctions. These purposes are deterrence, punishment, coercion, and¶ signaling. Deterrence is the goal of trying to prevent something from occurring,¶ while coercion is trying to convince a country to act in a certain way.¶ Punishment and signaling are similar goals in that they both express a dislike of¶ another country's actions. Punishment is done after the action has occurred,¶ while signaling is done prior to the action. Sanctions may be implemented in¶ order to achieve any one or a combination of these goals. Although there are¶ only four main purposes of sanctions, there are many more specific goals which¶ fall under one of the general categories. One common reason for imposing economic sanctions is to achieve a¶ national security objective. The basic goal may be " to deter military aggression¶ or to force an aggressor to withdraw its armed forces from a disputed territory."¶ 1997, pg. 4) Another goal may be (O'Quinn, to "discourage the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, end support for terrorism or¶ discourage armed aggression." (Haass, 1998, pg. 1) In this case, the sanctions¶ will serve as a signal for a country to discontinue its threat to the sender¶ country's security or else face military action. The goal of a sanction may even¶ be the replacement of a government if the threat from that regime is very high. 2NC---Oil Affirmative Only counterplan solves PDVSA corruption Coronel ’08 (Gustavo Coronel, as president of Agrupacion Pro Calidad de Vida, was the Venezuelan representative to Transparency International from 1996-2000. He was a member of the board of directors of Petroleos de Venezuela from 1976- 79; March 2008; “The Corruption of Democracy in Venezuela”; http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/corruption-democracy-venezuela)// High levels of mismanagement at the state-owned petroleum company, Petroleos de Venezuela. Corruption here takes many shapes. It includes the naming of six presidents and boards in seven years, in an effort to control the company politically. This finally was accomplished by naming the Minister of Energy and Petroleum president of the company, in violation of good management practice, since he now supervises himself. As a result, oil production has declined by some 800,000 barrels per day during the last decade . In a recent public hearing, Luis Vierma, the firm’s Vice President for Exploration and Production, admitted giving an oil well drilling contract for some $20,000,000 to a company with only three employees and no ri. AT: Aff Args 2NC---AT Perm Our threat is the only way to solve—there have to be repercussions without concessions—positive inducement links to the appeasement DA Ros-Lehtinen ’13 (Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen is chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa; 3/14/13; “Venezuela after Chavez: What comes next?”; http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/mar/14/venezuela-after-chavez-whatcomes-next/)// Since 1999, the Venezuelan people have suffered under an oppressive, neosocialist dictatorship that disregarded human rights, the rule of law and freedom of the press. For 14 years, Hugo Chavez trampled over democratic order, jailed political prisoners and oppressed the Venezuelan people. Chavez reportedly accumulated vast amounts of wealth estimated in the billions while Venezuelans suffered from high inflation and joblessness, rampant food shortages and a private sector that is threatened at every turn.¶ Venezuela is a pivotal national security interest for the United States. It is one of the largest foreign suppliers of crude oil to the United States and is a strategic foothold that continues to pose a threat to our interests in the region. Chavez was instrumental in bringing the threat of narcoterrorism, illicit activities by foreign terrorist organizations and the Iranian regime, including elements of Hezbollah, to the Western Hemisphere. Chavez’s cronies have made it abundantly clear that they do not wish to cooperate with U.S. law enforcement officials on terrorism and countering the narcotics trade. This was made clear once again as the new leadership in Venezuela expelled two U.S. Air Force attaches shortly before Chavez’s death. This unwarranted, provocative action was reciprocated last week when two Venezuelan diplomats were expelled from Washington. Still, there is more to be done.¶ In a post-Chavez era, much attention is being focused on new elections and a call for democratic order. However, elections for the sake of elections do not constitute a true democracy. Venezuela's National Electoral Council is extremely corrupt and colludes with Chavez loyalists, who aim to intimidate the masses in Venezuela by controlling the media and judicial system. A free, fair and transparent election cannot be conducted if the same players continue to control the already tainted electoral process. The authoritarian regime cannot be allowed to simply shift control from one despot to another in an effort to maintain its iron grip over the Venezuelan people.¶ The United States’ role in the post-Chavez era should be to support democratic order by continuing to promote the Venezuelan civil society and ensuring that their rights are respected. The freedom-hungry people of Venezuela fear that the United States is too weak to counter interim President Nicolas Maduro. Support for pro-democracy leaders cannot be accomplished if the Obama administration continues to cozy up to their oppressors and refuses to draw a line in the sand for Mr. Maduro, demanding an end to these undemocratic policies.¶ Last year, it was reported that the Obama administration was seeking to exchange ambassadors in an attempt to normalize relations between the countries. The U.S. State Department’s approach was extremely premature, and it, unfortunately, legitimized Mr. Maduro without even questioning whether the Venezuelan Constitution was being upheld. The Obama administration continued to send mixed messages and to undermine the opposition by sending a delegation to attend Chavez’s funeral services last week, alonide enemies of the United States, such as Iranian leader Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Words matter, but actions matter more, and this decision not only sends mixed signals to the people of Venezuela, but reiterates the failed policy of attempting to reestablish diplomatic relations.¶ It is in our best interest if political and economic reforms come to Venezuela, but all signs currently point to the contrary. As the leader of the Chavista movement, Mr. Maduro could potentially be worse for the Venezuelan people and for U.S. national security interests. Mr. Maduro still controls all branches of government, stifles free speech and was indoctrinated with socialist ideology. He has traveled to Tehran and has strong ties with Iran, supports the Assad regime in Syria and has become a lap dog for Cuba’s Castro brothers.¶ In January, the Castros orchestrated the violation of the Venezuelan Constitution when Chavez did not take the oath of office. The U.S. State Department responded that it is up to the Venezuelan people to decide if there was a violation, and that it would not interpret the constitution. However, those sentiments were nowhere to be found in 2009 when the State Department led the charge against the people of Honduras, helped expel Honduras from the Organization of American States, and did not recognize Honduras’ constitutional authorities. Why the double standard? Democratic rights under the Inter-American Democratic Charter cannot be selective; they must be uniform.¶ The United States should be telling the leaders of Venezuela that they need to respect the constitution, abide by the Inter-American Democratic Charter and uphold democratic principles. These democratic processes can only be enforced if the Venezuelan leadership thinks that there will be serious repercussions if they do not take responsible actions to fulfill their obligations. This is an opportunity for the United States and responsible nations to demonstrate a commitment to restoring true democracy to Venezuela, and I hope the opportunity isn’t missed. Economic sanctions don’t work alongside concessions DeMelfi ‘6 (Christy M. DeMelfi, New York Lawyer and author for the Journal of International Business and Law; 1/1/2006; “Nothing But The Facts: An In-Depth Analysis Of The Effects Of Economic Sanctions Against Cuba”; http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1064&context=ji bl) Economic sanctions are the most common tool in international politics.¶ Sanctions serve as an important aspect of foreign policy, because of the¶ frequency with which they are used. In order to understand why sanctions are¶ so important, one must first know the definition of a sanction. An economic¶ sanction can be defined as a restriction imposed on one country, the target, by¶ another country, the sender. This restriction is meant to persuade the target¶ country to change a policy by affecting international commerce engaged in by¶ the target. In other words, sanctions are policy tools imposed by a country to¶ influence another country in order to achieve some political goal. Perm is impossible—a pressure strategy can’t be coupled with unconditional engagement Caro ’06 (Ariela Ruiz Caro is an economist with expertise in economic integration processes at the University of Buenos Aires, was appointed Attaché for Economic Affairs at the Embassy of Peru in Argentina by Foreign Minister Rafael Roncagliolo, an international consultant on trade, integration and natural resources in the ECLAC, Latin American Economic System, SELA, Institute for the Integration of Latin America and the Caribbean, INTAL; “U.S. Trade Sanctions Seek to Pressure Latin America”, 8/24/2006, http://www.globalpolitician.com/default.asp?22078-foreign-latin) The U.S. government's announcement that it will review the possibility of limiting, suspending, or withdrawing trade preferences under the General System of Preferences (P) to three Latin American countries—Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela—is political pressure to make these nations participate in the model of regional integration proposed by the United States. The P is a mechanism through which developed countries (especially the United States, the European Union, and Japan) offer preferential access to their markets to products from underdeveloped countries, through exemption from tariffs and customs fees. This preferential and unilateral treatment from industrialized nations, delivered for more than three decades, has been used often as an instrument of political intimidation toward the beneficiary countries. The recent failure of multilateral negotiations in the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the recognition by industrialized countries that they will only be able to impose a trade system based on their requirements if it is built through bilateral agreements, has led some countries that give preferences to threaten to withdraw them. Specifically, the United States has announced it will carry out a review to determine whether to continue to offer the preferences to twelve countries, among them, the three Latin American nations mentioned. 2NC---AT: Squo Solves Maduro is shoving democracy aside—US intervention is critical Washington Post 4-16-13 (Washington Post Editorial Board; “Nicolas Maduro shoves aside democracy in Venezuela”; http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-0416/opinions/38584114_1_nicolas-maduro-recount-mr) THE ATTEMPT by the followers of Hugo Chavez to install a successor to the dead caudillo through a one-sided election is faltering. Now the Venezuelan regime appears to be preparing to maintain itself in power through brute force — and the oil-producing country is headed for a crisis that demands the attention of the United States and Latin America’s democracies.¶ On Tuesday, Nicolas Maduro, the former bus driver and Cuban protege who was designated as Mr. Chavez’s successor, went on national television to announce that he would “not permit” a march Wednesday called by the opposition to support its call for a recount of votes in Sunday’s election. Promising to use “a strong hand” — a hoary phrase from Latin America’s history of dictatorship — Mr. Maduro spoke of protesters “filling [Caracas] with death and blood,” words that rang like a threat. The government said that seven people already had been killed in post-election clashes and claimed that a coup was being prepared.¶ In fact, if anyone is preparing a coup, it is Mr. Maduro and his Cuban advisers. Opposition leader Henrique Capriles Radonski has put forward a peaceful and reasonable demand: that an audit be undertaken of the suspect presidential vote count. Mr. Maduro himself said Sunday that he would agree to a recount — but on Monday the electoral commission he controls abruptly ratified a result that gave him a margin of 260,000 votes out of 14.8 million cast. The narrow outcome clearly shocked the Chavistas, who had already installed Mr. Maduro in the presidency by unconstitutional means; they expected that their domination of the media and orchestration of voting by state employees would produce an easy “victory” and legitimize the regime’s continuation.¶ In fact a majority of Venezuelans, including many former Chavez supporters, appear to be fed up with a “revolution” that has produced double-digit inflation, severe shortages of power and staple foods and one of the world’s highest murder rates. Mr. Maduro has offered no answers to these problems — only ludicrous claims that they are the product of conspiracies by the opposition and the United States. Amid signs that his movement may be splintering, Mr. Maduro appears to be preparing repressive measures that should be intolerable to members of the Organization of American States, who are bound by treaty to resist violations of democratic order.¶ Fortunately the Obama administration, which until recently was prematurely and unwisely courting Mr. Maduro, has questioned the quick certification of the election and supported the call for the recount; so has the government of Spain and OAS Secretary General José Miguel Insulza. The administration should begin coordinating with Mexico, Chile and other important Latin American democracies to prevent Mr. Maduro from killing his way into power. 2NC---Say Yes Several factors prove Maduro would cooperate SRI 5-1-13 (Strategic Risk Index and Aegis Advisory Strategic Risk Alert—a specialist consultancy that supports businesses in assessing and adjusting their exposure to risk by providing privileged insights and timely intelligence; “Tentative economic reform looms in Venezuela”; http://www.strategicriskindex.com/pdf/Tentative%20economic%20reform%20looms% 20in%20Venezuela%201%20May%202013.pdf) Nicolás Maduro, Venezuela’s new president, has quickly made efforts to assert his authority, announcing his new ¶ administration in late April after taking office on 19 April. He has brought 14 new faces into the 31-member cabinet, the ¶ most significant being the new finance minister Nelson Merentes, who replaced the long-serving Jorge Giordani. This ¶ may signify a more pragmatic approach towards economic policy from the Maduro government after the presidency of ¶ Hugo Chávez, potentially relaxing access to hard currency as well as easing price controls. But anyone expecting a ¶ major economic shift should bear in mind the extent to which Maduro is hostage to political necessity, with his ebbing ¶ popularity making him vulnerable to pressure from both the opposition and his so-called allies.¶ Maduro won the election on 14 April with a wafer-thin majority of 50.7 per cent to 49.1 per cent for opposition leader ¶ Henrique Capriles. This was a surprise, given that Chávez, his predecessor and mentor, won re-election in October ¶ 2012 with a 10-point lead over Capriles. Although Maduro was expected to suffer in comparison to the charismatic ¶ Chávez, losing such a lead in the month since Chávez’s death on 5 March is a worrying signal for his new administration ¶ and may trigger a reassessment of current strategy.¶ Throughout the campaign, Maduro presented himself as Chávez’s heir, making a virtue of the fact that he was offering ¶ no new policies. However, while Chávez had managed to hold onto his fervent supporters despite the deteriorating ¶ economy, rising crime rates and surging inflation, the most recent election result illustrates that Maduro lacks this ¶ ability. Without being able to rely on sheer personality to win votes in the same way, Maduro’s hand will therefore be ¶ forced into tackling some difficult issues, particularly the economy and crime. Hence the appointment of the more ¶ moderate Merentes to the finance ministry: Giordani was a Chávez ideological standard-bearer on the economy, ¶ overseeing the introduction of price and exchange controls, which had the side effects of food and currency shortages as ¶ well as a spike in the inflation level to 31 per cent. Although Giordani is still in the cabinet as Planning Minister, the rise ¶ of Merentes may be an acknowledgement that these policies now need to be relaxed or amended An economic sanction would spark Venezuela reaction Duddy ’12 (Patrick D. Duddy is a senior lecturer in international studies at Duke University and former U.S. ambassador to Venezuela; “Political Unrest in Venezuela”; September 2012; http://www.cfr.org/venezuela/political-unrest-venezuela/p28936) Economic Interests: A significant number of U.S. companies have operations in Venezuela; it remains an important market for U.S. goods and some services, especially oil services. Many of these companies could be at risk if violent internal conflict broke out. Venezuela is consistently among the five largest foreign suppliers of oil to the United States. The United States is Venezuela's largest market, buying up to nine hundred thousand barrels of oil daily, up to 45 percent of Venezuela's total oil exports. Around six hundred thousand barrels of Venezuelan crude per day are refined at CITGO facilities in the United States. Although a cut off of Venezuelan oil to the United States is theoretically possible, it is unlikely given Venezuela's dependence on the U.S. market.¶ The United States is now less vulnerable to a cut off of supply from Venezuela as U.S. domestic production has risen and imports from elsewhere could relatively quickly replace Venezuelan oil. Venezuela's economy, on the other hand, has become more dependent on petroleum. Although production has stagnated since 2003, oil accounts for over 95 percent of Venezuela's export earnin, and export revenue pays for nearly 50 percent of the government's budget. Thus, although Venezuela is vulnerable to pressure via its dependence on its oil exports generally and the U.S. market and refineries specifically, global markets would likely react negatively to either an interruption of Venezuelan production or a crisis in U.S.Venezuelan relations that threatens the bilateral trade in oil. 2NC---Now Key Chavez’ death means now is key for US pressure to end corruption in Venezuela Walser and Zuckerman ’13 (Ray Walser and Jessica Zuckerman—Senior Policy Analyst for Latin America and Research Associate in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies; “Venezuela After Chavez: U.S. Should Rally to Democracy”; http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/03/venezuela-afterdeath-of-chavez-us-should-rally-to-democracy) On Tuesday, cancer claimed the life of Venezuela’s President Hugo Chavez, silencing one of Latin America’s most controversial leaders in the 21st century. Chavez’s death opens the way to an uncertain succession process, continued polarization, and potential instability in oil-rich Venezuela.¶ Dealing with a post- Chavez Venezuela will require an ongoing U.S. commitment to free and fair presidential elections, to the defense of individual rights and liberties, and to leveraging future improvements in bilateral relations to genuine cooperation in the fight against transnational crime and terrorism. Working with Venezuela for a more stable and secure hemispheric energy market is also a desired, if still distant, objective.¶ From Coup-Maker to Kingmaker¶ During his 14-year presidency (1999–2013), Chavez developed a unique combination of populism, authoritarianism, socialism, and combativeness that won him the adulation of the masses and a large international following. Born in 1954, the career military officer and failed military coup-maker of 1992 emerged as the self-proclaimed revolutionary kingmaker of Venezuela’s politics. As president, Chavez survived an inept 2002 coup, a massive oil strike, a recall referendum, and a battle to institute term limits. He won re-elections in 2006 and 2012 by comfortable margins. His goal was to govern until 2032.¶ By tapping Venezuela’s enormous oil wealth, Chavez advanced a hybrid economic program of nationalizations, socialist economics, free spending social programs, price and exchange controls, and crony capitalism dubbed “Socialism of the 21st Century.” Under the banner of “participatory democracy,” Chavez offered a grassroots strategy that gave limited authority to local communities, forged loyal political cadres, and created a network of citizen-clients. Subsidies, social missions, and patronage power were the ties holding the system together.¶ Via constitutional suicide, Chavez concentrated unprecedented powers in the executive’s hands. He ushered in a new model for elected authoritarianism that ended separation of powers and institutional autonomy in Venezuela while toppling rule of law and constricting basic rights and liberties. Admirers hailed him as the greatest Latin American since Fidel Castro. Chavez’s legacy, they claim, is a genuine revolution of social justice that has improved the lives of millions. The October 2012 presidential re-election demonstrated that his style and plan for governance could still deliver electoral victories.¶ Nonetheless, Chavez’s successor will face many challenges, including over- dependence on oil revenues and a comparatively stagnant oil industry starved of muchneeded re-investment. High inflation, a recent currency devaluation, capital flight, food shortages, and extremely high levels of homicide and criminal violence will be handed down. National investment has been haphazard, and infrastructure has crumbled. Venezuelan society remains polarized, overly militarized, and ripe with corruption. A fall in oil prices or a debt crisis could send it into recession. From economic freedom to perceptions of corruption, Venezuela raced relentlessly toward the bottom in global rankin. *Aff* Pressure Fails / AT Snowden Proves Venezuela won’t adhere to pressure—South American alliances and international law prove—most recent ev Daly 7-12-13 (Marilyn Daly—graduate of the University of Miami with a B.A. in Communications. She is a life long teacher and tutor in the field of History, Government, Economics, and Law. She earned a Masters Degree from Florida International University, and is presently the developing editor for NewsNetworkReport.com; “South American countries unite against U.S. policies”; http://www.examiner.com/article/south-american-countries-unite-against-u-s-policies) Reuter reports that leaders from Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay and Bolivia will be meeting today to discuss many issues of mutual concern, including the alleged spying by the United States at the international level, possible asylum for Edward Snowden, and the detention of Bolivian President Evo Moralas last week in Europe, after he was denied access to travel airspace by several European countries. Morales was suspected of having Edward Snowden aboard his airplane, an allegation that ended up being false. Edward Snowden is wanted by the United States on suspicion of espionage and theft, and has been formally charged by the U.S. Department of Justice.¶ The South American group meeting today is part of Mercosur, or the “Common Market of the South.” Mercosur is a South American Trade Bloc. It includes Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay, and Venezuela, with five associate members: Chile, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru, who do not have access to all the cooperative benefits, but do receive tariff reduction in return for the same from participating countries. Their mission is to promote free trade among the participating nations in goods and services. Mercosur came out of the 1991 "Treaty of Asuncion" between South American nations, with hopes of creating a union similar to the European Union, uniting all of the South America countries in a cooperative economic bloc. ¶ Ever since the allegations that the United States’ National Security Agency (NSA) targeted many Latin American countries with spying programs, the leaders of some of these nations want clarification and details of the extent of the spying from U.S. officials. ¶ Edward Snowden is still presently delayed at a Russian Airport evaluating his options for asylum, with many nations not wanting to cooperate due to U.S. pressure. Nonetheless, Reuter further reports that Venezuelan Foreign Minister Elias Jaua announced:¶ "We believe that the international community must demand the right of all citizens of the world to request asylum: diplomatic, political, humanitarian, whatever you want to call it," "Venezuela is going to exercise its right under international law regardless of threats, regardless of retaliation, regardless of consequences," Maduro Says No Maduro won’t give in to pressure—has to gain legitimacy through Chavismo policies Grais-Targow ’13 (Risa Grais-Targow is an associate in Eurasia Group's Latin America practice. Previously, Risa covered Latin American economies for financial clients at the Institute of International Finance, based in Washington, DC; “Maduro’s victory is the worst possible outcome for Venezuela’s economy”; April 15, 2013; http://qz.com/74567/maduros-victory-is-the-worst-possible-outcome-for-venezuelaseconomy/) Further complicating matters, Maduro begins his presidency in a very difficult economic context. The economy is plagued by sluggish economic growth (0.9% in 2013 according to local consultancy Ecoanalitica), high inflation (25% year-overyear in March), dollar and goods scarcity, stagnant oil production, and fiscal accounts that are in disarray. In this context, Maduro will struggle to recover popularity.¶ Consequently, economic policy and political stability will likely suffer. Maduro will be an inherently weak president, and will be under pressure to reverse social discontent, which means he is unlikely to make needed economic adjustments. This means that foreign exchange and price controls will likely remain in place, and demands on state-run oil company PDVSA for financing will remain high, limiting the firm’s investment capacity. Moreover, Maduro will be constrained in his ability to implement more pragmatic policies, as he will need to prove his revolutionary credentials in order to legitimize his role as heir to Chavez. In this context, Maduro will likely attempt to rally his support base by finding common enemies. This means he will probably have to take some tough actions , especially towards the private sector, such as further nationalizations or more stringent controls.¶ In this context, political dynamics will likely deteriorate further, and rapidly, which will also worsen economic conditions, increasing the risk of political instability. Maduro won’t cooperate—more pressure only pushes him over the edge O’Reilly ’13 (Andrew O’Reilly--bachelor’s degree in journalism from the University of Pittsburgh and a joint master’s degree in journalism and Latin American studies from New York University. His regional focus in reporting is Mexico and Central America. Andrew now works at Fox News Latino; “U.S.-Venezuelan Relations Remain Tense Under Maduro, Experts Claim”; April 17, 2013; http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/politics/2013/04/17/us-venezuelan-relations-remaintense-under-maduro-experts-claim/) While the ultimate impact of the Venezuelan presidential election remains to be seen, what's for sure is that relations between the United States and the administration of President-elect Nicolás Maduro will continue to be as tense as under the late Hugo Chávez, experts said.¶ After voting on Sunday in a Caracas slum, Maduro said that while he would like to reestablish relations with the U.S. “in terms of equality and respect,” Washington will always try to undermine his rule.¶ These words followed a steady rhetoric on the campaign trail of Maduro accusing the U.S. of conspiring against him and causing disruptions in Venezuela to unseat his rule, including working with opposition labor unions and causing electric power blackouts. ¶ Experts argue that given Maduro’s anti-American sentiments leading up to the election, as well as the controversy surrounding his victory and the polarization in Venezuela, there is little hope for a change in relations between the countries.¶ It’s hard to see [Maduro] backing off his rhetoric in the aftermath of the election...Americans will insist on a level of respect that he is not going to give them.¶ “It’s hard to see [Maduro] backing off his rhetoric in the aftermath of the election,” Eric Hershberg, the director of American University’s Center for Latin American and Latino Studies, told Fox News Latino. “Americans will insist on a level of respect that he is not going to give them.”¶ The death of Hugo Chávez put Maduro and the rest of the Venezuelan left in a difficult position. Chávez’s charisma held the movement together and his social spending allowed him to skirt the dicey issues of rising inflation, high crime and a fledgling economy.¶ While the current election results are still being debated, how Maduro faces the country’s mounting problems – both politically and socially – are what will decide is he and Chavismo survive his six-year term.¶ In 2009, Chávez led a successful push for a constitutional referendum that abolished term limits for the offices of President, state governors, mayors and congress members. The previous provision established a three-term limit for deputies and a twoterm limit for the other offices, but with the 2009 referendum, Chávez – or any other leader – could ostensibly stay in power indefinitely. ¶ Maduro does not have the charm or power to hold the Chavista movement together nor make Venezuelans forget about the problems plaguing their nation. If Sunday’s vote is any indication, Venezuela is torn between Chávez’s legacy and a dismal future, with the official results giving Maduro 51 percent of the vote to challenger Henrique Capriles’ 49 percent – although opposition sources showed Capriles winning by more than 300,000 votes.¶ “Chávez could overcome the detractors because he was viewed as a national hero, Maduro doesn’t have that,” said Larry Birns with the Council for Hemispheric Affairs.¶ To maintain his credibility within the Chavista movement and fend off opponents from within his own party, Maduro needs to maintain his opposition to the U.S. and continue to paint Americans as imperialist intruders, experts said.¶ “He’s got to worry about the opponents that will pose a threat to his rule,” Birns said. “These are difficult times for Maduro and no one knows how the scenario will play out.”¶ For its part, the United States is not in better shape when it comes to its relations with Venezuela – or other Latin American nations. Diplomatic disputes with Venezuela and touchy relations with neighboring Bolivia and Ecuador have led to a schism between the United States and the countries in the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas.¶ Hershberg said that the Obama administration's refusal to accept the official results of Venezuela's election will not only anger Maduro, but could be viewed as hypocritical in the light of the scandal surrounding the uncounted votes during the 2000 U.S. presidential election that saw George W. Bush defeat Al Gore. ¶ The U.S. has a long history of political involvement – both overtly and covertly – in elections throughout Latin America.¶ “For the Americans to say this only 12 years after Bush. V. Gore is remarkable,” he said. "Latin America looked at the U.S. and said that the U.S. will never again be able to tell us how to conduct our elections.”¶ “This makes them look absurd,” he added, about the State Department’s refusal to recognize the election of Maduro.¶ The State Department said it was "difficult to understand" why the commission certified ruling party candidate Nicolás Maduro as the winner in the absence of a recount, which challenger Henrique Capriles is demanding.¶ It also condemned the post-election violence that has killed at least seven people and injured 61.¶ In a televised broadcast Tuesday, Justice Minister Nestor Reverol accused Capriles of numerous crimes, including insurrection and civil disobedience.¶ Maduro blamed Capriles personally.¶ "You are responsible for the dead we are mourning," he said, calling Capriles "the defeated candidate."¶ Government officials have been alleging since Monday that Capriles is plotting a coup, and President-elect Maduro announced that he was prohibiting an opposition march scheduled for Wednesday in the capital.¶ On Tuesday Capriles' supporters protested in cities including Merida and Maracay. No Solvency—Maduro Recognition Failure to recognize Maduro guts solvency—seen as an act of belligerence CSM ‘13 (Christian Science Monitor; “Venezuela's Maduro still waiting on Washington's recognition”; http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/2013/0517/Venezuela-s-Maduro-stillwaiting-on-Washington-s-recognition) More than a month after Venezuela’s contested presidential election, President Nicolás Maduro’s narrow victory has yet to be recognized by the United States. Refusing to legitimize the new premier while a partial recount of the vote is underway, the US position has led to further political tensions in a relationship historically stressed under the leadership of former President Hugo Chávez. ¶ A handful of countries, including Chile, Peru, and the US, have expressed concern over the democratic standards of the election, which Maduro won by a little more than 1 percent of the vote. Venezuela’s opposition party is calling for the results to be annulled, citing over 3,000 instances of election fraud, ranging from alleged multiple-voting in chavistastrongholds to polling booth intimidation.¶ “Obviously, if there are huge irregularities we are going to have serious questions about the viability of that government,” said Secretary of State John Kerry during a hearing of the US Foreign Affairs Committee following the announcement of President Maduro’s victory in April.¶ While the US has pledged not to interfere with Venezuelan politics, the refusal to recognize Maduro's presidency has left many to question what message the US is trying to send, and how – if at all – it will impact Venezuela post-Chávez.¶ “[The US isn’t] recognizing or failing to recognize,” says David Smilde, professor of sociology at the University of Georgia. “They’re just waiting. But here in Venezuela that’s seen as an act of belligerence.” Recognizing Maduro is a pre-requisite to counterplan solvency— pressure fails absent recognition Carlsen ’13 (Laura Carlsen—director of the Americas Policy Program in Mexico City and journalist for Foreign Policy In Focus; “US Efforts to Block Democracy in Venezuela Harm Hemispheric Relations”; May 2, 2013; https://www.commondreams.org/view/2013/05/02-8) At worst, it is an example of U.S. external pressure that encourages a break with the rule of law and violates the principle of self-determination that President Barack Obama claims to uphold .¶ This is the first time the U.S. government has refused to recognize a Venezuelan election result, as Mark Weisbrot of the Center for Economic and Political Research points out. Weisbrot notes, “Washington's efforts to de-legitimise the election mark a significant escalation of US efforts at regime change in Venezuela. Not since its involvement in the 2002 military coup has the US government done this much to promote open conflict in Venezuela.”¶ The Obama administration is bending over backwards to spur on an opposition movement that has no virtually legal leg to stand on in its desire for new presidential elections. There are some indications that the strategy to refuse to accept defeat at the polls was considered even before the close vote. Although Capriles conceded rapidly and gracefully to former President Hugo Chavez in the presidential elections last fall, it was a bad omen when he refused to sign a pre-electoral pact to respect the results prior to this election.¶ Now violent opposition protests in the streets have led to the deaths of nine people. Maduro has attended the funerals of his supporters killed in the disturbances with vows to defend his victory and prosecute those inciting and participating in violent acts. Health clinics established by Chavez have been frequent targets.¶ It is highly unlikely that Capriles would stake his future on rejecting legal electoral institutions if he did not have the support of the U.S. government. It is even more unlikely that he could sustain a movement for non-recognition. Even many members of his own coalition will not go so far as to say they honestly believe he won the April 14th elections. The other countries of the region recognized Maduro as the new president within hours of the results. Not only did the left-leaning governments provide their diplomatic welcome, but also Colombia, Mexico, and other nations closely allied with the United States.¶ Capriles’ actions and de facto U.S. support for prolonging post-electoral unrest not only endanger peace and stability in Venezuela, but also potentially the entire region. Venezuela is a geopolitical hub—for its oil, for its role in building south-south integration projects like ALBA and Unasur, for its solidarity trade pacts, and for its defiance of U.S. hegemony.¶ To illegally disrupt the constitutional order there will not be as easy as it was in Honduras, where even a broad opposition movement couldn’t restore the constitutionally elected president after a right-wing coup in 2009. Inevitably, nations across the hemisphere and the world will react with anger if the Obama administration decides to maintain this course, both in defense of their neighbor Venezuela and also in what they see as a threat to their own sovereignty. Already former Brazilian president Lula da Silva has warned that "Americans should take care of their own business a little and let us decide our own destiny." ¶ The longer the United States remains globally isolated in its refusal to accept Venezuela’s election results, the longer the instability, uncertainty, and violence will continue. Extending the conflict could very well end up unnecessarily costing more lives.¶ The Obama administration should consider that its stubbornness about what it considers an adverse election result in a foreign country is a direct cause of bloodshed. It harms relations with our hemispheric neighbors and partners and sows the seeds of distrust and enmity in a region where we have a good chance at building cooperation on issues of vital importance to all of our countries. Venezuela’s elections must be accepted at once to show that the United States will uphold democratic processes and the rule of law, even when its government is not particularly pleased with the results. Only Cooperation Solves Any type of threat will harm relations—only cooperation solves Venezuelan Embassy ’13 (“Calixto Ortega Designated as Chief of Venezuelan Embassy in Washington”; 4/24/2013; http://venezuela-us.org/2013/04/24/calixtoortega-designated-as-chief-of-venezuelan-embassy-in-washington/) Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro announced Tuesday his decision to name Deputy Calixto Ortega as charge d’affaires for Venezuela in the United States.¶ “For some time I have been evaluating naming a new charge d’affaires at our Embassy in Washington and I have decided to name Deputy Calixto Ortega as the new charge d’affaires so that he can increase dialogue with US society,” Maduro said at a meeting with governors at Miraflores Presidential Palace in Caracas.¶ Dialogue in the US, he said, should include “universities, the academic world, the social world, unions, the African-American community, the Latino community, the Congress, senators, representatives, the economic world, economic and commercial sectors with which we have relationships.”¶ “Calixto Ortega is a man with a lot of experience and knowledge of US society and we believe he can play an important role in bringing the truth about Venezuela [to the United States] to continue opening up understanding so that, sooner rather than later, there is respect for Latin America, the Caribbean, respect for the Bolivarian Revolution.”¶ The head of state said that the Venezuelan government wants to have the best possible relations with all governments around the world, including the United States, but on the basis of respect.¶ “There cannot be any type of threats,” he said.¶ To the US government, Maduro said: “If you want to have relations based on respect, conversations, cooperation, that’s welcome.” Pressure Fails—Maduro Status quo rhetoric guts solvency—more pressure only emboldens Maduro’s Anti-American stance and wrecks relations Oppenheimer ’13 (Andres Oppenheimer is an Argentine journalist who resides in the United States. He is the Latin American editor and syndicated foreign affairs columnist with The Miami Herald. His column, "The Oppenheimer Report," appears twice a week in The Miami Herald and more than 60 U.S. and foreign newspapers; “Andres Oppenheimer: Venezuela Vice President Maduro will raise anti-U.S. rhetoric — for now”; 3/6/13; http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/03/06/3270595/maduro-willraise-anti-us-rhetoric.html) With record inflation and skyrocketing crime rates, Venezuela’s Vice President Nicolas Maduro’s best bet to win Venezuela’s upcoming elections will be to campaign on late President Hugo Chávez’s memory, and to raise tensions with Washington.¶ He has already started.¶ On Tuesday, shortly before announcing Chávez’s cancer-related death, Maduro — the Venezuelan government’s candidate for elections expected within the next 30 days — suggested that the United States had “inoculated” Chávez’s with the cancer.¶ At the same time, he expelled two U.S. diplomats from Venezuela. Maduro was in full campaign mode when he made those claims, U.S. officials say. The vice president, a former bus driver and union leader who was designated by Chávez as his political heir, needs to cast himself as a hard-line “anti-imperialist” leader both to keep the Chavista movement united, and to rally Venezuelans behind him against an imaginary U.S. threat, they say.¶ The Obama administration has turned the other cheek on Maduro’s accusations. It has categorically denied having caused Chávez’s death, and called the charge “absurd.”¶ Interestingly, Maduro and the U.S. State Department’s top official in charge of Latin American affairs, Roberta Jacobson, had discussed improving bilateral relations during a telephone conversation as recently as late last year.¶ In a Nov. 21 telephone call initiated by Jacobson, Maduro had suggested restoring the two countries’ ambassadors. Jacobson, in turn, had proposed a step-by-step approach to upgrade relations, starting with counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism cooperation measures, the U.S. official said at the time.¶ On Wednesday, I asked Jacobson why she thinks Maduro made his claim earlier this week that the U.S. government had “inoculated’’ Chávez with cancer.¶ “We find it really unfortunate that at a time when we were, and are, seeking a more productive relationship with Venezuela, they use this kind of rhetoric publicly and expel two of our officials,” Jacobson said. “It’s disappointing. But we remain interested in having a productive relationship with Venezuela.”¶ Jacobson didn’t want to speculate on Maduro’s motives, but other well-placed Venezuela watchers in Washington see it is as an obvious electoral ploy.¶ Maduro, a former bus driver who is very close to Cuba’s military government, does not have Chávez’s charisma, and does not have a record to run on. And with Venezuela’s inflation and crime rates reaching record highs, his best hope to win the election is capitalizing on Chávez’s popularity, and showing that he is as tough on the Gringos as Chávez was, they say.¶ “The harder days in U.S.-Venezuelan relations are not behind us, but ahead of us,” says Carl Meacham, Americas Director of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington D.C., and until recently a senior analyst with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.¶ “Maduro is shoring up political support within Chavismo,” Meacham added. “ His charges against the United States and his expulsion of the two U.S. diplomats were his way of telling his followers, “I’m like Chávez.” We can expect his rhetoric to get worse in coming weeks.”¶ My opinion: I agree that Maduro is likely to raise his “anti-imperialist’’ rhetoric during the campaign, but I wouldn’t be surprised if he resumes his amicable dialogue with the Obama administration afterward should he win the elections, as now seems likely.¶ Right now, Maduro is following Chávez’s script of provoking confrontations and inventing domestic and foreign conspiracies, so as to present himself as the protector of the fatherland and cast his political rivals as alleged U.S. stooges. It’s a script that Chávez followed for the past 14 years, and that worked well for him.¶ But Maduro is pretty much managed by remote control from Cuba — which has depended on Chávez’s petro dollars to keep the island’s economy afloat — and the Cuban regime’s top priority will be helping Maduro consolidate power at home, and maintaining stability in Venezuela.¶ Cuba will probably tell Maduro, “You have a divided Chavismo, growing economic problems and a serious crime epidemic on the streets. The last thing you need now is it to open a new front by stirring up trouble with Washington.”¶ So Cuba will be among the most interested in preventing a larger U.S.Venezuelan confrontation. But before getting better, worse. U.S.-Venezuelan ties are likely to get Mexico---Consult Canada Top Level 1NC Canada CP Consultation with Canada on Mexican economic engagement Ayon et al. 9 (David R. Ayon, is a political analyst and writer, who serves as a Senior Research Associate at the Center for the Study of Los Angeles at Loyola Marymount University and as the U.S. Director of the Focus Mexico/Enfoque México Project. Robert Donnely, is Program Associate of the Woodrow Wilson Center's Mexico Institute and was previously the Coordinator of the Justice in Mexico Project at the University of San Diego's Transborder Institute. Dolia Estevez, is a career journalist who currently writes tor Poder magazine and El Semanario and serves as the consulting coordinator of the U.S.-Mexico Journalism Initiative at the Woodrow Wilson Center. Eric Olson, is Senior Advisor to the Security Initiative of the Woodrow Wilson Center's Mexico Institute and has held senior positions at the Organization of American States, Amnesty International, and the Washington Office on Latin America. Andrew Seele, is Director of the Woodrow Wilson Center's Mexico Institute and an Adjunct Professor at Johns Hopkins University. “THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO: Towards a Strategic Partnership”, January 2009, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/The%20U.S.%20and%20Mexico.%20Towards%20a%20Strategic%20Partnership.pdf) Crises offer challenges and opportunities ¶ for long term strategies. The current downturn ¶ highlights, perhaps more than other times in the ¶ past, the need for better macroeconomic policy ¶ consultation and short-term crisis management ¶ mechanisms to avoid sudden shocks to the ¶ economies of both countries by developments ¶ that take place on either side of the border. ¶ History shows us that each country benefits from ¶ its partner’s success and each is diminished by ¶ the other’s problems. The United States has a ¶ vested interest in Mexico’s economic and social ¶ stability and long-term health, given the impact ¶ that Mexico’s economy has on U.S. exports and ¶ on migration. Financial mismanagement and ¶ insufficient regulation in the United States have ¶ had a direct impact in Mexico. And although ¶ good macroeconomic management has allowed ¶ Mexico’s economy to grow gradually since the late ¶ 1990s, the lack of attention to crucial structural ¶ reforms, including rule of law, competition policy, ¶ tax collection, labor laws, primary and secondary ¶ education, energy and monopolies have limited the potential for growth and highlighted weaknesses ¶ in Mexico’s economy.23 Insufficient investment in ¶ infrastructure and human capital create long-term ¶ drags on the Mexican economy and, in turn, limit ¶ the potential for economic growth, with secondary ¶ effects on the U.S. economy. While these are ¶ essentially matters of domestic policy in each ¶ country, both governments have a vested interest in ¶ improving communication , pursuing a more viable ¶ process of engagement on macroeconomic policy and ¶ maintaining a critical dialogue about the need for ¶ sound economic policies in both countries. Given the importance that bilateral ¶ economic integration has for economic growth ¶ and development in both countries, the two ¶ governments could do far more to maintain highlevel attention on the best ways of managing this ¶ relationship. hee principal institutional framework ¶ for economic dialogue in recent years has been ¶ the Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP); ¶ however, the issues related to security have almost ¶ always trumped those related to prosperity, and ¶ the design of the process has largely excluded ¶ most important stakeholders in the economic ¶ relationship between the two countries. Similarly, ¶ the labor and environmental commissions, which ¶ were designed parallel to NAFTA, have been left ¶ to languish with insufficient funding and unclear ¶ mandates. The North American Development ¶ Bank (NADBank), created as a parallel tool for development for Mexico and the United States, ¶ has only a . A new ¶ U.S. administration brings the opportunity to ¶ deepen the process of consultation and dialogue ¶ and to assess limited mandate and is far from meeting ¶ the larger challenges the two countries face the effectiveness of existing bilateral ¶ institutions. "The two countries, together and in ¶ partnership with Canada , have an opportunity to ¶ design new institutional arrangements that ensure ¶ high-level communication and problem-solving on ¶ economic issues and allow them to address major ¶ challenges that economic integration produces.¶ Mexico and the United States would benefit ¶ from an enhanced dialogue on economic policy, ¶ including closer consultation in dealing with ¶ economic shocks. Much of the work that needs to ¶ be done on each side of the border to invigorate ¶ both economies requires unilateral action by each ¶ government, but ongoing dialogue between them ¶ could help encourage Keeping the bilateral relationship in mind when¶ pursuing measures to stabilize the economy ¶ during a crisis. Because major shifts in monetary ¶ and fiscal policy in one country can have sharp ¶ effects on the other, prior consultation can ¶ mitigate cooperation. Policy options ¶ include:¶ secondary effects across the border. ¶ Institutionalizing periodic consultations between ¶ the Secretary of the Treasury and Mexico’s ¶ Finance Minister through regular yearly meetings ¶ with their Canadian counterpart . Extraordinary ¶ meetings can be called for in moments of crisis . ¶ NB—Politics Canada says yes and the CP avoids the link to politics Brister 12 (Dr. Bernard Brister is an Assistant Professor at the Royal Military College of Canada where he teaches strategy and international relations in the Department of Political Science and Economics. His research interests include North American security in an Asia-Pacific context and global energy strategies. Forget Al-Qaeda: Think Mexico – Next Great Threat to Canadian Security, November 2012, http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/Forget%20Al-Qaeda%20Think%20Mexico.pdf) How would such a proactive and comprehensive approach to continental security be received by the two partners in the process? One could speculate that it would be received with enthusiasm by both but for different reasons. To the extent that the Canadian contributions aligned themselves with established Americans strategies and measures, the United States would welcome the approach for all of the reasons provided previously and for the added benefit that it would reduce the commitment of American resources. Having Canadian participation would also provide political cover domestically and internationally with the associated positive political effects. That this type of cooperation is already under consideration by Canada and the United States is evidenced by the discussions between US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, and Canadian Minister of National Defence Peter McKay on joint military co-operation relating to continental defence, including anti-drug efforts and weapons control at their meeting in Halifax on 18 November, 2011.33 Mexico would likely welcome Canadian participation as well if only for the reason that it would reduce American participation and presence on issues of vital Mexican interests. This position is supported also by the fact that Mexican public opinion polls since 2004 have consistently put Canada at, or near, the top of the list of most popular foreign countries by both the general public and the informed elite that regularly considers Mexican foreign policy.34 While the implementation of a visa requirement may have dampened this affection somewhat, a large portion of the Mexican population see Canada as a positive example of a smaller state that has successfully resisted integration with a more powerful neighbour and maintained its sovereignty in the face of sometimes daunting pressure.35 There may also be some benefits and synergies for the Mexicans in the ways that Canadians approach governance, security and judicial issues. Lastly, the Mexicans may appreciate what is often a less intrusive approach to providing assistance to our friends and allies. There would also be several benefits to Canadian interests of adopting this strategy. First, it would put Canadians “at the table” when issues central to continental security are discussed with the result that Canadian governments would be informed and current on the thoughts and actions of their continental allies and in the best position as possible to influence their actions and decisions in those areas vital to Canadian interests. Such participation in a variety of security, governance, and judicial capacities would also provide invaluable experience and develop expertise in addressing threats and situations that while not directly affecting Canadians at present, clearly threaten to do so in the future. Along these lines, Canada would be doing what it has always done in the realm of national security, addressing the threat before it actually reaches our shores, or in this case, our borders. Exts – doesn’t link to ptx Avoids politics - no congressional oversight and no attention Corsi 10 (Jerome R., a Harvard Ph.D in Poli Sci, “Towards a North American Union? Removed from the Public Eye, Top Level Consultations behind Closed Doors”, December 2010, http://www.globalresearch.ca/towards-a-north-american-union-removed-from-the-public-eye-top-levelconsultations-behind-closed-doors/22545) With little attention from mainstream media, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton met with the foreign ministers of Canada and Mexico in a North American Foreign Ministers Meeting in Quebec, Canada. The Dec. 13 meeting is a prelude to the next North American Summit Leaders meeting in 2011, a yet unscheduled trilateral summit that is the continuation of the Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America. Under the low-key format, the continental meetings have been carried out with little fanfare and outside of congressional oversight. NB—North American Integration Trilateral cooperation is key to North American economic integration Barrio-Terrazas 12 – Francisco is the Mexican Ambassador to Canada. (“North America: Continental competitiveness, trilateral cooperation”, Jan/Feb 2012, http://www.2020magazine.ca/en/magazine/january-february2012/north-america-continental-competitiveness-trilateral-co-operation/, Callahan) Our common objective was clear: we needed to cement historical trends in the movement of people, goods and capital among our three countries. That shared dream resulted in the largest free trade zone in the world, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Since then, integration has been the true spirit of our partnership. NAFTA has been widely criticized and highly praised, but outcomes have undoubtedly been positive: the creation of more than 40 million jobs; trade flows have tripled to an estimated value of $1 trillion US this year; our combined GDP has doubled, and we have developed some of the most competitive supply chains in the world. Mexico is Canada's third largest partner and the third largest for the US as well. The three nations have learned that the best way to compete successfully is by -capitalizing on each other's -competitive advantages. Since NAFTA came into effect in 1994, other regions and countries have intensified the negotiation of regional and bilateral agreements with more than 489 FTAs that have been notified to the WTO. This trend urges us to move faster by adapting our strengths and experiences to the new global conditions and challenges. Unfortunately, our response in the face of this changing scenario has fallen short of meeting the true needs of our industries and citizens; our leadership in the international context has faded. The surge of security as a top priority and the new economic global order, where emerging economies will lead growth, have deviated our focus as a single block. Canada has evolved, the US has changed, Mexico has transformed, but contrary to the spirit of the NAFTA, the new dynamic emerging in North America seems to run in the opposite direction. The North American region has lost competitiveness vis-a-vis other regions: our share in global markets has decreased from 19 per cent in 2000 to 12.9 per cent in 2010, while the Asia-Pacific region (including India) has increased its market participation from 29.6 per cent to 35.4 per cent in the same period. In December, Canada and the US signed an historic agreement on security and economic competitiveness and Mexico has intensified its bilateral approach with the US — both efforts geared toward addressing the specific issues that prevail along our shared borders. However, if we closely review each initiative, common ground is identifiable. Key elements like competitiveness, the necessity to diversify markets, security, trade facilitation, transportation and infrastructure, energy, and regional supply chains are in our common interest; let us avoid dealing with them from a partial perspective. Bilateralism is undeniable and unavoidable in the global context, but we must not forget that North America is the keystone in our integration process. Bilateralism is a part of the equation, not the whole. Mexico maintains its firm conviction to preserve the trilateral vision in our relationship. We are convinced that by working together, an extensive and ambitious agenda focused on competitiveness will be of benefit for the region. NAFTA has been a key element in opening new markets, bolstering innovation and enhancing our supply chains. This is not only an inward commitment; we must visualize the North American region as a unique body competing successfully in the international field. Global market forces are moving quickly and determinedly. The world is on the verge of witnessing the emergence of the most ambitious trade and economic integration initiative of recent years, a process that will involve countries across the Pacific Rim and incorporate modern principles — the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Asia is projected to be the new engine of economic growth. Canada, Mexico and the US are facing a new opportunity to demonstrate our capacity to capitalize on our joint strength . During the last APEC Leaders Meeting in Hawaii, Mexico and Canada officially expressed our intention to participate in this process led by the US. Mexico is convinced that maximum benefits can be reaped only if we act jointly. For Mexico and Canada, active participation in this process represents a unique opportunity to access new markets and share in the benefits of this outstanding co-operation zone. The most renowned economic research agencies have -recognized Mexico as one of the largest -economies for the coming years. We can -supply the US and Canadian markets in -shorter times and we can jointly -produce under competitive cost -conditions; these realities must be recognized by our North American -partners . It is imperative that we -urgently -mobilize to work together in a streamlined -approach aimed at -recovering our global presence and influence. The three countries share borders and an entrepreneurial culture, which -obliges us to co-operate and recoup our joint position. Canada, Mexico and the US must work together, -transforming -institutions, -creating -common -strategies and - renewing -trilateral dialogue -mechanisms . We must lead our -industries and -address the needs of our citizenry by -attending to their -requirements, -providing the certainty they require for long-term planning, we must -create jobs and attract -investment; their real goals must -supersede -short-term events. Better results will be achieved if North America's countries work from a -common ground. Beyond the border must run from the Usumacinta River to the Arctic, crossing the Rio Grande and the Great Lakes. Let's produce and buy North America. NB—Competitiveness Impact North America is uniquely key Pastor 13 – Robert is a Professor and Founding Director of the Center for North American Studies at American University. (“Shortcut to U.S. Economic Competitiveness: A Seamless North American Market”, March 2013, http://www.cfr.org/competitiveness/shortcut-us-economic-competitiveness-seamless-north-american-market/p30132, Callahan) In looking abroad to promote economic growth, the United States need go no further than its two closest neighbors, Canada and Mexico. But the three governments have failed to pursue collaborative efforts to address a new generation of issues that were not anticipated by the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Instead of tackling new transnational problems such as regulatory harmonization together, the United States and its neighbors reverted to old habits of bilateral, ad hoc negotiations. Instead of forging a unified competitiveness strategy toward the European Union and East Asia, each government has negotiated on its own. The three North American governments should create a seamless market, one in which it is as easy and cheap for a Chicago merchant to sell products in Monterrey as in San Francisco. This requires negotiating a common external tariff, eliminating restrictions on transportation and services, funding new continental infrastructure, and fostering a sense of community among the publics of the three countries that will also enhance the region's influence in negotiations with Asia and Europe. One estimate suggests that the benefits to the three countries would exceed $400 billion. The Case For a North American Market With rising competitive pressures from overseas and weak growth at home, the quickest external route to economic recovery and enhanced competitiveness is to stretch the U.S. market to include 113 million Mexicans and 34 million Canadians. The Obama administration has made it a priority to complete the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) with Asia and has announced its intention to launch a new U.S.European Union Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. But the administration has neglected its two neighbors despite the fact that their combined product is more than six times that of other TPP countries and that U.S. exports to them exceed those to the EU. Mexico and Canada are already the United States' two largest export markets, its two largest sources of energy imports, and in the case of Mexico, the largest source of immigrants. The three countries also make products together. Unlike U.S. trade with most other countries, roughly 25 to 40 percent of the value of U.S. imports from Canada and Mexico comes from components made in the United States, and then assembled into finished goods in one of the two countries. Closer integration would translate into a more efficient supply chain and improved competitiveness. With labor costs in China rising to those in Mexico, and the cost of transportation across the Pacific increasing, a North American supply chain is not only more efficient than an Asian route, but it could also become a strong export platform to Asia. Moreover, if the United States seeks a unified approach to trade negotiations with Mexico and Canada, Asia and Europe will recognize that Washington has other options, and prospects for concluding transpacific and transatlantic trade deals would likely improve. For example, in the 1990s, world trade talks were stalemated until NAFTA was signed. Where NAFTA Went Astray North America was on track to create a competitive market in the 1990s. The most rapid job expansion in recent U.S. history occurred between 1993 and 2001. This coincided with the onset of NAFTA and the end of most trade and investment barriers between the United States, Canada, and Mexico. Trade tripled and foreign direct investment grew fivefold. But 2001 proved to be a turning point for North America just as the outlines of a continental market were becoming visible. Growth in trade has since declined by twothirds and foreign investment by half. Competitiveness is key to solve global nuclear war Khalilzad 11 (Zalmay Khalilzad was the United States ambassador to Afghanistan, Iraq, and the United Nations during the presidency of George W. Bush and the director of policy planning at the Defense Department from 1990 to 1992 “The Economy and National Security” http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/259024/economy-andnational-security-zalmay-khalilzad?pg=3) Today, economic and fiscal trends pose the most severe long-term threat to the United States’ position as global leader. While the United States suffers from fiscal imbalances and low economic growth, the economies of rival powers are developing rapidly . The continuation of these two trends could lead to a shift from American primacy toward a multi-polar global system , leading in turn to increased geopolitical rivalry and even war among the great powers. The current recession is the result of a deep financial crisis, not a mere fluctuation in the business cycle. Recovery is likely to be protracted. The crisis was preceded by the buildup over two decades of enormous amounts of debt throughout the U.S. economy — ultimately totaling almost 350 percent of GDP — and the development of creditfueled asset bubbles, particularly in the housing sector. When the bubbles burst, huge amounts of wealth were destroyed, and unemployment rose to over 10 percent. The decline of tax revenues and massive countercyclical spending put the U.S. government on an unsustainable fiscal path. Publicly held national debt rose from 38 to over 60 percent of GDP in three years.Without faster economic growth and actions to reduce deficits, publicly held national debt is projected to reach dangerous proportions. If interest rates were to rise significantly, annual interest payments — which already are larger than the defense budget — would crowd out other spending or require substantial tax increases that would undercut economic growth. Even worse, if unanticipated events trigger what economists call a “sudden stop” in credit markets for U.S. debt, the United States would be unable to roll over its outstanding obligations, precipitating a sovereign-debt crisis that would almost certainly compel a radical retrenchment of the United States internationally. Such scenarios would reshape the international order. It was the economic devastation of Britain and France during World War II, as well as the rise of other powers, that led both countries to relinquish their empires. In the late 1960s, British leaders concluded that they lacked the economic capacity to maintain a presence “east of Suez.” Soviet economic weakness, which crystallized under Gorbachev, contributed to their decisions to withdraw from Afghanistan, abandon Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, and allow the Soviet Union to fragment. If the U.S. debt problem goes critical, the United States would be compelled to retrench, reducing its military spending and shedding international commitments. We face this domestic challenge while other major powers are experiencing rapid economic growth. Even though countries such as China, India, and Brazil have profound political, social, demographic, and economic problems, their economies are growing faster than ours, and this could alter the global distribution of power. These trends could in the long term produce a multi-polar world. If U.S. policymakers fail to act and other powers continue to grow, it is not a question of whether but when a new international order will emerge. The closing of the gap between the United States and its rivals could intensify geopolitical competition among major powers, increase incentives for local powers to play major powers against one another, and undercut our will to preclude or respond to international crises because of the higher risk of escalation. The stakes are high. In modern history, the longest period of peace among the great powers has been the era of U.S. leadership. By contrast, multi-polar systems have been unstable, with their competitive dynamics resulting in frequent crises and major wars among the great powers. Failures of multi-polar international systems produced both world wars. American retrenchment could have devastating consequences. Without an American security blanket, regional powers could rearm in an attempt to balance against emerging threats. Under this scenario, there would be a heightened possibility of arms races, miscalculation , or other crises spiraling into all-out conflict . Alternatively, in seeking to accommodate the stronger powers, weaker powers may shift their geopolitical posture away from the United States. Either way, hostile states would be emboldened to make aggressive moves in their regions. As rival powers rise, Asia in particular is likely to emerge as a zone of great-power competition . Beijing’s economic rise has enabled a dramatic military buildup focused on acquisitions of naval, cruise, and ballistic missiles, long-range stealth aircraft, and anti-satellite capabilities. China’s strategic modernization is aimed, ultimately, at denying the United States access to the seas around China. Even as cooperative economic ties in the region have grown, China’s expansive territorial claims — and provocative statements and actions following crises in Korea and incidents at sea — have roiled its relations with South Korea, Japan, India, and Southeast Asian states. Still, the United States is the most significant barrier facing Chinese hegemony and aggression. Econ decline causes war ROYAL 10 Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense [Jedediah Royal, 2010, Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises, in Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215] Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent stales. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level. Pollins (20081 advances Modclski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin. 19SJ) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Fcaron. 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner. 1999). Separately. Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level. Copeland's (1996. 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states arc likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Mom berg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write. The linkage, between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict lends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other (Hlomhen? & Hess. 2(102. p. X9> Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blombcrg. Hess. & Wee ra pan a, 2004). which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions . Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. "Diversionary theory" suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1996), DcRoucn (1995), and Blombcrg. Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force arc at least indirecti) correlated. Gelpi (1997). Miller (1999). and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that Ihe tendency towards diversionary tactics arc greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked lo an increase in the use of force. In summary, rcccni economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict al systemic, dyadic and national levels.' This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves Exts—Integration I/L The CP is key to revitalize NAFTA and integration—bilateralism fails Belanger 10 – Louis Bélanger has been an adjunct professor in the department of Political Science at Laval University, and also was a research associate of the Institute of International Studies. (“Canada, Mexico and the Future of Trilateralism in North America”, February 2, 2010, http://www.fss.ulaval.ca/cms/upload/pol/fichiers/north_american_dialogue_no8_louis_belanger[9].pdf, Callahan) Many of its critics maintain that North-American trilateralism is flawed because there is no real community of interests between Canada and Mexico ―beyond the NAFTA treaty itself‖ (Daudelin 2003, p. 10; see also From Correct to Inspired 2009, p. 15). In this short paper, I will argue, rather, that NAFTA‘s preservation and maintenance is, in itself, more than a sufficient reason for Canada and Mexico to commit to a trilateral agenda. Furthermore, recognition of this common interest should lead Canada and Mexico to strategically develop more substantive bilateral relations. If Canada and Mexico are not able to get their act together and pursue a coordinated trilateral strategy in defence of the NAFTA advantage, they will lose it. This will happen for three reasons. First, if nothing is done, NAFTA‘s comparative edge will erode as its provisions will become obsolete and outmatched by more ambitious trade agreements negotiated by the United States or overseas regional blocs. Second, if something is to be done about it, it is highly inconceivable that a solution could be negotiated bilaterally; concessions offered by Washington to Ottawa will also have to be offered to Mexico City, and vice versa. Furthermore, the type of institutions that will be needed to secure the NAFTA advantage cannot realistically be decoupled along bilateral lines. Third, due to evident asymmetries in power and relative dependence, Washington will not take the initiative in favour of a reinvigorated North American free trade area. The initiative will have to come from the smaller partners and will probably be ignored if Canada and Mexico do not push in the same direction. Consultation is key – solves North American integration Pastor 8 (Robert A., Dr. Robert Pastor is a professor of international relations and director of the Center for North American Studies and the Center for Democracy and Election Management. From 2002-07, he was Vice President of International Affairs at AU where he transformed and expanded the study abroad program, established the American University of Nigeria, and initiated new programs on language immersion and “Abroad at AU.” He has served in government as National Security Advisor for Latin America, and he was a Senior Fellow and director of programs on democracy, Latin America, and China at the Carter Center, “The Future of North America”, 2008, http://www.american.edu/sis/cnas/upload/ForeignAffairs_Pastor_On_NA_072008.pdf) North America’s model of integration is different from Europe’s. It respects the market more and trusts bureaucracy less. Still, some institutions are needed to develop continental proposals, monitor progress, and enforce compliance. The three leaders should institutionalize summit meetings at least annually, and they should establish a North American commission composed of independent and distinguished leaders from academia, civil society, business, labor, and agriculture and with an independent research capacity. The commission should offer continental proposals to the three leaders. The leaders would continue to be staffed by their respective governments, but they would respond to a continental, rather than a dual-bilateral, agenda. The commission should develop a North American plan for transportation and infrastructure and plans on labor, agriculture, the environment, energy, immigration, drug trafficking, and borders. The three heads of state must also commit to building a new consciousness, a new way of thinking about one’s neighbors and about the continental agenda. Americans, Canadians, and Mexicans can be nationals and North Americans at the same time. Indeed, an appreciation of one’s neighbors as part of a compelling North American idea could enhance the prestige of each country. To educate a new generation of students to think North American, each country should begin by supporting a dozen centers for North American studies. Each center should educate students, undertake research, and foster exchanges with other North American universities for both students and faculty. This is a formidable agenda that could transform North America and each of its states. It is not possible without a vision, and it is not feasible without real leadership and credible institutions. But with all three, a North American Community can be built. The existence of such a community would mean that the United States would consult its neighbors on important issues that affected them. It would mean that Canada would work closely with Mexico to build rule-based institutions and to develop a formula for closing the development gap. It would mean that Mexico would undertake reforms to make good use of the additional resources. Exts—Competitiveness Key to us economic growth and competitiveness Alden 12 – Edward Alden is a Bernard L Schwartz Senior Fellow at CFR. (“The North American Market: A Competitive Edge That Shouldn’t Be Squandered”, June 8, 2012, http://blogs.cfr.org/renewing-america/2012/06/08/thenorth-american-market-a-competitive-edge-that-shouldnt-be-squandered/, Callahan) If there’s a golden rule for economic competitiveness, it’s this: “ Always exploit your advantages .” Yet United States has systematically undermined one of its biggest – our proximity to a wealthy, resource-rich partner to the north and a developing, labor-rich partner to the south. Robert Pastor’s fine recent book The North American Idea, makes a compelling case that the strong U.S. economic growth of the 1990s was directly linked to growing economic integration with Canada and Mexico, and that the weak growth of past decade is in no small part the result of disintegration, brought about largely by unwarranted fears over NAFTA and the unfortunate U.S. response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Two documents released this week drive that home. The first is a paper by Erik Lee of the North American Center for Transborder Studies and Christopher E. Wilson of the Woodrow Wilson Institute called “The State of Trade, Competitiveness and Economic Wellbeing in the U.S.-Mexico Border Region.” It lays out succinctly the benefits of what is essentially a joint production system between the two countries in sectors like automobiles, aerospace, and medical devices, with a supply chain that straddles the border. Crossborder production has allowed for more efficient location of business activities in ways that enhance productivity, lower costs, and help North American-based companies to compete more effectively with Asia and Europe. for more than a decade, the Most qualified PRN 09 – PRNewswire is a news agency that is citing a report by ASU experts. (“Obama Administration Urged to 'Seize North American Opportunities' on Security and Competitiveness”, Feb 10, 2009, http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/obama-administration-urged-to-seize-north-americanopportunities-on-security-and-competitiveness-65715702.html, Callahan) WASHINGTON, Feb. 10 /PRNewswire/ -- As President Obama prepares for his first foreign presidential trip to Canada on leading experts in the U.S., Canada and Mexico are urging his administration to strengthen U.S. partnerships with its neighbors on challenges ranging from border security to global competitiveness and environmental protection. Their recommendations were Feb. 19, released today in a report entitled "North America Next: Report to President Obama on Building Sustainable Security and Competitiveness". The report, prepared by the Arizona State University's North American Center for Transborder Studies (NACTS), represents more than a year of intensive consultations by its consortium of leading experts and universities in the three countries. "Despite the multiple crises facing the new administration," NACTS Director Rick Van Schoik said recognition of the "urgency next door" is required "because a number of significant challenges facing the United States also have created unprecedented North American opportunities for enhancing our nation's competitiveness, security and sustainability. Almost 40 million jobs were created in the US, Canada and Mexico between 1993-2007," he noted, "and today Canada and Mexico are respectively the first- and third-ranked trading partners and foreign suppliers to the U.S. Our challenge should not be to undo NAFTA," Van Schoik added, "but to build a North American strategy for the 21st century, one that generates economic development and job creation for all three nations. Post-9/11 border congestion has left the U.S. in many ways poorer, less secure and with major environmental challenges in the border region itself, Van Schoik said. One estimate cited a $7.2 billion annual output loss, or the equivalent of 62,000 jobs, between just two border sister cities in 2007 due to border congestion, traffic and paperwork. In contrast, Van Schoik said "smart infrastructure investments can simultaneously enhance U.S. and North American security, competitiveness and sustainability by creating jobs, enhancing outdated infrastructure and facilitating faster and 'greener' trade." Other urgent challenges cited by Van Schoik include: The necessity of increasing global competitiveness with other trading blocs, a vital element for sustainable economic recovery. Security threats to North America from the narcoinsurgency waged by Mexican organized crime that is raging along the border, fuelled by guns and cash from the U.S. Rapidly accelerating climate change that underscores the need to not only deal with emissions, but also water shortages and lost biodiversity. The prospect of "achieving energy security next door, not an ocean away, if we do a few things right...and right now." Mexico's difficult commitment to economic, legal, and political reform, which "offers a vital window of opportunity that simply must be supported, as potential risks and benefits extend far beyond its borders." UQ—Canada Relations Low Relations low Hampson, Chancellor’s Professor and Director of the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University, 7/21/2012 (Fen Osler H. and Derek Burney, Senior Strategic Adviser at Norton Rose Canada, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137744/derek-h-burney-and-fen-osler-hampson/how-obama-lost-canada) Obama’s choice marked a triumph of campaign posturing over pragmatism and diplomacy, and it brought U.S.-Canadian relations to their lowest point in decades. It was hardly the first time that the administration has fumbled issues with Ottawa. Although relations have been civil, they have rarely been productive. Whether on trade, the environment, or Canada’s shared contribution in places such as Afghanistan, time and again the United States has jilted its northern neighbor. If the pattern of neglect continues, Ottawa will get less interested in cooperating with Washington. Already, Canada has reacted by turning elsewhere -- namely, toward Asia -- for more reliable economic partners. Economically, Canada and the United States are joined at the hip. Each country is the other’s number-one trading partner -- in 2011, the two-way trade in goods and services totaled $681 billion, more than U.S. trade with Mexico or China -- and trade with Canada supports more than eight million U.S. jobs. Yet the Obama administration has recently jeopardized this important relationship. It failed to combat the Buy American provision in Congress’ stimulus bill, which inefficiently excluded Canadian participation in infrastructure spending. What’s more, by engaging in protectionism, Washington has violated the substance and spirit of the North American Free Trade Agreement, the trade bloc formed in 1994 among Canada, the United States, and Mexico. As a result, NAFTA, which was initially intended as a template for broader trade expansion by all three partners, has languished while each country has negotiated a spaghetti bowl of bilateral trade agreements with other countries. Trilateral economic summits among the NAFTA partners have become little more than photo-ops accompanied by bland communiqués. Bilateral meetings between U.S. and Canadian leaders, which were a regular feature of the Bill Clinton and George W. Bush eras, have also mostly fallen by the wayside. Meanwhile, the United States demanded upfront concessions from Canada as the price of entry to negotiations over the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a regional free-trade group, while preserving massive agriculture subsidies of its own. The protracted wrangling over a seat at the table does not augur well for meaningful progress. After years of procrastination, Canada finally secured an agreement for a new Detroit-Windsor bridge -- over which 25 percent of trade between Canada and the United States crosses -- but only after it offered to cover all of the initial costs. The U.S. share is to be repaid over time by the tolls collected, but any shortfalls will rest with Canadian taxpayers. Canada was essentially forced to hold negotiations with Michigan; the U.S. federal government observed quietly from the sidelines. Solvency 2NC – Solvency Trilateral consultation is key to effectiveness – takes out the aff Ayon et al. 9 (David R. Ayon, is a political analyst and writer, who serves as a Senior Research Associate at the Center for the Study of Los Angeles at Loyola Marymount University and as the U.S. Director of the Focus Mexico/Enfoque México Project. Robert Donnely, is Program Associate of the Woodrow Wilson Center's Mexico Institute and was previously the Coordinator of the Justice in Mexico Project at the University of San Diego's Transborder Institute. Dolia Estevez, is a career journalist who currently writes tor Poder magazine and El Semanario and serves as the consulting coordinator of the U.S.-Mexico Journalism Initiative at the Woodrow Wilson Center. Eric Olson, is Senior Advisor to the Security Initiative of the Woodrow Wilson Center's Mexico Institute and has held senior positions at the Organization of American States, Amnesty International, and the Washington Office on Latin America. Andrew Seele, is Director of the Woodrow Wilson Center's Mexico Institute and an Adjunct Professor at Johns Hopkins University. “THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO: Towards a Strategic Partnership”, January 2009, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/The%20U.S.%20and%20Mexico.%20Towards%20a%20Strategic%20Partnership.pdf) Strengthening the U.S. partnership with Mexico ¶ will require new channels for communication and ¶ ongoing consultation that allow strategic thinking ¶ to take place. From the early 1980s through 2006, ¶ the primary formal structure for dialogue between ¶ the two countries was the Binational Commission ¶ (BNC), which brought together cabinet officials ¶ from both governments for an annual meeting that ¶ focused on a range of bilateral topics. As contacts ¶ among cabinet officials of the two governments ¶ accelerated in recent years, however, the BNC ¶ increasingly became an unfocused bureaucratic ¶ exercise, and it has not met since 2006 by mutual ¶ agreement of the two governments. In 2005 ¶ the U.S., Mexican, and Canadian governments ¶ started a series of annual North American Leaders’ ¶ Summits, tied in with the Security and Prosperity ¶ Partnership, a trilateral effort to get agencies ¶ in the three governments to work together on ¶ economic and security issues. A North American ¶ Business Council, made up of CEOs of large ¶ companies, was invited to participate in this ¶ process. The North American Leaders’ Summits ¶ and SPP have been useful in addressing common ¶ standards and border policies. However, they have ¶ left out other stakeholders in North America, ¶ including labor, environmental organizations, ¶ and small and medium businesses, and provided ¶ insufficient opportunities to address major issues ¶ of integration among the three countries, such as ¶ education, technology transfer, and environmental ¶ cooperation.¶ A will need to create ¶ both bilateral (U.S.-Mexico) and new administration trilateral (U.S.-¶ Mexico-Canada) channels for consultation and ¶ cooperation. While most consultation across ¶ the border takes place among cabinet agencies ¶ routinely in the process of their operations, ¶ structuring an annual leadership meeting each ¶ year with the leaders of the three North American ¶ countries, which can include a separate bilateral ¶ leadership meeting, would help focus attention ¶ on major issues that need to be resolved and to ¶ develop strategic thinking . Trilateral consultation key Ayon et al. 9 (David R. Ayon, is a political analyst and writer, who serves as a Senior Research Associate at the Center for the Study of Los Angeles at Loyola Marymount University and as the U.S. Director of the Focus Mexico/Enfoque México Project. Robert Donnely, is Program Associate of the Woodrow Wilson Center's Mexico Institute and was previously the Coordinator of the Justice in Mexico Project at the University of San Diego's Transborder Institute. Dolia Estevez, is a career journalist who currently writes tor Poder magazine and El Semanario and serves as the consulting coordinator of the U.S.-Mexico Journalism Initiative at the Woodrow Wilson Center. Eric Olson, is Senior Advisor to the Security Initiative of the Woodrow Wilson Center's Mexico Institute and has held senior positions at the Organization of American States, Amnesty International, and the Washington Office on Latin America. Andrew Seele, is Director of the Woodrow Wilson Center's Mexico Institute and an Adjunct Professor at Johns Hopkins University. “THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO: Towards a Strategic Partnership”, January 2009, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/The%20U.S.%20and%20Mexico.%20Towards%20a%20Strategic%20Partnership.pdf) Redesigning Institutions for Cooperation and Consultation¶ To achieve these objectives, the governments ¶ would do well to rethink the current institutional ¶ structure for economic dialogue. While the ¶ Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP) has ¶ helped address some barriers to trade, it has been ¶ conducted without monitoring by the public in ¶ all three countries involved, has no mechanism to ¶ address other critical concerns in the economic ¶ relationship, and has been overshadowed by the ¶ security components of SPP. Meanwhile, the labor ¶ and environmental commissions have languished ¶ as underfunded bodies with limited mandates. ¶ Policy options for the future include:¶ Institutionalizing annual North American¶ summit meetings attended by the heads of State ¶ from Mexico, the United States, and Canada. ¶ Creating trilateral working groups that include¶ government, business, and civil society from all ¶ three countries that takes into account the views ¶ of stakeholders in each area under discussion. ¶ This can be tied into the annual North American ¶ Heads of States meetings and include areas ¶ of current or potential cooperation such as ¶ health standards, technology transfer, education ¶ cooperation, environmental cooperation, and ¶ labor standards.¶ 2NC – Consultation Key/Say Yes Consultation is key to overall engagement Brister 12 (Dr. Bernard Brister is an Assistant Professor at the Royal Military College of Canada where he teaches strategy and international relations in the Department of Political Science and Economics. His research interests include North American security in an Asia-Pacific context and global energy strategies. Forget Al-Qaeda: Think Mexico – Next Great Threat to Canadian Security, November 2012, http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/Forget%20Al-Qaeda%20Think%20Mexico.pdf) As can be seen from the forgoing examples, the Canada-Mexico bilateral relationship is both healthy and robust and is augmented by trilateral inputs and consultations when and where trilateralism is seen to be of advantage to Canadian interests and as such, might be considered to be optimal in its present form. Mexico has been assessed as a failing state by some, languishing under a deeply entrenched system of political corruption that undermines the three branches of government and compromises Mexico’s law enforcement and national security capabilities. There is a culture of corruption that pervades the state and frustrates the rule of law in Mexico. The political elites, the judiciary, and police officials embrace corruption as a primary means for career advancement and for acquiring personal wealth. Mexico appears to many as a country overwhelmed by a system of government and commerce that has grown dependent on corruption in order to function. It may well take a massive breakdown and reordering of Mexican society to free Mexico from corruption’s stranglehold. But the individuals who have the capacity to lead such a drastic reform are the same individuals who would have the most to lose from doing so.46 The American strategy has not so far been successful in reducing this threat to their southern border and their citizens nation-wide in spite of the dedication of massive volumes of funds, resources and manpower. The result is a growing likelihood that the crisis presently building in the southern part of the North American continent will increasingly influence Canadian interests in the realms of security, economics, and social welfare. While the threat posed by international terrorism remains a real one, it is in decline and no longer warrants the unwavering attention of the Canadian security infrastructure or that of the government of Canada. Rather, attention must now be paid to a threat that has been developing closer to home while the Canadian focus has been further afield. The most effective Canadian strategy to address this evolving threat is a proactive one of engagement with the continental partners that, while proceeding in accordance with Canadian values and desires to help others, addresses the specific goals and objectives in the priority stated in the preceding paragraphs. The informed and proactive engagement of both American and Mexican authorities on either a bilateral or trilateral basis should be decided by the specifics of each situation and circumstance. Failure to recognize this looming threat to Canadian security and welfare and/or failure to aggressively pursue Canadian interests in issues of continental security will doom Canada to the progressive infiltration of the narco-culture into every aspect of Canadian society . Internationally, it will put Canada in a reactive posture where Canadian citizens are forced to accept American solutions to Canadian concerns or the application to Canada of policies focused upon security issues that exist only on the southern border. The existing Canadian strategy of selective engagement with Mexican and/or American agencies should continue to be pursued and proactively expanded upon when and as the need arises to maximize Canadian interests on the continent. Including and consulting Canada is key Wilson-Forsberg 01 – Stacey Wilson-Forsberg is a Policy Analyst for FOCAL. (“Overcoming Obstacles on the Road to North American Integration: A View from Canada”, November 2001, http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/1093/1/Overcoming%20Obstacles%20on%20the%20Road%20 to%20North%20American%20Integration%20A%20View%20from%20Canada.pdf?1, Callahan) Political integration between Canada, the United States, and Mexico will evolve slowly and naturally from economic integration, personal and professional interactions, and increased trilateral cooperation. However, it would be completely unreasonable to expect Canada to put trilateral North American relations before bilateral relations with its powerful and uniquely important US neighbour. After all, Canada is highly dependent on access to the US market. About 70% of Canadian GDP crosses the border and 50% of Canadian manufactured exports are inter-company trade with the United States. Yet, it is in Canada’s interest to invest more time and resources in the North American relationship. There are a number of foreign and domestic policy issues that warrant a coordinated, collective North American response. Two such issues, security concerns and energy supplies, were underscored in this paper. Canada could maximize its influence in the integration process by considering the following measures: • Adopt a trilateral approach to the process of North American integration. The approach should be used when policy issues lend themselves particularly well to trilateral cooperation. It should be driven by, but not exclusive to the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. Government departments with “functional” responsibilities (i.e. Transport Canada, Heritage Canada etc.) should continue to seek out and strengthen their contacts with Mexican and US officials when designing both policies and programs. Face-to-face meetings on a trilateral basis should become a regular feature of government-to-government contact . • Establish a high-level commission to deal with trilateral policy issues. Ideally the commission would be comprised of Cabinetlevel officials from Canada, the United States, and Mexico along with non-governmental advisors. Such a commission could be chaired jointly by the three Foreign Affairs Ministers who could oversee a series of functional or thematic projects. The commission might also task non-governmental entities to study and report on emerging issues that are primarily trilateral in nature. • Get the message out. Canada needs to articulate a position as soon as possible on the “North America” question. The Canadian government did not issue an adequate public response to Vicente Fox’s overtures during his visits to Ottawa in August 2000, and April 2001. This silence resulted in much detailed speculation in Canadian newspapers on integration, including articles on “seamless” or “disappearing borders”, “backroom talk” in Ottawa on deepening NAFTA, much exaggerated sovereignty and cultural identity arguments, and the “continentalist tendencies” of the Liberal Party. Work should begin immediately on a major speech to be delivered by the Prime Minister that would address the trilateral issue in a strategic way. Such a speech could provide Canadian officials with a reference point vis-à-vis their day-to-day activities. • Include Mexico in thinking about North America. North American solutions to problems that are clearly trans-national in nature will not be found if Mexico is missing from the equation. Moreover, trilateral relations will not grow if the Canada-Mexico bilateral relationship remains underdeveloped. This paper therefore reiterates a policy recommendation made in “High Expectations in Mexico: Responding to the Priorities of A New Government” (Source: FOCAL February 2001). Canada’s foreign policy toward Mexico essentially needs a shot in the arm. It needs to do a better job adjusting to changes in Mexico, be flexible enough to anticipate further reform in the country, and it needs to be consistent so as to develop a relationship that is not shaken up every time a crisis occurs there. Canada should also negotiations. ask to be consulted on United States-Mexico bilateral 2NC – Spillover Specific issues spill over by providing the basis for further integration Wilson-Forsberg 01 – Stacey Wilson-Forsberg is a Policy Analyst for FOCAL. (“Overcoming Obstacles on the Road to North American Integration: A View from Canada”, November 2001, http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/1093/1/Overcoming%20Obstacles%20on%20the%20Road%20 to%20North%20American%20Integration%20A%20View%20from%20Canada.pdf?1, Callahan) Many experts argue that Canada, the United States, and Mexico should build on the successes of NAFTA to find other areas that could bring mutual benefit to the citizens of all three countries. Trilateral cooperation on specific policy issues will open possibilities for increased integration . The coming into effect of NAFTA in 1994 created the underpinnings for trilateral cooperation between Canada, the United States and Mexico on issues outside of trade and commerce. Such cooperation evolved rapidly at the state/provincial and local levels, and even more so at the more informal level of civil society. While very difficult to measure, relationships have been built between parliamentarians, government officials, business associations, universities, churches and cultural institutions. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) from the three countries have established a wide web of networks, collaborating on a variety of issues, including: environmental protection, labour issues, human rights, women’s issues, indigenous issues, and economic and social development. Many of these NGOs share a common concern about the consequences of NAFTA and the path that continental integration is following. Some progress has been made in this area at the foreign policy level, but any steps taken have been cautious and perhaps even half-hearted . Former Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy, former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, and former Foreign Secretary Rosario Green signed a Framework for a North American Partnership in 1998 that dealt with such areas as development cooperation, disaster preparedness, culture and education, youth initiatives, and environmental issues. The three ministers discussed further collaboration at trilateral meetings in 1999 and 2000. As Director of the Liu Centre for the Study of Global Issues at the University of British Columbia, Lloyd Axworthy continues to promote trilateral cooperation between Canada and its North American counterparts. 2NC – Say Yes/Ptx NB Canada says yes and the CP avoids the link to politics Brister 12 (Dr. Bernard Brister is an Assistant Professor at the Royal Military College of Canada where he teaches strategy and international relations in the Department of Political Science and Economics. His research interests include North American security in an Asia-Pacific context and global energy strategies. Forget Al-Qaeda: Think Mexico – Next Great Threat to Canadian Security, November 2012, http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/Forget%20Al-Qaeda%20Think%20Mexico.pdf) How would such a proactive and comprehensive approach to continental security be received by the two partners in the process? One could speculate that it would be received with enthusiasm by both but for different reasons. To the extent that the Canadian contributions aligned themselves with established Americans strategies and measures, the United States would welcome the approach for all of the reasons provided previously and for the added benefit that it would reduce the commitment of American resources. Having Canadian participation would also provide political cover domestically and internationally with the associated positive political effects. That this type of cooperation is already under consideration by Canada and the United States is evidenced by the discussions between US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, and Canadian Minister of National Defence Peter McKay on joint military co-operation relating to continental defence, including anti-drug efforts and weapons control at their meeting in Halifax on 18 November, 2011.33 Mexico would likely welcome Canadian participation as well if only for the reason that it would reduce American participation and presence on issues of vital Mexican interests. This position is supported also by the fact that Mexican public opinion polls since 2004 have consistently put Canada at, or near, the top of the list of most popular foreign countries by both the general public and the informed elite that regularly considers Mexican foreign policy.34 While the implementation of a visa requirement may have dampened this affection somewhat, a large portion of the Mexican population see Canada as a positive example of a smaller state that has successfully resisted integration with a more powerful neighbour and maintained its sovereignty in the face of sometimes daunting pressure.35 There may also be some benefits and synergies for the Mexicans in the ways that Canadians approach governance, security and judicial issues. Lastly, the Mexicans may appreciate what is often a less intrusive approach to providing assistance to our friends and allies. There would also be several benefits to Canadian interests of adopting this strategy. First, it would put Canadians “at the table” when issues central to continental security are discussed with the result that Canadian governments would be informed and current on the thoughts and actions of their continental allies and in the best position as possible to influence their actions and decisions in those areas vital to Canadian interests. Such participation in a variety of security, governance, and judicial capacities would also provide invaluable experience and develop expertise in addressing threats and situations that while not directly affecting Canadians at present, clearly threaten to do so in the future. Along these lines, Canada would be doing what it has always done in the realm of national security, addressing the threat before it actually reaches our shores, or in this case, our borders 2NC – Say Yes Canada supports Mexican development Aspe at al. 5 (Pedro Aspe is Chief Executive Officer of Protego, a leading investment banking advisory firm in Mexico. Mr. Aspe was most recently the Secretary of the Treasury of Mexico He has been a Professor of Economics at Instituto Tecnolo ́ gico Auto ́ nomo de Me ́ xico (ITAM) and has held a number of positions in the Mexican government. “Building a North American Community”, 2005, pg. 5) Shared challenge of uneven economic development. A fast lane to development is crucial for Mexico to contribute to the security of the entire region. Mexico’s development has failed to prevent deep disparities between different regions of the country, and particularly between remote regions and those better connected to international markets. Northern states have grown ten times faster than those in the center and south of the country. Lack of economic opportunity encourages unauthorized migration and has been found to be associated with corruption, drug trafficking, violence, and human suffering. Improvements in human capital and physical infrastructure in Mexico, particularly in the center and south of the country, would knit these regions more firmly into the North American economy and are in the economic and security interest of all three countries. Leaders in our three countries have acknowledged these problems and indicated their support for a number of promising measures, including immigration reform, but there remains considerable scope for more individual, bilateral, and joint efforts to address development needs. Canada is pursuing cooperation now – they say yes Pastor 12 (Robert A., Dr. Robert Pastor is a professor of international relations and director of the Center for North American Studies and the Center for Democracy and Election Management. From 2002-07, he was Vice President of International Affairs at AU where he transformed and expanded the study abroad program, established the American University of Nigeria, and initiated new programs on language immersion and “Abroad at AU.” He has served in government as National Security Advisor for Latin America, and he was a Senior Fellow and director of programs on democracy, Latin America, and China at the Carter Center, “Beyond the Continental Divide”, August, 2012, http://www.the-american-interest.com/article.cfm?piece=1269) The Presidents of the United States and Mexico and the Prime Minister of Canada should seek to construct a North American Community that would invigorate their economies and improve the region’s competitiveness with Asia and Europe, enhance continental and public security, address more effectively the new transnational agenda, and design lean but effective trinational institutions for the 21st century. Such a Community would advance the principal goals of each country. For Mexico, it would narrow the development gap and lift its people to First-World status. For Canada, it would create institutions that would bind the three nations to agreed standards. For the United States, it would create a new style of leadership more aligned with long-term goals than with short-term special interests. For all three countries, it would allow a more cooperative and effective approach to transnational issues like transportation, infrastructure, immigration, anti-narcotics policies and the environment. The vision that undergirds this proposal is based on a principle of managed interdependence. If one country suffers a setback, all are hurt ; success for one helps the others . The principle is simple and often lauded by leaders , but rarely acted on. If the United States actually accepted its “shared responsibility” for the drug problem, for example, it would get serious about making sure the 7,500 gun shops on the U.S. side of the border do not sell weapons to drug cartels. And if all three countries actually incorporated a sense of community, they would advertise “Buy North America” instead of “Buy USA”, “Buy Mexico” or “Buy Canada.” The word “Community” refers to a group in which the members feel an affinity and desire to cooperate . It is not a union, and their relationship would differ from Europe’s, although, as already suggested, it should try to learn from Europe’s experience. It would be flexible enough for the three countries to define the new relationship that they would seek. Like the people and states of North America, the Community would be eminently pragmatic, choosing policies based on what advances the interests of all. By moving from a dual-bilateral relationship to a trilateral approach, the three countries could avoid duplication and clashing efforts. They would replace power imbalances with fair rules and would mobilize all three peoples to attack problems rather than each other. In December 2011, the U.S. and Canadian governments presented “Action Plans” on the border and regulatory convergence, and the U.S. and Mexican governments repeated the same exercise. The three countries restated the goal that they announced a decade before in the two “Smart Borders” agreements: to make the border efficient and secure. And they affirmed the need to harmonize regulations, just as they did in 2005, when they established the Security and Prosperity Partnership to avoid “the tyranny of small differences in regulations” that serve only to protect companies rather than benefit consumers. As it turned out, the “Action Plans” were really inaction plans. They set one-year deadlines for studies on virtually every issue identified a decade ago without ever trying to explain why the three governments had failed to achieve their goals. The Obama Administration waited until its third year to announce studies that won’t be completed until December 2012. The leaders called the plans “game-changers”, but anyone who bothered to read them knew they were playing the same old games. This was little more than a full-employment act for bureaucrats. It is possible, of course, that a trilateral approach might not yield any more effective policies than the dual-bilateral efforts have so far. Nevertheless, it is clear that the only way to move forward on the agenda is for the leaders to grasp the North American opportunity, give it a high priority and organize their governments to accomplish their goals. It’s also clear we need to create institutions to help the three governments think continentally. At a minimum, we need a North American Advisory Commission to prepare continental options for all three leaders to consider and choose at annual summits. The Summit generates support and ensures Canada says yes Aspe at al. 5 (Pedro Aspe is Chief Executive Officer of Protego, a leading investment banking advisory firm in Mexico. Mr. Aspe was most recently the Secretary of the Treasury of Mexico He has been a Professor of Economics at Instituto Tecnolo ́ gico Auto ́ nomo de Me ́ xico (ITAM) and has held a number of positions in the Mexican government. “Building a North American Community”, 2005, pg. 5) An annual summit of North American leaders would do more to carry out our overall goal of creating a North American community than virtually any of the report’s other recommendations. As we have seen with the annual Group of Seven/Eight (G-7/8) and AsiaPacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summits, regular meetings of leaders not only help promote a sense of community and shared objectives , but channel the various bureaucracies each year to work on those common objectives. Whether on matters of security, education, or economic integration and development, annual summits will drive a process that will hasten the goals that we outline in our report. More to the point, an annual summit can be announced and implemented right away, giving tangible impetus to the good beginning made at the March 2005 summit and to the goals we promote here. Canada says yes – consultation and US Brister 12 (Dr. Bernard Brister is an Assistant Professor at the Royal Military College of Canada where he teaches strategy and international relations in the Department of Political Science and Economics. His research interests include North American security in an Asia-Pacific context and global energy strategies. Forget Al-Qaeda: Think Mexico – Next Great Threat to Canadian Security, November 2012, http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/Forget%20Al-Qaeda%20Think%20Mexico.pdf) Having identified some of the potential threats and pitfalls associated with the contemporary state of internal Mexican affairs and the American desire for a closer continental security relationship, one should now consider the Canadian alternatives in dealing with these circumstances. First, one option that cannot be adopted is a “head in the sand” attempt to ignore the situation and do nothing. The only outcome resulting from this course of action will be Canadian irrelevance in the Canadians have always done well in their interactions with their American neighbours. In part this is due to the generosity of the American spirit towards a country that they see as a mirror of their own in many ways. In other cases it is because what is seen as a small concession by the Americans over the decision-making process and ultimately the imposition of an American border security regime upon the Canadian public. Historically course of the negotiating process is seen as a much larger benefit to Canada when disparities in the size of our nations are considered. But most importantly, Canadians have always done particularly well with America whenever they have pursued a course of action involving the potent combination of informed and pro-active engagement with demonstrations of bald-faced intransigence when and as required. Thus the bold pursuit of Canadian interests with both the Americans and Mexicans promises to be a winning strategy in the circumstances. A strategy of informed and pro-active engagement will require the quintessential “whole of government” approach internally and a process that others have called, “trilateral bilateralism” externally.30 This external process is where issues that primarily concern two of the states are pursued bilaterally and those few instances of truly trilateral concern are addressed with all three partners in consultation . Thus the situation in addressing any given issue may well be one that involves paraphrasing MacKenzie King’s well known saying, “trilateralism if necessary, but not necessarily trilateralism.” Say yes – security calculations Brister 12 (Dr. Bernard Brister is an Assistant Professor at the Royal Military College of Canada where he teaches strategy and international relations in the Department of Political Science and Economics. His research interests include North American security in an Asia-Pacific context and global energy strategies. Forget Al-Qaeda: Think Mexico – Next Great Threat to Canadian Security, November 2012, http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/Forget%20Al-Qaeda%20Think%20Mexico.pdf) Nonetheless, the inclusion of Mexico in the continental security matrix does appear to be a long term objective for the Americans and as such it should be a long term concern for Canada . In the interim however, and regardless of how much Canadians wish to be considered separately from Mexico on many security issues, the reality is that an American problem on their southern border will inevitably influence the thickness and permeability of their northern border if Canada does not actively engage both the Americans and the Mexicans on the issue.27 Thus as much as Ottawa would like to avoid becoming embroiled in United States-Mexico issues, Canadians have a vested interest in the resolution of Mexican security and economic issues as they pertain to their American neighbour. Yes – US pressure Brister 12 (Dr. Bernard Brister is an Assistant Professor at the Royal Military College of Canada where he teaches strategy and international relations in the Department of Political Science and Economics. His research interests include North American security in an Asia-Pacific context and global energy strategies. Forget Al-Qaeda: Think Mexico – Next Great Threat to Canadian Security, November 2012, http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/Forget%20Al-Qaeda%20Think%20Mexico.pdf) Having identified a number of advantages to a trilateral relationship for the United States and Mexico, one is hard-pressed to do the same for the Canadians. One possible advantage that could be put forward by Canadian nationalists would be a variation of one just mentioned for Mexico. That with Canada and Mexico opposing an American initiative or policy there would be the mistaken belief that American authority and influence upon the relationship as a whole would be weakened and Canadian interests would be better served in the process. The reality is that the last vestiges of special consideration and a special security relationship between Canada and the United States would likely disappear as Canada and Mexico were lumped into the same security strategy envelope, with the specific security interests of neither state being directly addressed. With Mexico in the relationship, Canada could be used by the United States as additional support for its views as is already the case with its membership in the Organization of American States (OAS). America could prevail upon Canadians to go and talk to the Mexicans to bring them around to the shared Canada-United States perspective on issues that Canada and the United States agree upon. It can use the Mexicans in the same way against the Canadians on issues upon which the Mexicans and the Americans agree. The United States would be able to use both Canada and Mexico against each other, but refuse to yield when the two junior partners are united against an American position. 2NC—Mexico Says Yes Both countries say yes Parliament of Canada 02 – Obvi. (“CHAPTER 5: A CANADIAN AGENDA FOR ENHANCING BILATERAL AND TRILATERAL RELATIONS IN NORTH AMERICA”, 2002 (based on dates in the cites and in the article), http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=1032320&Mode=1&Parl=37&Ses=2&Language=E&Fi le=344, Callahan) Interestingly, as Wood and MacLean observed, a few years ago it had been the Canadian government that seemed to be the prime advocate of “trilateralism” (then-foreign minister Axworthy in particular promoted the idea of developing a “community” relationship within North America that could also provide an “important model of regional cooperation”61), whereas the Mexican government was seen as most sceptical and wary of potential intrusions into Mexican domestic affairs.62 A few years later the roles seemed to be reversed when the new Mexican administration of Vicente Fox presented a long-term “Vision 20/20” for such a continental community that was “met with polite scepticism in Ottawa” during Mr. Fox’s first Canadian visit in August 2000.63 Canada now appears more ready to engage with Mexico on some aspects of a North American agenda. Speaking for DFAIT, Marc Lortie stated to the Committee before its visit to Mexico: “The Government supports the development of a North American relationship. President Fox has said that a common currency and customs union are long-term goals. Over the short term, we are working to identify issues that would be best served through trilateral engagement.”64 At the same time, the current Mexican government has clearly been the most enthusiastic about pursuing trilateral North American approaches and the “community” concept. Indeed, in Monterrey the Mexicans submitted proposals to Canada and the United States to further the study of ambitious initiatives along these lines.65 Several senior Mexican officials who spoke to the Committee in Mexico City in March also suggested that some sort of expert group or commission might be formed, reporting to the three governments, as a possible vehicle for moving forward the agenda for trilateral cooperation. 2NC – Currency Swaps Solvency Consultation is key Ayon et al. 9 (David R. Ayon, is a political analyst and writer, who serves as a Senior Research Associate at the Center for the Study of Los Angeles at Loyola Marymount University and as the U.S. Director of the Focus Mexico/Enfoque México Project. Robert Donnely, is Program Associate of the Woodrow Wilson Center's Mexico Institute and was previously the Coordinator of the Justice in Mexico Project at the University of San Diego's Transborder Institute. Dolia Estevez, is a career journalist who currently writes tor Poder magazine and El Semanario and serves as the consulting coordinator of the U.S.-Mexico Journalism Initiative at the Woodrow Wilson Center. Eric Olson, is Senior Advisor to the Security Initiative of the Woodrow Wilson Center's Mexico Institute and has held senior positions at the Organization of American States, Amnesty International, and the Washington Office on Latin America. Andrew Seele, is Director of the Woodrow Wilson Center's Mexico Institute and an Adjunct Professor at Johns Hopkins University. “THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO: Towards a Strategic Partnership”, January 2009, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/The%20U.S.%20and%20Mexico.%20Towards%20a%20Strategic%20Partnership.pdf) The interdependence of the two economies makes Mexico one of the most vulnerable countries in Latin America during the present global financial turmoil. Mexico will be affected especially from a fall in U.S. imports, declining remittances from the United States and reduced demand for tourism. The U.S. recession, which is expected to deepen in 2009, will have a dramatic effect on Mexico’s prospects for growth.18 Increased unemployment in the U.S. labor market and a slowdown in the construction and service industries, are expected to force unprecedented number of documented and undocumented Mexican migrants to go back to Mexico where they have little hope of finding jobs in the formal economy. In addition, the financial crisis has caused the value of the Mexican peso to drop to record levels, despite the Banco de Mexico deployment of billions of dollars of reserves to try to maintain its value during October 2008. The Bolsa, Mexico’s stock market, paralleled the extreme volatility of its U.S., European and Asian counterparts. Although Mexico was virtually free of the toxic mortgage-backed securities at the heart of the crisis, and the Mexican government has followed conservative and responsible fiscal policies, the country’s economy has been hit by declining oil prices and the turmoil of the highly speculative derivatives market in which Mexican corporations were involved. The move by the U.S. Federal Reserve to extend emergency currency swap lines to Mexico and other emerging economies helped restore confidence in the Mexican currency.20!e Fed’s concern about Mexico’s financial well-being is not new. In the aftermath of the assassination of the ruling party’s presidential candidate in 1994 which provoked massive capital flight, the Federal Reserve’s Open Market Committee established the North American Framework Agreement (NAFA), and the associated bilateral reciprocal currency (“swap”) arrangements with the Banco de Mexico and the Bank of Canada. The Fed’s swap arrangements, which are renewed yearly, are in the amount of $3 billion to Mexico and $2 billion to Canada. The Department of Treasury, through its Exchange Stabilization Fund, which was used to lend funds to Mexico in 1995, is also a NAFA participant. During the 1982 debt crisis and the 1994–95 peso crisis, the Fed played a pivotal role in assisting Mexico to renegotiate with its foreign creditors and meet its dollars liquidity needs.21 This close collaboration between Mexican and U.S. financial authorities underscores the importance of timely and coordinated actions in crisis management. Crises offer challenges and opportunities for long term strategies. The current downturn highlights, perhaps more than other times in the past, the need for better macroeconomic policy consultation and short-term crisis management mechanisms to avoid sudden shocks to the economies of both countries by developments that take place on either side of the border. History shows us that each country benefits from its partner’s success and each is diminished by the other’s problems. The United States has a vested interest in Mexico’s economic and social stability and long- term health, given the impact that Mexico’s economy has on U.S. exports and on migration. Financial mismanagement and insufficient regulation in the United States have had a direct impact in Mexico. And although good macroeconomic management has allowed Mexico’s economy to grow gradually since the late 1990s,22 the lack of attention to crucial structural reforms, including rule of law, competition policy, tax collection, labor laws, primary and secondary education, energy and monopolies have limited the potential for growth and highlighted weaknesses in Mexico’s economy.23 Insufficient investment in infrastructure and human capital create long-term drags on the Mexican economy and, in turn, limit the potential for economic growth, with secondary effects on the U.S. economy. While these are essentially matters of domestic policy in each country, both governments have a vested interest in improving communication , pursuing a more viable process of engagement on macroeconomic policy and maintaining a critical dialogue about the need for sound economic policies in both countries. 2NC – China exports impact Failure to commit to trilateral shit causes Canadian energy shift to China Pastor 12 (Robert A., Dr. Robert Pastor is a professor of international relations and director of the Center for North American Studies and the Center for Democracy and Election Management. From 200207, he was Vice President of International Affairs at AU where he transformed and expanded the study abroad program, established the American University of Nigeria, and initiated new programs on language immersion and “Abroad at AU.” He has served in government as National Security Advisor for Latin America, and he was a Senior Fellow and director of programs on democracy, Latin America, and China at the Carter Center, “Beyond the Continental Divide”, August, 2012, http://www.the-americaninterest.com/article.cfm?piece=1269) There are, of course, a wealth of ways to measure the direct and indirect impact of NAFTA, but political attention, not without justification, tends to focus on violations of the agreement. The U.S. government violated NAFTA by denying Mexican trucks the right to enter the United States for 16 years, relenting in the most timid way, and only after Mexico was permitted by the World Trade Organization to retaliate in October 2011. And for more than a decade, Washington failed to comply with decisions made by a dispute-settlement mechanism regarding imports of soft-wood lumber from Canada. More recently, the United States decided to build a huge wall to keep out Mexicans, and after a three-year process of reviewing the environmental impact of the Keystone XL pipeline from western Canada to the Gulf of Mexico, this past December 2011 President Obama decided to postpone the decision for another year. This is the sort of treatment likely to drive both Canada and Mexico to conclude that depending on the United States was the wrong decision. ¶ Imagine for a moment what might happen if Canada and Mexico came to such a conclusion. Canada might divert its energy exports to China , especially if China guaranteed a long-term relationship at a good price. Mexico would diversify with South America and China and might be less inclined to keep America’s rivals, like Iran, at arm’s length. Is there anyone who thinks these developments would not set off national security alarms? A very old truth would quickly reassert itself: The United States can project its power into Asia, Europe and the Middle East in part because it need not worry about its neighbors. A new corollary of that truth would not be far behind: Canada and Mexico are far more important to the national security of the United States than Iraq and Afghanistan. 2NC – Energy Solvency The counterplan solves the aff better Hufbauer and Schott 04 – Gary C. Hufbauer is the Reginald Jones Senior Fellow at the Institute for International Economics (IIE) in Washington. He is one of the authors of NAFTA: A Ten-Year Appraisal. Jeffrey J. Schott is a Senior Fellow at the IIE. He is one of the authors of NAFTA: A Ten-Year Appraisal. (“The Prospects for Deeper North American Economic Integration: A US Perspective”, January 2004, http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/hufbauer0104.pdf, Callahan) High on a future agenda is the common U.S., Canadian and Mexican interest in expanding regional energy production, especially production of North American natural gas. The U.S.-Canada energy infrastructure is already fairly well integrated, but distribution of supplies faces numerous obstacles both within and between countries. U.S.-Mexico energy relations are sharply constrained by the Mexican constitutional prohibition on foreign participation in the exploitation of oil and gas. Mexico must reexamine these policies if the country is to avoid a major power shortage in the coming years.14 Unfortunately, the Mexican Congress seems reluctant to proceed on even modest reforms that could boost investment in electricity generating plants. It is even less willing to contemplate foreign energy companies playing a role in developing deep Mexican oil reserves (in the Gulf) or gas reserves (in the northern states). What could be done? Dobson (2002) proposes a constructive starting point: use the existing bilateral and trilateral mechanisms to coordinate efforts at regulatory reforms that would encourage production and distribution of natural gas.15 Other 2NC Things a/t: bilateralism/perm Perm fails – bilateral treatment is unsuccessful Pastor 8 (Robert A., Dr. Robert Pastor is a professor of international relations and director of the Center for North American Studies and the Center for Democracy and Election Management. From 2002-07, he was Vice President of International Affairs at AU where he transformed and expanded the study abroad program, established the American University of Nigeria, and initiated new programs on language immersion and “Abroad at AU.” He has served in government as National Security Advisor for Latin America, and he was a Senior Fellow and director of programs on democracy, Latin America, and China at the Carter Center, “The Future of North America”, 2008, http://www.american.edu/sis/cnas/upload/ForeignAffairs_Pastor_On_NA_072008.pdf) The dual-bilateral strategy (U.S.-Canada, U.S.-Mexico) is also failing. It exacerbates the defining and debilitating characteristic of the United States’ relations with its neighbors— asymmetry . It leads Washington to ignore them or impose its will, and it causes Ottawa and Mexico City to either retreat or be defensive. Given the imbalance in power and wealth, a truly equal relationship may be elusive , but it is in the long-term interests of all three countries to build institutions that will reduce the imbalance. The genius of the Marshall Plan was that the United States used its leverage not for short-term gain but to encourage Europe to unite. That kind of statesmanship is needed to step beyond short-term and private interests and construct a North American Community Binding key Consent by all parties is key Parliament of Canada 02 – Obvi. (“CHAPTER 5: A CANADIAN AGENDA FOR ENHANCING BILATERAL AND TRILATERAL RELATIONS IN NORTH AMERICA”, 2002 (based on dates in the cites and in the article), http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=1032320&Mode=1&Parl=37&Ses=2&Language=E&Fi le=344, Callahan) The Committee accepts the point that voluntary North American associations and alliances are essential if trilateral relations are to be more than just occasional official rhetoric about partnership and cooperation; more than just a top-down intergovernmental affair decided in distant capitals with minimal public engagement. However, such informal “community-building” as Blank recommends only partially sidesteps, and does not resolve, the dilemmas of designing adequate democratic institutions at a North American level. It does not address how governance decisions might be arrived at trilaterally through transparently democratic structures and processes in key policy areas, especially if, as a result of continuing integration, certain older instruments or levers of democratic control are no longer available or effective at the national and/or local levels. In sum, a democratic “North American community” may well be desirable over the longer term. But its content, form, and feasibility are all still far from being clearly or consensually defined, much less established. Referring to a new book on North American integration published by Washington’s Brookings Institution, and based on the proceedings of a December 2001 conference that brought together leading thinkers from Canada and Mexico as well as the United States, David Crane writes that it “shows why the idea of a North American Community, our continent’s version of the European Union, would be so difficult.”125 Certainly, the concept of such a community is not one that can simply be asserted or wished into being. Accordingly, we believe that realizing progress on trilateral relations needs to start at a practical level by governments pursuing and supporting initiatives that could be achievable within a time frame of the next few years. The measures we have in mind would not unduly affect the sovereignty of any of the partners. And they would be undertaken for the demonstrable purpose of benefiting each partner’s citizens. If there is to be a common trilateral vision, it will be one based on a mutual recognition of each partner’s interests, and on a shared commitment to forms of North American cooperation that serve each other’s interests. It is to these final considerations for action that we now turn. The permutation bypasses Canada’s interests which reinforces status quo fragmentation Clarkson and Mildenberger 11 – Stephen and Matto are writers for the Globe and Mail. (“Sad but true: Canada and Mexico have no clout in Washington”, Oct 7, 2011, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/commentary/sad-but-true-canada-and-mexico-have-no-clout-inwashington/article557286/, Callahan) The paradox of North America’s skewed development is that, although Canada and Mexico make extraordinarily large contributions to America’s economic strength, homeland security and international effectiveness, they have virtually no influence in Washington’s corridors of power . Starting with the economic realm, Canada and Mexico are the United States’ largest external sources of material strength. Although the GDP of Mexico and Canada taken together would only constitute the world’s fifth-largest economy, their intense, proximity-driven economic ties make them America’s largest trading and investment partners. This relationship boosts the U.S. economy’s productivity and raises its GDP by some 2 to 3 per cent, supplementing the average American’s income by a very considerable $1,000 every year. Economic relations with Canada alone support eight million American jobs. These bilateral linkages literally fuel the U.S. economy. Together, Canada and Mexico provide a third of U.S. oil imports and almost all of its natural gas imports. Low-wage labour from Mexico has become indispensable in many American service industries and supplies a third of its agricultural work force. When it comes to security, Canada’s and Mexico’s land masses are a potential menace, since they could be used by terrorist organizations to infiltrate the United States. But this proximity also turns the Canadian and Mexican governments into Washington’s prime associates in its war on terrorism, as they are in its war on drugs. Specifically, Ottawa has focused on financing joint border-toughening measures, harmonizing its visa policies, supplying the Department of Homeland Security with data about its citizens’ air-travel movements, and integrating its counterintelligence capacities with Washington’s. In foreign policy matters, Canada and Mexico have occasionally proved to be an essential support for achieving U.S. aims. Without Canada’s and Mexico’s participation in developing the precedent-setting North American free-trade agreement, the U.S. would not have managed to pull off its remarkable feat 16 years ago of transforming the limited General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade into the muscular World Trade Organization that reinforced its corporations’ power overseas. There are two reasons why America’s material and security dependence on its two next-door neighbours does not translate into their political influence in Washington. First, the U.S. has shaped the governance structures within which continental policy processes play out ‒ including disempowering any institutions that could give the continental periphery a voice in affecting American policies. Institutionalizing its two bilateral relationships with the Canada-U.S. free-trade agreement and NAFTA was a masterstroke that established rules that, for instance, constrain Canada from turning off its oil taps as a bargaining lever. The second reason has to do with the historically rooted deference of our business and political elites who will make almost any concession in order to get access to the U.S. market. Their resulting limp bargaining culture causes Ottawa’s negotiators to back off from confrontations, then claim the resulting compromises as victories – as we saw with the Harper government’s capitulation in the softwood lumber agreement of 2006 and last year’s pathetic government procurement deal. The impending report of the bilateral Beyond the Border Working Group in which the Canadian government is committing another $1-billion to harmonize its immigration and border operations still further with American practices in the hope that Homeland Security will modify some of its border controls confirms North America’s enduring puzzle. While Canada and Mexico are essential to American prosperity and security, they remain impotent in Washington, unable to prevent it from pursuing its antiterrorism-fixated border thickening that is strangling the commercial flows that are the lifeblood of North America’s economic position in the world. *Aff* 2AC Perm Consult+do plan inev Perm solves Clarkson 9 (Stephen, Professor of Political Economy @ University of Toronto, “North America: A Trilateral, Bilateral, or Unilateral Space?”, 2009, http://www.jfki.fu-berlin.de/faculty/history/dates/clarkson_chapter.pdf) However, the Committee believes that there may be a way to take some elements from this idea, considered together with the Mexican idea for creating a high-level “wise persons” advisory group of some kind. What we suggest is that the three governments, rather than simply managing business as usual or dismissing ideas such as Robert Pastor’s out of hand, could benefit from the in-depth investigation and reflection of a small expert panel. The panel’s mandate would be to examine and report back to the governments on the future of the North American partnership overall and the feasibility of trilateral next steps in particular. Such a panel could be very small, perhaps only three persons, with each of the three governments appointing one member in consultation with the others. We see the mandate of this panel being defined only as broadly as the three governments are able mutually to agree . Moreover, none of its recommendations would be in any way binding . At the same time, we believe the striking of such a panel would provide an opportunity for a rigorous exploration of promising future agendas for North American cooperation, together with possible forms of institutional development and innovation, that would be extremely useful to feed into the more intensive executive and parliamentary trilateral processes that we have recommended. In addition, the expert panel would be encouraged to consult widely within the three societies. Its findings would be released publicly and would hopefully stimulate more informed debate. 2AC Internal Link Turn to NB Canadian consultation sucks Brister 12 (Dr. Bernard Brister is an Assistant Professor at the Royal Military College of Canada where he teaches strategy and international relations in the Department of Political Science and Economics. His research interests include North American security in an Asia-Pacific context and global energy strategies. Forget Al-Qaeda: Think Mexico – Next Great Threat to Canadian Security, November 2012, http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/Forget%20Al-Qaeda%20Think%20Mexico.pdf) Having identified a number of advantages to a trilateral relationship for the United States and Mexico, one is hard-pressed to do the same for the Canadians. One possible advantage that could be put forward by Canadian nationalists would be a variation of one just mentioned for Mexico. That with Canada and Mexico opposing an American initiative or policy there would be the mistaken belief that American authority and influence upon the relationship as a whole would be weakened and Canadian interests would be better served in the process. The reality is that the last vestiges of special consideration and a special security relationship between Canada and the United States would likely disappear as Canada and Mexico were lumped into the same security strategy envelope, with the specific security interests of neither state being directly addressed. With Mexico in the relationship, Canada could be used by the United States as additional support for its views as is already the case with its membership in the Organization of American States (OAS). America could prevail upon Canadians to go and talk to the Mexicans to bring them around to the shared Canada-United States perspective on issues that Canada and the United States agree upon. It can use the Mexicans in the same way against the Canadians on issues upon which the Mexicans and the Americans agree. The United States would be able to use both Canada and Mexico against each other, but refuse to yield when the two junior partners are united against an American position. The effect would essentially be one of a significant reduction in the Canadian “room to manoeuvre” within the Canada-United States relationship. The added complexity of a third party and issues in the institutions of the existing bilateral relationship would reduce the speed and effectiveness with which common CanadaUnited States issues and interests could be addressed at every level of the relationship. The differences between Canada and Mexico in the levels of trust between agencies, governance capabilities, and the specifics of the issues to be dealt with as they pertain to the United States, would all complicate the relationship and reduce the precision with which Canada could employ its established policy threads in pursuit of quintessentially Canadian interests.22 2AC – a/t: integration NB Engagement with Canada on Mexican policy internal link turns the net-benefit Brister 12 (Dr. Bernard Brister is an Assistant Professor at the Royal Military College of Canada where he teaches strategy and international relations in the Department of Political Science and Economics. His research interests include North American security in an Asia-Pacific context and global energy strategies. Forget Al-Qaeda: Think Mexico – Next Great Threat to Canadian Security, November 2012, http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/Forget%20Al-Qaeda%20Think%20Mexico.pdf) Having identified a number of advantages to a trilateral relationship for the United States and Mexico, one is hard-pressed to do the same for the Canadians. One possible advantage that could be put forward by Canadian nationalists would be a variation of one just mentioned for Mexico. That with Canada and Mexico opposing an American initiative or policy there would be the mistaken belief that American authority and influence upon the relationship as a whole would be weakened and Canadian interests would be better served in the process. The reality is that the last vestiges of special consideration and a special security relationship between Canada and the United States would likely disappear as Canada and Mexico were lumped into the same security strategy envelope, with the specific security interests of neither state being directly addressed. With Mexico in the relationship, Canada could be used by the United States as additional support for its views as is already the case with its membership in the Organization of American States (OAS). America could prevail upon Canadians to go and talk to the Mexicans to bring them around to the shared Canada-United States perspective on issues that Canada and the United States agree upon. It can use the Mexicans in the same way against the Canadians on issues upon which the Mexicans and the Americans agree. The United States would be able to use both Canada and Mexico against each other, but refuse to yield when the two junior partners are united against an American position. The effect would essentially be one of a significant reduction in the Canadian “room to manoeuvre” within the Canada-United States relationship. The added complexity of a third party and issues in the institutions of the existing bilateral relationship would reduce the speed and effectiveness with which common CanadaUnited States issues and interests could be addressed at every level of the relationship. The differences between Canada and Mexico in the levels of trust between agencies, governance capabilities, and the specifics of the issues to be dealt with as they pertain to the United States, would all complicate the relationship and reduce the precision with which Canada could employ its established policy threads in pursuit of quintessentially Canadian interests.22 -- integration high now Meetings ensure sufficient integration Gabriel 12 (Dana, is an activist and independent researcher. He writes about trade, globalization, sovereignty, security, as well as other issues, Beyond NAFTA: Shaping the Future of North American Integration within the Global Economy, December 2012, http://www.globalresearch.ca/beyond-nafta-shaping-the-future-of-north-american-integration-within-the-global-economy/5315136) In a move that signaled the importance placed on the NAFTA partnership, Mexico’s new president visited the U.S. and Canada before his inauguration. This was seen as a step forward in further strengthening political, economic, energy and security ties between all three countries. Other recent high-level meetings and policy papers are also shaping the future of North American integration. Before his recent trip to the U.S., Mexico’s new President Enrique Pena Nieto emphasized in a Washington Post editorial the opportunity both countries have to build on their economic partnership. He explained that, “in NAFTA we have a solid foundation to further integrate our economies through greater investments in finance, infrastructure, manufacturing and energy.” As part of his government’s strategy to reduce violence, he stated that it is, “important that our countries increase intelligence-sharing and crime-fighting techniques and promote cooperation among law enforcement agencies.” In a White House press release, Pena Nieto invited President Barack Obama to participate in the next North American Leaders Summit which will take place in Mexico sometime in 2013. With regards to U.S.-Mexico relations, Obama said that he was also looking forward to finding ways, “to strengthen our economic ties, our trade ties, our coordination along the border, improving our joint competitiveness, as well as common security issues.” Integration/competiveness is high now – shale boom Addison 12 (Velda, Associate editor (E&P) at Hart Energy Publishing, “Energy Renaissance Strengthens North America’s Competitiveness”, August 2012, http://www.epmag.com/Exploration/EnergyRenaissance-Strengthens-North-Americas-Competitiveness_104927) A natural gas production surge is reducing US reliance on foreign countries to meet energy needs. The transformation, fueled by shale development, also is increasing investment opportunities. With the shale boom driving unprecedented growth in US natural gas production, the nation is likely to import less and export more energy over the next decade. Already, change in the nation’s energy climate is sparking more investment in North America , where low domestic natural gas prices are impacting not only power generation and petrochemical production, but also natural gas intensive manufacturing. Foreign companies are “placing bets” in the US, sinking billions of dollars into North American shale plays. Plays aside, development in the US Gulf of Mexico also has a growing potential. Its large resource base of 16 Bbbl and short time to first production – about 5.5 years – places it among the most attractive deepwater regions in the world. These facts, presented during Deloitte’s Aug. 7 webcast called “US Energy Independence?: Implications for Imports and Exports of Major Energy Resources,” show that the energy renaissance under way in North America has established the US as a major competitor in the energy world. “We have a fantastic opportunity here in the US,” said Peter Robertson, an independent senior advisor for Deloitte LLP. “We have the resource base to supply our own energy, but it is not a given .... Our industry has to perform extremely well, and government policy is critical to making this resource base work for the country.” Shale gas production has increased from less than 2 Bcf/d in 2000 to about 20 Bcf/d in 2011. Analysts previously predicted the US would be importing more energy sources at this time, but shale discoveries changed the situation. Also, North America’s oil supply potential is predicted to well exceed 20 Mbbl/d, with unconventional oil making up the bulk of the supply by 2035, Deloitte said. “We’re getting almost a million barrels a day of oil coming from these kinds of plays,” Robertson said, referring to North Dakota’s Bakken and Texas’ Eagle Ford plays. Continued growth of shale gas also could support LNG exports, US production for which could reach 80 Bcf/year by 2030, according to Deloitte. The exports aren’t likely to impact energy security, Robertson said, referencing a chart that shows LNG exports at 44 Tcf over 20 years compared to a US demand of 520 Tcf with technically recoverable gas at 2,170 Tcf. Deloitte predicted LNG exports could generate US $300 billion in cumulative exports by 2025. Similar growth is being seen in tight oil plays. Major plays have sent production from about 100 Mb/d in 2000 to about 900 Mb/d in 2011. The same thing is happening in Canada, where tight oil production from selected plays climbed from less than 5 Mb/d in 2005 to more than 160 Mb/d in 2011. There, oil sands also have witnessed a production surge, jumping from about 0.6 MMb/d in 2000 to about 1.5 MMb/d in 2011. No one really knows where all of this will lead, Robertson said, but there is opportunity. The US already has become a significant exporter of refined products such as distilled fuel oil and motor gasoline, Deloitte said. Exports of total petroleum products jumped to more than 2,500 Mb/d in 2011 from about 1,000 Mb/d in 2000. And the nation is reducing its dependence on petroleum imports. US net imports of petroleum continue to drop, going from 60% in 2005 to 45% in 2011, as US petroleum production increases. That number went from 40% in 2005 to 55% in 2011. Overall, the energy developments are attracting interest in North America , something Robertson called “pretty profound.” -- alt causes Alt causes prevent integration Pastor 8 (Robert A., Dr. Robert Pastor is a professor of international relations and director of the Center for North American Studies and the Center for Democracy and Election Management. From 2002-07, he was Vice President of International Affairs at AU where he transformed and expanded the study abroad program, established the American University of Nigeria, and initiated new programs on language immersion and “Abroad at AU.” He has served in government as National Security Advisor for Latin America, and he was a Senior Fellow and director of programs on democracy, Latin America, and China at the Carter Center, “The Future of North America”, 2008, http://www.american.edu/sis/cnas/upload/ForeignAffairs_Pastor_On_NA_072008.pdf) The first step is to deepen economic integration by eliminating the costly and cumbersome “ rules of origin” regulations , allowing all legitimate goods to move seamlessly across the borders, and permitting border officials to concentrate on stopping drugs and terrorists. To eliminate the rules of origin, the three governments will need to negotiate a common external tariff at the lowest levels. This will not be easy , as there are other free-trade agreements that would need to be reconciled, but it will make the North American economy more efficient .A smaller measure, which could have as large an economic impact, would be to comply with NAFTA and harmonize the three countries’ regulations on truck safety so as to permit trucks to travel in all three countries. Alt causes – tons of other things are necessary – consultation insufficient Gabriel 12 (Dana, is an activist and independent researcher. He writes about trade, globalization, sovereignty, security, as well as other issues, Beyond NAFTA: Shaping the Future of North American Integration within the Global Economy, December 2012, http://www.globalresearch.ca/beyond-nafta-shaping-the-future-of-north-american-integration-within-the-global-economy/5315136) According to the new policy brief, A New Agenda with Mexico put out by the Woodrow Wilson Center, “declines in illegal immigration and organized crime violence in Mexico, open up an opportunity for U.S. policymakers to deepen the economic relationship.” The report recommended working, “together with Mexico and Canada to strengthen regional competitiveness and to grow North American exports to the world.” It further elaborated on how, “Economic issues can drive the next phase in deepening U.S.Mexico cooperation. Investments in trusted shipper programs, pre-inspection programs, and enhanced border infrastructure will be crucial .” The study called on Washington to offer more, “support for Mexico’s criminal justice institutions, and strengthen U.S. anti-money laundering efforts in order to combat organized crime and violence.” It also recommended engaging, “Mexico more actively on hemispheric and extra-hemispheric foreign policy issues, ranging from terrorism to international trade and finance, as Mexico’s role as a global power grows.” In a recent article, Laura Carlsen, director of the Americas Policy Program scrutinized some the new Mexican president’s policy initiatives. In the area of security, she pointed out that, “A real change in paradigm would require two measures that the Pena government has said it will not take: withdrawing the armed forces from counternarcotics efforts and renegotiating security cooperation with the U.S. government.” She noted, “Pena Nieto has reassured the U.S. that his administration will continue the drug war.” Carlsen acknowledged how, “The U.S. government has actively promoted and supported the drug war model of enforcement and interdiction through the Merida Initiative and spearheaded the massive expansion of U.S. counternarcotics activities in the country.” She further added, “U.S. defense, intelligence and security companies depend on the Mexican drug war to obtain multi-million dollar government contracts. The Pentagon and other U.S. agencies have achieved unprecedented freedom to act and even direct actions on Mexican soil.” As far as economic policy goes, Carlsen was also critical of President Pena Nieto’s commitment to deepen rather than fix NAFTA. Just days before being sworn in as Mexico’s new president, Pena Nieto also visited Canada. In a press statement, Prime Minister Stephen Harper said he was looking forward to working with him in improving trade ties, as well as strengthening North American competitiveness and security. In an editorial that appeared in the Globe and Mail, Pena Nieto announced that, “One of the areas with the largest potential for co-operation between Mexico and Canada is energy production and development. Mexico’s energy sector is about to change. I want to enhance its potential by opening it up to national and foreign private investment.” He went on to say, “We can cultivate a closer relationship in this area in order to attain North American energy security.” Canada-U.S. energy issues are also at the forefront. Following his re-election, President Obama is under pressure to make a decision on the Keystone XL pipeline. The proposed project would carry oil from western Canada to the Texas gulf coast. In the report, Forging a New Strategic Partnership between Canada and Mexico, Perrin Beatty and Andres Rozental recognized the opportunity both countries have to reshape bilateral relations. Among other things, the policy paper recommended removing the visa requirement for Mexican visitors to Canada. It supported increasing funding to the Anti-Crime Capacity Building Program which is aimed at enhancing the ability, “of government agencies, international organizations and non-governmental entities to prevent and respond to threats posed by transnational criminal activity throughout the Americas.” In addition, the study called for institutionalizing the North American Leaders Summit and establishing a complementary North American Business Council. It also advocated pursuing further economic cooperation with the U.S. on a pragmatic basis and suggested that, “Ongoing border and regulatory initiatives should be results-oriented and pursued in the most effective way possible, bilateral or trilateral, as the case may be. This policy recommendation can be extended to any North American issue, including continental security perimeter initiatives and anti-narcotics efforts.” 2AC – Possible Perm Perm? Burney 11 (Derek H., CDFAI Senior Research Fellow and Senior Strategic Advisor to Norton Rose OR LLP, “A FRESH START ON IMPROVING ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS AND PERIMETER SECURITY”, August, 2011, http://www.policyschool.ucalgary.ca/sites/default/files/research/dburney_0.pdf) There is certainly scope for trilateral cooperation on differences in regulations and standards.¶ The difficulty for Mexico stems less from inconsistency on definitions but more from the¶ relative weakness of enforcement capability — a deficiency that manifested itself much earlier¶ when environmental accords were being negotiated. For an administration under relentless¶ assault from organized crime and drug traffickers, the enforcement of safety and health¶ measures inevitably becomes secondary. That is why it would be easier and more practical to¶ begin with greater convergence bilaterally and move to a trilateral approach over time. A¶ troubled America beset with seemingly intractable political and economic challenges and with¶ new undercurrents of isolationism is not good news for either of its immediate neighbours.¶ Canada and Mexico both need a more resilient and more confident America as a necessary¶ basis for avenues of new cooperation. 2AC – Say No – Generic Canada says no – dismissiveness Pastor 12 (Robert A., Dr. Robert Pastor is a professor of international relations and director of the Center for North American Studies and the Center for Democracy and Election Management. From 200207, he was Vice President of International Affairs at AU where he transformed and expanded the study abroad program, established the American University of Nigeria, and initiated new programs on language immersion and “Abroad at AU.” He has served in government as National Security Advisor for Latin America, and he was a Senior Fellow and director of programs on democracy, Latin America, and China at the Carter Center, “Beyond the Continental Divide”, August, 2012, http://www.the-americaninterest.com/article.cfm?piece=1269) Mexico, the weakest of the three partners, has been the boldest in proposing ways to deepen the relationship. The United States has been courteous but mostly unresponsive to new ideas, and it has violated the agreement without notable qualms when special interests have insisted it do so. Canada has been altogether dismissive of Mexico and its trilateral proposals. Embracing its “special relationship” with the United States, Canada remains oblivious to the overwhelming evidence that its affections are reciprocated with empty gestures, not agreements. The result is that the noble experiment of creating a genuinely new North America that soared in its first decade has been in decline ever since.¶ Instead of forging a community of interests to make the continent more competitive and secure, instead of negotiating a customs union, regulatory harmonization, a single North American pass to transit both borders, a mechanism for reducing the income gap between Mexico and its northern neighbors, a North American Transportation and Infrastructure Plan, proposals for joint research and educational exchanges, a common policy on climate change and energy security, higher labor standards—instead of implementing all of these initiatives, or for that matter, any of them, the political leadership of all three countries from administration to administration in Washington, Toronto and Mexico City essentially reverted to the dysfunctional dual-bilateral relationships—U.S.-Canada and U.S.-Mexico—that had characterized the pre-NAFTA era. 1AR – Say No – Generic Canada is extremely dismissive Pastor 12 (Robert A., Dr. Robert Pastor is a professor of international relations and director of the Center for North American Studies and the Center for Democracy and Election Management. From 200207, he was Vice President of International Affairs at AU where he transformed and expanded the study abroad program, established the American University of Nigeria, and initiated new programs on language immersion and “Abroad at AU.” He has served in government as National Security Advisor for Latin America, and he was a Senior Fellow and director of programs on democracy, Latin America, and China at the Carter Center, “Beyond the Continental Divide”, August, 2012, http://www.the-americaninterest.com/article.cfm?piece=1269) Mexico, the weakest of the three partners, has been the boldest in proposing ways to deepen the relationship. The United States has been courteous but mostly unresponsive to new ideas, and it has violated the agreement without notable qualms when special interests have insisted it do so. Canada has been altogether dismissive of Mexico and its trilateral proposals. Embracing its “special relationship” with the United States, Canada remains oblivious to the overwhelming evidence that its affections are reciprocated with empty gestures, not agreements. The result is that the noble experiment of creating a genuinely new North America that soared in its first decade has been in decline ever since.¶ Instead of forging a community of interests to make the continent more competitive and secure, instead of negotiating a customs union, regulatory harmonization, a single North American pass to transit both borders, a mechanism for reducing the income gap between Mexico and its northern neighbors, a North American Transportation and Infrastructure Plan, proposals for joint research and educational exchanges, a common policy on climate change and energy security, higher labor standards—instead of implementing all of these initiatives, or for that matter, any of them, the political leadership of all three countries from administration to administration in Washington, Toronto and Mexico City essentially reverted to the dysfunctional dual-bilateral relationships—U.S.-Canada and U.S.-Mexico—that had characterized the pre-NAFTA era. Say no (this card sucks) Pastor 8 (Robert A., Dr. Robert Pastor is a professor of international relations and director of the Center for North American Studies and the Center for Democracy and Election Management. From 2002-07, he was Vice President of International Affairs at AU where he transformed and expanded the study abroad program, established the American University of Nigeria, and initiated new programs on language immersion and “Abroad at AU.” He has served in government as National Security Advisor for Latin America, and he was a Senior Fellow and director of programs on democracy, Latin America, and China at the Carter Center, “The Future of North America”, 2008, http://www.american.edu/sis/cnas/upload/ForeignAffairs_Pastor_On_NA_072008.pdf) It would be desirable for Canada and Mexico to join in making a comprehensive proposal for a North American Community, but Canada’s aloofness from Mexico makes that unlikely . Therefore, the responsibility for defining North America’s future will lie with the new U.S. president. If the next administration seeks to renegotiate NAFTA, presses for enforceable labor and environmental provisions, and allows special interests, such as the Teamsters Union and the trucking industry, to prevent competition and avoid compliance with the agreement, the United States’ neighbors may look back on the Bush years with nostalgia. Canada and Mexico would be under pressure to seek their own exemptions to NAFTA, and they would likely remind Washington that when it comes to enforceable sanctions, the United States has been more guilty of noncompliance than they have. Renegotiating NAFTA would require a significant investment of the new administration’s time and political capital without, in the end, helping workers or the environment much, if at all 2AC – Say No – Visas Say no – doesn’t care about Mexico’s interests Nossal 10 (Kim Richard, Prof of Poli Sci and Director of School of Policy Studies @ Queens University, Canadian Policy Towards Mexico: Pastor’s Puzzle Reconsidered”, February 2010, http://cedan.ccm.itesm.mx/wpcontent/uploads/2010/08/north_american_dialogue_no13_kim_richard_nossal.pdf) I have looked at Canada‘s visa requirement decision in such detail because it is an excellent example of the essence of unilateralism in world politics. In other words, when explained from the perspective of Canadian interests, the visa decision makes considerable sense. Needless to say, however, the unilateralist doesn‘t care about the interests of others – that‘s what makes it unilateralist. So in this case, only Canadian interests were considered; Mexican interests were completely unimportant, as were all those business interests in Canada affected by the dramatic decrease in visitors from Mexico. Moreover, officials in Ottawa calculated correctly that Mexico was in no position to introduce a mirror visa requirement, which would have instantly dried up tourists from Canada. But the visa decision is important because it demonstrates so clearly how little impact multilateralism has on Canadian policy towards Mexico, thus making sense of Pastor‘s puzzle. It also shows how little interest the Canadian government has in developing a relationship with Mexico that goes beyond the dual-bilateralism that has marked the North American project since NAFTA came into being. 2AC – Links to Politics The CP causes the right and left to freak out Pastor 8 (Robert A., Dr. Robert Pastor is a professor of international relations and director of the Center for North American Studies and the Center for Democracy and Election Management. From 2002-07, he was Vice President of International Affairs at AU where he transformed and expanded the study abroad program, established the American University of Nigeria, and initiated new programs on language immersion and “Abroad at AU.” He has served in government as National Security Advisor for Latin America, and he was a Senior Fellow and director of programs on democracy, Latin America, and China at the Carter Center, “The Future of North America”, 2008, http://www.american.edu/sis/cnas/upload/ForeignAffairs_Pastor_On_NA_072008.pdf) Assaults from both ends of the political spectrum have transformed the debate on North America in recent years. From the right have come attacks based on cultural anxieties of being overrun by Mexican immigrants and fears that greater cooperation with Canada and Mexico could lead down a slippery slope toward a North American Union. Dobbs, among others, viewed a report by a 2005 Council on Foreign Relations task force (which I cochaired), Building a North American Community, as the manifesto of a conspiracy to subvert American sovereignty. Dobbs claimed that the CFR study proposed a North American Union, although it did not. From the left came attacks based on economic fears of job losses due to unfair trading practices. These two sets of fears came together in a perfect storm that was pushed forward by a surplus of hot air from talk-show hosts on radio and television. In the face of this criticism, the Bush administration was silent, and the Democratic candidates competed for votes in the rustbelt states, where unions and many working people have come to see nafta and globalization much as Dobbs does. The debate in the United States became so insular that Americans essentially reversed roles with their neighbors. For nearly two centuries, many in Canada and Mexico built walls to limit U.S. influence. Within two decades of their decision to dismantle the walls, the United States is being pressed by anti–North American Union populists to rebuild the barriers to keep out its neighbors. The idea that the United States should fear being taken over by its weaker neighbors is bizarre, but it is becoming a staple of the populist critique AT: NAFTA NAFTA ineffective Pastor 12 (Robert A., Dr. Robert Pastor is a professor of international relations and director of the Center for North American Studies and the Center for Democracy and Election Management. From 2002-07, he was Vice President of International Affairs at AU where he transformed and expanded the study abroad program, established the American University of Nigeria, and initiated new programs on language immersion and “Abroad at AU.” He has served in government as National Security Advisor for Latin America, and he was a Senior Fellow and director of programs on democracy, Latin America, and China at the Carter Center, “Beyond the Continental Divide”, August, 2012, http://www.the-american-interest.com/article.cfm?piece=1269) NAFTA generated a sunny set of hopes and a thunderstorm of fears. Mexicans hoped that their country would rise to First-World status; Canadians hoped that the agreement would compel the United States to stop imposing duties on soft-wood lumber and comply with dispute-settlement mechanisms; and the United States hoped that NAFTA would put an end to undocumented migration from Mexico. Alas, none of these hopes panned out. Mexico and Canada feared that U.S. investors would purchase their country’s assets, but despite substantial additional foreign investment in both countries, the percentage owned by U.S. firms actually declined. The United States feared that its jobs would march south to Mexico, but the greatest period of NAFTA-promoted trade growth in the United States (1993-–2001) coincided with the largest U.S. job-creation expansion in U.S. history. So the fears also fell short. Leaving aside hopes and fears, if the criteria for evaluating NAFTA were whether it achieved its explicit goal of removing barriers and expanding trade and investment, then it succeeded grandly. In its first seven years, trade among the three countries of North America tripled, foreign direct upward trajectory has not been sustained. Since 2001, the growth in trade among North American countries declined by two-thirds; in foreign direct investment the rate of growth shrunk by half, and the share of the world product sank to 29 percent. investment quintupled and North America’s share of world product soared from 30 to 36 percent. Unfortunately, that Intra-regional trade as a percent of the three countries’ world trade rose from 40 percent in 1992 to 46 percent in 2001, only to fall back to 40 percent in 2009. Why? What happened? Will Rogers once said that even when you are on the right road, you’re going to get run over if you sit down. To some extent, that’s what happened to North America: We sat down in 2001, and China ran over us. Although Canada and Mexico remain the most important markets for U.S. goods, China replaced them as the largest source of U.S. imports. But the China factor is hardly the whole story, and it’s the least important part of it from a policy perspective. Besides China’s commercial success, new security barriers erected after 9/11 took a major toll on commerce without any discernable benefit to security. Barely eight years after NAFTA began to lower barriers to trade, the United States raised new and more formidable barriers to our two closest neighbors. We slowed traffic and insisted on a plethora of credentials, forms and fees to cross the border, driving many of the small trucking firms in Canada out of business. Since 9/11, on average, each year 65 million people transit between San Diego and Tijuana, but the Department of Homeland Security has not arrested a single individual on suspicions of terrorism. The impact was paradoxically most severe on our neighbors because NAFTA had begun to transform the way the three countries traded with each other. Instead of just trading products, we started making them together on a “just in time” basis, meaning that parts would be shipped across the border within a day. The automotive industry had long been the most important segment of North American trade, with car parts crossing the borders many times before ending up fully assembled. The added cost of 9/11 restrictions, therefore, transformed the North American advantage into a disadvantage; other countries only had to surmount one border just once instead of two borders seven times. Also responsible for the North American reversal were the ongoing U.S. underinvestment in infrastructure (a folly for which both parties are responsible) and U.S. non-compliance with some NAFTA provisions (in trucking, for example).