Desmond Morton, a Canadian historian noted that war is a major catalyst for social,
political and economic change. He suggested that almost every aspect of Canadian society has
been profoundly affected by war.1 Therefore, the study of Canada’s involvement in war is
essential. One way to accomplish this is to study how historians wrote Canadian military history.
However, this is a complex task. The writing of Canadian military history, which is one aspect of
larger Canadian historiography, has been shaped by a variety of issues. These issues reflect
historical conditions, political influences and factors that have affected the social climate of
specific time periods. Changes in approaches, subject matter, historiographic materials,
knowledge and methodology have also influenced the direction of Canadian military writing.
Tim Cook, a historian with the Canadian War Museum noted that, “history is constructed in
layers-written, reworked, revised, reappraised, added to, and then dismembered, each generation
viewing the past in a different way from the next or the last.”2 Thus, the direction and purpose of
the writing of military writing has evolved substantially over the twentieth century. By
examining the writing of Canadian military history, from the amateurs, veterans and military
historians at the start of the twentieth century, to the professional, academic, military historians
today, the evolution of the writing of military history can be evaluated in its proper historical
context. Subsequently, larger trends can be identified and analyzed. From the initial heroic
“drum and trumpet” trend of the 1800s, to the current trend to re-evaluate previous assumptions
and reclaim previously unexplored history, it will be demonstrated that historians have written
military history as a way to record, commemorate, analyze, judge and learn from military events
in Canada’s past.
Prior to World War I, the study of military history remained basically the same, and it
was not studied by the academic community of the time. Some historians reflecting back at
1
writers of late nineteenth century, and early twentieth century military history, suggested that
they utilized a heroic “drum and trumpet” approach. These historians suggested that since
Canada was just beginning to form its identity, this trend reflected a way of expressing Canada’s
growing “embryonic nationalism.”3 Historians in this era glorified the role of the militia in the
French-Indian wars and Canadian heroes of the War of 1812 by emphasizing their courage and
skill. Later historians would refer to this glorification of the militia as the militia myth. Historian
Francis Parkman wrote Montcalm and Wolfe in 1884. In his recording of the battle on the Plains
of Abraham, the epic struggle between England and France to control the North American
continent, Parkman focused on the heroism of not only the militia, but also the British
commander James Wolfe and the French commander Louis-Joseph de Montcalm. Brigadier
General E.A. Cruikshank, a militia member for 22 years, and the most respected historian of the
time, wrote several volumes of the War of 1812, as well as the Canadian militia.4 He
documented and popularized the role of the militia in defending Canada during the American
Revolution, the War of 1812, and the Fenian Raids. 5
The “drum and trumpet” trend in describing warfare was followed by what some
historians have referred to as the tendency to romanticize war.6 This was the trend of the first
generation of writers of military history after World War I that included veterans, journalists, and
amateur historians.7 In their writings, they strove to find meaning in the war, document its
impact, and enhance the reputation of the Canadian Corps.8 The Canadian government assigned
Sir Max Aitken in 1916, to go overseas, to supervise the collection of World War I war records.9
This collection became Canada’s first archival record of World War I. In 1916, he completed
Canada in Flanders, the first volume of The Official Story of the Canadian Expeditionary Force.
In this official history, Aitken noted that he “aimed to bridge the gap between the firing line and
2
the home front.”10 Thus, he fulfilled the Canadian government’s wish to keep the public
informed regarding Canada’s role in the war. He deliberately avoided addressing issues related to
inadequate training, lack of supplies and problems of leadership. Cook noted that Aitken’s
writings were “supremely patriotic, sanitized, and uncritical and that they must be understood as
a product of their times.11 By using information gathered from war diaries and officers who had
fought in the war, he commemorated not only the fallen officers but the front-line soldiers. In
doing so, Aitken had created a new “pantheon of heroes.”12 By romanticizing the heroes of the
Great War, he successfully established the reputation of the Canadian Expeditionary Force
(CEF) and brought comfort to many grieving families.
After World War I, Canadians became concerned that the British and Americans had
downplayed the contributions of the CEF in World War I. This generated a great deal of concern
regarding the need to secure the appropriate war records so that the memory of Canada’s
sacrifices would not be forgotten.13 Thus in 1917, Brigadier General E.A. Cruikshank, a trained
historian, was appointed the official historian and guardian of the CEF’s war records by the
Department of Militia and Defence.14 After completing four volumes of a summary of World
War I for the Canada Year Book in 1919, it was not approved by the senior generals. M.J. Hyatt,
a Canadian military historian, noted that the generals felt that Cruikshank’s work, consisting of
only twenty-eight pages of text and 234 pages of miscellaneous documents, had not captured the
essence of their heroic leadership. Therefore, they decided that someone who had actually been
part of the CEF would be in a better position to become the official historian of World War I.15
This reflected the power that military officials sometimes exercised, after they assumed powerful
postwar positions.
Thus, in 1921 the Canadian government appointed a retired veteran Colonel A.F.
3
Duguid to replace Cruikshank as the official historian of World War I.16 However, the fact that
the government did not provide a large team of historians to assist Duguid reflected the
government’s apathy regarding the recording of official military history, as well as the lack of
pressure from the public who were weary of war.17 Although he began to write the Canadian
Forces in the Great War 1914-1919, General Series Vol. 1, From the Outbreak of War to the
Formation of the Canadian Corps, August 1914-September 1915 in 1921, he did not complete it
until 1938. Some people referred to this delay as a “minor national scandal.”18 The fact that the
eight anticipated volumes had not been completed, was due in part to Duguid’s obsession with
detail. Richard A. Preston noted that Duguid did not engage in critical analysis. He suggested that
this was reflected in his coverage of the battle of Second Ypres, which was limited to sixty pages
and was essentially a compilation of orders, messages, and troop movements. Preston also noted
that Duguid made little effort to assess tactics, allocate praise or blame, or provide an overview.19
Duguid, like Aitken, promoted “heroic history” by commemorating the dead, so their memories
would be preserved. However, unlike Aitken he did not romanticize the war. The rest of the war
was covered by semi-official histories of regiments written by veterans. Duguid called these
“literary memorials.”20 Duguid’s book served as a guide to the army personnel for World War II.
He provided a significant understanding of Canadian Corps’ operational successes. Duguid’s
limited coverage of the war created a critical gap in the nation's understanding of World War I.
However, Duguid’s extensive research files laid the foundation for W.L. Nicholson who
filled part of that gap by completing The Canadian Expeditionary Force, in 1962. Cook noted
that since he had not served in the CEF and was not an expert on the war, Nicholson interviewed
former CEF officers, Aitken, and conducted research in the Canadian, British and German
archives. He also toured the battlefields in 1959. Nicholson provided a comprehensive analysis
4
of the operational aspects of the war, as well as military and political leadership. Cook noted that
this analysis was easier to do because “some of the concerns and restraints of the interwar years
could be relaxed.” 21 Cook also noted that as he wrote his operational history, he had taken
“pains to situate the Canadian story within the larger war context.” 22 He did this by examining
the conscription crisis and the contentious 1917 federal election. However, he seldom mentioned
the experiences of the front-line soldiers.23 This single volume established the foundation for
future historians of Canada’s role in the Great War.
Fortunately, when World War II broke out, the Canadian government, realizing the error
they had made in the previous war, was determined to provide a comprehensive, official military
history for the public. Thus, they hired an academic, civilian historian named Colonel Charles
Stacey and made him chief of the Army General Staff’s Historical Section. As the Director of
History in 1946, Stacey had access to all the war documents, as well as direct access to Canada’s
Ministers of National Defence.24 Stacey also placed the team of professional historians, the
government had provided, in each Canadian division and Headquarters in Europe. Thus he
ensured the safety and organization of documents.25 Many of them also accompanied the troops
on the battlefield as writers. Stacey wrote two of the three volumes of the Official History of the
Canadian Army in the Second World War. He wrote the first volume in the 1950s and the third
volume, The Victory Campaign: The Operations in North-West Europe, 1944-1945 in 1960.
Like Duguid, Stacey used the operational part of the war and the decision-making that
accompanied it as the framework for his work. Since he had exclusive and full access to all
government documents, Stacey, like Duguid, had a great deal of control over how the war would
be interpreted.
5
Stacey’s work set the standard for scholarship in military writing in his era. Cook noted
that “for Stacey, the importance was in the overall campaign rather than in the multitude of
narratives that formed it; he saw history as a top-down affair.”26 Since the Directorate of History
had given him academic freedom, Stacey did not have any direct pressures from politicians,
senior officers, or veteran groups. Even though, contemporary historians sometimes did face
indirect pressures, Stacey always wanted to respect historical accuracy. He insisted on
understating rather than overstating anything, and refused a “blatant denigration of the enemy or
a heroic narrative of the past. He also wanted to avoid “anything that reeked of victor’s
history.”27 Although Stacey had the luxury of having direct personal access to top commanders
like Andrew McNaughton, Harry Crerar, and Guy Simonds during and after the war, he had to
deal with their conflicting interpretations regarding certain operations. For example, he had to
rely extensively on Crerar’s interpretation of events, which were biased against Simonds’
because they did not like each other.28 Therefore, since it was difficult for him to objectively
analyze the army’s leadership, he chose to ignore their shortcomings.29 However, his work was
more analytical than Duguid’s work. Thus it served as a source for the military in terms of
reflecting on tactical lessons and decision-making processes. The historian Carl Berger called
Stacey the “country’s finest practitioner of technical history.”30
The second volume of the Official History of the Army in the Second World War: The
Canadians in Italy, 1943-1945 was published in 1956 and was written by Stacey’s deputy
director, Lieutenant-Colonel G.W.L. Nicholson. Stacey directed him to place “the Canadian
Army within the Allied strategic operations,” which he did.31 Nicholson provided an analytical
account in providing insights into the nature and outcome of the war. For example, he explained
how establishing Italy as the second European front, diverted important strategic German
6
resources from the Eastern and Western Fronts. His tour of the Italian battlegrounds allowed him
to analyze the impact of the topography and climate on military successes and failures.
Nicholson also explained why the Americans initially did not support establishing Italy as the
second European front. 32 Like Stacey, Nicholson did not provide a critical assessment of the
shortcomings of the senior officers. Cook noted that while Nicholson was drafting his book, he
was reprimanded by several senior officers for neglecting to acknowledge the heroism and skill
of the Canadian soldiers.33 The fact that Nicholson revised his book by being more sympathetic
to the Canadian soldiers illustrates the pressures contemporary writers sometimes faced.34
Stacey and Nicholson’s volumes formed the foundation for many future historians, academics
and popular writers who decided to expand, deconstruct or re-interpret the Canadian army’s
involvement in World War II.
In the 1950s and 1960s, many veterans wished to preserve the history of the smaller army
units that had not been addressed in the official histories and began to write about their
individual battalions. Since they were written by veterans, these regimental histories often lacked
scholarship and were biased because they sought to maintain the reputation of their heroes. The
focus of regimental histories was not on analyzing the war itself, but to bring comfort, healing
and closure for the survivors.35 The Regiment, written in 1955 by Farley Mowat, described the
war experiences of the Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment. He noted that he had no desire to
assess the past through “the cold and retrospective eye of the historian.”36 Instead, he addressed
the everyday struggles and triumphs of the front-line soldiers on the battlefield. Thus he avoided
the “unemotional, archives-based narrative of the official historians.” 37
In 1960 “Military History” was finally classified as a specific category in History. 38 This
facilitated a major shift in the way military history would be written.39 This was due to a variety
7
of reasons. In 1967, the Department of National Defence established its Military and Strategic
Studies Program.40 Access to twentieth century material through the National Archives of
Canada was finally available to the public. As a result of the Cold War, Cuban missile crisis, the
Vietnam War, Quebec’s Quiet Revolution and October 1970 crisis, Canadians started to question
whether their peacekeeping soldiers were merely international policemen.41 Furthermore, Cook
suggested that as Canadians became introspective about the possibility of a nuclear war, they
desired “to explore their present, in part by examining their past.”42 Thus a “new military
history” emerged. 43 G.W.L. Nicholson completed the official history of the CEF of the Great
War in 1964. In order to get a better understanding of this time period, the Directorate of History
eventually endorsed the publication of semi-official histories designed to elaborate or fill in the
gaps that earlier histories had not addressed.44 As a result, a reinterpretation of issues related to
military events often occurred. One example was the The Incredible War of 1812, A Military
History, written by Mackay Hitsman in 1965. Instead of just focusing on the operational and
political events of the time, Hitsman focused on regular and militia soldiers who faced incredible
challenges associated with early warfare in Canada. He analyzed the contributions of
Commander-in-Chief of the British forces, Sir George Prevost and attempted to vindicate him.
He explained why the British leadership had misjudged his defensive and cautious strategy, and
why his approach had actually help win the war.
In the 1970s, there was a resurgence of academic military history. This was heavily
influenced by the Directorate of History, in the Department of National Defence. During the
generation after the Second World War, military historians in the Royal Military College of
Canada in Kingston, became pioneers in research and writing. 45 Eventually, many of these
historians like George F. G. Stanley became university professors. Thus the trend emerged
8
whereby academic military historians started writing military history. Furthermore, in the 1980s,
the national war archives became open to the public. This facilitated a “renaissance of writing” in
which a new generation “reworked the interpretation” of the “foundational official histories”
through new, innovative methodologies and archival sources that had not previously been
explored. Historians were also able to conduct interviews with the “previously silent but aging
number of veterans now anxious to tell their story.”46 Therefore, the “dirty linen” of the forces
was exposed as academic military historians critically reappraised official history, even though
they acknowledged the invaluable contributions Stacey and other had made.47
In the late 1980s, the trend to be more critical of the Canadian army developed. In The
Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign: A Study of Failure in High Command, John
English suggested that Canadian senior officers were not innovators in tactics and doctrine and
that they had inadequate leadership skills. J.L. Granatstein agreed with English’s conclusions in
The Generals: The Canadian Army’s Senior Commanders in the Second World War. 48 However,
Terry Copp and Robert Vogel challenged this in their five volumes of Maple Leaf Route,
completed in 1988, in which they agreed that Generals Crerar and Simonds were criticized too
harshly for adopting World War I tactics. They also argued that the leadership of junior officers
had not been appropriately acknowledged. Therefore, Copp and Vogel challenged the belief that
Canadians performed poorly in comparison to their German counterparts, as suggested by writers
like English and Granatstein. 49. These types of academic monographs did much to strengthen
the canon of Canadian military history.50
In 1989, Marc Milner noted that operational histories of the Great War written by
academic historians who wrote the “new history” tended to neglect operational analysis, in
particular, battle management and tactics.51 Writers like Bill Rawling helped to fill this gap.
9
Surviving Trench Warfare: Technology and the Canadian Corps, 1914-1918 was published in
1992. In this book, Rawling rejected the mythology that World War I consisted mainly of static
trench warfare. Instead, he revised this generally held view by arguing that it was a war in which
Canadian soldiers through “bloody battle” became “efficient practitioners of their craft” by being
resourceful, innovative people. 52 Rawling demonstrated how tactical and technological
innovations initiated by the Canadian soldiers broke the stalemate of trench warfare and helped
to defeat the German army.
In the 1990s, a trend developed to re-examine not just issues and controversies
surrounding the wars, but also sought to address gaps and flaws in the official histories. There
developed a shift away from campaign history. Historians began to suggest that the Canadian
soldier had been poorly served in the official histories because their stories had been either
omitted or misunderstood. Populist writers like Pierre Burton often reached wider audiences than
academic historians because they “repackaged, lively interpretations of previous, academic
works,” as they re-examined the Great War.53 Although they conducted scholarly research, it was
their writing style, rather than new scholarship, that made them popular with readers. Yet books
like Vimy, were recognized by academic military historians for their academic integrity. 54 By
highlighting individual stories of struggle and sacrifice in Vimy, Burton was able to reach more
Canadians than the academic historians.55
In the 1990s there developed a new trend in the writing of military history, that explored
areas related to “social-scientific and behavioural scientific analyses.”56 The book Battle
Exhaustion: Soldiers and Psychiatrists in the Canadian Army, 1939-1945, written in 1990 by
Terry Copp and Bill McAndrew, shed light on the psychiatric implications of the horrors of war.
The authors discuss Post Traumatic Stress Disorder and other mental health issues that front-line
10
soldiers faced. For the first time in the writing of military history, historians examined medical
information regarding the identification and treatment of mental health issues connected with the
pressures of the battlefield. Thus, the authors explained how psychologists and psychiatrists
became an important part of the military, since they helped address manpower issues and
improved morale.57 Cook suggested that the trend to address weapons, technology, tactics and
strategy had been overemphasized in the past. He advocated that writers of Canadian military
writing should develop an appreciation for the human element of war. 58
In the 1990s, a trend also developed in terms of covering aspects of military history that
had not been covered before. For example, War Without Battles: Canada’s NATO Brigade in
Germany, 1951-1993, written in 1997 by Sean M. Maloney, is the first military history of
Canada’s contribution to NATO in ensuring peaceful relations with the Soviet Union. The 19901991 Gulf War was documented by historian Major Jean H. Morin and Lieutenant-Commander
Richard H. Gimblett. Just as Stacey had ensured the collection of records in World War II, so
too, did these two men cooperate with the forces to create and preserve records. The fact that
electronic records were also preserved revealed how far historiographic materials had evolved by
1990.59 Operation Friction, 1990-1991: The Canadian Forces in the Persian Gulf, was
completed by Morin and Gimblett in 1997. Since contemporary writers, who were also military
personnel, wrote this official account, it will be interesting to see what future historians will
write. Judging from past trends, they will likely fill in the gaps by creating personal accounts of
how the soldiers regarded the war itself. They will likely view the war in its larger context, and
perhaps even question the validity of the war. As with other official histories, the authors have
laid a foundation for others as they seek to embellish or deconstruct events of this war.
11
After 1990, there was resurgence in the writing of official military history. After World
War II, a financial decision had been made as part of the postwar cost reduction to cancel the
official air force history.60 However in 1994, the official history of the air force was finally
completed. The Crucible of War, 1939-1945: The Official History of the Royal Canadian Air
Force, Volume III, was written by Brereton Greenhous, Stephen J. Harris, William C. Johnston,
and William G.P. Like the other official histories, they continued the trend of adopting a
hierarchical ‘top-down’ approach and left the writing of the ordinary soldier and service people
to other writers. Their goal was not to write exclusively for service personnel and veterans, but
also to the general public. Thus, they were able to demonstrate that the writing of official history
was a field that was more than “simply soldiers, sailors and air personnel writing for one
another.”61 Subsequently, the authors departed from the previous trend in official history that
tended to protect the reputations of important military and political leaders. They exercised
judgment in addressing what they interpreted as errors in the war. They noted that many
Canadian flyers found themselves “committed to a malevolent, technological, impersonal battle
waged primarily against women and children.” 62 They analyzed the effectiveness of strategic
area bombing on the outcome of the war, and provided evidence that bombing military and
industrial sites, in particular oil refineries, would have been more effective. They passed
judgment on the morality of bombing populated cities as a way of terrorizing civilians in order to
destroy German morale. With the benefit of hindsight, and the use of new and updated evidence,
the authors re-examined orthodox views on World War II. Thus, they may well have set a
precedent for future writers of official history.63
The writing of the official history of the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) also evolved
slowly. Since there was little written on the RCN, a series of conferences took place from 1980
12
to 1988 that were designed to reclaim the past history of the navy. Officers who were currently
serving in the navy, met with veterans and scholars to examine a collection of seventeen papers.
These were compiled in The RCN in Retrospect, 1910-1968 and edited by James A. Boutilier.
The various authors of these papers had critically analyzed navy commanders and military
operations of Canada’s navy in World War II. Later these papers were published into various
anthologies.64 However, a well-researched, official operational history of the RCN was not
produced until 2002, when W.A.B. Douglas, Roger Sarty, Michael Whitby, et. al produced the
two volume set of No Higher Purpose: The Official Operational History of the Royal Canadian
Navy in the Second World War, 1939-1943. The authors conducted a reappraisal of the RCN’s
contribution to the war. After considering such limitations as their small size, short time in
existence and limited technology, they concluded that the RCN made a significant contribution
to the Battle of Atlantic in spite of their shortcomings.65 Cook summarized how historiographical
methodologies had evolved by 2002, when he commented that, “it was a striking work of
synthesis and original research that drew on the scholarship of the profession and deep forays
into international archives.” 66
Questioning assumptions in official histories continues to be a current trend. For
example, in A War of Patrols: Canadian Army Operations in Korea, completed in 2003, William
Johnston re-examined the official history Strange Battleground? A War of Patrols: Canadian
Army Operations in Korea written in 1966, by Lieutenant Colonel H.F. Wood. Johnston refuted
Wood’s official history by arguing that the special militia forces that initially went to Korea
never got the credit they deserved. Through a re-examination of primary documents and
comparing and analyzing the training, tactics and operations associated with the wartime
commanders, Johnston demonstrated that the performance of Brigadier John Rockingham’s 25th
13
Commonwealth Brigade was superior to the other units. In his epilogue, Johnston unraveled
Wood’s myth that the militia was incompetent. Instead, he argues that they were actually more
disciplined and productive than the professional soldiers that followed them. Johnston noted that
although Rockingham’s brigade fought more aggressively, and more frequently in dangerous
situations, they still had a lower casualty rate. 67 Therefore, he deconstructs Wood’s portrayal of
Rockingham, by providing documented evidence to demonstrate how his skilful leadership was a
major contributing factor to the superiority of the first militia forces. It is interesting that in this
case a ‘militia myth’ is refuted. However, in previous portrayals of militia myths, historians have
frequently suggested that the militia was overrated.
Cook noted that the twentieth-century wars shaped Canadian society, and that significant
social, cultural, demographic, and industrial changes resulted as a consequence of the two world
wars. 68 As this exploration of Canadian historical writers has revealed, the writing of Canadian
military history has been impacted by these changes. Changes in approaches, subject matter,
historiographical materials, knowledge and methodology are also significant when investigating
the evolution in the writing of Canadian military history. Determining how the professional
community adapted to these changes also reveals how the writing of Canadian military history
has evolved during the twentieth century.
Only by exploring the historical context of the particular time period, can the various
trends be accurately identified and analyzed. The “drum and trumpet” accounts of the War of
1812 and other early military events decreased as the official historians of World War I became
the dominant writers of Canadian history. They were the ones who collected, organized and
interpreted the war records. As Cook noted, “The nation that oversees its own archives is able to
shape and manufacture its own history and eventually guard its own memory while creating its
14
own identity.”69 The first official military historian, Aitken focused on romantizing the war by
creating a “heroic history” in order to commemorate the dead. Although Duguid also desired to
commemorate the dead, he like Stacey, favoured a more “technical” account of the war by using
the operational aspects and the decision- making of generals as a framework. The official
histories of the air force and navy also use the same framework. However, since these authors
were contemporary writers and had the advantage of hindsight, they were able to critically
analyze past events and decision-making by top commanders and politicians.
The foundation of the official histories and archival records cannot be underestimated.
Without the foundations of the official histories, future historians would have a difficult time
analyzing the broader experiences of war. Cook summarized the power of official military
historians when he noted that, “the nation that oversees its own archives is able to shape and
manufacture its own history and eventually guard its own memory while creating its own
identity.”70 However, after the archives were opened and new methodologies employed,
academic historians and popular writers could finally assist in shaping history as they reevaluated the foundational work of the official historians and either confirmed or denied their
accuracy. Furthermore, as they re-examined and analyzed the evidence, they sometimes came to
conclusions that were different from traditional assumptions. Historian John Gaddis claimed
that, “We know the future only by the past we project into it…history, in this sense is all we
have.”71 Thus, in the future, the Canadian war experience will continue to be constructed and
reconstructed as each generation of writers reflects on its impact on Canadian society. As they
view the past in ways that were different from the previous generation, those studying the writing
of military history will see the pattern – that “history is constructed in layers-written, reworked,
revised, reappraised, added to, and then dismembered.”72
15
Endnotes
1
Ronald Haycock, Teaching Military History: Clio and Mars in Canada, Athabasca: Athabasca University, 1995,
17.
2
Tim Cook, Clio’s Warriors: Canadian Historians and the Writing of the World Wars, Vancouver: UBC Press,
2006, 222.
3
Haycock, 3.
4
Cook, 43.
5
Cook, 42.
6
HIST 4016, Directed Readings 1: The Writing of Canadian Military History, Instructor: Dr. Daniel Byers,
October 6, 2009.
7
Haycock, 16.
8
Cook, 41.
9
Haycock, 5.
10
Cook, 17.
11
Cook, 16.
12
Haycock, 17.
13
HIST 4016, October 6, 2009.
14
Haycock, 36.
15
M.J. Hyatt, “Official History in Canada” in Robin Highan ed. Official Histories: Essays and Bibliographies from
around the world, (Manhattan: Kansas State University Library, 1970), 89.
16
Cook, 43.
17
HIST 4016, October 6th 2009.
18
Haycock, 5.
19
Richard A. Preston, “Review Essay: Canadian Military History: A Reinterpretation Challenge of the Eighties?”
The American Review of Canadian Studies XIX, no.1 (Spring 1989) (Association for Canadian Studies in the United
States: Taylor and Francis), 95-104. 97.
20
Cook, 70.
21
Cook, 205.
22
Cook, 206.
23
Cook, 206.
24
Haycock, 6.
25
Haycock, 6.
26
Cook, 179.
27
Cook, 179.
28
Cook, 154.
29
Cook, 198.
30
Carl Berger, The Writing of Canadian History, 172, quoted in Teaching Military History, Clio and Mars in
Canada, (Athabaska: Athabaska University,1995), 7.
31
Cook, 179.
32
Cook, 180.
33
Cook, 180.
34
Cook, 181.
35
HIST 4016, November 24, 2009.
36
Cook, 189.
37
Cook, 189.
38
Haycock, 11.
39
Haycock, 12.
40
Haycock, 17.
16
41
Haycock, 12.
Haycock, 12.
43
Haycock, 13.
44
HIST 4016, November 16, 2009.
45
Haycock, 9.
46
Haycock, 24.
47
Cook, 222.
48
Haycock, 25.
49
Haycock, 25.
50
Cook, 242.
51
Haycock, 22.
52
Haycock, 22.
53
Cook,225.
54
HIST 4016, October 6, 2009.
55
Cook, 225.
56
Haycock, 24.
57
HIST 4016, November 24, 2009.
58
Cook, 236.
59
Cook, 243.
60
Cook, 220
61
Cook, 220.
62
Cook, 220
63
HIST 4016, November 10, 2009.
64
Cook, 223.
65
HIST 4016, November 17, 2009.
66
Cook, 239.
67
Johnston, William, A War of Patrols: Canadian Army Operations in Korea (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2003), 374.
68
Cook, 254.
69
Cook, 16.
70
Cook, 16.
71
John Lewis Gaddis, The Landscape of History: How Historians Map the Past (Oxford University Press, 2002), 3,
quoted in Tim Cook, Clio’s Warriors: Canadian Historians and the Writing of the World Wars. (Vancouver: UBC
Press, 2006), 258.
72
Tim Cook, Clio’s Warriors: Canadian Historians and the Writing of the World Wars, Vancouver: UBC Press,
2006, 222.
42
17