The Palestinians August 30, 1991 • Volume 1 Will they ever get an independent homeland of their
own?
Introduction
The U.S.-led rout of Iraq in the gulf war has reshaped the geopolitical map of the Middle East.
Among other things, the crisis has focused attention on one of the region's most intractable
problems: what to do about the Palestinians. Having rallied behind Iraq in the war, the Palestinians
are now politically isolated and economically ravaged. The nearly four-year-old uprising, or
intifada, in the occupied territories has begun to sputter, leaving the Palestinians' dream of an
independent state as distant as ever. Recognizing the urgency of the situation, President Bush has
proposed a regional peace conference, tentatively scheduled for October. The Palestinians' current
weakness could work in their favor. As one expert says, it allows them “to pursue the attainable
rather than the ideal.”
Overview
For more than 40 years, Palestinians have been a disenfranchised, displaced people, yearning for a
homeland. So when Iraqi President Saddam Hussein attempted to link his Aug. 2, 1990, invasion of
Kuwait to the Palestinian cause, he found a receptive audience. Saddam promised to withdraw Iraqi
troops if Israel relinquished Arab lands it took in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. But instead of
liberating the occupied territories, the gulf war has left the Palestinians even more in crisis—
economically destitute, bereft of financial backers and torn apart by internal strife.
“Politically and economically, the plight of Palestinians across the board has no equivalent since
1948, when [Israel declared the establishment of a Jewish state and the Palestinians] were
dispossessed,” says Hisham Sharabi, a professor at Georgetown University and editor of the Journal
of Palestine Studies. “This is a human tragedy on a grand scale.”
The decision to back Iraq in the gulf war has cost the Palestinians much of the sympathy and
support they had earned during the intifada, the nearly four-year-old popular uprising in the
occupied territories. “It certainly did the Palestinian cause no good for the Palestinians themselves
to appear to be using the violation of another people's sovereignty to redeem their own,” writes
George Abed, director of the Palestine Welfare Association, a Geneva-based developmentassistance foundation.
The consequences for the Palestinians living in the occupied territories—the West Bank and the
Gaza Strip —have been severe. The Palestinian economy, already crippled by the intifada, was
virtually destroyed by Israel's wartime emergency measures, which included a 40-day, dawn-todusk curfew, a ban against travel outside the territories and severe work restrictions. Arab
economists estimate that fewer than 200,000 of the 1.7 million Palestinians in the occupied
territories now have jobs. That brings unemployment among adults to roughly 60 percent. While
about 110,000 Palestinians worked in Israel last year, only 35,000 now have army permits to enter
Israeli territory for jobs. But even many of those cannot get regular work, their jobs having been
filled by Soviet Jewish immigrants, who numbered some 200,000 last year.
The economic devastation caused by the war, the intractable political deadlock with Israel and the
recent influx of Soviet Jews have created unparalleled frustration and desperation among
Palestinian Arabs. In the last three years, the suicide rate in the
Gaza Strip has quadrupled.
Even more disturbing, the intifada seems to be turning inward: Palestinians suspected of
collaborating with Israel are being killed by other Palestinians. Some 400 have been murdered since
the intifada began, and the pace has been accelerating. In Gaza , 59 Palestinians have been
killed by other Arabs so far this year, compared with 15 killed by Israeli soldiers.
The gulf war has also created a new diaspora.
Hundreds of thousands of Palestinians—as well as
Jordanians and Yemenis (who also supported Iraq)—have been expelled from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait
and other gulf states. The Palestinian community in Kuwait, considered the most prosperous in the
diaspora, has been fractured. Since Saddam's invasion last August, more than half of its 400,000
residents have fled and many of those who have remained have been abused. “The Palestinians are
weak, and they have nobody to protect them,” says Rashid Khalidi, a professor of Middle East
Studies at the University of Chicago. “It [has been] like anti-Semitism, like pogroms in Europe.”
The Palestinians, of course, are no strangers to economic hardship—or controversy. For decades
the Palestinian issue has occupied center stage in the Middle East drama. Since 1948, the Arab
states have justified their continuing hostility toward Israel on the grounds of defending the rights
of the Palestinians to return to the land whence they came. But now, in the aftermath of the war,
some experts say support for that cause has waned—and, along with it, Arab financial aid for the
Palestinians.
With nowhere else to turn, moderate Palestinians are pinning their hopes on the United States—
and the newly invigorated Middle East peace process. Hoping to translate momentum from the
allied victory into a broader peace between Arabs and Israelis, President Bush has proposed a
regional peace conference, tentatively scheduled for October, sponsored by Washington and
Moscow. Bush is pursuing a “two-track strategy,” parallel talks between Israel and the Palestinians
on the one hand and between Israel and the Arab states on the other.
Many analysts, including those in the Bush administration, believe the gulf war has created a
historic opportunity. For the first time in 43 years, Syria appears willing to talk peace with Israel.
For different reasons, some Palestinians also are more willing to negotiate than they have been in
the past. Disarray among Palestinian leaders, including those in the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO), the mass exodus from the gulf states, the exhaustion of the intifada—all have
combined to open the way for flexibility. Says Palestinian journalist Daoud Kuttab, “We're almost
dying for any solution, and therefore we're willing to make almost any concession.”
Some Palestinians even appear willing to negotiate without a direct presence by the PLO and its
leader, Yasir Arafat. This would remove an impediment that has confounded Middle East peace
negotiations for the past decade. But even if the Palestinians decide to attend the conference, the
road to peace will be rocky.
It's not yet clear, for example, whether the conference will be delayed because of the recent threeday coup attempt in the Soviet Union. Some Palestinians expressed support for the eight-man
committee that tried to oust Soviet President Mikhail S. Gorbachev, which could further weaken
the Palestinians' negotiating position at a peace conference.
Progress toward resolving the Palestinian problem also depends on whether Israel is willing to
compromise on the notion of “land for peace,” embedded in United Nations Resolutions 242 and
338, which call for withdrawal of Israeli forces from occupied Arab areas, an end to the state of
belligerency between the Arab nations and Israel, and acknowledgment of and respect for the
sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every nation in the area.
Israel
has agreed to attend the conference, but thus far has shown no inclination toward compromise on
substantive issues. In fact, in the three months following Kuwait's liberation, Israel earmarked more
occupied land in the West Bank for Jewish settlement than it did in the preceding year.
Historically both sides have found war easier to wage than peace. And breaking that cycle will
require unprecedented diplomatic efforts—far more than the usual diplomatic talks. As the various
parties jockey for position at the peace table, here are some issues that must be addressed.
Who is the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people?
Whether living under Israeli occupation, confined in squalid refugee camps in Lebanon or Jordan
or working as aliens in other Arab countries, most Palestinians still identify their struggle for selfdetermination with the Palestine Liberation Organization. Denied a homeland, the Palestinians
have considered the PLO as their only national emblem for more than 20 years. In poll after poll,
even informal surveys conducted after the gulf war, the vast majority of Palestinians have
consistently affirmed that the PLO represents their political aspirations.
“Those much sought-after alternatives to the PLO do not exist,” writes Rami Khouri, a well-known
Palestinian author living in Jordan. “The PLO commands the trust and allegiance of the
overwhelming majority of Palestinians…. It is more than a collection of politicians or ideas; it is a
symbol of our very being as a national community.”
Nevertheless, since the PLO emerged as a guerrilla force in the 1960s, Israel has steadfastly refused
to recognize it, much less negotiate with it, out of concern that its members were determined to
destroy the Jewish state. “The PLO is a terrorist organization,” says Elie Kedourie, a scholar at the
pro-Israeli Washington Institute for Near East Policy. “Furthermore, its leadership is selfappointed. It does not represent a democratic organization in any real sense.”
Palestinians respond that the PLO is more democratic than most Arab governments. They claim
their nationalist movement does find political expression in the sometimes stormy sessions of the
Palestine National Council, the PLO's 450-mem-ber parliament-in-exile, where votes are taken and
the losing minority abides by the majority decision.
Despite Israel's concerns, many Middle East experts believe the PLO's legitimacy should no longer
be questioned. In 1974, Arab heads of state recognized the PLO as “the sole legitimate
representative of the Palestinian people.” One month later, the organization received international
recognition when Yasir Arafat spoke before the U.N. General Assembly, which granted the PLO
observer status.
In 1976, the PLO became the twenty-first full member of the Arab League, and
by 1977 more than 100 nations had granted the PLO some form of diplomatic recognition.
By far the PLO's most significant step toward legitimacy was made in December 1988 when Arafat
recognized Israel's right to exist, provided an independent Palestinian state was created alongside
it. In an address before a special U.N. General Assembly session in Geneva, Arafat renounced
terrorism and accepted Resolutions 242 and 338—a profound policy shift that cleared the way for
then U.S. Secretary of State George P. Shultz to enter into official dialogue with the PLO.
But Israel questions the genuineness of the PLO commitment to a negotiated agreement. Most
Israelis, both on the left and the right, are convinced the changes reflect a shift in tactics rather
than policy. They say deeds, not words, represent the PLO's true intentions. Indeed, many
Palestinian leaders have been intimidated, or even assassinated, by one or another radical faction of
the PLO in the past. For example, recent evidence suggests that intelligence chief Salah Khalaf (Abu
lyad), the PLO's No. 2 in command, was assassinated last January for his moderate stance on ArabIsraeli negotiations and his role in disrupting terrorist operations.
If the PLO isn't the legitimate representative of the Palestinians, who is? Israelis say that has been
the problem all along. They say there have been no legitimate “interlocutors” to represent the
Palestinians in negotiations. Israel's critics respond that it has served their interests to deny
Palestinians national identity. Even today, there are Israelis, such as Housing Minister Ariel Sharon,
a former defense minister, who believe that Palestinians do not represent a national entity and
ought to be incorporated into other Arab states, primarily Jordan, which is more than 50 percent
Palestinian. These views, however, represent the fringe, even in Israel.
The current Israeli government, led by Yitzhak Shamir, favors elections in the occupied territories
that would lead to some sort of limited autonomy, short of a Palestinian state. The PLO's weakened
image as a result of its stance in the gulf war has made this scenario more plausible. Although few
Palestinians are willing to repudiate the PLO publicly, many believe the organization's leadership is
increasingly ineffective, corrupt and out of touch. To some degree, the PLO's missteps have allowed
West Bank Palestinians freedom to pursue their own interests, and possibly to negotiate their own
settlement with the Israelis.
But as Graham Fuller, a senior analyst at the RAND Corporation, a think tank in Santa Monica,
Calif., points out, “West Bankers are not the sum total of the Palestinian people.” Fuller says
elections in the West Bank and Gaza would effectively ignore the roughly 3.5 million
Palestinians who live outside the territories, and over the long run would create more problems
than they solved.
How has the intifada altered the political equation in the occupied territories?
What the Arab armies had failed to do with planes and missiles, the Palestinians under Israeli
military rule in the occupied territories accomplished with stones, metal pipes and knives: They
attracted attention and sympathy for the plight of Palestinians.
The intifada erupted in December 1987. Some analysts say the uprising was inevitable, a
spontaneous outburst caused by prolonged, intense poverty and social injustice. Others say it was
orchestrated by PLO “insiders” operating out of Israel's prisons.
Whatever its origins, the
intifada has had a profound impact on world opinion, on Palestinians and on Israeli society.
“The intifada brought the Palestinian issue front and center for the world to see,” says Helena
Cobban, a scholar-in-residence at the Middle East Peace Foundation, a Washington-based
organization that supports peace and security in the region. “Until 1987, Israeli leaders had
convinced the world—and the Israeli public—that their occupation in the territories was the most
benign in history.” That image dissolved as scenes of Palestinian teenagers being beaten by the
Israeli Defense Forces flashed across television screens around the world.
Israel's violent crackdown against bands of stone-throwing youths aroused criticism from all
quarters. “Before 1987, the occupation was morally comfortable for Israel, and considered viable
over the long term,” says Cobban. “The intifada shattered those perceptions.”
As the uprising stretched on from month to month, serious fissures in the body politic began to
emerge. For example, hundreds of senior Israeli reserve officers who had done duty in the
territories formed the Council for Peace and Security, which urged an exchange of territory for
peace. In March 1989, the Israeli newspaper Ha'aretz became the first Israeli publication to call on
Shamir to drop his opposition to talks with the PLO.
While most Israelis didn't feel immediately endangered, the intifada served notice that the threat to
the Jewish state did not come exclusively from surrounding countries. The war could come to the
“home front” even if it wasn't raging on the borders.
The stones of the intifada also sent ripples through the Arab world, most notably Jordan, which had
been seen by Israel and the United States as the most appropriate state with which a Palestinian
entity could be linked. The uprising's relentless force persuaded King Hussein to remove Jordan
from consideration as a surrogate ruler of the territories. In July 1988, the king announced that
“Jordan is not Palestine” and that his kingdom would relinquish its historic links to the West Bank.
He said he could no longer speak for the Palestinians and that the world would have to accept a
separate Palestinian state.
The political vacuum created by King Hussein's withdrawal was quickly filled by the PLO, which
was embraced by the intifada's leadership. Most experts believe the PLO had little or nothing to do
with the outbreak of the uprising. On the contrary, it is the intifada that had a major impact on the
PLO leadership, forcing it to abandon its long-trumpeted “military solution” against Israel and
adopt a more pragmatic policy, including Arafat's acceptance of Resolutions 242 and 338.
The intifada represents the first large-scale independent political action by the West Bank to assert
control over its own destiny. Indeed, for the first time, the West Bank has begun to think of itself as
a distinct Palestinian political entity, rather than simply as part of the broader Palestinian people.
That, according to scholars at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, has created a real
opportunity. Executive Director Martin Indyk says the intifada precipitated a shift in the balance of
power in the Palestinian national movement from the PLO, based in Tunis, Algeria, to a local
leadership in the territories.
Indyk also believes the intifada ultimately will force the combatants to negotiate. “The combination
of Palestinian desperation and Israeli discomfort has produced for the first time an agreement on
the objective: a transitional negotiation that would end the military occupation and provide selfgovernment for the Palestinians in the territories,” he writes.
Other Middle East experts are not so optimistic. The fact that the intifada began to sputter even
before Iraq invaded Kuwait has led some to conclude that Israel has little incentive to compromise
with the Palestinians. “Israel has crushed the intifada, and in my opinion has no intention of giving
the Palestinians anything tangible,” says Noam Chomsky, a political scientist at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology (MIT). “So long as Israel has U.S. support, it can maintain the occupation
indefinitely.”
What will the Palestinians bargain for eventually?
The demand for a Palestinian state is almost surely non-negotiable in the eyes of most Palestinians.
“They have not come this far and waited so long for something less,” says Fuller at the RAND
Corporation. “Any other arrangement, like some kind of local autonomy in confederation with
Israel or Jordan, is strictly interim—a way station before a more permanent settlement.”
On the other hand, some Western observers argue that the “Palestinian tragedy” lies in their
decades-long failure to accept the various deals that have been put to them. As Abba Eban, a
former Israeli foreign minister, once quipped: “The Palestinians never miss an opportunity to miss
an opportunity.” In 1937, when Britain's Peel Commission suggested dividing Palestine between
Arabs and Jews, they said “no.” They said “no” on at least three subsequent occasions: in 1947, when
the United Nations proposed the idea; in 1967, after the Six-Day War, when they told Israel, “no
conciliation, no negotiation and no recognition”; and in 1977, when Egyptian President Anwar elSadat tried to coax the PLO into his peace diplomacy with President Jimmy Carter at Camp David.
It is tempting, surveying this history, to accuse the Palestinians of having inflicted most of their
miseries upon themselves. By insisting on the whole loaf, they have ended up with no loaf.
Palestinians, of course, see it differently. Dividing Palestine between its Arab and Jewish
inhabitants may sound fair now, but it did not seem that way in the 1930s and '40s when most of
Palestine's people were Arabs and most of the Jews were new arrivals from Europe. Ever since
Israel's creation in 1948, Arabs have dreamed of recovering the land that they believe was unjustly
taken from them. Instead of partition, they favored abolishing Israel and establishing a democratic,
binational Palestinian state, as expressed in the PLO's National Charter.
For many Palestinians, that dream died in 1988, when the PLO accepted Resolutions 242 and 338.
By declaring statehood and recognizing Israel, the PLO signaled its hope that a diplomatic
settlement to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict might be found. Early in 1989, intelligence chief Salah
Khalaf, in a dramatic videotaped address to an Israeli-Arab symposium in Jerusalem, said: “In the
past we believed that this land was ours alone, and we did not believe the idea of coexistence
between states… [Today] we have come to believe in the necessity of coexistence.”
Not all Palestinians, however, are prepared to accept coexistence. Radical PLO factions, such as the
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine,
still advocate “total armed struggle.” Moreover, the
Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza , generally speaking, have always had a slightly
different political agenda than those Palestinians living in the refugee camps of Jordan, Syria and
Lebanon. Because most of the refugees were from those parts of Israel that fell within the pre-1967
boundaries—from places like Haifa, Jaffa or the Galilee—the only way they would ever feel truly at
home again was if Israel disappeared entirely and they were allowed to return to their original
villages.
Many of the 1.7 million Palestinians in the West Bank and
Gaza , however, could feel at home
again in the fullest sense if Israel's occupation of the West Bank and
Gaza ended. “Their
immediate problem was Israel's occupation, not its existence,” explains Cobban. “Therefore, they
are much more receptive to a two-state solution.”
How this dichotomy within the Palestinian community will be handled is one of the most serious
challenges that the Palestinian leadership faces today. Obviously, a settlement that satisfies only
the narrower interests of the Palestinians in the occupied territories, without dealing with
Palestinians in the diaspora, would expose the PLO to internal stress and factionalism.
Background
Roots of the Conflict
The collision between Jews and 1 Palestinian can be traced to the late 19th century. It was then that
Jews from around the world began flocking back to their ancient biblical homeland in Palestine,
drawn by a modern Jewish nationalist movement known as Zionism. The Zionists called for the
ingathering of the Jews in Palestine and the creation there of a modern Jewish nation-state. The
movement met resistance, faint at first, from the indigenous Arab population of Palestine, whose
own national awakening had begun amidst the gradual collapse of the Ottoman Empire.
Following World War I, Palestine fell under British control. In 1917, in what has come to be known
as the Balfour Declaration, British Foreign Minister Arthur James Balfour announced Britain's
support for the “establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people.” Out of the
broad region known as Palestine, Britain carved two political entities in 1921. One territory
consisted of the region east of the Jordan River; it was named the “Emirate of Transjordan,” and
later simply “Jordan.”
There, the British enthroned Abdullah ibn Hussein, a Bedouin tribal
chieftain educated in Istanbul, whose family came from what is now Saudi Arabia. Half of Jordan's
original 300,000 population were nomadic Bedouins and the other half “East Bankers,” or
Palestinian Arabs from the East Bank of the Jordan.
In the western half of Palestine, between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River, Palestinian
Arabs and Zionist Jews wrestled for control under the British umbrella. As the Jewish-Palestinian
conflict sharpened in the wake of a massive influx of European Jewish survivors of World War II,
Britain announced its intention to withdraw from the western half of Palestine.
London turned over responsibility for determining the fate of this disputed territory to the United
Nations, and on Nov. 29, 1947, the U.N. General Assembly voted 33 to 13 with 10 abstentions to
partition western Palestine into two states—one for the Jews, which would consist of the Negev
Desert, the coastal plain between Tel Aviv and Haifa and parts of the northern Galilee, and the
other for the Palestinian Arabs, comprising primarily the West Bank of the Jordan, the
Gaza
District, and the Arab sectors of the Galilee. Jerusalem, cherished by both Muslims and Jews as a
holy city, was to become an international enclave under U.N. trusteeship.
The Zionists, then led by David Ben-Gurion, accepted this partition plan even though they had long
dreamed of controlling all of western Palestine and Jerusalem. “We could hold out for all the land
of Israel,” he said, “but if we did that we might lose everything.”
But the Palestinian Arabs and the surrounding Arab states rejected the partition proposal on the
ground that it would legitimize the Jewish state. They felt that Palestine was all theirs, that the Jews
were interlopers and that they had the strength to drive them out.
On May 15, 1948, the day after the Jews declared establishment of Israel, the armies of Jordan,
Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Iraq invaded Palestine with the declared intention of
wiping the Jewish state off the map. Many Palestinians fled to neighboring Arab countries to wait
out the war, hoping to return as victors.
Toward the end of the war, with the Jewish troops in control, Ben-Gurion sought to expand and
secure Israel's highly vulnerable borders by taking more territory and expelling Palestinians from
their villages—especially those near border areas. By the time a U.N.-mediated armistice ended the
conflict in 1949, some 600,000 to 760,000 Palestinians had fled or been expelled from the region.
Meanwhile, the other areas designated for the Palestinians by the United Nations were taken by
Jordan and Egypt; Jordan annexed the West Bank, while Egypt assumed control of
Gaza .
Neither Arab state allowed the Palestinians to form their own independent government in these
areas.
Jordan's annexation of the West Bank dramatically altered its own ethnic makeup. The 450,000
Bedouins and East Bank Palestinians who had made up Jordan's population before 1948 were joined
by some 300,000 Palestinian refugees. In 1951, King Abdullah was assassinated by a disgruntled
Palestinian in Jerusalem. He was soon succeeded by his grandson Hussein, who is the present king
of Jordan.
Following the 1948 fighting, Israel signed separate armistice agreements with Egypt, Lebanon,
Jordan and Syria. These agreements notwithstanding, the Arab states frequently allowed various
Palestinian resistance groups to use their territory to launch raids against Israel, particularly from
the Egyptian-occupied Gaza Strip .
Eventually, in 1964, the Arab League, inspired by Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, an ardent
advocate of Arab unity,
organized the Palestinian resistance groups under one umbrella, which
later became known as the Palestine Liberation Organization. In those days, ironically, the PLO
was essentially a tool of the existing Arab regimes—intended to control the Palestinians as much as
to support them.
The Six-Day War
In June 1967, Israel launched a pre-emptive strike against Egypt, Syria and Jordan. The attack came
after Nasser declared his intention to annihilate the Jewish state and forged military alliances with
Syria and Jordan for that purpose, building up troops along his border with Israel and blockading
shipping at the Israeli port of Eilat. The war that followed Israel's surprise attack, known as the SixDay War, ended with the Israeli army occupying Egypt's Sinai Peninsula, Syria's Golan Heights and
Jordan's West Bank.
While the Six-Day War was a triumph for Israel's small but well-equipped army, it also contained
foreboding elements. The Arabs' defeat “awakened widespread national consciousness, especially
among the Palestinians,” writes Don Peretz, director of the Middle East Program at the State
University of New York at Binghamton. “The anti-Israel virus spread from the Arab East across all
North Africa, and ardent Arab nationalist through the Middle East and North Africa joined in
support of the Palestinian guerrilla movements.”
The 1967 defeat also resulted in a radicalization of the Palestinian movement. After the war, says
William Quandt, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, a think tank in Washington, “the
Palestinians took a somewhat different tack. They said, ‘We can't wait for the Arab regimes,
because the Arab regimes are all… self-interested. Even though the Arab masses may be with us, the
regimes have to be forced to join us, and therefore we have to ignite something, a revolution.’
“Palestinians continued to seek money and support from Arab governments, but they no longer
looked to those governments for leadership.
Rise of the PLO
For the Palestinians, dislocation, dispossession and exile had rendered their society politically weak
and physically divided. In the longer term, however, occupation at home and harassment abroad
strengthened their socio-political identity, assuring the psychological and political foundations
upon which continuing demands for self-determination would be based.
In 1969, a little-known Palestinian guerrilla by the name of Yasir Arafat, who headed the al-Fatah
(“Conquer”) guerrilla group, was elected chairman of the PLO's executive committee. Then, as now,
the PLO was composed of many different political camps. Although Arafat carried the title
chairman of the executive committee, he would never wield complete and uncontested control over
all the PLO factions.
The PLO guerrilla groups were granted significant economic aid by the Arab states in order to press
the battle with Israel. The Arab states also backed PLO efforts to take control of Palestinian refugee
camps in the weaker Arab countries, particularly Lebanon and Jordan, and to use those camps as
bases of operation against Israeli targets at home and abroad. In both Jordan and southern
Lebanon, the Palestinian guerrillas assumed quasi-sovereign authority over certain regions
bordering on Israel. Their raids on Israel brought about fierce Israeli retaliation, which created
tensions between the Palestinians and the Lebanese and between the Palestinians and Jordanians.
Matters came to a head in Jordan in September 1970, when radical Palestinian guerrillas brought to
Jordan three hijacked airliners and prevented the Jordanian army from getting near the planes or
rescuing the passengers. Recognizing that he was on the verge of losing control over his whole
kingdom, King Hussein decided to wipe out Arafat and his men once and for all by launching a fullscale offensive against the PLO-dominated Palestinian refugee camps and neighborhoods in the
Jordanian capital, Amman. The PLO responded by calling for Hussein's overthrow. In what became
known as “Black September,” Bedouin troops killed thousands of Palestinians while crushing the
PLO's attempt to topple Hussein.
But Arafat was not to be counted out. He and the PLO immediately fell back on their other “statewithin-a-state,” which they had established in the Palestinian refugee districts of Beirut and
southern Lebanon. More than 150,000 Palestinians had fled to Lebanon after the 1948 war, and by
1975 their numbers - increased by a high birth rate and by refugees from Jordan—had risen to
nearly half a million.
After the 1973 Yom Kippur War,
when it became obvious to Palestinians that they could no
longer count on Arab states to regain their land by force, Palestinian guerrilla groups stepped up
their own actions against Israel. Israel, in turn, launched raids against Palestinian camps in
Lebanon.
As a result of political deadlocks inside Lebanon, the Lebanese government was paralyzed—a
situation that served Arafat's interests. As the fighting escalated, divisions between Muslim and
Christian communities in Lebanon deepened. “For a decade, from the mid-1960s, the expanding
Palestinian presence served increasingly to polarize Lebanese opinion,” writes Patrick Seale.
“Muslims, sharing Arab nationalist sentiments, were committed to their cause, but Christians on
the whole were not, and the more importunate the Palestinians became, the wider grew the
Muslim-Christian cleavage.”
It was at this point that the Lebanese civil war became fully
intertwined with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
In 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon in an attempt to destroy the PLO leadership and infrastructure. As
a result, the PLO was forced to leave Beirut, depriving Arafat of his last base in the Arab world from
which to make direct attacks on Israel. It appeared that the PLO's significance to the Arab-Israeli
conflict had greatly diminished. This was an illusion, however, because the strength of the PLO,
although founded on the concept of armed struggle against Israel, had never rested with its military
capability. The broad range of international diplomatic support the PLO had garnered over the
years as the institutional symbol of Palestinian nationalism had become the principal basis of its
legitimacy.
Meanwhile, throughout the 1970s and early '80s, Egypt, Jordan and Syria unsuccessfully attempted
to negotiate for the return of the territories occupied by Israel. Israel made it clear, however, that it
had no intention of returning to the so-called Green Line, the borders set in the 1949 armistice.
Israel cited security concerns and the unwillingness of neighboring Arab states to recognize the
legitimacy of Israel.
Under Occupation
Israel's treatment of the lands captured in 1967 is highly controversial. History records numerous
other instances when territories gained during war have been incorporated against their will within
the victorious country's boundaries—as in the Soviet occupation of the Baltic republics of Estonia,
Latvia and Lithuania during World War II. But in such cases, the populations of the conquered
territories generally are made citizens of the conquering state and are granted some degree of
equality with the rest of the citizenry of the country. In other instances, for example the U.S.
occupation of Japan after World War II, the occupation is short-term, and the actions of the
occupying power are constrained by international law. Neither description fits the Israeli
occupation of the West Bank (including East Jerusalem), the
Gaza Strip and the Golan
Heights.
There have been changes in official Israeli policies toward the occupied territories. The Sinai was
returned to Egypt as part of the 1978 Camp David agreements, negotiated by President Jimmy
Carter, Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat and Israeli President Menachem Began. Israel extended
its legal jurisdiction to East Jerusalem in 1967 and officially annexed it in 1980; the Golan Heights
region was annexed in 1981. The basic approach, however, has been to rule the Palestinian
population through harsh military laws, while giving all rights and benefits of citizenship to those
Jewish Israelis who chose to establish settlements.
In spite of Palestinian absence at the negotiations, the Camp David Accords had recognized the
“legitimate rights of the Palestinian people” and affirmed that the Palestinians would be allowed to
establish a self-governing authority in the West Bank and
Gaza for a transitional period, after
which the final status of these territories would be negotiated. Since he could not annex the West
Bank, but had no intention of giving it back or even allowing the Palestinians the real autonomy
promised them under Camp David, Israeli Prime Minister Begin simply left the final status of the
West Bank formally open, meanwhile building a whole new reality on the ground: more roads
connecting the territories to Israel, more land expropriations from Palestinians and more Jewish
settlements.
By 1987, there were 67,000 Jewish settlers in the West Bank and roughly 50
percent of the land and most of the area's water sources were under Israeli control.
Beginning of the Intifada
As the Palestinian population ballooned during the 1970s and '80s, conditions inside Palestinian
villages, towns and refugee camps were deteriorating. Stifling pressures of life in this cramped
environment were exacerbated by Israeli policies that restricted local economic development. The
Palestinians' frustrations needed only a catalyst to create the long-anticipated explosion. That spark
occurred on Dec. 9, 1987, in a refugee camp in Gaza , when four Arab workers returning from
their jobs in Israel were killed in a collision with an Israeli truck. Thousands of mourners marched
on an Israeli army camp, convinced that the accident was deliberate.
the demonstrators, killing four of them.
The Israeli army “fired on
What began as sporadic protests by random groups of restless youth not only spread but developed
into an organized resistance movement ?with an underground leadership, a definite political
objective and a well-planned and integrated strategy. From rock throwing, insults and the illegal
display of national colors and patriotic slogans, tactics were devised to extend participation to the
entire Palestinian community. These included an economic boycott of many Israeli products,
nonpayment of taxes to Israel and weeklong strikes closing down public facilities.
As the first long-term, deep-rooted expression of political protest against Israeli occupation, the
intifada began a process of psychological and political transformation among Palestinians who had
always looked to external actors for salvation from Israeli control. “The Palestinians came to
understand through the uprising what made the Israeli occupation work—it was themselves and
their own cooperation with the whole Israeli system,” says Sari Nusseibeh, a Palestinian professor at
Bir Zeit University on the West Bank. “The most important achievement of the intifada was to show
Palestinians where their chains were and how they could remove them.”
The uprising has hastened remarkable changes in the socio-political structure of Palestinian society
under occupation. Virtually all age groups and social classes were mobilized in its support. But the
uprising also signaled the coming of age of a new generation of activists. They represent a potent
social force, one with little respect for Israeli administrative authority and one less responsive to
Israeli coercive measures.
While the intifada raised Palestinian national consciousness, it has carried a heavy price. Since its
inception, some 950 Palestinians, mostly teenagers, have been killed by Israeli forces, more than
110,000 have been injured and 15,000 are held in administrative detention.
The intifada has also
taken a toll on the precarious economies of the West Bank and
Gaza . Since 1987,
unemployment has soared to 75 percent in some areas, and the gross national product in
Gaza
has declined by at least 30 percent.
By mid-1990, many Palestinians had begun to feel that their struggle was losing its force—and its
balance. The intifada's singular strength had been its ability to sustain an unarmed, civil rebellion
against what Palestinians considered a cruel and unjust occupation, and to do so with extreme
restraint. But after nearly three years of mounting self-sacrifice, the intifada was careening out of
control. The uprising had stopped delivering headlines in the world press, and increasingly there
were reports of infighting over the merits of reverting to a strategy of “armed struggle.”?
Current Situation
The Gulf War
It was at this critical juncture in the Palestinian national movement that the gulf crisis occurred.
The PLO's recognition of Israel and acceptance of a two-state solution, announced by the Palestine
National Council in November 1988 and further elaborated by PLO Chairman Arafat at a special
U.N. General Assembly session in Geneva the following month, had produced no tangible political
gains. Moreover, Palestinians felt deep resentment at the failure of Egypt and the gulf states to use
their influence with Washington to find a just resolution to the Palestine question.
In 1989, as the Palestinian leadership grew more disenchanted, it began to draw closer to Iraq. The
choice was reinforced by necessity, given the deadly hostility of Syria on the one hand and the
disengagement of Jordan from the Palestine issue in 1988 on the other. Iraq gradually became a
hospitable base for logistical and political support for the PLO, as well as a source of financial aid to
the intifada. A strategic alliance of convenience, if not of objectives, had been forged.
It was a clear sign of the direction events in the region were taking when an Iraqi-based PLO
faction carried out an unsuccessful attack against civilians at a Tel Aviv beachfront during the
summer of 1990. The PLO, unwilling or unable to alienate Iraq, did not condemn the raid. This
silence persuaded the Bush administration to break off the dialogue it had been pursuing with the
PLO. Experts say this convinced the Palestinians that the United States was not genuinely
interested in a balanced solution to their problem.
It was within this context of utter frustration, economic deterioration and political impasse that
Palestinians rallied behind Iraq's occupation of Kuwait. While many Palestinians opposed the
actual invasion, they were even more opposed to the U.S. occupying force in the region.
“Westerners underestimate the Arab fear of outside domination,” explains Sara Roy of the Center
for Middle East Studies at Harvard University. Saddam Hussein, she says, offered an alternative;
finally an Arab leader had stood up to Israel and U.S. hegemony. Furthermore, it was viewed as
hypocritical that the United States would so boldly enforce U.N resolutions in Kuwait while
ignoring those relating to Palestine.
Whether one sympathizes with Palestinians for their stance in the war or not, one thing is certain:
They are paying dearly for it. During the war, the Israeli army resumed its highly criticized policy of
deporting Palestinians considered security risks, imposed Draconian security measures and
enforced an unprecedented 40-day curfew and travel ban that effectively sealed off the territories.
“Conditions in the West Bank and Gaza are as bad or worse than I have ever seen them,
probably worse even than the aftermath of the 1967 war,” says Peter Gubser, who heads American
Near East Refugee Aid, a private relief group.
The consequences have been greatest for Palestinians in the gulf states. The once-prosperous
Palestinian community in Kuwait has lost an estimated $10 billion.
“Kuwait was the bedrock, a
place of unquestioned stability for Palestinians,” says Helena Cobban. “For 40 years, it was always
the place where a substantial number of Palestinian professionals or technical people could find
jobs.” That haven of stability has disappeared. Some 250,000 Palestinians have either been expelled
or fled for fear of reprisals. Although a very small percentage of Palestinians in Kuwait collaborated
with the Iraqi invaders, the common Kuwaiti line now is to condemn all Palestinians: “We took
them in; we gave them good jobs; and now they stab us in the back. Never again will we do
anything for them.”
The expulsion of Palestinians from the gulf states has also added to the region's already seething
refugee problem. Since the end of the war, Jordan has taken in more than 200,000 refugees, a
burden its anemic economy can hardly bear. Jordan lost about $600 million in aid from Saudi
Arabia and the gulf states for having backed Iraq in the war. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait used to pour
more than $120 million a year into the Palestine National Fund, which financed the PLO. That
funding has stopped, as have the remittances from Palestinian workers in the gulf states.
Economically devastated, the Palestinians are also isolated politically. “The Arab leaders have
always used the Palestinian issue for their own purposes,” says Chomsky of the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology. “They've made gestures to appease their own populations, who support
Palestinian nationalism, but they've never had any use for Palestinians as a people. Now, after the
gulf war, they aren't even making gestures.”
Baker Peace Plan
When the gulf war ended in March, Washington had high hopes that the allied victory would
provide the momentum for Arabs and Israelis to seek a more lasting peace. In May, the United
States proposed holding a regional peace conference under American and Soviet auspices that
would address both the future of the occupied territories and the larger question of Israel's
relations with the Arab states.
Since May, Secretary of State James A. Baker III has made seven trips to the region, shuttling
between the various capitals to line up the conference's principal participants: Syria, Israel, Jordan,
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Lebanon. Apprehensive as the Arabs and Israelis may be, they
haven't turned down Baker's offer. The first encounter is expected to be a one-day multilateral
conference, followed by direct talks between Israel and Syria and Israel and a joint JordanianPalestinian delegation.
Only the Palestinians have yet to agree to attend. The sticky question of who will represent them at
the conference has yet to be resolved. Though the Palestinians haven't requested direct PLO
participation, Israel still adamantly refuses to sit down with Palestinians from the diaspora or East
Jerusalem for fear of signaling that the area, won in the 1967 war and now annexed to Jewish West
Jerusalem, is open to negotiation.
Angry at being frozen out, PLO Chairman Arafat has threatened that no Palestinians will attend the
conference unless Washington asks him to choose the Palestinian delegates. “In effect, what Arafat
is saying is, ‘I'm important; pay attention to me,’ “says Brookings' William Quandt. But most
analysts predict that the Palestinians, weakened and isolated after the gulf war and under fierce
pressure from the United States and the Arab states, will eventually bow to the inevitable. “It's hard
for the Palestinians to accept how much their position has eroded,” says Quandt. “But they want in
the game, and in the end they will have to swallow it.”
But even if such procedural gaps are bridged, numerous impediments remain. A peace conference
is not the same thing as peace. U.S., Arab and Israeli officials have expressed concern that progress
in bringing the parties to the table has done nothing to change the fundamental attitudes of Israel
and its neighbors or narrow the gap between their views on territory, security and coexistence.
Instead, some officials say, both Israel and the Arab states have accepted the U.S. plan solely to
improve their relations with the Bush administration, or out of fear of the consequences of defying
Washington. Israel, Egypt and Saudi Arabia are all heavily reliant on U.S. aid, and Syria has a keen
interest in improving U.S. ties. Once the conference begins, officials fear the attention and tactics
of the parties may remain focused on Washington rather than on each other, making progress on
substantive issues, such as the question of Palestine, nearly impossible.
Land for Peace?
Washington's foundations for a comprehensive peace settlement, Bush has recently reiterated, are
Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, which call on Israel to trade land it has occupied since
1967 for security guarantees from the Arab states. In the U.S. view, the West Bank, Gaza , the
Golan Heights and East Jerusalem are all negotiable. But Prime Minister Shamir has repeatedly
vowed to oppose any territorial concessions, offering only what he calls “peace for peace.” In April,
Shamir told the French newspaper Le Monde: “I will never abandon the territories. I wouldn't want
to enter national memory as someone who sold off part of Israel cheaply.”
Meanwhile, every day approximately 50 new Jewish settlers move to the occupied territories,
bringing the total Jewish population to more than 100,000.
According to recent data, Israel now
owns title to 68 percent of the land in the West Bank.
And if current settlement activity
continues, Palestinians will within three years become a minority in East Jerusalem, which was
Arab until the 1967 war.
In testimony before the Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee
on May 22, Secretary of State Baker said: “I don't think that there is any bigger obstacle to peace
than the settlement activity that continues not only unabated but at an enhanced pace.” Although
the United States has repeatedly condemned the expansion of Jewish settlements in the territories,
even hinting that U.S. aid to Israel could be affected if the practice continues, the real heat is on the
Palestinians. Increasingly, say local residents and foreign diplomats involved in the peace process,
Arabs are realizing that if they don't strike a deal with Israel now, there may be a lot less to deal for
later.
“The settlement activity is tantamount to the liquidation of the Palestinian people, acre by acre,”
said Ibrahim Mattar, a Palestinian economist who monitors Israeli settlements. “The giant condos
are more than an obstacle to peace; they are facts we cannot change.”
Palestinians are also
terrified by the mass immigration of Soviet Jews to Israel and by Shamir's comment last year about
needing a “big Israel” to settle them. As many as 1 million Soviet Jews are expected to settle in Israel
and the occupied territories during the next five years. Palestinians had always counted on
demographics to work in their favor, noting the high Palestinian birth rates in Israel and the
territories. The massive influx of Soviet Jews could take away what some PLO strategists called
their “secret weapon.”
Many Israelis feel a deep religious attachment toward the West Bank, known in Israel as the
biblical area of Judea and Samaria. To a majority of Israelis, however, maintaining the territories is
basically a matter of security. And in the aftermath of the gulf war, there is no longer any certainty
that land buys security. If the Israeli state can give up most of the West Bank for genuine peace,
and if the security threat of a West Bank in Palestinian hands can be reasonably resolved, then
experts say many would settle for resolving the national crisis by handing the territories over to the
Palestinians as the lesser evil. In a poll published in June by the Institute of Applied Social Research
at Hebrew University, one-third of Israelis favored a demilitarized Palestinian state, 69 percent
favored some territorial concessions and 78 percent favored letting go of the
Gaza Strip .?
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Outlook
Window of Opportunity
In essence, the Palestinian problem is straightforward: two peoples, Jews and Palestinian Arabs,
vying for the same turf, which since the 1967 Six-Day War has been controlled by Israel. For half a
century, it has been essential to the psychology and mental security of each side to absolutely deny
the existence—and the rights—of the other. At some point this vicious circle has to be broken.
In the Middle East, however, optimists are a scarce commodity. History seems more on the side of
conflict than peace. Despite the emergence of the United States as the pre-eminent foreign power
in the region, there are roadblocks at every turn. Radical Islamic factions could easily launch a
campaign of violence, either against Israel or against Palestinians willing to cooperate with the
United States, in an effort to sabotage the process. And though some Palestinian leaders have
sounded positive, the conference still could fall apart over the problem of choosing Palestinian
negotiators acceptable to both Israel and the PLO.
Clearly, the easing of Cold War tensions and the U.S. triumph in the gulf war have jumbled the
Middle East chessboard. The region's principal players—Syria, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and
Egypt—have at least some interest in a genuine settlement to the disputes that have left their
region roiling for decades.
But there are also compelling reasons not to settle, not least being the sheer complexity of the
issues and the risks of failure. Explosive questions need to be answered: Should Palestinians in the
diaspora be allowed their “right of return”? Should Jerusalem, revered by Jews and Arabs alike, be
shared between the two states? Can Syrian President Hafez al-Assad be trusted? Who will control
the Golan Heights, the West Bank and Gaza ? What security arrangements will be in place? If
and when peace talks begin, the real issues of contention will be these, not the composition of the
negotiating teams.
Despite frequent speculation that the Palestinian cause will be abandoned by the Arab states, most
experts doubt that will happen. “The Palestinian issue remains the linchpin of the entire region,”
says Sara Roy. “It is still the only issue Arab governments can use to legitimize themselves to their
constituencies.” Graham Fuller agrees. “We must look beyond the fact that many Arabs dislike
Palestinians and are bitter over Arafat's stance in the gulf war,” he says. “No Arab can accept what
he considers unjust treatment of another Arab. There will be no peace in the region until the
Palestinian issue is resolved, and every Arab leader knows that.”
In an ironic twist, the Palestinians' current weakness may ultimately work in their favor. On their
own, they've never made enough concessions to satisfy Israel or, for that matter, the United States.
Now that they are politically emasculated and economically desperate, says William Quandt, they
may for the first time actually get to the negotiating table. Paradoxically, he points out, their
weakened position permits them to “pursue the attainable rather than the ideal.”
Israel, which emerged from the gulf war strategically strengthened and morally vindicated, is in less
of a mood for compromise. “The Shamir government has no intention of giving up one inch of
territory. There will be deadlock within the first 30 seconds of sitting down at the table,” says
Zachary Lockman, a professor of Middle East Studies at Harvard. “Israel has been able to have its
cake and eat it, too—absorb new immigrants, keep the territories and still get U.S. aid.”
Lockman argues that the outlook for resolving the Palestinian problem will remain bleak until the
United States uses aid as a carrot, or stick, to coerce the Israeli government to compromise. At
present, that is not too likely. Publicly, the Bush administration insists it will not link aid with
progress toward peace. More important, by agreeing to attend a conference, Israel boosted
prospects for U.S. congressional approval of a much-needed $10 billion program of loan guarantees
to help it absorb the expected influx of Soviet immigrants.
Congress is expected to consider the
package in September, before the peace conference is scheduled to convene.
Lockman contends that the most likely scenario is that Prime Minister Shamir will attend a
ceremonial conference, and even enter into a few months of bilateral negotiations, but never yield
on the territories question—knowing full well that with elections coming up in 1992, the United
States is unlikely to pressure Israel too hard. By then there would be another 20,000 or so Jewish
settlers in the territories, and there also would have been elections in Israel, meaning Shamir might
not personally have to preside over any territorial concessions.
Is the Status Quo Tenable?
If the Palestinian issue is not re solved now or in the near future, most observers believe it will
become even more volatile. The stakes for both Israelis and Palestinians are tremendous. Secretary
of State Baker has warned Palestinians that this may be their “last chance” to obtain autonomy, a
necessary step before achieving their dream of an independent state. According to Palestinians, it
may also be the last chance before Israeli settlement activity and repression create new and even
uglier political dynamics.
“In the fervor to initiate a process, attention has focused on procedural issues that have nothing to
do with the fundamental problems of the territories,” says Roy. “People in Gaza and the West
Bank live miserable lives. The status quo is not tenable.”
If peace talks fail to take place because either Israel or the Palestinians refuse to budge, experts say
diplomacy will be discredited in the Arab world, further radicalizing young Palestinians inside and
outside the occupied territories. The refugee camps will then continue to be the seeds of intense
Palestinian resentment, frustration and terror.
The reality in the West Bank and Gaza is that time is on no one's side. Georgetown's Hisham
Sharabi says this may be the last time that a relatively moderate PLO will still be able and willing to
make a deal that involves territorial compromise. And it may be the last chance before Palestinians
become so desperate and so radicalized that groups advocating “no negotiation, no compromise”
come to reflect the majority view in the territories. Says Sharabi: “If this initiative fails, there is no
doubt that fundamentalism will gain. More and more Palestinians are already turning to Islam as
the only solution.”
No matter how unappealing Arafat may be to Americans or Israelis, and no matter when or why
Palestinian nationalism arose, that nationalism is staring the world in the face now. The histories of
South Africa, Northern Ireland, Lebanon, the Soviet Union and many other nations show that
suppressed nationalism can be a powerful revolutionary force that is dangerous to ignore.
Short Features
Who are the Palestinians?
Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir once declared: There is “no such thing as Palestinians.”
Her blunt comment in 1969 caused a furor in the Arab world, but it reflected what many
Israelis then felt. Even today, there are Israelis, such as former Defense Minister Ariel
Sharon, who believe the Palestinians do not represent a distinct national entity and ought
to be incorporated into other Arab states, primarily Jordan, which is more than 50 percent
Palestinian.
Though it is true that the creation of a Jewish state galvanized Palestinian consciousness, most
historians call Meir's statement a gross
inaccuracy. “That argument is pure polemics,” says Laurie Brand, a political scientist at the
University of Southern California. “The overriding point today is that more than 5 million
Palestinians around the world trace their roots to the area west of the Jordan River that now
constitutes Israel and the occupied West Bank.”
Both Arabs and Jews lived in that region thousands of years ago. But the area has been
predominantly Arab and Islamic since the end of the 7th century and—despite the steady arrival of
Jewish colonists beginning in the late 19th century—had an Arab majority until 1948.
The word “Palestine” is of Roman origin, referring to the biblical land of the Philistines. The term
fell into disuse for centuries, but the British revived it as an official designation for the area that the
League of Nations mandated to their supervision in 1920, following the World War I breakup of the
Turkish-Ottoman Empire.
Because the league's mandate applied to both Transjordan (now Jordan), east of the Jordan River,
and Palestine, west of the river, the argument was made that the term “Palestinian” applied to
persons east as well as west of the Jordan River. Thus, it was argued, the designation applied not
just to the Arab inhabitants—as is the common practice today—but also to Jews and Christians
living in the former mandated area.
Palestine as a legal entity ceased to exist in May 1948 when Britain, unable to control Arab Jewish
hostility and the influx of Jewish immigrants, relinquished its mandate, and Israel declared its
independence. The United Nations had voted in 1947 to partition Palestine into Arab and Jewish
sectors.
During 1948–49, Israel enlarged its territory in a war's of independence with neighboring Arab
nations. By war's end, some 600,000 to 760,000 Palestinians had fled or been expelled from Israel.
But Israel did not take control of all of Palestine. One region, the West Bank, came under the
control of Jordan, which later annexed the territory, and another, the
Gaza Strip , came under
Egyptian control. These territories later were occupied by Israel during the 1967 Six-Day War.
Although the Palestinians are physically dispersed—mostly in Israel, the occupied territories,
Jordan, Kuwait and other Arab states—and more than 2.3 million live in refugee camps, they are
unified by a common dream of a national homeland. “Unlike other Arabs,” writes James Akins, the
former U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia, “Palestinians have retained a pure nationalism. They have
been deprived of their homes, and their nationalism represents their only hope of regaining their
homeland.”
Palestinian refugees have been eligible for Jordanian citizenship since 1952, and they
are prominent in Jordanian government and business. But even in that country, says Ele Saaf,
director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency in Jordan, the Palestinians have never been
“psychologically integrated.”
[1] See Edward Said and Christopher Kitchens, eds. Blaming the Victims (1988), p. 236.
[2] See Congressional Quarterly, The Middle East, 7th ed., 1990. p. 9.
[3] James E. Akins, “The New Arabia,” Foreign Affairs, summer 1991, p. 39.
[4] Quoted in Robert I. Friedman, “The Palestinian Refugees,” The New York Review of Books,
October 1991', p. 40.
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What Can Be Gained at a Peace Conference?
Undoubtably, everybody in the Middle East has at least some interest in a genuine
settlement of the Palestinian problem. If the various factions actually end up at the peace
table, here are some of the things the key players hope to get out of the process:
THE PLO. The Palestine Liberation Organization hasn't been invited to directly participate in
negotiations. But its position is important because most Palestinians will consider the Palestinian
negotiating team that will participate to be legitimate only if it is blessed by the PLO. The
Palestinians ultimately hope to gain an independent state but might be willing to settle for less—so
long as the door is left open for statehood at some point down the road. Having lost international
credibility since the gulf crisis, the PLO is under great pressure to approve a Palestinian delegation,
even if it means compromise.
ISRAEL. Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir's hard-line government has been leery of international
peace conferences for years, and insists it will not trade land for peace. Nevertheless, Israel can't
afford to be seen as a spoiler. No longer the sole U.S. ally in the region, Israel has asked the United
States for $10 billion in loan guarantees to build housing for the influx of Soviet immigrants. By
appearing to support U.S. peace diplomacy, Israel greatly improves its chances for getting the U.S.
aid. Israel is clearly more interested in one-on-one peace talks with its Arab neighbors than in talks
with the Palestinians, which could eventually lead to territorial concessions.
SYRIA. The gulf war has convinced Syria that the United States is now the pre-eminent foreign
power in the Middle East. President Hafez al-Assad knows where the money is and wants to curry
U.S. favor. Assad also wants to shed Syria's image as a terrorist state. He may pay lip service to the
Palestinians, but reportedly detests PLO leader Yasir Arafat and might be satisfied with the return
of the Golan Heights in exchange for peace with Israel.
JORDAN. King Hussein needs to recover from the gulf war debacle, when he lost political standing
throughout the West for supporting Iraq. Jordan also needs cash to repair the damage the war dealt
to its economy by curtailing trade with Iraq and shutting down the flow of money sent home by
Jordanian workers in Iraq and Kuwait. Participating in a U.S.-led peace process could rehabilitate
Jordan politically and also would help reopen the spigots of U.S. aid. Obviously, by agreeing to take
part in a joint delegation with Palestinians, Jordan would re-emerge as a pivotal player in
determining the future of the West Bank and Gaza . Few experts, however, believe King
Hussein wants to incorporate a Palestinian state into Jordan.
SAUDI ARABIA. Publicly, the Saudis espouse strong support for the Palestinian cause. But since
the end of the gulf war they have been ridding their kingdom of thousands of Palestinians and
replacing them with Egyptian workers. Above all, the Saudis want stability for the region and might
prefer that the fate of the Palestinians be controlled by the Israelis rather than by Yasir Arafat or
Jordan's King Hussein.
UNITED STATES. By organizing a peace conference, the United States would enhance its own
reputation as the superpower most able to control events on the world stage. Israel is still a close
strategic ally, and it is unclear how hard President Bush is willing to push Prime Minister Shamir
on the issue of land for peace.
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Bibliography
Books
Brynen, Rex, ed., Echoes of the Intifada: Regional Repercussions of the Palestinian-Israeli
Conflict, Westview Press, 1991.
This collection of essays by Palestinian experts concentrates specifically on the origins and
ramifications of the intifada, or uprising. Essays on the intifada's impact on the United States and
Israel are particularly interesting.
Congressional Quarterly, The Middle East, Seventh Edition, 1990.
An excellent compendium of facts about the Middle East, this book contains a detailed chapter on
the evolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the various Middle East peace proposals. It also
contains useful background on the various factions within the Palestine Liberation Organization.
Friedman, Thomas, From Beirut to Jerusalem, Farrar Straus Giroux, 1989Thomas Friedman offers readers a vivid picture of his life as a foreign correspondent for The New
York Times, first in Beirut and, later, in Jerusalem. This is journalism at its best—observant,
objective and sensitive.
Hudson, Michael C, ed., The Palestinians: New Directions, Center for Contemporary Arab
Studies, Georgetown University, 1990.
The essays in this collection cover a wide range of topics relating to Palestinians and their quest for
an independent state. Focusing on both history and the future, several of the essays offer
provocative analysis of the thinking within the Palestinian nationalist movement.
Schiff, Ze'ev, and Ya'ari, Ehud, Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising—Israel's Third Front,
Simon & Schuster, 1989.
A very readable account of the uprising by two Israeli journalists, generally sympathetic to the
Palestinians but still from an Israeli point of view. The book is extremely informative but may
overstate the intifada's impact on Israeli society.
Articles
Abed, George T., “The Palestinians and the Gulf Crisis,” Journal of Palestine Studies, spring
1991.
An excellent article on the losses the Palestinian community has endured in the aftermath of the
gulf war. The author is critical of the PLO leadership yet compellingly explains their predicament
prior to the crisis.
Akins, James E., “The New Arabia,” Foreign Affairs, summer 1991.
The former U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia offers an interesting analysis of the geopolitical map in
the Middle East following the defeat of Saddam Hussein. Akins examines the future of inter-Arab
relations as well as the fate of Palestinians following the war.
Friedman, Robert I., “The Palestinian Refugees,” The New York Review of Books, March 29,
1990.
Robert Friedman presents an in-depth, well-researched account of how the Palestinian refugee
problem evolved from 1947 to 1990. Published prior to Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait, this
article is nonetheless a timely chronicle of conditions inside the refugee camps.
Miller, Judith, “Nowhere to Go: The Palestinians After the War,” The New York Times
Magazine, July 21, 1991.
Judith Miller's article focuses on the plight of Palestinians in Kuwait and their sense of despair and
hopelessness.
Reports and Studies
Fitzgerald, Garret, The Israeli-Palestinian Issue, Trilateral Commission, May 1990.
This report is particularly useful in describing how the various parties in Israel, the Arab states and
the Palestinian community perceive the Palestinian issue.
Fuller, Graham, The West Bank of Israel: Point of No Return? RAND Corporation, August
1989.
Though a bit dated, this report contains a superb analysis of the forces at play in the Israelioccupied territories. Fuller contends that the intifada has made a Palestinian state on the West
Bank inevitable.
United Nations, The Origins and Evolution of the Palestine Problem, 1917–1988, 1990.
This U.N. study is tedious and poorly written but still serves as an invaluable resource for
background on the Palestinian issue.
U.S. Department of State, Israeli Settlement in the Occupied Territories, March 19, 1991.
This study of Israeli settlement activity in the occupied territories was written at the request of the
House Committee on Appropriations. The report contains useful background data and up-to-date
information on the status of Soviet immigrants living in the occupied territories.
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The Next Step
Debates & Issues
“A lost voice,” The New York Times Magazine, April 28, 1991, p. 34.
Palestinian novelist Anton Shammas contends that language lay at the heart of the Persian Gulf
War and may hold the key to peace in the Middle East. Arab-Israeli-Palestinian disputes and the
role of language; use of the word “linkage”; more.
“UN Security Council resolution on Israel,” Dispatch, Dec. 24, 1990, p. 358.
Presents the text of U.N. Security Council Resolution 681 (Dec. 20, 1990) expressing grave concern
over the rejection by Israel of Security Council Resolutions 672 and 673 and deploring the decision
by the government of Israel to resume deportations of Palestinian civilians in the occupied
territories.
Dickey, C, “Keeping up appearances of movement,” Newsweek, April 22, 1991, p- 26.
Assesses the current relationship between the Arabs and Israel, contending that even though
Israel's most threatening enemy, Iraq, is now in ruins, the central problems between Israel and the
Arabs remain. Questions if Israel has a right to exist and the Palestinians a right to a state.
Confusing debates; efforts made by U.S. Secretary of State James A. Baker III; U.N. Security Council
Resolution 242; more.
Goode, E. E., “Israel's willful conscience,” U.S. News & World Report, April 15, 1991, p. 62.
Profiles Amos Oz, Israel's most celebrated and controversial novelist, an outspoken dove, the
“conscience” of his country, the man who “is determined above all to tell the truth regardless of
whom it offends.” Supporter of a Palestinian homeland and a negotiated peace; founder of the
organization Peace Now; blunt, arrogant, naive, dreamer, death threats in the mailbox; his newest
novel “To Know a Woman.”
Israel
“Security Council asks for urgent efforts to monitor Palestinian civilian situation,” UN
Chronicle, March 1991, p. 55.
Summarizes the U.N. Security Council's unanimous vote to make new, urgent efforts to monitor
the situation of Palestinian civilians under Israeli occupation, and to ensure respect by Israel for
Geneva Convention obligations.
“That man again,” The Economist, April 13, 1991, p. 40.
Reports on the visit of U.S. Secretary of State James A. Baker III to Israel. Israeli reaction; Israel's
Likudled coalition government; Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir; Foreign Minister David Levy;
outlook for a successful Arab-Israeli peace conference; question of who would speak for the
Palestinians; position of PLO leader Yasir Arafat; details.
Doherty, C.J., “U.S.-Israeli relations cool after heat of war,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly
Report, May 4, 1991, p. 1145.
Declares that although at the height of the Persian Gulf War the Bush administration drew close to
the Israeli government of Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, like the war itself, the era of warm
relations passed quickly. Battling a common enemy; at odds again with Shamir government;
compromise on conditions for peace talks between Israel and its neighbors; barring contacts
between U.S. officials and the Palestine Liberation Organization; expanding role of Rep. Mel
Levine, D-Calif.
Elon, A., “Letter from Jerusalem,” The New Yorker, Dec. 24, 1990, p. 80.
Describes the current political and social conditions in Jerusalem. Palestinian uprising on the West
Bank and the Gaza Strip ; relationships between Jews and Arabs; riots and other forms of
violence; United States policy toward Israel; more.
Elon, A., “Report from Jerusalem,” The New Yorker, April 1, 1991, p. 80.
Presents a report on the current political situation in Jerusalem after the end of the Persian Gulf
War. Sense of civilian vulnerability in the area; President Bush's promised new world order; damage
to Tel Aviv area houses; lack of Israeli preparation for the war; continuation of immigration from
Soviet Union; Palestinian support of Saddam Hussein; Arab-Israeli conflict.
Land disputes
“Next stop Palestine,” The Economist, March 9, 1991, p. 17.
Examines how the end of the gulf war will impact the long-standing argument between Israel and
the Palestinians. Why the Israelis don't want to give the West Bank back to the Palestinians;
benefits from the defeat of Iraq; loss sustained by Palestine Liberation Organization leader Yasir
Arafat; change in Palestinian leadership; value of American friendship; stance of the present Israeli
government; outlook.
“Shamir talks about talks,” U.S. News & World Report, April 8, 1991, p. 15.
Notes Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir's stance in relation to controversies between Israelis
and Palestinians. His refusal to hold direct talks with Arabs; no sympathy for the idea of swapping
land for peace; comments on the anticipated U.S.-Soviet offer to host Middle East peace talks.
Church, G.J., Fernandez, M., et al., “Does land still buy security?” Time, April 1, 1991, p. 39.
Considers the raging debate over whether Israel could safely return even a demilitarized Golan
Heights to Syria. The heretics: (1) Bassam Abu Sharif, adviser to PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat, hinting
a Palestinian state did not have to include every last bit of the West Bank; (2) Ehud Olmert, Health
Minister of Israel, proclaiming Israel ready for negotiations with Syria; (3) Dan Shomron, chief of
staff, remarking “one can speak about risk vs. territory.”
Doherty, C. J., “Disputes over settlements strain the peace process,” Congressional
Quarterly Weekly Report, March 30, 1991, p. 802.
Discusses the issues that strained relations between the United States and Israel before the Persian
Gulf War and that have begun to cause renewed friction now that the conflict has ended. Prime
Minister Yitzhak Shamir continuing to expand housing settlements in Israel's occupied territories;
determined to halt violence by Palestinians against Israelis; Israeli request for new loan guarantees
later this year; expanding settlements; more settlers planned.
Zuckerman, M. B., “New thinking, old realities,” U.S. News & World Report, March 25, 1991,
p. 76.
Editorial. Argues that in the wake of the Persian Gulf War the United States should not blindly buy
into the notion of land for peace. Saddam Hussein has united the Jews of Israel, left and right, in
the belief that a Palestinian homeland would be suicide, and that the Palestinians will never accept
the coexistence of Israel. Fundamental hostility of Syria toward Israel; importance of the West Bank
to Israel's defense; new respect for the old realities.
Middle East relations
Lane, C. and Warner, M. G., “Your -wish is my demand,” Newsweek, May 20, 1991, p. 34.
States that Washington still hopes for a breakthrough in the Middle East, but reveals that the area
is reverting to its old, intransigent form. Secretary of State James A. Baker Ill's fourth diplomatic
tour last week; the behavior of the Saudis; Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak; Arab and Israeli
relations; security and the peace process; Prince Bandar bin Sultan; Kuwait.
Reed, S. and Javetski, B., “The gulf: What America should do now,” Business Week, April 15,
1991, p. 32.
Reports on the battle still raging in the Middle East and tells how President Bush is doing almost
nothing to help. Losing some of the respect he earned during the war; his inaction could doom
thousands of Iraqis and Palestinians to refugee camps or death; killing hopes for progress on ArabIsraeli peace and for reforming the region's medieval political system; what should be done.
Robbins, C. A., Makovsky, D., et al., “In search of tiny openings,” U.S. News & World Report,
May 6, 1991, p. 44.
Details the most recent Middle East trip of Secretary of State James A. Baker III that failed to break
the deadlock on two key questions: who would represent the Palestinians at any talks and what role
would the United Nations play in any peace conference. Sorting out the various players; keeping
the agenda intentionally vague; Palestinians appear willing to accept a gradualist approach. INSET:
photo essay of Baker's trip.
Moral & religious aspects
Budiansky, S., “Bowed heads and golden rules,” U.S. News & World Report, March 25, 1991, p.
10.
Comments that Western expectations for a Middle East peace remain peculiarly Christian ones,
based at heart on the premise that if only the Israelis and the Palestinians would sit down and talk
they would learn to love their neighbors as themselves. Fundamental differences between the
Semitic and the Western world views; the essence of Jewish morality: to perfect this world, one
must hate evil, not forgive it; “What is hateful to you, do not do to your fellow man.”
Landes, D. S., “Islam dunk,” The New Republic, April 8, 1991, p- 15.
Analyzes the religious overtones of the gulf war, which pitted the Western infidels against Muslims
even though one was a tyrant. History of Muslim conquest; Western influence; importance of
Saddam Hussein's move into Kuwait; impact of war on Middle Eastern politics; role of IsraeliPalestinian conflict; other religious obstacles.
Palestine Liberation Organization
“Arafat's dangerous ploy,” Time, Oct. 15, 1990, p. 55.
Discusses the problems arising because of the refusal of the Palestine Liberation Organization's
leader Yasir Arafat to condemn Iraq's conquest of Kuwait. Infuriated Arab backers; Kuwait and
Saudi Arabia cut off funds; thousands of Palestinians lose their jobs on the gulf; political squeeze;
covering all bets; internal radicals who would like to depose him.
“Life after Arafat,” The Economist, Feb. 2, 1991, p. 20.
Assesses the likelihood of Yasir Arafat remaining as the leader of the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO). Recent criticism of Arafat's judgment; impact of PLO support for Iraqi
President Saddam Hussein; impact to Palestinians; need for the PLO to economize; potential new
leaders; killings of several senior PLO men; details; outlook.
Persian Gulf War, 1991
“Revenge is blind,” The Economist, March 30, 1991, p. 39.
Describes mistreatment of Palestinians in Kuwait. Accused of collaboration with Iraqis; many cases
of unjust accusation.
“The other occupation,” The Economist, March 9, 1991, p. 40.
Looks at what the end of the gulf war means for the 1.7 million Palestinians living in the West Bank
and Gaza Strip , which are occupied by Israel. Visit by U.S. Secretary of State James A. Baker
III; position of the government of Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir; signs of cautious independence
among the Palestinians living under occupation; signs that the intifada is reviving; details.
Bollag, B., “Gulf crisis may leave deep scars on higher education in the Middle East,” The
Chronicle of Higher Education, April 3, 1991, p. Al.
Details some of the massive destruction the Persian Gulf crisis has caused in Iraq and Kuwait and
suggests the biggest losers may be Palestinians, as hundreds of Palestinian teachers find themselves
unable to reclaim jobs they were forced to give up because of the conflict. Financial aid for the six
Palestinian universities in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in doubt; problems in Egypt and
Saudi Arabia; persecution of Palestinians in Kuwait; positive developments.
Dowell, W., “Life under a cloud,” Time, April 29, 1991, p. 42.
Describes Kuwait today, a sky of charcoal cloud dripping white ash and underneath scores of flashy
cars and motorcycles, running water, electricity and telephones, fresh vegetables in the
supermarket. Meeting the country's basic requirements; much Iraqi damage was superficial;
persecution by Kuwaitis enraged by Palestinian support of Saddam Hussein; continuing retribution
and government incompetence; resignation of the Cabinet; Parliamentary elections, fall 1992.
Kirk, D., “Saddam boosters,” The Nation, April 1, 1991, p. 400.
Reports how the Palestinians and Bedouins in Jordan see Saddam Hussein as a hero and feel that
they have won a victory. Their attitude toward “enemy” nations; why they feel they have won; the
danger to Jordan from these two groups.
Peretz, M., “Worst enemy,” The New Republic, March 25, 1991, p. 13.
Argues that the Palestinians have severely damaged world support for their cause due to their
decision to side with Saddam Hussein in the gulf war. How their joyous response to Iraqi Scud
attacks on Israel has reinforced that country's fears of living in close proximity to a hostile state;
recommended Western policy toward Palestinians and Jordan, which also exhibited support for
Hussein.
Warner, M. G., Pedersen, D., et al., “With friends like these,” Newsweek, May 6, 1991, p. 42.
Looks at the problems facing Kuwait since the withdrawal of Iraqi troops. Rebuilding infrastructure
to make progress in political reform; Emir Jabir al-Ahmad al-Sabah grudgingly entertaining idea of
“a new Kuwait”; Kuwait's nascent opposition pushing for reopening of Parliament; American
displeasure; recent Amnesty International report; misery of 600 people, mostly Palestinians;
inability of al-Sabah family to keep its own house in order.
Protests, demonstrations, etc.
“A most exploitable massacre,” The Economist, Oct. 13, 1990, p. 41.
Details the Oct. 8, 1990, killing of 19 Palestinians by Israeli police in Jerusalem. President Bush's
response and his dismissal of the idea that the event had undermined his strategy in the gulf; Iraqi
President Saddam Hussein's use of the massacre by linking his fate to that of Palestine's; comments
of Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir; accusations against the Palestine Liberation Organization and
the intifada.
Stanger, T., “New mandate: Shoot to kill,” Newsweek, Apr. 8, 1991, p. 38.
Details the violence in Israel between Palestinians and Jews and the hard line Israeli police are
taking on Arab violence. Anger over renewed attacks against soldiers and civilians; the intifada
since 1987; Israel struggling for three years to contain Arab attacks on Jews; surge in gun-license
applications for self-defense.
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Footnotes
[1] George Abed, “Palestinians and the Gulf War,” Journal of Palestine Studies, spring 1991, p. 30.
[2] The New York Times, May 25, 1991.
[3] See The Economist, June 29, 1991, p. 36, and The New York Times, Aug. 8, 1991.
[4] Quoted in The Wall Street Journal, May 10, 1991.
[5] The U.N. Security Council unanimously approved Resolution 242 on Nov. 22, 1967. Resolution
338, approved on Oct. 22, 1973, basically reaffirms Resolution 242 and calls for negotiations among
the parties in the region.
[6] Cited in The Wall Street Journal, Aug. 1, 1991.
[7] “The Palestinians After the Gulf War: The Critical Questions,” collection of articles published by
The Center for Policy Analysis on Palestine, Washington, D.C., March 27, 1991, p. 16.
[8] See The Washington Post, July 23, 1991.
Footnote:
8. See The Washington Post, July 23, 1991.
[9] See “Israel's Prison Academies,” The Atlantic, October 1989, p. 22.
[10] See Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari, Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising—Israel's Third Front (1989).
[11] See Martin Indyk, “Peace Without the PLO,” Foreign Policy, summer 1991, p. 30.
[12] Martin Indyk, “Half-Bakered: The Administration's Fanciful Peace Plan,” The New Republic,
May 27, 1991, p. 8.
[13] Quoted in Michael C. Hudson, The Palestinians: New Directions (1990), p. 160.
[14] Quoted in Thomas Friedman, From Beirut to Jerusalem (1989), p. 253.
[15] For a detailed account see Benny Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947–49
(1987).
[16] For background on Nasser and the history of Pan-Arabism, see “The Elusive Search for Arab
Unity,” Editorial Research Reports, Oct. 19, 1990, pp. 602–616.
[17] Don Peretz, The Middle East Today (1988), p. 146.
[18] Patrick Seale, Assad: The Struggle for the Middle East (1988), p. 271.
[19] See Deborah J. Gerner, One Land, Two Peoples (1991), p. 89.
[20] Friedman, op. cit, p. 266.
[21] Ibid., p. 386.
[22] See Hudson, op. cit., p. 7.
[23] These figures were as of May 31, 1991. Provided by the Palestine Human Rights Information
Center, Jerusalem/Chicago.
[24] Sara Roy, “The Political Economy of Despair: Changing Political and Economic Realities in the
Gaza Strip ,” Journal of Palestine Studies, spring 1991, p. 61.
[25] See Rashid Khalidi, “The Palestinians and the Gulf Crisis,” Current History, January 1991, p. 19.
[26] The Washington Post, March 2, 1991.
[27] James E. Akins, “The New Arabia,” Foreign Affairs, summer 1991, p. 37.
[28] Quoted in The Nation, July 1, 1991, p. 11.
[29] See “Israeli Settlement in the Occupied Territories,” Report prepared for the Committee on
Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives, March 19, 1991. This figure doesn't include East
Jerusalem, which has a Jewish population of approximately 120,000. Washington has not
recognized Israel's annexation of East Jerusalem.
[30] The Wall Street Journal, May 10, 1991.
[31] Quoted in Judith Miller. “Nowhere to Go: The Palestinians After the War,” The New York Times
Magazine, July 21, 1991, p. 32.
[32] See Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, July 27. 1991. p. 2094.
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*Diaspora means the scattering of people with a common origin, background, set of beliefs, etc.
*U.N. observer status entitles the PLO to maintain a mission at the U.N. and participate in all U.N.
functions except voting. The vote on the PLO's observer status was 105–4 with 20 abstentions. Only
Israel, the United States, Bolivia and the Dominican Republic voted against the PLO.
*The U.S.-PLO dialogue was curtailed six months later when Arafat refused to condemn outright a
terrorist raid at a Tel Aviv beach thought to have been conducted by an Iraqi-backed PLO faction
(see p. 622).
*Since Secretary of State James A. Baker III began his peace diplomacy in March, King Hussein has
signaled a new willingness to accept a confederation of his country and the West Bank in order to
achieve a breakthrough toward a Middle East peace settlement. Ultimately, however, the king still
advocates a separate Palestinian state.
*On March 26. 1979. Egyptian President Sadat, Israeli President Menachem Begin and U.S.
President Jimmy Carter signed the Camp David Agreements in Washington. In return for peace and
the establishment of diplomatic relations, Israel agreed to withdraw from the Sinai Peninsula.
*Founded by George Habash in 1967, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine is the main
rival of al-Fatah, the comparatively moderate PLO group that Arafat heads. The Popular Front is
pro-Marxist and headquartered in Syria.
*Under a treaty signed with Britain in 1946, this area became the independent Hashemite Kingdom
of Transjordan.
*Unlike the Six-Day War, the Yom Kippur War had nothing to do with the struggle for a
Palestinian homeland. On Oct. 6, 1973, Egyptian and Syrian troops launched a surprise attack on
Israeli-occupied territory in the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights in an attempt to regain
territories lost in 1967. The Arab nations inflicted heavy damage on Israeli defenses, but were
ultimately defeated.
*Three days earlier an Israeli merchant had been stabbed to death in Gaza , and Gazans
believed the truck driver was a relative of the merchant intent on avenging his death.
*Israeli elections must take place no later than the fall of 1992.
Israel, Palestine, and Middle East Peace
May 2009
Middle East Peace Prospects
Oct. 27, 2006 Middle East Tensions
Jan. 21, 2005 Middle East Peace
Aug. 30, 2002 Prospects for Mideast Peace
Apr. 06, 2001 Middle East Conflict
Mar. 06, 1998 Israel At 50
Aug. 30, 1991 The Palestinians
Oct. 19, 1990 The Elusive Search for Arab
Unity
Feb. 24, 1989 Egypt's Strategic Mideast
Role
Apr. 15, 1988 Israel's 40-Year Quandary
Mar. 02, 1984 American Involvement in
Lebanon
Nov. 12, 1982 Reagan's Mideast Peace
Initiative
Apr. 23, 1982 Egypt After Sadat
Jan. 04, 1980 Divided Lebanon
Jul. 20, 1979 West Bank Negotiations
Dec. 01, 1978 Middle East Transition
Jan. 13, 1978 Saudi Arabia's Backstage
Diplomacy
Oct. 29, 1976 Arab Disunity
May 16, 1975 Middle East Diplomacy
Sep. 13, 1974 Palestinian Question
Dec. 12, 1973 Middle East Reappraisal
Apr. 25, 1973 Israeli Society After 25 Years
Aug. 19, 1970 American Policy in the
Middle East
Apr. 25, 1969 Arab Guerrillas
Aug. 02, 1967 Israeli Prospects
Jul. 06, 1966 Middle East Enmities
Apr. 14, 1965 Relations with Nasser
Aug. 17, 1960 Arab-Israeli Deadlock
May 27, 1959 Middle East Instability
Jun. 04, 1958 Nasser and Arab Unity
Oct. 02, 1957 Soviet Threat in Middle East
Sep. 18, 1956 Suez Dispute and Strategic
Waterways
May 09, 1956 Middle East Commitments
Apr. 13, 1955 Middle East Conflicts
Mar. 31, 1954 Security in the Mideast
Oct. 23, 1952 Israel and the Arab States
Jan. 30, 1952 Egyptian Crisis and Middle
East Defense
Mar. 17, 1948 Palestine Crisis
Feb. 18, 1946 Soviet Russia and the Middle
East
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