Multi-Dimensional Consequentialism and Risk
Vuko Andrić
vuko_andric@yahoo.de
1. Introduction
Objective consequentialism (OC) is the view that the deontic status of acts depends only on actual
consequences.
Subjective consequentialism (SC) is the view that the deontic status of acts depends only on expected
or rationally expectable consequences.
I want to show:
(1) Whenever there is a problem for OC or SC, Peterson’s proposal (PP) shares this problem.
(2) The possibilities of improving multi-dimensional consequentialism (MDC) are very limited as far
as risk is concerned.
2. Peterson’s Proposal
a) The Jackson Case
State s
(p = 0.5)
State t
(p = 0.5)
Degree of rightness wrt
risk
Drug A
Partial cure
Partial cure
0
Drug B
Death
Complete healing
0.5
Drug C
Complete healing
Death
0.5
The intuition is that prescribing drug A is all-things-considered right and prescribing drug B or drug C allthings-considered wrong. This contradicts OC. But this is also hardly taken into account in PP’s
concession that B and C (!) are not entirely right with respect to risk, whereas A (!) is entirely wrong with
respect to risk.
b) Control and c) Action-guidance
Charge: since you often do not know the consequences of the acts available to you…
…OC is incompatible with “‘ought’ implies ‘can’“.
…OC is not sufficiently action-guiding.
Since on PP the deontic status of acts is, apart from the risk dimension, determined by the act’s actual
consequences, PP raises similar worries.
d) Decisiveness of optimal consequences
Just like SC, PP does not preserve the intuition that only optimal outcomes contribute towards making
right acts right. For on PP, the reduction of risk also contributes towards making right acts right.
e) Disagreement
If SC can’t make sense of disagreement, PP can’t either.
BMWs or Torture
Alice can choose between three doors. All the evidence suggests that she will be gifted six BMWs
behind door no. 1 and tortured behind door no. 3. The evidence also suggests that Alice will almost
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certainly be tortured behind door no. 2, but there is a very small chance that she will be gifted seven
BMWs. In fact, however, door no. 2 yields seven BMWs.
s1
(p = 0.01)
s2
(p = 0.99)
Degree of rightness wrt risk
Door no. 1
10
10
0.99
Door no. 2
11
-100
0.01
Door no. 3
-100
-100
0
>s1 obtains<
On PP, choosing door no. 1 is almost completely all-things-considered right since it is almost completely
right with respect to every relevant aspect. Choosing door no. 2 is right to a considerably lower degree
because this option is almost entirely wrong with respect to risk.
Alice: I ought to choose door no. 1 because I will get six BMWs this way and do not run the risk of being
tortured.
Adviser: No, you ought to choose door no. 2. For then you will be gifted seven BMWs.
f) Value-as-you-see-it
Some philosophers believe that the “ought” of SC refers to what an agent can appropriately be held
responsible for doing. However, we cannot more legitimately expect agents to maximize expected
instead of actual value than we can expect them to maximize value instead of value-as-they-see-it.
Therefore, so the objection goes, SC’s criterion of rightness is unstable.
The problem is even worse for proponents of PP. For if it is correct that the main motivation for adopting
a subjective criterion of rightness is to take into account what agents can legitimately be held
responsible for, then proponents of PP need not only explain why value-as-you-see-it isn’t relevant for
rightness but also why they maintain that rightness depends only on actual rather than expected
consequences when it comes to the dimensions of persons and equality.
g) False beliefs and misleading evidence
Some critics of SC object to the idea that false beliefs and misleading evidence are right-makers of
actions. PP subscribes to this idea, too, because it recognises the dimension of risk.
3. The Possibility of Improvement
1st idea: render MDC completely objectivist or subjectivist.
Assessment: Solves one kind of problem. But MDC collapses into OC or SC.
2nd idea: accept a version of MDC according to which expected value, rather than best possible
consequences, determines rightness with respect to risk.
Assessment: Arguably allows MDC to handle the Jackson case. However, the other problems remain.
3rd idea: Modify decision procedure to handle the Jackson case.
Assessment: There are (at least) three problems with this idea. 1. The modified decision procedure
arguably doesn’t fit with the claim that rightness depends on best possible outcomes. 2. The modified
decision procedure has to be true to the idea of multiple dimensions. 3. In any case, this manoeuvre
only covers the Jackson’s case; the other problems remain.
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