THEOLOGY II
The Omnipotence Paradox
Could an omnipotent being create a stone so heavy that even he could not lift it?" If he could lift
the stone, then it seems that the being could cease to be omnipotent, as the stone was not heavy
enough; if he could not, it seems that the being was not omnipotent to begin with. A being that is
not omnipotent, though, is not God. God, therefore, does not exist.
Answers1


1
2
Although this simple argument may appear compelling at first glance, there are some
fundamental problems with it. Before identifying these problems, however, it is necessary
to make clear what is meant by “omnipotence”. Christian philosophers have understood
omnipotence in different ways. René Descartes though of omnipotence as the ability to
do absolutely anything. According to Descartes, God can do the logically impossible; he
can make square circles, and he can make 2 + 2 = 5. Thomas Aquinas had a narrower
conception of omnipotence. According to Aquinas, God is able to do anything possible;
he can part the red sea, and he can restore the dead to life, but he cannot violate the laws
of logic and mathematics in the way that Descartes thought that he could. If Descartes’
conception of omnipotence is correct, then any attempt to disprove God’s existence using
logic is hopeless. If God can do the logically impossible, then he can both create a stone
so heavy that he cannot lift it, and lift it, and so can do all things. Yes, there’s a
contradiction in this, but so what? God can, on this understanding of omnipotence, make
contradictions true. Descartes’ understanding of omnipotence therefore doesn’t seem to
be vulnerable to the paradox of the stone. Descartes can answer the question "Yes"
without compromising divine omnipotence. Aquinas’ understanding of omnipotence,
which is more popular than that of Descartes, also survives the paradox of the stone. For
if God exists then he is a being that can lift all stones. A stone that is so heavy that God
cannot lift it is therefore an impossible object. According to Aquinas’ understanding of
omnipotence, remember, God is able to do anything possible, but not anything
impossible, and creating a stone that God cannot lift is something impossible. Aquinas
can therefore answer the question "No" without compromising divine omnipotence. The
paradox of the stone, then, can be resolved; it fails to show that there is an incoherence in
the theistic conception of God, and so fails to demonstrate that God does not exist.2
Suppose that God’s omnipotence enables Him to do even what is logically impossible
and that He actually creates a stone too heavy for Him to lift. The critic plays into his
hands … For why should God not be able to perform the task in question? To be sure, it
is a task – the task of lifting a stone which He cannot lift – whose description is selfcontradictory. But if God is supposed capable of performing one task whose description
is self-contradictory – that of creating the problematic stone in the first place – why
should He not be supposed capable of performing another – that of lifting the stone?
After all, is there any greater trick in performing two logically impossible tasks than there
NOTE: The best answers aren’t necessarily the shortest ones.
http://www.existence-of-god.com/paradox-of-the-stone.html
Professor Christopher Ullman – Christian Life College -- 1
THEOLOGY II




is in performing one? If an omnipotent being can do what is logically impossible, then he
can not only create situations which he cannot handle but also, since he is not bound by
the limits of consistency, he can handle situations which he cannot handle.3
This problem involves a logical contradiction, and thus is contrary to the nature of God as
a rational being. If God creates the stone, he has already moved it from nothingness to
reality, and it would be a contradiction to say that he cannot move it.4
The answer is no. And it's not a paradox. The problem is- as you noted- a linguistic one,
but that doesn't mean it's insurmountable. Look at it in terms of 'Being 1' who can lift
infinitely large/heavy stones and 'Being 2' who can build infinitely large/heavy stones.
We say to Being 2, make a stone this large (where we specify some particular- possibly
infinite- 'weight'), and he makes it. By hypothesis he is always able to do this. To Being
1, we say lift this, where we hand him a stone. By hypothesis he is always able to do it.
Now the problem with the question is the 'description' of the thing we are asking Being 2
to do. We [i]know [i] he is uninhibited by building infinitely large stones. But that is only
what he is uninhibited to do. Whereas when we attach the description 'larger than Being 1
can lift' to the size of stone he is supposed to be able to cook up, when we say he cannot
in fact make one so big that Being 1 cannot lift, we do not thereby mean to take away his
power to make a rock as big as he'd like; that remains. What we are denying him is the
power to do something that inhibits another uninhibited power- and that was not included
in the description of his power to make a rock no matter how big. Of course God is a
being which has both powers of Being 1 and 2. The same reasoning applies. The power
we ascribe to God to make a rock is a power whose description only applies to the size of
the rock he can make (which we allow to be unlimited), not to any other special
metaphysical features that could come a long with it, such as a forced limitation on some
other power. To say it another way, God's lifting an infinitely big rock in no way
impugns his building an infinitely big rock, whereas his building one "large enough"
(where the quotes specify the conditions of the paradox- it is an abuse of language
though) obviously impugns his ability to lift, and that contradicts our hypotheses, so we
have to throw it out. In philosophy it is extremely important to be clear about what
exactly the assumptions are, and the consequences of the assumptions. 5
The "idea of a weight that necessarily cannot be lifted" is not an idea. So there is no
paradox. 6
I find this paradox utterly ridiculous because it ignores the meaning of the word
"omnipotent." If a being is omnipotent (all-powerful) then it is ridiculous to argue that
such a being could somehow create something that it is powerless to manipulate. The
only way for this paradox to make any sense is if the being isn't all-powerful, and then it's
not a paradox at all because it is obvious that beings of limited power will encounter
circumstances that they are not powerful enough to manipulate.7
Harry G. Frankfurt, quoted in Life’s Ultimate Questions by Ronald H. Nash (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1999),
p. 311.
4
Jack Cottrell, The Faith Once For All (Joplin, MO: College Press, 2002), pp. 82 & 99.
5
http://forums.catholic.com/showthread.php?t=583071
6
http://forums.catholic.com/showthread.php?t=583071
7
http://www.sciencechatforum.com/viewtopic.php?f=46&t=7261
3
Professor Christopher Ullman – Christian Life College -- 2
THEOLOGY II


8
But what would such a stone be like? What, for example, would it weigh? If God is
omnipotent, then, presumably, he can create stones of any possible weight. But if he is
omnipotent, then, presumably as well, for any possible weight n, he can lift stones of
weight n. Realizing this has led some philosophers to one of the simplest solutions which
has been offered to the stone paradox. They have just claimed that ‘creating a stone
which even an omnipotent being can’t lift,’ and all its analytical equivalents, is just an
incoherent act-description. And since the phrase ‘the power to create a stone which even
an omnipotent being can’t lift’ does not designate a logically possible power, it does not
follow from the fact that God cannot create such
a stone that God lacks any power
required for omnipotence, or that he lacks in any other respect. This solution maintains
that the proper answer to our original question is no, but that does not cause any problems
for the ascription of omnipotence to God. – Thomas V. Morris8
Visit http://rationalwiki.org/wiki/Omnipotence_paradox for interesting approaches to this
paradox.
Our Idea of God: An Introduction to Philosophical Theology. InterVarsity Press, 1991, page 74.
Professor Christopher Ullman – Christian Life College -- 3