Omnipotence, etc
Philosophy of Religion 2008
Lecture 1
Today
 Course Admin
 Intro to first topic: coherence of theism/attributes
of God
 One attribute: omnipotence. How to understand
this?
 A problem for omnipotence: paradox of the stone
 Further reading, questions
1: Course outline
2: First topic – divine attributes
Unique
 Incorporeal
 Unchanging
 Eternal
 Good
 Benevolent/loving

Omnipotent
 Omnisicient
 Wise
 Just
 Free
 A person (controversial!)

Is theism coherent?
 Could there be such a being?
 A being possessing ANY of these attributes?
 A being possessing ALL these attributes?
Which attributes are essential?
‘Suppose God knows the answer to any question that
can be asked except this: what colour shoes did Martha
Washington wear on the day of her wedding to George?
Suppose God has somehow forgotten this fact and has
forgotten how to deduce it from other facts he knows …
I believe that God … does know the answer to this
question. But I am not prepared to grant that if he didn’t
know it he would no longer be divine’
(Steven Davis, from Davies, Introduction p14)
3: Omnipotence
a)
Omnipotence means being able to do anything

‘The mathematical truths which you call eternal have
been laid down by God, and depend on him entirely
no less than the rest of his creatures … even those
truths which are called eternal—as that ‘the whole is
greater than its part’—would not be truths if God had
not so established.’

(Descartes, Letter to Mersennes in Davies p183)
Logical impossibilities?


Aquinas:
God’s power, considered in itself, extends to all such objects as
do not imply a contradiction … and as regards things that imply a
contradiction, they are impossible to God as being impossible in
themselves. Consequently, God’s power extends to things that
are possible in themselves, and such are the things that do not
involve a contradiction’
(De Potentia, in Davies p184)
Swinburne:
A logically impossible action is not an action. It is what is
described by a form of words which purport to describe an
action, but do not describe anything which it is coherent to
suppose could be done
(Coherence of Theism p149)
A revised definition
b) Omnipotence means being able to do
anything that it is logically possible to do
 But can God do things that go against his other
attributes?
 Things that require a body?
 Can God do wrong?
Can God do wrong?
 Aquinas:
To be able to sin is to be able to fail in doing,
which cannot be reconciled with omnipotence. It
is because God is omnipotent that he cannot sin
(Summa Theologiae, in Davies p188)
 Pike: not necessarily a weakness; but to be God,
God cannot do wrong
Another alternative
c) An omnipotent God is able to do anything that is
logically possible for him
 Mr McEar …
 But if God’s attributes are necessary for him to
be God, he cannot act in ways inconsistent with
them without contradiction …
Backtrack: another problem
b) Omnipotence means being able to do anything
that it is logically possible to do
 Swinburne:
We should hardly regard the fact that an
unmarried spirit could not get divorced as
showing that he was not omnipotent
(Coherence of Theism p150)
States of affairs
d) Omnipotence means being able to bring about any
logically possible state of affairs
e) A person P is omnipotent at a time t if and only if he
is able to bring about any (logically possible) state of
affairs after t
 Swinburne’s final version
f) ‘a person P is omnipotent at a time t if and only if he is
able to bring about any logically contingent state of
affairs after t, the description of which does not entail
that P did not bring it about at t’ (Coherence of Theism p152)
Omnipotence as maximal power?
 Omnipotence doesn’t mean being able to do
anything at all …
 But doing more than any other being …
 There can only be one such omnipotent being
4: Paradox of the stone

Mavrodes:
… can God create a stone too heavy for him to life?
This … poses a dilemma. If we say that God can create
a stone, then it seems there might be such a stone. And
if there might be a stone too heavy for Him to life, then
He is evidently not omnipotent. But if we deny that God
can create such a stone, we seem to have given up his
omnipotence already. Both answers lead us to the same
conclusion. (in MP, p113)
Suggested solutions
 Mavrodes: self-contradictory
 Hoffman and Rosenkrantz: perhaps God’s
omnipotence is contingent
 Savage: Mavrodes begs the question ( but the
paradox is still dissolvable …)
 Swinburne: both Mavrodes and Savage miss the
point (but the paradox is still dissolvable)!
Extra suggested reading
Davies, Introduction Chapter 9
 Hoffman and Rosenkrantz, ‘Omnipotence’ in Blackwell
Companion to Philosophy of Religion
 Brown and Nagasawa (2005) ‘Anything you can do God
can do better’ American Philosophical Quarterly 42
(also at www.philosophy.bham.ac.uk/staff/nagasawa
_Stone.pdf)
 Nelson Pike (1969) 'Omnipotence and God's Ability to
Sin,' American Philosophical Quarterly 6(3)

For the seminar
 Consider:
Must God be omnipotent?
Which is the best definition of omnipotence?
Is it immune from criticism?
Is there a satisfactory solution to the paradox of the
stone?
 But most important, bring your own questions
and ideas!