COMMONWEALTH ASSOCATION FOR EDUCATION,
ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT
ISSN NO 2322-0147
VOLUME 2 ISSUE 4
APRIL 2014
RISE AND FALL OF THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT IN EGYPT:
A CASE STUDY OF MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD
INDEXED WITH PARIS, DAIS.NET, DRJI, WORLDCAT, EBSCO-USA, J-GATE
(EDITOR-IN-CHIEF)
DR MUJIBUL HASAN SIDDIQUI
ASSISTANT PROFESSOR, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY,
ALIGARH-202002,
UTTAR PRADESH,
INDIA
website: www.ocwjournalonline.com
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Research (Multi- subject journal)
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RISE AND FALL OF THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT IN EGYPT: A CASE
STUDY OF MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD
By
Miss. AFSHAN,
Ph.D. Scholar
Deptt. Of West Asian Studies
Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh
Aligarh U.P., India
Email id: scott.tiger.phd@gmail.com
ABSTRACT
This article examines the emergence and growth of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt from
the 1930s to 1950s. It begins by outlining and empirically evaluating possible explanations
for the organization’s growth based on (1). Theories of political adaptation and (2). The
concept of political opportunity structure in social movement theory. The successful
mobilization of the Muslim Brotherhood was possible because of the way in which its Islamic
message was tied to its organizational structure, activities, and strategies and the everyday
lives of the Egyptians. The analysis suggests that ideas are integrated into social movements
in more ways than the concept of framing allows. It also expands our understanding of how
organization can rise in highly repressive environments.
After gaining majority seats in the Egyptian Parliament and winning the Presidency Office,
the Muslim Brotherhood movement emerged as a cutting edge political force in the Egyptian
political system as well as in the Egyptian society in general. In this regard, this paper is an
attempt to shed lights on and to trace the legal, political and religious justifications and
connotations given by the Muslim Brotherhood for their rule in Egypt internally and
externally. After a brief description of the factors and reasons that stood behind the rise of
contemporary Islamism, the article goes a step further to explore the adaptive nature of the
Muslim Brotherhood under the former authoritarian regime. The pragmatism of the Muslim
Brotherhood was further tested during Al- Tahrir Square Revolution and later on their
approval and consent to participate in the national election under the military rule but the
recent sustained attempts of its overthrow, to curtail the Brotherhood’s influence, and
placing it on the path of transition.
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The twentieth century saw the emergence of the most influential Islamic movement in
Egypt; the Muslim Brotherhood. It was founded by Hasan al- Banna, a school teacher in 1928
in Isma- iliyya after the fall of the Ottoman Caliphate with the aim of revitalising Islam with
a political approach and subsequently spread throughout most Muslim countries. In its early
days, the movement combined religious, political engagement and social welfare, established
its image as an internally well-disciplined, economically strong and Islamic revivalist
movement, adopted the strategy to educated lower middle class and working class, and thus
rapidly increased its influence to other important cities in Egypt.
Instead of increasing its influence in the country, Al-Banna’s vision of moral upliftment of
the country was based on faith especially a return to the precocious wisdom of Islam and selfimprovement (internal reform). In his teaching he said;
“We have heard and we have become aware and we have been affected. We know not the
practical way to reach the glory (izza) of Islam and to serve the Welfare of Muslims. We are
weary of this life of humiliation and restrictions. Lo, we see that the Arabs and the Muslims
have no status (Manzilah) and no dignity (Karama). They are not more than mere hirelings
belonging to the foreigners. We possess nothing but this blood...... and these souls........ And
these few coins.... we are unable to perceive of the fatherland watan, the religion, and the
nation Umma as you know it. All that we desire now is to present you with all that we
possess, to be acquitted by God of the responsibility, and for you to be responsible before
Him for us and for what we must do. If a group contracts with God sincerely that it live for
His religion and die in His service, seeking only His satisfaction, then its worthiness will
assure its success however small its numbers or weak its means”1.
Banna, duly moved accepted the burden imposed on him, and together they took on the oath
to God to be troop’s (Jund) for the message of Islam. The name was selected by Banna, We
are brothers in the service of Islam; and hence, we are the “Muslim Brothers”.
1928-70: RISE, VIOLENCE AND DISSOLUTION: In the early years of the Muslim Brotherhood,
its major concern was the enlargement of its membership in and around Isma iliyya and
spreading the movement. As Islamic reform movement about a return to original sources of
the faith, Banna and other members of the group early and primary concern achieved this
goals by direct contact with people in homes, mosques, clubs and other meeting place,
preaching to them the basis of Islamic values and norms through established Islamic state
rejection of Western influence & gained more followers.
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The Muslim Brotherhood also played out its influence in anti-colonial rule; meanwhile on the
political front, delirious joy was giving way to anger and bitterness by the turn of the year.
The abrogation of the treaty of 1936 had not, after all, resolved the national dispute, the
British were still in the Canal Zone and seemed determined to stay there; the Brotherhood
was strictly against this treaty and was planning imminent revolution2. More immediately,
however the order related to the stream of violence which shook Egypt in which the role of
the Muslim Brothers, although not unique, was the most dramatic and from the point of view
of the government, the most potentially dangerous. The violent struggle for primacy between
the Wafd and the Muslim Brothers was itself part of a larger picture of violence. The group
also allegedly involved in the assassination of prime minister Mahmoud al Noqurashi Pasha
in December 1948 as a result the dissolution of the group for a short period and the officially
inspired murder of its leader Hasan al-Banna in February 1949.
Then, the organization enjoyed good relations with free officers. A liaison was established
between the Brotherhood and the movement of the free-officers who, in 1952 seized power in
a coup that benefitted from the mass support provided by the Brotherhood, which caused the
end of colonial rule in Egypt in 19523. The organization was banned again in 1954 due to a
failed attempt to assassination of the President Nasser. Underlying the order dissolving the
Muslim Brotherhood, the violence of the Brothers created an intolerable measure of
sectarianism--- involving Muslims as well as Jewish and Christian minorities --- generated
out the critical imbalance between the recognized tradition and the actual condition of
Muslim society, and the militant quality of the teachings by which the organization hoped to
redress this imbalance, as a result of its political commitment, its place in the movement of
the Islamic modernism lack of clarity. Through, Nasser’s rule, the Brotherhood suffered
severe repression and the hanging of six brothers including Sayyid Qutb in 19664. He was a
prominent member of the Brotherhood, who laid down the ideological grounds for the use of
jihad or armed struggle against the regime in Egypt and beyond. His Milestones, has provided
the intellectual and theological under pinning’s for the founders of numerous radical and
militant Islamist groups, including al-Qaeda. Extremist leaders often channel Qutb, to argue
that governments not ruled by sharia are apostate, and therefore legitimate targets of jihad5.
1970-80: IDEOLOGICAL RECONSTRUCTION & POLITICAL ADAPTATION:For a long period
after its dissolution, the organization remained under ground then emerged with new hopes
and strength, after Nasser with an apparently new importance a fact which derived from a
long, clandestine association of some officer with the organization. This was carried over
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under President Anwar Sadat himself. He had been closely associated with Muslim Brothers
even before the 1952 revolution. Under his regime, the organization Muslim Brotherhood
consolidated its position and its comeback was phenomenal. In his early days Sadat started a
process of de Nasserisation; so he used the organization and other Islamic elements for
erasing Nasser charisma. He announced that ‘Egypt is a state of science and faith and came
down heavily on the left’ and called it inappropriate and irrelevant, to Egyptian and Islamic
conditions6. He promised that he would implement sharia. However, the 1971 constitution
made Islam state religion and the sharia law a source of legislation not the sole source as
some fundamentalist’s desired7.
Sadat released many of Muslim Brothers, including Umar al-Tilmissany, the leader of the
organization and allowed it to operate again (without legal status). Under the leadership of
Tilmissany, the Brotherhood began to rebuild its public and political power and regain its
membership. In the meantime, the Muslim Brothers expanded its support among the major
professional classes. In 1976 the Brothers were allowed to bring out their journal al-Dawah
and monthly al-Itisam8 through which their political opinions were expressed but he quickly
realised that Islamic groups were as dangerous as the left because the organization have
critical attitude towards his policies especially his “open-door policy” (which had produced a
new class of elites) and second his peace treaty with Israel in 1978-799.
However, his decision to crackdown Islamic groups which posed tremendous challenge to his
authority, led to his assassination in 1981. The Muslim Brothers’ confrontation took place
when thousands of its members were arrested despite its ideological reconstruction and
peaceful political and social engagement.
1980-2000: ELECTORAL
STRATEGY:The
ENGAGEMENT
WITH
POLITICAL
PARTIES,
A
CHANGE
IN
relationship between state and the Muslim Brothers did not change under
Mubarak’s regime. However, the group’s main concern was to increase its influence and
achieve legal status in political arena through informal network because the Muslim Brothers
had no legal status which continued in Mubarak rule and lastly to participate in political
election. The third supreme guide of the organization, Al- Tilmissany remembered the
decision to contest the 1984 elections in the following words
“When we were released from the 1981 detention, we were in a state of near recession. We
set to looking for a lawful means to carry out our activities without troubling security or
challenging the laws. Allah saw fit to find us a lawful way in the views of officials. The
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parliamentary session had just ended and thinking began on the new parliamentary elections.
It was the opportunity of a lifetime, had the Ikhwan let it slip from their hands they would
surely have counted among the rank of the neglectful”10.
Owing to no legal status its members ran for parliamentary election by making an alliance
with Wafd Party in 1984 and this alliance won the majority of the opposition seats in People
assembly, although the National Democratic Party (N D P) had a vast majority in the
assembly. The 1984 election, however, proved the Muslim Brothers strong political
engagement, its negotiated electoral alliance in both professional union elections and
parliamentary elections. By 1987, the Muslim Brothers had achieved the same success
forming new coalition with the Liberal and Labour Parties became the leading opposition
won 56 seats (36 seats went to the Muslim Brothers). Driven by the Brotherhood’s success
Mustafa Mashour, the fifth and future general guide described the organization’s electoral
victory in the following words....
“We must benefit from the experience of election for our future, for elections are an art with
its own rules, expertise, and requirements, and we must push those who have given up on
reforming this nation, push them to get rid of their pessimism and register to vote as soon as
possible”11.
However, the parliamentary election of 1984 and 1987 were significant events in the history
of the Muslim Brotherhood and the development of its political ideology. The group’s
participation in the electoral process demonstrated that the organization saw participation in
democratic elections as consistent with their Islamist platform12. Furthermore, the
Brotherhood’s participation in the elections served the purpose of signally a commitment to
work within Egypt’s existing political system to pursue its goals, a platform of implementing
Islamic law, after the election , a group within the organization demanded changes and called
for adaptation more openness and flexibility for political recognition. In the post-election
period, the Muslim Brotherhood’s electoral victory led massive crackdown by, Mubarak’s
government but the group steadily growing its influence as a political opposition sought
recognition as a political party and a continued commitment to work for democracy and
establishing a legal system within the context of sharia.
In February 1989, the group’s spokesperson and later General Guide, Muhammad Ma ’mun
al-Hudaibi (son of Hasan al-Hudaibi) wrote in one of the Brotherhood’s official publications,
Liwa ‘al-Islam: (In Egypt) there is a certain degree of democracy; we (the Brotherhood)
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guard and hold on to it. We work to confirm and develop it until rights are complete. It is
important to confirm the democratic pursuit in practice13. In October of the following year,
Dr. Essam al Erian, one of the Brotherhood’s most outspoken advocates for democracy and
the vice president of the doctor’s syndicate wrote; “The Brothers consider constitutional rule
to be the closet to Islamic rule...... We are the first in Egypt to call for and apply democracy,
and we are devoted to it until death”14.
The organization continued to participate in election and publicly demanded democracy
through most of the 1990s and into the present. The group chose to boycott the 1990
parliamentary elections, along with nearly all opposition parties in Egypt in protest over a
new national law passed by the N D P stating that only individuals, not parties, could
participate in parliamentary elections. Lastly, the Organization participated in elections and
its members were elected to parliament as independent. Following the 1995 elections the
government dealt with the organization with a heavy-hand and the arrest of a number of its
members. The Egyptian Minister of the Interior announced that “the Muslim Brotherhood,
Islamic Jihad and al Jama ‘at al-Islamiyya were all part of same organization”15, regained its
powers and its members independently elected in 2000 parliamentary election; despite legally
banned, the group increased its influence, won 17 seats and the organization began to show
its organizational stresses familiar to other Egyptian political parties.
2000-2010:
INCREASED
ITS
INFLUENCE
IN POLITICAL
ARENA:As
a result of the
organization’s political adaptation, its place in the movement of Islamic modernism lack of
clarity. The group was internally divided within two groups’ old guards and new guards
known as new generation politically pragmatic wing. The reason, of conflict within the group
was that the new generation members demanded more accountability, transparency and
democratic engagement in addition to making the organization a secular political party. Late
Ma ‘mun al- Hudaibi and his successor Mahdi Akef and Mohammad Badie faced such
challenges within the group & discontent rose to the surface in an unprecedentedly public
manner. The memories of the near destruction of the organization bred caution and suspicion
about the political system16. Rejecting the notion that politics ideals with religious
interpretation, the old guard is considerably more conservative in its outlook. It resents the
idea that beliefs can be submerged in order to pursue political interests. There is, therefore, a
tendency to define itself as a social movement that works above and in constant opposition to
the political system, rather than merely as a political party that adjusts its policies to the will
of its membership and for the further transformation of the group of Muslim Brotherhood17.
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Rather than change their attitude the organization supported the government, which
coordinated U S in its invasions on Iraq in March 2003 and organised a thousand strong antiwar rally, argument of preserving national unity in the face of foreign occupation. But the
Egyptian Security Forces detained leading Muslim Brothers from various provinces who had
been involved in anti-war activities18.
After five years, in the 2005 parliamentary election, the Muslim Brotherhood held the largest
opposition seats in parliament as the most dynamic and well organised opposition forces in
country, won 88 seats or 20 percent of the total, a record, as captured over the past fifty years.
The rest of the opposition parties combined won only sixteen seats (3.4 percent); and the
independents captured 6 percent of the seats.
Although still in control of a two third majority in the parliament, the NDP’s performance
was astonishingly poor. However, this remarkable victory of the Muslim Brothers in election
directly challenged authority of the NDP (ruling party) or as the main contender to the NDP.
Unlike the secular opposition, the Muslim Brothers’ remarkable performance was a result of
long years of reasserting their presence at the public level, their direct engagement with the
people, an appealing and pragmatic reform agenda, and willingness to confront the regime
and pay the price for their defiance. The parliamentary elections of 2005 definitely animated
the political scene, but left Egypt’s political reality almost unchanged19. Egypt subsequently
mounted a new crackdown on the group, beginning in late 2006, and in 2007 the nation’s
constitution was amended to religious based political parties20.
In a clear attempt to stop the Muslim Brothers from achieving further victories, the regime
decided to cripple the movement and downsize its presence in the political process. It
postponed the local elections that were scheduled to take place in March 2006 for two
years21. The Muslim Brotherhood had planned to compete in these elections and hoped to
make a strong showing. The regime used a parade that Muslim Brothers students set up on
Al-Azhar university campus in December 2006 as a pretext to launch a major crackdown and
intensive media campaign against the group. Mubarak announced that the Muslim Brothers
represented a threat to national security and would lead Egypt to isolation, ushering in a
brutal suppression of the group; this confrontation seemed to mark a new confrontational
stage in the relationship between the regime and the Muslim Brothers. However in 2008 the
government refused to register the group as a party because the government wanted that the
group could not take part in the election. As a result, the group withdrew from the municipal
elections in a last minute. Despite this confrontation by the regime the Muslim Brotherhood
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steadily extended its political power, and their common political opposition to the existing
state system and its reluctance to fully introduce democratic participation connected the
Brotherhood with movements of the secular left22.
In 2010, at the very beginning of the parliamentary election year conjunction was seen with
the regime’s aim to prepare conditions for a handover from President Hosni Mubarak to a
successor of his choice, with his son Gamal Mubarak as the favourite option. Following this
announcement several secular and liberal opposition parties began to challenge the regime
but the regime stepped up its confrontation with the heavy repression. Similar to what
happened in the 2010 elections, the poll was critical analysis for sequential electoral
infringements, vote rigging, state violence, thuggery that resulted in some deaths and many
casualties ended with heavy losses for the Muslim Brothers because the group secured only
one seat that shows, How the group played, its role in political arena as a democratic figure
and how it fitted into its evolving political landscape.
PRESENT STATUS OF THE
MOVEMENT:
POLITICAL CHALLENGES & DEMOCRACY: Though
the Muslim Brotherhood is now viewed as a more moderate group than other Islamist
organizations operating in the Middle East, such as al-Qaida, Hamas and Hezbollah. It
participated in free elections in countries where it was permitted23. Following the 2011
political crisis in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood emerged as the most influential political
actor in the Egyptian politics. In the initial period of the revolution the Muslim Brotherhood
coordinated with Mohammad El Baradei struggle’s with the protestors against the Mubarak’s
government, hoping to use El-Baradei for their own political interest.
In June 2011, the group for the first time since it was outlawed in 1954 recognized as a
legitimate political party and allowed for participation in coming parliamentary election. Its
Freedom and Justice party won 47 percent of the seats in Majlis al Sha’b and its candidate
Mohammed Morsi won presidential elections in June 2012 for the first time but soon it
involved itself for political power struggle with the judiciary and the military to form a
national unity government, to demonstrate commitment to political liberalization rather than
view alternative voices and political visions as a threat to the political system.
The Islamization of the Egyptian state was not solely the work of the Muslim Brothers but it
is committed to gradual and peaceful Islamization and only with the consensus of Egypt’s
citizens. In those days, many of its leaders left the idea of an Islamic state, which was based
on sharia and expressed commitment to work with other secular and liberal parties. But the
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conflict ensued between the Muslim Brothers and other secular forces over the implications
of sharia in the new drafted constitution. If this constitution were passed, it would be the first
Egyptian constitution that would have adopted a specific religious doctrine for the state,
instituting authoritarianism in the name of religion24.
Following a popular referendum and parliamentary vote, the proposed constitution was
signed into law by President Morsi. The passage of the constitution into law was met with
charges by secular forces that Islamist tinged government intended to exploit loopholes in the
charter in order to move Egypt towards theocracy, while leftist former presidential candidate
Hamdeen Sabbahi accused Morsi and his Islamist allies of “manipulating religious faith to
rally support for the constitution in an effort to increase their own power and to support
capitalist interests”25.
Despite their religious agenda President Morsi arguing that the rise of the Brotherhood to
power in Egypt. The group wanted US support and it would have been largely unthinkable
without US backing. So the Brotherhood showed its intention that they would continue,
relationship with the US and follow all international obligations and treatise including the
peace treaty with Israel which was one of the main manifestations of US-sponsored economic
aid. In another significant triumph for the US strategy in Egypt, the Morsi regime pledged to
continue with the neo-liberal economic policies of Mubarak for the benefit of Egyptian
business elite and Western capital and to the detriment of the vulnerable majority of Egyptian
people.
But it is not hard to image that US’s recent history in the Arab region that America would
support any government which would support US’s interests. This policy mainly depended
upon its orientalist reading of the Arab region. However, Egyptian politics is a conjecture
both disordered and fluid. A weakness of Muslim Brotherhood’s government occurred in
both dimensions political and economic despite its image being secular or progressive. As
recently as June 2013, the Egyptians demanded Morsi’s resignation and formation of a new
government that would fulfil the aspirations of the country. Following on the path of January
2011 uprising for democracy. Social and economic justice caused the departure of Morsi26.
Now, Egypt was under the military rule. In that political atmosphere, the Muslim Brothers
were losing their ideological uniqueness. It was striking for the organization how a majority
of party organisms regardless of ideology modulated their organizational and ideological
features to align with changing environmental cues and incentives.
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CONCLUSION:Founded in 1928, Hasan al Banna’s organization of Muslim Brotherhood a
movement which began by calling for social, moral and religious reform through a return to
orthodox beliefs and piety but which in course of time became a political movement which
troubled the political life of Egypt for a generation until it was suppressed by the military
regime in 1954. It continued after that in secret and emerged briefly as a focus of opposition
to the regime aiming at the seizure of power, the destruction of a social order, and its
replacement by another in which it was possible for the devout Muslims to live without
making compromises with the world.
In these terms the movement emerged as one of the conservative transitions, one which not
only sought to imbue the present with some sense of the past. This ambivalence towards the
definition of the political role of the society and towards the problem of the use of the
existing political channels to influence the situation was, as has been suggested partly
ideological and partly tactical in provenance. Many critics presenting their arguments laid
down the Muslim Brotherhood’s political career involving strange, moral and intellectual
sacrifices27. The participation of the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1984 parliamentary elections
marked a turning point for Egypt’s most popular Islamist movement. Since the mid-1980s the
Brotherhood has consistently professed a general commitment to a democratic system of the
government. When the Brotherhood chose to participate in parliamentary elections the
decision reflected the group’s desire to achieve its political goals by the process of normal
Egyptian politics.
Over the past years, this new and unique political ideology of the Egyptian Muslim
Brotherhood that has emerged, is reflected both in political plate form and in public
statement. Changes in the Brotherhood’s political perspective have been effected by the key
leaders in the younger generation of the movement and this has resulted in its active electoral
participation. Despite increased repression from 2006 to 2008, the Brotherhood continued to
exert significant role in Egyptian politics and its candidate Mohammed Morsi won
presidential election last year and showed good performance in parliamentary election.
Fighting with the loyalists of the previous regime was tough for Morsi, and he faced many
challenges because these elements were not keen to work for the new regime, which they
used to denounce as extremist and violence prone. And this caused Morsi resignation.
However, the domestic political challenges posed a difficult road for the Muslim Brothers
especially with regards to political legitimacy. The country was now under military rule, the
recent sustained attempts of its overthrow, to curtail the Brotherhood’s influence and
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potential for political process, placing the Muslim Brothers on the path to modulate them
organizationally and ideologically with the changing environment.
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NOTES
1. R. Mitchell, “The Society of the Muslim Brothers”, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969) p.
83
2. Brynjar Lia, “The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt: The rise of an Islamic mass movement
1928-42”, Reading: Ithaca Press, (1998) p. 21
3. R. Mitchell, “The Society of the Muslim Brothers” p. 8
4. Sayyid Qutb, “Social Justice in Islam”, (Oneonta, New York: Islamic Publications International,
2000) p. 117. 5. Ibid. pp. 119-121
6. Cited in Mohammad Haikal, Sphinx and commission: The rise and fall of Soviet’s influence in the
Middle East, Land; (1978) p. 236
7. Joseph P.O. Kano “Islam in the new Egyptian constitution”, The Middle East Journal, 26 spring,
(1972) pp. 137-148
8. See the Ikhwan by laws reprinted in Abdalla al-Nafisi, led, al Haraka al-Islamiyya Ru, ya
mustaqbaliyya (The Islamist Movement: A Future Oriented view) Cairo, Maktab Madbuli, (1989) pp.
401-16
9. Israeli Raphael, “The Role of Islam in President Anwar Sadat’s Thought” Jerusalem Journal of
International Relations, vol-4, no-28, (1980), pp 1-12
10. Umar al-Tilmissany, Dhikrayat la mudhakkirat (Memories-Memories) al-Qahira: Dar al Tiba
’awa al-Nashr al-Islamiyya (1985) p. 197
11. cited in Tawfiq Yusuf al-wa’ al-Fikr al-Siyasial al- mu’asir’ inda al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin (The
Muslim Brothers Contemporary Political Thought) Kuwait: Maktabat al-Manar al- Islamiyya, (2001)
p. 165
12. N Ghadbian, Democratization and the Islamist challenge in the Arab World, Boulder: Co
Westview Press, (1997) p. 5
13. S. Abe- Kotob and D. Sullivan, Islam in Contemporary Egypt: Civil Society vs The State, Boulder
Co: Lynne Rienner Publishers, (1999) p. 118
14. Ibid, p. 48
15. Ibid, p. 53
16. I. E. Altman, Democracy, Elections and the Egyptian Islamist Ideology, vol.3 (Hudson Institute,
16 Feb, 2006). Available at http://www.Futureofmuslimworld.Com/research/ pub I D.17/pub-detail.
Asp (accessed Dec. 2008).
17. Kotob & Sullivan, ‘Islam in Contemporary Egypt: Civil Society vs the state’, p. 53
18. Barbara Zollner, ‘The Muslim Brotherhood’, Routledge Handbook of Political Islam edited
Shahram Akbarzadeh, Routledge, US (2012) p. 58
19. Jilted Brothers, Cairo Times, 24-30 (April, 2003), p. 15
20. ‘Reforming Egypt In search of a strategy’, International Crisis Group, Middle East/North Africa
Report 46, (October 2005), p.9
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21. Shehata S. and Stacher J. “The Brotherhood Goes to Parliament”, Middle East Report 240;
(2006) p. 32-40. And also see in A. Hamzawy, “Regression in the Muslim Brotherhood’s plateform”
Arab Reform Bulletin, vol.5, No.8 (Oct. 2007), p. 5
22. Amr Hamzawy, “Amending Democracy out of Egypt’s constitution” Washington Post April 2,
(2007) p. 10
23. Al-Anani, K, “The myth of excluding moderate Islamists in the Arab World”, Working Paper no. 4
Washington D. C. , The Saban Centre for Middle East Policy at the Brooking Institute, (2010), p. 18
24. Ragab Saad, Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies September (2012).
25. Al- Arabiya (Sep-2), http:// English. Al-Arabiya. Net/ articles20120902235739. Html (accessed
Sep-2, 2012)
26. Ibid.
27. R. Mitchell, the Society of Muslim Brothers, p. 83
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