To appear in Ho-Cheong Leung, A. & van der Wurff, W. (eds), The Noun Phrase in English:
Past and Present. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
Complex NPs with third-order entity clauses:
towards a grammatical description and semantic typology
Kristin Davidse1
(KU Leuven – University of Leuven)
This article focuses on complex NP constructions of the form ‘determiner (+ adjective) +
noun (+ complementizer) + clause’, which refer to third-order entities, defined by Lyons
(1977: 443) as “such abstract entities as propositions, which are outside time and space”.
Their functional structure has so far tended to be analysed in terms of one syntagmatic model,
either as an appositive structure defined by the criterion that NP and clause have identical
reference (e.g. Quirk et al. 1985) or as a complementation structure in which the noun is
viewed as licensing the complement clause (e.g. Huddleston & Pullum 2002). I argue that as
unified descriptions neither of these analyses can be maintained. I propose instead that these
NPs divide into two distinct subtypes on the basis of different grammatical behaviour: one in
which the third order entity clause is premodified by the noun and one in which it
complements the head noun. Starting from this basic functional-structural division, I propose a
typology that distinguishes the main semantic classes of nouns patterning with third-order
entity clauses. The typology aims to capture the most important semantic distinctions between
the subtypes of these complex NPs.
1. Introduction
This article is concerned with a type of complex NP construction on whose definition the
literature has reached no consensus yet. In terms of word classes, it has the structure
1
This study was made possible by sabbatical leave grant K8.017.12N, which was awarded to me by FWOFlanders Research Foundation. It was further supported by GOA-project 12/007, “The multiple functional load
of grammatical signs”, awarded by the Research Council of The University of Leuven and grant no. HUM200760706/FILO of the Spanish Ministry of Education and Science and the European Regional Development Fund. I
thank everyone who offered comments and feedback to the first presentation of this material at The Second
International Workshop on the Structure of the Noun Phrase in English, organized by William van der Wurff and
Alex Ho-Cheong-Leung at Newcastle University (15 and 16 September 2011). My particular thanks go to the
two anonymous referees for their very generous and incisive comments which added many extra dimensions to
the original discussion in the first draft. I also thank Lieselotte Brems, Caroline Gentens, Ulrike Verdonck and
An Van linden for discussion of a number of issues. Needless to say, I am the only one responsible for remaining
errors of thought in the final version.
‘determiner (+ adjective) + noun (+ complementizer) + clause’. The following examples
illustrate the great range of semantic relations these NPs can express: the content of speech
and thought acts (1)-(3), degrees of factuality and likelihood of propositions (4)-(5),
emotional and cognitive reactions to propositions (6)-(7), reasons (8), requirements (9),
abilities (10), etc.2
(1)
This is the easiest answer to the question of who is the customer. (WB)
(2)
The suggestion of parting us had fortunately aroused the indignation of Granny
M. (WB)
(3)
It might shake his conviction that the man he had under arrest was guilty.
(WB)
(4)
The European Parliament thus acknowledges the fact that education is an
important factor also for personal development and social integration. (WB)
(5)
The more symptoms you tick, the higher the likelihood that you have the
hormone imbalance represented by that group. (WB)
(6)
… she is also caught between her desire to affirm her Korean identity and her
anger that the South Korean media depicted the Los Angeles uprising as
`savage African Americans attacking innocent Koreans for no reason’. (WB)
(7)
He repeated his denial that he had been involved in the killing of Jews. (WB)
(8)
He couldn’t read for the simple reason that no one ever showed him how. (WB)
(9)
… necessary business expenses, however, are fully deductible, subject only to
the requirement that they be reasonable, … (WB)
(10)
Anna envied Regina her ability to live so absolutely in the present. (WB)
The clauses in these complex NPs refer to what Lyons (1977: 443) calls third-order
entities, “such abstract entities as propositions, which are outside time and space”. Third-order
entities contrast with first-order entities, which are physical objects typically coded by NPs,
and second-order entities, coded by clauses, “which are events, processes, states-of-affairs,
etc. which are located in time and which, in English, are said to occur, or to take place, rather
than exist” (Lyons 1977: 443). The nominalized clauses in the complex NPs in (1)-(10) depict
propositions and predications as abstract entities that are not of the same order of reality as the
situation depicted by the clause in which they figure. For instance, example (4) describes a
2
All examples cited were extracted either from WordbanksOnline (WB), which covers the period from 1995 to
the present, or were found on the Internet with Google.
specific act of acknowledgement (situated in time and space) by the European Parliament of
the abstract proposition that education is an important factor also for personal development
and social integration.
Two different syntactic analyses of these complex NPs have common currency: they are
approached either as appositive NPs, defined by the criterion that NP and clause have
identical reference (Quirk et al. 1985), or as NPs with noun complement clauses, in which the
noun is viewed as licensing the complement clause (Huddleston & Pullum 2002). In Section
2, I will discuss the merits and problems of these two analyses, and argue that as unified
descriptions of the whole range of complex NPs exemplified by (1)-(10) neither can be
maintained. In Section 3, I propose instead that these NPs divide into two distinct subtypes on
the basis of different grammatical behaviour: one in which the third-order entity clause is
premodified by the noun and one in which it complements the head noun. The emphasis in
Sections 2 and 3 is on grammatical analysis, but, as I assume the functional-cognitive view
that a construction’s form codes its meaning (Bolinger 1968, Halliday 1985, 1994,
Wierzbicka 1988, Langacker 1991, McGregor 1997), I will also discuss general semantic
distinctions correlating with formal distinctions.
In Section 4, semantics becomes the main focus. No existing description gives a
comprehensive and coherent semantic typology. The functional-cognitive perspective I take
entails that a semantic typology has to be based on systematic lexicogrammatical distinctions.
Classifications of, for instance, the mere formal clause types that can occur in these NPs are
available in the literature. As noted in for instance Biber et al. (1999), the complement clauses
may be finite, either declarative (3-9) or interrogative (1), or non-finite, either -ing form (2) or
to-infinitive (10). What is needed, however, is a classification of (i) all the nouns that can
precede these specific types of clauses, and (ii) the semantic relations that can obtain between
the noun and the clause. In Section 4, I set out to offer such a typology.
2. Main analyses in the literature
For NPs with third order entity clauses, two different syntactic analyses are commonly
assumed, which are the ones found in the two main reference grammars of English, Quirk et
al. (1985) and Huddleston & Pullum (2002). In this section I discuss both the insights and
limitations of these two analyses. In particular, I argue that the syntactic tests on which they
are based do not apply to all the instances the analyses set out to cover.
2.1 Complex NPs with appositive clauses
The first main analysis is the appositive one by Quirk et al. (1985: 1260-2, 1271-2), according
to which there is a relationship of apposition between NP and postmodifying clause, which
involves identical reference of the two apposites (Quirk et al. 1985: 1301). It is claimed that
apposition is “analogous to a copular relationship” (1301), which entails that the apposed
units in complex NPs such as in (11a)-(13a) can also be linked by copular be (1261), as in
(11b)-(12b). Presumably, if implemented as a test of apposition, the corresponding copular
clause has to be an identifying one in view of the alleged identity of reference between the
apposites. However, it is not shown how this criterial test applies to examples with an
indefinite NP such as (13a), for which no identifying copular clause is available.
(11)
a.
The fact that he wrote a letter to her suggests that he knew her. (Quirk
et al. 1985: 1260)
(12)
a.
The belief that no one is infallible is well-founded. (Quirk et al. 1985:
1260)
(13)
a.
A message that he would be late arrived by special delivery. (Quirk et
al. 1985: 1261)
(11)
b.
The fact is that he write a letter to her.
(12)
b.
The belief is that no one is infallible. (Quirk et al. 1985: 1261)
(13)
b.
*A message was that he would be late.
Quirk et al. (1985: 1260) note that the first apposite “must be a general abstract noun such as
fact, idea, proposition, reply, remark, answer, and the like”. If the noun is a nominalization of
a verb, e.g. belief in (12a), then an alternate with verb and object clause is often available, as
in (12c). In contrast with the alternation with an identifying clause, this alternate is seen as a
characteristic of only a subset of the nouns figuring in NPs with appositive clauses.
(12)
c.
He believes that no one is infallible. (Quirk et al. 1985: 1261)
Quirk et al.’s claim that an ‘equivalence’ relation holds between NP and clause was
criticized by Francis (1993: 148-152). She noted that examples like (14a)-(15a) resist the test
for equivalence, viz. the possibility of forming a corresponding identifying clause.
(14)
a.
He … picked up the receiver with a mild annoyance that his secretary
had let the call through. (WB, quoted in Francis 1993: 151)
(14)
b.
*His mild annoyance was that his secretary had let the call through.
(15)
a.
The denial that unemployment is related to crime … pervades the crime
prevention initiatives discussed here. (WB, quoted in Francis 1993: 153)
(15)
b.
*The denial is that unemployment is related to crime.
Semantically, in (14a) the “that-clause supplies … the cause of the feeling” (Francis 1993:
151), construing a ‘causal’ rather than an appositive relation, while example (15a) involves
still another semantic relation between noun and clause, which any informative description
will have to capture. The type of semantic relation found with one and the same noun may
even be dependent on phraseologies of various degrees of fixedness. For instance, with
reason, “[t]here is the reason itself and there is the event or situation for which the reason is
being given” (Francis 1993: 152), illustrated by (16) and (17) respectively. The second of
these may be realized not only by a (that-)clause, but also by a for + -ing form and a whyclause, while the actual ‘reason’ can be expressed only by a that-clause. The reason itself
often appears in a specific phraseological environment, viz. for the simple / good / very /
obvious, etc.) reason that.
(16)
The reason that/why/zero/ Burton made those films …/ Burton’s reason for
making those films … (cf. Francis 1993: 153)
(17)
…. for the simple reason that it hasn’t worked (Francis 1993: 153)
We can conclude that Quirk et al.’s (1985) account fails to cover the whole range of
NPs with third order entity clauses, as neither indefinite NPs nor NPs with nouns such as
annoyance and denial exhibit the alleged equivalence relation. The question remains whether
the identical reference account can be maintained for a specific subset of these complex NPs.
In what follows we consider this question by investigating the analysis proposed by
Langacker (1991), who is a proponent of an appositive analysis of definite NPs containing
nouns such as fact.
Langacker (1991: 149) argues that the finite clauses in examples such as (18a)-(19) are
nominalized, thus offering explicit support for Quirk et al.’s (1985: 1301) view that apposition
is primarily a relation between two NPs.
(18)
a.
the fact that whales are mammals (Langacker 1991: 149)
(19)
the very idea that she might be unfaithful (Langacker 1991: 149)
His argumentation for the nominalized status of appositive clauses hinges on the point that
they are converted into NPs, because they are both externally and internally reclassified as
NPs. On the one hand, they can fulfil the external functions of NPs in clause structure “as
witnessed by their ability to occur alone as subject or direct object” (Langacker 1991: 148),
illustrated in (18b) and (18c) respectively.
(18)
b.
That whales are mammals is agreed upon among experts.
(www.iva.dk/bh/lifeboat_ko/../concept_in_knowledge_organizatio.htm)
(18)
c.
The Greek philosopher Aristotle, who lived from 384 to 322 B.C., may
not have been the first person to recognize that whales are mammals, but he
was
certainly
the
first
to
record
his
observations.
(www.savethewhales.org/folklore.html)
On the other hand, Langacker (1991: 148-149) argues, they also realize the component
functions of an NP, viz. type specification, instantiation, quantification and grounding (the
last being the marking of the referent’s identifiability status). Appositive clauses do not code
these functions separately, but they realize each function in the way explained in the
following quote:
The proposition conveyed by the nominalized clause can be regarded as a detailed type
specification for the resulting noun. Moreover, since the entire finite clause undergoes
the nominalization, including its grounding of the profiled process, the unique
circumstances of the grounding relationship are incorporated in that proposition; an
inherent aspect ... is thus the location of the reified process with respect to the specific
time and participants of the speech event. The specified type therefore has only a
single instance, with the consequence that the derived noun is inherently definite (i.e.
the noun itself puts the speaker and hearer in mental contact with the profiled
instance.)” (Langacker 1991: 148-149, italics K.D.)
This then leads Langacker to propose that apposition obtains between identical functional
structures, each of which is a nominal and each of which is grounded, i.e. given a reference
point in the ground, or speech event. A complex appositional NP is hence “a doubly
characterised, a doubly grounded thing” (Langacker 1991: 149), both components of which
are definite.
The view that the first segment of a complex appositional NP is a grounded nominal has
been rejected by both Acuña-Fariña (2009: 453) and Van Langendonck (1999, 2007), mainly
with reference to data of close apposition involving a common noun and a proper name such
as (20)-(21)
(20)
the poet Burns (Acuña-Fariña 2009: 461)
(21)
the city of London (Van Langendonck 1999: 114)
Against analyses attributing head status to the common noun and referentiality to the segment
containing the determiner + common noun, they adduce similar and converging arguments3.
Van Langendonck (1999, 2007: 126-131) adduces extensive philosophical,
morphosyntactic and neurolinguistic evidence that the first NP has a classifying function with
regard to the second identifying nominal. He points out that it is the proper name which
identifies the actual referent. The common noun merely has a categorizing function, which
when it occurs as a predicate nominal in a copular clause, e.g. Burns is a poet, is generally
accepted to be non-referential (Kuno 1970). It is for this reason that he, like Burton-Roberts
(1975), views the common noun in close apposition as non-referential, and as a premodifier of
the proper name head.
Acuña-Fariña (2009: 462) observes that it is the proper name that imposes restrictions
on the whole construction, which is generally taken as an indication of head status. For
instance, modification of the common noun tends to be restricted, but if it is modified, this has
to be pragmatically compatible with the proper name, e.g. the great painter Picasso, as
against ?the short painter Picasso (Acuña-Fariña 2009: 465). In a similar vein, Van
Langendonck (1999) points out that it is the proper name in terms of which the base level
categorization designated by the common noun is chosen: it makes the categorial
presuppositions of the proper name explicit. This supports a premodifier-head analysis.
Van Langendonck (1999: 118) explicitly states that this argumentation can be extended to
NPs containing a clausal apposite, such as (22).
3
While Acuña-Fariña (1996) came down on the side of a premodifier-head analysis of close apposition, AcuñaFariña (2009) advocates the position that the structure is vague between a head-postmodifier and a premodifierhead reading.
(22)
the question: What does it mean to live in modern society. (Van Langendonck
1999: 118)
Semantically, the first NP can be viewed as categorizing the status of the referent of the
following clause. The second nominal, the clause, can be ascribed an identifying function.
These clauses “show individual reference and can function on their own syntactically” (Van
Langendonck 1999: 118). In other words, he follows Langacker (1991: 148-9) in attributing
definite singular reference to the appositive clause, but he disagrees on the point that the first
nominal segment is referential.
From this section, I take the following two points with me in the rest of the discussion.
Firstly, it is the ‘categorizing’, rather than the ‘identical reference’, view of apposition that
may shed light on complex NPs with third order entity clauses. Secondly, even this
categorizing view of apposition does not cover all the instances, as the nouns in examples
such as (14a) above, his mild annoyance that his secretary had let the call through, do not
indicate what kind of third order entity status the following clause has.
2.2 Complex NPs with noun complement clauses
The second general syntactic denominator under which the complex NPs studied in this article
are brought in the literature is that of noun complement clauses, with the noun being viewed
as licensing the complement clause. This is the approach found in, amongst others, Biber et al.
(1999) and Huddleston & Pullum (2002). I will focus on the latter description because it is
more elaborate.
The notion of complementation central to their approach is discussed most explicitly
in Chapter 11, “Content clauses and reported speech” (Huddleston & Pullum 2002: 9471030), where the sections dealing with content clauses functioning as subject or object in
clause structure precede the section on content clauses complementing nouns. This reflects the
generalization they make: content clauses in NPs complement nouns in the same way that
content clauses in subject or object position complement verbs. They argue this point
explicitly with regard to examples (23) and (24), by relating the notion of a clause
‘complementing’ a verb or a noun to that of the verb or the noun ‘licensing’ a clause (10161017). If the verb, feared, in (23), and noun, fear, in (24), are replaced by a verb, used, in
(25), and noun, injury, in (26), not licensing content clauses, we get inadmissible results.
(23)
He [feared that he might lose his job]. (Huddleston & Pullum 2002: 1016)
(24)
He told me of his [fear that he might lose his job]. (Huddleston & Pullum 2002:
1016)
(25)
He [used that he might lose his job]. (Huddleston & Pullum 2002: 1017)
(26)
He told me of his [injury that he might lose his job]. (Huddleston & Pullum
2002: 1017)
(27)
His fear was that he might lose his job. (Huddleston & Pullum 2002: 1017)
They then consider the “traditional” appositive analysis for examples like (24), taking the
tests of (i) a corresponding specifying be clause and (ii) the possible omission of the first noun
as criteria. They find that (i) is possible in some cases, e.g. (27) corresponding to (24), but
impossible in other cases, such as (28b) corresponding to (28a), and that (ii) is very often
impossible, as shown by the impossibility of (29b) as alternate of (29a). On these grounds,
they completely reject the apposition analysis in favour of a wholesale complementation
analysis.
(28)
a.
Their insistence that the meetings should be held at lunch-time angered
the staff. (Huddleston & Pullum 2002: 1017)
(28)
b.
*Their insistence was that the meetings should be held at lunch-time.
(Huddleston & Pullum 2002: 1017)
(29)
a.
His fear that he might lose his job was increasing. (Huddleston &
Pullum 2002: 1017)
(29)
b.
*That he might lose his job was increasing. (Huddleston & Pullum
2002: 1017)
Having shown the analogy between the complements of verbs and of deverbal nouns, they
extend it to complements of adjectives and of deadjectival nouns. With adjectives such as
aware, ‘X is aware that proposition p’ is proportional with ‘X’s awareness that proposition
p’. Similarly with adjectives like likely, ‘proposition p is likely’ is said to be proportional with
“the likelihood that proposition p’. A similar possibility of derivation is posited for nouns that
are not morphologically related to either verbal or adjectival predicates such as ‘the chance
that proposition p’ (Huddleston & Pullum 2002: 965) (see nouns listed under (I)).
Huddleston & Pullum apply the proposed complementation analysis to a wide range of
nouns, which are listed under various headings, both formal and semantic. In Chapter 11, on
finite complement clauses, there are two sections on nouns licensing the formal types of
declaratives, listed under (II), and interrogatives, listed under (III).
(I) nouns licensing declaratives:
(i) deverbal nouns like admission, assumption, belief, discovery, proposal, worry;
(ii) deadjectival nouns like likelihood, certainty, sorrow, willingness;
(iii) nouns not derived according to a regular morphological scheme like chance, danger,
principle, evidence, fact, sign, etc. (Huddleston & Pullum 2002: 965):
(II) nouns licensing interrogatives:
question, decision, test, debate, discussion, etc. (Huddleston & Pullum 2002: 980)
There are two more sections on the specific semantic types of mandative and factive clauses.
Mandative clause complements express situations ‘to be brought about’ and invoke
‘compliance’ rather than ‘truth’ as the crucial issue (995-996); they are licensed mainly by
nouns derivative of verbs such as those listed under (III).
(III) nouns licensing mandatives:
advice, intention, stipulation, requirement, desire, arrangement, decision, ruling, etc. (999).
Factive complements, whose paradigm noun is fact, are defined as a subset of declarative
content clauses, viz. those whose content is presupposed (1004-8).
In Chapter 14, “Non-finite and verbless clauses”, nouns licensing to-infinitive
complements are listed (see (IV) below) in terms of the same classes (1259) as finite
declarative noun complements (965).
(IV) nouns licensing to-infinitive complements:
(i) deverbal nouns: advice, attempt, consent, failure, need, plan, proposal, request, threat,
wish, hope, desire, tendency, will, etc.
(ii) deadjectival nouns: ability, impatience, eligibility, readiness, willingness, etc.
(iii) nouns not derived according to a regular morphological scheme: chance, concern,
opportunity, power, strength, etc.
In conclusion, Huddleston & Pullum (2002) convincingly argue a complementation
analysis for NPs with deverbal nouns such as fear and deadjectival nouns such as awareness.
They completely reject the appositive analysis which ascribes identical reference to the two
parts of the complex NP. However, as argued by Van Langendonck (1999), the appositive
analysis can also be given a categorizing interpretation, and its explanatory power on this
definition is not considered. While they suggest how many different types of nouns can
appear in these complex NPs clauses, no semantic typology can be gleaned from the mainly
formally-based inventories. No systematic relations are indicated, for instance, between
factive and (by implication) non-factive complements and the lists of nouns associated with
declarative clause complements.
3. Basic outline of a grammatical description
In this section I will argue that NPs with third-order entity clauses have to be approached in
terms of two basic subtypes, one defined by a complementation relation and the other by a
modification relation, with these two types of dependency relation understood in the sense of
Langacker (1987, 1991). As I assume the functional-cognitive view that a construction’s form
codes its meaning (Langacker 1999, McGregor 1997), abstract semantic distinctions
correlating with formal distinctions will also be invoked.
3.1 Complex NPs with a complementation relation between noun and clause
The notion of complementation that I propose holds between noun and clause in the first type
of complex NP is the semantico-grammatical relation defined by Langacker (1987, 1991) as a
dependency relation with a head whose valence and meaning enable it to bind a complement.
The head of a complementation relation is ‘conceptually dependent’, i.e. semantically
incomplete; it is semantically completed by the complement that enters into a valence relation
with it (Langacker 1987: 277f). A typical example of a complement-taking head is formed by
verbs taking complement clauses, e.g. believe.
(30)
a … majority of U.S. adults now believes that there is a civil war in Iraq.
(Google, www.democraticunderground.com)
In the semantic structure of the predicate believe schematic reference is made to ‘something
believed in’ (Langacker 1987: 304). In Langacker’s (1987: 277–278) view, grammatical
constructions involve the integration of component structures into a composite structure, and
this integration feeds on correspondences between substructures in the component structures.
In the composite structure of (30) the schematic proposition ‘believed in’ present in the
semantic structure of believe is elaborated by the concrete proposition that there is a civil war
in Iraq. In a composite construction, it is always the head that designates the same kind of
thing or event as the whole construction (Langacker 1987: 288–289, Van Langendonck 1994:
247). In (30) believes determines the “semantic profile” (Langacker 1987: 288–289) of the
whole sentence: it represents an act of belief, not the state of affairs there is a civil war in
Iraq, which merely specifies what is believed.
In an example like (31a), the same semantic relation of complementation obtains
between the noun belief and the clause following it. As a deverbal noun, belief has valence
and makes schematic reference to something believed in, which is elaborated by the
proposition that there was a God who had made all things to a certain design. The verbal
meaning of the noun licenses the occurrence of the clause. The head determines the semantic
profile of the whole complex NP, which refers to a belief (with the sentence containing that
NP making the point that modern science required the belief in a God-given order of things).
(31)
a.
Modern science could only have come from the belief that there was a
God who had made all things to a certain design. (BNC, B2G, 585, quoted in
Butler 2003: 252)
This is why I propose that the type of dependency relation obtaining between the noun and the
clause is of the complementation type.
In this type of complex NP, the noun refers to or implies a process. According to
Langacker (1987: 277f), an essential semantic dimension of a process is its valence, i.e. the
direct integration of the participants with the process. In complex NPs of this type, the
complement clause relates to the process described by the noun as it would to the
corresponding predicate. To nouns describing speech acts that create locutions, they relate as
an ‘effected’ complement. For instance, in (32a) that life is about personal achievement is the
complement resulting from Ella’s ‘stating’ act. To nouns describing thought processes, the
clause similarly relates as an ‘effected’ complement, as in (33a), where that he might really
have disappeared out of my mind is a third-order entity created in the thought process referred
to by the thought. If the noun refers to an emotion, like annoyance in (34a), the clause has a
different semantic role to this process: it is not created by the emotion, but it is the stimulus
causing the emotion (Francis 1993: 151), and for this reason it is pre-existent to the emotion.
In example (31a) above, the relation of that there was a God who had made all things to a
certain design to the belief is different still. The proposition here is not created by the act of
‘believing’ and is pre-existent to it. ‘Believing’ this pre-existent proposition is a cognitive
manipulation of it (Langacker 1991: 35), with the proposition functioning as the patient or
affected of the process. In short, with the NPs in which the clause is licensed by the verbal
semantics of the noun, the semantic interpretation is based on the participant role which the
complement has in relation to the corresponding verb.
(32) a.
Ella's statement that life is about personal achievement is just what an
introvert would say. (WB)
(33) a.
In the end I put the thought that he might really have disappeared out of
my mind. (WB)
(34) a.
Mr Greene seemed inclined to talk about the heat, the long drive, and his
annoyance that he could not play golf. (WB)
Syntactically, the clauses functioning as complement of the noun are integrated with
the deverbal noun in the same subordinate clausal form as they would be integrated in with
the corresponding verb: a that-declarative in (31a)-(34a), a to-infinitive in (35a), a polar ifinterrogative with the ‘indirect’, non-inverted subject + finite verb order (Halliday 1994: 263)
in (36a), and a wh-interrogative in (37a).
(35)
a.
The document below is the order to attack Japanese cities with atomic
bombs. (WB)
(36)
a.
It is as if the scientists a rival order of religion are, cursed as are the
churches by that same uncertainty, the doubt if they have got it right. (J. Quinn,
2008. The Makers Handbook. The Case for Intelligent Design. Lulu.)
(37)
a.
To this suit John Alexander filed his answer stating the death of Dade
Massey leaving a son by Parthenia, her subsequent marriage with Townshend
Dade, and the doubt who was entitled to the land, as the reasons for its not
having been previously conveyed.
(http://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/12/462/)
The point that there is a - semantically motivated - complementation relation between the
deverbal noun and the complement clause correlates with lexicogrammatical behaviour that
distinguishes this type from the second type that I will discuss in Section 3.2. In what follows
I discuss four such forms of behaviour, two alternates that are systematically possible and two
alternates that are not systematically possible: (i) systematic alternation with a sentence in
which the complement clause relates to a verb corresponding to the noun, (ii) presence of a
speaker or cognizant who can be made overt, (iii) non-systematic availability of a copular
alternate, (iv) impossibility of omitting the noun.
(i) Systematic alternation with a sentence in which the complement clause relates to a verb
corresponding to the noun
Because this complex NP type is defined by a complementation relation in the Langackerian
(1987) sense between the deverbal noun and the clause, it systematically alternates with a
sentence containing a corresponding verb and its complement clause. Below the sentential
alternates of the NP examples just discussed are given. This alternation can be used as a
recognition test of the complementation type of NPs with third-order entity clauses. As we
will see in Section 3.2, this alternation is not systematically available for the second type.
(31)
b.
People believed that there was a God who had made all things to a
certain design.
(32)
b. Ella stated that life is about personal achievement is just what an introvert
would say.
(33)
b. I thought that he might really have disappeared.
(34)
b.
Mr Greene was annoyed that he could not play golf.
(35)
b.
They ordered to attack Japanese cities with atomic bombs.
(36)
b.
The scientists doubt if they have got it right.
(37)
b.
They were in doubt who was entitled to the land.
(ii) Presence of a speaker or cognizant who can be made overt
The fact that the head noun refers to, or implies, a verbal or cognitive process entails that
there is inherently a cognitive agent associated with it: the conscious participant who creates
the proposition or who verbally or mentally interacts with a prior proposition. This speaker or
cognizant may be overtly expressed by a genitive (38) or periphrastic modifier (39), or a
possessive determiner (40) modifying the deverbal noun. Importantly, the speaker/cognizant
can be the represented, or ‘internal’, speaker/cognizant, associated with a process of
consciousness being described by the actual speaker, like President Bush, in (38), or the
radical Teheran newspaper (Abrar) in (39), or it may be the actual, or ‘external’, speaker, as
in my proof in (40).
(38) President Bush’s proposal that nuclear weapons should be used only as a last resort
has been accepted. (WB)
(39) The Iranian news agency (IRNA) quoted radical Teheran newspaper (Abrar) as
dismissing the offer, saying that the order by the late Ayatollah Khomeini to
Muslims to kill Mr Rushdie is irrevocable. (WB)
(40) It is the demonstration of these truths and laws played out before my eyes. It is my
proof that what is spiritual truth and universal law courses through all of reality.
(WB)
The inherent presence of a speaker/cognizant entails that s/he can systematically be made
overt by genitival, possessive or periphrastic modifiers of the head noun, as illustrated by
alternates (34c)-(36c) of (34a)-(36a).
(34)
c.
Mr Greene’s annoyance that he could not play golf.
(35)
c.
The order by the generals to attack Japanese cities with atomic bombs
(36)
c.
Their doubt who was entitled to the land.
This alternation is not associated with the second type of NP with third order entity clauses, as
we shall see in Section 3.2. Therefore, if a speaker or cognizant is coded, or can be coded,
then it is an indication that the noun describes or implies a verbal or mental process. This
process licenses the occurrence of the clause which completes the verbal meaning of the head
noun.
(iii) Non-systematic availability of a copular alternate
A second kind of distinctive grammatical behaviour is of a negative type. With these complex
NPs, a copular alternate is not always possible. It is, for instance, not possible with example
(15) above, reproduced here as (41a), as pointed out by Francis (1993: 151-153), and with
(34a), as shown by (34d). On the other hand, it is possible with (35a) and (36a), as shown by
(35d) and (36d).
(41)
The denial that unemployment is related to crime … pervades the crime
a.
prevention initiatives discussed here. (WB, quoted in Francis 1993: 153)
(41)
b.
(34)
a.
*The denial is that unemployment is related to crime.
Mr Greene seemed inclined to talk about … his annoyance that he could
not play golf. (WB)
(34)
d.
*Mr Greene’s annoyance was that he could not play golf.
(35)
a.
The document below is the order to attack Japanese cities with atomic
bombs. (WB)
(35)
d.
The order was to attack Japanese cities with atomic bombs.
(36)
a.
It is as if the scientists a rival order of religion are, cursed as are the
churches by that same uncertainty, the doubt if they have got it right.
(36)
d.
The scientists’ doubt if they have got it right.
Seeing that the nouns convey verbal or mental acts, we can formulate some conditions that
have to be fulfilled for a copular alternate to be possible. Firstly, the meaning of the deverbal
noun has to be resultative. Secondly, the third order entity needs to be an ‘effected’, the result
of the verbal or mental act depicted by the noun. If deverbal noun and third order entity are
semantically co-oriented to a resultative meaning, then they can be linked to each other in a
copular clause. These conditions are fulfilled in (35) and (36). In (35) order refers to the result
of a verbal act, and to attack Japanese cities with atomic bombs is the content created by that
verbal act. In (36), the cognitive action noun doubt likewise has a resultative meaning and can
therefore be linked by be to the content resulting from that cognitive act.
By contrast, if the first condition is not fulfilled, i.e. if the meaning of the deverbal
noun is not resultative, then no copular alternate is possible. This is illustrated by (42), in
which doubting is an agent-oriented nominalization.
(42)
a.
“The sun offers to our globe, in eight minutes, as much energy as the
annual consumption of fossil and atomic energy is. That means the doubting if
there would be enough renewable energy for the replacement of nuclear and
fossil
energies
is
ridiculous.
There
is
(http://www.socialwatch.org/book/export/html/15820)
by
far
enough.”
(42)
b.
*The doubting is if there would be enough renewable energy for the
replacement of nuclear and fossil energies.
The second condition, i.e. the third-order entity is not an ‘effected’ of the process depicted by
the noun, is illustrated by examples (34) and (41) above. In this case, the proposition is
already around in some way prior to the verbal or mental act described by the noun – it is not
created by that act but verbally or mentally interacted with by it. In (34), the third-order entity
is the stimulus bringing about the emotion of annoyance. Mr Green has to be aware of the
proposition that he could not play golf before he can have the emotional reaction of
annoyance to it. In (41), the negative meaning of denial entails that this verbal act did not
create the proposition that unemployment is related to crime but formulates a stance to it. The
denial is a cognitive manipulation of this pre-existent proposition.
In sum, only if the proposition is an ‘effected’ of the verbal or cognitive act, and if the
deverbal noun has resultative meaning, is a copular alternate possible.
(iv) Impossibility of omitting the deverbal noun
A fourth kind of distinctive grammatical behaviour is also of a negative type. It is not possible
to omit the head noun because this changes the meaning and/or results in an ungrammatical
form. (32c) is not ungrammatical, but the meaning is changed in comparison with the original
(32a) because the attribution of the proposition to Ella is lost. (35e) is ungrammatical because
the infinitive bereft of its head order does not convey a mandative meaning and cannot be
used on its own in this context.
(32) a.
Ella’s statement that life is about personal achievement is just what an
introvert would say. (WB)
(32) c.
≠That life is about personal achievement is just what an introvert would
say.
(35) a.
The document below is the order to attack Japanese cities with atomic
bombs. (WB)
(35) e.
*The document below is to attack Japanese cities with atomic bombs.
The reason, I would suggest, why in the complementation subtype, the noun cannot be
omitted is because it designates meanings that are not inherent in the proposition itself. The
deverbal noun refers to the speech or thought act the proposition originates in or interacts
with, and invokes a speaker or cognizant. NPs with complement clauses inherently need the
noun designating the verbal or mental process. The deverbal noun is the head and, as such,
determines the semantic profile of the whole NP. This type of complex NP cannot be replaced
by the complement clause on its own.
3.2 Complex NPs with a modification relation between noun and clause
The second type of complex NP with third-order entity clause is internally defined, I will
argue, by a modification relation between noun and clause, with the dependency relation of
modification understood as in Langacker (1987: 235-6, 309-10). Whereas in complementation
the head is conceptually dependent, in modification the modifier is conceptually dependent
and the head is conceptually independent. The semantic profile of the whole construction is
determined by the autonomous head. A typical example of a modifier-head relation is formed
by a preposition phrase specifying the spatial setting of an action, as in (43).
(43)
We chased squirrels in the park. (Langacker 1987: 308)
In the park in (43) is a modifier of the clause nucleus We chased squirrels. It specifies the
spatial setting of the instance of ‘chasing’ depicted by the clause nucleus. That is, “the process
together with the participants engaged in it (i.e. roughly the nuclear predication of Dik’s
(1989: 56) functional grammar)” (McGregor 1992 1997) forms the head which determines the
semantic profile of the clause. This head is conceptually complete. In the park is not
necessary to ‘complete’ the energetic interaction of chasing conducted by us and the squirrels:
it does not go into the formation of a ‘whole’ the way complements are needed to form a
whole together with the conceptually dependent head. Rather, it is the prepositional phrase
expressing the spatial setting, which with its inherently relational meaning, is a conceptually
dependent modifier.
I will argue that this semantico-grammatical model applies to the subtype of NPs with
third order entity clauses that is known in the literature as fact clauses. Fact clauses are
generally accepted to manifest the alternation illustrated in (44)-(45): They can either occur
on their own as the object (44b) or subject (45b) of a sentence, or they can be prefaced by NP
the fact, as in (44a) and (45a) (Kiparsky & Kiparsky 1971, Halliday & Hasan 1976, Halliday
1994).
(44)
a.
John regrets the fact that it is raining (Kiparsky & Kiparsky 1971: 345)
(44)
b.
John regrets that it is raining (Kiparsky & Kiparsky 1971: 345)
(45)
a.
The fact that Caesar was dead was obvious to all. (Halliday 1994: 265)
(45)
b.
That Caesar was dead was obvious to all. (Halliday 1994: 264)
It is in view of this crucial characteristic of fact clauses that I propose that their complex NPvariant illustrated in (44a) and (45a) forms a dependency structure of the modification type as
defined by Langacker (1987). More precisely, the fact clause forms the conceptually
autonomous head and the fact noun its premodifier4. That is, I argue that the premodifier –
head analysis advocated by Acuña-Fariña (1996) and Van Langendonck (1999) for close
apposition involving two nouns also applies to complex NPs with a fact noun and a clause, as
in (44a) and (45a). The modification analysis that I propose is thus opposed to that of Quirk et
al. (1985: 1260) and Halliday (1994: 266), who view the clause in this type of NP as the
postmodifier.
The reason why I propose to view the clause as the conceptually independent head is
precisely because it can occur on its own. In this respect it contrasts with the clause in
complex NPs with a deverbal noun, where omission of the noun either leads to an
ungrammatical form or to a substantial change of meaning as illustrated by respectively (35e)
and (32c) above. As we saw above, in the complementation subtype, the head noun describes
a verbal or mental process which is conceptually dependent on the specific complement
clause that turns the whole NP into a description of an act of speaking, thinking or feeling. A
fact clause, irrespective of whether it is preceded by the fact or not simply represents a
proposition. Just as in close appositions such as the poet Burns and the city of London, the
noun fact gives a base-level categorization of the proposition: it designates the specific thirdorder entity status of the following clause. The categorization is conceptually dependent on
the head: for instance, London has to be categorized as a city – it cannot be categorized as a
country. In this respect, the categorization can be viewed as the more dependent, ‘relational’,
element of the composite structure.
Kiparsky & Kiparsky (1971) and Halliday (1994, Halliday & Hasan 1976) take
basically the same grammatical behaviour to be criterial of fact clauses and their complex NP
variants. They propose, however, a different semantic delineation of the category. The
4
I thank Willy Van Langendonck and Ulrike Verdonck for helpful discussion of this analysis, as well as one of
the anonymous referees, who also pointed out arguments for this position.
Kiparskys, as is well-known, define the class in terms of its truth presupposition. In uttering
the clauses in (44b) and (45b), the speaker is said to presuppose the truth of the fact clause.
This semantic understanding has remained the predominant one ever since the appearance of
the Kiparskys’ article “Fact”. Yet, Delacruz (1976:195) took issue with the position that the
speaker is always committed to the truth of the fact clause. He argued that a sentence like (46)
(46)
Bill regrets that John resigned.
can also be uttered in the sense of ‘believing that John had resigned, Bill regretted that John
had resigned’. On this reading, the speaker is not committed to the truth of the proposition
’John resigned’. It is not hard to find real, contextualized examples in which the speaker is not
necessarily convinced of the truth of the fact clause, as illustrated by (47), in which that things
have not changed since his childhood is a fact to the represented speaker, Evans, but not
necessarily to the actual speaker. It is possible that the actual speaker has a less negative or
more neutral view of Haiti than the inhabitant whose views and feelings he is portraying.
(47)
a.
There is no official state of siege but we have a de facto situation where
democracy does not function Evans declares. What the 37 year-old finds most
soul destroying about Haiti is the fact that things have not changed since his
childhood. Under the Duvalier regime I lost my father Alexandre at the age of
two Evans says with surprising calm. (WB)
Delacruz’s point strikes at the heart of the Kiparskys’ understanding of factivity. Yet, the
mainstream continued to work with the Kiparskys’ definition of factive clauses as being
presupposed true by the actual speaker.
A second dimension on which the Kiparskys’ semantic definition of fact clauses
needs, I argue, to be broadened and redefined is that they always presuppose truth, i.e. a 100%
certainty that the proposition is the case. In fact, complex NPs with fact may contain
modalized conjectures which are by no means a ‘fact’, as in (48a), where will expresses a high
likelihood only, so that the commitment at stake is lower than a 100% certainty. (48a) is also
an example of a fact clause to which the actual speaker is not necessarily committed. The
choice of the noun fact in (48a) is probably meant to convey that the U.S. wishes this
conjecture to be true. The writer might just as well have used the noun likelihood here, as in
(49a). Importantly, just as with the examples with the noun fact, the complex NP with the
noun likelihood (49a) alternates with a bare nominalized clause, that it would be the most
difficult feat to accomplish, in (49b).
(48)
a.
But, this is risky. The U.S. is banking on the fact that the Serbs will
understand it won't serve their purposes to attack humanitarian airdrops.
(WB)
(49)
a.
Obviously the last phase -- the reaching of Allied lines -- was a
different operation which could only be planned when nearer in time and
space. Neither of them disputed the likelihood that it would be the most difficult
feat to accomplish. (WB)
(49)
b.
Neither of them disputed that it would be the most difficult feat to
accomplish.
The point that with fact clauses the commitment is not always to their absolute truth, but may
also be to a degree of epistemic modality has always been part of Halliday’s (1994, Halliday
& Hasan 1976) approach to fact clauses. In addition, he also includes deontic propositions in
the category, as in (50). They manifest the alternation of complex appositive NP (50a) and
bare clausal realization (50b-d). The latter displays the full range of syntactic behaviour of
subjects or objects (Vandelanotte & Davidse 2009)5: it can occur in the unmarked object
position (50b), as fronted object (50c), and as subject of the passive (50d). Example (51a)
shows that the noun fact is also used with propositions describing such third-order entities as
necessities and obligations.
(50)
a.
He resented the rule that they had to wait in line. (Halliday 1994: 268)
(50)
b.
He resented that they had to wait in line. (Halliday 1994: 268)
(50)
c.
That they had to wait in line he resented.
(50)
d.
That they had to wait in line was resented by him.
(51)
a.
I had a roommate in college who resented the fact that he had to take a
foreign language course as part of his requirements to fulfill his undergraduate
degree.
(http://www.ep.soe.vt.edu/ms/pdf/StrategiesToImplementTheMUSICmodel.pdf)
5
In contrast with the complements of represented speech and thought, which do not (Vandelanotte & Davidse
2009).
Thus, irrespective of whether the clause is an indicative or an epistemically or deontically
modalized proposition, the complex NPs show the same syntactic alternations and they have
the same abstract ‘presupposed’ semantics – either to the truth, or to a degree of likelihood or
obligation.
It has been stressed in the functional-cognitive tradition that “factive” complements
“enter as constituents into the structure of other clauses” (Halliday 1985: 249), taking on the
semantics of the process-participant relations being expressed in the clause that contains them.
“A fact thus functions as a participant, with certain roles in certain process types” (Halliday
1985: 249). The “proposition [expressed by the factive complement clause] is taken as one
participant in a higher-order relationship (e.g. a relationship of belief, denial, evaluation,
etc.)” (Langacker 1991: 35). As true subjects they ‘affect’ the experiencer (e.g. That he could
not play golf annoyed Mr Green), and as true objects, they have the semantic properties of
that function, viz. that of ‘being affected’ by the process denoted by the verb, e.g. being
cognitively accepted or rejected (e.g. accept, deny), and being emotionally reacted to (e.g.
regret, like, love, hate).
With regard to the factive complements’ own status, their ability to function as true
subjects or objects of verbs shows that they have undergone conceptual reification (Langacker
1991: 34, 148). Factive complements are nominalized clauses. They are reclassified externally
as NPs realizing clausal functions that require nominals. They are also reclassified internally
as NPs in that they discharge the basic functions of a nominal: they designate fully
characterized third-order entities and they are uniquely identified in relation to the speech
context, or ground (Langacker 1991: 149).
At the highest level of their conceptual organization, they are grounded as definite
nominals. However, as observed by Langacker (1991: 148), “there are multiple levels of
organization to consider, and multiple paths through which the contents of a that-clause are
accessible from the ground”. The unit that has been nominalized in examples (44b), (45b),
(49b) and (50b) is a that-clause, which itself contains grounding markers, such as epistemic
and deontic modal markers. Because of the nominalization process, these clausal grounding
devices relate to the speech event via the intermediary of the nominal into which they have
been converted. More precisely, they indicate what precisely is ‘presupposed’ about the
nominalized clause. It may be a 100% epistemic certainty that is presupposed as conveyed by
the choice of the indicative mood in (44b) and (45b) (Davies 2001, Verstraete 2007: 38-57). It
may also be a degree of epistemic modality (49b) or a specific deontic status (50b) that is
presupposed.
It is this correlation of form and function that delineates the second type of complex
NP with third order entity clause that I posit. I analyse them as a case of ‘categorizing’
apposition (see Section 2.1), i.e. as a premodifier–head structure. Assuming this definition I
will refer to this subtype as the appositive subtype. In support of this analysis I discuss in the
remainder of this section the two alternates that are systematically possible with the appositive
type and not with the complementation type: (i) copular alternate, (ii) alternate without
categorizing noun.
(i) Systematic alternation with a copular clause
Appositive complex NPs allow for the identifying copular alternate that has been discussed in
the literature (e.g. Quirk et al. 1985: 1261), as shown by the b-versions of examples (47a),
(49a) and (52a). This alternate is not systematically possible with the complementation
subtype, as discussed in Section 3.1. In accordance with its categorizing function, the noun
can also function as a predicative complement either in a straight predicative clause or in an
extraposed variant, both providing what are sometimes more natural alternates than the
identifying clauses, as shown by the c- and d-versions.
(47a) What the 37 year-old finds most soul destroying about Haiti is the fact that things have
not changed since his childhood.
(47b) The fact is that things have not changed since his childhood.
(47c) That things have not changed since his childhood is a fact.
(47d) It’s a fact that things have not changed since his childhood.
(49a) Neither of them disputed the likelihood that it would be the most difficult feat to
accomplish. (WB)
(49b) The likelihood was that it would be the most difficult feat to accomplish.
(49c) That it would be the most difficult feat to accomplish was a likelihood.
(49d) It was a likelihood that it would be the most difficult feat to accomplish.
(52a) While attending Trinity College, Cambridge Byron resented the rule that students were
not
allowed
to
have
pet
dogs,
so
he
kept
a
(archives.smdailyjournal.com/article_preview. php?id)
(52b) The rule was that students were not allowed to have pet dogs.
(52c) That students were not allowed to have pet dogs was a rule.
(52d) It was a rule that students were not allowed to have pet dogs.
bear
as
a
pet.
In the predicative variants, the complement is non-referential (Kuno 1970, Declerck 1988:
56), that is, it does not pick out a referent in the universe of discourse. This provides a clue to
the specific nature of the subject NPs in the identifying alternates. They do not refer to
distinct, identifiable referents either. It is a characteristic of identifying clauses that the item to
be identified can be ‘weakly referring’ (Declerck 1988: 47f), or what Donellan (1966) called
an ‘attributive’ definite description. The fact (47b), the likelihood (49b) and the rule (52b) are
set up as such weakly referring, attributive definite descriptions, which are then identified by
the postverbal clause. This means that in all the copular variants, the identifying ones (the bexamples) and the predicative ones (the c- and d-examples), the clause is the only really
referential element. In this way, these copular variants support the proposed analysis of the
complex NPs, in which the clause is viewed as the identifying element with unique reference
and the noun preceding it as merely a classifying element (cf. Van Langendonck 1999: 118).
(ii) Alternate without categorizing noun
As discussed above, appositive complex NPs alternate systematically with third- order entity
clauses that function on their own in nominal syntactic environments. These clauses are
therefore generally recognized to be nominalized (e.g. Langacker 1991: 149). They function
as subject or direct object of factive predicates (in the broad sense), as in (44b), (45b) and
(49b). Semantically, they presuppose either the “simple fact” (Halliday 1994: 267) status of
the proposition, or its epistemic or deontic degree.
It has to be to added immediately that the bare clausal realization is not possible in a
number of nominal syntactic environments that require the proposition to be preceded by
determiner + noun. The most important of these are (see Davidse 2003):
(i) complements of prepositions:
(53)
Despite the fact that/*that he is 53 and vastly overweight, his wife didn’t have
the slightest reservation about him going. (WB)
(ii) complements of phrasal verbs:
(54)
Arsenal … had to settle for the fact that/*that they had lost the tie when
drawing at home. (WB)
(iii) second co-ordinate of a NP:
(55)
Can’t help suspecting his reason isn’t fraternal bonhomie but the fact that/*that
the combined economies, militaries and populations of Europe would f…
America, Russia, China and Japan right over. (WB)
(iv) complements of verbs such as have and hold:
(56)
We see how first of all Elizabeth holds the fact that/*that John committed
adultery against him, … (WB)
When we say that appositive complex NPs alternate with the nominalized clauses on their
own, this is true only if they are direct participants of factive predicates (in the broad sense),
as in (44b), (45b) and (49b).
Conversely, the two alternations that are characteristic of the complementation type do
not apply systematically to the appositive type, viz. systematic alternation with a sentence in
which the third order proposition relates to a corresponding verb of the noun, and presence of
a speaker or cognizant who can be made overt.
The nouns used in appositive complex NPs do not refer to, or do not inherently imply,
a verbal or cognitive process creating a proposition or manipulating a pre-existent proposition.
Complex appositive NPs do not designate a specific act of speaking, thinking or feeling, and
therefore they do not correspond to a clause describing such an act. They are not associated
with a cognitive agent either and are therefore not modified by possessive or genitive
expressions referring to a cognitive agent. This is obvious with a noun of “simple fact” such
as fact and epistemic nouns such as chance, possibility, likelihood, probability, certainty, offchance, impossibility (Halliday 1994: 267). The case may be somewhat less clear-cut for the
deontic nouns which Halliday (1994: 267) illustrates with nouns such as the following:
requirement, need, rule, obligation, necessity, onus, duty, some of which are deverbal.
However, the uses of the nouns that are at stake here are the ones in which they are not “the
name of a locution or an idea” Halliday (1985: 241). “There … is no implication of a
conscious participant” that is creating a proposition in a specific speech or thought act; the
nominalized clause “comes as it were ready packaged” (1985: 243), and it is precisely for this
reason, Halliday argues, that it can appear either as part of a NP or as a nominalization on its
own. The class of nouns referring to propositions that are around in pre-packaged form also
include axiom, caveat, dictum, maxim, etc. (Francis 1993: 153). Such nouns do not depict
cognitive acts and can therefore be used as categorizations of propositions.
3.3 The main feature shared: nominalized third order entity clauses
In the previous sections I have argued that complex NPs with third-order entity clauses divide
into two distinct types defined by a different dependency structure coding different schematic
semantics. These two types belong in different paradigms of constructions.
On the one hand, there is the type characterized by a complementation relation
between the verbal semantics of the noun and the complement clause. The noun refers to a
process and the complement clause relates to it as it would to the corresponding predicate.
The verbal meaning of the noun licenses the occurrence of the clause, which has a specific
participant role in the process as effected, affected or stimulus. The whole NP refers to an act
of ‘uttering or thinking a proposition’, or of ‘emotionally/cognitively reacting to a
proposition’. This type belongs to the larger paradigm of constructions that also subsumes
agent-oriented nominalizations licensing clauses, such as the doubting if there would be
enough renewable energy for the replacement of nuclear and fossil energies in example (42a)
above and the complex NP in (57).
(57)
And if so, what absurdities will follow the denying that the Lord, both as to his
active and passive obedience, is our righteousness?
(www.ccel.org/ccel/whitefield/sermons.xvi.html)
On the other hand, there is the appositive type, in which the noun’s categorizing
semantics are crucial. The noun is a premodifier and functions as a base-level categorization
of the following proposition. The clause identifies the referent of the complex NP: it
determines the semantic profile of the NP and is hence its head. This type belongs to the
constructional paradigm that also subsumes nominalized clauses that function on their own as
subject or object, the so-called subject clauses and object clauses.
This raises the question if it is at all meaningful to group these two types of complex
NPs together. In this section I will argue that, provided we do not claim the same
lexicogrammatical structure for them, we can say that there are two respects in which the two
types of complex NPs are related: (i) the very fact that they contain third order entity clauses,
and (ii) their strong tendency to have esphorically motivated definite reference.
(i) Third order entity clauses
Both the complementation type and the appositive type contain clauses that refer to thirdorder entities, i.e. “such abstract entities as propositions, which are outside time and space”
(Lyons 1977: 443). The third-order entities referred to by the clauses in complex NPs are,
more specifically, nominalized abstract propositions, disconnected from the temporal and
spatial reference points of the actual ongoing discourse by their nominalization (cf. Lyons
1977: 443, Langacker 1991: 148-149). Because the entire clause undergoes nominalization,
speaker and hearer relate to its referent as a reified entity, i.e. a referent with definiteness
status. Halliday (1994: 249) observes that such clauses represent “meta-phenomena”: they are
of a different order of reality than the second-order processes they participate in. Whereas
actions and events are situated in space and time, meta-phenomena have a semiotic reality
only: they are “a representation of a (linguistic) representation” (Halliday 1985: 228). They
are the words or meanings created by a verbal or cognitive act or the propositions mentally or
verbally interacted with. The main feature that all the complex NPs studied in this article have
in common is thus the fact that they contain a nominalized clause referring to a third-order, or
meta-phenomenal, entity, which is reified into a thing with definiteness status.
(ii) Esphorically motivated definite reference
We can link this semantico-grammatical feature to a textual feature, more specifically a strong
tendency with regard to information structure. Biber et al. (1999: 648) report that the large
majority6 of NPs with third-order entity clause have a definite article. Only occasionally is the
indefinite article used, which then overtly marks the newness to the discourse at that particular
point of the abstract proposition. This is the case in Quirk et al.’s example A message that he
would be late arrived by special delivery, cited above as (13a). Biber et al. explain this
preference for the definite article in terms of a rhetorical strategy. The definite article implies
that the proposition is known information, shared between speaker and hearer. In fact, in most
cases, the hearers or readers will be exposed to this proposition for the first time. Example
(58) is a case in which the proposition following that claim is actually given in the preceding
discourse. Example (59) illustrates the far more common case in which the proposition
following the claim, that a collision with an asteroid 65 million years ago led to the extinction
of dinosaurs, is new to the discourse.
6
About 85% according to Biber et al. (1999: 648).
(58)
… the reliable narrator of John’s Gospel begins by assuring readers that Jesus
is God’s Word made flesh. That claim that Jesus is God’s Word made flesh
governs the christological claims.
(https://books.google.be/books?isbn=0664257526)
(59)
Velikovsky’s major ideas built on the claim that Earth has experienced natural
global disasters throughout its history. The major cause of natural catastrophes
was brushes with other objects in the solar system and beyond. It’s probably
thanks to Velikovsky that Walter and Luis Alvarez were able to propose the
claim that a collision with an asteroid 65 million years ago led to the extinction
of dinosaurs. (http://climatecrocks.com/2010/12/15/potholer-on-the-newestcrock/)
If the definite article is used in a NP with a third-order entity clause that is discourse-new
(Prince 1992), this is motivated by the fact that the clause “serves to define it [the nominal
referent, K.D.] in exactly the same way that a ‘restrictive’ relative clause defines the noun it is
expanded by” (Halliday (1985: 241). The definite article points forward to the information
contained in the clause, marking this information as ‘defining’ (Halliday 1985: 241), i.e. as
turning the NP into the description of a uniquely identifiable referent. Martin (1992: 123)
reserves the term “esphora”’ for this type of forward pointing reference within the NP, which
marks a uniquely identifiable entity, but not a referent that was already present, or given, in
the discourse (Breban, Davidse & Ghesquiere 2011). The complex NPs of both the
complementation and the appositive type share this preference for esphorically motivated
definite reference.
In sum, the two subtypes have in common that they allow the speaker/writer to insert
nominalized clauses into NPs that can take on any semantic role in a clause, construing the
various ways in which we cognitively interact with abstract propositions. Moreover, their
strong tendency to take a definite article often gives a ‘pseudo-given’ aura to what is in fact a
proposition that is new to the discourse, which creates further possibilities for rhetorical
manipulation.
4. A semantic typology of NPs with third-order entity clauses
In this final section, I will set out the main semantic classes that should, in my view, be
distinguished within the range of nouns patterning with third-order entity clauses. This
typology is meant to capture the main semantic distinctions brought out by the different
grammatical features and the distinct syntactic behaviour of subtypes of complex NPs with
third-order entity clauses. It is, therefore, a lexicogrammatically-based typology. Whereas in
Section 3, the basic distinction between the complementation and the appositive
(modification) subtype was illustrated with prototypical instances, Section 4 sets out to cover
the finer subtypes of complementation (Section 4.1) and modification (Section 4.2).
4.1 A semantic typology of NPs with a complementation relation between noun and clause
As touched on in Section 3.1, this subtype divides into two further main subtypes, viz. one in
which the complement clause is presupposed, in the sense of being logically pre-existent to
the process it interacts with, and one in which it is not presupposed, but created by the process
described by the head noun.
4.1.1 Nouns taking presupposed complement clauses
The following types of nouns take presupposed complement clauses.
(i) emotion, e.g. regret, annoyance, anger
(ii) presupposing verbalization, e.g. denial
(iii) presupposing cognition, e.g. discovery, acceptance
(iv) presupposing perception, e.g. sight
(v) presupposing internal causation, e.g. evidence, proof, reason
With regard to emotion verbs, it is generally accepted that the proposition p in their finite
complement clauses is presupposed. As noted in Section 3.2, the truth of the proposition may
be presupposed but also its epistemic or deontic modal status. Nouns deriving from emotion
verbs (class i) hence also take presupposed complement clauses, e.g. his annoyance that he
could not play golf in (34a) above.
In Kiparsky & Kiparsky (1971) and Halliday (1985: 246), it was pointed out that some
predicates of verbalization and cognition can also presuppose the propositions they interact
with, such as the verbalization verbs acknowledge, admit, deny, explain and the cognition
verbs grasp, comprehend, ignore, forget. More typically, the complements of verbalization
and cognition are created in the speech and thought acts being described. But their ability to
take presupposed complement clauses has to be recognized. Some verbalization verbs, e.g. X
re-asserts that p, X reconfirms that p, mean, or have verb senses that mean, something like
‘re-confirm’ a pre-existent proposition p. Some cognition verbs mean, or have verb senses
that mean, something like ‘(not) grasping’/’ (not) accepting’ a proposition p that is already
there, e.g. X accepts/comes to see/discovers that p, X denies/rejects/does not accept that p.
The deverbal nouns describing such “factive” verbalization and cognition processes equally
take presupposed complement clauses, as in the denial that unemployment is related to crime
in (15a) and the belief that there was a God who had made all things to a certain design
(31a).
With perception verbs, the unmarked type of complementation is not a third-order
entity, or a meta-phenomenal proposition. Typically, it is a non-finite clause in which the
actual speaker describes what s/he – as well as the perceiver – perceived: a state-of-affairs
simultaneous with the perception. But, perception verbs can also presuppose a propositional
complement. The distinction can be illustrated with the example, familiar from novels and
films, where a young man is greeted on his return by a mother, or wife, with a rather hostile I
can see that you've kissed a girl. This is very different from I saw you kiss a girl. In the latter
example, the speaker was present on the scene of the perception, allowing her to describe both
her own act of perception and what she saw. In the first example, the speaker was not present
and so cannot have 'seen' the (past) action of the addressee kissing a girl. What she 'sees' is, as
Halliday (1985: 227) puts it, "the projection or idea of a phenomenon", a proposition which
she presupposes to be true. With nouns corresponding to perception verbs, the complements
are mostly not of the meta-phenomenal kind, but very occasionally examples occur such as
(60), in which the perception is described of a proposition presupposed to be true – in this
case by the internal cognizant.
(60)
to
Look at Figure 1 and study it a little. The eye is misled. The parallel lines lead
the
sight
that
the
horizontal
lines
are
converging.
(Google,
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=FB0E17FA3C5415738DDDA00994D
0405B8485F0D3)
In all these cases, the presupposed complement is a proposition that “comes ready made” and
“is already wrapped and packaged”, which “happens particularly when a proposition is an
object of affect” (Halliday 1985: 249). It has to be noted that the pre-existence of the
proposition to the emotional, verbal, cognition or perception process does not mean that the
proposition is always discourse-given in the sense of being known by the actual addressee (cf.
Kallulli 2010). It merely means that the semantics of the predicate require the proposition to
be presented as being already around as a third order entity to which the represented speaker
or cognizant reacts.
The last class of nouns that can take presupposed complements are not
nominalizations describing processes of consciousness, but the “internal causation” of third
order entities (Halliday 1985: 153-154, 246). With an “internal causing” relation something
“proves/implies” (Halliday 1985: 246) a proposition. This semantic relation is expressed by
nouns such as proof, reason and evidence followed by a complement clause. The valency of
the process of ‘proving’ can include both a proposition being proved and a proposition doing
the proving (Francis 1993: 152). Hence, the corresponding nouns can also licence
complement clauses that stand in a patientive or in an agentive relation to them. The complex
NP in (61a) contains a proposition being proved while that in (62a) contains a proposition that
does the proving. Some of the nouns of this class, like proof, are clearly deverbal and can
straightforwardly be related to an alternate with a verb and its complement, as in (61b). Other
nouns of the class, such as evidence in (62a), only alternate with a composite predicate
incorporating the noun, like be evidence in (62b).
(61)
a.
Some people think I must be easy, just because the proof that I have
had sex is in my arms! (WB)
(61)
b.
The baby in my arms proves that I have had sex.
(62)
a.
On the evidence of what we've seen at Leopardstown this is one horse
that will take an awful lot of beating. (WB)
(62)
b.
What we've seen at Leopardstown is evidence that this is one horse that
will take an awful lot of beating.
4.1.2 Nouns taking non-presupposed complement clauses
The following types of nouns take non-presupposed complement clauses.
(i) a. speech act
a. + information: e.g. statement, query, inquiry
b. + desired action: e.g. proposal, offer, command
(ii) thought act
a. cognition + information, e.g. thought, doubt
b. desideration + desired action, e.g. desire, plan, intention
(iii) participant-inherent dynamic modality, e.g. ability, need
Clear cases of complex NPs with non-presupposed complement clauses are those
describing (i) speech acts and (ii) thought acts and the propositions created in those acts. The
clauses describe the ‘content’ of the speech and thought acts. Halliday (1994: 263-264)
classifies the nouns occurring in them in the following way. Speech acts and thought acts can
be crossclassified according to whether they exchange (a) information about states-of-affairs
or (b) desired action7. The verbal exchange of information subsumes the giving (e.g.
statement, assurance) and the asking of information (e.g. question, query, inquiry). The verbal
exchange of desired action likewise subsumes offering (e.g. proposal, offer) or demanding
desired action (e.g. command). With thought acts, the distinction between information and
desired action correlates with (ii.a) nouns describing cognition processes (ii.b) and nouns
describing desideration processes. The information-oriented propositions created by cognition
processes can be statements (e.g. thought) or questions (e.g. doubt). The desired actionoriented propositions resulting from desiderative processes can be depicted from an offering
(e.g. intention) or demanding perspective (e.g. desire, wish). The eight resulting combinations
are illustrated by examples (63) to (70).
(63) Then I left him with the assurance I would see him again before leaving for
England. (WB)
speech act: stating information
(64) However, the study does not answer the question if antibiotics are a cause of
breast cancer. (WB)
speech act: asking information
(65) Bob had gone to Dale in the early part of June with the offer to buy his share in
the mine. (WB)
speech act: offering desired action
(66) The document below is the order to attack Japanese cities with atomic bombs.
(WB)
7
Halliday’s (1994:68) term ‘‘goods-and-services’’ for the commodity exchanged in commands and offers has
been replaced by ‘‘desired action’’, thus incorporating Wierzbicka’s (1988:134) point that the meaning of
commands and offers implies a reference to ‘wanting’.
speech act: demanding desired action
(67)
His belief that he was not bright was revealed when we were discussing how
he felt about work. (WB)
thought act: stating information
(68)
Delivery clears away the doubt that the novel would not be finished at all.
(WB)
thought act: demanding information
(69)
He would equally have known nothing of my intention to come to Sweden.
(WB)
thought act: intending desired action
(70)
Conscious love is the wish that the object should arrive at its own native
perfection. (WB)
thought act: demanding desired action
Besides the classes of speech and thought act nouns proposed by Halliday (1994: 263-264),
there is, in my view, one more set of nouns that pattern with non-presupposed complement
clauses. This is the set of nouns describing dynamic modal notions that are participantinherent (Nuyts 2005, see also Palmer 1990) such as need (71) and ability (72). The following
clause describes what the need or ability consists in. The complex NPs describe the need of a
participant to engage in a (type of) action or the ability of a participant to carry out an action
expressed by the – typically non-finite – clause. As with the speech and thought act nouns
taking complement clauses, NPs describing participant-inherent modality can in principle take
genitives, possessives and periphrastic modifiers referring to the conscious participant
involved in them. For instance, in (71), he needs to communicate, and in (72) it is the General
who is not able to bring the marching people to a halt. Often nouns such as these are not
accompanied by elements explicitly referring to the participant, as in (73), where the need can
be inferred to be inherent in every human being.
(71)
You will find that his need to communicate will make him extremely friendly
towards his contemporaries. (WB)
(72)
The latest reports suggested that tens of thousands of people would be taking
part in the march and he doubted the General’s ability to bring them to a halt
in the middle of the Ku'damm. (WB)
(73)
In social psychology, the need to belong is an intrinsic motivation to affiliate
with others and be socially accepted. (Google,
http://psychology.about.com/od/nindex/g/needtobelong.htm)
4.2 A semantic typology of NPs with a modification relation between noun and clause
Which sets of nouns, finally, occur in the appositive complex NPs in which the noun is a
premodifier of the following clause? In Section 3.2, I argued that it is nominalized clauses that
can also occur on their own as object and subject of predicates that can be premodified by a
noun categorizing the following proposition. The question is: which specific types of
categorizations can we find in the premodifier position? They should be nouns that explicitly
name an aspect that the proposition in its participant role to the predicate embodies on its own
too. They should not be deverbal nouns describing a process because the proposition then
relates to that process rather than to the one expressed by the predicate of the clause. I
tentatively propose the following classes:
(i) fact in broad sense
a. simple fact, e.g. fact, point, issue
b. epistemic degree, e.g. likelihood, probability, possibility, (off)chance, risk, promise
c. deontic status, e.g. rule, principle
(ii) mention use of wording, e.g. dictum, proverb, words, phrase
(iii) mention use of idea, e.g. (hypo)thesis, idea, assumption, presumption
Class (i) subsumes nouns of “facts” in the broad sense discussed in Section 3.2: (a)
nouns of “simple fact”, (b) nouns that express various degrees of epistemic modality and (c)
nouns expressing deontic status (Halliday 1994: 244). For these subclasses of nouns it can be
straightforwardly shown that they explicitly name an aspect that is inherent in the proposition,
viz. its modal status in a broad sense. In this light, let us reconsider examples (47a), (49a) and
(52a), reproduced here as (74a), (75a) and (76a) with their alternate bare clausal realizations
in (74b), (75b) and (76b). Clause type (e.g. indicative vs. subjunctive) and modal elements
(e.g. auxiliaries, adverbs) together indicate the modal status of the nominalized propositions
(cf. Verstraete 2007). In (74) the indicative have not changed indicates 100% certainty, in
(75) would indicates strong likelihood, and in (76) were not allowed describes absence of
permission. The nouns fact, likelihood and rule make this modal status explicit.
(74)
a.
What the 37 year-old finds most soul destroying about Haiti is the fact
that things have not changed since his childhood. (WB)
(74)
b.
What the 37 year-old finds most soul destroying about Haiti is that
things have not changed since his childhood. (WB)
(75)
a.
Neither of them disputed the likelihood that it would be the most
difficult feat to accomplish. (WB)
(75)
b.
Neither of them disputed that it would be the most difficult feat to
accomplish. (WB)
(76)
a.
While attending Trinity College, Cambridge Byron resented the rule
that students were not allowed to have pet dogs. (WB)
(76)
b.
While attending Trinity College, Cambridge Byron resented that
students were not allowed to have pet dogs. (WB)
Note that the nouns actually chosen may be slightly at variance with the modal status of the
proposition: fact can for instance be used with epistemically modalized propositions (see
(48a) above, the US is banking on the fact that the Serbs will understand …) or deontically
modalized propositions (as in 77).
(77)
we had to face the fact that we must find a spiritual basis of life
(www.nwarkaa.org/aintinthebook.htm)
Nouns from classes (ii), e.g. words, saying, and (iii), idea, are not frequently used as
premodifiers to categorize propositions that can also occur on their own as the subject or
object of a clausal predicate. However, they do occur, and their function differs from the
nominalizations and deverbal nouns licensing complement clauses discussed in Section 4.1:
the deverbal nouns considered in the previous section describe actual speech acts or thought
acts which verbally or mentally interact with pre-existent propositions (Section 4.1.1) or
which create propositions (Section 4.1.2). To grasp the categorizing use of these nouns, we
first have to discuss the use of bare complement clauses to “mention” (Sweetser 1990: 72)
wordings or ideas.
As Halliday (1985: 244) notes: “… we do not normally say that Caesar was ambitious
was thought/said by Brutus – at least not in a reporting context, only in the special sense of
‘these lines were spoken by’…”. The special sense is the “mention” use, which, as argued in
Davidse (1994: 280-282), results from reifying the wording or the idea into a nominalized
clause. All the tests for detecting the nominalization of a clause apply to the that-clause in a
sentence like (78a). In the passive phrasing in (78a) that “we do not normally” (Halliday
1985: 244) use, that Caesar was ambitious is the subject of the passive was thought/said; that
is, it is a nominalized clause in the same way that the fact clauses in (74b) - (76b) are
nominalized. If a that-complement is used as an object in the mention sense, it can only be
replaced by nominal reference items such as it or that in (78b), not by the clausal substitute
so. The proform so is typical of (non-mentioned) reported speech, as in Will it need surgery?
– The doctor said/thought so (Halliday 1994: 256-257). That Caesar was ambitious can also
be premodified by a noun, not one of the “fact” class, but one categorizing a proposition as a
wording, e.g. claim (78c), or an idea, e.g. assumption (78d).
(78)
a.
That Caesar was ambitious was thought/said by Brutus. (Halliday
1985: 244)
(78)
b.
Did Brutus really say that Caear was ambitious? – Yes, he said
that/it/*so. I heard him.
(78)
c.
The claim that Caesar was ambitious was uttered by Brutus.
(78)
d.
The assumption that Caesar was ambitious was thought by Brutus.
In attested examples, the context for such mention uses will often be one emphasizing that
specific words were definitely uttered, or assumptions really made. Example (79) illustrates
such a context for wording being mentioned. In (79) the quoted form "This is it" is used as the
subject of the passive was definitely said; the quoted form is thus semantically reified and
syntactically nominalized.
(79)
"This
is
it"
was
definitely
said
by
the
suspect.
(www.jfkassassinationforum.com/index.php?topic)
Bare nominalized ‘mentioned’ ideas are perhaps less common, but they also do occur.
Huddleston (1988: 144f) discusses example (80), noting that, according to Halliday (1985:
240-241, 243-248)8, it can only be a fact, yet the example does not contextually evoke ‘fact’
status.
(80)
That she was guilty was assumed by everyone. (Huddleston 1988: 144f)
On my reading, that she was guilty is the realization by a bare nominalized clause of an idea
that is around and that is as such assumed by everyone. That the subject clauses in (78) - (80)
are embedded as mentioned wordings and ideas, not as ‘facts’, can be inferred from the verbs
used, e.g. was said/thought in (78), was assumed in (80), and from contextual clues pointing
at a mention use, such as definitely said (79), assumed by everyone (80). The mention use of
wordings and ideas involves reifying them as pre-existent objects being uttered or being
assumed, etc.
Classes (ii) and (iii) subsume nouns that can be used to explicitly categorize such
wordings or ideas in their mention use. Typical examples of nouns describing pre-existing
wordings are dictum, saying, proverb, words and typical nouns describing existing ideas are
(hypo)thesis, assumption, presumption. Example (81) illustrates the ‘mention’ use of a
wording in its quoted from, premodified by proverb. ‘Mentioned’ ideas, as in (82), typically
take indirectly reported clauses. The complex NPs in examples (81a) and (82a) alternate
naturally with the bare nominalized clause (81b)-(82b). This is in accordance with my
analysis of these complex NPs as appositive, with the noun categorizing the proposition as a
‘mentioned’ wording or idea.
(81)
a.
For example, a value in the proverb “The early bird catches the worm”
is punctuality; … https://books.google.be/books?isbn=1579228046
(81)
b.
The theory is relatively simple and has been immortalized in several
well-known phrases that we all heard as children - 'the early bird catches the
worm' is one that springs to mind.
http://www.simplyzesty.com/Blog/Article/September-2011/Why-The-FirstMover-Advantage-Theory-Doesn-t-Hold-Water#sthash.FSaERt9G.dpuf
(82)
a.
The bills strengthened penalties for traffickers and established the
presumption that minors entangled in sex-trafficking cases should be
8
It is true that Halliday (1985: 240) says that nominalized clauses giving the content of locutions and ideas
always have to be preceded by a common noun indicating the type of locution or idea. He does not incorporate
the ‘mention’ use of locutions and ideas he discusses later (1985: 244) into his typology of locutions and ideas.
considered victims, not criminals.
(www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/presumption)
(82)
b.
Historically, it was established that minors were too young to be held
responsible for criminal behaviour (www.hg.org/juvenile-crime-law.html)
5. Conclusion
In this article, I have tackled the relatively neglected topic of NPs with third-order entity
clauses. In the literature, there is no agreement about the delineation, the syntactic analysis
and the semantic sub-classification of this category. I first discussed the main grammatical
descriptions on offer in the literature: Quirk et al.’s (1985) appositive analysis and Huddleston
and Pullum’s (2002) complementation analysis (Section 2). In Section 3, I proposed the
outline of a personal grammatical analysis. I argued that these complex NPs all contain thirdorder entity clauses, but divide into two distinct subtypes, one in which the third-order entity
clause complements the deverbal head noun and one in which it is premodified by a noun with
categorizing function. In Section 4, I set out the main semantic classes that should, in my
view, be distinguished within the range of nouns patterning with third-order entity clauses.
This typology is meant to capture the main semantic distinctions brought out by the different
grammatical features and the distinct syntactic behaviour of the subtypes of complex NPs
with third-order entity clauses. Section 4.1 discusses the complex NPs in which the clauses
are sanctioned by a noun with verbal meaning: they may either be ‘presupposed’ propositions
that are pre-existent to their verbal or mental manipulation expressed by the noun (Section
4.1.1), or they may be propositions that give the ‘content’ of the predicate expressed by the
verb (Section 4.1.2). Section 4.2. discusses the complex NPs in which the clauses are
premodified by a categorizing noun. I have argued that these are clauses whose simple fact,
epistemic or deontic status is presupposed, and occasionally also their status as a pre-existent
wording or idea. They alternate with a bare clausal realization in the syntactic environments
that allow this. We thus see that the complex NPs studied in this article can contain
presupposed clauses in two ways. In the complementation type discussed in Section 4.1.1, we
find the bare clausal realizations that stand in a complementation relation to deverbal nouns
such as regret, annoyance, acceptance, proof. The appositive type discussed in Section 4.2 is
formed by complex NPs with explicit categorization of the presupposed clause by nouns such
as fact, likelihood, rule, words, etc.
This whole domain of the English lexico-grammatical is a vast one, involving, as
noted by Francis (1993), hundreds of nouns. One of the main challenges for further research
will therefore be to put more lexical flesh on the semantic typology, which, doubtless, will
bring with it further fine-tuning.
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