The conditional impact of election news on political cynicism:
A cross-nationally comparative perspective
Andreas R.T. Schuck
Hajo G. Boomgaarden
Claes H. de Vreese
CONTACT:
University of Amsterdam
Amsterdam School of Communication Research ASCoR
Kloveniersburgwal 48, 1012 CX Amsterdam
Email: A.R.T.Schuck@uva.nl; H.Boomgaarden@uva.nl; C.H.deVreese@uva.nl
Paper presented at the 64th Annual Conference of the
World Association for Public Opinion Research (WAPOR),
Amsterdam/The Netherlands, September 21th-23th
News and political cynicism
Abstract
Previous research suggests that the news media’s reporting about politics in terms of
strategy fosters political cynicism. The literature hitherto has addressed this matter
mostly in single country studies and in a US context which raises questions about
generalizability. The current study draws on a unique multi-method and comparative
cross-country study design, combining a media content analysis (N=52,009) with data
from a two-wave panel survey conducted in 21 EU member states (N=32,411) during
the 2009 European Parliamentary elections. Our findings stress that the effect of
strategy news on cynicism is conditional upon both individual as well as countryspecific factors. Citizens who paid less attention to the election campaign were more
affected. Furthermore, strategy news had more of an effect on cynicism in countries in
which trust in EU institutions was lower. Overall, our study provides the first
comprehensive overview over the conditional impact of election coverage on
cynicism in a European context.
Keywords: strategy framing, political cynicism, election campaigns, comparative
analysis, media content analysis, panel survey.
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News and political cynicism
Introduction
Scholarly and public debates about the role of the media during elections are heated
and ongoing. Previous research has identified different content features of campaign
news coverage with the potential to affect citizens in electoral contexts. An important
strand of extant research has, for example, established a link between news media’s
reporting of election campaigns in terms of strategy and political cynicism (Rhee,
1997; Valentino et al., 2001). Political cynicism describes a gap between voters and
their political representatives and is said to have increased over the past decades,
arguably driven by how politics is covered in the mass media (e.g., Adriaansen, van
Praag & de Vreese, 2010; Cappella & Jamieson, 1997). The news media’s emphasis
on framing politics in terms of strategy thereby is suggested to lead citizens to
perceive politics as a game that is remote from representing citizens’ interests.
Strategic news reporting is conceptualized as news that focuses on winning
and losing, is driven by ‘war and games’ language, or focuses on the style and
perceptions of politicians (Jamieson, 1992). Similarly, following Robinson’s (1976)
‘‘video malaise’’ thesis, several studies demonstrated the news media’s increasingly
strong emphasis on strategic elements such as strategic motivations or the style of
presentation of political leaders and showed how this mode of coverage negatively
affects citizens’ political attitudes and behavior (Fallows, 1996; Farnsworth &
Lichter, 2003; Patterson, 1993, 2002). Whereas a relationship between citizens’
exposure to strategy framing in the news and their cynicism towards politics has been
established previously, we know little about the specific conditions under which this
relationship is more or less likely to occur. Without specifying these conditions,
however, we may draw incorrect inferences about the nature and pervasiveness of this
phenomenon.
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News and political cynicism
The literature hitherto has addressed this topic by and large in single country
studies and mostly in a US context. However, we know from studies of national
election campaigns in other countries that strategic news reporting is also found in
election news coverage also outside of the U.S., albeit in varying degrees (e.g.,
Brettschneider, 1997; de Vreese & Boomgaarden, 2006; Schuck et al., 2011;
Stromback & Kaid, 2008). Some scholars even refer to strategic coverage as the
dominant journalistic mode since the 1970s (e.g., Esser et al., 2001), but there is little
specific evidence of strategic news reporting and its effects beyond the U.S. example
(see Jackson, 2011) or with regard to European politics specifically. Previous research
has shown, for example, how strategically framed news coverage can foster cynicism
towards the EU which in turn can affect vote choice in EU integration referenda
among younger voters (de Vreese & Elenbaas, 2008). What is missing so far,
however, is a comparative view on news effects on political cynicism which allows to
not only consider the relationship between news and cynicism itself, but also its
conditionality on both individual as well as contextual, system-specific factors. It is
now widely acknowledged that media effects are unlikely to be across-the-board
effects and may strongly depend on recipients’ characteristics or the contexts in which
they operate (e.g., Delli-Carpini, 2004; McLeod et al., 2004). In line with this we
expect that the impact of strategy news on political cynicism is not equal across all
countries, but differs depending on relevant individual characteristics, such as the
attention paid to a particular election campaign, and context characteristics, such as
factors pertaining to the overall opinion climate in a country regarding the respective
election context.
To investigate the relationship between strategy news and political cynicism,
this study draws on a unique multi-method and comparative cross-country study
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News and political cynicism
design, which combines a large-scale media content analysis with data from a twowave panel survey, conducted in 21 EU member states during the 2009 European
Parliament (EP) elections. The focus on the same election taking place in different
contexts at the same time allows for a unique comparative perspective on the
relationship between news contents, exposure to such news and changes in cynicism
over the course of the campaign. Considering the electoral context of this study, we
specifically address cynicism to the EP elections and strategy framing in EP election
news coverage.
Theoretical framework
The role of strategy framing in election news
A news frame is ‘an emphasis in salience of certain aspects of a topic’ (De Vreese,
2002). Research has amply demonstrated the effects news frames have on political
attitudes (e.g., Iyengar, 1991; de Vreese & Elenbaas, 2008), issue interpretations (e.g.,
Rhee, 1997), policy proposals (e.g., Slothuus & de Vreese, 2010), or evaluations (e.g.,
Nelson et al., 1997). Previous research focusing on the role of strategy framing in
elections has demonstrated how the news report elections with a focus on tactics and
the game character of politics rather than actual substance (e.g., Cappella & Jamieson,
1997; Valentino et al., 2001). A lot of this research has dealt with the presumed
negative consequences of this way of framing electoral contests, such as increasing
levels of political cynicism thought to be detrimental for electoral participation (e.g.,
Cappella & Jamieson, 1997).
But why is there such a focus on strategy in campaign news and how can it be
characterized in more concrete terms? Developments towards increasing
professionalization of election campaigns (e.g., Norris, 2000) and the application of
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News and political cynicism
advanced political marketing strategies in political parties’ campaigning efforts (e.g.,
Kavanagh, 1995) have led to increasing attention by journalists for what is going on
‘behind the campaign’ (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997). Consequently, news relying on
such a strategy frame when covering election campaigns emphasizes considerations
relating to how political actors present a certain issue or event and the style of such
presentation. It furthermore relates to the description of specific actions of political
actors to improve their position in the public eye. In sum, strategic news is described
as stressing the strategies, performances, styles and tactics of campaigning necessary
to for a candidate or party to obtain and remain in a favorable position (Esser &
D’Angelo, 2006; Jamieson, 1992).
Such strategic news framing appears to be a standard ingredient of election
coverage nowadays, at the expense of substantial issue news coverage (Cappella &
Jamieson, 1997; Iyengar et al., 2004). This observation applies to the US context,
even outside election times (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997; Lawrence, 2000), but has
also been made – among others – for Germany (Esser & Hemmer, 2008), the UK
(Scammell & Semetko, 2008), or the Netherlands (Elenbaas & de Vreese, 2008).
However, we have hardly any knowledge about the way in which campaign news
frames an election in terms of strategy across countries. In the present study, in a first
step, we therefore look at the presence of strategic news framing in media coverage
across Europe.
Studies focusing on the role of political cynicism have referred to a ‘‘spiral of
cynicism’’ according to which news media report largely strategically about politics
— that is, emphasizing the political performance of and battle among politicians, as
well as the tactics they use in pursuing political victory at the expense of actual
content or substance — which fuels public distrust in and cynicism about politics and
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News and political cynicism
politicians among the public. Consequently, exposure to strategy framing in the media
has often been blamed to contribute to political cynicism and, consequently, to
demobilize voters (e.g., Cappella & Jamieson, 1997). Accordingly, Rhee (1997)
found, for example, that news framed in terms of strategy bolster participants’
strategic interpretations of an election campaign. This is assumed to have important
implications for modern democracy since other research suggests that higher levels of
cynicism can – in turn - alienate people from politics, reduces learning, erodes civic
engagement and can result in lower levels of participation in the political process (see
e.g., Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1995; Cappella & Jamieson, 1997; Hibbing & TheissMoore, 1995; Patterson, 1993, 2002; Valentino et al., 2001). In line with these
findings, already Patterson (1993) concluded that “election news, rather than serving
to bring candidates and voters together, drives a wedge between them” (p. 52).
However, findings are mixed and whereas some stress the contingency of the
effect of strategy framing on cynicism (de Vreese, 2005; Valentino et al., 2001). This
is in line with more general observations regarding the contingency of media effects
(e.g., McLeod et al., 2004). Others argue that while strategy framing might increase
political cynicism this does not necessarily result in lower turnout (de Vreese &
Semetko, 2002; de Vreese & Boomgaarden, 2008). In the current study we apply and
further extend the argument that effects of strategy framing on cynicism are not omnipresent and put this expectation to an empirical test.
Individual characteristics are likely to moderate framing effects. In De Vreese
(2005) it was found that strategy news had a stronger effects on citizens low in
political sophistication. Also in other studies it was found that news framing showed
to have stronger effects among those with lower levels of political knowledge (e.g.,
Kinder & Sanders, 1990; Schuck & de Vreese, 2006). We in this study rely on a
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News and political cynicism
composite index of political knowledge, concretely knowledge about the EP elections,
and political interest, again concretely interest in the EP campaign. In concrete terms,
we expect strategy framing to have more of an effect on voters who are less aware.
(H1): The effect of campaign news framed in terms of strategy on political
cynicism is conditional upon the level of awareness citizens have for the
campaign such that effects are greater for those with low awareness.
Not only individual characteristics but also context has been described to moderate
media effects. In the current study we additionally focus on one contextual
characteristic specific to EU politics, namely trust in EU institutions. This is important
since cynicism is closely related to issues of trust (see discussion in de Vreese &
Semetko, 2002). Also empirically, our case, the 2009 EP elections, lends itself well to
such an investigation, given that it presents a context with considerable variance in
trust in EU institutions across the different countries (Eurobarometer 73-75). We
expect that in country contexts in which trust in institutions is lower strategy framing
should have more of an effect compared to contexts with higher levels of trust
because when trust is low susceptibility to strategy framing should be higher.
(H2): Campaign news coverage framed in terms of strategy has more of an
effect on political cynicism in contexts in which trusts in EU institutions is low
than in contexts in which trust in EU institutions is high.
Methodological innovativeness and prior research
Methodologically, most research on the impact of strategy framing on cynicism
employ experimental research designs (for exceptions see de Vreese & Semetko,
2002, de Vreese, 2005; Adriaansen et al., 2010). However, although experiments are
especially useful for testing causal hypotheses while ensuring high internal validity,
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News and political cynicism
the unnatural settings of and forced exposure in these tests form a limitation. While
experimentation with controlled manipulations in media content is superior compared
to merely establishing a relationship between news media use and political cynicism,
this sort of research has two potential shortcomings. First, the high internal validity of
experimentation comes at the price of unnatural viewing environments and forced
exposure. The field needs complementary non-laboratory studies that can
compellingly assess the effects of exposure to strategic news coverage. Essentially,
this calls for a panel study in which respondents’ level of cynicism is assessed
repeatedly and the media content that these respondents are in fact exposed to is
analysed for the presence of strategic reporting. Previous research, such as Pinkleton
and Austin (2001), investigated the link between general news media use and political
cynicism by means of a cross-sectional survey. However, in order to assess the role of
different media outlets more specifically and more convincingly it becomes necessary
to assess the actual media content individuals have been exposed to, as well as the
frequency of this exposure (see also Slater, 2004).
Three studies have initially investigated the effects of repeated exposure to
strategic news. De Vreese (2004) included a one-week delayed post-test in an
experimental study and found that in the case where participants were not
subsequently exposed to strategically framed news, the effect on cynicism that was
established in the immediate post-test vanished. De Vreese and Semetko (2002) found
that exposure to strategic news media reporting about a national political issue
contributed to citizens’ levels of cynicism, even when controlling for the initial level
of cynicism in the campaign. De Vreese (2005), drawing on two-wave panel surveys
with repeated measures of political cynicism and detailed data on news media use and
content, conducted in European political and media contexts, showed that, after
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News and political cynicism
controlling for prior cynicism levels, the strongest increases in cynicism were among
those individuals who had been exposed the most to strategic news. However, no
study to date has tested the conditional nature of the effect of strategy framing on
cynicism in a non-US comparative context, considering both individual-level as well
as contextual-level moderating factors, within the same election context and in a realworld setting.
Study context: The 2009 European Parliamentary Elections
The context for this study is provided by the 2009 elections for the European
Parliament (EP). The vast majority of European citizens receive most of their
information about the EU and EP elections from traditional news media such as
television news and newspapers (e.g., Eurobarometer 55-64). Previous research has
stressed that information, communication, and public debate could play a key role in
legitimating and shaping public opinion about the EU and further European
integration (see e.g., Hewstone, 1986; Meyer, 1999; Risse-Kappen, EngelmannMartin, Knopf, & Roscher, 1999) and have made a link between the media and public
opinion. Such studies have shown that the way the media present the EU affects how
people think of it, i.e. their support regarding specific EU policies (Brettschneider,
Maier & Maier, 2003; Maier & Rittberger, 2008; Schuck & de Vreese, 2006; Lecheler
& de Vreese, 2010), their evaluation of EU membership of their country (Vliegenthart
et al., 2008) and also if and what to vote for in EU referendums or EP elections (de
Vreese & Tobiasen, 2007; Hobolt, 2009; Schuck & de Vreese, 2008). Thus, the way
the EU is covered in the news can affect both public opinion formation and electoral
behaviour (de Vreese & Boomgaarden, 2006). Therefore, as most of what citizens
learn about an EP election and the campaign stems from the media (Bennett &
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News and political cynicism
Entman, 2001), it is relevant to ask what role the news media play in shaping public
perceptions of the EU.
In the present study, we investigate to what extent, and under what conditions,
strategically framed news coverage can foster cynicism towards the EU and thus
contribute to deepen the divide between Europe and its citizens. For the 2004 EP
election it was shown that the amount of strategy framing differed considerably
between the member states, with Latvia, Estonia, Denmark or Luxembourg showing
very little, and Greece, Poland, or Slovakia a substantial share of EP election news
framed in terms of strategy. Exposure to this strategy framing in the media
significantly affected political cynicism towards politics (de Vreese & Boomgaarden,
2008). The 2009 EP elections offer a unique opportunity to further investigate the
connection between strategy framing and political cynicism and the factors which
condition any potential effects, both on the individual as well as on the contextual
level. As we outline below, we do so combining both large-scale media content and
panel survey data from 21 countries and thus provide the first comprehensive
overview over the conditional impact of election coverage on cynicism across Europe.
Data & Methods
We add the role of the news media to our understanding of how attitudes towards the
EU take shape and take actual media content characteristics into account. Since we in
this study are interested in the dynamics of public opinion we do not draw on crosssectional survey data but rather on a dynamic model of change in public opinion.
A multi-method research design including a content analysis and a two-wave
panel survey was employed, first, to investigate how the news media in the different
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News and political cynicism
EU member states have covered the campaign, and second, to assess the impact of
such coverage on the decision of voters to turn out to vote.
This design enables us to assess the effect of campaign news more specifically
by building in the results from our media content analysis with regard to the media
framing of election coverage directly in specific news outlets into our measure of
individual news exposure to those same news outlets in our panel survey analysis. For
this, we analyse the media content of exactly those specific media outlets which are
also included in our panel study design and for which respondents report their
individual exposure. Building in actual media content characteristics into individual
exposure measures yields a more accurate and realistic account of modelling media
effects.
What is furthermore unique about our design is that it includes an in-depth
content analysis of campaign coverage in 21 of the 27 EU member states and
combines it with panel survey data in the same 21 countries, allowing for a multi-level
analysis assessing the impact of both individual-level and country-level variables as
well as their cross-level interaction on the mobilization of voters in the 2009 EP
elections across Europe in one single study.
Media content analysis
To empirically test our expectations and collect information to build into our weighted
measure of news exposure in the analysis of our panel data, we rely on a large scale
media content analysis. This content analysis was carried out within the framework of
PIREDEU (www.piredeu.eu), Providing an Infrastructure for Research on Electoral
Democracy in the European Union. PIREDEU is funded by the European Union’s FP
7 program (for more details see data documentation report in Schuck et al., 2010).
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News and political cynicism
Sample: The content analysis was carried out on a sample of national news
media coverage in all 27 EU member states.i In each country we include the main
national evening news broadcasts of the most widely watched public and commercial
television stations. We also include two ‘quality’ (i.e. broadsheet) and one tabloid
newspaper from each country. Our overall television sample consists of 58 TV
networks and our overall newspaper sample consists of 84 different newspapers.
Period of study: The content analysis was conducted for news items published
or broadcast within the three weeks running up to the election. Since election days
varied across countries also the coding period varied from e.g. May 14th-June 4th for
some countries up to May 17th – June 7th for others.
Data collection: For television news coverage, all news items have been
coded; for newspapers, all news items on the title page and on one randomly selected
page as well as all stories pertaining particularly to the EU and/or the EU election on
any other page of the newspaper have been coded.ii In total, 52,009 news stories have
been coded in all 27 EU-member countries, 19,996 of these news stories dealt
specifically with the EU of which 10,978 news stories dealt specifically with the EU
election.iii The coding of EP campaign strategy framing was based on EP election
campaign-specific stories only. The unit of analysis and coding unit was the distinct
news story.
Coding procedure: Coding was conducted by a total of 58 coders at two
locations, the University of Amsterdam (The Netherlands) and the University of
Exeter (UK). Coders were trained and supervised and the coder training included
repeated tests of intercoder-reliability which yielded satisfactory results (reported
below).iv
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News and political cynicism
Strategy framing. We rely on Cappella and Jamieson’s (1997, p. 33) work which
we adapted to the current study context and coded three indicators of strategic news.
(1) ‘Does the story mention a person’s, group’s, institution’s or organization’s
presentation and style – of how, in which way, in which manner they handle an
issue?’, (2) ‘Does the story mention that an action of a person, group, institution or
organization was taken in order to stabilize, consolidate or enhance his/her/its
position, in order to make him/her/it look better in public opinion or in the political
arena? I.e., does the story mention a tactical, calculated or strategic move with a
certain motivation?’, and (3) ‘Does the story use one or more metaphors from the
language of games, sport and/or war?’. Each of these items was coded as being either
present (=1) or not present (=0) in the news item and the individual item scores were
then summed up and divided by three to build an average index which represents the
relative presence of the frame per individual item and news outlet (reaching from 0fully absent to 1- fully present) (see e.g., Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000; de Vreese,
2004; Schuck & de Vreese, 2006, 2009). The three items form a common factor in a
principal components analysis (Eigenvalue = 1.65, 55 % explained variance, factor
loadings > .71) and an acceptable scale (M = .29, SD = .33; Cronbach’s alpha= .59).
These scores are later built into our outlet-specific survey news exposure measures.
Panel survey
The data for this study come from the 2009 European Election Campaign Study.v A
two-wave panel survey was carried out in 21 European Union member states.vi
Respondents were interviewed about one month prior to the EP elections and
immediately afterwards. Fieldwork dates were 6-18th of Mayvii and 8-19th of Juneviii
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News and political cynicism
2009. The survey was conducted using Computer Assisted Web Interviewing
(CAWI).
Country sample: The fieldwork was coordinated by TNS Opinion in Brussels
and involved TNS subsidiaries in each country. All subsidiaries comply with
ESOMAR guidelines for survey research. A total of 32,411 respondents participated
in wave one and 22,806 respondents participated in wave two.ix Only respondents
who participated in both waves are included in the analysis presented below. On
average, 1,086 respondents per country completed the questionnaires of both waves,
varying from 1,001 in Austria to 2,000 in Belgium.x In each country, a sample was
drawn from TNS databases. These databases rely on multiple recruitment strategies,
including telephone, face-to-face, and online recruitment. Each database consists of
between 3,600 (Slovakia) and 339,000 (the UK) individuals. Quotas (on age, gender,
and education) were enforced in sampling from the database. The average response
rate was 31% in wave 1 and the re-contact rate was on average 80% in wave 2.xi The
samples show appropriate distributions in terms of gender, age and education
compared to census data. As we are mostly interested in the underlying relationships
between variables, we consider the deviations in the sample vis-à-vis the adult
population less problematic and we exert appropriate caution when making inferences
about absolute values.xii
Questionnaire and translations: The questionnaire was developed in English
and translated into the different national languages. It was then translated back into
English as an additional check of the accuracy of the translations. The translation was
supervised by the research team and it was carried out by TNS (which also executes
and translates the Eurobarometer surveys). Irregularities and problems arising from
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News and political cynicism
this process were resolved by deliberation. For more information, see de Vreese et al.,
2010.
Dependent variable: In the current study political cynicism is measured as EP
campaign-specific cynicism. Thus, this variable is not tapping general political
cynicism as in most other studies but specifically focuses on cynicism regarding the
campaign. We believe this is an important addition to the existing literature to also
investigate such campaign-specific cynicism. Recent research has shown that such
more specific measures of cynicism matter when assessing the effect of strategy
framing and effects are more likely to occur as compared to more general political
cynicism (Jackson, 2010). To measure citizens’ level of cynicism about the European
Parliament election campaign in wave 2 of the panel survey, we rely on three items,
answered on 7-point disagree-agree Likert-scales. The three items were (1) ‘During
the European Parliamentary election campaign, many promises were made that are
never kept’, (2) ‘During the European Parliamentary election campaign, politicians
were more concerned with their own image than with the future of Europe’, and (3)
‘During the European Parliamentary election campaign, politicians were too
concerned with their standing in the polls’. The sum score of these three variables was
divided by three to represent EP campaign cynicism on a 7-point scale, and we use the
identical measurement to control for wave 1 EP campaign cynicism (wave 1 M =
5.14, SD = 1.36; wave 2 M = 5.22, SD = 1.39).
Independent variables: First, in order to model change between our two panel
waves, we use a lagged term for cynicism at wave one in our model (see Markus
[1979] for discussion of the use of lagged specifications in panel data). This enables
us to control for the level of initial cynicism and to assess individual change during
the period between the two panel waves.
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News and political cynicism
News exposure (individual level): The core independent variable in this study
is news exposure. Respondents indicated for each news outlet that was also included
in our media content analysis for their respective country how many days per week
they used any of these in an average week. Exposure to each newspaper outlet was
measured on a scale from 0-6 and exposure to each TV news show was measured on a
scale from 0-7 indicating exposure in an average week. For our main independent
variable we build a weighted additive index by weighing the individual exposure to
each news outlet by the share of strategy framing in its coverage of the EP elections
and adding up outlet exposure into one strategy frame exposure variable. This
constructed measure ranges from 0 (no strategy frame exposure) to 13.1 (highest
individual strategy frame exposure) (M = 1.57, SD = 1.69).
EP campaign awareness (individual level): Awareness of the EP election
campaign is an indicator comprised of two variables, interest in the EP election on a 1
(low) to 7 (high) scale and knowledge of the campaign measured by a battery of four
items coded 1 (correct) or 0 (incorrect) (M = 4.69, SD = 2.55).
Trust in EU institutions (country level): We use the country mean aggregates
to construct a context variable for national trust in EU institutions In wave 1 we
measured respondents’ trust towards EU institutions with two items: (1) ‘How much
trust do you have in the European Parliament?’, and (2) ‘How much trust do you have
in the European Commission?’, answered on 7-point scales ranging from ‘not trust at
all’ (1) to ‘a great deal of trust’ (7). A confirmatory factor analysis yielded a distinct
factor of trust in EU institutions (Eigenvalue = 2.47). The sum score was divided by
two, yielding a variable on a 7-point scale (M = 3.68, SD = 1.50).
Controls (individual level): Furthermore, we control for age measured in years
(M = 39.29, SD = 13.21), gender (1 = female, 0 = male, 46.7 % male), and education
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News and political cynicism
measured with country-specific lists indicating obtainable educational degrees and
recoded into six categories comparable across countries from lowest to highest (M =
3.83, SD = 1.53).
Finally we include a number of information related variable as additional
control variables. First, we are the first study to take into account types of contact with
parties election campaign efforts. In particular we assume that having direct, face-toface contact with a candidate running for the EP or with a party member that is
campaigning may reduce EP campaign cynicism over the course of the campaign.
Face-to-face contact is thought to contribute to perceiving candidates as more sincere
and honest. Two measures indicating citizens’ contact with the EP campaign are
utilized. The first indicates direct, face-to-face contact with a candidate or party
member either on the street or at the front door, and the second indicates mediated
campaign contact through email, social network sites, telephone or direct mail. The
direct campaign contact variable ranges between 0 and 2 (M = 0.14, SD = 0.39) and
the mediated campaign contact variable ranges between 0 and 4 (M = 0.57, SD =
0.75). Secondly, we also include the frequency of discussing the EP campaign with
family or friends measured on a 7-point scale (M =3.32, SD = 1.67) as an additional
information related control variable.
Analysis: We specified multilevel regression models with EP campaign
cynicism (wave 2) as the dependent variable. In our model we focused on change
between the panel waves by controlling for EP campaign cynicism at time 1 and
assessed the impact of individual news exposure as well as other individual-level and
country-level variables on EP campaign cynicism at wave 2. All independent
variables were z-standardized before entered into the analysis and interaction terms
were computed from the z-standardized variables.
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News and political cynicism
Results
As Figure 1 illustrates, the degree of strategy framing in campaign news coverage
varies across countries and has been of considerable prominence in campaign news
coverage (M=.29, SD=.33). Thus, in response to our research question we can state
that averaging the degree of strategy framing per country (i.e. including all news
outlets in a country) yields high scores for Malta (M=.54, SD=.43), Austria (M=.43,
SD=.32 and Greece (M=.39, SD=.36), followed by the Czech Republic (M=.36,
SD=.32), Finland (M=.35, SD=.35), and Romania (M=.34, SD=.33). Strategy framing
was least prominent in Luxembourg (M=.02, SD=.08), Lithuania (M=.02, SD=.09),
Sweden (M=.06, SD=.15), Estonia (M=.12, SD=.20), and the Netherlands (M=.12,
SD=.19). In our analysis below, we will build in the outlet-specific strategy framing
scores of our media content analysis into our survey measure of individual news
exposure in order to assess the impact of strategy framing on EP campaign cynicism.
--- FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE ---
Figure 2 displays the country means of EP campaign cynicism at wave 2 (grey bars)
and the average change in EP campaign cynicism by country (black bars). We see the
lowest levels of cynicism in some of the Northwest European countries such as
Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands, Germany and the UK, but contrast to high levels
of cynicism in Greece, Bulgaria, Poland and the Czech Republic. On average EP
campaign cynicism slightly increased over the course of the campaign (wave 1 M =
5.14, SD = 1.36; wave 2 M = 5.22, SD = 1.39). We can see considerable variation
across countries, however, with cynicism increasing the most in Greece, Bulgaria,
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News and political cynicism
Lithuania, Czech Republic and Spain with more than .2 on a 7-point scale. Also
increases in Finland, the UK, Hungary and Denmark (> .1) are significant as shown
by paired-sample t-tests for the different countries (all t-values > 2.57, p < .05). EP
campaign cynicism decreased significantly over the course of the campaign only in
Germany and Belgium (t-values < 3.02, p < .01).
--- FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE ---
We now turn to the results of our multivariate analyses presented in Table 1. The
empty model shown in the second column yields an intra-class correlation of 16.5
percent, thereby warranting a multilevel modeling strategy. Next we present the
individual level baseline model in the third column. We do not find any significant
direct effect of exposure to strategically frames news. As expected, there is a strong
effect of the lagged term of EP campaign cynicism. Furthermore, and as expected, we
find an, albeit weak and negative, effect of direct campaign contact. Those citizens
who were in direct contact with political candidates tended to become less cynical.
We furthermore find a substantial effect of age, with older people showing a higher
likelihood to become more cynical over the campaign. Women became less cynical,
and frequently discussing the campaign was related to increasing cynicism.
--- TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE ---
The next model shows the hypothesized interaction effect between strategy frame
exposure and awareness of the EP campaign. The interaction effect is significant and
negative, which is in line with our expectations: The more aware citizens are, if at all,
20
News and political cynicism
the less affected by exposure to strategy framing they are. It is the politically unaware
for whom strategy frame exposure yields a positive effect. The interaction effect is
illustrated in Figure 3a. This finding yields support for Hypothesis 1. The effects of
the control variables are largely unchanged compared to the baseline model.
--- FIGURE 3a AND 3b ABOUT HERE ---
Next, we turn to our second hypothesis. We expected that in contexts with lower
levels of trust in EU institutions, cynicism is more likely to increase in response to
exposure to strategy framing compared to contexts that are characterized by higher
levels of institutional trust. The cross level interaction model shown in the fifth
column confirms this expectation. We indeed find significant variation of the effect of
strategy framing across countries: In countries with low levels of trust in EU
institutions exposure to strategy frames likely increases EP cynicism. In high trust
countries, we see a reverse impact. The intraclass correlation decreases substantially
to 11 percent after the inclusion of the country level variable. Again, the effect of the
control variables remains substantially unaltered.
The final two models are included to show the robustness of our results. First,
we include both interaction terms in one model in the complete model in column six.
Substantially, the effects remain as discussed previously. Finally, the inclusion of two
different interaction terms with strategy frame exposure yields the question of the
interplay between all three factors. Therefore, in the final model we test the 3-way
interaction effect between strategy frame exposure, EP awareness and country level
trust in EU institutions. As can be seen this effect is not statistically significant,
whereas both interaction effects remain. We therefore are confident in our finding that
21
News and political cynicism
the impact of exposure to strategy frames on cynicism depends on individual and
country level factors.
Discussion
The present study investigates the impact of strategy framing in campaign news
coverage on levels of political cynicism. The analysis was conducted in the context of
the European Parliamentary elections in 2009 which ensures 27 countries in which to
study the variation of the framing of a single event. EP elections are one of the rare
occasions at which the EU receives wide media attention and as such they represent a
defining moment also for the formation of public attitudes (Boomgaarden et al.,
2010). The article draws upon a comprehensive study of the election news coverage in
the most prominent television news and newspapers in the 27 EU countries, totaling
more than 52,000 stories. Previous research on the link between news framing and
public opinion has pointed to the importance of taking into account actual content
characteristics of news coverage when modelling media effects. The present study
takes account of this by combining media content with panel survey data and provides
evidence for that political cynicism towards the EU has increased during the period of
the 2009 EP election campaign and that the impact of exposure to strategically framed
news on political cynicism was conditional on both individual and contextual factors.
Different framing effects studies address the question of how political
sophistication influences the magnitude as well as the processing of a news frame.
Evidence is divided and one group of scholars finds less knowledgeable individuals to
be more susceptible to framing effects (e.g. de Vreese, 2005; Kinder & Sanders, 1990;
Schuck & de Vreese, 2006), whereas a second group finds the opposite (Krosnick &
Brannon, 1993; Nelson et al., 1997). Druckman and Nelson (2003: 732) ascribe the
22
News and political cynicism
mixed findings to a general failure of measuring political knowledge. As de Vreese
and Lecheler (2011) argue it may not be political knowledge per se that moderates
framing effects, but the availability of relevant knowledge and the existence of prior
opinions on that issue. For this reason we used interest in and knowledge about the
issue at hand and it is likely that strategic news framing is more powerful for those
who are less engaged with EU politics. For other news frames this may work
differently since these frames invite for more active processing and may therefore be
more influential for those high in political sophistication
Our study carries important implications, both with regard to the discussion
about the alleged democratic deficit of the EU and the growing detachment of
European citizens from the Union as well as concerning the more normative question
regarding the function and role of news coverage of election campaigns. Our findings
suggest that strategy framing in the news has the potential to fuel public
dissatisfaction with EU politics. This was particularly the case for those who are less
attuned to EU politics to start with and who live in a country in which trust in EU
institutions is low. Strategy news does not create cynicism for those more engaged
with EU politics and those living in a country where the base line trust in the EU is
higher.
Indeed, some research suggests that EU news coverage has the potential to
increase knowledge about EU affairs and higher levels of knowledge about European
politics, for example, have shown to be associated with higher satisfaction with EU
democracy (Karp et al., 2003). Furthermore, de Vreese (2002) argued that the EU
needs to be present in the news in order to facilitate discussion and knowledge about
its policies. This study makes an important nuance to this observation: news coverage
of the EU ‘in action’ may not per se contribute positively to public perceptions of the
23
News and political cynicism
EU and is not always beneficial for the EU. However, as we demonstrate in the
current study if strategy framing in the news leads to political cynicism or not depends
on various individual and contextual factors. Thus, it indeed seems more legitimate to
speak of a ‘spiral of cynicism for some’ and, as we add, only under certain conditions
on the contextual level which we took a first step to investigate in this study.
The conditionality of effects we show may also help to understand why
previous studies, conducted in single country contexts, came to differing conclusions
regarding the connection between strategy framing in the news and political cynicism.
Moreover, this study specifically investigates the effects of strategy news framing
which is often confounded with the game frame (Lawrence, 2000). In general, it
seems plausible that news focusing on the strategic operation of politicians can more
easily contribute to negative public sentiments about politics than news about which
party or candidate is ahead which is the essence of the game frame (Patterson, 1993).
Specifically in the case of EP elections it also seems unlikely that the focus on the
political game of who is ahead would spark cynicism since less it at stake during the
elections and no government is formed as a consequence of the elections (de Vreese,
2002). Both in general conceptual terms as well as in the specific case of EU politics
it therefore makes sense to distinguish between strategy and game framing in the
news.
Our findings also have important implications for the EU. The relationship
between the EU and the news media has not always been a love affair. Former EU
Commission president Romano Prodi in 2002, at a press conference of the European
Convention, felt the need to add some clarifications to his speech in order to “avoid
misunderstandings fuelled by the press”. Often EU officials seem to believe that the
media are in part to blame for the alleged communication deficit of the European
24
News and political cynicism
Union, let it be because they feel misrepresented or neglected. Some research on the
working conditions of Brussels correspondents indeed cites different reasons for why
EU news is not represented more prominently in national media (e.g., Gavin, 2001;
Lecheler, 2008; Morgan, 1995) and other research has characterized the EU as a
“faceless Union” as a result of its low general visibility in the news (Peter & de
Vreese, 2004; see also Meyer, 1999).
The present study combined a media content analysis with panel survey data in
21 of the 27 EU member states, assessing media effects on political cynicism more
elaborately and thus also methodologically represents a contribution to existing
investigations into the role of the media in elections. Our findings contribute to the
discussion of the role of the news media for political cynicism. Overall, this study
provides the first comprehensive overview over the impact of election coverage on
political cynicism within a European context. Based on our findings we conclude that
future research should consider the contents of campaign news coverage as an
important factor in explaining cross-country variation in levels of political cynicism
towards politics in general as well as the EU in particular and, importantly, also take
into account those factors that can explain how the same content can have different
effects in different contexts.
25
News and political cynicism
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Figure 1:
Level of strategy framing in campaign coverage in all 27 EU member states
1
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
Austria
Belgium
Bulgaria
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Ireland
Italy
Latvia
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Malta
Netherlands
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
UK
0
Note: Bars indicate average level of strategy framing in media coverage in the
respective EU member states (aggregated to country-level).
32
News and political cynicism
Figure 2:
Change in EP campaign cynicism between wave 1 and wave 2 by country
7
0.5
0.4
6
0.3
5
0.2
4
0.1
0
3
-0.1
2
-0.2
-0.3
1
-0.4
EP cynicism w2
Greece
Bulgaria
Poland
Czech Republic
Spain
Lithuania
France
Italy
Hungary
Portugal
Ireland
Total average
Austria
Latvia
Belgium
Finland
Slovakia
UK
Germany
Netherlands
Sweden
-0.5
Denmark
0
change EP cynicism
33
News and political cynicism
Figure 3a:
Plot of interaction effect between exposure strategy news and EU awareness
(Individual level interaction model)
5.5
Predicted values EP campaign cynicism
5.4
5.3
5.2
5.1
5
Low Exposure strategy news
Low EU awareness
High Exposure strategy news
High EU awareness
34
News and political cynicism
Figure 3b:
Plot of interaction effect between exposure strategy news and country level trust in
EU institutions (Crosslevel interaction model)
5.5
Predicted values EP campaign cynicism
5.4
5.3
5.2
5.1
5
Low Exposure strategy news
Low Trust EU institutions
High Exposure strategy news
High Trust EU institutions
35
Table 1:
Multilevel regression explaining EP campaign cynicism in 2009 EP elections (wave2)
Empty model
Coefficient
Constant
Campaign
cynicism t-1
Age
Gender
Education
Exposure strategy
news
Direct campaign
contact
Mediated
campaign contact
Discussing EP
campaign
EU awareness
EU awareness *
Exposure strategy
news
Mean trust EU
institutions
Mean trust EU
institutions*
Exposure strategy
news
Mean trust EU
institutions*EU
5.226***
Std.
Err.
.059
Individual level
baseline model
Coefficient
Std.
Err.
5.225***
.046
0.600***
.008
Individual level
interaction model
Coefficient
Std.
Err.
5.231***
.046
0.599***
.008
Crosslevel interaction
model
Coefficient
Std.
Err.
5.227***
.035
0.599***
.008
Complete model
5.232***
0.598***
Std.
Err.
.035
.008
Three-way interaction
model
Coefficient
Std.
Err.
5.233***
.035
0.598***
.008
0.132***
-0.031***
-0.001
0.001
.009
.008
.009
.010
0.129***
-0.027**
-0.006
0.008
.009
.008
.009
.010
0.131***
-0.031**
-0.001
-0.001
.009
.008
.009
.010
0.129***
-0.026**
-0.006
0.006
.009
.008
.009
.010
0.130***
-0.026**
-0.006
0.005
.009
.008
.009
.010
-0.019*
.009
-0.019*
.009
-0.019*
.009
-0.019*
.009
-0.019*
.009
0.010
.009
0.009
.009
0.011
.009
0.010
.009
0.010
.009
0.025**
.009
-0.012
.013
0.025**
.008
-0.011
.013
-0.012
.013
0.048***
-0.028***
.013
.008
0.047***
-0.026***
.013
.008
0.048***
-0.024***
.013
.008
Coefficient
0.128***
.035
0.125***
.035
0.124***
.035
-0.043***
.010
-0.041***
.010
-0.042***
.011
-0.011
.008
News and political cynicism
awareness
Mean trust EU
institutions*
Exposure strategy
news*EU
awareness
Intercept variance
Intraclass
correlation
N level 1
N level 2
Average N per
group
Log likelihood
Wald chi2
0.269***
.165
.043
0.209***
.148
.034
0.207***
.146
.034
0.157***
.115
.027
0.158***
.116
.027
0.010
.008
0.159***
.116
.027
22804
21
1085.9
22804
21
1085.9
22804
21
1085.9
22804
21
1085.9
22804
21
1085.9
22804
21
1085.9
-39441.59
-36706.12
6252.45
-36700.94
6283.97
-36697.18
6300.41
-36693.23
6328.25
-36699.24
6332.01
Note. Coefficients are are unstandardized coefficients from multilevel models. Variables were z-standardized prior to estimations.
* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001 (two-tailed)
37
ENDNOTES
i
We focus on national television and newspapers because these media are consistently
listed as the most important sources of information about the EU for citizens in
Europe (Eurobarometer 54–62).
ii
Sport, Travel, Housing, Culture, Motor/Auto, Fashion or Entertainment sections
have not been coded.
iii
In order to be classified as EU story, the EU or any sort of EU institution, policy or
synonym had to be mentioned at least once in a story. In order to be classified as EU
election story, the EP election or the campaign had to be mentioned explicitly at least
once in the story.
iv
The study coordinators not only attended but also performed as trainers in all
training sessions at both locations. The inter-coder reliability scores reported below
are based on a combined test including all 58 coders from both locations and is based
on a sub-sample of 35 randomly selected news items, including both TV and
newspaper items and including EU, EU election as well as non-EU stories (for more
detailed information on inter-coder reliability see the documentation report, Schuck et
al. 2010).
v
The study was funded by the Dutch National Science Foundation (VICI grant) and
additional grants from the Danish Science Foundation, the University of Amsterdam,
and the Swedish Riksbanken Foundation.
vi
The countries were the UK, France, Italy, Germany, Spain, Sweden, Denmark,
Greece, Hungary, Czech Republic, Poland, Ireland, Austria, Portugal, Belgium
(Flanders and Wallonia), Netherlands, Finland, Lithuania, Latvia, Slovakia &
Bulgaria. The country selection includes larger and smaller member states, countries
News and political cynicism
from North, South, East and West, and long term and new members to the Union. The
country selection was finalized based on feasibility.
vii
Fieldwork started on May 6 in all countries. In the UK and Ireland data collection
finished on May 11, in France, Italy, Germany, Spain, Sweden, Greece, Czech
Republic, Austria, Portugal, Netherlands, Finland and Slovakia on May 12, in
Hungary, Poland and Latvia on May 13, in Denmark and Belgium on May 14, in
Lithuania on May 15 and in Bulgaria on May 18.
viii
In Slovakia and Bulgaria data collection finished on June 11, in Italy, Germany,
Sweden, Czech Republic, Lithuania, and the Netherlands on June 12, in Ireland and
the UK on June 13, in France, Poland and Austria on June 14, in Spain, Denmark,
Greece, Hungary, Portugal, Finland, and Latvia on June 15 and Belgium on June 19.
ix
The age limit in Austria was 16. This is because voting age in Austria is 16
(whereas it is 18 in all other countries).
x
In Belgium, 1,000 Flemish respondents and 1,000 Walloon respondents completed
both waves of the survey.
xi
The response rates vary from 19% (Denmark) to 63% (Lithuania) in wave 1 and the
re-contact rate between 67% (Latvia) and 89% (Hungary). An analysis of the nonparticipation (i.e. respondents who were invited but did not participate or not
complete the interview) showed that non-respondents were younger, included more
men compared to women in the UK, Sweden and Denmark and more women in
Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Austria. Concerning education, the pool
of non-respondents was significantly lower educated in six countries (Spain,
Denmark, Czech Republic, Poland, the Netherlands and Finland).
xii
An overview of the composition of our sample vis-à-vis census data per country
showed no differences between the adult population and the sample in terms of
39
News and political cynicism
gender in Austria, Ireland, Slovakia and Spain. The mean difference between the
population and the sample was 2.76% (SD=3.43%). Small deviations occurred (08%), with sometimes women overrepresented and sometimes men. One substantial
overrepresentation (of women) by 15% occurred in Latvia. Young citizens were
generally slightly overrepresented in the samples. The share of young citizens (under
35) deviated 9.62% on average (SD=8.95%), with a minimum of 1% absolute
deviation (overrepresentation) in Italy and Sweden, and a maximum of 34%
(overrepresentation) in Greece. The largest underrepresentation of younger citizens
was found in Latvia (14%). The share of older citizens (55+) (M=16.57%,
SD=9.91%) deviated from 1% in France and the UK (overrepresentations) to 33%
(underrepresentation in Greece). Most countries had slight underrepresentation of
older citizens. The German sample had the largest overrepresentation (2%). In terms
of education (collapsed in three categories, following the European Social Survey),
the sample reflected the population in Ireland and Spain, while deviations (M=8.12%,
SD=8.37%) were found in other countries with higher educated citizens being
overrepresented in the samples. Underrepresentations were found in Greece (1%),
France (6%), Slovakia (5%) and Sweden (11%). For more information, see de Vreese
et al., 2010.
40