PO8007
International Politics
MSc International Politics
Department of Political Science
Trinity College Dublin
Michaelmas Term 2013
William Phelan
phelanw@tcd.ie
Office: 5.04, 2-3 College Green.
This course is a survey of International Relations scholarship, introducing students to fundamental
concepts and important writing in the field.
Much scholarship in international politics naturally addresses important but specific questions
relating to particular international conflicts or particular international regimes: explanations of wars
between particular state pairs (‘dyads’) in particular years, explanations of the amount of aid granted
by the IMF to different countries in particular years, or explanations for why states pursue disputes
against other states in the World Trade Organization (WTO). Scholarship on these particular questions
is often driven by more fundamental scholarship addressing offering theoretical explanations for the
causes of war, or reasons for decisions by international institutions, or for international cooperation
between states in costly issue-areas. This course provides an overview of some of the fundamental
readings in many different issue-areas in international politics, as well as discussion of, or references
to, related examples of recent scholarship.
The approach of this course to studying international politics is positive and generalisable. By positive
is meant that the research discussed in this course attempts to explain outcomes in international
politics, rather than to address normative questions of justice or morality, or to offer advice to policymakers. By generalisable is meant that the research discussed in this course attempts to find causal
explanations that work across time and space, rather than idiosyncratic explanations for particular
events.
Books recommended for purchase:
R. O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton
University Press, 1984 or 2005)
Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Addison-Wesley, 1979),
Or Neorealism and its Critics, edited by R. O. Keohane, (Columbia U Press, 1986)
[The main chapters of Waltz, Theory are reprinted in Keohane, Neorealism]
All three should be available at Hodges Figgis on Dawson St, and other good booksellers.
Student Requirements and Grades:
Class participation
10%
Class participation requires contributing to class discussion, including listening to others, and having
questions for discussion, demonstrating that contributions are based on a thorough understanding
and detailed knowledge of all the required readings for the week, and on-time attendance. Additional
readings will not be discussed in seminar, but offer further background for students, particularly for
the in-class assessment, and, if so desired, for response papers. Note that where a book extract is a
required or additional reading, the remainder of the book in question is always an available and
relevant additional reading. Where a student is falling behind in class participation, the lecturer may
require additional response papers to be submitted.
1
Attendance: Attendance is required and non-attendance can result in a lowered overall module grade
absent a medical certificate or similar being provided. Where class is missed for any reason, even
where excused, an additional response paper for that week’s material is required, drawing on the
additional readings from that week, so that students do not fall behind. There is a separate folder on
turnitin for response papers due on account of non-attendance, make sure to state which week of
non-attendance the additional response paper refers to.
Response papers
30%
Students are required to write a response paper for week two plus six other response papers over the
term, at least three of which before reading week (i.e. three of the four weeks 3, 4, 5 & 6, and three
from weeks 8, 9, 10 & 11).
Response papers are not summaries, but demonstrate an understanding and provide a critique of, or
reasoned response to, the week’s readings. Assume the reader of your response paper knows the
readings well, so keep the summary of the readings terse, and focus on developing an argument
about them. Response papers can be written about either one or several of the week’s required
readings (and, if desired, additional readings, but not to the exclusion of the required readings).
Response papers should be at least one but no more than three double-spaced pages long and must
be submitted through turnitin.com by 9pm Irish Time on the Sunday preceding the Monday class. Get
your act together to submit well in advance of Sunday 9pm as late submissions will not be accepted.
Submitting on Saturday or even Friday is recommended. When you submit a response paper, you are
also particularly expected to actively participate in the discussion that week and the grade for the
response paper will take this into account. It is advised to read the required readings in the order they
have been set out in the syllabus.
Response papers may not be submitted late, so make sure to keep up with your required
submissions. Note that submitted response papers may be shared with other class students.
In-Class Assessment, Likely Monday December 9th 2013 [To be Confirmed]
60%
The in-class assessment at the end of term will require students to demonstrate an understanding of
the range of issues, arguments, and authors covered over the whole syllabus, and how they
contribute to the study of international relations. It will be possible to pass demonstrating knowledge
only of the required readings, but a good answer will demonstrate some knowledge of recommended
readings as well. Further details and an example assessment paper will be provided later in the term.
If you have not taken a timed in-class test relatively recently, you may want to practice.
Plagiarism: You are reminded of your obligations as a student at Trinity College to avoid plagiarism
and respect the highest standards of academic honesty. This is particularly important in terms of
commenting on academic literature where it is important that the review or critique is based on your
own reading and assessment of any literature discussed.
Turnitin: Course number 6998932. Password: intpolitics
Acknowledgments: I have benefitted from reading syllabuses by Andrew Moravcsik, Thomas
Christensen, and Ulrich Krotz in the preparation of this course.
2
Week 1: Introduction, Classical Realism
Variation-to-be-Explained Packet (short extract)
Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, Chapters 15, 17, 18.
Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War, pp 24-25 of Rex Warner Translation, and the Melian
Dialogue.
Melian Dialogue at:
http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/melian.htm
Kenneth Waltz, Man, The State, and War Chs 4 and 6
Hendrik Spruyt, The sovereign state and its competitors : an analysis of systems change (Princeton
studies in international history and politics, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J 1994), pp. 152180
Additional:
Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (Knopf, New York 1948),
chapter 1
Sean Molloy, The Hidden History of Realism: A Genealogy of Power Politics (Palgrave, 2006)
Waltz, K., Realism and International Relations Theory: The Essays of Ken Waltz.
Ashworth, Lucian M. “Did the Realist-Idealist Great Debate Really Happen? A Revisionist History of
International Relations,” International Relations (2002), Vol. 16, No. 1.
Brian C. Schmidt, The political discourse of anarchy: A disciplinary history of international relations
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998)
Wilson, Peter. “Carr and His Early Critics: Responses to The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1939–1946,” in E.H.
Carr: A Critical Reappraisal, ed. Michael Cox (London: Macmillan, 2000).
Gary King, Robert O. Keohane and Sidney Verba, Designing social inquiry : scientific inference in
qualitative research (Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J 1994)
Ben Cohen “Are IPE Journals Becoming Boring?” International Studies Quarterly (2010) 54, pp 887-891
and other papers in the ISQ seminar.
See also the Maliniak piece in the last week of the syllabus.
More European macro-history:
Gianfranco Poggi, The Development of the Modern State: A sociological introduction (Stanford
University Press, Stanford, California 1978)
Brian M. Downing, The military revolution and political change : origins of democracy and autocracy in
early modern Europe (Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J. 1992)
3
Week 2: Neorealism
Edward Hallett Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939: an introduction to the study of international
relations (Macmillan, London 1940) Chapter 11 ‘The Sanctity of Treaties’
Waltz K., Theory of International Politics (1979), Chapters 1, 4-6.
Also available in
Keohane, ed., Neorealism and its Critics (Columbia U Press, 1986)
Chapters 2-5 by Waltz
Waltz K, “Explaining International Institutions” pp 207-213 in Realism and International Politics.
John J. Mearsheimer, "Why Is Europe Peaceful Today," European Political Science, Vol. 9, 2 No. 3
(September 2010)
Additional:
Neorealism and its Critics:
Chapter by Keohane ‘Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond’
R Keohane, ed., Neorealism and its Critics, the rest.
D Baldwin, “Power analysis in World Politics: New Trends versus Old Tendencies” World Politics 31
(1979), pp. 161-194.
D Baldwin, Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (CUP, 1993).
John J. Mearsheimer, "Correspondence: Back to the Future, Part II: International Relations Theory and
Post-Cold War Europe," International Security, Vol. 15, No. 2 (Fall 1990), pp. 194-199 and John J.
Mearsheimer, "Correspondence: Back to the Future, Part III: Realism and the Realities of European
Security," International Security, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Winter 1990/1991), pp. 219-222. Rosato, S. Europe United: Power Politics and the Making of the European Community (Cornell UP,
2011).
John J. Mearsheimer, "Why Is Europe Peaceful Today," European Political Science, Vol. 9, 2 No. 3
(September 2010)
Rosato, Sebastian (2011). 'Europe's Troubles: Power Politics and the State of the European Project.'
International Security 35(4): 45-86. Also: Krotz, Ulrich, Richard Maher, David M. McCourt, Andrew
Glencross, Norrin M. Ripsman, Mark S Sheetz, Jean-Yves Haine and Sebastian Rosato (2012).
'Correspondence: Debating the Sources and Prospects of European Integration.' International Security
37(1): 178-199.
4
Week 3:
State Preferences: Social Pressures
Fédéric Bastiat “A Petition from the Manufacturers of Candles…”
Available at: http://bastiat.org/en/petition.html
Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations, pp. 41-53 on ‘small groups’ and ‘encompassing
groups’.
Note on Olson, Collective Action etc. On Blackboard.
John A. Hobson, "Imperialism: A Study", pp.4-28, in H. Wright, ed., The ‘New Imperialism’ (Boston,
Heath, 1961).
Andrew Moravcsik, 'Taking preferences seriously: A liberal theory of international politics' (1997) 51
(4) International Organization 513-553
Ellen A. Cutrone, Benjamin O. Fordham “Commerce and Imagination: The Sources of Concern about
International Human Rights in the US Congress” International Studies Quarterly 2010 54(3) 633-655
Additional:
P. Gourevitch, 'Second Image Reversed - International Sources of Domestic Politics' (1978) 32 (4)
International Organization 881-911
Jonathan Kirschner, Appeasing Bankers: Financial Caution on the Road to War (Princeton, 2007)
John Ruggie, 'International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar
Economic Order' (1982) 36 (2) International Organization 379-425
P. A. Gourevitch, 'International-Trade, Domestic Coalitions, and Liberty - Comparative Responses to
Crisis of 1873-1896' (1977) 8 (2) Journal of Interdisciplinary History 281-313
Robert O. Keohane, 'The Demand for International Regimes' (1982) 36 (2) International Organization
325-355
David Lake and Robert Powell, Strategic Choice and International Relations: (Princeton University
Press, Princeton, NJ 1999), Chapter 1 and throughout
J. A. Frieden, 'Invested Interests - the Politics of National Economic-Policies in a World of Global
Finance' (1991) 45 (4) International Organization 425-451
Geoffrey Garrett, “Global Markets and National Politics: Collision Course or Virtuous Circle?”
International Organization 52, 4 (Autumn 1998), pp. 787-824.
Mark Copelovitch, “Master or Servant? Common Agency and the Political Economy of IMF Lending”.
Forthcoming, International Studies Quarterly.
Mancur Olson, The logic of collective action : public goods and the theory of groups (Harvard
economic studies ; Vol124, Harvard U.P.; Oxford U.P, 1965)
5
Week 4: State Preferences: Domestic Institutions
Norman Angell, The Great Illusion (1933 Edition), 77-81, 137-145.
Paul Kennedy Strategy versus Finance in Twentieth Century Great Britain The International History
Review, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Jan., 1981), pp. 44-61
G. Allison, "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis," APSR (Sept 1969): 696-7l8.
Michael W. Doyle, 'Liberalism in World Politics' (1986) 80 (4) American Political Science Review 11511169
Bruce Russett and Zeev Maoz, “Normative and Structural Causes of the Democratic Peace, 19461986,” American Political Science Review, 87, 3, (1993):624-638.
SJ Rickard, 'Democratic Differences: Electoral institutions and compliance with GATT/WTO
agreements' (2010) 16 (4) European Journal of International Relations 711-729
Additional:
Michael Bailey, J. Goldstein and Barry Weingast, 'The institutional roots of American trade policy:
Politics, Coalitions and International Trade' (1997) 49 (3) World Politics 309-338
Jonathan Bendor and Thomas H. Hammond, "Rethinking Allison's Models," American Political Science
Review 86, 2 (June 1992), pp. 301-22.
S. Krasner, "Allison in Wonderland: Are Bureaucracies Important?" Foreign Policy (Summer l972), pp.
l59-l79.
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and others, The Logic of Political Survival (MIT Press, Cambridge MA 2003)
Immanuel Kant, pp72-85 in Toward Perpetual Peace and other Writings, edited by Kleingeld,
translated Colclasure, Yale UP, 2006.
James D. Fearon, 'Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes' (1994) 88
American Political Science Review 577-592
Helen V. Milner, Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International
Information (Princeton University Press, Princeton 1997)
Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Cornell, Ithaca 1991)
Snyder, Shapiro, Bloch-Elkon “Free Hand Abroad, Divide and Rule at Home”, World Politics 2009, 61:1,
155-187.
Milner, H. V. and K. Kubota (2005). "Why the Move to Free Trade? Democracy and Trade Policy in the
Developing Countries." International Organization 59(4): 107-143.
Ceadel, Martin (2009). Living the great illusion : Sir Norman Angell, 1872-1967. Oxford, OUP.
6
Week 5: Strategic Interaction, Bargaining, War
[Selections of readings relevant to negotiations for the NAFTA treaties]
Thomas Schelling, Strategy of Conflict, Ch. 2 ‘Essay on Bargaining’ 1960.
James D. Morrow, “The Strategic Setting of Choices: Signaling, Commitment, and Negotiation in
International Politics,” in Lake and Powell, Strategic Choice, pp. 77-114.
James D. Fearon, 'Rationalist Explanations for War' (1995) 49 (3) International Organization 379-414
Robert Putnam, 'Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games' (1988) 42 (3)
International Organization 427-460
Robert Pape “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism” American Political Science Review (2003) 97(3)
pp 343-361.
Additional:
R. Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," World Politics (January l978), pp. l67ff.
R. Keohane and J. Nye, Power and Interdependence, pp. 1-19 (Longman, 2001)
T. Schelling Arms and Influence (Harvard, First Edition, 1966).
J. Kirshner, "Rational Explanation for War?" Security Studies, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Autumn 2000), pp. 143150.
Eric Gartzke, “War is in the Error Term,” International Organization, 53, 3 (Summer 1999), pp. 567587.
R. Harrison Wagner, “Bargaining and War,” American Journal of Political Science 44, 3 (July 2000),
pp.469-484.
Branislav L. Slantchev and Bahar Leventoglu, “The Armed Peace: A Punctuated Equilibrium Theory of
War,” American Journal of Political Science, 51, 4 (October 2007), pp. 755-771.
Andrew Moravcsik Why the European Community Strengthens the State: Domestic Politics and
International Cooperation 1994, Harvard CES Working Paper no. 52
http://www.princeton.edu/~amoravcs/library/strengthen.pdf
Stephen Van Evera, “Why Cooperation Failed in 1914,” in Oye, “Cooperation Under Anarchy.”
Jack S. Levy, “War and Peace,” in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth Simmons, Handbook of
International Relations (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2002), pp.350-368.
Peter B. Evans, Harold Karan Jacobson and Robert D. Putnam, Double-edged diplomacy : international
bargaining and domestic politics (Studies in international political economy ; 25, University of
California Press, Berkeley 1993)
7
Week 6: Alliances [NB Rescheduled from Monday, Bank Holiday]
TIMING TO BE RESCHEDULED
Richardson, L. When Allies Differ: Anglo-American Relations During the Suez and Falklands Crises (St.
Martin’s Press, 1996), pp 1-21.
S. Walt, The Origins of Alliances, chapters 1 and 2.
S. David, "Explaining Third World Alignment," World Politics, January 1991, pp. 233-256.
R. Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In,” International Security
19 (1994), pp. 72-107.
Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, “Is Anybody Still a Realist?” International Security 24:2 (Fall
1999), 5-55.
Additional:
James Morrow, “Arms Versus Allies: Trade-offs in the Search for Security,” International Organization,
47, pp. 207-33.
D. Reiter, “Learning, Realism, and Alliances: The Shadow of the Past,” World Politics 46 (July 1994), pp.
490-526.
T. Christensen, "Perceptions and Alliances in Europe, 1865-1940," International Organization vol. 51,
no. 1 (Winter 1997), pp. 65-97. (response to Morrow).
Jervis, “From Balance to Concert: A Study of International Security Cooperation,” in Kenneth A. Oye,
ed,, Cooperation Under Anarchy, (Princeton, NJ; Princeton Univ. Press, 1986), pp. 173-199.
William Wohlforth et al, “Testing Balance of Power Theory in World History,” European Journal of
International Relations 13:2 (2007), 155-185.
*Robert Powell, In the Shadow of Power: States and Strategies in International Politics, (1999)
Chapters 1, 5.
Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Neoclassical Realism, the State, and
Foreign Policy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), chapter 1 (“Neoclassical Realism, the
State, and Foreign Policy,” pp. 1-41)
Rosato, S. Europe United: Power Politics and the Making of the European Community (Cornell UP,
2011), 2-3, 20-40.
WEEK 7 IS READING WEEK
8
Week 8
Institutions and Information
Charles Kindleberger, “An Explanation of the 1929 Depression,” in The World in Depression, 19291939 (1986), pp. 288-305. (19 pp.)
Mandelbaum, M. The Case for Goliath: How America Acts as the World’s Government in the Twenty
First Century, pp. 6-11.
Axelrod, R. M. (1984). The Evolution of Cooperation. New York, Basic Books. Chapter 4 on the Live and
Let Live System in World War One. pp. 73-87
Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (1984),
pp 1-17 and 65-109. [Or whole book!]
Rosendorff, B. Peter and Helen V. Milner (2001). 'The Optimal Design of International Trade
Institutions: Uncertainty and Escape.' International Organization 55(4): 829-857.
Christina Davis and Yuki Shirato, 'Firms, Governments and WTO Adjudication: Japan's Selection of
WTO Disputes' (2007) 59 World Politics 274-313
Additional:
B. Blonigen and C. Bown “Antidumping and Retaliation Threats” Journal of International Economics 60 (2003)
249-273.
J. M. Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism,"
International Organization 42, 3 (Summer 1988): 485-508.
Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (Basic Books, New York 1984)
Complete special issue of International Organization on Regimes, Spring 1982.
Esp Krasner, Regimes Introduction in International Organization (Spring 1982).
Robert Powell, "The Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate" International Organization Spring 1994
A. Hasenclever, P. Mayer and V. Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes (Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge 1997)
Xinyuan Dai, International Institutions and National Policies (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2007)
Urpeleinen, J. Dissertation “All or Nothing: Avoiding Inefficient Compromise in International Cooperation”.
Dissertation. Extract [Available on Blackboard]
Norrlof, Carla. America’s Global Advantage: US Hegemony and International Cooperation (Cambridge University
Press, 2010).
Elinor Ostrom, 'A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action' (1997) 92 (1) American
Political Science Review 1-22
Alexander Thompson, Channels of Power: The UN Security Council and US Statecraft in Iraq (Cornell UP, Ithaca,
NY 2009)
Drezner, Daniel (2007). All Politics Is Global: Explaining International Regulatory Regimes. Princeton, NJ,
Princeton University Press.
J. Kucik and E. Reinhardt, 'Does Flexibility Promote Cooperation? An Application to the Global Trade Regime'
(2008) 62 (3) International Organization 477-505
9
Week 9
Variation in Regimes
Lisa L. Martin, 'Interests, Power and Multilateralism' (1992) 46 (4) International Organization 765-792
Statement delivered by Colin Murdoch, ambassador of Antigua and Barbuda to the 8 th session of the
WTO Ministerial Conference 17 December 2011 [on Blackboard]
Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, 'On Compliance' (1993) 47 (2) International Organization
175-205
George W. Downs, David M. Rocke and Peter N. Barsoom, 'Is the good news about compliance good
news about cooperation?' 1996 (3) International Organization 379-406
Davis, Christina (2012). Why Adjudicate? Enforcing Trade Rules in the WTO. Princeton NJ, Princeton
UP. Chapter 7 on Adjudication by Developing Countries.
Robert A. Dahl, 'Can International Organisations be Democratic? A Sceptic's View' in I Shapiro and C
Hacker-Cordón (eds) Democracy's Edges (Cambridge 1999)
From before:
Waltz K, “Explaining International Institutions” pp 207-213 in Realism and International Politics
Additional:
Arthur Stein, 'Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World' (1982) 36 (2)
International Organization 299-324
George W. Downs and David M. Rocke, Optimal Imperfection? Domestic Uncertainty and Institutions
in International Relations (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ 1995)
Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson and Duncan Snidal, 'The Rational Design of International
Institutions' (2001) 55 (4) International Organization 761-799
Jana von Stein, 'Do Treaties Constrain or Screen? Selection Bias and Treaty Compliance' (2005) 99 (4)
American Political Science Review 611-622
S. Krasner, 'State Power and the Structure of International Trade' (1976) 28 (3) World Politics 317-347
Michael J. Gilligan, Empowering Exporters: Reciprocity, Delegation, and Collective Action in American
Trade Policy (University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor 1997)
Fiona McGillivray and Alaistair Smith, Punishing the Prince: A Theory of Interstate Relations, Political
Institutions and Leader Change (Princeton University Press, Princeton 2008)
Jon C. Pevehouse, “Democracy from the Outside In? International Organizations and
Democratization,” International Organization, 56, 3 (Summer 2002), pp. 515-549.
Robert O Keohane, Stephen Macedo, and Andrew Moravcsik “Democracy-Enhancing Multilateralism”
International Organization 63, Winter 2009, pp 1–
Dai, Xinyuan (2005). 'Why Comply? The Domestic Constituency Mechanism.' International
Organization 59(2): 363-398.
James D. Fearon, 'Bargaining, Enforcement and International Cooperation' (1998) 52 (2) International
Organization 269-305
10
Week 10
Novelties, Oddities and further Developments
Spirling, Arthur (2012). 'U.S. Treaty Making with American Indians: Institutional Change and Relative
Power, 1784–1911.' American Journal of Political Science 56(1): 84-97.
E. Hafner-Burton “Trading Human Rights: How Preferential Trade Agreements Influence Government
Repression.” International Organization, 2005, 59(3), pp. 593-629.
Phelan, William (2012). 'What is Sui Generis about the European Union? Costly International
Cooperation in a Self-Contained Regime.' International Studies Review 14: 367-385.
Ulrich Krotz “Parapublic Underpinnings of International Relations: The Franco-German Construction
of Europeanization of a Particular Kind” European Journal of International Relations 2007,
Vol. 13, No. 3, pp. 385-417
Moon, Katherine (1997). Sex Among Allies: Military Prostitution in US-Korea Relations pp. 1-16.
Tingley, Dustin H. and Barbara F. Walter (2011). 'Can Cheap Talk Deter? An Experimental Analysis.'
Journal of Conflict Resolution 55(6): 994-1018.
Additional:
P. Haas, "Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean Pollution Control," International
Organization 43(3) (1989): 377-404.
Andrew Moravcsik, 'The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic delegation in postwar Europe' (2000) 54
(2) International Organization 217-+
Phelan, William (2011). 'Open International Markets without Exclusion: Encompassing Domestic Political
Institutions, International Organization, and Self-Contained Regimes.' International Theory 3(2): 286-306.
Andrew Moravcsik, The choice for Europe : social purpose and state power from Messina to Maastricht (Cornell
studies in political economy, UCL Press, London 1998) [Whole book, in Library]
Rickard, Stephanie J. (2010). 'Democratic Differences: Electoral institutions and compliance with GATT/WTO
agreements.' European Journal of International Relations 16(4): 711-729.
Anne-Marie Burley [Slaughter] and Walter Mattli, 'Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal
Integration' (1993) 47 International Organization 41-76
Daniel Yuichi Kono, 'Market Structure, Electoral Institutions, and Trade Policy' (2009) 53 (4) International Studies
Quarterly 885-906
J. Vreeland “Political Institutions and Human Rights: Why Dictatorships enter into the United Nations Convention
Against Torture” (2008) 62 (1) 65-101
Gauri, Varun (2011). 'The cost of complying with human rights treaties: The convention on the rights of the child
and basic immunization.' Review of International Organization 6: 33-56.
Copelovitch, Mark (2010). 'Master or Servant? Common Agency and the Political Economy of IMF Lending.'
International Studies Quarterly 54: 49-77.
Haas, Peter M. (1990). Saving the Mediterranean : the politics of international environmental cooperation. New
York, Columbia.
Hudson, Natalie F. and Michael J. Butler (2010). 'The State of Experimental Research in IR: An Analytical Survey.'
International Studies Review 12(2): 165-192.
J Gray and JB Slapin, 'How effective are preferential trade agreements? Ask the experts' (2012) 7 Review of
International Organization 309-333
11
Week 11
Beyond Rationality
A. Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It”, International Organization (1992), pp. 391-425.
Pape, Robert A. and Chaim D. Kaufmann (1999). 'Explaining Costly International Moral Action:
Britain's Sixty-Year Campaign against the Atlantic Slave Trade.' International Organization 53(4): 631668.
F. Schimmelfennig, 'The community trap: Liberal norms, rhetorical action, and the eastern
enlargement of the European Union' (2001) 55 (1) International Organization 47-+
R Price, 'A Genealogy of the Chemical Weapons Taboo' (1995) 49 (1) International Organization 73103
P. A. Hall and R. C. R. Taylor, 'Political science and the three new institutionalisms' (1996) 44 (5)
Political Studies 936-957
Daniel Maliniak, Amy Oakes, Susan Peterson and Michael J. Tierney The International Relations
Discipline, 1980-2006 http://irtheoryandpractice.wm.edu/projects/trip/TRIP.pdf
Additional:
Henry Farrell, “Constructing the International Foundations of E-Commerce – The EU-US Safe Harbor
Arrangement,” International Organization 57 (Spring 2003), pp. 277-306.
Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam decisions of
1965 (Princeton, 1992) Ch. 1
R. O. Keohane and J. Goldstein Ideas and Foreign Policy (1993, Cornell), Chapter 1 “Ideas and Foreign
Policy: An Analytical Framework”.
Thomas Risse, “Let’s Argue! Communicative Action in World Politics,” International Organization
(Winter 2000), 1-39.
Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change.”
International Organization 52, 4 (1998), pp. 887-917.
Jonathan L. Mercer, "Anarchy and Identity" 49:2 International Organization (Spring 1995), pp. 229252.
Jeffrey Legro, "Which Norms Matter? Revisiting the "Failure" of Institutionalism," International
Organization 51:1 (Winter 1997), pp. 31-63.
G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, “Socialization and Hegemonic Power,” International
Organization 44:3 (Summer, 1990), pp. 283-315.
C. Kaufmann and R. Pape 1999. Explaining costly international moral action. International
Organization 53 (autumn): 631-668.
March and Olsen, “The Logic of Appropriateness”, ARENA working paper, 04/09.
http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/wp04_9.pdf
Fearon, James D. and Alexander Wendt (2001). 'Rationalism v. Constructivism? A Skeptical View'. in
Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth Simmons (eds) Handbook of International Relations, Sage:
52-72.
N. Tannenwald The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons Since
1945 (Cambridge, 2007)
A Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (CUP, 1999).
12