15 Minute Learning Series
15 Minute Philosophy
From Thought to Thinking: A General Survey of
Philosophic Thought
Stephen Kirsch
Ciliegia Publishing Company
15 Minute Philosophy
From Thought to Thinking
Amassed By Stephen Kirsch
15 Minute Philosophy:
From Thought to Thinking
Edited, Compiled, and Written 2008-2011 by Stephen Kirsch
This work is a reflection solely of its author and as such reflects no great
scholarship or pride of ownership. As a whole the parts belonging to the
author are probably best kept by him and as a matter of fact are
probably not fit for reproduction. Still, like any children, I must claim
them as my own. Any inaccuracies, similarity to other works, or
downright lies should be considered par for the course. For truly, and
this work provides some proof of it, there are few original thoughts in
the world1.
As for that, those parts which may be considered new or not as
belonging to the author and appropriated from others, belong to them
as should be noted by citation (mea culpa if not) and should not be
considered a part of this work except by guilt through association.
1
Or in the words of Qoheleth “There is nothing new under the sun.” Ecclesiastes 1:9
Table of Contents
Table of Contents .................................................................................................................... ii
Illustrations, Lists and Charts .......................................................................................... xviii
Introduction ............................................................................................................................. xx
Thanks ................................................................................................................................. xx
By Way of Introduction… .................................................................................................. xx
Dedication ........................................................................................................................... xx
Chapter 1 ................................................................................................................................... 1
Philosophos ........................................................................................................................... 1
Understanding: Thinking About Thinking ........................................................................... 1
Logic: Testing the Waters ..................................................................................................... 2
Thinking Well: Logical Basis ............................................................................................... 2
Thinking Poorly: Logical Fallacy ......................................................................................... 4
Putting It Together ................................................................................................................ 5
Chapter 2 ................................................................................................................................... 6
Logic ..................................................................................................................................... 6
Supercalifallacylogicalidoscious .......................................................................................... 6
Aristotle: The Square of Opposition ..................................................................................... 6
Boole: Truth Tables .............................................................................................................. 8
Gödel: Incompleteness .......................................................................................................... 8
Putting It Together ................................................................................................................ 9
Chapter 3 ................................................................................................................................. 10
Fallacy ................................................................................................................................. 10
Fallacious Thinking ............................................................................................................ 10
Thinking Fallaciously ......................................................................................................... 11
Bias and Logical Bias ......................................................................................................... 11
Fallacies Bergere ................................................................................................................ 12
Putting It Together .............................................................................................................. 13
Chapter 4 ................................................................................................................................. 15
Decisions, Decisions ........................................................................................................... 15
Time To Focus .................................................................................................................... 15
Final Answer? ..................................................................................................................... 18
Making the Decision ........................................................................................................... 18
Putting It Together .............................................................................................................. 19
Chapter 5 ................................................................................................................................. 20
The Name Game ................................................................................................................. 20
Semantics ............................................................................................................................ 20
The Branches of the Philosophical Tree ............................................................................. 21
The Flowering of Philosophical Thought ........................................................................... 21
Putting It Together .............................................................................................................. 21
Chapter 6 ................................................................................................................................. 23
We Have A History............................................................................................................. 23
The History of Philosophy .................................................................................................. 23
East vs. West ....................................................................................................................... 23
Geographically .................................................................................................................... 24
Chronographically............................................................................................................... 24
Philosophically.................................................................................................................... 24
Pre-History .......................................................................................................................... 24
History................................................................................................................................. 25
Putting It Together .............................................................................................................. 26
Chapter 7 ................................................................................................................................. 27
Philosophical Journeys........................................................................................................ 27
The Roots of Philosophy..................................................................................................... 27
The Philosophy of Roots ..................................................................................................... 27
Are We There Yet? ............................................................................................................. 28
So Just Where Are We Going? ........................................................................................... 28
Putting It Together .............................................................................................................. 28
Chapter 8 ................................................................................................................................. 29
Philosophy World ............................................................................................................... 29
Thinking about Thinking .................................................................................................... 29
Western Philosophy at a Glance ......................................................................................... 29
Development of Philosophies ............................................................................................. 31
The Players.......................................................................................................................... 31
Early Thinking .................................................................................................................... 31
Something Or Nothing ........................................................................................................ 31
Cause And Movement......................................................................................................... 32
Animal, Mineral Or Vegetable? .......................................................................................... 32
Putting It Together .............................................................................................................. 32
Chapter 9 ................................................................................................................................. 34
Western Philosophy ............................................................................................................ 34
The Players.......................................................................................................................... 34
Fate ...................................................................................................................................... 34
The Sophists ........................................................................................................................ 35
The Others ........................................................................................................................... 35
The Gist ............................................................................................................................... 36
Putting It Together .............................................................................................................. 37
Chapter 10 ............................................................................................................................... 38
Eastern Philosophy.............................................................................................................. 38
Where Angels Fear To Tread… .......................................................................................... 38
The Players (a refresher) ..................................................................................................... 38
Lao Tse................................................................................................................................ 38
Buddha ................................................................................................................................ 39
Confucius ............................................................................................................................ 39
Mo Tzu ................................................................................................................................ 40
You Buddha do Mo Tzu be less Confucius ........................................................................ 40
Putting It Together .............................................................................................................. 41
Chapter 11 ............................................................................................................................... 42
Introduction to Socrates and Plato ...................................................................................... 42
Who Is That Guy Behind Those Platonic Dialogues? ........................................................ 42
Natural Law ........................................................................................................................ 42
The Socratic Method ........................................................................................................... 43
Virtue .................................................................................................................................. 43
Putting It Together .............................................................................................................. 44
Chapter 12 ............................................................................................................................... 45
Socrates and Plato ............................................................................................................... 45
Virtue Revisited .................................................................................................................. 45
The Dichotomized Man ...................................................................................................... 45
Name Dropping ................................................................................................................... 45
The Early Dialogues: Questions, I Got Questions… .......................................................... 46
Putting It Together .............................................................................................................. 48
Chapter 12a ............................................................................................................................. 49
Plato: Ion ............................................................................................................................. 49
Chapter 13 ............................................................................................................................... 58
Plato .................................................................................................................................... 58
The Middle Dialogues: Answers, I got Answers…. ........................................................... 59
The Late Dialogues ............................................................................................................. 60
Digging Deep ...................................................................................................................... 60
Putting It Together .............................................................................................................. 60
Chapter 13a ............................................................................................................................. 62
A Plato Addendum: Allegory of The Cave......................................................................... 62
But First: The Analogy of the Divided Line ....................................................................... 62
Digging Deeper – The Cave ............................................................................................... 62
Chapter 13b ............................................................................................................................. 64
Yet Another Platonic Addendum: Grouping the Dialogues ............................................... 64
Chapter 13c ............................................................................................................................. 65
Plato: Laws Book X ............................................................................................................ 65
Laws Book X Thought Sheet .............................................................................................. 85
Chapter 14 ............................................................................................................................... 86
The East Revisited .............................................................................................................. 86
What Was Everyone Thinking? .......................................................................................... 86
The Players (a timeframe refresher) ................................................................................... 86
Chang-Tzu........................................................................................................................... 86
Chang-Tzu and Plato: Compare and Contrast .................................................................... 87
Mengzi ................................................................................................................................ 88
Not Putting It Together ....................................................................................................... 88
Putting It Together .............................................................................................................. 89
Chapter 15 ............................................................................................................................... 90
Post-Plato ............................................................................................................................ 90
The Players.......................................................................................................................... 90
The Academia ..................................................................................................................... 90
The Minor Prophets ............................................................................................................ 90
Cynics ................................................................................................................................. 91
Cyrenaics............................................................................................................................. 91
Aristotle............................................................................................................................... 91
Stoics ................................................................................................................................... 91
Eclecticism .......................................................................................................................... 92
Neo-Platonism..................................................................................................................... 92
Clement of Alexandria, Origen and Augustine................................................................... 92
Alkindus, Alpharabius, Avicenna and Averroes................................................................. 92
Putting It Together .............................................................................................................. 92
Thought Exercise ................................................................................................................ 93
Chapter 16 ............................................................................................................................... 95
Aristotle............................................................................................................................... 95
A Man, A Plan…. ............................................................................................................... 95
The Big Themes .................................................................................................................. 95
Thought Exercise ................................................................................................................ 96
Aristotle Interrupted ............................................................................................................ 96
Metaphysics ........................................................................................................................ 96
Science (Physics) ................................................................................................................ 96
Logic ................................................................................................................................... 96
The Soul .............................................................................................................................. 97
Ethics (Nicomachean) ......................................................................................................... 97
Politics................................................................................................................................. 97
Putting It Together .............................................................................................................. 97
Chapter 17 ............................................................................................................................... 98
Aristotle Unveiled ............................................................................................................... 98
And The Categories Are… ................................................................................................. 98
Meaning, for 100 ................................................................................................................. 99
Double Jeopardy ................................................................................................................. 99
Logic, for 500.................................................................................................................... 100
Language, for 1000 ........................................................................................................... 100
Final Jeopardy ................................................................................................................... 100
Putting It Together ............................................................................................................ 101
Chapter 17a ........................................................................................................................... 102
CATEGORIES (Chapters 1-6) ......................................................................................... 102
Chapter 18 ............................................................................................................................. 109
Aristotle’s More Physical Side ......................................................................................... 109
More Than Just Good Looks............................................................................................. 109
A Rugged Exterior ............................................................................................................ 109
Ch-Ch-Ch-Ch-Changes ..................................................................................................... 110
Mysterious Ways .............................................................................................................. 110
…Don’t Know Much Biology .......................................................................................... 111
A Heart Of Gold................................................................................................................ 111
Putting It Together ............................................................................................................ 112
Chapter 19 ............................................................................................................................. 113
Aristotle’s (Meta) Physical Side ....................................................................................... 113
Accentuate The Positive ................................................................................................... 113
From The Beginning ......................................................................................................... 113
Mind Games ...................................................................................................................... 114
Soul Man ........................................................................................................................... 114
Being There ....................................................................................................................... 115
Putting It Together ............................................................................................................ 116
Chapter 20 ............................................................................................................................. 117
Aristotle’s Fourth Third .................................................................................................... 117
Logic: Syllogism In A And B Therefore C minor ............................................................ 117
Ethics: Andante Ma Non Troppo ...................................................................................... 118
Politics: The Art Of The Possible ..................................................................................... 118
Putting It Together ............................................................................................................ 119
Chapter 20a ........................................................................................................................... 121
Nicomachean Ethics.......................................................................................................... 121
Chapter 21 ............................................................................................................................. 134
Science and the East.......................................................................................................... 134
It’s Not Just The Speed Of Light, It’s The Law ............................................................... 134
Apples And Oranges ......................................................................................................... 134
The Sound Of One Hand Clapping ................................................................................... 135
Putting It Together ............................................................................................................ 136
Chapter 22 ............................................................................................................................. 137
Epicureans ......................................................................................................................... 137
Putting It In Context: The Players .................................................................................... 137
Let The Party Begin .......................................................................................................... 138
Everybody’s Workin’ For The Weekend .......................................................................... 138
Let’s Get Physical ............................................................................................................. 139
Feelings, Woh, Woh, Woh, Woh, Woh, Feelings............................................................. 139
Putting It Together ............................................................................................................ 141
Chapter 23 ............................................................................................................................. 142
Stoicism............................................................................................................................. 142
Zeno (Of Citium) .............................................................................................................. 142
Feelings, No, No, No, No, No Feelings…. ....................................................................... 142
Vulcans Have Feelings Too .............................................................................................. 143
Logic, Captain? ................................................................................................................. 143
Physical reality is consistent with universal laws............................................................. 144
It is curious how often you humans manage to obtain that which you do not want. ........ 144
Damn it Jim, I’m A Doctor, Not A Greek! ....................................................................... 145
Putting It Together ............................................................................................................ 146
Chapter 23a ........................................................................................................................... 148
Marcus Aurelius (Excerpts from Meditations) ................................................................. 148
Chapter 24 ............................................................................................................................. 151
Greco-Roman Thought ..................................................................................................... 151
The Players........................................................................................................................ 151
The Greek System ............................................................................................................. 151
Roman Hands and Russian Fingers .................................................................................. 152
The In Crowd .................................................................................................................... 152
Pre-nups: Get It In Writing ............................................................................................... 153
The Blue Or The Red Pill (or One Pill Makes you Taller…) ........................................... 153
Putting It Together ............................................................................................................ 154
Chapter 25 ............................................................................................................................. 155
Philosophical Weaknesses ................................................................................................ 155
Philosophical Synthesis .................................................................................................... 155
Philosophical Exercises .................................................................................................... 155
Philologus Ludi ................................................................................................................. 156
Putting It Together ............................................................................................................ 157
Chapter 26 ............................................................................................................................. 158
Early Jewish and Christian Philosophy............................................................................. 158
Philosophy VS. Theology ................................................................................................. 158
The Players........................................................................................................................ 159
Jewish Philosophers .......................................................................................................... 159
Early Christian Philosophers............................................................................................. 159
Justin Martyr ..................................................................................................................... 160
Cynics ............................................................................................................................... 161
Heresy ............................................................................................................................... 161
Ecumenical Councils ........................................................................................................ 162
Putting It Together ............................................................................................................ 162
Chapter 26a ........................................................................................................................... 163
Apologetic Writers ............................................................................................................ 163
Chapter 26b ........................................................................................................................... 170
Interlude: The Divided Empire ......................................................................................... 170
What You See Is What You Get ....................................................................................... 170
Ramming Speed ................................................................................................................ 170
Putting It Together ............................................................................................................ 170
Chapter 27 ............................................................................................................................. 171
Late Roman And Early Medieval Philosophy .................................................................. 171
The Players........................................................................................................................ 171
Calling Mr. Plato…Call for Mr. Plato… .......................................................................... 171
It’s Fate ............................................................................................................................. 172
Okay, Maybe It’s Will ...................................................................................................... 172
Party Line .......................................................................................................................... 173
The Imperfect Tense ......................................................................................................... 174
What Was That Middle Thing?......................................................................................... 174
Augustine .......................................................................................................................... 175
Boethius ............................................................................................................................ 176
Anselm .............................................................................................................................. 176
Putting It Together ............................................................................................................ 177
Chapter 28 ............................................................................................................................. 178
A Closer Look ................................................................................................................... 178
Just A Closer Walk With Thee… ..................................................................................... 178
The Players........................................................................................................................ 178
Augustine Again ............................................................................................................... 178
Something Rather Than Nothing ...................................................................................... 179
It’s A Shame, Bless His Heart .......................................................................................... 179
Grace Period...................................................................................................................... 180
It’s About Time! ............................................................................................................... 180
John Scottus Eriugena ....................................................................................................... 180
Anselm .............................................................................................................................. 181
Say What? ......................................................................................................................... 182
You Would Argue With A Brick Wall, Wouldn’t You? .................................................. 182
Putting It Together ............................................................................................................ 183
Chapter 28a ........................................................................................................................... 184
Augustine Confessions ...................................................................................................... 184
Chapter 28b ........................................................................................................................... 197
Augustine: Additional Selections from The Teacher and On Free Will ........................... 197
Chapter 28c ........................................................................................................................... 203
Anselm Proslogium (DISCOURSE ON THE EXISTENCE OF GOD) ............................ 203
Chapter 29 ............................................................................................................................. 206
An Interlude: Monasticism ................................................................................................ 206
Asceticism ......................................................................................................................... 206
Communal Versus Anchoritic........................................................................................... 207
Eastern Monks .................................................................................................................. 207
Western Monks ................................................................................................................. 208
It’s Music To My Ears ...................................................................................................... 208
The Repository Of Faith ................................................................................................... 209
Trouble At The Mill… ...................................................................................................... 209
Putting It Together ............................................................................................................ 209
Chapter 30 ............................................................................................................................. 211
Islamic Philosophers ......................................................................................................... 211
The Players........................................................................................................................ 211
Islam For Dummies Philosophers ..................................................................................... 211
Islamic Philosophy ............................................................................................................ 212
Avicenna (Not His Real Name)......................................................................................... 212
What? Yet More Logic?.................................................................................................... 212
To Be, Not Necessarily To Be…. ..................................................................................... 213
Metaphysics ...................................................................................................................... 213
That Daring Young Man On The Flying Trapeze… ........................................................ 214
Ethics................................................................................................................................. 214
Algazali ............................................................................................................................. 214
Averroes ............................................................................................................................ 215
Putting It Together ............................................................................................................ 215
Chapter 31 ............................................................................................................................. 217
Scholasticism and The Like .............................................................................................. 217
The Players........................................................................................................................ 217
Before Scholasticism ........................................................................................................ 217
Wha…? ............................................................................................................................. 218
Moses Maimonides ........................................................................................................... 219
That Is Not What I Meant To Say… ................................................................................. 219
Scholasticism .................................................................................................................... 220
Monasticism: The Sequel .................................................................................................. 220
Franciscans ........................................................................................................................ 220
Dominicans ....................................................................................................................... 221
Thomas Aquinas ............................................................................................................... 221
Putting It Together ............................................................................................................ 222
Chapter 32 ............................................................................................................................. 223
Thomism ........................................................................................................................... 223
But First A Word From Our Sponsor…. .......................................................................... 223
And Now, Back To Our Show!......................................................................................... 223
Thomas .............................................................................................................................. 224
What Is And What Should Never Be… ............................................................................ 224
What Is And What Can Be…............................................................................................ 225
Aquinas On Being And Existence .................................................................................... 225
Whew! ............................................................................................................................... 226
Was That It? ...................................................................................................................... 226
Putting It Together ............................................................................................................ 226
Chapter 32a ........................................................................................................................... 228
Thomas Aquinas: On Being and Essence ......................................................................... 228
Chapter 33 ............................................................................................................................. 235
Reconsidering Where We Are .......................................................................................... 235
So Who Is Right? .............................................................................................................. 235
Fire Good…. ..................................................................................................................... 235
Sunshine On My Shoulder…. ........................................................................................... 236
The Heart And Soul Of The Matter .................................................................................. 236
Professional Logician........................................................................................................ 236
Why So Negative? ............................................................................................................ 237
So, What Are The Main Points? ....................................................................................... 237
So What? ........................................................................................................................... 238
Putting It Together ............................................................................................................ 238
Chapter 34 ............................................................................................................................. 239
Later Than Medieval Philosophy ...................................................................................... 239
The Players........................................................................................................................ 239
The Final Bow................................................................................................................... 239
A Brief Historical Interlude (The Ebb Of History) ........................................................... 239
Renaissance And Reformation .......................................................................................... 240
The Rising Tide................................................................................................................. 240
A New Reason?................................................................................................................. 241
Desiderius Erasmus ........................................................................................................... 241
Eastward Ho! .................................................................................................................... 242
You’re A Prince! ............................................................................................................... 242
What? There’s More? ....................................................................................................... 243
Putting It Together ............................................................................................................ 243
Chapter 35 ............................................................................................................................. 245
The Enlightenment ............................................................................................................ 245
The Players........................................................................................................................ 245
The Age Of Enlightenment ............................................................................................... 245
The End Of The Innocence ............................................................................................... 246
Calvin And Hobbes ........................................................................................................... 246
Do Not Put Descartes Before The Horse .......................................................................... 247
Locke Your Doors............................................................................................................. 248
Putting It Together ............................................................................................................ 249
Chapter 36 ............................................................................................................................. 250
The American Founding Fathers As Philosophers ........................................................... 250
The Players........................................................................................................................ 250
The Rise Of The Nation State ........................................................................................... 250
Locke, Stock And Barrel................................................................................................... 250
The Bottom Of The Barrel ................................................................................................ 251
Can Someone Wind The Clock Before You Leave? ........................................................ 252
Thomas Jefferson .............................................................................................................. 252
John Adams....................................................................................................................... 253
Benjamin Franklin ............................................................................................................ 253
Alexander Hamilton .......................................................................................................... 254
Morris Enough .................................................................................................................. 254
A Slave To Fashion ........................................................................................................... 254
It’s All Right, It’s All Right…. ........................................................................................... 255
Putting It Together ............................................................................................................ 255
Chapter 37 ............................................................................................................................. 256
Descartes ........................................................................................................................... 256
He Is .................................................................................................................................. 256
Whaddya Know? ............................................................................................................... 256
How Did You Come Up With That? ................................................................................ 256
Wait…Where Did I Leave My Keys? .............................................................................. 257
I Am, I Cried…To No One There…. ................................................................................. 257
What’s The Matter? .......................................................................................................... 257
The Show Must Go On! .................................................................................................... 258
Are You Sure?................................................................................................................... 258
Is This Just Some Kind Of Movement? ............................................................................ 258
That’s Just Perfect…. ........................................................................................................ 258
The Soul Of Tact ............................................................................................................... 259
Putting It Together ............................................................................................................ 259
Chapter 38 ............................................................................................................................. 260
The Seventeenth Century .................................................................................................. 260
The Players........................................................................................................................ 260
Where To Begin? .............................................................................................................. 260
Pascal ................................................................................................................................ 260
Spinoza.............................................................................................................................. 261
Leibniz .............................................................................................................................. 261
Vico ................................................................................................................................... 262
Berkeley ............................................................................................................................ 263
Astell ................................................................................................................................. 263
Putting It Together ............................................................................................................ 264
Chapter 39 ............................................................................................................................. 265
The Fight Of The Century................................................................................................. 265
Past Champions................................................................................................................. 265
In This Corner, Wearing Visually Stunning Trunks… ..................................................... 265
And In This Corner, Wearing Practical Trunks… ............................................................ 265
Round One ........................................................................................................................ 266
Round Two........................................................................................................................ 267
Round Three...................................................................................................................... 267
Putting It Together ............................................................................................................ 269
Chapter 40 ............................................................................................................................. 271
‘Modern’ Philosophy ........................................................................................................ 271
The Players........................................................................................................................ 271
Some Pun On The German Enlightenment ....................................................................... 271
Empiricism And The East ................................................................................................. 272
The Body Politic ............................................................................................................... 272
Montesquieu ...................................................................................................................... 273
Rousseau ........................................................................................................................... 273
Smith ................................................................................................................................. 274
Herder ............................................................................................................................... 274
Bentham ............................................................................................................................ 275
Hume, Kant, And Hegel.................................................................................................... 275
Putting It Together ............................................................................................................ 275
Chapter 41 ............................................................................................................................. 277
Hume ................................................................................................................................. 277
Hume-idity ........................................................................................................................ 277
An Exercise In Exercising Futility .................................................................................... 277
Come Together, Right Now…Over Me…........................................................................ 278
Now, What Caused You To Think That Was True? ......................................................... 279
You Want Fries With That? .............................................................................................. 279
So How’s That Working For You? ................................................................................... 280
Putting It Together ............................................................................................................ 280
Chapter 42 ............................................................................................................................. 282
Hegel ................................................................................................................................. 282
What You See Is Not What You Get ................................................................................ 282
Let’s Talk About It…........................................................................................................ 282
This Is Absolutely, Positively The Beginning .................................................................. 283
I Have Conflicting Feelings About This ........................................................................... 284
Logic Is King .................................................................................................................... 284
You Say Potato and I Say Potato… .................................................................................. 284
All Is Loss ........................................................................................................................ 285
Never Fear, Underdog Is Here! ......................................................................................... 286
Your Mission Jim, Should You Choose To Accept It…. ................................................. 286
Putting It Together ............................................................................................................ 286
Chapter 42a ........................................................................................................................... 288
G. W. Hegel: Phenomenology Of Spirit (or Mind) .......................................................... 288
Chapter 43 ............................................................................................................................. 296
Kant ................................................................................................................................... 296
Kant Be ............................................................................................................................. 296
Ideally, We Would Start Here ........................................................................................... 297
100% Pure ......................................................................................................................... 297
Kant Take It Any More ..................................................................................................... 299
I Now Pronounce You Husband And Wife ...................................................................... 300
Kantegories ....................................................................................................................... 300
Kant Get The Words Out .................................................................................................. 301
And Now A Word From Our Sponsor… .......................................................................... 302
This Is Above My Head .................................................................................................... 302
Making Lemonade From Lemons ..................................................................................... 303
Neither An Empiricist Nor A Rationalist Be… ................................................................. 304
Putting It Together ............................................................................................................ 304
Chapter 44 ............................................................................................................................. 305
The Kant Zone .................................................................................................................. 305
A Kuick Review ................................................................................................................ 305
The Latest Phenom ........................................................................................................... 306
Can You Give Me Some Space? ....................................................................................... 307
Excuse Me, Is That Polyester? .......................................................................................... 308
Kant Get A Grip On It ...................................................................................................... 310
Psyche! Or I Get The Idea ................................................................................................ 311
Mary, Mary, Quite Contrary, How Do Your Antinomies Grow? Or Aren’t Those Some
Lovely Antinomies? .......................................................................................................... 312
Putting It Together ............................................................................................................ 313
Chapter 45 ............................................................................................................................. 314
Kant: The Morality Play ................................................................................................... 314
The Story So Far…. .......................................................................................................... 314
Something From Something ............................................................................................. 315
Is That Really Necessary? ................................................................................................. 316
Ve Have Other Means Of…Persvation…. ........................................................................ 317
The Golden Compelled Action .......................................................................................... 318
The Denouement ............................................................................................................... 319
The Finale: Deus Ex Machina .......................................................................................... 319
Putting It Together ............................................................................................................ 320
Chapter 45a ........................................................................................................................... 322
Immanuel Kant: Introduction to Critique Of Pure Reason ............................................... 322
Chapter 46 ............................................................................................................................. 332
Hegel Revisited ................................................................................................................. 332
Thought Exercise: Idealist Or Realist? ............................................................................. 332
Hegel Revisionist .............................................................................................................. 332
Mr. Fichte .......................................................................................................................... 333
À La Recherché Du Temps Perdu ..................................................................................... 334
A Title Dealing with Loss and Misunderstanding............................................................. 335
Putting It Together ............................................................................................................ 336
Chapter 46a ........................................................................................................................... 338
Johann Fichte: The Science of Knowledge ....................................................................... 338
Chapter 47 ............................................................................................................................. 341
The Nineteenth Century .................................................................................................... 341
The Players........................................................................................................................ 341
The Players (Alternate Take) ............................................................................................ 341
Ideology vs. Philosophy .................................................................................................... 342
Ideology And Philosophy ................................................................................................. 342
Dogmatism vs. Skepticism................................................................................................ 342
Go East Young Man! ........................................................................................................ 342
The Human Element ......................................................................................................... 343
Mill.................................................................................................................................... 344
Will Someone Get That? ................................................................................................... 344
Schopenhauer .................................................................................................................... 345
Brain and brain, what is brain? ........................................................................................ 346
May The Circle Be Broken… ............................................................................................ 346
The Rest Is Silence. ........................................................................................................... 347
Ideal Behavior ................................................................................................................... 348
Transcendental Meditation................................................................................................ 348
Phenomenology................................................................................................................. 349
Existentialism.................................................................................................................... 349
Pragmatism ....................................................................................................................... 349
And One Final Word: Atheism ......................................................................................... 349
Putting It Together ............................................................................................................ 350
Chapter 47a ........................................................................................................................... 351
Arthur Schopenhauer: The World As Will And Representation ........................................ 351
Chapter 48 ............................................................................................................................. 358
Existentialism.................................................................................................................... 358
The Players........................................................................................................................ 358
Thinking About Being ...................................................................................................... 358
To Be Or Not To Be.......................................................................................................... 358
I Am I Cried…. ................................................................................................................. 359
Categories Of Being .......................................................................................................... 360
Kierkegaard ....................................................................................................................... 360
Adolescent Angst .............................................................................................................. 362
Ten Lords A Leaping ........................................................................................................ 362
Dostoyevsky...................................................................................................................... 363
Putting It Together ............................................................................................................ 363
Chapter 48a ........................................................................................................................... 365
Soren Kierkegaard: Selected Readings ............................................................................. 365
Chapter 49 ............................................................................................................................. 372
Nietzsche ........................................................................................................................... 372
Being Nietzsche ................................................................................................................ 372
All The World’s A Stage .................................................................................................... 372
A Poor Player That Struts And Frets or Eat, Drink, Die .................................................. 373
Human, All Too Human .................................................................................................... 374
Beyond Good And Evil ...................................................................................................... 375
Reports Of My Death Have Been Greatly Exaggerated. .................................................. 376
Putting It Together ............................................................................................................ 377
Chapter 49a ........................................................................................................................... 379
Friedrich Nietzsche: Selected Readings and Comments ................................................... 379
Chapter 50 ............................................................................................................................. 384
Pragmatism ....................................................................................................................... 384
The Players........................................................................................................................ 384
Practical Sidebar ............................................................................................................... 384
Practical Thinking ............................................................................................................. 385
Peirce................................................................................................................................. 385
James ................................................................................................................................. 386
Schiller .............................................................................................................................. 388
Dewey ............................................................................................................................... 388
So What Is Truth? ............................................................................................................. 390
Putting It Together ............................................................................................................ 390
Chapter 50a ........................................................................................................................... 393
Charles Peirce: How To Make Our Ideas Clear ............................................................... 393
Chapter 50b ........................................................................................................................... 404
William James: The Will To Believe1................................................................................ 404
Chapter 51 ............................................................................................................................. 416
Socialism and Communism .............................................................................................. 416
The Players........................................................................................................................ 416
Communism, We Hardly Knew Ye… .............................................................................. 416
Marx .................................................................................................................................. 416
The Beautiful Lounge Suite .............................................................................................. 418
A Lack Of Social Graces .................................................................................................. 419
Engels ................................................................................................................................ 420
Solidarity ........................................................................................................................... 421
Oh The Places You’ll Go! ................................................................................................. 421
BFFs .................................................................................................................................. 422
Opiate Of The Masses ....................................................................................................... 422
Putting It Together ............................................................................................................ 423
Chapter 51a ........................................................................................................................... 425
Karl Marx: People’s Paper ............................................................................................... 425
Chapter 51b ........................................................................................................................... 428
Frederick Engels: Dialectics of Nature ............................................................................. 428
Chapter 52 ............................................................................................................................. 437
Realism Versus Idealism................................................................................................... 437
Really Reaching Back For An Idea Of Thought ............................................................... 437
Idealism ............................................................................................................................. 437
Realism ............................................................................................................................. 438
Making Sense of It ............................................................................................................ 438
Your People...My People...Call Me .................................................................................. 439
What Can I Say? ............................................................................................................... 439
Putting It Together ............................................................................................................ 440
Chapter 53 ............................................................................................................................. 441
Phenomenology................................................................................................................. 441
The Players........................................................................................................................ 441
Phenomenology Thru The Ages ....................................................................................... 441
But What Does All This Have To Do With Existentialism? ............................................ 442
Brentano ............................................................................................................................ 442
That Was Not My Intention... ........................................................................................... 443
Husserl .............................................................................................................................. 443
Not That I’m Conscious of ............................................................................................... 445
Heidegger .......................................................................................................................... 446
Being There ....................................................................................................................... 447
Wha’chu Say? ................................................................................................................... 447
Putting It Together ............................................................................................................ 448
Chapter 54 ............................................................................................................................. 450
20th Century Philosophy.................................................................................................... 450
The Players........................................................................................................................ 450
Trends In Philosophy ........................................................................................................ 450
Positivism.......................................................................................................................... 451
Russell ............................................................................................................................... 452
G. E. Moore....................................................................................................................... 452
Wittgenstein ...................................................................................................................... 453
Max Weber........................................................................................................................ 453
W. E. B. Du Bois .............................................................................................................. 453
Rand .................................................................................................................................. 454
de Beauvoir ....................................................................................................................... 455
Putting It Together ............................................................................................................ 455
Chapter 55 ............................................................................................................................. 456
Classifying Russell and Wittgenstein: Defining the 20th Century .................................... 456
The Players........................................................................................................................ 456
Russell ............................................................................................................................... 456
I Was Not Aware Of That ................................................................................................. 457
What Caused You To Think That? ................................................................................... 457
Language And Logic......................................................................................................... 458
As I See It.......................................................................................................................... 460
Wittgenstein ...................................................................................................................... 460
I’m Positive ....................................................................................................................... 461
A Penny For Your Thoughts ............................................................................................. 462
Language as Lesson .......................................................................................................... 463
Putting It Together ............................................................................................................ 464
Chapter 56 ............................................................................................................................. 465
Process Philosophy ........................................................................................................... 465
The Players........................................................................................................................ 465
Pre-Processors ................................................................................................................... 465
Process And Recurrence ................................................................................................... 466
Speaking of Recurrence, The Return Of Metaphysics...................................................... 467
Whitehead ......................................................................................................................... 468
Life, the Universe, and Everything ................................................................................... 469
Real Unity ......................................................................................................................... 470
The Past Present ................................................................................................................ 470
Processing Reality............................................................................................................. 471
Are We There Yet? ........................................................................................................... 472
Processing God ................................................................................................................. 473
Hartshorne ......................................................................................................................... 474
Putting It Together ............................................................................................................ 475
Chapter 57 ............................................................................................................................. 477
Post-Modern and Contemporary Existentialism ............................................................... 477
The Players........................................................................................................................ 477
What Else Is There To Say?.............................................................................................. 477
Sartre ................................................................................................................................. 477
A Place For My Stuff......................................................................................................... 478
Nietzsche Revisited............................................................................................................ 479
The Final Blow ................................................................................................................. 479
What The Hell? ................................................................................................................. 480
Speaking of Nothingness .................................................................................................. 481
Camus ............................................................................................................................... 481
Don’t Make Me Laugh...................................................................................................... 482
Workers Of The World Unite! .......................................................................................... 483
Putting It Together ............................................................................................................ 483
Chapter 58 ............................................................................................................................. 485
Contemporary Philosophy ................................................................................................ 485
The Players........................................................................................................................ 485
Thinking About Thinking ................................................................................................. 485
The Continental Divide ..................................................................................................... 485
Doing The Continental...................................................................................................... 486
Say What You Will ........................................................................................................... 486
Stop Sign ........................................................................................................................... 486
Structure ............................................................................................................................ 487
Cheating ............................................................................................................................ 488
Eco .................................................................................................................................... 489
Kripke ............................................................................................................................... 490
Hursthouse ........................................................................................................................ 491
Putting It Together ............................................................................................................ 491
Chapter 59 ............................................................................................................................. 493
The Final Chapter ............................................................................................................. 493
Family Portrait .................................................................................................................. 493
Framing The Question ...................................................................................................... 494
The Question Of Truth ...................................................................................................... 496
The Question Of Physics .................................................................................................. 496
The Question Of Metaphysics .......................................................................................... 497
The Question Of Consciousness ....................................................................................... 497
The Question Of Existence ............................................................................................... 498
The Question Of Faith ...................................................................................................... 498
The Question Of Socio-Economics .................................................................................. 498
The Wisdom Of The Ages ................................................................................................ 499
Putting It All Together ...................................................................................................... 499
Appendix A ........................................................................................................................... 501
Philosophical Terms and Catch Phrases ........................................................................... 501
Appendix B ........................................................................................................................... 505
Philosophical Timeline ..................................................................................................... 505
Appendix C ........................................................................................................................... 510
Answers? ........................................................................................................................... 510
Thought Exercise: Idealist Or Realist? ............................................................................. 512
Appendix D ........................................................................................................................... 514
Bibliography ..................................................................................................................... 514
Appendix E ........................................................................................................................... 515
Logic Reference ................................................................................................................ 515
Ways Of Thinking............................................................................................................. 515
Appendix F............................................................................................................................ 517
Chinese Anglicization And Other Conventions ................................................................ 517
Index ..................................................................................................................................... 518
Illustrations, Lists and Charts
Figures and Illustrations
Figure 1: The really non-rectangular Square of Opposition ..................................................... 7
Figure 2: The Allegory Of the Cave ....................................................................................... 63
Figure 3: Illustration of the Cave Allegory ............................................................................. 63
Figure 4: The Divided Empire .............................................................................................. 170
Figure 5: Aristotle's Categories as explained and enhanced by Franz Brentano .................. 442
Figure 6: The Process View of Reality and ‘Causation’....................................................... 472
Figure 7: Process Progress .................................................................................................... 473
Figure 8: The Several Views of Reality................................................................................ 495
Figure 9: The Sliding Scales of Knowledge and Reality ...................................................... 495
Figure 10: The Active and Passive Consciousness ............................................................... 495
Tables
Table 1: Aristotle’s Logical Theses .......................................................................................... 7
Table 2: Boole's Theses of Operators ....................................................................................... 8
Table 3: Boole's Truth Tables ................................................................................................... 8
Table 4: Western Philosophical Systems ................................................................................ 30
Table 5: The Early Players ...................................................................................................... 31
Table 6: The 'Pre-Socratics' .................................................................................................... 34
Table 7: Early Eastern Philosophers ....................................................................................... 38
Table 8: Plato's Dialogs By Period ......................................................................................... 46
Table 9: Reading Plato, Part I ................................................................................................. 47
Table 10: Reading Plato, Part II .............................................................................................. 48
Table 11: Plato -- The Divided Line ....................................................................................... 62
Table 12: Plato's Tetralogies ................................................................................................... 64
Table 13: Ancient East and West Players ............................................................................... 86
Table 14: Chang-Tzu Summary .............................................................................................. 87
Table 15: Post-Platonic Players .............................................................................................. 90
Table 15: Epicurus in Context .............................................................................................. 137
Table 16: The Greco-Roman Players .................................................................................... 151
Table 17: Early Jewish and Christian Players....................................................................... 159
Table 18: Late Roman and Early Medievals......................................................................... 171
Table 19: The Early Medieval Players.................................................................................. 178
Table 20: The Islamic Players............................................................................................... 211
Table 21: Scholastic Players ................................................................................................. 217
Table 22: Late Medieval Players .......................................................................................... 239
Table 23: The Enlightenment Players ................................................................................... 245
Table 24: The Founding Fathers ........................................................................................... 250
Table 25: Seventeenth Century Players ................................................................................ 260
Table 26: The 'Modern' Players ............................................................................................ 271
Table 27: Kant’s Ideas .......................................................................................................... 312
Table 28: Great Idealists I Have Known – or not ................................................................. 332
Table 29: Nineteenth Century Players .................................................................................. 341
Table 30: 19th Century Existentialist Players ........................................................................ 358
Table 31: Pragmatic Players ................................................................................................. 384
Table 32: Social Players........................................................................................................ 416
Table 33: 20th Century Players.............................................................................................. 450
Table 34: 20th Century Players: Russell and Wittgenstein ................................................... 456
Table 35: Process Players ..................................................................................................... 465
Table 36: Contemporary Existentialist Players..................................................................... 477
Table 37: Contemporary Players .......................................................................................... 485
Table 38: Main Thoughts ...................................................................................................... 494
Lists
List 1: Basic Thought Organization Terms ............................................................................... 3
List 2: Major Types of Western Logic (Logical Systems) ....................................................... 4
List 3: A Useful Subset of Leibniz's Theory of Proof .............................................................. 4
List 4: Three Habits of Highly Bad Thinking ........................................................................... 5
List 5: Aristotelian Forms of Fallacy ...................................................................................... 12
List 6: Fallacy Styles and Examples ....................................................................................... 13
List 7: Pascal's Proof For God ................................................................................................ 17
List 8: The Disciplines of Philosophy..................................................................................... 21
List 9: Leibniz’s Principles ................................................................................................... 262
Introduction
Thanks
This book relies on the impetus of two people and a series of lunchtime ‘lectures’, but it is
founded in the gift of so many. So first to Julien and Allison, thanks for the Food For
Thought challenge. To my parents and everyone else, thanks for giving me the love of critical
thinking and later of philosophy. Thanks especially to my wife, Alice, who married me even
though I had a degree in philosophy. Finally an apology to my kids, as they had no choice in
the matter.2
As for philosophy itself, I also owe a debt of gratitude to the Monks of St. Joseph Abbey
and Monty Python’s Flying Circus and to the many others who spent their time giving us
such a rich history of thinking; what more can I say?
By Way of Introduction…
If one agrees with Hegel on this matter3, then this preface will be short.
So what is philosophy and why write another book about it?
Despite the moniker, there is no promise that it will only take 15 minutes to understand all
of philosophy! The idea of these lectures was to take about 15 minutes of reading and a
lifetime of understanding. Not too much to ask or expect? I have tried to translate the spirit of
these weekly lunch-time lectures into this printed format.
As for this work, it will pretend to be at first no more than an historical survey of
philosophers and philosophy but may end up with some survey of overall concepts through
time. The philosophers discussed here in fact thought of more things than we discuss, and to
a much deeper degree than is shown in the book. The pericopes included in this work show
the limited nature of the limited nature of this discussion.
As for myself, I hold but a mere undergraduate degree in this field. Why do I feel
qualified to produce such a work? Well, I hold a mere undergraduate degree in this field.
Dedication
I dedicate this book to everyone who has struggled with the idea of thinking, and
especially to those who struggled to teach me this fine art.
2
THE appearance of this volume demands more than the usual amount of apology. Introduction to Humanism,
by F.C.S. Schiller
3
And one should; c.f. Phenomenology of Spirit, 1, Georg W. Hegel
PART I
Introduction til Aristotle
rd
Prehistory to 3 Century BCE
(Chapters 1 - 15)
Chapter 1
Philosophos
If Aristotle, the great Greek philosopher is right and definition is understanding, then
Philosophy could simply (and literally) be the ‘love of wisdom’4 and we could be done with
it. But alas, that would first make for a short book, and second be untrue to the modern
philosophical spirit of obfuscation and double meaning. So let us confound it further and
state that it is also known in some circles simply as Metaphysics (somewhat literally
pertaining to and the study of things “beyond the physical”, but more on that later). This
would be slightly inaccurate as I hope we will see. Those circles are trying to relegate it to
some obscure mumbo-jumbo fringe, which has no bearing in our lives. Since Aristotle
himself gives us the notion of physics (and metaphysics, and psychology, and biology) which
they so seem to love, then to heck with them – they do not know what they are talking about
anyway. Let us embark upon our own journey, unfettered by the confusion or judgments of
others and delve into the true meaning and place of philosophy.
For our purposes then, philosophy is the devotion and discipline of thinking which is
committed to understanding, not just a commitment of knowing, how the world is put
together, like the molecular components of water, but also of an understanding of ‘truth’ of
how the world works and our place in it. One can see then, that philosophy, rather than being
separate and inconsequential to science, math, politics, ethics or whatever you can come up
with (thanks again, Aristotle), is integral to all human thought and action. A fairly ‘bold
statement for a one eyed fat man’5, but one which I hope will be vindicated by the end of this
work.
So on what basis is such a claim made? The Greeks divided the world into the physical:
tangible objects (earth, wind, fire and water) and the metaphysical: as said, the things which
were beyond the physical (beauty, truth, etc.). Perhaps more speculative than tangible, it uses
logic, science and reason as well as experience to transform knowledge into understanding.
In its own way it is similar to what we presently call science6 in that it too seeks a ‘Unified
Theory’, not just of the physical universe but of life and living. We will use words like
‘being’ and ‘substance’ to help us understand this world, but mostly to help us understand
ourselves. What are we? What is thought? How are we different than the world around us?
How are we part of it? We will examine critical methods using words like ‘logic’ and
‘dialectic’. In this form it is as legitimate of a science as physics itself (and was considered
such by the Greeks – but again, that is another discussion).
Understanding: Thinking About Thinking
This seems like such a simple term, and in order to stave off this kind of quick conclusion
let us here and now strip it of such a simplistic dismissal. Understanding, or as we will also
call it wisdom, is getting your head around an idea, not just at your level but on its level.
think Philadelphia – the city of ‘brotherly love’
True Grit
6
Or perhaps more correctly we should say that in its own way science is similar to and based within what we
call philosophy.
4
5
What I mean by this is seeing it ‘eye to eye’, on its own ground and not with hubris or bias.
In an inappropriate appropriation of an idiom: Seeing is skin deep but Understanding goes
right to the bone. 7
Understanding is not a passive activity. It should be and is efficacious, as we will see. We
come together, then, here within these pages seeking more knowledge and wisdom than
when we entered, as both student and teacher. It is a road to becoming a philosopher, not a
destination, to over-coin a phrase and in order to begin we need to shod our feet with good
shoes for the journey and take the first steps. On our way we can both look ahead on our
journey and behind to where we have been, but we must always keep our focus:
understanding is the main goal and logic is our main road.
Logic: Testing the Waters
That means that the next word which we must wrest from the hands of infidels is logic.
Logic is the art and action of critical thinking, not merely the means by which you ‘win’ an
argument8. By that I mean it contains the tools and methods to allow us to evaluate validity
and falsity and therefore determine truth. Truth is a word we will get to but in opposition to
popular thinking we must first grasp that logic is primarily systematic and deductive in
nature, that is, it is a system which follows a deductive reasoning path called a syllogism
made up of thesis (aka premises, or truths) which are combined to reach a conclusion (aka
new truth) as in: ‘If A and B then C’, and not ‘A and B imply C’ or ‘I think A therefore C’.
The art of argumentation, known as ‘rhetoric’ was formalized in the West by the Greeks and
was taught religiously (or philosophically, I suppose) until recently (think classical education
systems like the English). The art of critical thinking requires a chest of tools, and logic is
their source – though they are often now delegated not to Philosophy but the realm of
Psychology (which too has been discounted as a ‘speculative science’, and not just because it
rises from philosophy, but more on that later) and is by that means often used against us
rather than for us. But then I digress. Let us continue on the path of definition and the insight
which comes from it.
Logic then is the study of truths (again, aka thesis or premises) and the systematic
methods for determining the validity of such truths. It evaluates not the source of the truth
but the ‘truth’ itself. Truths therefore may originate from any source, be it rational thought,
science, or experience, and may develop from any resource available to the human mind and
heart. What we want to understand is a truth in the context of the argument being made with
it and then ultimately the validity of the conclusion made from it.
Thinking Well: Logical Basis
But what is truth? Are mine the same as yours (with all apologies to Pilate and the
Evangelist John)? Logic gives us an answer to this question because it is the best objective
basis (so far) for the determining of truth. All well and good but how do we fight our way
through the pervasive chicken-and-egg problem to objectively determine what is logical? At
what point do we determine that the premise is sufficiently ‘true’ and ‘true’ in and of itself?
As my father always says “‘I see’, said the blind man to the deaf mute”.
And by ‘winning’ they mean crushing the life out of your opponent with nothing more than clichés and pat
slogans.
7
8
These questions and many others are used to establish the logical ground rules and the means
to accomplish them have been proposed, honed, and ‘perfected’ over time. While many will
argue and debate over the final definition or even the necessity of logic, that is a discussion
for another time.
Terms Logic
The problem with defining things is finding all of the words you need to define first in
order to define that thing. When honing our definition of logic there are terms to be
addressed in order to understand the definition, and so let us start by defining a few of them.
Do not worry, many other definitions will follow so you will definitely9 get your money’s
worth. You have just been introduced to these terms but here is the official discussion of
them. Think of this first set of definitions as the how-is-human-thought-organized group (in
descending order):
Methods: The ways of demonstrating and formulating ideas, like a syllogism (A2 + B2
= C2).
Systems: Groupings or classes from which logical premises may be derived (like
axioms in Trigonometry – remember those?)
Truths: The foundation or basics by which other methods, systems or arguments
may be measured or developed (i.e. ‘humans think’) also known in an
argument as the theses or premises or...well you get the idea.
List 1: Basic Thought Organization Terms
The Logical Playing Field
The form of logic is the argument. An argument is a series of propositions which added
together form some sort of conclusion. In a bit of set logic, be aware that all arguments are
not necessarily good arguments and while they may be true, they do not always arrive at the
truth, being flawed in ways we will discuss. We are not concerned at this moment with the
correctness of an argument merely the understanding of what an argument is.
That said, the final caveat is that this is a Western discussion. On our journey, there will
be some exploration of Eastern philosophers but for now, as they say, write what you know.
In order to understand the basics we will keep it basic. That said, there are (basically) two
main systems of Logic developed within the West:
Predicative: based in terms (nouns and verbs).
Propositional: based on the operators between those terms (+, -, =, and, or).
List 2: Basic Thought Organization Terms
For our purposes the two main representative Logics of these systems are:
Aristotelian: Classic basis for Western logic. It is of the predicative type because it uses
syllogisms (if A and B then C or if A is B and B is C then A is C) involving
nouns and verbs and such words as all, some, are, not.
Boolean: Familiar to all computer programmers, a symbolic pared-down version of
Aristotle’s form. Fashions truth tables using and, or, not, and is more about
how the propositions are paired using those operators.
9
Ha, ha…get it?
List 3: Major Types of Western Logic (Logical Systems)
We will discuss other forms and their impact but these two are the most prevalent and the
others will make more sense only when we understand these, or as I am fond of saying, that,
my friends is another chapter. Suffice it to say that at this time our focus is on deductive
styles of thinking and that these two forms fit the bill. They also hang nicely in time with
Aristotle’s classical style coming from ancient Greece and Boole’s coming from the 20th
century.
The Last Word?
One final thought to keep in mind. Gottfried Leibniz (1646-1716, see Chapter 38)
postulated that propositions can be thought of as contingent (may or may not be true) or
necessary (can only be true), thinking on which we will dwell more later. That said, what we
really want to pull out of this tidbit is his two ‘great’ premises for establishing this basis:
The Identity of This is the paring down of something until it is undistinguishable from
Indiscernibles another thing, that is, all of their properties are identical, meaning that the
things themselves are for all practical purposes the same thing.
Principle of The acceptance of a premise because at this point no reasonable
Sufficient argument can be made against it.
Reason
List 4: A Useful Subset of Leibniz's Theory of Proof
Thinking Poorly: Logical Fallacy
This term fallacy is used to imply several levels of ‘error’ with or within an argument.
Though there are probably as many methods of fallacy categorization as fallacies, most
fallacies can be categorized into three types of errors by where the error takes place:
In Argument the actual components of the argument are flawed.
Reasoning the thinking behind the argument is flawed.
Belief roughly, what we think to be true is flawed.
Another way to think about them is to categorize them by the format of the error, or to put
it another way, how they take place:
Formal structure based (‘form-al’), that is, the physical structure of the argument
is flawed.
Informal internal to the structure (‘in-form-al’), that is, one part, a premise or
conclusion for example, is flawed.
For our purposes we will lump, I mean organize errors into three ‘basic’ ways to identify
them (though there are many more specifically identified):
1. Some invalid idea presented as valid: Using irrelevant, incorrect or insignificant
information (which is similar to belief), for example:
Ad hominem – personal attack (“This person says they have a plan, but that
cannot be correct because they’re a liberal/conservative”)
2. Applying an unjustified premise: Use of non-sequitur10 (non-following) statements
(as with reasoning, or formal), for example:
Consequent Affirmation – bi-directional logic; using the premise to prove itself
(“Aristotle was Greek, that guy’s name is Aristotle so he must be Greek”)
3. Fact Misuse: Ignoring or suppressing relevant information (an informal type), for
example:
“No I did not touch my sister” (the stick I poked her with touched her).
List 5: Three Habits of Highly Bad Thinking
By way of thinking well about thinking poorly, in the end we want to keep in mind that
what most of these categories and fallacies deal with is the improper use of ideas or their
presentation. We must think before we speak.
Putting It Together
Philosophy and philosophical thinking rely on a structured, consistent language. If we
spend all of our time arguing terms, where does that leave us? No, really that is just a
rhetorical question. Logic is the tool of philosophy, but the aim is to examine life, in a
consistent and repeatable manner.
As confusing as all those categorizations may be, do not be worried. Rome was not
philosophized in a day, as we might but probably should not say. Philosophers have proposed
various ideas for centuries, using different words and groupings but all seeking the same end
– a common language for discussing ideas, so we should not get bogged down in the terms
and then creating a common structure for presenting those terms. Placing these errors within
categories only serves us mnemonically and so there are no hard and fast rules which dictate
their commitment to memory. Thousands of years have gone into perfecting our
understanding of logic, and probably thousands more will continue in their development.
Keeping in mind the notions which they represent is the first step to utilizing them. It is also
the most important step in utilizing them.
Once again: do not expect to remember every one of them. Expect instead to understand
them and utilize every one of them in avoiding and identifying error when constructing or
understanding arguments.
One last wrench in the works: suffice it to say these methods do not speak to the veracity
or the morality of the truths being examined, merely that they are or are not relevant to the
argument. When looking at logic we are not making judgments so much about the content of
the thesis but their context.
“These common thoughts are expressed in a shared public language, consisting of shared signs...a sign has a
‘sense’ that fixes the reference and is ‘grasped by everybody’ who knows the language...”
Noam Chomsky, Language and Thought
10
Just one non-sequitur after another….
Chapter 2
Logic
In the last chapter I presented two mainstream logical methods, Aristotelian and Boolean.
Are they by any means the only two methods? No, but then this is a 15-minute philosophy
lesson not the spend-the-rest-of-your-life-committing-terms-to-memory philosophy lesson.
For our purposes, we will stick to these two as sufficient to illustrate the point about how do
we think about truths. We will peek at others as we go along.
With that in mind, let us get this out of the way: when we use the word truth we think of it
more as a promulgated statement which is the basis for other statements, not necessarily as
the end objective conclusion (as in ‘ultimate truth’), nor necessarily as ‘true’ in the sense of
valid. Do not quote me on this but in a preliminary way of offering explanation, truths are the
premises of arguments from which we derive a conclusion or another truth. To this we apply
logic standards which are the meat of this discussion (structure, fallacy, etc.). The fancy
words we could use for a truth are thesis or premise, but a rose by any other name….
Supercalifallacylogicalidoscious
To start with, we must examine the concept of logic. Logic, like
supercalifragilisticexpialidocious may be the strangest word you have ever heard. We may
think we understand what it means, but we do not. Logic is not merely a term, it is a way of
life. When we think logically we are thinking critically, merely categorizing, ordering and
curtailing our thoughts, keeping a watch over our tongues as it were. By this method we can
consistently share, organize and evaluate specific aspects of an argument and determine its
validity and soundness. Starting here gives us a lingua franca, the confidence and the means
to examine and understand. That said (again) let us move to logical thinking.
Aristotle: The Square of Opposition
Among his many gifts to the world, Aristotle (4th century BCE – Chapter 16ff) laid out for
us the ‘limits’ of thinking, that is, what thoughts are viable within logic, or to put it another
way (which I apparently do with great alacrity throughout this work) what are the possible
viable deductive paths of argumentation?
Not every philopher/phy would refer to or give credit to this formal designation but it
really is a standard in Western thought. The sum of Aristotle’s thought is encased in the
doctrine known as the ‘square of opposition’. Through it he hoped to finalize the boundaries
of argumentation making it possible to have an argument in a controlled, logical way (do not
worry, there will be more on this later).
Syllogisms (in the form of truth, truth, new truth) are the basis of Aristotelian logic. The
square of opposition is a diagram showing how theses (hypothesis/ideas hence thesis and
antithesis) – not the ‘truths’ themselves – are logically related. The diagram is just a useful
way to keep them straight (or diagonal as the case may be). The theses concern logical
relations among four logical forms or operations (logical relationships):
NAME
A
E
FORMAT
Every S is P
No S is P
AKA
Universal Affirmative
Universal Negative
NAME
I
O
FORMAT
Some S is P
Some S is not P
AKA
Particular Affirmative
Particular Negative
Table 1: Aristotle’s Logical Theses
These theses are fairly self explanatory, but I will expound anyway: what it comes down
to are a general true and false and a particular true and false. For Aristotle these four
statement types pretty much summed up all that you could say, logically. It is the relationship
of these simple statements which are also shown in the square. The theses are placed at the
corners of a diagram which, as said, we call the square of opposition (Figure 1, though it
looks more like a rectangle of opposition).
The corners are connected by specific oppositions:
 Contradictories: if they cannot both be true and they cannot both be false.
 Contraries: if they cannot both be true but can both be false.
 Subcontraries: if they cannot both be false but can both be true.
 Subaltern: must be true if its superaltern is true (think sub as below)
 Superaltern: must be false if the subaltern is false (think super as above)
Figure 1: The really non-rectangular Square of Opposition
Just as the four logical operations are set in pairs, the theses embodied in this diagram are
thereby further grouped into relational pairs:
 ‘Every S is P’ and ‘Some S is not P’ are contradictories.
 ‘No S is P’ and ‘Some S is P’ are contradictories.
 ‘Every S is P’ and ‘No S is P’ are contraries.
 ‘Some S is P’ and ‘Some S is not P’ are subcontraries.
 ‘Some S is P’ is a subaltern of ‘Every S is P’.
 ‘Some S is not P’ is a subaltern of ‘No S is P’.
Confused? Don’t be. When we think of an idea, we place it somewhere in this square. The
next idea is in relationship to that point at another point on the square. If the idea does not fall
into a relationship noted by the square then we must disregard it. Simple Enough? The
verbiage of alterns and contraries is only a means to evaluate the ideas placed on the square
or better yet where to place them on the square.
By thinking this way we share a common ground for discussion. This gives logic its
power: common understanding and rules.
Boole: Truth Tables
George Boole (19th century CE) was a mathematician and at the risk of preaching to most
of the choir, I’ll spend a minute on his stuff at, as above, a very high and rough level. Logic
looks for tools, and Boole proposed a logic method using mathematical means which became
the main method for that period (and therefore influences into the 20th+ century).
Boole broke the logic down
remember?):
NAME
AND
OR
NOT
to three basic operations (aka logical relationships,
FORM
A and B
A or B
not A
Table 2: Boole's Theses of Operators
These three are part of a total of 16 operations which can be applied in what we usually
call ‘truth tables’; Boole did not invent the truth table but it is the best illustration, like the
‘square’ above.
AND Form
NOT Form
OR Form
Argument
A
Argument
B
Function
Value
Argument
A
Argument
B
Function
Value
False
false
false
false
false
false
False
true
false
false
true
true
True
false
false
true
false
true
True
true
true
true
true
true
Argument
A
Function
Value
false
True
true
False
Table 3: Boole's Truth Tables
Compared to Aristotle, Boolean logic presents us with a pared-down, bare-bones semantic
guide for discussing a truth (or premise). The thought here being that we really do not need to
muddy the water with discussions (i.e. all that baggage which Aristotle saddles us with)
which are fruitless (in the end) because they are merely manufactured subsets of the basic
argument/truth. By eliminating them we could have gotten to and through the main truths
faster and more logically.
Of course the worst thing about this is that you have been studying using Aristotelian
logic for almost a whole semester and suddenly they drop this in your lap. I on the other
hand, have been merciful.
Gödel: Incompleteness
As a further sign of my benevolence, at this time I’ll throw in the Kurt Gödel (20th century
CE) tidbit at no extra cost. You may have heard of Gödel from the popular book Gödel,
Escher and Bach by Douglas Hofstadter. If not (and even if), Gödel demonstrated that in any
branch of mathematics (or as we might say ‘system’), you would eventually find propositions
which you could not prove or disprove using that system. The implication is that all logical
systems of any complexity have, by definition, a level of incompleteness; that is, each of
them contains more true statements than it can possibly prove by the methods and rules of
that system. In other words they will in and of themselves always be incomplete systems for
demonstrating truth.
You are welcome.
Putting It Together
When we approach a ‘truth’ or a proposed conclusion logically in order to determine the
value or validity of that truth or conclusion, we have to determine what path we will take to
get there. There has to be a defined, agreed upon set of rules by which we will argue our truth
to a conclusion.
The logical systems presented by philosophers are used to set the boundaries within which
they will think and argue. Is the loss of Aristotelian grey areas presented by Boolean logic
the end word? Is Aristotelian logic better or worse at reaching logical consensus? Why am I
asking you? Peace. Here is where Gödel comes in: to keep ourselves honest we must admit
that in any system there comes a time where we will run into a quandary or paradox or
whatever that we will be unable to solve within the scope we are working…and you know
what? That is okay because it forces us to continue to think beyond what we know and are
secure/comfortable with. We may even, dare I say, look to other systems in which to seek the
answers.
“Whoa, Sam Gamgee, your legs are too short, so use your head!” J.R.R Tolkien, The
Fellowship of the Ring.
Chapter 3
Fallacy
Incomplete, flawed or just plain wrong thinking is the source of so many
misunderstandings that it deserves its own section just for that reason. For our purposes
though, we will constrict ourselves to the realm of philosophical logic. Therefore let us start
with the defining of the idea and its ramifications. Logical fallacy hinders our ability to form
understanding and ultimately our ability to live the ‘examined life’. This affects most often
our moral decisions which in my humble opinion (and as you shall see, a large number of
philosophers’) are the true driving force for which we seek understanding.
Argumentation is mainly a deductive process but may sometimes involve inductive
reasoning. For logic purposes, deductive is preferred because in the end you have a solid
argument from which you can derive an agreed upon truth. Inductive logic tends to only
provide a plausible truth, which even though agreed to by a majority of thinkers could still
leave the truth up for grabs. Inductive reasoning also avails one to go down the primrose path
of fallacy, because it sounds reasonable. But as we should be learning, in logic just because it
sounds reasonable does not make it so. Ergo sum11, the use of inductive reasoning for further
argumentation might/can really lead to problems later in a method or system but, as we will
see, the use of deductive reasoning may not be any better.
Fallacious Thinking
As mentioned before, a technical way of thinking about fallacies is formal (invalid form)
and informal (invalid argument). The best way to understand these are to think in terms of
someone deliberately or accidently misshaping the argument to confuse or confound (formal)
or someone deliberately or accidently misshaping some aspect of the argument (informal).
Most errors tend to be informal but we can elaborate on this later.
Recognizing fallacious thinking can be harder than we think, especially because so many
of the fallacies appeal to prejudices and stereotypes or seem ‘logical enough'. Affronts to
logic aside, we define fallacies as flaws or errors in the argument, introduced usually in the
premises (though sometimes in the conclusions) and are often minor. Think of adding instead
of subtracting or misplacing the parenthesis in a mathematical formula. The effect is that any
conclusion drawn from the flawed argument which is used as a later premise only
compounds the error throughout the whole of the argument or system.
The scariest thing about logical error is that you can reach a correct conclusion from
flawed arguments. For example “All men die, Aristotle is a man, Aristotle is dead” or
something like “whales are fish, fish live in the sea, whales live in the sea”. In the first
argument, the premises are both correct but the order does not lend itself deductively to the
conclusion – though it does inductively (the name Aristotle does not just apply to the Greek
philosopher Aristotle but in this context we can imply that it does.). In the second example
the first fact is wrong, but the conclusion is correct.
Think back to the Aristotle’s Square or Boole’s truth tables. These are the tools we keep in
mind when constructing or evaluating an argument, so that we do not run into the error of the
11
Let’s just call it “therefore it is”.
first argument; keeping the logical fallacies in mind helps to keep us from making the error in
the second argument.
Thinking Fallaciously
In addition, we must be vigilant in even detecting an argument. Here are some classic
example statements like:
“Have you stopped beating your wife yet?”
This is not an argument, though it seems to have conclusions all throughout it (it is a
formal violation: Plurium Interrogationum* – too many questions). Another inference style
statement is:
“If the Bible is accurate, Jesus must have been the Son of God.”
This is not an argument but an assertion that looks like an argument; there seems to be
one ‘premise’ and one ‘conclusion’ but no statement in the sentence proves any other
statement. Arguments are not open to opinion or only one premise.
Finally for your viewing pleasure, look at this one:
“Einstein made his famous statement 'God does not play dice' because of his belief in
God.”
This too is not an argument but an explanation. We cannot derive that Einstein believed in
God or what that belief was just because he used the word ‘God’ in a sentence once. Again
there are no statements within the sentence which give proof of any other statement within
the sentence. One could even argue that in the last part the word belief could be ambiguous.
Get the idea?
Exercise: What would be an argument then? Let’s take the assertion and see if we can do
anything with it for example by restructuring it and adding a premise: “The Bible is an
accurate, historical document; Jesus makes statements recorded in the Bible;…” What
conclusion can we draw? In this case is the first statement a good premise? Is the second?
Bias and Logical Bias
(Warning: the following contain personal logical reflections of the author that
may or may not be embraced by the wider philosophical world but possibly by
my mother but only because she loves me)
I think we understand bias (a particular leaning which colors the argument) but is there
something known as ‘logical bias’? Can we over intellectualize something? Are some
statements seen as true by some but not by others? Does a statement have to mean
something? Can we unwittingly make one system (or even a single truth) the only system for
gauging truth?
The simple answer to all these and many other questions is yes. In addition to (and usually
containing) logical fallacy, we can be biased toward one system or another or method to the
exclusion of all others. The argument that something is wrong merely because it disagrees
with our own conclusions, or does not follow what we believe to be the logic rules is what I
would term a logical bias (some might call it intellectual hubris). This is in addition to any
other biases we bring into the argument.
This leads me to address one particular effect from this attitude: the tendency to speak in
absolutes based on logic. Some things are considered true throughout history and they can
pretty much be depended upon to continue to be true. Say, the earth is round. That was true
whether people knew it or understood it to be true. Well actually the earth is kind of egg-
shaped. Does that bar us from using ‘the earth is round’ as a premise? If we are figuring
rocket trajectories then round may not be good enough, but for most argument’s sake, ‘the
earth is round’ works pretty well. What we have to watch is ‘once-thought-always-true’
mentality (or as I like to classify it: one track mind, derailed) as well as the ‘well-that-wasdisproved-and-therefore-completely-useless’ (or baby with the bathwater) syndrome.
Fallacies Bergere
Okay, enough wandering. Aristotle divided fallacies up into three types if I recall:
1. Material: subject matter of or within the statement(s) – often unquantifiable or
incorrect statements.
2. Verbal: communication errors or abuses.
3. Formal: structural errors in the argument.
List 6: Aristotelian Forms of Fallacy
(Another probably less formal way to think about them is to divide them up as fallacies of
relevance, fallacies caused by causal (cause and effect) reasoning, and fallacies caused by
ambiguity…as I have said, there are probably as many ways as there are philosophical
systems and again, you just have to find the one that suits you.).
Fallacies are easily identifiable as they often have Latin names**. The list of fallacies
seems to be growing even since I first studied them, but I think that most are subsets of a
basic few. By that I mean that you can place most into families which involve the same basic
flaw, just as you can group them like we do above. Sometimes the categories fail and some
are defined which cross over between two or more categories (Yada, yada, yada; quit
coverin’ yer butt). Still the most effective way to keep them in mind is to group them and
remember the groupings. Whatever mnemonic helps go for it! I am sorry, what was I saying?
Oh yes. For now and to be able to continue writing we will stick with the above.
Here then, are a choice few:
Material:
 Ad Verecundiam: (argument from/to modesty) deferring to another source
o Related Common Example: Ipse Dixit: (he himself said) he said/believes it
therefore it must be true (aka Appeal to Authority/Celebrity, etc) slightly
different but in the same family.
 Ad Hominem: (at/to the man) attacking the individual not the truth; one of the most
prevalent.
 *Plurium Interrogationum: (too many questions) questions couched such that no
answer is sufficient for all of the questions.
 **Non Sequitur: (does not follow) presenting two disparate statements as connected.
 Circulus in Probando: (circular argument) assuming the conclusion in the premise
(s)
 Ignoratio Elenchi: (ignoring of the chosen [argument]) intentionally diverting
attention away from the facts at hand.
Verbal:
 Argumentum Verbosium: (verbose arguing) overwhelming by the sheer repetition of
words.

Unum Ad Pluribus (I think): (…from one to all) assuming the whole is true because
the parts are [this has an opposition of assuming each from the whole]. This is verbal
because it is a confusion of terms.
 Equivocating (can’t recall the Latin, or even make it up) using a word ambiguously
or using a word which could have two or more meanings.
Formal:
 Quaternio Terminorum: (four terms) introducing a fourth element (premise) into the
normal three element argument.
 Negative Premises: assuming the positive from two negatives – two wrongs do not
make a right.
 Petitio Principii: assuming the conclusion implicitly (or explicitly) within a premise.
List 7: Fallacy Styles and Examples
Putting It Together
Logic is a pretty Zen experience then. We must not allow ourselves to be overly
influenced by either emotional passion or intellectual passion. We must allow ourselves to be
open to all influences and yet disciplined to eliminate those which are redundant, extraneous,
erroneous or false.
Still, it is not a cold and passionless discipline. Understanding, enlightenment, peace, or
whatever you want to call it should be the result of our search. Calm rational discussion,
based in specific rules and methods will eventually produce for us a system of operating from
which we will tackle the world. Philosophical pursuits only have validity if applied in the real
world, the day-to-day workshop of life, not just for ourselves but for everyone and should
always involve kindness.
If philosophy insulates us from life then we have failed in our attempt make sense of the
world and have fallen into the reality fallacy: what we think is real actually is not, kind of
like ‘Reality TV’.
Post Discernment Exercises:
1. When asked about a particular point within a candidate’s speech all a commentator
had to say was “I don’t think he really had anything to say.” Discuss.
2. The Bible says: “There is no God.” The Bible is literally true. Therefore, there is
no God. Discuss.
From Xcdr (A webcomic of romance, sarcasm, math, and language)
Chapter 4
Decisions, Decisions
In this episode, we want to delve deeper into the basic facts and influences on our
thinking, and at the same time add yet another definition. We have to understand what
clouds, controls, influences, and enhances our thinking. Logic gives us the basis for proving
or disproving truths. We can see how faulty logic or hubris can influence the ongoing
argument but what are some of the truths from which our system will ultimately operate?
That is, what we might consider whenever we approach a subject. In what can only be called
audacious, let me state that this basic founding principle is often called the Prime Cause or
the Prime Mover or the First Principles, that is, the one thing which gets the whole ball
rolling. This overlaps but should not be confused with Aristotle’s idea of ‘first principles’,
which are basic ideas without being the basic idea which is not really shared by some of the
later thinkers – well, do not worry, we will cover that later (as we will examine ideas like
cause and movement).
For now, remember that this is often a premise or thesis which should at a minimum meet
the two rules we mentioned earlier from Herr Leibniz:
 Identity of Indiscernibles (reduction renders the two indiscernible from one
another)
 Sufficient Reason (no logical argument exists against it at this time)
So when we begin to look at this Prime Mover idea, we are trying to come up with the
primal cause of all things, the agreed upon singularity or truth from which we can begin to
establish other truths.
Time To Focus
Usually, when we examine something, we are fixed within a space and time frame. That
is, we reason it out, not from its very foundational cause, but usually within the time and
space frame in which it happened/happens/will happen (I wonder what I will have for lunch).
We do this not from its very source, that is, its primary cause or as we might say, the
‘PRIME’ Prime Mover, position (I only have peanut butter and jelly, so I cannot have a
steak).
This is mostly because we are trying to solve or understand the problem right before us.
Our needs are very immediate, or seem limited to the immediate. How though, do we know
we are even on the right path when we begin our investigation?
For us, in order to fully explore our own thinking, we need to establish base camp truths
from which we can feel confident in our explorations. To put it simply (and trust me on this
one) at this time, this primary cause is our Prime Mover.
In our discovery we want to avoid the chicken-and-the-egg problem, or the always-halfway-there problem of never knowing where to start (or to stop). So we can reason that there
must be a place where truth starts. We will ‘postulate’ (assume or take something for granted
based on sufficient reasoning, i.e. our two principles above) a beginning.
Cause and Effect are two portions of the argument. Most often we observe an effect and
we postulate or premise a cause. A ball rolls by on a billiards table, followed by the cue ball.
What caused it? Was there a cause? What cause operated on which ball? On both? We know
from experience of the rules of pool that it usually means that someone with a cue stick hit
the cue ball into the other ball causing both to roll past our field of vision, but is that true? If
we did not see the initial cause it is mere speculation on our part as to what that cause was.
Perhaps someone just grabbed one of the balls and rolled it into the other; perhaps the white
ball was hit by the other and not the other way around, etc., etc.
Yet, even though we observe effects and causes after the fact, we naturally apply cause
and effect as a normal mental operating environment. For that reason, we will begin to take
on two of the more common postulates. Hmmm. Sounds suspiciously like a segue.
But First, A Detour: A Priori and A Posteriori
Of course, as you may increasingly be beginning to understand, you just cannot begin
there. There are always more terms which must be utilized so that we can say that we are all
on the same page. Two concepts we need to explore now are the idea of a priori (from
before) and a posteriori (from afterwards) which I have already bantered about in less
formal terms.
A priori: This is kind of what we are thinking of when we talk about deductive reasoning;
it is sequential as in one thing depends on the thing before it. In this thinking, we take the
things from before (our premises) and come to a conclusion. A priori, it can be postulated, is
done mainly without or at least does not depend upon experiential knowledge or more
precisely perhaps, independent of experience, really working from the obvious (2+2=4).
A posteriori: This is what we think of when we doing more analytic reasoning; we take
the things from after (our experiences, the effects) and come to a conclusion. Posteriori is
really based on experience, sometimes the unquantifiable (men grow beards).
Ultimately, and for our needs (as there are/will be other uses of these terms and the fact
that I forgot what I was about to write), these are the terms for understanding how we might
arrive at a premise. Some things just are, independent of our thoughts and experience and
other things are because experience (or experimentation) has shown it to be so.
Another way to look at these might be by using the terms themselves. Prior means before
so think of a priori as ‘before the conclusion’ that is we are moving toward an unknown
conclusion through deductive argument. Posterior means (well aside from that) after, so we
can see a posteriori as moving back from the conclusion. A priori: think science experiment;
a posteriori: think crime investigation.
Sooooo, when we look at an idea, we have to evaluate its a priori or a posteriori nature.
There is no value judgment per se, as to which is more better. What judgment we have to
exercise is whether the argument has merit, as we have discussed before.
Exercise: The statements “The Earth revolves around the Sun” and “The Sun revolves
around the Earth” can both be considered ‘true’. How? What kind of thinking (a priori or a
posteriori) is involved?
In the end, all that out-of-the-way ruminating will help us to look at two of the possible
Prime Movers.
Postulating ‘God’ as the Prime Mover
The really great thing about God is that you can throw Him in at the end of any argument
when you reach the boundary of truths reachable within that system (kind of like that old
joke of adding in my bed to the end of any fortune cookie fortune).
There is the argument (St. Anselm’s, actually 11th century, but more on him later) that
states that God is that thing which we can conceive of which nothing greater can be
conceived…that is, try to think about the greatest thing you can think of in the universe and
whatever that is, for which you can think of nothing greater (simply because it is the
greatest), well, that is God. This is not a definition of God, nor is the word ‘God’ the
definition for this thing, but it is the word that we often use for such a concept.
This begs the question then, because we have conceived it, does that make it so? Is there
such a being, just because we can conceive it (think unicorns)? So we have a definition of
what could be construed as God, but no proof. Now we begin to argue about the conception
versus the objection or ‘thought’ versus ‘reality’. Very soon after that our heads explode.
Blaise Pascal (17th cent, Chapter 38), known to many due to the computer language
named for him, posited a square of oppositions or truth table if you will where he basically
used the following four ‘truths’:
1. God exists
2. God does not exist
3. I believe in God
4. I don’t believe in God
and sub to these:
a) Heaven and Hell exist
b) Heaven and Hell do not exist
From these four ‘premises’ of sorts he (basically) worked out that (although there is more
to this, and I’m doing this all from memory):
A. If God exists and I believe in him (and heaven exists) then ‘whoo hoo’! 
B. If God exists, and I don’t believe in him (and hell exists) then ‘oops’, .
C. If God does not exist and I don’t believe in him, nothing happens, .
D. If God does not exist and I believe in him then nothing happens, .
List 8: Pascal's Proof For God
So one has to ask oneself what is the worst outcome if I do believe and what is the worst
outcome if I do not believe. Pascal would say ‘two out of three ain’t bad’, so you might as
well believe.
The ‘strength’ of this PM is that the design of the universe is logically and soundly based
in an immutable external.
The ‘weakness’ of God as PM is the ‘improvability’ of God.
Postulating Physics as the Prime Mover
The really great thing about Physics is that you can throw in speculations based on
experiential observation and call it plausible when you reach the boundary of truths reachable
within that system.
Modern thought (~17th century and on) often relegates the God PM to the outer fringe,
starting off the whole business but TDY or dismisses the idea as unobservable and therefore
not valid as a premise or truth. This comes from the argument that any ‘proof’ (think not only
‘provable’ but also the ‘mathematical proof’) of God is no proof at all. Rationalism and
Empiricism view the world as knowable within itself and apart from any mystical or external
cause. This post-medieval thinking champions the sensible/rational human being origin of
knowledge over a
Throughout philosophical history, there are many advocates of the ‘no god’ school, like
Epicurus (3rd cent BCE) who saw the only viable world as the here and now and Nietzsche
(19th cent CE) whose point was less that there was no God but more that if there was we had
long since supplanted him/her/it. His famous quote of “God is dead.” is actually larger God is
dead, and we have killed him. Now who will clean up the blood? (or something in German to
that effect)12. Nietzsche really pushed into the psychological realm looking more to the
achievements of man through science, obviously exclusive of any repressive religious or
godly influence. We can look at Kant, Sartre and even Sagan among others, arising from the
intellectual revolution which questioned the nature and source of intelligence. The universe
seems like an unlikely but well-tuned machine which runs by immutable rules.
The ‘strength’ of this PM is that it relies on the observable world and does not rely on any
miracles or mystical universals to explain any phenomena.
The ‘weakness’ of Physics as PM is the a posteriori nature of the scientific method (as per
our billiards example earlier).
Final Answer?
Actually, neither mover precludes the other. If God, God could control all of the forces
within himself or could have created them, to act independently of him yet completely within
the confines of his created forces; if physics, by the earlier statements, their independence
from anything could be complete, but they may have been designed by their creator to be in
and of themselves. Nothing solved, eh?
Making the Decision
So what we are really exploring is the beginnings of philosophy. What are the questions
which spur philosophical endeavors? Who am I? Where did I come from? Why am I here?
What is the meaning of life? What does all this have to do with the price of tea in China (a lot
apparently).
The first thing we must remember at this point is that the search is for understanding, not
just knowledge. Knowledge without understanding enhances our view of the world but really
does not lead us to critical thinking about that knowledge and how it should be applied. Still
without knowledge, in all of its forms, our wisdom would be lacking.
What means of argument can help us come up with the Prime Mover? There is no limit to
the number, but we have to do some leg work. Anselm uses a reductio ad absurdum (reduced
to the absurd) argument which means he switches the argument around (takes its opposite)
until he reaches an absurd conclusion, thereby ‘proving’ because the opposite is ridiculous or
self-contradictory. Think of it like ‘water is wet’; how does one prove this? Well let’s take
"Where has God gone?" he cried. "I shall tell you. We have killed him - you and I. We are his murderers…Do
we not hear anything yet of the noise of the gravediggers who are burying God? Do we not smell anything yet
of God's decomposition? Gods too decompose. God is dead. God remains dead. And we have killed him. How
shall we, murderers of all murderers, console ourselves? That which was the holiest and mightiest of all that the
world has yet possessed has bled to death under our knives. Who will wipe this blood off us? With what water
could we purify ourselves? What festivals of atonement, what sacred games shall we need to invent? Is not the
greatness of this deed too great for us? Must we not ourselves become gods simply to be worthy of it? " (The
Gay Science) To be exact.
12
the opposite: water is not wet, therefore it is dry, but dry is the absence of water so how could
water not be wet? Or something to that effect.
Others, would argue epistemologically, from the point of ‘what can we know?’ This tact
relies heavily upon our senses and our perceptions, which may or may not be faulty and
therefore to what level can we depend upon them? However we approach the problem, the
quandary of beginnings is one of the toughest in all of philosophy.
Putting It Together
When we begin to ask the cause and effect questions and we discuss such notions as ‘god’
or ‘physics’ what kind of knowledge are we discussing? Many might pooh-pooh one or the
other because of what they consider it a posteriori knowledge (science or faith), but are there
any a priori arguments which might overcome these conjectures?
Think back to the billiard ball example. Understanding the prime mover is important for
answering some of the questions, but not necessary for all the questions which might arise
from the situation. For instance we know, a posteriori, that an object will remain at rest until
acted upon by a greater force and that for every action, there is an equal and opposite
reaction. So some of the events taking place on the table are explained or have their
arguments taken care of, that is, we do not have to argue them within the framework of the
event. Still we may be able to backtrack, using them in seeking out the prime mover. Then
again they may lead us down a winding and rocky path to nowhere.
So, two things: we do not always need to know the prime mover or first cause to discuss
something and we may not be able to determine the prime mover from our discussions.
Man: I came here for a good argument!
Mr. Vibrating: No you didn’t, you came for an argument.
Man: Well, an argument’s not the same as contradiction.
Mr. Vibrating: It can be.
Man: No it can’t. An argument is a connected series of statements to establish a definite proposition.
Mr. Vibrating: No it isn’t.
Man: Yes it is. It isn’t just contradiction.
Mr. Vibrating: Look, if I argue with you I must take up a contrary position.
Chapter 5
The Name Game
Where do we go now? After our last chapter, and as what would seem to be beating a dead
horse, I have decided to include one more discussion of ‘thinking’. So far, in an effort to shift
our way of thinking toward better understanding, we have looked at what philosophy is, what
its tools are, how to go about ‘thinking’, what are some good habits to develop, what are
some faults to avoid and even how to think about a possible place to start. Let us take some
time to look at places to stop.
When we begin to look at the ‘big picture’ as we did last chapter, we begin to see the
limits of systems and argumentation. But it does not mean that we do not seek ways to
discuss these difficult topics. After all we are seeking wisdom and there are difficult
questions which must be asked, some of which we may not be able to answer within our
present framework, but will open up after consideration of other systems.
The limitations and boundaries of discussion have been the focus of previous
examinations of the subject. As the author of this work, let me just say I am not really sure
where this is going but that has never stopped me before. Hopefully by the end we can all
make some sense of it.
Semantics
The ‘final’ (at least in this conversation) roadblock to understanding is ironically the road
itself. While symbolic logic hopes to accomplish logical communication through the use of
only symbols (hence the symbolic part), thereby reducing any confusion there may be by
eliminating language, it may be considered a bit ‘cold’ or un-nuanced. It also could be
considered, depending upon how you define ‘language’, merely another ‘language’ among
the myriad ways of human communication.
Language is the most complex of human characteristics and developments. One moment,
it is a shared meaning, i.e. a word is attached to a concept by which we communicate the
same idea to another, no matter what the language being used (‘hat’ or ‘chapeau’). The next
it is a confusion of meaning, i.e. the concept behind the word evokes different meanings
(‘love’). And furthermore, it might contain several meanings evoked by the user, all, some or
none of which might be available to the hearer. But I ramble.
Often in philosophy, in order to be unmistaken about a concept, a word from the writers’
native language will be used, for example zeitgeist13. Like so many words in English, that
word becomes an entity unto itself, holding a different meaning than just the plain word or
words from which the ‘term’ is derived.
Since words are the main means of the communication of ideas, we must also be prepared
to learn to keep words within their context, that is, a word used in Greek times may be reused in Medieval times and then again later, but with different ‘meaning’ each time; we need
to keep the meanings separate and within their time context. This may also be true between
methods and systems of the same time/thought period.
13
Spirit of the time.
Sometimes the thing itself drives the meaning, for instance, as from above, ‘hat’ or
‘chapeau’; either word works for that thing which you set on your head. Often though, it is
the word which drives the meaning, for instance, as from above, ‘love’. English uses the
word ‘love’ for many things, to cover many concepts and it is the context alone which gives
the meaning, whereas the Greeks use five different terms, eros, agape, philia (the three main
ones), storge and thelema with each one carrying its specific meaning, that is, having no need
for context.
All worthy of discussion but I think you get the idea so I will finally abandon that now
and move on. We do not want to get bogged down here, as semantics can be a branch of
study all on its own – and that is another chapter. Suffice it to say that verbal context is
another factor to keep in mind when approaching systems or methods. Put it also in the
context of biases; some words may just get your hackles up unless you can keep them
compartmentalized in their proper place.
The Branches of the Philosophical Tree
There are several ‘flavors’ of philosophy, each fixing on some of the great questions of
the world (and many conveniently laid out by Aristotle – therefore easily recognized, like
fallacies, because they are in Greek) such as:
 Epistemology – the mind: How do we know? What do we know?
 Ontology – the soul or being: What are we? Why are we?
 Aesthetics – the senses: What is beauty? What is art?
 Hermeneutics – the mouth (communication): How do we understand written
texts? How should they be interpreted?
 Theology – the Other: What/who is God? What is the relationship between God
and humans?
 Ethics – praxis (putting thought into actions): How should we live? How do we
live together?
List 9: The Disciplines of Philosophy
The Flowering of Philosophical Thought
Each of these branches can involve one or all of the other branches. For example there is a
parallel of philosophy and theology, and at times one has seen as the ‘handmaid’ of the other,
but that is another chapter. When we look at each of these we see a basic avenue of thought.
Why do humans think? What is thinking? Am I something special or just a figment of mine
or someone else’s imagination? Why do I care about things that most creatures do not? Why
can we speak? Does it matter how I act?
If we want to put a name on the flower, it might be how the Greeks thought of wisdom, as
understanding truth, and from truth meaning and action.
Putting It Together
And the list goes on. Think of these like disciplines in other fields. Into this mix could
also go sciences and maths, but as they are snobby we have to talk about the ‘philosophy of
mathematics’ or the ‘philosophy of science’ (not ‘mathology’ or ‘scientology’ – hmmmm –
or something like that).
Now this is a different categorization than philosophical methods such as Scholasticism or
Existentialism, the sort of things we will get to later. These are logical discussions about
themes and most systems will attempt to incorporate most into themselves; after all the
system is trying to answer all of these questions. By specializing, these focus logical
argument within the confines of an idea. They can also include discussions which have no
real place in a system, and are just ends in themselves, the ‘mechanics’ of speech.
These disciplines can help to give us consistent language within an idea which may be
incorporated or utilized within a system or method, as well as a place to refer to, a well prethought out series of truths on which we can rely, keeping most systems from wandering too
far or reaching a dead-end.
Think about it this way, if you were to define a system, where would you start? How long
could you discuss before wandering? Having these areas of pre-defined discussion can be an
aid in our own journeys into understanding.
“Let me give you a warning…If you go to Paris, France: ‘chapeau’ means ‘hat’; ‘oeuf’ means ‘egg’... it's
like those French have a different word for everything!” Steve Martin
Chapter 6
We Have A History
Okay. So it seems that nowadays no one can agree on a basic principle or even what
language to use or how to approach a problem or question. Still, we might, through the
means of looking at philosophical systems over time, be able to find a few basic principles
and terms.
The History of Philosophy
In one of the greatest simplifications of this over-simplified discussion, we can probably
make a generalization that there are two branches of philosophical thought: Dynamic and
Static or as they are often designated ‘Western’ and ‘Eastern’. As an aside I thought it odd as
I began my studies that it was east and west not north and south or east and north or…well
you get the picture. As a complete aside one might argue that it is because the sun moves in
an east/west motion and therefore all of thought is tied to this simple action of rotation.
Getting aside from the aside:
East vs. West
Well perhaps it is not so aside, because when we speak of Eastern versus Western thought
we must be aware of the direction the sun moves in the sky. In a further example of previous
discussion about understanding in context, earlier thinkers spoke of the whole world in terms
of that path. “From East to West” meant everywhere. Okay, digression done, really. Where
we geographically draw the philosophical line for East/West is about as arbitrary as the one
we use for maritime purposes. So why do it? It might seem odd, if all people are people, that
there might be the possibility of differences in approach to thinking dependent upon
geography. Oddly enough then, there may be a subtle difference to be stated here.
(Warning: author influenced attempts at explanation to follow, which even my
mother may disagree with even though she loves me)
It might be safe to say that even though ‘Western’ thought developed from Greek thought,
Greek thought is ‘Eastern’ in nature. That said, while there may be a difference in approach,
all basic philosophical thoughts are all ‘Eastern’ in basis, which is to restate that people are
people, no matter where they live. They just develop different ideas of what is important and
what is not and these differences are often culturally based.
At the risk of seeming trite or of reducing all of human thought to a couple of catchphrases, let me put forth that Eastern thought tends to seek ‘enough’ of an answer – at the
risk of leaving some things ‘unanswered’ (mysterion), hence its more ‘static’ nature, whereas
Western thought tends to want the final answer, splitting hairs to leave no stone unturned,
producing a more dynamic nature in thought.
Think of it like ‘liberal’ and ‘conservative’ in their broadest of meanings. Conservatives,
seeking to conserve, present a very static system; liberals, seeking to broaden, present a very
dynamic system. People’s tendency toward one system or another is dependent on many
factors, including place and time. More on that later.
Either way, each system has strengths and weaknesses. The East can make grand
pronouncements leaving you thinking ‘yeah, but what does that mean?’; the West can beat a
horse to death, leaving you thinking ‘okay, but where is the answer?’ As an example, the
words catholic as in Roman Catholic and orthodox, as in Greek Orthodox reflect these two
positions, and as such can be seen within their respective theologies.
Geographically
Philosophies are sometimes associated with a specific geography or country, and as such
are often labeled ‘Greek’ or ‘Chinese’ or ‘German’. This is usually because philosophies can
often be culturally related. Socrates and Plato are directly related not only to each other but to
the Sophists before them (incidentally they are grouped together because all we know of
Socrates comes through the writings of Plato, but that is another chapter). Aristotle depends
directly upon them. Hence there is a Greek ‘school’ of philosophy, though the systems are
not necessarily congruent in time or thought.
Chronographically
Philosophies are also associated with specific times, such as ‘The Enlightenment’,
grouping several philosophers or systems together by time frame. Often, the systems grouped
this way are more congruent because the authors are building on similar ideas within a
similar framework, even though they are spread out over different systems.
Philosophically
Philosophies are most often grouped by system, ‘Pragmatism’ or ‘Existentialism’. These
systems are related by an idea or grounding, and are usually different approaches to the same
situations. Some seem quite similar, others not as much; some are associated with only a few
philosophers, others with many. An example would be Empiricism or Rationalism, which
gives you an idea of the nature of the thinker even though they may be spread out over time.
Our journey is now at the gate. How to proceed? We can step down a philosophical timeline or we could wander through history looking at specific ideas throughout time. We can
examine the development of ideas through time or we can seek to understand the time and
therefore what gives rise to thoughts. We can approach the different philosophical branches
in and of themselves or seek to understand them within different times. It is pretty open from
here.
I think for our purposes, at least for now, we can start by looking at the idea of
philosophical thought through time.
Pre-History
Think back to our original discussion of the meaning of philosophy: the love or search for
understanding. Human communication takes many forms, many of which are non-verbal. We
can look at cave paintings or material artifacts14 and get an idea of what people are/were
thinking. We look at burial practices, religious or cultural buildings, listen to oral stories
handed down, observe tribal behavior untainted by modern society or thinking and we will
hear what is important to people.
Most often during this period, what we see is theo-philosophy (my term); that is, not quite
theology but systems heavily based in a theological view. Nature religions, death cults, poly-
14
This would be such things as pottery, weapons, housing, or art.
theism, ancestor worship; these represent a fair number of the philosophies of what we might
call pre-history. The codification and writing down of these theo-philosophies meant that
many lasted centuries (think Greek, Zoroastrian and Egyptian mythologies).
Where am I going? Keep thinking back to our early discussions; knowledge and
understanding go hand in hand. The more knowledge you have, the deeper your
understanding can be and vice versa. Still, knowledge and truth are not mutually exclusive.
Does the fact that the sun does not go around the earth (factually) affect other ‘truths’? Yes
and no. Can truths be gleaned from seeming non-facts? Yes. Looking at myths (even the
Judeo-Christian ones) shows a vast amount of understanding especially of human nature. Are
these ‘myths’ factual? Yes, inasmuch as they reveal ‘truths’ about ourselves to us (c.f. M.
Eliades or J. Campbell for good discussions in this realm).
We have always and will always seek meaning and understanding. Even as our scientific
knowledge grows we still must make facts fit into our understanding. Einstein shifted the
way we look at time, yet the Greeks already had a concept of time which was relative (Kiaros
versus Chronos).
Where am I going with all of this? First we must not think of philosophy as a ‘modern’
invention. People have always sought understanding and systems have developed, usually
what we call religions or sacred rituals, myths and thoughts. The validity of these myths or
religions lies not in their ‘scientific’ or ‘factual’15 nature but in their ‘true’ insights and
archetypes. As we discussed earlier (well at least I did), many understandings and ‘truths’
can be lost by invalidating systems based on hubris and bias, and this time in human
development and history should not be discounted, even though the ‘factual’ nature of the
observations may be suspect to our modern ears. As a final judgment call, we can categorize
most philosophical ‘thought’ of this period is a posteriori or experiential in nature.
History
This would be our ‘recorded’ time. We have snippets of writings starting in this period
and continuing until today. What would be the difference between pre-history and history?
Nothing really, except that we have datable, serial understanding and a greater practical
knowledge of the workings of the universe which a) causes us to re-evaluate and b) gives us
deeper understanding. Again, though, this is not better or worse. Truth comes to us through
both a priori and a posteriori means. Perhaps then the main difference is the systemization of
philosophical thought, aside from and somewhat independent of the a posteriori nature of the
earlier period. Here we develop logic and other a priori methods of coming to knowledge and
understanding.
Philosophy becomes detached from survival concerns (why doesn’t it rain?), becoming
more humanistic (why do I?).
There are arguments about all periods of time, calling some ‘dark’ or ‘backwards’ and
others ‘enlightened’ or ‘golden’. What we have to keep in mind here is that just like the prehistory at all times people seek meaning, and that at all times people find meaning. We must
avoid the hubris of knowledge and see progress in terms of the effectiveness (efficacious
nature) of thought in people’s lives. We must also not judge based on our present
sensibilities, biases or knowledge.
15
At least not how we define science and fact today.
Putting It Together
The first thing we will notice is that some questions are eternal. They have always been
asked and they will always be asked: Why are we here? What makes something beautiful?
What makes us human?
We need to evaluate each idea or system within its own framework, but mainly within the
body of established ‘truth’, not by some unrelated standard. We are striving to develop
objective criteria for critical thinking. This is not promoting a face-value, non-critical
evaluation but the exact opposite. As we plow through writers and writings, we must listen,
as we might to a myth or allegorical story, for the ‘truth’ within it, as well as the fallacies
which hinder the truths. Through this we can build a broad and deep understanding of
ourselves and our world. [What motivates? What captivates?]
Here you are trying to learn something, while here your brain is doing you a favor by making sure the learning
doesn’t stick. Your brain’s thinking, “Better leave room for more important things, like which wild animals to
avoid and whether naked snowboarding is a bad idea.”
Head First Servlets and JSP™ Second Edition by Bryan Basham, Kathy Sierra, and Bert Bates, 2008
Chapter 7
Philosophical Journeys
So now where do we go? We have established the rules, traveled through thinking,
rummaged about the attic of philosophy run down the steps to the basement of meaning and
finally examined the first floor of a very basic basis of human understanding. Where else but
the back yard?
You know that place where you can lounge safely, often behind the boundary of a fence
and the comfort of a hammock.
The Roots of Philosophy
When humans looked out and tried to live in their world, they came up against a broad
range of obstacles: Nature, limitations of the human body, cruelty, death. Life could seem
very arbitrary. If the rain came, you were fine. If the rain did not come you were in a world
of hurt, so to speak. Slowly the cycles of nature became apparent, but still arbitrary events
happened, earthquakes, floods, sunshine, crops, death. Stories developed to pass on the
knowledge of the seasons, of the dangers of life, and of life lessons.
These stories often took the form of myths. The telling of a myth involves the exchange of
an idea in a teaching format. Like Aesop’s fables there is always a moral at the end in a form
which can be understood, and reached ‘logically’ by the individual.
The search to explain and to transmit that explanation is at the root of the human
experience. Without such thinking and transmittal we would not have made it very far.
When we begin to have a good operations manual, we begin to branch out beyond just the
basic, what shall I eat, what shall I wear, where will I sleep existence. The questions of life,
death, birth, illness, love, happiness, fear begin to rise up in our minds beyond the level of
physical survival to that of mental survival.
The Philosophy of Roots
Tracing philosophy can be a bit like tracing your genealogy. There are gaps, solid
evidence, hints, wrong paths, exhilaration and frustration. You have to move from what you
know to what you do not yet know. You may even have to abandon long-held ideas about
something in order to move in the right direction.
If you were to examine your ‘personal philosophy’ at this moment, how would you
identify the roots of that philosophy? Could you? Experience would be your most likely
answer, but how about family? Country? Region? Era?
The ultimate root of philosophy is human experience and the ultimate foundation of
human experience comes from the shared experience of humanity. One might say that
philosophy is in our very soul. It is passed from generation to generation, tinged by the time
and situations through which it passes. Are times good? Are times bad? Are the ills human
caused or natural disasters? What effect does each generation have on an idea? What nudges
or changes of direction are part of the propulsion of an idea?
In the end, ideas survive because they have merit outside of the slice of time in which we
consider them.
Are We There Yet?
Still, the journey into philosophical thought is a life-long one. Our experiences are
important but without a framework or a language in which to exchange them with others,
how can we make sense of them? For this reason we have not discussed specific philosophers
yet. We are not ready to get on the road until we pack the car correctly, and pick up a good
map.
But just like having a map does not show you where you are and what you will see, so the
map we have created so far is only good once we get on the road, headed for the place we
have not yet arrived. Like I tell my kids when they ask the age old question: Have we stopped
yet? We only stop when we get there, so we must not be there yet.
There exists for each generation the chance to re-invent the wheel. Fresh mistakes and
discoveries are always possible, but we know that we stand on the shoulders of giants and
those who fail to learn from history are doomed to repeat it. Our problem will be that there is
often more to the issue than our glancing blow can reveal. So in a sense even this foray will
not get us there, merely on our way.
So Just Where Are We Going?
Okay. I have spouted off enough about the ways of the world and the obvious
shortcomings of this work and its author. What does that have to do with why we have
gathered these thoughts together here in this volume? Think of it as a vague map. We have
yet to lay out a detailed route, similar to maps made in the 1400’s versus maps made by
AAA. In a way the first thing we have to do is begin shedding some of that baggage we
packed. And we have to be willing to get lost, mess up the directions, and misread the map.
Sometimes we will go to the same place over and over again. Thought will rise to a high
level only to be challenged or torn down at a later time. Ideas which seemed insignificant at
one time will rise up to the forefront of thought.
We are on a journey of personal discovery, but like all things, we are not alone on that
journey. Just as AAA has done some of the leg work for us and can even tailor our map to
our particular journey, so this time together will hopefully do the same. With an awareness of
the high-level nature of the discussion and the survey nature of the information we can
wander off the beaten path, stop where we want to stop and see things the map can never tell
us. Where we choose to spend our time along the way is not dictated by the map.
Putting It Together
The commitment to philosophical learning is not a short-term one. Part of that
commitment is the abandoning of pre-conceived notions and ideas, as well as predispositions to current prejudices and understandings. We are not so much seeking to
examine things from our modern point of view but to understand them within two contexts:
their own time, where sensibilities and correctness may not agree with us and secondly
within the overall human condition.
Granted this survey will not give us all the answers but hopefully it will whet our appetites
and give us cause to delve deeper and come to understandings which will guide us. The
souvenirs which we pick up along the way will always remind us where we have been and
stand as the foundation for where we are going.
Chapter 8
Philosophy World
The title here is not to imply that we will now journey through thoughts about how the
world should operate. Instead it is more along the lines of our movement into the world of
philosophy. Think of it more as a browsing in the philosophy department store, with
departments like Western Philosophy and Eastern Philosophy and Logic (first floor).
Thinking about Thinking
I don’t know. Perhaps we should examine that one little blurb from the Chapter 6 where I
brought up the development of thought. Philosophers rarely cling to one system throughout
their lives. Circumstances and events combine to create a posteriori experiences which hone
a priori discussions. Still within that development it is rarely a radical 180 degree shift but
often a more subtle one. Socrates may have started out as a soldier, a Pythagorean or a
Sophist, but he reacted against those teachings, yet not radically. Granted he was poisoned
for upsetting the political balance (corrupting the youth of Athens, to state the exact charges
– that is another class), but he, or at least Plato, was not radical in his discussion. For
Socrates, the answers lay within us already. We have knowledge, as shown by the things we
do (politics, art, society, religion) which guides us. Right, wrong, good, bad, table, chair – we
know these things innately, even if we do not understand them. How else could we even
begin to discuss them?
The philosopher seeks to peel away the layers to seize the heart of the thing. The
knowledge of who we are, how we think, what our strengths and weakness are – these are the
things which direct us. Still, our understanding is imperfect and develops. We should be well
aware of this and be able to adjust as we make new discoveries. These discoveries are never
in vain, even if they are replaced, for without them who knows if we should ever have
arrived where we are now. (Take a moment and think about what is the most important thing
to you; Logic? Morality? Order? Causality?; what about 10 years ago?)
Finally, we do not go into philosophy with the intention of creating a system. If that is our
discovery then so be it, but let us take a journey not head for a destination.
Western Philosophy at a Glance
We will also study our Eastern philosophical heritage, but as they say write what you
know, or in our case, start with what you know. Here are a couple of on-line timelines which
may or may not be helpful. If you find more in your searches please share. I thought this one
was quite nice, interactive with some basic overall views though at times a bit speculative:
http://www.wadsworth.com/philosophy_d/special_features/timeline/ptimeline.html
(from
part of a larger philo-historical timeline). This one was a nice quick reference, including
some minor events for perspective but including the whole in one view:
http://www.rit.edu/cla/philosophy/Timeline.html. And finally one not as easy to read but very
full: http://www.hyperhistory.com/online_n2/History_n2/a.html
I’m sure that there are many others out there. I have included a broader philo-historical
reference in Appendix B but the following quick reference is (as stated) biased toward
western philosophy. Its categories are also perhaps a bit precocious, my being certain that
Xenophanes would not prefer to be lumped together with Thales much less be known as a
‘pre-Socratic’, but we, with our hubris of history (and them being dead) can lump them any
way we want.
Western Philosophy Quick Reference
Philosophers
The `Pre-Socratics’
Time
to 469 BC/BCE
Socrates
469-399 BCE
Plato
427-347 BCE
Aristotle
384-322 BCE
Early Christians
(Apologists)
100-500 AD/CE
Medieval
philosophers
500-1200 CE
Thomas Aquinas,
Scholasticism and
the Catholic doctors
1250-1500 CE
Early Modern/preNewtonians
1530-1716 CE
Post-Newtonians
1716-1804 CE
19th century
Moralists /
Existentialists
1800-1910 CE
Analytic
philosophers
1910-1960 CE
Contemporary
philosophers
since 1960 CE
Main concerns
How is the world ordered? How is change possible?
What is everything made of?
How should one live? Living and knowledge go
together. The world is based on objective Forms.
Expanded on Socrates. What is knowledge and how is
it possible? What is the relationship between
mathematical (rational) objects and everyday (sensual)
objects? Is the world as it appears to be? How should
we act within it?
You name it – and pretty much he did.
What is the nature of God and Humanity? How does
God want people to live? What is the nature of the
divine order? How can we make God understandable in
light of secular (non-Christian – usually Platonic)
thought?
How can God and his properties be made logically
comprehensible? What is the relationship between faith
and reason?
Resurgence of Ancient texts. How can Aristotle’s
philosophy be reconciled with Christian doctrine?
The ‘Death’ of Scholasticism. How can knowledge be
built on new foundations (other than God) that will
guarantee truth? What is the relationship between
reason and material causation?
What is the relationship between the scientific
(Newtonian) picture of the world and the common
sense picture?
What is the place of humanity and its moral concerns in
the wider intellectual landscape, and in the modern
State? We know we are the dominant beast but why
can’t we just get along?
Can all non-scientific problems be dissolved by
examining logic and/or language?
What is the relationship between the scientific (postNewtonian) picture of the world and the everyday
(moral, social, religious) picture? What is social justice
and how can it be increased in the contemporary state?
What is the philosophy of everything?
Table 4: Western Philosophical Systems
Development of Philosophies
From our previous discussion the tack we will navigate will be, as the name implies, a
back and forth through history, examining the beginnings of philosophies in terms of
historical placement. When we examine early philosophy, we must keep in mind their theophilosophical nature. Often knowledge, wisdom and faith are tied together. This is true of
many philosophies throughout time but at this time there is a struggle to step beyond mere
anthropomorphism or pantheism to understand into a more humanistic view. Still, most see
us as part of a whole, not separated from the whole as later humanism does but as within, part
of the overall functioning of the universe.
The Players
Dates
Philosophers
Main Points
Ionians, Italians, Greeks, Orientals
~625-547
Thales
~610-545
Anaximander
~560-478
~545-?
~540-480
Xenophanes
Anaximenes
Heraclitus
~581-507
Pythagoras
?
Lao Tse
One thing, an underlying ‘spirit’ (anima - water) orders
everything; the world is ‘one’
The underlying principle must be ‘other’ than the things
which make it up found through reason
One god, a conscious universe; ‘father’ of epistemology
Air is the founding spirit.
Change; everything is transitory except the ‘Logos’
Reincarnation. Numbers reveal the order of the
universe.
Balance, harmony yin-yang. The underlying principle is
unfathomable yet not transcendent.
Table 5: The Early Players
Early Thinking
We can take a moment here and point out some names. The ones you might easily
recognize would be Heraclitus and Pythagoras from the West and Lao Tse from the East. We
will touch on their thought later but take a moment and contemplate why you know their
names (aside from why you do not know the others). Most of us know Pythagoras because of
his theorem and prowess as a mathematician but not so much as a philosopher and Heraclitus
because of his famous river metaphor, but not so much a natural scientist and his
observations of the natural world which will play into later philosophies. What we know and
what we think we know are not just two different things but may also be different than the
reality.
So it is for our early philosophers. What is the nature of reality, of humans, of the world?
Are all things one or are they separate? Are they different but connected? How do we come
to know? Is the world a place of laws and predictability or is it completely random? Is what
is in front of me real or what is in my head? These questions may seem obvious to us but
they were not obvious at that time (and some may still be not obvious!). The early thinkers
set about to understand their world and their place in it, so without discussion specific
systems or philosophers let us examine some of these basic ideas.
Something Or Nothing
Is there something or nothing? Seems like a strange question to us but it was a hot topic
back then. When I move my arm through the air is there something, some medium, some n
which allows for that movement? If there is something would not that stop my arm from
moving, like a wall in the way? Does nothing imply non-existence? If it does how could
there be nothing in between the two point of my arm at rest?
You can begin to see the depth to which this simple question plumbs. We have insight that
they did not have, about molecules and such. We know that technically there is something in
the way but we are able to push it out of the way because air is not as solid as a wall. They
begin to postulate such things but they have no empirical proof. Common sense tells me that
I can move my arm, and nothing stops it from happening. But the question is why?
Cause And Movement
Whether there is something or nothing, we still observe change. Heraclitus said that you
never stand in the same river twice. He understood the linear nature of a river, and he
extrapolated that to time as well. We can see how movement implies change. We see a boy
become a man. We see the earth change with the seasons. All of this change implies
movements of state, that is, change from one state to another, as well. Of course he also
thought that everything is made of fire.16
The earlier thinkers pondered on the meaning and the mode of this. If I roll a ball down
the bowling alley I observe its movement from point A to point B (and hopefully point B is
not the gutter) and I see pins fall when the ball hits them. So I know that the ball hitting the
pins caused them to fall. I know that me throwing the ball caused it to roll toward the pins.
Basically one begins thinking about cause as a thing in itself. With light I can see, without
light I cannot. Is the thing that changed destroyed? Does it remain with the object, but we just
cannot see it?
Animal, Mineral Or Vegetable?
Where do humans fit into the universe? We are obviously different than starfish, but we
have hair like dogs. Philosophers will make observations about what makes us us. In terms of
the other two sections, this is the logical next step for us. No matter how the universe is
constructed, we think. We are aware that we are our self.
Putting It Together
There is a broad playing field here in these early days. There is as much epistemological
thinking as there is ethical systems, with a big interest in why and that falls under the heading
of metaphysics. The two big names here are Heraclitus and Parmenides, and if we spent
some time with them you would see why. At the least Plato thought they were the bee’s
knees.
These two basically laid out the ideas of determinism and libertarianism (not to be
confused with the political party), meaning that everything is completely determined (past,
present, and future) or free-will rules. These two forms of thinking can be found at the center
of most systems.
16
This really makes sense, trust me.
Obviously the point here is that there comes a point where we no longer have to just worry
about where our next meal is coming from and whether or not it will eat us first.
Chapter 9
Western Philosophy
We have visited those crazy and kooky pre-Socratics, with their wild notions about the
nature of things, so now we can move on to the slightly more sane mainstream philosophers.
Let us set the scene. Picture Athens in its Golden Age; Thinkers are moving from theophilosophy to philo-theology to philosophy. Art is moving from representation and symbol to
realism and sign. Democracy is producing a powerful state as worthy of reckoning as much
as the powerful military states. Smoke drifts across the field of view from some unseen
brazier. The camera pans from a hard rocky terrain to a conquered hill of buildings and
activity…wait, sorry, my latest screenplay file must have gotten mixed in here somehow.
Most of the folks in the list are heavily influenced (initially) by the Pythagoreans. Often,
they began there but broke for some reason, usually after a meeting of some sort with
another. Still they are developing new ideas which they are not afraid to share with one
another, and in some cases with the next generation of thinkers.
I stuck Confucius here instead of above mainly through lack of conviction, and to contrast
him with Mo Tzu.
The Players
Dates
Philosophers
Main Points
Greeks (Italians), Orientals
551-479
Confucius
515-450
Parminedes
500-428
Anaxagoras
490-430
490-420
490-430
483-376
470-391
Empedocles
Protagoras
Zeno of Elea
Gorgias
Mo Tzu
Leucippus &
Democritus
Socrates
Plato
? & ~460-?
470-399
428-348
Ethical living through ritual observances (political, religious and
etiquette)
Step by step arguments – others rely on senses too much
Everything must be in everything else – ‘seeds’; external
causes; the ‘Mind’ ()
Both a priori and posteriori; ’opposite’ principles
Sophism; relativism: truth is in the eye of the beholder
Paradoxes; ‘reduction ad absurdum’
Sophist – rhetoric; reality = appearance; knowledge = opinion
Self-reflection and authenticity rather than obedience to ritual
Atomism; movement and nothingness
Socratic Method – birthing ideas; ‘Why?; unity of virtue
Student of Socrates; foundations of Western Philosophy
Table 6: The 'Pre-Socratics'
Fate
This may seem a strange concept to introduce, but Fate, in Greek thought especially, plays
a big role. At this time, Fate was not really a philosophical concept but a religious one. Still
for the later more established thinkers, it does play into some of the philosophical thinking.
So, more on this later.
Okay, before we go, one can think of Fate as the ‘end of something’, that is, examine it
from a teleological point of view. Suffice it to say, these guys do not.
The Sophists
The Sophists were a school of thought and teaching which originated in Protagoras (do
not confuse him with Pythagoras) but had many exponents, including Gorgias (mentioned by
Plato in a dialogue of the same name). The Sophists believed that there were always two
sides to every argument. They taught an idea which we would call relativism – that is
everything is relevant to its observer. Truth is subjective not objective. For Protagoras it is the
art of persuasion which determines truth. Gorgias also put forth that the stronger argument
basically trumped the weaker argument. That is to say, that he made his living from teaching
rhetoric or oratory skills and so better argumentation made right.
Before we write this off, consider that in the Sophist’s view, ‘Man’, or in an effort to
avoid even the hint of an impropriety, Humanity, is the ‘measure of all things’ of what exists
and does not exist. Because of this, things should seem the same to you as they do to me, by
our shared humanity. I may just understand it better than you, so my job is to persuade you to
greater understanding.
Protagoras also felt that even though one opinion was as good as another, people would do
what is best (because of laws or social pressure), not just what they felt like doing.
In a final note here, Gorgas also taught that laughter was a great tool: “In contending with
adversaries, destroy their seriousness with laughter.” Good advice in any corner.
PHILOSOPHICAL MOMENT: We end up with two questions here, which we somewhat
cover above. First, if everyone’s knowledge/opinions are the same who is right? And
secondly, in terms of moral action, who is right? Ponder these for a moment.
The Others
In this section we will look at the non-sophists and their contributions to the whole of
human thought. You can see from the table above that the list is beginning to grow. The
number of people out plying the philosophical shingle is growing rapidly in response to the
relative stability of the Greek empire. Leisure time is growing. A wealthier class is growing
from the merchant community. No longer is thought and learning the playground of the
original privileged class (royalty) but in Athens democracy gives political power to that
wealth as well. An educated ruling class becomes the staple of the masses. At least the nonslave, land-holding masses.
People, no longer scrounging for their next meal, hang out in the agora or main plazas and
listen to sages. These sages are transforming into teachers, and these teachers are teaching
philosophy for a living.
Yet the persistent questions still persist.
Parmenides bears mentioning here as the guy who decided that a priori argumentation was
the way to go. His treaty On Nature: That Which Is was a poem, of which only a fragment
(original, not second-hand) exists. He also bore mentioning by Plato later in a dialog bearing
his name, which helps to fix him on the shelf of philosophy giants. Anyway there are two
paths; he tells us one, where we comprehend* what we think to exists and the other (which,
he says, is sheer nonsense), that you can comprehend* something which does not exist.
Think of it kind of like ‘I think it therefore it is, because it is impossible to know something
that is not.’ What he does is distinguish between our reason and our senses. We can only
know the things which are not changing.
I will mention Zeno (of Elea) here, because he is a disciple of Parmenides, who writes to
defend his mentor’s thoughts, but by doing so introduces a style of argumentation, ‘reduction
ad absurdum’, which we have mentioned before. He uses it to show the paradoxes within his
mentor’s detractors’ arguments, as well as introducing paradoxes which confound to this day.
Empedocles, saw things somewhat differently. For him, both reason and senses were
flawed, but together they did a pretty fair job of getting us through the day. For him, things
are paired together for such purposes. One by itself would be insufficient to give us a clear
understanding of things. These opposites or pairs were complimentary. Our first Western Zen
master. In an aside, he did postulate a theory of evolution where the best adapted is the ones
who survive.
Next comes Anaxagoras, who was very curious and very scientific in his approach to
things. Aside from his eventual banishment, he can be noted as looking at things and trying
to understand how something can be at the same time ‘of itself’ (an apple) and ‘of something
else’ (me, after I eat the apple). He also wonders in the same vein, things like how does a
thing like hair (a thing in itself) come from me (a different thing). He understands (as
Parmenides tells us) that nothing can be created or destroyed so that within everything is a
share of everything else. We can see in this the idea of the atom which will develop. These
‘seeds’ as he calls them were separated by a force called the ‘Mind’. We might think of this a
God, but that was not what he saw, and it was probably what got him kicked out.
Finally let me throw in Leucippus and Democritus. Like Socrates, most of what we know
of Leucippus comes from Democritus, though most of both their works is still fragmentary.
Leucippus wrote that nothing is random but is necessity (our one sentence fragment).
Democritus expounds a bit fortunately. There is something and there is nothing, but even
nothing is something. Everything is made up of something which is ultimately indivisible
(literally a-tomos) and that there is something in the nothing, we just cannot perceive it. They
bounce off one another and into our senses. These ‘atoms’ are not controlled by a force or
deity.
The Gist
Okay, let us take a second and talk about overall concepts which are developing in this
period. Logic is on the rise and ground rules are being laid by Zeno and Parmenides.
Parmenides, Anaxagoras, Empedocles and Democritus are defining the natural world in a
way that we can almost understand. Parmenides tells us that there is something not nothing.
Leucippus and Democritus say that there is nothing which is not nothing. The Sophists are
telling us that most of life is an illusion which must be cleared up.
The thinkers in this period are classified in several ways. Since we are doing more of a
historical look, the only ones I mention as a group are the Sophists because you hear that one
a lot. But one of the other main thought-groups is the Pluralists who put forth that there is a
plurality of things, that is, everything is not ‘one’ a concept which comes to us from earlier
thought. The ability to ‘separate’ things, like movement from objects is laying the
groundwork for a physics we recognize. Many of these fellows fall into this group.
Movement is of great concern to these guys. Odd as that may seem, they question back
and forth whether it really exists or is a mere illusion. Remember, movement implies change.
It gets to the core that niggles. Therefore substance and movement dominate many of these
discussions. WARNING: The Following Introduces Terms Being able to distinguish
between an object’s ‘substance’ (the things which make it up, make it what it is) and its
‘accidents’ (its attributes) is really the heart of this.
What does this mean? No ‘nothingness’ means there can be no movement, because there
is no space to move in. Nothingness means that there is space for movement, but that
confuses how things come together and stay together (like people and ice cream). Both ideas
call into question our senses and our reason. How we perceive and or know them bears
heavily on their arguments for and against. Without getting into the specifics, they are really
concentrating on what makes things up, what makes them distinguishable from one another
and how do they operate together and finally how do we know.
Anther one of the many things we get from this group goes back to our discussion of the
Prime Mover. The ideas like the ‘Mind’ posit a purposeful, external force acting upon the
stuff that makes up everything. Others argue a more mechanical nature of things, unguided
and random.
Putting It Together
During this period of time, there develops an interesting mix of thoughts on the nature of
things. Questions about what we know, what we can know, how can we know it and how
does it all fit together are really beginning to take front row seats. For the most part, this is
the environment into which Socrates enters and participates. We place more emphasis on
Socrates mainly because we have a more broad understanding of his thought as provided for
us by Plato. So lucky for Socrates but unlucky for these guys, they or their followers where
plain out-written. Socrates = better press. It is simply because of that later philosophers lean
heavily on him and we can see more of his influence because of it.
Still there is a depth of thought and connection between these guys which I have really not
touched on or developed, but then the format limits us. What we can pull away is the idea
that Sophists pretty much saw the world in a very practical way, and that your brain is your
ticket around. Second, the others were not a group, like the Pythagoreans or the Sophists.
They were mainly individuals or becoming more individual. Not that they did not consult or
question one another, but they were postulating as individuals, not for lifestyles per se but
espousing critical thinking in those around them.
They also began to develop styles of logic and argumentation which are still in force. We
can see here as we talked about before, one had to develop a means of arguing. The
formulation of logic and logical systems really begins to develop and blossom during this
period, as well as many ideas, such as the ‘seeds’ or survival of the fittest.
Chapter 10
Eastern Philosophy
Before we plunge deeper into Western philosophy let us take a class to examine the East
mainly because they too arise during this period and secondly I am afraid that I will forget if
I do not.
When we approach this, as we are with the Western philosophers, we will concentrate on
the ideas, not so much the cultural implications of these thinkers. By no means an expert on
this subject, I will both hesitate to opine here and refrain from speculation, though it might be
argued that it is all speculation on my part.
The rise of Classical Greek culture corresponds to a similar rise in China and India. I will
not pretend to discuss the reasons for this, or even hazard a guess (but I do recommend it as
an interesting project for someone). It is fascinating that all (both East and West) are roughly
contemporaries though separated by many miles. As to whether they were aware of each
other may be a different matter. I believe one Greek philosopher was rumored to have
traveled to India where he met with ‘naked seers’, so some interaction may actually have
taken place between India and Greece!
Where Angels Fear To Tread…
These Eastern figures are arising as were their counterparts and contemporaries in the
West at times of relative peace in their respective empires. Of course this peace could be an
object of conjecture but let us ignore that now and plunge deeply into the uncharted waters.
They too are often seeking to rise above recent chaos and give meaning and order to the
world around them.
Along those lines let me make a note about spelling which I will use in this text (well
perhaps less of a note and more of a disclaimer): I neither speak nor read any Chinese or
Indian language or dialect. I have not studied these thinkers in great detail. Hence I have
settled upon what I consider to be the most familiar or best Anglicization of the original. If
you want to say Dao instead of Tao, be my guest. Cross it out and rewrite it if you are so
inclined! Just do not write me (see appendix F for a guide to why things look different).
The Players (a refresher)
Dates
Philosophers
Main Points
South Asian, East Asian
?
Lao Tse
563-483?
Buddha
551-479
Confucius
500-428
Mo Tzu
Lao Tse
Balance, harmony yin-yang. The underlying principle is
unfathomable yet not transcendent.
Emphasizes personal experience, a pragmatic attitude,
and the use of critical thinking toward all types of
knowledge
Ethical living through ritual observances (political,
religious and etiquette)
Self-reflection and authenticity rather than obedience to
ritual
Table 7: Early Eastern Philosophers
Lao Tse does not directly fit historically into this group (though depending on how you
date some these guys, he could have been a contemporary), but since I was trying to cover
the early East in on shot I thought it best to include him here.
For Lao Tse the Prime Mover is the Tao (way, path) which has existed before time.
Everything depends upon the Tao, but the Tao is not obvious within all things. The Tao is
unfathomable but can be known about, that is to say that we cannot say what it is or what it is
not, merely that it is.
A certain amount oneness is necessary for living in harmony. Being one with nature
brings one into harmony with nature. Still, life is full of balances: light, dark; big, small;
male, female. When these things are in balance there is harmony.
Buddha
Buddha, like so many of the philosophers we have looked at so far, did not write anything
down. Followers and ‘schools’ which came later did that. So, like anything else separating
the original philosophy from later philosophical and theological development is difficult.
Avoidance of extremes is a central idea. Buddha taught that the two extremes of thinking
dogmatism and skepticism should be avoided. This pragmatic, a posteriori view did involve
deep levels of critical thinking applied to truths, but still allowed for the dynamic experiences
of life or the wisdom of others to influence thinking. That said, it is not a chaotic dynamism
but one with boundaries (Buddha is reacting to both ridged doctrine of the Brahmas and the
extreme skepticism of the Sramanic movement, wandering teachers something like the
Sophists – odd how that seems to be the way with wandering teachers).
For the Buddha there are no self-caused entities and that everything is dependent, that is, it
arises from or upon something else. Life is a process, because nothing is permanent. There is
really only self-knowledge but human identity is without a permanent and substantial self.
The ‘self’ is an evolving process constrained or enhanced by previous or past ‘selves’.
Reincarnation is the process of that development (this question also arises in Socrates’
thought – transmigration of the soul). Buddha also presents an ethical view based on these
epistemological thoughts.
Confucius
The person or thought school known as Confucius is mainly ethical in focus and presents
no logic or logic systems. While he seems to be against any sort of divine Prime Mover, there
is a higher order or ‘heaven’ which is dependent upon the person to carry out its will. Ritual
is the means of carrying out the will.
Ritual adherence is based on heavenly ‘mandates’ and we are ‘good’ in terms of how we
align ourselves to that will by carrying out the mandates. Manners, taste, morality and social
order are part of and dependent upon ‘heaven’ but are combined with ‘moral force’ (action)
to bring harmony and symmetry to the world.
Confucius is often associated with government and governing. He spent a large amount of
time training adherents for government service, so we can see that influence in history. Still,
he does not seem to posit a ‘philosopher class’ for ruling.
The stronger the moral force in a person the better person, ruler, boss, philosopher,
painter, etc. they are. It is important to correct the lacking moral force in another but it must
be done with respect.
All thought and action therefore are directed to seeking and bringing about harmony and
symmetry.
Mo Tzu
Mo Tzu is the rival (and I do not use the word lightly) to the teachings of Confucius and
his teaching is summed up in ten theses extensively argued in the non-self authored text that
bears his name (though the text could be considered fragmentary because some of the
sections below are marked ‘missing’). He seems somewhat akin to Confucius in some
teachings, but he really departs from him into a more practical, common sense way of
looking at things. He is also associated (in another divergence from Confucius) with
scientific and logical explorations. In the end he is pretty much supplanted in China by
Confucianism but the influence of his thought is visible.
1. Elevating the Worthy – for political office
2. Exalting Unity – consistency of moral thought
3. Impartial Concern – do unto others as you would have them do unto you
4. Against Military Aggression – both unprofitable and immoral
5. Frugality in Expenditures – governing requires thrift
6. Frugality in Funerals – do not be opulent, similar to the above
7. Heaven's Will – directly involved in human action
8. Elucidating the Spirits – skeptics are wrong, spirits exist
9. Against Music – not against all but lavishness, like funerals above
10. Against Fatalism – leads to chaos
You Buddha do Mo Tzu be less Confucius
Honestly, there are several developments of Eastern philosophers which may have bearing
within our present and eventual conversations but they are not presented here. I have tried to
boil down the origins to the concepts we are already discussing. Eventually, for example, it
looks like Buddhism develops a type of atomism (Democritus)but I did not find (in my short
exploration) a statement by Buddha on atomism. I have tried to distill to what the guys
themselves seem to stress, not what their followers developed. In other words any complaints
should be made to the Tao complaint department, if one existed.
Buddha, Mo Tzu and Confucius gave a sense of order and comfort during raucous periods
in their cultures’ history. As in the West, there seems to be a movement away from
theological explanations to more philosophical or theo-philosophical exploration for
meaning. A certain practicality, that is, a less speculative thought appears, differing from the
West, which has moved in a more metaphysical direction; less of a why do we live and more
of how do we live.
For Mo Tzu heaven is active, unlike Confucius and Buddha who keep heaven out of the
affairs of humans. Still both groups see heaven as the source of moral action. There is some
difference on the place of humans in the overall scheme of things, but as we have seen in the
West there is some disagreement about that place. A certain notion of separation from the
‘one’ is present, but also the notion that there is more to the ‘one’ than there is to ‘other’.
The moral nature of these thinkers’ philosophies must, like Socrates’, speak to the nature
of the times in which they lived. We can also see the more static nature of Eastern philosophy
in that these systems have continued to exist on their own for thousands of years.
Balance and Ritual are a big portion of the thought of these guys. The loss of concern for
ritual or earlier thinking has brought about chaos. The attachment to extremes has produced
imbalance which produces immoral behavior, hence chaos.
For Buddha and arguably Confucius, chaos seems to be produced by over-thinking.
Putting It Together
For the most part, these are philosophies of action. They are mainly ethical in nature, the
how-to-live mode of thought. In this way they are very much like the West at this time.
Most of these systems are not seen in opposition to each other, hence you can hear of Zen
Buddhism. This aspect is important because in contrast, Western thinkers tend to put
themselves into opposition to other thinkers and secondly because Western thinkers will
begin to explore and lean on some of these systems within their own systems.
Honestly, and completely aside, I think that Western people who abandon Western
thought in favor of Eastern thought do injustice to the both systems. This ability to integrate
is somewhat foreign to Westerners who seek to distinguish and separate (which I guess is
really the problem and base cause of their abandoning). The Western tendency to
dichotomize is not always true to even the roots of Western thought (recall one of our earliest
discussions as to the roots of Western philosophy).
There is a non-compromising synthesis within Western philosophy but it is often ignored.
Examining Eastern thought often re-vitalizes that thought within the West.
Chapter 11
Introduction to Socrates and Plato
Plato does not fall directly under this era of philosophy, but without him we would know
little to nothing of Socrates (other sources do not cover the breath of Plato’s dialogues).
Socrates was a teacher and so we rely mainly on Plato (authorship arguments aside here)
who was his student. At the same time, Plato is a filter. Plato tells stories about Socrates, so
he advances Socrates’ philosophy and his own at the same time. Think of it this way: Plato
tells stories or aspects of stories from Socrates teaching which promote Plato’s way of
thinking, kind of a ‘selective philosophy’.
Still scholars tell us that the ‘early Socrates’ of Plato’s early writing may reflect more
closely Socrates’ actual thinking. From that we can guess that as Plato’s thoughts emerge and
develop, Socrates may become more of a mouthpiece as time goes on, but couched within a
recognizable true Socrates. If that were not true then more of a ruckus would probably have
been raised at the time. Understanding Aside: When we talk about authorship in this time
(and probably until ‘modern’ times), we have to be aware of the idea that one might write
quotes from or ‘in the thought or vein of’ the character mentioned as the author. That is to
say, this is what so-and-so said or would have said had he said it, so we can ‘attribute’ it to
him, ergo he is the ‘author’. This was a widely accepted practice.
Who Is That Guy Behind Those Platonic Dialogues?
With aforementioned in mind, what can we say about Socrates? A bunch. Ultimately, for
Socrates, it was all about living, and living right at that. He flouted many of the social norms
of the day and directly attacked many, like the Sophists, who had political influence, because
he felt their thinking and their lifestyles did not reflect the ‘examined life’. He was not afraid,
at least in Plato’s telling, to broach any subject, lifestyle or mannerism. In the end he was
condemned to drink poison at a trial from which he should have escaped punishment. In the
Apology (from the Gk for defense), a ‘transcript’ of the trial and some ‘subsequent’
dialogues, we see that instead he turns on his detractors and supporters alike to keep to his
principles and stubbornly make his point. Needless to say, it did not extend his life.
Enough of the man; how did he view the world? Unlike the Sophists, he does not stop at
sensations, at opinion based knowledge; his ‘investigations’ tended to scrutinize the more
intimate part of man, by what makes a human a human: reason. Like the Sophists, was not
concerned with metaphysics, saying that nature is under the direction of gods. He
concentrated all his attention on the search for moral concepts; he was convinced that the
practice of morality could only be accomplished by having a concept of justice. From this
rose his opposition to that destructive idea which Sophists espoused.
Socrates is a teacher. He is not the first full-time teacher in Athens (as we saw above in
the Sophists among others). He is different in that he is not only teaching but challenging the
notions of other teachers and political and moral leaders. Now a cynic might say that like the
sophists he was just looking for a buck and so had to discredit the competition, but as they
did not die for doing the same thing, one has to lend a bit more credence to Socrates as a
‘gadfly’ and trouble maker for a cause.
Natural Law
Something I probably should have covered earlier but will do so here because I like the
placement better is a concept known as ‘Natural Law’. In a nutshell, within each of us lies an
innate knowledge of how things should be, i.e. a natural or (human) nature-based, hard-wired
knowledge. This differs from Secular or Human Law in that human law is imposed from the
outside. Natural Law is often considered the basis for Secular Law.
To the Sophists Natural Law meant “the right of the stronger” (Republic), that is the one
who can impose his will (usually through rhetoric). Socrates saw it more as an innate
understanding of right and wrong.
The Socratic Method
Socrates seems to embody many of thoughts and theories of his day. His search for
wisdom and understanding brings him into contact with the movers and shakers of politics,
philosophy and science. For this reason he discusses a great many things which may seem
odd since we present Socrates as an ethical-moral philosopher, but is not in why he discusses
a great many things.
Whenever a concept is being proffered, espoused or ranted about Socrates often asks
everyone else to define it, because he is ignorant and needs their input. People are always
trying to help poor Socrates understand. Socrates continues to ask questions, to draw out
meaning from the individual. This process, which Socrates thought of as ‘midwifery’, we call
his ‘method’
This questioning honed the person’s own understanding, and we would think of it as an
informal form of logic, as we have discussed before. Socrates’ directed questioning was often
sly but served to remove poor premises and lead to logical thinking. Generalities should only
be used when sufficient cause could be shown that they could be; that reason should be the
rule by which we judge them and that eventually we could arrive at general concepts by
which other concepts could be judged, and so on and so on. Function and meaning go hand in
hand.
For Socrates, wisdom was the end.
Virtue
What does Socrates mean by the word we translate as ‘virtue’? First let us start with what
it is not. For Socrates ignorance, not malice per se, is why one does evil. To know good is to
do good. Therefore wisdom and learning are not just virtues as we would think of them, they
are Virtue.
Therefore Virtue and Wisdom go hand in hand. Socrates asks what good are worldly
possessions or power if you do not have the sense to use them? That becomes especially
pertinent when say, we are the powerful person wielding it. As paraphrasing Jesus would say,
“what profit it a man if he gains the whole world but loses his soul in the process?”
Wisdom leads to right living. For Socrates that is paramount. That is the reason we gain
wisdom. By working from the particular (usually a particular circumstance) we can gain
wisdom and see general patterns which guide us in the particular. Socrates called this a ‘unity
of virtues’, in the sense of all things being one.
This sense is why we classify Socrates, at least the one presented mainly by Plato, as an
ethical philosopher, because for him, all things, all knowledge, all learning are about living
right. For this reason ‘the unexamined life is not worth living’. This is not an intellectual
hubris; knowledge is virtue and virtue is everything.
Putting It Together
So, without getting into the nitty-gritty of the texts we can see the powerful influence
Socrates has, not only for his time but for all times to follow. His inability to be satisfied with
the status quo (or whatever the Greek equivalent of that phrase is) drove him to question
everything and everyone all by asking questions. Do not worry though, as ‘methinks my lady
doth protest too much’. Socrates is crafty and vicious in his pursuit of wisdom. He defers and
grovels, cajoles and angers, praises and self-deprecates, but he is a bull dog for virtue.
WANDA: The central message of Buddhism is not: “Every man for himself.” And the London Underground is
not a political movement. Those are all mistakes, Otto. I looked them up.
OTTO: Don’t call me stupid….
WANDA: To call you stupid would be an insult to stupid people. I've known sheep who could outwit you. I've
worn dresses with higher IQs, but you think you're an intellectual, don't you, ape?
OTTO: Apes don't read philosophy.
WANDA: Yes they do, Otto, they just don't understand it.
WANDA: What would Plato do?
OTTO: Apologize.
A Fish Called Wanda (1988)
Chapter 12
Socrates and Plato
Socrates states in Plato’s Apology that the whole direction of his life is due to the Oracle’s
at Delphi answer to a simple question his friend Chaerephon asked of it: who is the wisest
man? The Delphic answer was Socrates. This ‘simple act’ set Socrates on the path to
understand why he was the wisest of men. According to him (or is PR man, whoever you
choose to believe), he did not see himself as wise so he set out to understand this Oracle. It
was not his fault that those he sought out, those whom he saw as wise, were unable to answer
his simple questions.
Virtue Revisited
A word we brought up before and bandied about here is virtue. This is the catch-word for
the gist of Socrates’ thought. Recall that virtue is knowledge/wisdom and knowledge/wisdom
is virtue. What the wise man does is virtue and what the virtuous man does is wisdom.
Ignorant and unwise people are not virtuous because they cannot act virtuously. Still, they are
not evil, because since they are ignorant they are not responsible. It is really impossible to do
wrong voluntarily because you would really only do good voluntarily. Capice?
The Dichotomized Man
Socrates believed in duality. Humans were body and soul. In terms of ontology or being,
the idea of the ‘soul’, i.e. that thing which is separate from the ‘body’, is that which makes
us, well, us. This is somewhat different from other Weltanschauung (world-view), like say
the Hebrews, who saw the person as unity, that is, the ‘head’ and the ‘heart’ made up the
person. So who cares, right? Well the concept of a separate soul does is allow within Western
philosophy the idea of the after-life (which will eventually creep into Hebrew thoughts as
well). We brushed against this in the early Western philosophers and most recently in the
Eastern philosophy section. The idea of heaven, the idea of something beyond us becomes
more immediate, more ethical in nature here, as opposed to concepts like ‘the Mind’ which
we saw in earlier Greek thought.
Think back. Is everything one or is everything plural? This dichotomy places Socrates
squarely within the Pluralist’s camp but more importantly means that not only can I be
outside of something else, but also that something else can be outside of me, as well as both
together. Take a long drag on that thought cigarette and hold it. (you know how to argue
don’t you Steve? You just put your two premises together and cognate….)
Because of this, Virtue plays into Socrates’ understanding of the soul and vice versa.
Name Dropping
For ease of reference, a quick list of the works of Plato follows. Though all involve
Socrates, the ‘Early’ group is considered closest to Socrates’ thought, probably because Plato
is writing them closest to the events they recount. Because we are inquirers and not Platonic
Scholars we will put authorship and chronological questions aside and plunge forward and
roughly order the dialogs by period. While the grouping and the order may be questionable at
best, here goes:
Chronological
Division
Early
Middle
Late
Works
Apology, Crito, Charmides, Euthyphro, First Alcibiades, Greater Hippias, Lesser
Hippias, Ion, Laches, Lysis
Cratylus, Euthydemus, Gorgias, Menexenus, Meno, Phaedo, Protagoras,
Symposium, Republic, Phaedrus, Parmenides, Theaetetus
Timaeus, Critias, Sophist, Statesman, Philebus, Laws
Table 8: Plato's Dialogs By Period
Important Secondary Source for Socrates’ Thought: Xenophon – look him up!
The Early Dialogues: Questions, I Got Questions…
(Ethics, Religion, Psychology and Epistomology)
Once more, due to the nature of our inquiry, let us sift through and reduce Socrates’
thoughts to some quick one-liners. Socrates’ ethical/theological (I will tie them together) and
epistemological (how we know things) understanding can be found in the early dialogues of
Plato, which as discussed are probably the closest thing to Socrates’ thought as we can
divine. The fight here is opinion verses knowledge, ignorance versus virtue.
Reading Philosophy
As a pretty major aside here, as earlier sections were given in order to help with the
beginning of thinking philosophy, this section is the introduction to beginning to read
philosophy. Reading can be difficult, especially in translated works. Depending on how the
translator chooses to translate (word for word; meaning for meaning; timeframe, etc.), how
contemporary the philosopher’s thought is to our own, just to name a few, we can have more
or less difficulty in plowing through the text. In the end most of the thought are thoughts
which are familiar to us in one form or another. Still, we are seeking to understand what the
author is trying to tell us, not necessarily what we think is being said. The ultimate goal is to
be able to pick up a work and read it from beginning to end, all the while marking arguments
and conclusions as we go along, finally gleaning some understanding after we are done. Be
aware that this may take more than one reading!
It is really a three-step process. Think about what we have discussed so far and why. Well,
this is why. First we want to be able to objectively read a work or series of works. In this step
we are really just seeking to hear what the author is trying to tell us, that is the work in and of
itself (or the body of work), free of our own thinking on the subject. Second, we want to
examine it within a context, still objectively, understanding the author’s subjective and
environmental influences and how that plays into the work. Thirdly, we begin to examine it
for the purpose of ‘usefulness’ to us, i.e. critically, using the tools we have stuck into our
belts as a work of influence in our own thoughts.
We do not just want to depend upon the learned and consumed commentaries of others.
We want to read the texts themselves and not take it for granted that is what they say or what
they mean for us. Therefore think of this exposition as a good ‘reading list’ for us to start
with. Rather than tackling whole body of a single work, we will start with ideas, and see if
we can recognize these ideas within the text. Later we will start with a passage and the try to
determine what the idea being proffered is. For now, baby steps.
Reading Plato
The following list is based on the early works of Plato, those which we see as closest to
Socrates’ thought. Take a moment, read the Idea and reflect on what you think it means.
Make sure you grasp the idea. Now go to the text as listed under the Passage heading and see
if that is being said in that passage. Hopefully, if I have not screwed up, it at least touches it.
Part of this exercise also challenges us to understand the commentaries we read. Like this
exercise, we generalize what is said, but we generalize because enough of the texts support
that generalization about the author’s thought. For the most part these pericopes are not the
only place in the writer’s works you would see this idea proffered.
So two of the aspects of come into play here: the work within itself and within a body of
works (context). Do not forget that some of the works are in reaction to the ideas or works of
others! The first ones show only one passage for easing into the process, but after that more
passages, more work.
IDEA
Body as metaphor for soul. Goodness is to be understood in terms of conduciveness
to human happiness, well-being, or flourishing, which may also be understood as
“living well,” or “doing well”; doing injustice harms one's soul, the thing that is most
precious to one, and, hence, that it is better to suffer injustice than to do it. – karma?
The health of the soul as important as the health of the body. Virtue is good just by
itself; anything else that is good serves virtue.
One should do the right thing; A rejection of retaliation, or the return of harm for
harm or evil for evil. – sound familiar?
Is something the sum of part of its parts? Merely listing examples of some particular
ethical value, even if all are viable and reasonable cases of that value would never
provide an adequate analysis of what the value is, nor would it provide an adequate
definition of the value term that refers to the value and therefore not an adequate
understanding of that value. Proper definitions must state what is common to all
examples of the value – objective truth
Definitive definition of ethical terms is at least a necessary condition of reliable
judging of specific instances of the values they name.
Those with expert knowledge or wisdom on a given subject do not err in their
judgments on that subject, and therefore can teach and explain their subject – Prime
Arguer?
The common good: the view that the citizen who has agreed to live in a state must
always obey the laws of that state, or else persuade the state to change its laws, or
leave the state – good of the soul, good of the soul collective
PASSAGE
Crito 47a-48b
Apology 30b
Crito 48b-49d
Euthyphro 6d-e; Meno
72c-d
Euthyphro 4e-5d, 6e;
Laches 189e-190b;
Lysis 223b; Greater
Hippias 304d-e; Meno
71a-b, 100b
Ion 532a-b; Euthyphro
4e-5a; Laches 185b,
185e, 1889e-190b
Crito 51b-c, 52a-d
Table 9: Reading Plato, Part I
Let’s kibitz on this group so far. Can you see a continuity of thought? A development of
argument? How effective is Socrates’ questioning? What effect on later thought do these
arguments have? Enough; continue.
IDEA
The gods are completely wise and good
PASSAGE
Apology 28a;
Euthyphro 6a, 15a
IDEA
Natural Law: in some sense, everyone recollects knowledge, that is the knowledge is
within them
Divine inspiration: Poets are able to write and do the wonderful things they write and
do, not from knowledge or expertise, but from some kind of divine inspiration. The
same can be said of diviners and seers, although they do seem to have some kind of
expertise-perhaps only some technique by which to put them in a state of appropriate
receptivity to the divine
Various types of divination can allow human beings to come to recognize the will of
the gods
No one really knows what happens after death, but it is reasonable to think that death
is not an evil; there may be an afterlife, in which the souls of the good are rewarded,
and the souls of the wicked are punished
PASSAGE
Meno 81; see also
Gorgias 472b, 475e476a
Ion 533d-536a, 538de; Apology 22b-c;
Laches 198e-199a;
Meno 99c
Apology 21a-23b, 33c
Apology 40c-41c;
Crito 54b-c
Table 10: Reading Plato, Part II
Putting It Together
Nothing like reducing months if not years of study to a short burst of activity! This
chapter is primarily a hands-on activity, so the conclusions to draw from its reading are
mainly of the personal type. Socrates has some very definite ideas about how the world
works/should work and he is not afraid to share them. We can get a sense from this short
reading set his ‘method’, and the effectiveness (and annoyingness) of it.
There is another small point here. Hopefully from this reading session, some of the humor
comes through too.
Homegame
Question: Even with all of his protestations, does Socrates use rhetoric similarly to the
Sophists (i.e. as a blunt object)?
Activity: Let us look at one short work from the early period as a whole, Ion; a seemingly
odd discussion with an actor.
Technical Terms
Art: techne = skill or craft, as in the art of medicine.
Knowledge: epistome = knowledge of or about a thing (sometimes inspiration or
science), as in a doctor knows about the flu.
So in this case, you go to your doctor feeling achy and sniffling and coughing. The doctor
knows this is the flu and he does something to make you feel better.
Chapter 12a
Plato: Ion
Personae
 Socrates
 Ion – an actor (rhapsodes) from Ephesus
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Welcome, Ion. Where have you come from now, to pay us
this visit? From your home in Ephesus?
No, no, Socrates; from Epidaurus and the festival there of
Asclepius.
Do you mean to say that the Epidaurians honor the god with
a contest of rhapsodes also?
Certainly, and of music in general.
Why then, you were competing in some contest, were you?
And how went your competition?
We carried off the first prize, Socrates.
Well done: so now, mind that we win too at the Panathenaea.
Why, so we shall, God willing.
I must say I have often envied you rhapsodes, Ion, for your
art: for besides that it is fitting to your art that your person
should be adorned and that you should look as handsome as
possible, the necessity of being conversant with a number of
good poets, and especially with Homer, the best and divinest
poet of all, and of apprehending
his thought and not merely learning off his words, is a matter
for envy; since a man can never be a good rhapsode without
understanding what the poet says. For the rhapsode ought to
make himself an interpreter of the poet's thought to his
audience; and to do this properly without knowing what the
poet means is impossible. So one cannot but envy all this.
What you say is true, Socrates: I at any rate have found this
the most laborious part of my art; and I consider I speak
about Homer better than anybody, for neither
Metrodorus of Lampsacus, nor Stesimbrotus of Thasos, nor
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Glaucon,5 nor any one that the world has ever seen, had so
many and such fine comments to offer on Homer as I have.
That is good news, Ion; for obviously you will not grudge
me an exhibition of them.
And indeed it is worth hearing, Socrates, how well I have
embellished Homer; so that I think I deserve to be crowned
with a golden crown by the Homeridae.
Yes, and I must find myself leisure some time to listen to
you;
but for the moment, please answer this little question: are
you skilled in Homer only, or in Hesiod and Archilochus as
well?
No, no, only in Homer; for that seems to me quite enough.
And is there anything on which Homer and Hesiod both say
the same?
Yes, I think there are many such cases.
Then in those cases would you expound better what Homer
says than what Hesiod says?
I should do it equally well in those cases, Socrates, where
they say the same.
But what of those where they do not say the same? For
example, about the seer's art, on which both Homer and
Hesiod say something.
Quite so.
Well then, would you, or one of the good seers, expound
better what these two poets say, not only alike but
differently, about the seer's art?
One of the seers.
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And if you were a seer, would you not, with an ability to
expound what they say in agreement, know also how to
expound the points on which they differ?
Of course.
Then how is it that you are skilled in Homer,
and not in Hesiod or the other poets? Does Homer speak of
any other than the very things that all the other poets speak
of? Has he not described war for the most part, and the
mutual intercourse of men, good and bad, lay and
professional, and the ways of the gods in their intercourse
with each other and with men, and happenings in the heavens
and in the underworld, and origins of gods and heroes?
Are not these the subjects of Homer's poetry?
What you say is true, Socrates.
And what of the other poets? Do they not treat of the same
things?
Yes; but, Socrates, not on Homer's level.
What, in a worse way?
Far worse.
And Homer in a better?
Better indeed, I assure you.
Well now, Ion, dear soul; when several people are talking
about number, and one of them speaks better than the rest, I
suppose there is some one who will distinguish the good
speaker?
I agree.
And will this some one be the same as he who can
distinguish the bad speakers, or different?
The same, I suppose.
And he will be the man who has the art of numeration?
Yes.
And again, when several are talking about what kinds of
foods are wholesome, and one of them speaks better than the
rest, will it be for two different persons to distinguish the
superiority of the best speaker and the inferiority of a worse
one, or for the same?
Obviously, I should say, for the same.
Who is he? What is his name?
A doctor.
Socrates
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And so we may state, in general terms, that the same person
will always distinguish, given the same subject and several
persons talking about it,
both who speaks well and who badly: otherwise, if he is not
going to distinguish the bad speaker, clearly he will not
distinguish the good one either, where the subject is the
same.
That is so.
And the same man is found to be skilled in both?
Yes.
And you say that Homer and the other poets, among whom
are Hesiod and Archilochus, all speak about the same things,
only not similarly; but the one does it well, and the rest
worse?
Yes, and what I say is true.
And since you distinguish the good speaker,
you could distinguish also the inferiority of the worse
speakers.
So it would seem.
Then, my excellent friend, we shall not be wrong in saying
that our Ion is equally skilled in Homer and in the other
poets, seeing that you yourself admit that the same man will
be a competent judge of all who speak on the same things,
and that practically all the poets treat of the same things.
Then what can be the reason, Socrates, why I pay no
attention when somebody discusses any other poet, and am
unable to offer any remark at all of any value,
but simply drop into a doze, whereas if anyone mentions
something connected with Homer I wake up at once and
attend and have plenty to say?
That is not difficult to guess, my good friend; anyone can see
that you are unable to speak on Homer with art and
knowledge. For if you could do it with art, you could speak
on all the other poets as well; since there is an art of poetry, I
take it, as a whole, is there not?
Yes.
And when one has acquired any other art whatever as a
whole, the same principle of inquiry holds through all the
arts? Do you require some explanation from me, Ion, of what
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I mean by this?
Yes, upon my word, Socrates, I do; for I enjoy listening to
you wise men.
I only wish you were right there, Ion: but surely it is you
rhapsodes and actors, and the men whose poems you chant,
who are wise; whereas I speak but the plain truth, as a simple
layman might.
For in regard to this question I asked you just now, observe
what a trifling commonplace it was that I uttered—a thing
that any man might know—namely, that when one has
acquired a whole art the inquiry is the same. Let us just think
it out thus: there is an art of painting as a whole?
Yes.
And there are and have been many painters, good and bad?
Certainly.
Now have you ever found anybody who is skilled in pointing
out the successes and failures among the works of
Polygnotus son of Aglaophon, but unable to do so with the
works of the other painters;
and who, when the works of the other painters are exhibited,
drops into a doze, and is at a loss, and has no remark to offer;
but when he has to pronounce upon Polygnotus or any other
painter you please, and on that one only, wakes up and
attends and has plenty to say?
No, on my honor, I certainly have not.
Or again, in sculpture, have you ever found anyone who is
skilled in expounding the successes of Daedalus son of
Metion, or Epeius son of Panopeus,
or Theodorus of Samos, or any other single sculptor, but in
face of the works of the other sculptors is at a loss and dozes,
having nothing to say?
No, on my honor, I have not found such a man as that either.
But further, I expect you have also failed to find one in
fluting or harping or minstrelsy or rhapsodizing who is
skilled in expounding the art of Olympus
or Thamyras, or Orpheus, or Phemius, the rhapsode of
Ithaca, but is at a loss and has no remark to offer on the
successes or failures in rhapsody of Ion of Ephesus.
I cannot gainsay you on that, Socrates: but of one thing I am
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conscious in myself—that I excel all men in speaking on
Homer and have plenty to say, and everyone else says that I
do it well; but on the others I am not a good speaker. Yet
now, observe what that means.
I do observe it, Ion, and I am going to point out to you
what I take it to mean. For, as I was saying just now, this is
not an art in you, whereby you speak well on Homer, but a
divine power, which moves you like that in the stone which
Euripides named a magnet, but most people call “Heraclea
stone.” For this stone not only attracts iron rings, but also
imparts to them a power whereby they in turn are able to do
the very same thing as the stone,
and attract other rings; so that sometimes there is formed
quite a long chain of bits of iron and rings, suspended one
from another; and they all depend for this power on that one
stone. In the same manner also the Muse inspires men
herself, and then by means of these inspired persons the
inspiration spreads to others, and holds them in a connected
chain. For all the good epic poets utter all those fine poems
not from art, but as inspired and possessed, and the good
lyric poets likewise;
just as the Corybantian worshippers do not dance when in
their senses, so the lyric poets do not indite those fine songs
in their senses, but when they have started on the melody and
rhythm they begin to be frantic, and it is under possession—
as the bacchants are possessed, and not in their senses, when
they draw honey and milk from the rivers—that the soul of
the lyric poets does the same thing, by their own report. For
the poets tell us, I believe, that the songs they bring us are
the sweets they cull from honey-dropping founts
in certain gardens and glades of the Muses—like the bees,
and winging the air as these do. And what they tell is true.
For a poet is a light and winged and sacred thing, and is
unable ever to indite until he has been inspired and put out of
his senses, and his mind is no longer in him: every man,
whilst he retains possession of that, is powerless to indite a
verse or chant an oracle. Seeing then that it is not by art that
they compose and utter so many fine things about the deeds
of men—
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as you do about Homer—but by a divine dispensation, each
is able only to compose that to which the Muse has stirred
him, this man dithyrambs, another laudatory odes, another
dance-songs, another epic or else iambic verse; but each is at
fault in any other kind. For not by art do they utter these
things, but by divine influence; since, if they had fully learnt
by art to speak on one kind of theme, they would know how
to speak on all. And for this reason God takes away the mind
of these men and uses them as his ministers, just as he does
soothsayers and godly seers,
in order that we who hear them may know that it is not they
who utter these words of great price, when they are out of
their wits, but that it is God himself who speaks and
addresses us through them. A convincing proof of what I say
is the case of Tynnichus, the Chalcidian, who had never
composed a single poem in his life that could deserve any
mention, and then produced the paean which is in everyone's
mouth, almost the finest song we have, simply—as he says
himself—”an invention of the Muses.” For the god, as it
seems to me,
intended him to be a sign to us that we should not waver or
doubt that these fine poems are not human or the work of
men, but divine and the work of gods; and that the poets are
merely the interpreters of the gods, according as each is
possessed by one of the heavenly powers. To show this forth,
the god of set purpose sang the finest of songs through the
meanest of poets:
or do you not think my statement true, Ion?
Yes, upon my word, I do: for you somehow touch my soul
with your words, Socrates, and I believe it is by divine
dispensation that good poets interpret to us these utterances
of the gods.
And you rhapsodes, for your part, interpret the utterances of
the poets?
Again your words are true.
And so you act as interpreters of interpreters?
Precisely.
Stop now and tell me, Ion, without reserve what I may
choose to ask you: when you give a good recitation and
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specially thrill your audience, either with the lay of Odysseus
leaping forth on to the threshold, revealing himself to the
suitors and pouring out the arrows before his feet, or of
Achilles dashing at Hector, or some part of the sad story of
Andromache or of Hecuba, or of Priam, are you then in your
senses, or are you carried out of yourself, and does your soul
in an ecstasy suppose
herself to be among the scenes you are describing, whether
they be in Ithaca, or in Troy, or as the poems may chance to
place them?
How vivid to me, Socrates, is this part of your proof! For I
will tell you without reserve: when I relate a tale of woe, my
eyes are filled with tears; and when it is of fear or awe, my
hair stands on end with terror, and my heart leaps.
Well now, are we to say, Ion, that such a person is in his
senses at that moment,—when in all the adornment of
elegant attire and golden crowns he weeps at sacrifice or
festival, having been despoiled of none of his finery; or
shows fear as he stands before more than twenty thousand
friendly people, none of whom is stripping or injuring him?
No, on my word, not at all, Socrates, to tell the strict truth.
And are you aware that you rhapsodes produce these same
effects on most of the spectators also?
Yes, very fully aware: for I look down upon them from the
platform and see them at such moments crying and turning
awestruck eyes upon me and yielding to the amazement of
my tale. For I have to pay the closest attention to them;
since, if I set them crying, I shall laugh myself because of the
money I take, but if they laugh, I myself shall cry because of
the money I lose.
And are you aware that your spectator is the last of the rings
which I spoke of as receiving from each other the power
transmitted from the Heraclean lodestone?
You, the rhapsode and actor, are the middle ring; the poet
himself is the first; but it is the god who through the whole
series draws the souls of men whithersoever he pleases,
making the power of one depend on the other. And, just as
from the magnet, there is a mighty chain of choric
performers and masters and under-masters suspended by
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side-connections from the rings that hang down from the
Muse. One poet is suspended from one Muse, another from
another:
the word we use for it is “possessed,” but it is much the same
thing, for he is held. And from these first rings—the poets—
are suspended various others, which are thus inspired, some
by Orpheus and others by Musaeus; but the majority are
possessed and held by Homer. Of whom you, Ion, are one,
and are possessed by Homer; and so, when anyone recites
the work of another poet, you go to sleep and are at a loss
what to say; but when some one utters a strain of your poet,
you wake up at once, and your soul dances,
and you have plenty to say: for it is not by art or knowledge
about Homer that you say what you say, but by divine
dispensation and possession; just as the Corybantian
worshippers are keenly sensible of that strain alone which
belongs to the god whose possession is on them, and have
plenty of gestures and phrases for that tune, but do not heed
any other. And so you, Ion, when the subject of Homer is
mentioned, have plenty to say, but nothing on any of the
others. And when you ask me the reason
why you can speak at large on Homer but not on the rest, I
tell you it is because your skill in praising Homer comes not
by art, but by divine dispensation.
Well spoken, I grant you, Socrates; but still I shall be
surprised if you can speak well enough to convince me that I
am possessed and mad when I praise Homer. Nor can I think
you would believe it of me yourself, if you heard me
speaking about him.
I declare I am quite willing to hear you, but not until
you have first answered me this: on what thing in Homer's
story do you speak well? Not on all of them, I presume.
I assure you, Socrates, on all without a single exception.
Not, of course, including those things of which you have in
fact no knowledge, but which Homer tells.
And what sort of things are they, which Homer tells, but of
which I have no knowledge?
Why, does not Homer speak a good deal about arts, in a
good many places? For instance, about chariot-driving: if I
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can recall the lines, I will quote them to you.
No, I will recite them, for I can remember.
Tell me then what Nestor says to his son Antilochus,
advising him to be careful about the turning-post in the
horse-race in honor of Patroclus.
“Bend thyself in the polished car slightly to the left of them;
and call to the right-hand horse”
“and goad him on, while your hand slackens his reins. And at
the post let your left-hand horse swerve close, so that the
nave of the well-wrought wheel may seem to come up to the
edge of the stone, which yet avoid to touch.” (Hom. Il.
23.335 ff).
Enough. Now, Ion, will a doctor or a charioteer be the better
judge
whether Homer speaks correctly or not in these lines?
A charioteer, of course.
Because he has this art, or for some other reason?
No, because it is his art.
And to every art has been apportioned by God a power of
knowing a particular business? For I take it that what we
know by the art of piloting we cannot also know by that of
medicine.
No, to be sure.
And what we know by medicine, we cannot by carpentry
also?
No, indeed.
And this rule holds for all the arts, that what we know by one
of them we cannot know by another? But before you answer
that, just tell me this: do you agree that one art is of one sort,
and another of another?
Yes.
Do you argue this as I do, and call one art different from
another when one is a knowledge of one kind of thing, and
another a knowledge of another kind?
Yes.
Since, I suppose, if it were a knowledge of the same things—
how could we say that one was different from another, when
both could give us the same knowledge? Just as I know that
there are five of these fingers, and you equally know the
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same fact about them; and if I should ask you whether both
you and I know this same fact by the same art of numeration,
or by different arts, you would reply, I presume, that it was
by the same?
Yes.
Then tell me now, what I was just going to ask you, whether
you think this rule holds for all the arts—that by the same art
we must know the same things, and by a different art things
that are not the same; but if the art is other, the things we
know by it must be different also.
I think it is so, Socrates.
Then he who has not a particular art will be incapable of
knowing aright the words or works of that art?
True.
Then will you or a charioteer be the better judge of whether
Homer speaks well or not in the lines that you quoted?
A charioteer.
Because, I suppose, you are a rhapsode and not a charioteer.
Yes.
And the rhapsode's art is different from the charioteer's?
Yes.
Then if it is different, it is also a knowledge of different
things.
Yes.
Now, what of the passage where Homer tells how
Hecamede,
Nestor's concubine, gives the wounded Machaon a posset?
His words are something like this: “Of Pramneian wine it
was, and therein she grated cheese of goat's milk with a
grater of bronze; and thereby an onion as a relish for drink.”
(Hom. Il. 11.639-40) Is it for the doctor's or the rhapsode's
art to discern aright whether Homer speaks correctly here or
not?
For the doctor's.
Well now, when Homer says:
“And she passed to the bottom like a plummet which, set on
a horn from an ox of the field, goes in haste to bring mischief
among
the
ravenous
fishes”
—
(Hom. Il. 24.80-82) are we to say it is for the fisherman's or
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for the rhapsode's art to decide what he means by this, and
whether it is rightly or wrongly spoken?
Clearly, Socrates, for the fisherman's art.
Then please observe: suppose you were questioning me and
should ask:
“Since therefore, Socrates, you find it is for these several
arts to appraise the passages of Homer that belong to each,
be so good as to make out those also that are for the seer and
the seer's art, and show me the sort of passages that come
under his ability to distinguish whether they are well or ill
done”; observe how easily and truly I shall answer you. For
he has many passages, both in the Odyssey, as for instance
the words of Theoclymenus, the seer of the line of
Melampus, to the suitors:
“Hapless men, what bane is this afflicts you? Your heads
and faces and limbs below are shrouded in night, and wailing
is enkindled, and cheeks are wet with tears: of ghosts the
porch is full, and the court full of them also, hastening hellwards 'neath the gloom: and the sun is perished out of
heaven, and an evil mist is spread abroad;” (Hom. Od.
20.351-57)
and there are many passages in the Iliad also, as in the fight
at the rampart, where he says:”For as they were eager to pass
over, a bird had crossed them, an eagle of lofty flight,
pressing the host at the left hand,
and bearing a blood-red monster of a snake, alive and still
struggling; nor had it yet unlearnt the lust of battle. For
bending back it smote its captor on the breast by the neck,
and the bird in the bitterness of pain cast it away to the
ground, and dropped it down in the midst of the throng;”
“and then with a cry flew off on the wafting winds.” (Hom.
Il. 12.200-7) This passage, and others of the sort, are those
that I should say the seer has to examine and judge.
And you speak the truth, Socrates.
And so do you, Ion, in saying that. Now you must do as I
did, and in return for my picking out from the Odyssey and
the Iliad the kinds of passage that belong severally to the
seer,
the doctor, and the fisherman, you have now to pick out for
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me—since you are so much more versed in Homer than I—
the kinds which belong to the rhapsode, Ion, and the
rhapsode's art, and which he should be able to consider and
distinguish beyond the rest of mankind.
What I say, Socrates, is—”all passages.”
Surely you do not say “all,” Ion! Can you be so forgetful?
And yet forgetfulness would ill become a rhapsode.
Why, how am I forgetting?
Do you not remember that you said that the art of the
rhapsode was different from that of the charioteer?
I remember.
And you also admitted that, being different, it would know
different things?
Yes.
Then by your own account the rhapsode's art cannot know
everything, nor the rhapsode either.
Let us say, everything except those instances, Socrates.
By “those instances” you imply the subjects of practically all
the other arts. Well, as he does not know all of them, which
kinds will he know?
Those things, I imagine, that it befits a man to say, and the
sort of thing that a woman should say; the sort for a slave
and the sort for a freeman; and the sort for a subject or for a
ruler.
Do you mean that the rhapsode will know better than the
pilot what sort of thing a ruler of a storm-tossed vessel at sea
should say?
No, the pilot knows better in that case.
Well, will the rhapsode know better than the doctor what sort
of thing a ruler of a sick man should say?
Not in that case either.
But he will know the sort for a slave, you say?
Yes.
For instance, if the slave is a cowherd, you say the rhapsode
will know what the other should say to pacify his cows when
they get fierce, but the cowherd will not?
That is not so.
Well, the sort of thing that a woman ought to say—a
spinning-woman—about the working of wool?
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No.
But he will know what a man should say, when he is a
general exhorting his men?
Yes, that sort of thing the rhapsode will know.
Well, but is the art of the rhapsode the art of the general?
I, at any rate, should know what a general ought to say.
Yes, since I daresay you are good at generalship also, Ion.
For in fact, if you happened to have skill in horsemanship as
well as in the lyre, you would know when horses were well
or ill managed:
but if I asked you, “By which art is it, Ion, that you know
that horses are being well managed, by your skill as a
horseman, or as a player of the lyre?” what would your
answer be?
I should say, by my skill as a horseman.
And if again you were distinguishing the good lyre-players,
you would admit that you distinguished by your skill in the
lyre, and not by your skill as a horseman.
Yes.
And when you judge of military matters, do you judge as
having skill in generalship, or as a good rhapsode?
To my mind, there is no difference.
What, no difference, do you say? Do you mean that the art of
the rhapsode and the general is one, not two?
It is one, to my mind.
So that anyone who is a good rhapsode is also, in fact, a
good general?
Certainly, Socrates.
And again, anyone who happens to be a good general is also
a good rhapsode.
No there I do not agree.
But still you agree that anyone who is a good rhapsode
is also a good general?
To be sure.
And you are the best rhapsode in Greece?
Far the best, Socrates.
Are you also, Ion, the best general in Greece?
Be sure of it, Socrates and that I owe to my study of Homer.
Then how, in Heaven's name, can it be, Ion, that you, who
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are both the best general and the best rhapsode in Greece, go
about performing as a rhapsode to the Greeks, but not as a
general?
Or do you suppose that the Greeks feel a great need of a
rhapsode in the glory of his golden crown, but of a general
none at all?
It is because my city, Socrates, is under the rule and
generalship of your people, and is not in want of a general;
whilst you and Sparta would not choose me as a general,
since you think you manage well enough for yourselves.
My excellent Ion, you are acquainted with Apollodorus of
Cyzicus, are you not?
What might he be?
A man whom the Athenians have often chosen as their
general, though a foreigner;
and Phanosthenes of Andros, and Heracleides of
Clazomenae, whom my city invests with the high command
and other offices although they are foreigners, because they
have proved themselves to be competent. And will she not
choose Ion of Ephesus as her general, and honor him, if he
shows himself competent? Why, you Ephesians are by origin
Athenians, are you not, and Ephesus is inferior to no city?
But in fact, Ion, if you are right in saying it is by art and
knowledge that you are able to praise Homer, you are
playing me false: you have professed to me that you know
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any amount of fine things about Homer, and you promise to
display them; but you are only deceiving me, and so far from
displaying the subjects of your skill, you decline even to tell
me what they are, for all my entreaties. You are a perfect
Proteus in the way you take on every kind of shape, twisting
about this way and that, until at last you elude my grasp in
the guise of a general, so as to avoid displaying your skill
in Homeric lore. Now if you are an artist and, as I was saying
just now, you only promised me a display about Homer to
deceive me, you are playing me false; whilst if you are no
artist, but speak fully and finely about Homer, as I said you
did, without any knowledge but by a divine dispensation
which causes you to be possessed by the poet, you play quite
fair. Choose therefore which of the two you prefer us to call
you, dishonest or divine.
The difference is great, Socrates; for it is far nobler to be
called divine.
Then you may count on this nobler title in our minds, Ion, of
being a divine and not an artistic praiser of Homer.
Determine Three ‘Ideas’ From This Work
Idea
1.
2.
3.
Passage(s)
Reason(s)
A Quick Analysis
Some of the ideas Socrates seems to be investigating are art, knowledge, inspiration, expertise. From where do the better natures we
participate in derive?
Chapter 13
Plato
Though he probably regarded himself a teacher, artistically, by some accounts Plato
started out life as a playwright. I guess then, artistically, he ended his life as a playwright as
well. Anyway this is what makes the Dialogues so readable. They are witty and insightful.
The language is rich and full, just as you would expect from a poet or writer during this high
time of Greek culture.
Still, Plato saw the dialogues only as popular reading. We will find little of him in the
dialogues as they mainly feature Socrates. If that is the case, what do we know of Plato the
Philosopher? Now we have sort of the opposite problem. As we try to see Socrates shine
through the words of Plato so we try to see Plato within the words he gives to Socrates.
We do know many things about him; his family was political, therefore his education was
extensive. We know that he met Socrates early in his life, yet pursued a military career (as
would be the want of his family) and politics. However, with the death of Socrates at the
hands of an increasingly autocratic government, he seems to have shifted away from politics.
He began to see only the worthy, those who have followed Socrates’ lead and sought
wisdom, as viable leaders.
Plato takes Socrates’ basic ideas and expounds, extends and conforms them to his view of
the ideal state, where people get along and the state looks out for the needs of its citizens.
And not just an ideal state but a state of ideals where we can move beyond the partial images
of selfish and ignorant thought to full vision and wisdom.
To this end he returned to Athens and sets up the “Academy” (named for its location near
the Grove of Academus) in order to educate future statesmen.
Virtue
As with Socrates, Virtue is everything for Plato as well. Striving for the best is the only
way to live life. In this he is truly Socrates’ disciple. Sure the bar is high and may seem pie in
the sky, but that does not mean we do not strive for it. “Ah, but a man's reach should exceed
his grasp, Or what's a heaven for?” (Robert Browning). Plato tempers and expands Socrates’
ideas, giving form and meaning to the incessant questioning. He handles a lot of the how as
well as the why, but he too sees an objective truth and guiding principle. There must be an
objective base for all things. If the subjective is the rule then there is nothing which
permanently binds us to the Good; I can change social or cultural norms or abide by them
only as a matter of convenience and convenience is not virtue.
The Forms
We can ‘see’ overall ideas, as we looked at in the last lesson, but now we must explore
Plato’s idea of the ideal. In many of his dialogues, Plato mentions ‘supra-sensible’ (above the
senses) entities he calls ’Forms’ (or ‘Ideas’). So, for example, in the Phaedo (see Phaedo
74a-75d), Plato talks about equality and the idea of equality, that is, particular sensible equal
things for example, equal sticks or stones are equal because of their “participation” or
“sharing” in the character of the Form of Equality, which is absolutely, changelessly,
perfectly, and essentially equal.
Think of it this way: for us to recognize two pieces of a tree on the ground as ‘sticks’,
because their accidents could be completely different (one could be oak and the other
magnolia) there must be some set formal idea of what is a stick is, aside from its accidents.
Not only must there be an ideal but we must be able to grasp it, that is, that these things can
‘participate’ in the larger idea of ‘stick’. Plato sometimes characterizes this participation in
the Form as a kind of imaging, or ‘approximation’ of the Form.
The same may be said of insensible, non-particular things, the many things that are greater
or smaller and the Forms of Great and Small (Phaedo 75c-d), or the many tall things and the
Form of Tall (Phaedo 100e), or the many beautiful things and the Form of Beauty (Phaedo
75c-d, Symposium 211e, Republic V.476c). When Plato writes about ‘instances’ of Forms
‘approximating’ Forms, it is easy to infer that, for Plato, Forms are archtypes. If so, Plato
believes that The Form of Beauty is perfect beauty, the Form of Justice is perfect justice, and
so forth. Conceiving of Forms in this way was important to Plato because it enabled those
who grasp the entities to be best able to judge to what extent ‘sensible instances’ of the
Forms are good examples of the Forms they approximate. That is, judging something by an
objective norm.
Keep In Mind: this is different than substance and accidents.
One question: a priori or a posteriori?
The Middle Dialogues: Answers, I got Answers….
(Forms, Morality and Love)
As mentioned in previous chapters (and rehashed here), Plato's early works mainly reflect
the teachings of his teacher, Socrates, and are almost all in the form of Socratic Dialogues,
using the Socratic Method in which Socrates because he is merely seeking to understand
(cough, cough) asks somebody what appears at first glance to be a straightforward question,
such as “what is beauty?” or “can virtue be taught?”. The person, often sought out by
Socrates because of their expertise in an area (though the encounters seem accidental)
confidently gives an answer, but Socrates, by asking further ‘questions’, shows that the
person really doesn't know the answer after all. The key feature of the early works is that
they never give the answer to these questions – their purpose is to make the reader think for
himself and come to his own conclusions about the subject being asked. These dialogues are
skillfully written ‘plays’ in their own right and often feature real historical figures, other
philosophers or their disciples. They probably give a reasonably accurate picture of what
Socrates was really like (an astonishingly irritating man to try to have a conversation with!).
Several of these works are attacks on the Sophists - professional teachers of rhetoric who
made a living by teaching aristocratic young men who wanted to learn the art of public
speaking (an extremely important skill in Athens). Socrates considered the sophists to be
completely ‘amoral’ (lacking virtue) because they taught how to argue anything from both
sides, without reference to which was “right” or “wrong”.
In the “middle” dialogues, Plato's Socrates actually begins supplying answers to some of
the questions he asks, or at least beginning to put forth positive doctrines (authoritative
teachings) on the subjects. This is generally seen as the first appearance of Plato's own views.
What becomes most prominent in the middle dialogues is the idea that knowledge comes of
grasping knowledge one already has of objective truths, unchanging Forms or essences,
along with active seeking of the knowledge of such Forms. The immortality of the soul, and
specific doctrines about justice, truth, and beauty, begin appearing here. The Symposium (a
drinking party) and the Republic (a political party?) are considered the prime examples of
Plato's middle dialogues. It is here that we also meet the Allegory of the Cave (see below).
The Late Dialogues
(Methodology, Forms and Law)
Those dialogues considered to be written last by Plato look more at the “big picture” –
how was the world created; what are the ideal characteristics of the good ruler; what laws
should the state have, etc. Plato has danced about the edges in the earlier dialogues, laying
foundations for the difficult ideas, and now begins to lay them out. Consequentially these are
difficult and challenging philosophical works, and represent Plato's mature thoughts on the
subjects raised in his earlier works. These are not, it must be said, remotely as easy and
enjoyable to read as his earlier works.
Timaeus, Sophist, and Laws probably represent the centerpieces of the Late writings, with
Laws being one worth concentrating on for understanding later ideas of governance.
Digging Deep
So let us look at some of these themes, but from the other angle. What you will be
supplied with is the passage notation, and you will need to determine what idea, from the
previous exercise it is tied to.
PASSAGE
IDEA
Gorgias 468b;
Meno 77e-78b
Republic I. 354
Protagoras 352a-c;
Gorgias 468b
Republic I.335
Euthydemus 281d-e
Protagoras 329b333b, 361a-b
Gorgias 472b, 475e476a
Phaedo 72e-76a ;
Symposium 211
Exercise 1: Guess the Platonic Thought
Putting It Together
Reading, as one might say, is believing. Once again it is the delving into the works which
will help us to fully appreciate and understand these over-simplifications. Alfred North
Whitehead, a 20th Century mathematician and philosopher stated that all of Western
Philosophy was a series of footnotes to Plato17. Do you agree or disagree with such a blanket
statement? Do you think you are qualified to do so (remember poor Ion)? Do you think you
will only discover the truth of the statement as time goes on?
“The safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of
footnotes to Plato.” To be exact.
17
Chapter 13a
A Plato Addendum: Allegory of The Cave
Socrates (and Plato) uses illustration and comparison in order to educate and convince;
what we might (and probably should) call allegory (the using of symbolic or physical
representations to express spiritual or abstract ideas). Recall how Socrates said that just like a
body does ill or well and we can see that, so the soul too can be understood in the same light
(Crito 47). We can see a certain a posteriori method in his illustrations – take what you know
and push through to understanding. Hopefully I am making some sense here (and sense of
Platonic thought): we move (journey) from partial, incomplete or faulty knowledge to pure
complete knowledge; this is equally true in the material world and the objective world.
But First: The Analogy of the Divided Line
The basic framework for understanding Platonic thought is a table, divided into quadrants.
The quadrants are further divided by level of ‘reality’ so to speak, in an ever increasing
upward depth.
Intelligible
World
Objects
Mental States
The Good
Knowledge / Wisdom
Forms
Thinking
Mathematical Objects
World of
Appearances
Visible Things
Belief
Images
Imagination
Table 11: Plato -- The Divided Line
The sensible world is the world of things, but these things are only sense-perceived
images of things. Whether physical or mental, these things really are not real in the sense that
they are mere reflections of the real things which we can know through our intellect.
Therefore there is a ‘division’ between the flawed sensible/mental world and the perfect
objective/intelligible world.
Digging Deeper – The Cave
So what is all this talk I hear about a cave? In Chapter XXV of the dialog known as The
Republic, Plato seeks to illustrate the above tenets using a cave in which prisoners are
trapped in a pretty stringent time-out corner. Unable to move or look around they are left
with only the things they can see by which they can understand their world, which in their
case turns out to be the back wall of the cave. Behind and unbeknownst to them is an
elevated walkway on which passers-by carry objects. To light their way is a large fire. This
fire casts shadows on the back wall, which consequentially are all that the prisoners can
perceive. Most people, Plato feels, live at this level, never knowing the source of their
understanding or the faint shadow of reality which it represents.
The cave then shows the nature of the universe as well as the levels of knowledge,
understanding, reality and frankly effort which go with the path of enlightenment. Outside
the cave lies the pure light of Forms and Reason, which he also says can be a bit
overwhelming even for the seeker of Wisdom. It serves the dual purpose of explaining the
physical and the interior worlds at the same time. Everything in one is paralleled in the other
for we are beings of both body and soul, in a universe which is both physical and nonsensible.
Figure 2: The Allegory Of the Cave
Figure 3: Illustration of the Cave Allegory
Chapter 13b
Yet Another Platonic Addendum: Grouping the Dialogues
(For your Consideration)
The dialogues are sometimes grouped by common thought or theme. This is, in my mind,
only helpful simply because it means you can read similar ideas ‘together’. In this case they
are in groups of 4 (hence tetra), a grouping suggested by past authors who claim that Plato
spoke of them this way. Who knows? There are other groupings but none of them ultimately
are really important to understanding Platonic thought.
Overview
Of the Groupings
(Tetralogies)
Start of quest:
what is man?
Desires
(epithumiai)
Nature
(phusis)
Will
(thumos)
Judgment
(krisis)
Reason
(logos)
Order
(kosmos)
LYSIS
friendship
(philo-)
HIPPIAS Maj.
LACHES
manhood
(andreia)
GORGIAS
CHARMIDES
wisdom
(-sophos)
HIPPIAS min.
relativism
illusion of
beauty
illusion of
justice
illusion of
truth
MENO
EUTHYPHRO
THE APOLOGY
CRITO
pragmatism
letter of the
law
law
in action
spirit of the
law
THE SYMPOSIUM
PHAEDRUS
THE REPUBLIC
PHAEDO
the driving
force:
eros
nature of
the soul:
eros<=>logos
behavior of
the soul:
justice
destiny of
the soul:
being
CRATYLUS
ION
EUTHYDEMUS
MENEXENUS
the words of
speech
logos of the
poet
logos of the
sophist
logos of the
politician
PARMENIDES
THEAETETUS
THE SOPHIST
THE STATESMAN
the traps of
reason
the limits of
reason
the rules of
reason
the goals of
reason
PHILEBUS
TIMAEUS
CRITIAS
THE LAWS
the good of
man
contemplating
(theoria)
deciding
(krisis)
acting
(erga)
Cause
(aitia)
ALCIBIADES
man
PROTAGORAS
Anti-Sophists:
conjecture
(eikasia)
Socrates’ trial:
true belief
(pistis)
The soul
(psuche)
speech (logos)
knowledge
(dianoia)
dialectic
science
(episteme)
Man in world
order
(kosmos)
Table 12: Plato's Tetralogies
Chapter 13c
Plato: Laws Book X
Personae
 An Athenian Stranger – (Socrates or Plato?)
 Clinias – a Cretan
 Megillus – a Lacedaemonian
884a
885a
Athenian
Next after cases of outrage we shall state for cases of
violence one universally inclusive principle of law, to
this effect:—No one shall carry or drive off anything
which belongs to others, nor shall he use any of his
neighbor's goods unless he has gained the consent of
the owner; for from such action proceed all the evils
above mentioned—past, present and to come. Of the
rest, the most grave are the licentious and outrageous
acts of the young; and outrages offend most gravely
when they are directed against sacred things, and they
are especially grave when they are directed against
objects which are public as well as holy, or partially
public, as being shared in by the members of a tribe or
other similar community. Second, and second in point
of gravity, come offences against sacred objects and
tombs that are private;
and third, offences against parents, when a person
commits the outrage otherwise than in the cases
already described.1 A fourth2 kind of outrage is when a
man, in defiance of the magistrates, drives or carries
off or uses any of their things without their own
consent; and a fifth kind will be an outrage against the
civic right of an individual private citizen which calls
for judicial vindication. To all these severally one allembracing law must be assigned. As to templerobbing, whether done by open violence or secretly,
885b
885c
Clinias
Athenian
Clinias
Athenian
885d
it has been already stated summarily what the
punishment should be; and in respect of all the
outrages, whether of word or deed, which a man
commits, either by tongue or hand, against the gods,
we must state the punishment he should suffer, after
we have first delivered the admonition. It shall be as
follows:—No one who believes, as the laws prescribe,
in the existence of the gods has ever yet done an
impious deed voluntarily, or uttered a lawless word: he
that acts so is in one or other of these three conditions
of mind—either he does not believe in what I have
said; or, secondly, he believes that the gods exist, but
have no care for men; or, thirdly, he believes that they
are easy to win over when bribed by offerings and
prayers
What, then, shall we do or say to such people?
Let us listen first, my good sir, to what they, as I
imagine, say mockingly, in their contempt for us.
What is it?
In derision they would probably say this: “O Strangers
of Athens, Lacedaemon and Crete, what you say is
true. Some of us do not believe in gods at all; others of
us believe in gods of the kinds you mention. So we
claim now, as you claimed in the matter of laws,
that before threatening us harshly, you should first try
to convince and teach us, by producing adequate
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proofs, that gods exist, and that they are too good to be
wheedled by gifts and turned aside from justice. For as
it is, this and such as this is the account of them we
hear from those who are reputed the best of poets,
orators, seers, priests, and thousands upon thousands
of others; and consequently most of us, instead of
seeking to avoid wrong-doing, do the wrong and then
try to make it good.
Now from lawgivers like you, who assert that you are
gentle rather than severe, we claim that you should
deal with us first by way of persuasion; and if what
you say about the existence of the gods is superior to
the arguments of others in point of truth, even though
it be but little superior in eloquence, then probably you
would succeed in convincing us. Try then, if you think
this reasonable, to meet our challenge.
Surely it seems easy, Stranger, to assert with truth
that gods exist?
How so?
First, there is the evidence of the earth, the sun, the
stars, and all the universe, and the beautiful ordering
of the seasons, marked out by years and months; and
then there is the further fact that all Greeks and
barbarians believe in the existence of gods.
My dear sir, these bad men cause me alarm—for I will
never call it “awe”—lest haply they scoff at us. For the
cause of the corruption in their case is one you are not
aware of; since you imagine that it is solely by their
incontinence in regard to pleasures and desires
that their souls are impelled to that impious life of
theirs.
What other cause can there be, Stranger, besides this?
One which you, who live elsewhere, could hardly have
any knowledge of or notice at all.
What is this cause you are now speaking of?
A very grievous unwisdom which is reputed to be the
height of wisdom.
What do you mean?
We at Athens have accounts4 preserved in writing
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(though, I am told, such do not exist in your country,
owing to the excellence of your polity)
some of them being in a kind of meter, others without
meter, telling about the gods: the oldest of these
accounts relate how the first substance of Heaven and
all else came into being, and shortly after the
beginning they go on to give a detailed theogony, and
to tell how, after they were born, the gods associated
with one another. These accounts, whether good or
bad for the hearers in other respects, it is hard for us to
censure because of their antiquity; but as regards the
tendance and respect due to parents, I certainly would
never praise them or say that they are either helpful or
wholly true accounts.
Such ancient accounts, however, we may pass over
and dismiss: let them be told in the way best pleasing
to the gods. It is rather the novel views of our modern
scientists5 that we must hold responsible as the cause
of mischief. For the result of the arguments of such
people is this,—that when you and I try to prove the
existence of the gods by pointing to these very
objects—sun, moon, stars, and earth—as instances of
deity and divinity, people who have been converted by
these scientists will assert that these things are simply
earth and stone,
incapable of paying any heed to human affairs, and
that these beliefs of ours are speciously tricked out
with arguments to make them plausible.
The assertion you mention, Stranger, is indeed a
dangerous one, even if it stood alone; but now that
such assertions are legion, the danger is still greater.
What then? What shall we say? What must we do? Are
we to make our defense as it were before a court of
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of doing something dreadful by assuming in our
legislation the existence of gods? Or shall we rather
dismiss the whole subject and revert again to our laws,
lest our prelude prove actually more lengthy than the
laws? For indeed our discourse would be extended in
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no small degree if we were to furnish those men who
desire to be impious with an adequate demonstration
by means of argument concerning those subjects
which ought, as they claimed, to be discussed, and so
to convert them to fear of the gods, and then finally,
when we had caused them to shrink from irreligion, to
proceed to enact the appropriate laws.
Still, Stranger, we have frequently (considering the
shortness of the time) made6 the very statement,—that
we have no need on the present occasion to prefer
brevity of speech to lengthiness (for, as the saying
goes, “no one is chasing on our heels”); and to show
ourselves choosing the briefest in preference to the
best would be mean and ridiculous. And it is of the
highest importance that our arguments, showing that
the gods exist and that they are good and honor justice
more than do men, should by all means possess some
degree of persuasiveness;
for such a prelude is the best we could have in defense,
as one may say, of all our laws. So without any
repugnance or undue haste, and with all the capacity
we have for endowing such arguments with
persuasiveness, let us expound them as fully as we
can, and without any reservation.
This speech of yours seems to me to call for a
prefatory prayer, seeing that you are so eager and
ready; nor is it possible any longer to defer our
statement. Come, then; how is one to argue on behalf
of the existence of the gods without passion? For we
needs must be vexed and indignant with the men who
have been, and now are,
responsible for laying on us this burden of argument,
through their disbelief in those stories which they used
to hear, while infants and sucklings, from the lips of
their nurses and mothers—stories chanted to them, as
it were, in lullabies, whether in jest or in earnest; and
the same stories they heard repeated also in prayers at
sacrifices, and they saw spectacles which illustrated
them, of the kind which the young delight to see and
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hear when performed at sacrifices; and their own
parents they saw showing the utmost zeal on behalf of
themselves and their children in addressing the gods in
prayers and supplications, as though they most
certainly existed; and at the rising and setting of the
sun and moon
they heard and saw the prostrations and devotions of
all the Greeks and barbarians, under all conditions of
adversity and prosperity, directed to these luminaries,
not as though they were not gods, but as though they
most certainly were gods beyond the shadow of a
doubt—all this evidence is contemned by these people,
and that for no sufficient reason, as everyone endowed
with a grain of sense would affirm; and so they are
now forcing us to enter on our present argument.
How, I ask, can one possibly use mild terms in
admonishing such men, and at the same time teach
them, to begin with, that the gods do exist? Yet one
must bravely attempt the task; for it would never do
for both parties to be enraged at once,—the one owing
to greed for pleasure, the other with indignation at men
like them. So let our prefatory address to the men thus
corrupted in mind be dispassionate in tone, and,
quenching our passion, let us speak mildly, as though
we were conversing with one particular person of the
kind described, in the following terms: “My child, you
are still young, and time as it advances
will cause you to reverse many of the opinions you
now hold: so wait till then before pronouncing
judgment on matters of most grave importance; and of
these the gravest of all—though at present you regard
it as naught—is the question of holding a right view
about the gods and so living well, or the opposite.
Now in the first place, I should be saying what is
irrefutably true if I pointed out to you this signal fact,
that neither you by yourself nor yet your friends are
the first and foremost to adopt this opinion about the
gods; rather is it true that people who suffer from this
disease are always springing up, in greater or less
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numbers. But I, who have met with many of these
people, would declare this to you, that not a single
man
who from his youth has adopted this opinion, that the
gods have no existence, has ever yet continued till old
age constant in the same view; but the other two false
notions about the gods do remain—not, indeed, with
many, but still with some,—the notion, namely, that
the gods exist, but pay no heed to human affairs, and
the other notion that they do pay heed, but are easily
won over by prayers and offerings. For a doctrine
about them that is to prove the truest you can possibly
form you will, if you take my advice, wait, considering
the while whether the truth stands thus or otherwise,
and making enquiries not only from all other men, but
especially from the lawgiver; and in the meantime do
not dare to be guilty of any impiety in respect of the
gods. For it must be the endeavor of him who is
legislating for you both now and hereafter to instruct
you in the truth of these matters.
Our statement thus far, Stranger, is most excellent.
Very true, O Megillus and Clinias; but we have
plunged unawares into a wondrous argument.
What is it you mean?
That which most people account to be the most
scientific of all arguments.
Explain more clearly.
It is stated by some that all things which are coming
into existence, or have or will come into existence, do
so partly by nature, partly by art, and partly owing to
chance.
Is it not a right statement?
It is likely, to be sure, that what men of science say is
true. Anyhow, let us follow them up, and consider
what it is that the people in their camp really intend.
By all means let us do so.
It is evident, they assert, that the greatest and most
beautiful things are the work of nature and of chance,
and the lesser things that of art,—for art receives from
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nature the great and primary products as existing, and
itself molds and shapes all the smaller ones, which we
commonly call “artificial.”
How do you mean?
I will explain it more clearly. Fire and water and earth
and air, they say, all exist by nature and chance, and
none of them by art; and by means of these, which are
wholly inanimate, the bodies which come next—those,
namely, of the earth, sun, moon and stars—have been
brought into existence. It is by chance all these
elements move, by the interplay of their respective
forces, and according as they meet together and
combine fittingly,—hot with cold, dry with moist,
soft with hard, and all such necessary mixtures as
result from the chance combination of these
opposites,—in this way and by those means they have
brought into being the whole Heaven and all that is in
the Heaven, and all animals, too, and plants—after that
all the seasons had arisen from these elements; and all
this, as they assert, not owing to reason, nor to any god
or art, but owing, as we have said, to nature and
chance.7 As a later product of these, art comes later;
and it, being mortal itself and of mortal birth, begets
later playthings
which share but little in truth, being images of a sort
akin to the arts themselves—images such as painting
begets, and music, and the arts which accompany
these. Those arts which really produce something
serious are such as share their effect with nature,—like
medicine, agriculture, and gymnastic. Politics too, as
they say, shares to a small extent in nature, but mostly
in art; and in like manner all legislation which is
based on untrue assumptions is due, not to nature, but
to art.
What do you mean?
The first statement, my dear sir, which these people
make about the gods is that they exist by art and not by
nature,—by certain legal conventions8 which differ
from place to place, according as each tribe agreed
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when forming their laws. They assert, moreover, that
there is one class of things beautiful by nature, and
another class beautiful by convention9; while as to
things just, they do not exist at all by nature, but men
are constantly in dispute about them and continually
altering them, and whatever alteration they make at
any time
is at that time authoritative, though it owes its
existence to art and the laws, and not in any way to
nature. All these, my friends, are views which young
people imbibe from men of science, both prose-writers
and poets, who maintain that the height of justice is to
succeed by force; whence it comes that the young
people are afflicted with a plague of impiety, as
though the gods were not such as the law commands
us to conceive them; and, because of this, factions also
arise, when these teachers attract them towards the life
that is right “according to nature,” which consists in
being master over the rest in reality, instead of being a
slave to others according to legal convention.10
What a horrible statement you have described,
Stranger! And what widespread corruption of the
young in private families as well as publicly in the
States!
That is indeed true, Clinias. What, then, do you think
the lawgiver ought to do, seeing that these people have
been armed in this way for a long time past? Should he
merely stand up in the city and threaten all the people
that unless they affirm that the gods exist and conceive
them in their minds to be such as the law maintains11
and so likewise with regard to the beautiful and the
just and all the greatest things,
as many as relate to virtue and vice, that they must
regard and perform these in the way prescribed by the
lawgiver in his writings; and that whosoever fails to
show himself obedient to the laws must either be put
to death or else be punished, in one case by stripes and
imprisonment, in another by degradation, in others by
poverty and exile? But as to persuasion, should the
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lawgiver, while enacting the people's laws, refuse to
blend any persuasion with his statements, and thus
tame them so far as possible?
Certainly not, Stranger; on the contrary, if persuasion
can be applied in such matters in even the smallest
degree, no lawgiver who is of the slightest account
must ever grow weary, but must (as they say) “leave
no stone unturned”12 to reinforce the ancient saying
that gods exist, and all else that you recounted just
now; and law itself he must also defend and art, as
things which exist by nature or by a cause not inferior
to nature, since according to right reason they are the
offspring of mind, even as you are now, as I think,
asserting; and I agree with you.
What now, my most ardent Clinias? Are not
statements thus made to the masses
difficult for us to keep up with in argument, and do
they not also involve us in arguments portentously
long?
Well now, Stranger, if we had patience with ourselves
when we discoursed at such length on the subjects of
drinking and music,13 shall we not exercise patience in
dealing with the gods and similar subjects? Moreover,
such a discourse is of the greatest help for intelligent
legislation,
since legal ordinances when put in writing remain
wholly unchanged, as though ready to submit to
examination for all time, so that one need have no fear
even if they are hard to listen to at first, seeing that
even the veriest dullard can come back frequently to
examine them, nor yet if they are lengthy, provided
that they are beneficial. Consequently, in my opinion,
it could not possibly be either reasonable or pious for
any man to refrain from lending his aid to such
arguments to the best of his power.14
What Clinias says, Stranger, is, I think, most excellent.
Most certainly it is, Megillus; and we must do as he
says. For if the assertions mentioned had not been
sown broadcast well-nigh over the whole world of
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men, there would have been no need of counterarguments to defend the existence of the gods; but as it
is, they are necessary. For when the greatest laws are
being destroyed by wicked men, who is more bound to
come to their rescue than the lawgiver?
No one.
Come now, Clinias, do you also answer me again,
for you too must take a hand in the argument: it
appears that the person who makes these statements
holds fire, water, earth and air to be the first of all
things, and that it is precisely to these things that he
gives the name of “nature,” while soul he asserts to be
a later product therefrom. Probably, indeed, he does
not merely “appear” to do this, but actually makes it
clear to us in his account.
Certainly.
Can it be then, in Heaven's name, that now we have
discovered, as it were, a very fountain-head of
irrational opinion in all the men who have ever yet
handled physical investigations? Consider, and
examine each statement. For it is a matter
of no small importance if it can be shown that those
who handle impious arguments, and lead others after
them, employ their arguments not only ill, but
erroneously. And this seems to me to be the state of
affairs.
Well said; but try to explain wherein the error lies.
We shall probably have to handle rather an unusual
argument.
We must not shrink, Stranger. You think, I perceive,
that we shall be traversing alien ground, outside
legislation, if we handle such arguments. But if there
is no other way in which it is possible for us to speak
in concert with the truth, as now legally declared,
except this way, then in this way, my good sir, we
must speak.
It appears, then, that I may at once proceed with an
argument that is somewhat unusual; it is this. That
which is the first cause of becoming and perishing in
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all things, this is declared by the arguments which
have produced the soul of the impious to be not first,
but generated later, and that which is the later to be the
earlier; and because of this they have fallen into error
regarding the real nature of divine existence.
I do not yet understand.
As regards the soul, my comrade, nearly all men
appear to be ignorant of its real nature and its potency,
and ignorant not only of other facts about it, but of its
origin especially,—how that it is one of the first
existences, and prior to all bodies, and that it more
than anything else is what governs all the changes and
modifications of bodies. And if this is really the state
of the case, must not things which are akin to soul be
necessarily prior in origin to things which belong to
body, seeing that soul
is older than body?15
Necessarily.
Then opinion and reflection and thought and art and
law will be prior to things hard and soft and heavy and
light; and further, the works and actions that are great
and primary will be those of art, while those that are
natural, and nature itself which they wrongly call by
this name—will be secondary, and will derive their
origin from art and reason.
How are they wrong?
By “nature” they intend to indicate production of
things primary; but if soul shall be shown to have been
produced first (not fire or air), but soul first and
foremost,—it would most truly be described as a
superlatively “natural” existence. Such is the state of
the case, provided that one can prove that soul is older
than body, but not otherwise.
Most true.
Shall we then, in the next place, address ourselves to
the task of proving this?
Certainly.
Let us guard against a wholly deceitful argument, lest
haply it seduce us who are old with its specious
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youthfulness, and then elude us and make us a
laughing-stock, and so we get the reputation of
missing even little things while aiming at big things.
Consider then. Suppose that we three had to cross a
river that was in violent flood, and that I, being the
youngest of the party and having often had experience
of currents, were to suggest that the proper course
is for me to make an attempt first by myself—leaving
you two in safety—to see whether it is possible for
you older men also to cross, or how the matter stands,
and then, if the river proved to be clearly fordable, I
were to call you, and, by my experience, help you
across, while if it proved impassable for such as you,
in that case the risk should be wholly mine,—such a
suggestion on my part would have sounded
reasonable. So too in the present instance; the
argument now in front of us is too violent, and
probably impassable, for such strength as you possess;
so, lest it make you faint and dizzy as it rushes past
and poses you with questions
you are unused to answering,16 and thus causes an
unpleasing lack of shapeliness and seemliness, I think
that I ought now to act in the way described—question
myself first, while you remain listening in safety, and
then return answer to myself, and in this way proceed
through the whole argument until it has discussed in
full the subject of soul, and demonstrated that soul is
prior to body.17
Your suggestion, Stranger, we think excellent; so do as
you suggest.
Come then,—if ever we ought to invoke God's aid,
now is the time it ought to be done. Let the gods be
invoked with all zeal to aid in the demonstration of
their own existence. And let us hold fast, so to speak,
to a safe cable as we embark on the present discussion.
And it is safest, as it seems to me, to adopt the
following method of reply when questions such as this
are put on these subjects; for instance, when a man
asks me—”Do all things stand still, Stranger, and
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nothing move? Or is the exact opposite the truth? Or
do some things move
and some remain at rest?” My answer will be, “Some
things move, others remain at rest.”18 “Then do not the
standing things stand, and the moving things move, in
a certain place?” “Of course.” “And some will do this
in one location, and others in several.” “You mean,”
we will say, “that those which have the quality of
being at rest at the center move in one location, as
when the circumference of circles that are said to stand
still revolves?” “Yes. And we perceive that motion of
this kind, which simultaneously turns in this revolution
both the largest circle and the smallest, distributes
itself
to small and great proportionally, altering in
proportion its own quantity; whereby it functions as
the source of all such marvels as result from its
supplying great and small circles simultaneously with
harmonizing rates of slow and fast speeds—a
condition of things that one might suppose to be
impossible.” “Quite true.” “And by things moving in
several places you seem to me to mean all things that
move by locomotion, continually passing from one
spot to another, and sometimes resting
on one axis19 and sometimes, by revolving, on several
axes. And whenever one such object meets another, if
the other is at rest, the moving object is split up; but if
they collide with others moving to meet them from an
opposite direction, they form a combination which is
midway between the two.” “Yes, I affirm that these
things are so, just as you describe.” “Further, things
increase when combined and decrease when separated
in all cases where the regular constitution20 of each
persists; but if this does not remain, then both these
conditions cause them to perish. And what is the
condition which must occur
in everything to bring about generation? Obviously
whenever a starting-principle receiving increase comes
to the second change, and from this to the next, and on
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coming to the third admits of perception by
percipients.21 Everything comes into being by this
process of change and alteration; and a thing is really
existent whenever it remains fixed, but when it
changes into another constitution it is utterly
destroyed.” Have we now, my friends, mentioned all
the forms of motion, capable of numerical
classification,22
save only two?
What two?
Those, my good sir, for the sake of which, one may
say, the whole of our present enquiry was undertaken.
Explain more clearly.
It was undertaken, was it not, for the sake of soul?
Certainly.
As one of the two let us count that motion which is
always able to move other things, but unable to move
itself; and that motion which always is able to move
both itself and other things,—by way of combination
and separation, of increase and decrease, of generation
and corruption,—let us count as another separate unit
in the total number of motions.
Be it so.
Thus we shall reckon as ninth on the list that motion
which always moves another object and is moved by
another; while that motion which moves both itself
and another, and which is harmoniously adapted to all
forms of action and passion, and is termed the real
change and motion of all that really exists,—it, I
presume, we shall call the tenth.
Most certainly.
Of our total of ten motions, which shall we most
correctly adjudge to be the most powerful of all and
excelling in effectiveness?
We are bound to affirm that the motion which is able
to move itself excels infinitely, and that all the rest
come after it.
Well said. Must we, then, alter one or two of the
wrong statements we have now made?
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Which do you mean?
Our statement about the tenth seems wrong.
How?
Logically it is first in point of origin and power; and
the next one is second to it,
although we absurdly called it ninth a moment ago.
What do you mean?
This: when we find one thing changing another, and
this in turn another, and so on,—of these things shall
we ever find one that is the prime cause of change?
How will a thing that is moved by another ever be
itself the first of the things that cause change? It is
impossible. But when a thing that has moved itself
changes another thing, and that other a third, and the
motion thus spreads progressively through thousands
upon thousands of things,
will the primary source of all their motions be
anything else than the movement of that which has
moved itself?
Excellently put, and we must assent to your argument.
Further, let us question and answer ourselves thus:—
Supposing that the Whole of things were to unite and
stand still,—as most of these thinkers23 venture to
maintain,—which of the motions mentioned would
necessarily arise in it first? That motion, of course,
which is self-moving; for it will never be shifted
beforehand by another thing,
since no shifting force exists in things beforehand.
Therefore we shall assert that inasmuch as the selfmoving motion is the starting-point of all motions and
the first to arise in things at rest and to exist in things
in motion, it is of necessity the most ancient and
potent change of all, while the motion which is altered
by another thing and itself moves others comes
second.
Most true.
Now that we have come to this point in our discourse,
here is a question we may answer.
What is it?
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If we should see that this motion had arisen in a thing
of earth or water or fire, whether separate or in
combination, what condition should we say exists in
such a thing?
What you ask me is, whether we are to speak of a
thing as “alive” when it moves itself?
Yes.
It is alive, to be sure.
Well then, when we see soul in things, must we not
equally agree that they are alive?
We must.
Now stop a moment, in Heaven's name! Would you
not desire to observe three points about every object?
What do you mean?
One point is the substance, one the definition of the
substance, and one the name;24 and, moreover, about
everything that exists there are two questions to be
asked.
How two?
At one time each of us, propounding the name by
itself, demands the definition; at another, propounding
the definition by itself, he demands the name.
Is it something of this kind we mean now to convey?
Of what kind?
We have instances of a thing divisible into two halves,
both in arithmetic and elsewhere; in arithmetic the
name of this is “the even,” and the definition is “a
number divisible into two equal parts.”
Yes, that is what I mean. So in either case it is the
same object, is it not, which we describe, whether,
when asked for the definition, we reply by giving the
name, or, when asked for the name, we give the
definition,—describing one and the same object by the
name “even,” and by the definition “a number
divisible into two halves”?
Most certainly.
What is the definition of that object which has for its
name “soul”?
Can we give it any other definition than that stated just
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now—”the motion able to move itself”?
Do you assert that “self-movement” is the definition of
that very same substance which has “soul” as the name
we universally apply to it?
That is what I assert. And if this be really so, do we
still complain that it has not been sufficiently proved
that soul is identical with the prime origin and motion
of what is, has been, and shall be, and of all
that is opposite to these, seeing that it has been plainly
shown to be the cause of all change and motion in all
things?
We make no such complaint; on the contrary, it has
been proved most sufficiently that soul is of all things
the oldest, since it is the first principle of motion.
Then is not that motion which, when it arises in one
object, is caused by another, and which never supplies
self-motion to anything, second in order—or indeed as
far down the list as one cares to put it,—it being the
change of a really soulless body?
True.
Truly and finally, then, it would be a most veracious
and complete statement
to say that we find soul to be prior to body, and body
secondary and posterior, soul governing and body
being governed according to the ordinance of nature.
Yes, most veracious.
We recollect, of course, that we previously agreed25
that if soul could be shown to be older than body, then
the things of soul also will be older than those of body.
Certainly we do.
Moods and dispositions and wishes and calculations
and true opinions and considerations and memories
will be prior to bodily length, breadth, depth and
strength, if soul is prior to body.
Necessarily.
Must we then necessarily agree, in the next place, that
soul is the cause of things good and bad, fair and foul,
just and unjust, and all the opposites, if we are to
assume it to be the cause of all things?
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Of course we must.
And as soul thus controls and indwells in all things
everywhere that are moved, must we not necessarily
affirm that it controls Heaven also?
Yes.
One soul, is it, or several? I will answer for you—
”several.” Anyhow, let us assume not less than two—
the beneficent soul and that which is capable of
effecting results of the opposite kind.
You are perfectly right.
Very well, then. Soul drives all things in Heaven and
earth and sea by its own motions,
of which the names are wish, reflection, forethought,
counsel, opinion true and false, joy, grief, confidence,
fear, hate, love, and all the motions that are akin to
these or are prime-working motions; these, when they
take over the secondary motions of bodies, drive them
all to increase and decrease and separation and
combination,26 and, supervening on these, to heat and
cold, heaviness and lightness,
hardness and softness, whiteness and blackness,
bitterness and sweetness, and all those qualities which
soul employs, both when it governs all things rightly
and happily as a true goddess, in conjunction with
reason, and when, in converse with unreason, it
produces results which are in all respects the opposite.
Shall we postulate that this is so, or do we still suspect
that it may possibly be otherwise?
By no means.
Which kind of soul, then, shall we say is in control of
Heaven and earth and the whole circle? That which is
wise and full of goodness, or that which
has neither quality? To this shall we make reply as
follows?
How?
If, my good sir, we are to assert that the whole course
and motion of Heaven and of all it contains have a
motion like to the motion and revolution and
reckonings of reason,27 and proceed in a kindred
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manner, then clearly we must assert that the best soul
regulates the whole cosmos and drives it on its course,
which is of the kind described.
You are right.
But the bad soul, if it proceeds in a mad and disorderly
way.
That also is right.
Then what is the nature of the motion of reason? Here,
my friends, we come to a question that is difficult to
answer wisely; consequently, it is fitting that you
should now call me in to assist you with the answer.
Very good.
In making our answer let us not bring on night, as it
were, at midday, by looking right in the eye of the
sun,28 as though with mortal eyes we could ever
behold reason and know it fully;
the safer way to behold the object with which our
question is concerned is by looking at an image of it.
How do you mean?
Let us take as an image that one of the ten motions
which reason resembles; reminding ourselves of
which29 I, along with you, will make answer.
You will probably speak admirably.
Do we still recollect thus much about the things then
described, that we assumed that, of the total, some
were in motion, others at rest?
Yes.
And further, that, of those in motion, some move in
one place,
others move in several places?
That is so.
And that, of these two motions, the motion which
moves in one place must necessarily move always
round some center, being a copy of the turned wheels;
and that this has the nearest possible kinship and
similarity to the revolution of reason? 30
How do you mean?
If we described them both as moving regularly and
uniformly in the same spot, round the same things and
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in relation to the same things, according to one rule
and system—reason, namely, and the motion that
spins in one place
(likened to the spinning of a turned globe),—we
should never be in danger of being deemed unskillful
in the construction of fair images by speech.
Most true.
On the other hand, will not the motion that is never
uniform or regular or in the same place or around or in
relation to the same things, not moving in one spot nor
in any order
or system or rule—will not this motion be akin to
absolute unreason?
It will, in very truth.
So now there is no longer any difficulty in stating
expressly that, inasmuch as soul is what we find
driving everything round, we must affirm that this
circumference of Heaven is of necessity driven round
under the care and ordering of either the best soul or
its opposite.
But, Stranger, judging by what has now been said, it is
actually impious to make any other assertion than that
these things are driven round by one or more souls
endowed with all goodness.
You have attended to our argument admirably, Clinias.
Now attend to this further point.
What is that?
If soul drives round the sum total of sun, moon and all
other stars, does it not also drive each single one of
them?
Certainly.
Then let us construct an argument about one of these
stars which will evidently apply equally to them all.
About which one?
The sun's body is seen by everyone, its soul by no one.
And the same is true of the soul of any other body,
whether alive or dead, of living beings. There is,
however, a strong suspicion that this class of object,
which is wholly imperceptible to sense,
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has grown round all the senses of the body,31 and is an
object of reason alone. Therefore by reason and
rational thought let us grasp this fact about it,—
What fact?
If soul drives round the sun, we shall be tolerably sure
to be right in saying that it does one of three things.
What things?
That either it exists everywhere inside of this apparent
globular body and directs it, such as it is, just as the
soul in us moves us about in all ways; or, having
procured itself a body of fire or air (as some argue), it
in the form of body pushes forcibly on the body from
outside;
or, thirdly, being itself void of body, but endowed with
other surpassingly marvellous potencies, it conducts
the body.
Yes, it must necessarily be the case that soul acts in
one of these ways when it propels all things.
Here, I pray you, pause. This soul,—whether it is by
riding in the car of the sun,32 or from outside, or
otherwise, that it brings light to us all—every man is
bound to regard as a god. Is not that so?
Yes; everyone at least who has not reached the
uttermost verge of folly.
Concerning all the stars and the moon, and concerning
the years and months and all seasons, what other
account shall we give than this very same,—namely,
that, inasmuch as it has been shown that they are all
caused by one or more souls, which are good also with
all goodness, we shall declare these souls to be gods,
whether it be that they order the whole heaven by
residing in bodies, as living creatures, or whatever the
mode and method? Is there any man that agrees with
this view who will stand hearing it denied that “all
things are full of gods”?33
There is not a man, Stranger, so wrong-headed as that.
Let us, then, lay down limiting conditions for the man
who up till now disbelieves in gods, O Megillus and
Clinias, and so be quit of him.
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What conditions?
That either he must teach us that we are wrong in
laying down that soul is of all things the first
production, together with all the consequential
statements we made,—or, if he is unable to improve
on our account, he must believe us, and for the rest of
his life live in veneration of the gods.
Let us, then, consider whether our argument for the
existence of the gods addressed to those who
disbelieve in them has been stated adequately or
defectively.
Anything rather than defectively, Stranger.
Then let our argument have an end, in so far as it is
addressed to these men. But the man who holds that
gods exist, but pay no regard to human affairs,—him
we must admonish. “My good sir,” let us say, “the fact
that you believe in gods is due probably to a divine
kinship drawing you to what is of like nature, to honor
it and recognize its existence; but the fortunes of evil
and
unjust men, both private and public,—which, though
not really happy, are excessively and improperly
lauded as happy by public opinion,—drive you to
impiety by the wrong way in which they are
celebrated, not only in poetry, but in tales of every
kind. Or again, when you see men attaining the goal of
old age, and leaving behind them children's children in
the highest offices,
very likely you are disturbed, when amongst the
number of these you discover—whether from hearsay
or from your own personal observation—some who
have been guilty of many dreadful impieties, and who,
just because of these, have risen from a small position
to royalty and the highest rank; then the consequence
of all this clearly is that, since on the one hand you are
unwilling to hold the gods responsible for such things
because of your kinship to them, and since on the
other hand you are driven by lack of logic and inability
to repudiate the gods, you have come to your present
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morbid state of mind, in which you opine that the gods
exist, but scorn and neglect human affairs. In order,
therefore, that your present opinion may not grow to a
greater height of morbid impiety, but that we may
succeed in repelling the onset of its pollution (if haply
we are able) by argument, let us endeavor to attach our
next argument to that which we set forth in full to him
who utterly disbelieves gods, and thereby to employ
the latter as well.”
And do you, Clinias and Megillus, take the part of the
young man in answering, as you did before; and
should anything untoward occur in the course of the
argument, I will make answer for you, as I did just
now, and convey you across the stream.34
A good suggestion! We will do our best to carry it out;
and do you do likewise.
Well, there will probably be no difficulty in proving to
this man that the gods care for small things no less
than for things superlatively great. For, of course,
[900d] he was present at our recent argument, and
heard that the gods, being good with all goodness,
possess such care of the whole as is most proper to
themselves.
Most certainly he heard that.
Let us join next in enquiring what is that goodness of
theirs in respect of which we agree that they are good.
Come now, do we say that prudence and the
possession of reason are parts of goodness, and the
opposites of these of badness?
We do say so.
And further, that courage is part of goodness, and
cowardice of badness?
Certainly.
And shall we say that some of these are foul, others
fair?
Necessarily.
And shall we say that all such as are mean belong to
us, if to anyone, whereas the gods have no share in any
such things, great or small?
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To this, too, everyone would assent.
Well then, shall we reckon neglect, idleness and
indolence as goodness of soul? Or how say you?
How could we?
As the opposite, then?
Yes.
And the opposites of these as of the opposite quality of
soul?
Of the opposite quality.
What then? He who is indolent, careless and idle will
be in our eyes what the poet described35—”a man most
like to sting-less drones”?
A most true description.
That God has such a character we must certainly deny,
seeing that he hates it; nor must we allow anyone to
attempt to say so.
We could not possibly allow that.
When a person whose duty it is especially to act and
care for
some object has a mind that cares for great things, but
neglects small things, on what principle could we
praise such a person without the utmost impropriety?
Let us consider the matter in this way: the action of
him who acts thus, be he god or man, takes one of two
forms, does it not?
What forms?
Either because he thinks that neglect of the small
things makes no difference to the whole,
or else, owing to laziness and indolence, he neglects
them, though he thinks they do make a difference. Or
is there any other way in which neglect occurs? For
when it is impossible to care for all things, it will not
in that case be neglect of great things or small when a
person—be he god or common man—fails to care for
things which he lacks the power and capacity to care
for.
Of course not.
Now to us three let these two men make answer, of
whom both agree that gods exist, but the one asserts
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that they can be bribed, and the other that they neglect
the small.
First, you both assert that the gods know and hear and
see all things,36 and that nothing of all that is
apprehended by senses or sciences can escape their
notice; do you assert that this is so, or what?
That is what we assert.37
And further, that they can do all that can be done by
mortal or immortal?
They will, of course, admit that this also is the case.
And it is undeniable that all five of us agreed that the
gods are good, yea, exceeding good.
Most certainly.
Being, then, such as we agree, is it not impossible to
allow that they do anything at all in a lazy and indolent
way? For certainly amongst us mortals idleness is the
child of cowardice, and laziness of idleness and
indolence.
Very true.
None, then, of the gods is neglectful owing to idleness
and laziness, seeing that none has any part in
cowardice.
You are very right.
Further, if they do neglect the small and scant things
of the All, they will do so either because they know
that there is no need at all to care for any such things
or—well, what other alternative is there except the
opposite of knowing?
There is none.
Shall we then assume, my worthy and excellent sir,
that you assert that the gods are ignorant, and that it is
through ignorance that they are neglectful when they
ought to be showing care,—or that they know indeed
what is needful, yet act as the worst of men are said to
do, who, though they know that other things are better
to do than what they are doing, yet do them not,
owing to their being somehow defeated by pleasures
or pains?
Impossible.
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Do not human affairs share in animate nature, and is
not man himself, too, the most god-fearing of all living
creatures?
That is certainly probable.
We affirm that all mortal creatures are possessions of
the gods, to whom belongs also the whole heaven.
Of course.
That being so, it matters not whether a man says that
these things are small or great
in the eyes of the gods; for in neither case would it
behove those who are our owners to be neglectful,
seeing that they are most careful and most good. For
let us notice this further fact—
What is it?
In regard to perception and power,—are not these two
naturally opposed in respect of ease and difficulty?
How do you mean?
It is more difficult to see and hear small things than
great; but everyone finds it more easy to move, control
and care for things small and few than their opposites.
Much more.
When a physician is charged with the curing of a
whole body, if, while he is willing and able to care for
the large parts, he neglects the small parts and
members, will he ever find the whole in good
condition?
Certainly not.
No more will pilots or generals or house-managers,
nor yet statesmen or any other such persons, find that
the many and great thrive apart from the few
and small; for even masons say that big stones are not
well laid without little stones.
They cannot be.
Let us never suppose that God is inferior to mortal
craftsmen who, the better they are, the more accurately
and perfectly do they execute their proper tasks, small
and great, by one single art,—or that God, who is most
wise, and both willing and able to care,
cares not at all for the small things which are the easier
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to care for—like one who shirks the labor because he
is idle and cowardly,—but only for the great.
By no means let us accept such an opinion of the gods,
Stranger: that would be to adopt a view that is neither
pious nor true at all.
And now, as I think, we have argued quite sufficiently
with him who loves to censure the gods for neglect.
Yes.
And it was by forcing him by our arguments to
acknowledge
that what he says is wrong. But still he needs also, as it
seems to me, some words of counsel to act as a charm
upon him.
What kind of words, my good sir?
Let us persuade the young man by our discourse that
all things are ordered systematically by Him who cares
for the World—all with a view to the preservation and
excellence of the Whole, whereof also each part, so far
as it can, does and suffers what is proper to it. To each
of these parts, down to the smallest fraction, rulers of
their action and passion are appointed to bring about
fulfillment even to the uttermost
fraction; whereof thy portion also, O perverse man, is
one, and tends therefore always in its striving towards
the All, tiny though it be. But thou failest to perceive
that all partial generation is for the sake of the Whole,
in order that for the life of the World-all blissful
existence may be secured,—it not being generated for
thy sake, but thou for its sake. For every physician and
every trained craftsman works always for the sake of a
Whole, and strives after what is best in general, and he
produces a part for the sake of a whole, and not a
whole for the sake of a part;
but thou art vexed, because thou knowest not how
what is best in thy case for the All turns out best for
thyself also, in accordance with the power of your
common origin. And inasmuch as soul, being
conjoined now with one body, now with another, is
always undergoing all kinds of changes either of itself
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or owing to another soul, there is left for the draughtsplayer no further task,—save only to shift the
character that grows better to a superior place, and the
worse to a worse, according to what best suits each of
them, so that to each may be allotted its appropriate
destiny.
In what way do you mean?
The way I am describing is, I believe, that in which
supervision of all things is most easy for the gods. For
if one were to shape all things, without a constant view
to the Whole, by transforming them (as, for instance,
fire into water), instead of merely converting one into
many or many into one,
then when things had shared in a first, or second, or
even third generation,38 they would be countless in
number in such a system of transformations; but as
things are, the task before the Supervisor of the All is
wondrous easy.
How do you mean?
Thus:—Since our King saw that all actions involve
soul, and contain much good and much evil, and that
body and soul are, when generated, indestructible but
not eternal,39 as are the gods ordained by law (for if
either soul or body had been destroyed,
there would never have been generation of living
creatures), and since He perceived that all soul that is
good naturally tends always to benefit, but the bad to
injure,—observing all this, He designed a location for
each of the parts, wherein it might secure the victory
of goodness in the Whole and the defeat of evil most
completely, easily, and well. For this purpose He has
designed the rule which prescribes what kind of
character should be set to dwell in what kind of
position and in what regions;40 but the causes of the
generation of any special kind he left to the wills
of each one of us men.41 For according to the trend of
our desires and the nature of our souls, each one of us
generally becomes of a corresponding character.
That is certainly probable.
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All things that share in soul change, since they possess
within themselves the cause of change, and in
changing they move according to the law and order of
destiny; the smaller the change of character, the less is
the movement over surface in space, but when the
change is great and towards great iniquity,
then they move towards the deep and the so-called
lower regions, regarding which—under the names of
Hades and the like—men are haunted by most fearful
imaginings, both when alive and when disparted from
their bodies. And whenever the soul gets a specially
large share of either virtue or vice, owing to the force
of its own will and the influence of its intercourse
growing strong, then, if it is in union with divine
virtue, it becomes thereby eminently virtuous, and
moves to an eminent region, being transported by a
holy road to another and a better region;
whereas, if the opposite is the case, it changes to the
opposite the location of its life's abode.”“This is the
just decree of the gods who inhabit Olympus,”
“Hom. Od. 19.43O thou child and stripling who
thinkest thou art neglected by the gods,—the decree
that as thou becomest worse, thou goest to the
company of the worse souls, and as thou becomest
better, to the better souls; and that, alike in life and in
every shape of death, thou both doest and sufferest
what it is befitting that like should do towards like.42
From this decree of Heaven neither wilt thou nor any
other luckless wight ever boast that he has escaped; for
this decree is one which the gods who have enjoined it
have enjoined above all others, and meet it is that it
should be most strictly observed. For by it thou wilt
not ever be neglected, neither if thou shouldest dive, in
thy very littleness, into the depths of the earth below,
nor if thou shouldest soar up to the height of Heaven
above; but thou shalt pay to the gods thy due penalty,
whether thou remainest here on earth, or hast passed
away to Hades,
or art transported to a region yet more fearsome. And
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the same rule, let me tell thee, will apply also to those
whom thou sawest growing to great estate from small
after doing acts of impiety or other such evil,—
concerning whom thou didst deem that they had risen
from misery to happiness, and didst imagine,
therefore, that in their actions, as in mirrors, thou didst
behold the entire neglect of the gods, not knowing of
their joint contribution and
how it contributes to the All. And surely, O most
courageous of men, thou canst not but suppose that
this is a thing thou must needs learn. For if a man
learns not this, he can never see even an outline of the
truth, nor will he be able to contribute an account of
life as regards its happiness or its unhappy fortune. If
Clinias here and all our gathering of elders succeed in
convincing thee of this fact, that thou knowest not
what thou sayest about the gods, then God Himself of
His grace will aid thee; but shouldest thou still be in
need of further argument, give ear to us while we
argue with the third unbeliever,
if thou hast sense at all. For we have proved, as I
would maintain, by fairly sufficient argument that the
gods exist and care for men; the next contention, that
the gods can be won over by wrongdoers,43 on the
receipt of bribes, is one that no one should admit, and
we must try to refute it by every means in our power.
Admirably spoken: let us do as you say.
Come now, in the name of these gods themselves I
ask—in what way would they come to be seduced by
us, if seduced they were?
Being what in their essence and character? Necessarily
they must be rulers, if they are to be in continual
control of the whole heaven.
True.
But to which kind of rulers are they like? Or which are
like to them, of those rulers whom we can fairly
compare with them, as small with great? Would
drivers of rival teams resemble them, or pilots of
ships? Or perhaps they might be likened to rulers of
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armies; or possibly they might be compared to
physicians watching over a war against bodily disease,
or to farmers fearfully awaiting seasons of wonted
difficulty for the generation of plants, or else to
masters of flocks. For seeing that we have agreed44
among ourselves that the heaven is full of many things
that are good, and of the opposite kind also, and that
those not good are the more numerous, such a battle,
we affirm, is undying, and needs a wondrous
watchfulness,—the gods and daemons being our allies,
and we the possession45 of the gods and daemons; and
what destroys us is iniquity and insolence combined
with folly,
what saves us, justice and temperance combined with
wisdom, which dwell in the animate powers of the
gods, and of which some small trace may be clearly
seen here also residing in us. But there are certain
souls that dwell on earth and have acquired unjust gain
which, being plainly bestial, beseech the souls of the
guardians—whether they be watch-dogs or herdsmen
or the most exalted of masters—trying to convince
them by fawning words
and prayerful incantations that (as the tales of evil men
relate) they can profiteer among men on earth without
any severe penalty: but we assert that the sin now
mentioned, of profiteering or “over-gaining,” is what
is called in the case of fleshly bodies “disease,”46 in
that of seasons and years “pestilence,” and in that of
States and polities, by a verbal change, this same sin is
called “injustice.”
Certainly.
Such must necessarily be the account of the matter
given by the man who says that the gods are always
merciful to unjust men
and those who act unjustly, provided that one gives
them a share of one's unjust gains; it is just as if
wolves were to give small bits of their prey to watchdogs, and they being mollified by the gifts were to
allow them to go ravening among the flocks. Is not
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Athenian
Clinias
Athenian
907a
Clinias
Athenian
Clinias
Athenian
907b
Clinias
Athenian
Clinias
Athenian
907c
this the account given by the man who asserts that the
gods are open to bribes?
It is.
To which of the guardians aforementioned might a
man liken the gods without incurring ridicule? Is it to
pilots,
who, when warped themselves by wine's “flow and
flavor,”47 overturn both ships and sailors?
By no means.
And surely not to drivers ranged up for a race and
seduced by a gift to lose it in favor of other teams?
If that was the account you gave of them, it would
indeed be a horrible comparison.
Nor, surely, to generals or physicians or farmers or
herdsmen; nor yet to dogs charmed by wolves?
Hush! That is quite impossible.
Are not all gods the greatest of all guardians, and over
the greatest things?
Yes, by far.
Shall we say that those who watch over the fairest
things, and who are themselves eminently good at
keeping watch, are inferior to dogs and ordinary men,
who would never betray justice for the sake of gifts
impiously offered by unjust men?
By no means; it is an intolerable thing to say, and
whoever embraces such an opinion would most justly
be adjudged the worst and most impious of all the
impious men who practice impiety in all its forms.
May we now say that we have fully proved our three
propositions,—namely, that the gods exist, and that
they are careful, and that they are wholly incapable of
being seduced to transgress justice?
Certainly we may; and in these statements you have
our support.
And truly they have been made in somewhat vehement
terms, in our desire for victory
over those wicked men; and our desire for victory was
due to our fear lest haply, if they gained the mastery in
argument, they should suppose they had gained the
907d
Clinias
Athenian
907e
908a
908b
right to act as they chose—those men who wickedly
hold all those false notions about the gods. On this
account we have been zealous to speak with special
honor; and if we have produced any good effect,
however small, in the way of persuading the men to
hate themselves and to feel some love for an opposite
kind of character, then our prelude to the laws
respecting impiety
will not have been spoken amiss.
Well, there is hope; and if not, at any rate no fault will
be found with the lawgiver in respect of the nature of
the argument.
After the prelude it will be proper for us to have a
statement of a kind suitable to serve as the laws'
interpreter, forewarning all the impious to quit their
ways for those of piety. For those who disobey, this
shall be the law concerning impiety:—If anyone
commits impiety either by word or deed, he that meets
with him
shall defend the law by informing the magistrates, and
the first magistrates who hear of it shall bring the man
up before the court48 appointed to decide such cases as
the laws direct; and if any magistrate on hearing of the
matter fail to do this, he himself shall be liable to a
charge of impiety at the hands of him who wishes to
punish him on behalf of the laws. And if a man be
convicted, the court shall assess one penalty
for each separate act of impiety. Imprisonment shall be
imposed in every case; and since there are three
prisons in the State (namely, one public prison near the
market for most cases, to secure the persons of the
average criminals; a second, situated near the
assembly-room of the officials who hold nightly
assemblies,49 and named the “reformatory”; and a
third, situated in the middle of the country, in the
wildest and loneliest spot possible, and named after
“retribution”50), and since men are involved in impiety
from the three causes which we have described, and
from each such cause two forms of impiety result—
908c
908d
908e
consequently those who sin in respect of religion fall
into six classes which require to be distinguished, as
needing penalties that are neither equal nor similar.
For while those who, though they utterly disbelieve in
the existence of the gods, possess by nature a just
character, both hate the evil and, because of their
dislike of injustice, are incapable of being induced to
commit unjust actions, and flee from unjust men
and love the just, on the other hand, those who,
besides holding that the world is empty of gods, are
afflicted by incontinence in respect of pleasures and
pains, and possess also powerful memories and sharp
wits—though both these classes share alike in the
disease of atheism, yet in respect of the amount of ruin
they bring on other people, the latter class would work
more and the former less of evil. For whereas the one
class will be quite frank in its language about the gods
and about sacrifices and oaths,
and by ridiculing other people will probably convert
others to its views, unless it meets with punishment,
the other class, while holding the same opinions as the
former, yet being specially “gifted by nature'' and
being full of craft and guile, is the class out of which
are manufactured many diviners and experts in all
manner of jugglery; and from it, too, there spring
sometimes tyrants and demagogues and generals, and
those who plot by means of peculiar mystic rites of
their own, and the devices of those who are called
“sophists.” Of these there may be many kinds;
but those which call for legislation are two, of which
the “ironic”51 kind commits sins that deserve not one
death only or two, while the other kind requires both
admonition and imprisonment. Likewise also the
belief that the gods are neglectful breeds two other
kinds of impiety; and the belief in their being open to
bribes, other two. These kinds being thus
distinguished, those criminals who suffer from folly, 52
being devoid of evil disposition and character, shall be
placed by the judge according to law in the
909a
909b
909c
909d
reformatory for a period of not less than five years,
during which time no other of the citizens
shall hold intercourse with them, save only those who
take part in the nocturnal assembly,53 and they shall
company with them to minister to their souls' salvation
by admonition; and when the period of their
incarceration has expired, if any of them seems to be
reformed, he shall dwell with those who are reformed,
but if not, and if he be convicted again on a like
charge, he shall be punished by death. But as to all
those who have become like ravening beasts, and who,
besides holding that the gods are negligent
or open to bribes, despise men, charming the souls of
many of the living, and claiming that they charm the
souls of the dead, and promising to persuade the gods
by bewitching them, as it were, with sacrifices, prayers
and incantations,54 and who try thus to wreck utterly
not only individuals, but whole families and States for
the sake of money,—if any of these men be
pronounced guilty, the court shall order him to be
imprisoned according to law in the mid-country jail,
and shall order that no free man shall approach such
criminals at any time, and that they shall receive from
the servants a ration of food as fixed by the Lawwardens. And he that dies shall be cast outside the
borders without burial; and if any free man assist in
burying him, he shall be liable to a charge of impiety
at the hands of anyone who chooses to prosecute. And
if the dead man leaves children fit for citizenship, the
guardians of orphans shall take them also
under their charge from the day of their father's
conviction, just as much as any other orphans. For all
these offenders one general law must be laid down,
such as will cause the majority of them not only to
offend less against the gods by word and deed, but
also to become less foolish, through being forbidden to
trade in religion illegally. To deal comprehensively
with all such cases the following law shall be
enacted:—No one shall possess a shrine in his own
909e
910a
910b
910c
house: when any one is moved in spirit to do sacrifice,
he shall go to the public places to sacrifice, and he
shall hand over his oblations to the priests and
priestesses to whom belongs the consecration thereof;
and he himself, together with any associates he may
choose, shall join in the prayers. This procedure shall
be observed for the following reasons—It is no easy
task to found temples and gods, and to do this rightly
needs much deliberation; yet it is customary for all
women especially, and for sick folk everywhere, and
those in peril or in distress (whatever the nature of the
distress), and conversely for those who have had a
slice of good fortune, to dedicate whatever happens to
be at hand at the moment, and to vow sacrifices
and promise the founding of shrines to gods and demigods and children of gods; and through terrors caused
by waking visions or by dreams, and in like manner as
they recall many visions and try to provide remedies
for each of them, they are wont to found altars and
shrines, and to fill with them every house and every
village, and open places too, and every spot which was
the scene of such experiences. For all these reasons
their action should be governed by the law now stated;
and a further reason is this—to prevent impious men
from acting fraudulently in regard to these matters
also, by setting up shrines and altars in private houses,
thinking to propitiate the gods privily by sacrifices and
vows, and thus increasing infinitely their own iniquity,
whereby they make both themselves and those better
men who allow them guilty in the eyes of the gods, so
that the whole State reaps the consequences of their
impiety in some degree—and deserves to reap them.
The lawgiver himself, however, will not be blamed by
the god; for this shall be the law laid down:—Shrines
of the gods no one must possess
in a private house; and if anyone is proved to possess
and worship at any shrine other than the public
shrines—be the possessor man or woman,—and if he
is guilty of no serious act of impiety, he that notices
910d
the fact shall inform the Law-wardens, and they shall
give orders for the private shrines to be removed to the
public temples, and if the owner disobeys the order,
they shall punish him until he removes them.
And if anyone be proved to have committed an
impious act, such as is not the venial offence of
children, but the serious irreligion of grown men,
whether by setting up a shrine on private ground, or on
public ground, by doing sacrifice to any gods
whatsoever, for sacrificing in a state of impurity he
shall be punished with death. And the Law-wardens
shall judge what is a childish or venial offence and
what not, and then shall bring the offenders before the
court, and shall impose upon them the due penalty for
their impiety.
1 Cp. Plat. Laws 868c ff., Plat. Laws 877b ff., Plat. Laws 930e ff.
2 Cp. Plat. Laws 941d, Plat. Laws 941e.
3 Cf.Plat. Rep. 364b ff.
4 By Hesiod, Pherecydes, etc.
5 Materialists such as Democritus.
6 Cp. Plat. Laws 701c, Plat. Laws 701d; Plat. Laws 858a ff.: all this discussion is
supposed to have taken place on one and the same day,—hence the ref. to
“shortness of time.”
7 This is a summary of the doctrines of the Atomists (Leucippus and Democritus)
who denied the creative agency of Reason. Similar views were taught, later, by
Epicurus and Lucretius.
8 A view ascribed to Critias.
9 Cp. Aristot. NIc. Eth. 1094 b 14 ff.
10 This antithesis between “Nature” (φύσις) and “Convention” (νόμος) was a
familiar one in ethical and political discussion from the time of the Sophists. The
supremacy of “Nature,” as an ethical principle, was maintained (it is said) by
Hippias and Prodicus; that of “Convention,” by Protagoras and Gorgias: Plato
goes behind both to the higher principle of Reason (νοῦς), cp. Introduction. p.
xiv.
11 Cp. Plat. Laws 634d, Plat. Laws 634e; Plat. Laws 859b, al.
12 Literally, “utter every voice” (leave nothing unsaid).
13 In Books I and II.
14 Cp. Plat. Laws 811d.
15 Cp.Plat. Tim. 34d.
16 Cp. Plat. Laws 886b.
17 Cp. Plat. Laws 896b, Plat. Laws 896c.
18 Cp.Plat. Soph. 255 ff.; Timaeus 57 ff.
19 i.e. with a forward gliding motion, as opposed to rolling forward (like a car
wheel).
20 i.e. as solid, liquid, or gaseous substance.
21 This account of the derivation of the sense-world from the “starting-principle”
(ἀρχή) is obscure. It is generally interpreted as a “geometrical allegory,” the
stages of development being from point to line, from line to surface, from surface
to solid,—this last only being perceptible by the senses (cp. Aristot. Soul 404 b
18 ff.).
22 The 8 kinds of motion here indicated are—(1) circular motion round a fixed
center; (2) locomotion (gliding or rolling); (3) combination; (4) separation; (5)
increase; (6) decrease; (7) becoming; (8) perishing. The remaining two kinds (as
described below) are—(9) other-affecting motion (or secondary causation); and
(10) self-and-other-affecting motion (or primary causation).
23 E.g. Anaxagoras, who taught, originally, “all things were together (ὁμοῦ);”
and the Eleatic School (Parmenides, etc.) asserted that the Real World (τὸ ὄν) is
One and motionless; cp.xPlat. Theaet.180e.
24 Cp.Epistles 7, 342 A, B.
25 Plat. Laws 892a, Plat. Laws 892b.
26 Cp. Plat. Laws 894b, Plat. Laws 894c.
27 i.e. the uniform revolution of a sphere in the same spot and on its own axis:
cp. Plat. Laws 898a; Plat. Tim. 34a, Plat. Tim. 34b; Plat. 90c,d.
28 Cp.Plat. Rep. 516a ff.
29 Cp. Plat. Laws 893b ff.; the motion to which reason is likened is the first of
the ten.
30 Cp.Plat. Tim. 33b, Plat. Tim. 34a; Plat. Rep. 436b ff.
31 i.e. envelopes the body and its sense-organs (like circum-ambient air).
32 Cp.Plat. Tim. 41d, Plat. Tim. 41e, where the Creator is said to apportion a soul
to each star, in which it rides “as though in a chariot.”
33 A dictum of Thales: Aristot. Soul 411 a 7 ff.
34 Cp. Plat. Laws 892d, Plat. Laws 892e.
35 Hes. WD 303 f.:τῷ δὲ θεοὶ νεμεσῶσι καὶ ἀνέρες ὅς κεν ἀεργὸς|ζώῃ,
κηφήνεσσι κοθούροις εἴκελος ὁρμήν.
36 Cp. Plat. Laws 641e.
37 Here, and in what follows, Clinias is answering on behalf of the two
misbelievers.
38 This seems to refer to three stages of the soul's incarnation; see p. 367, n. 2.
39 Cp.Plat. Tim 37c ff.
40 Cp.Plat. Tim 42b ff. where it is said that the soul of the good man returns at
death to its native star, while that of the bad takes the form of a woman in its
second, and that of a beast in its third incarnation.
41 Cp.Plat. Rep. 617e.
42 Cp. Plat. Laws 728b f., Plat. Laws 837a.
43 Cp. Hom. Il. 9.497 ff., τοὺς（θεοὺς） . . . λοιβῇ τε κνίσῃ τε παρατρωπῶς᾽
ἄνθρωποι κτλ.
44 Cp. Plat. Laws 904a ff., Plat. Laws 896c ff., Plat. Rep. 379c.
45 Cp.Plat. Phaedo 62b.
46 Cp.Plat. Rep. 609, Plat. Sym. 188a ff., where the theory is stated that health
depends upon the “harmony,” or equal balance, of the constituent elements of the
body (“heat” and “cold,” “moisture” and “dryness,”); when any of these
(opposite) elements is in excess (πλεονεκτεῖ), disease sets in. So, too, in the
“body politic,” the excess of due measure by any element, or member, is
injustice.
47 Hom. Il. 9.500 (quoted above, p. 371, n. 1).
48 Cp. Plat. Laws 767c, Plat. Laws 767d, Plat. Laws 855c.
49 Cp. Plat. Laws 909a, Plat. Laws 961a ff.
50 Cp. Plat. Laws 704b.
51 i.e. “hypocritical,” hiding impiety under a cloak of religion.
52 Cp. Plat. Laws 863b, Plat. Laws 863c.
53 Cp. Plat. Laws 908a.
54 Cp. Plat. Laws 933a,, Plat. Rep. 364b ff.
Laws Book X Thought Sheet
Thought Point
Points of Thought
Describe this Dialog
Main Point
(What is he talking about?)
What section(s) bests describe
the Main Point?
Minor Points
(what examples does he use?
What strikes you?)
What section(s) bests
describes the Minor Points?
Does Socrates convince his
audience?
Does Socrates convince you?
Let us face it. This is hard work. But it should not be. What we have to develop is some disciplines which aid us as we read. This
sheet is one form of doing that. Underlining, highlighting, making notes, re-reading, all of these help us to get through the text to the
meaning.
Chapter 14
The East Revisited
Before we move on let us dwell once more in the shadow of the Banyan tree. Ahhh
refreshing. But then thoughts arise. Are there any similarities between Plato and the Eastern
philosophers of that time?
What Was Everyone Thinking?
While we may not do much justice to the Easterners, this chapter seeks to give a sense of
Eastern thinking in light of what we have learned in the West, which hopefully will give us a
common thought-chest from which to delve deeper. To do this we can revisit the themes
previously presented or we can dive into another deep thinker. Or, well, we could do both but
for an East-West meeting of minds kind of exercise.
The Players (a timeframe refresher)
Dates
Philosophers
Kind of Main Points
East and West
551-479
500-428
428-348
369-289
384-322
372-289
Ethical living through ritual observances (political,
religious and etiquette)
Self-reflection and authenticity rather than obedience to
Mo Tzu
ritual
We must strive to live the best lives of reason and good
Plato
works.
Move beyond the mundane to full understanding
Chuang-Tzu
Life is understandable in the observed world.
Aristotle
All human beings share an innate goodness that either
Mencius (Mengzi)
can be cultivated or squandered, but never lost
altogether
Table 13: Ancient East and West Players
Confucius
Chang-Tzu
Chang-Tzu is placed squarely in the Tao School. Similarly like Socrates, he espoused a
holistic philosophy of life, encouraging disengagement from the artificialities of
socialization, and cultivation of our natural “ancestral” (inherited/inherent) potencies and
skills, in order to live a simple and natural, but full and flourishing life. He was critical of our
ordinary categorizations and evaluations, noting the multiplicity of different modes of
understanding between different creatures, cultures, and philosophical schools, and the lack
of an independent means of making a comparative evaluation. He advocated a mode of
understanding that is not committed to a fixed system, but is fluid and flexible, and that
maintains a conditional, pragmatic attitude towards the valid use of these categories and
evaluations for everyday living. That is to say, he does not really seem to want to be held
bound by conventional thinking, or even hold fast to what beliefs he held before.
Here is a completely stolen summary of his works known as the Zhuangzi grouped as they
are by a later editor of Tzu’s works.
The Inner Chapters
1. Wandering Beyond
2. Discussion on
Smoothing Things Out
3. The Principle of
Nurturing Life
4. In the Human Realm
5. Signs of Abundant
Potency
6. The Vast Ancestral
Teacher
7. Responding to Emperors
and Kings
School of Tzuang
Anarchist chapters
Huang-Lao school
11. Let it Be, Leave it
Alone
17. Autumn Floods
8. Webbed Toes
18. Utmost Happiness
9. Horse's Hooves
12. Heaven and Earth
19. Mastering Life
10. Rifling Trunks
13. The Way of Heaven
20. The Mountain Tree
11. Let it Be, Leave it
Alone
14. The Turning of Heaven
21. Tian Zi Fang
15. Constrained in Will
22. Knowledge Wandered (16?. Mending the Inborn (16?. Mending the Inborn
North
Nature)
Nature)
23. Geng Sang Chu
24. Xu Wugui
28. Yielding the Throne
33. The World
25. Ze Yang
29. Robber Zhi
26. External Things
30. Discoursing on Swords
27. Imputed Words
31. The Old Fisherman
32. Lie Yukou
Table 14: Chang-Tzu Summary
Chang-Tzu and Plato: Compare and Contrast
From the chapter titles above we can see the main thought laid out in his works. Feel free
to peruse them at leisure (http://chinese.dsturgeon.net/text.pl?node=2712&if=en), but I only
want to touch on a few. Chapter One, Wandering Beyond, takes its notion from the idea of
the ‘walk-about’ or wandering beyond the daily life, that is, getting away from the hubbub of
society, but it is more than that. Like Socrates, Chang-Tzu is advocating the going beyond in
the spiritual and intellectual sense as well. We must branch out beyond what we are
comfortable with, beyond our everyday values. Socrates sees this as achieving wisdom and
Chang-Tzu more of achieving harmony. The translation uses some words we encountered in
Plato: passions and virtue.
Here Chang-Tzu takes on the question of ‘what is man’.
“Hui-Shi said to Chang-Tzu, 'Can a man indeed be without desires and passions?' The reply
was, 'He can.' 'But on what grounds do you call him a man, who is thus without passions and
desires?' Chang-Tzu said, 'The Tao gives him his personal appearance (and powers);
Heaven gives him his bodily form; how should we not call him a man?' Hui-Shi rejoined,
'Since you call him a man, how can he be without passions and desires?' The reply was, 'You
are misunderstanding what I mean by passions and desires. What I mean when I say that he
is without these is, that this man does not by his likings and dis-likings do any inward harm to
his body - he always pursues his course without effort, and does not (try to) increase his
(store of) life.' Hui-Shi rejoined, 'If there were not that increasing of (the amount) of life, how
would he get his body?' Chang-Tzu said, 'The Tao gives him his personal appearance (and
powers); Heaven gives him his bodily form; and he does not by his likings and dis-likings do
any internal harm to his body. But now you, Sir, deal with your spirit as if it were something
external to you, and subject your vital powers to toil. You sing (your ditties), leaning against a
tree; you go to sleep, grasping the stump of a rotten Dryandra tree. Heaven selected for you
the bodily form (of a man), and you babble about what is hard and what is white
(appearances).' “
(The Inner Chapters: The Seal of Virtue Complete 6)
Chang-Tzu also presents a kind of Divided Line where you cross a horizontal boundary
and free the imagination and a vertical ascension where we lose the distinction of things.
For Chang-Tzu, as for Socrates, a flourishing or examined life may indeed look quite
unappealing from a traditional point of view. One may give up social ambition and retire in
relative poverty to tend to one's spirit and cultivate one's nature.
Alternately, Chang-Tzu is a bit of an anarchist, and a certain type of relativism can be
seen in his thought which would put it at opposition to that of Plato (though not fully in the
camp of the Sophists). Take for instance the following story:
“Men claim that [two women] were beautiful, but if fish saw them they would dive to the
bottom of the stream; if birds saw them they would fly away, and if deer saw them they would
break into a run. Of these four, who knows how to fix the standard of beauty in the world?”
(The Inner Chapters: Adjustment of Controversies 11)
The following exchange takes place between Chang-Tzu and his intellectual sparring
partner Hui-Shi we met above and illustrates/highlights several ideas.
“Chang-Tzu and Hui-Shi were strolling along the dam of the Hao Waterfall when Chang-Tzu
said, ‘See how the minnows come out and dart around where they please! That's what fish
really enjoy!’
Hui-Shi said, ‘You're not a fish — how do you know what fish enjoy?’
Chang-Tzu said, ‘You're not me, so how do you know I don't know what fish enjoy?’
Hui-Shi said, ‘I'm not you, so I certainly don't know what you know. On the other hand, you're
certainly not a fish — so that still proves you don't know what fish enjoy!’
Chang-Tzu said, ‘Let's go back to your original question, please. You asked me how I know
what fish enjoy — so you already knew I knew it when you asked the question. I know it by
standing here beside the Hao.’”
(The Outer Chapters: The Floods of Autumn; 13)
There is also an apparently annoying Socratic habit in asking questions.
Mengzi
In a short tag and in addition/opposition to Chang-Tzu, let me throw in this guy, a
Confucian philosopher. Mencius takes a very internal view of things. Where Confucius
emphasized the external rituals as well, Mencius sees self-cultivation as kind of the
circulatory system of thinking. It flows out and comes back to itself, if that makes any sense.
So in some senses he is similar to Chang-Tzu and different from Plato. Still, he has a deep
abiding attachment to the idea of the Tian or deity, which is external/objective with its
alignment with moral goodness, its dependence on human agents to actualize its will,
somewhat, and the variable unpredictable nature of its associations with mortal actors,
similar to Chang-Tzu and Plato.
Not Putting It Together
Because time is short, a final thing we can do is look to see if there is a development in
Eastern philosophy. Does Chang-Tzu build upon or advance Taoism? Does he take it in a
new and innovative direction? Does he give it a bad name? How is this development similar
to Plato on his master Socrates? Dissimilar?
So here is the catch. There is a temptation to try to synthesize thought and ideas between
philosophers to show how they are not that different from one another. We do not want to do
that even though it makes for delightful discussion. We may group them into schools, we
may compare and contrast them for historical purposes, but they are distinct, even within
those groupings.
That does not mean that sometimes they do not build off one another, or that we cannot
build a consistent philosophy for ourselves by building off them. What understanding we are
looking at here is that our understanding of a ‘school’ of thought can be colored by all of the
developments of that school. That is to say, if Taoism develops over a 1000 year period, our
synopsis of it today would take in all 1000 years of thought development. The subtleties of
development can be lost. Reading the works is really the only way to truly understand and
appreciate the development of a philosophy. We must keep the parts in mind even as we
build the whole.
Putting It Together
So what can we say (in general) about the world philosophy during this time? There
appears to be similar thought development regardless of the culture or sphere of influence.
The questions which people are asking are very basic: what does it mean to be human? How
should one live? What is the order of the world? Why is there something rather than nothing?
What do we already know and is it correct and sufficient?
The point here is not to say which one of these philosophers is correct, or more correct or
more insightful or even wrong. The point here is to begin to understand human thought and
the quest for knowledge. Is it just ‘natural’ that disparate elements come to similar
conclusions? Can cultural differences lead to similar arguments but different conclusions?
What is it about the human intellect which sets it apart from other animal intellects? What
sets it apart and binds it to the observable world?
We can often see reactionary philosophies develop within cultures or between cultures
which have contact with one another and that is easily understandable. But what about
separate cultures? Should we view them as reactionary even though they had not contact?
Finally, does the a posteriori nature of thought at this time lend itself to these kinds of
similar observed thought developments?
Chapter 15
Post-Plato
We recognize Plato as a major influence in Western thought but that is mainly because
later philosophers picked up on his ideas and tried to integrate or replace them. What about
then, during or just after his lifetime? Was it just a fluke that his works and thought were
preserved and persevered? Did he have any immediate influence? Well, I guess the answer
had better be yes, or else this chapter will be really short.
The Players
Dates
445-365
412-323
384-322
336-264
20 BC-50
AD
150-215
184–253
204-270
354-430
Philosophers
Main Points
Antisthenes
Diogenes
Aristotle
Zeno of Citium
Philo of Alexandria
Clement of Alexandria
Origen
Plotinus
Augustine
Alkindus
Alpharabius
Avicenna
Averroes
Table 15: Post-Platonic Players
The Academia
Plato was considered even within his lifetime as one of the most influential and celebrated
teachers in Greece. The Academia (or Academy) of Athens was opened by Plato in about 387
BCE and lasted until it was closed down by the Emperor Justinian in 529 (for strictly
political purposes). This 800 year unbroken existence speaks volumes for the ideas implanted
there by its founder. History on the other hand, may not be as kind to the students.
The school’s influence in a secular sense was carried over about mid way through its
existence to the non-secular theologies of Philo of Alexandria (Jewish) as well as Christian
theologians and apologists who rise up at this time due to the legitimization of Christianity
by the Emperor Constantine.
While focused on the correct instruction of political leaders, it managed to keep intact,
alive and fresh the ideas of its founder for countless generations.
The Minor Prophets
While only Plato seemed best able to present and expound on the whole of Socrates’
thought, producing a balanced notion of discipline and virtue, he was not the only one who
was able to glean something from it. Even then, Plato eventually mainly focused on the
leadership aspect. Many people follow the thinking of an individual, presenting what they
think the main point or focus to be. Sometimes they are right, and sometimes they are wrong.
Other times they are just lunatics.
Cynics
From the Greek for ‘dog-like’, the Cynics took up Socrates’ call for austerity, and pretty
much little else. One should reject traditional desires (power, fame, etc.) and be free of
possessions. Antisthenes identified self-denial as virtue; Diogenes felt Antisthenes did not
take it far enough and took it farther by living in a tub. The term as we use it today only took
on that meaning later in history.
Cyrenaics
Named for their port of origin, these folks while often confused name-wise, were the
counterparts of the Cynics. Aristippus identified more with the instant and short-term
pleasure side of Socratic thought, and pretty much little else. One can only guess the reason
these guys too are not still around.
Aristotle
Plato really had no real use for what we might call the ‘hard sciences’. To him knowledge
only had use in terms of ‘right action’. Oddly enough then, one of his star pupils became
known as the father of modern science. We really do not want to spend much time here,
because we will be spending a lot later on this figure. Suffice it to say, his rejection/reaction
against his master Plato, produced a singularly large volume of work. Together, Plato and
Aristotle form what we basically consider to be Hellenistic Philosophy (with all apologies to
everyone else we have looked at).
He, for the West and because we tend to gloss over the details sometimes, begins that idea
that every generation produces a genius who seems to step outside the boundaries of
traditional thought to guide the world. But one (at least this one) wonders why philosophers
hold up both Plato and Aristotle, but scientific thinkers only hold up Aristotle. But I cause us
to wander.
Stoics
A fusion of Plato and Aristotle, these guys get their name from the stoa or columns from
near which they spouted their philosophy. Zeno of Citium is considered their main founder
and their ‘school’, lasted even into Rome (recall Seneca, Marcus Aurelius). The Stoic
doctrine is divided into three parts: logic, physics, and ethics. Stoicism is essentially a system
of ethics (like Plato) which is guided by logic (Aristotelian) and has physics (observable
phenomena) as its foundation.
What they taught was that life should be lived in accordance with nature and controlled by
virtue. Their teaching on morality though, is stern; it is an ascetic system, teaching selfdenial, restraint and denial of worldly pleasures as well as a perfect indifference (apathea:
apathy) to everything external, for nothing external could be either good or evil. Hence to the
Stoics both pain and pleasure, poverty and riches, sickness and health, were supposed to be
equally unimportant.
In this way they seem to also reflect the Taoists of the East, but that is another chapter.
Eclecticism
A synthesis from the 1st century BCE of Stoicism and Platonism, of Neo-Pythagoreansand
the various Platonic sects, and others. The name is given to a group of philosophers who,
from the existing philosophical beliefs, tried to select the doctrines that seemed to them most
reasonable, and out of these constructed a new system.
They tried to balance the logical search for pure truth, the attainment of practical virtue
and happiness, and the idea that pure truth was impossible to discover. Eclecticism was the
original cafeteria-style belief system, seeking to reach by selection from the various systems,
to the best possible degree of probability, with the full knowledge of the despair of attaining
to what is absolutely true. Puff, puff, whew.
That is to say, they knew they would not reach perfect knowledge but they also knew that
fact should not keep them from trying.
Neo-Platonism
Sure, okay, not really immediately after his life, but in our timeline fairly close, this is the
much later (3rd century CE/AD) ‘rediscovery’ of Plato founded by Plotinus, an attempt to
integrate Socratic/Platonic thought into newer systems. Alexandria in Egypt had replaced
Athens as the center of learning and the new-found sense of peace led back to the pursuit of
higher knowledge, truth, virtue and the state, in light of modern thinking.
Naturally they were drawn to the writings of Plato, for their ethical sense. We will be
covering these thinkers later but they bear mention here, within this context.
Clement of Alexandria, Origen and Augustine
These Christian theologian/philosophers pick up the neo-platonic movement and carry it
into the 4th century and beyond. They struggle with some of the notions of Plato, trying to
reconcile them with Christian Orthodoxy but for the most part they create a smooth
integration of Greek ideas into Christian thinking.
Alkindus, Alpharabius, Avicenna and Averroes
These Islamic theologian/philosophers pick up platonic ideas around the 11th century and
produce an Islamic philosophic-theological synthesis similar to their Christian counterparts.
These re-thinkings will be re-introduced into the West later in the late Middle Ages where
they will have an influence.
Putting It Together
Socrates and Plato had a great influence in Western philosophy on the immediate and the
long term thinking of the philosophers which followed them. Their thinking on morality gave
a language and a basis for discussing the larger human situation. While most of their
‘scientific’ thinking has subsequently been dismissed, it has been hard to shake their moral
discussions, or the thinking that within each of us lays a certain amount of knowledge which
we can use to act correctly or at least discover how to act correctly and the responsibility to
do so.
Our modern notions of law, of morality, of the ‘greater good’, of asceticism, even some
aspects of God all have their inception here, in Plato. Whether it has been embraced or
rejected, consciously or subconsciously integrated, the vestiges of Platonic thought are
solidly woven into the modern Western mindset.
Thought Exercise
Would you consider the thinkers of this period, even Plato, to be a posteriori or a priori
thinkers?
PART II
Aristotle to Aquinas
3rd Century BCE thru 13th Century AD
(Chapters 16 - 32)
Chapter 16
Aristotle
Next to Plato, Aristotle holds the title as one of the most influential thinkers in the West,
including amongst some of the Islamic philosophers. Still it is probably his ‘scientific’
thinking which has the most influence in our daily lives. If all of Western philosophy is a
footnote to Plato, think that all Western science is a footnote to Aristotle.
Aristotle represents a serious break in thought with previous philosophers (re: Socrates
and Plato) and yet he breaks little new ground in terms of questions. While he starts with and
refines some of Plato’s ideas, he abandons his mentor’s view of higher, non-physical truths
and seeks meaning within the world. He creates the analytical/deductive method, observing
with the senses to understand and know something, creating the movement from a posteriori
to a priori thinking.
A Man, A Plan….
We know a lot about Aristotle’s life. A lot. Of the highlights, though, we know his father
was a physician to the king of Macedonia but he was orphaned early and eventually placed
into Plato’s Academy at 17. Plato himself was impressed with the lad, so impressed that he
called him “the mind of the school”, which probably sounds much more poetic in Greek.
After Plato’s death, he found his thought too different from his mentor and therefore the
school he founded. Aristotle headed out, seeking his own way, hanging with other graduates
and classmates (sounds like some teen-age coming of age movie). Eventually, he was
summoned back to educate the young son of a certain Macedonian ruler named Phillip. This
young man Alexander , who eventually became known as ‘the Great’ (which sounds pretty
good even in English), also went on to have some influence on the thinking patterns of a
large number of people.
In connection with the ascendency of Alexander, Aristotle made his way back to Athens
to open a school in the Lyceum. Here he assembled a large library aided by money and
materials sent by Alexander from all over the new empire.
Unfortunately for him, all good things must come to an end and with the death of
Alexander the negative reaction to his rule swept Aristotle up. Similarly accused like his
mentor’s mentor, he choose to not let Athens ‘sin twice against philosophy’ (which sounds
bad in both Greek and English) and unlike his grand-mentor, fled the city. Soon afterwards
he got sick and died which may or may not prove Socrates’ point.
Not a bad resume. His parentage places him squarely within the political system, of which
the Academy sought to influence. His natural intellect and impressive mind guarantee him a
seat there and influence in the regime. The peace and influence of Alexander ensured a wide
effect of his thought. The idea of the library flourished, most famously in Alexandria in
Egypt and still survives, though not in Alexandria. Many of his works, most probably lecture
notes, survive. The right man in the right place at the right time.
The Big Themes
What distinguishes Aristotle from earlier thinkers? Not much really but to be fair it is
more than just his position in the historical timeline which calls our attention to him. Logic.
Vices and virtues. Understanding objects through Categories. Final cause. Biology.
Psychology. Rhetoric. Poetics. You name it, he had a thought on it. He accomplished this
volume of thought by breaking things down in to their components in order to better
understand them. He was a divider not a uniter to paraphrase. He divided the ‘sciences’
(think of the word meaning understanding/knowledge) up into three categories: the
theoretical, the practical and the productive. Science gives us information, but that
information has different ultimate ends: knowledge, conduct and the making of ‘beautiful’
objects.
For Aristotle, life surrounds us and is larger than just our moral actions. The quantification
and qualification of the world around us requires a portion of our thought as well. Still,
knowing involves right action. That is to say, contrary to some opinions just because we can
do something, we should not because it is not ethical.
Thought Exercise
Compare and contrast this understanding of knowledge and the purpose of knowledge
with Plato’s.
Aristotle Interrupted
But we digress. As stated previously, Aristotle wrote on a great many things. The
following are notes are on some of the works or lectures which are part of his main thought.
Later we will explore these and other ideas but for now, a mere overview because to expound
on them would take more room than we have.
One last observation is that Aristotle was the master of the opening line.
Metaphysics
“All men desire to know.” (Metaphysics Bk. 1:1) This fundamental function within
humans requires much thought. If Nature is the physical world around us, what is the nature
of what is beyond Nature? What knowledge is best characterized as ‘Wisdom’, and how do
we acquire it? While he takes a slightly different approach than Plato, the subject is similar.
Science (Physics)
What is the nature of Nature? Here he takes on some of the big ones we have glanced at:
Motion, something or nothing, Time and change. Biology and Psychology fall into this
realm. What are some of the ‘first principles’ of Nature? The term ‘natural philosopher’ is
used for a follower of science, one that has been dropped in favor of ‘scientist’.
Logic
We have previously examined this idea, but let us now look at the term in terms of the
man. Well, now comes the hard part. Sheepishly and with as much as the word is bandied
about here, contritely, I must inform you that Aristotle never formally assign a work to it, nor
did he actually use the word. It comes to us later probably from Cicero. His word would be
more correctly translated ‘analytics’. Aristotle saw logic not so much as a science but a
function of every human being and society. That is to say, it is, as we have proffered it to
you, an instrument of science and the necessary basis of science. He took it for granted that it
had to be understood and practiced in order to do any of the sciences.
Still we brazenly assign the moniker ‘Aristotelian Logic’ because he did wax at length on
the subject as it was so important to his system. He introduces the syllogism as the basis for
all reasoning.
The Soul
How different could this be from Plato, right? For Aristotle the study of the soul is
Psychology (think Psyche); therefore the end of Psychology is to study and reach an
understanding “first of its essential nature and secondly its properties” (De Anima Bk. 1:7).
As he presents it, the study of how and why we understand is perhaps the greatest in rank of
the sciences. In this way he still reflects Plato. What is the end of knowledge except that we
should live better?
Ethics (Nicomachean)
More than just a motivation, a system unto itself and a name Nicomachean (most probably
because it was written down by his son, Nicomachus). Everything by all accounts is aimed
toward the good, so it must be that the good is that toward which all is aimed. I wished I had
said that and people would be quoting me instead of the first line of the Ethics. An interesting
development is the non-relativistic notion that some goods are subservient to other goods.
So what is the Good? Think back; virtue, as Plato saw it was involved the whole of the
person working toward a synthesis of thought and deed. Aristotle, never content to let whole
things be whole, dissects virtue back into two parts: intellectual (thoughts) and moral
(actions).
Politics
Well everyone has an opinion right? Aristotle’s opinion was that Politics was the science
of the good, that of which Ethics speaks. In that sense and if we look at the categories of
knowledge, this would be the most practical science. As with Plato, Aristotle puts high value
on political thought.
Putting It Together
So as we begin to examine this great thinker, we have to stand in awe of the effect his
formalized thought has on so much of what we think today.
Ironically (if irony were not dead, but that is another class), at least to this observer, the
idea of ‘free-thinking’ that we cling to and the ideas we often dismiss through Science, are
often at odds with what was embraced by this author of Science.
“That which is there to be spoken of and thought of, must be.” Parmenides, Fragment 6
Chapter 17
Aristotle Unveiled
Our previous discussion shows the breadth of Aristotle’s thought, but gives very little in
the way of depth. The ultimate problem not just for us in our limited format, and not just for
the voluminous Aristotle, but for most philosophers is the extent of their writings and
thought. What to pick and choose? What to survey that will be good for later? What is good
just to know in and of itself? Well, not easily answered questions, at least for this writer. In
the meantime, we have never let ignorance stop us. Knowing that the extent of our treatment
will be a mere pale shade compared to the works themselves, let us press on. To do that we
must pierce the veil; well maybe at best we can spend some time peeking beneath the curtain
and come to understand some of the language and thought of Aristotle.
Aristotle often invokes the dialectical method. Plato (and Socrates) employs it but more
often uses the Socratic method because he really believes in drawing the answer out of the
individual. Aristotle dialogs with other thinkers to work through the idea. Whereas Plato
believes the answer lies within the individual, Aristotle believes the idea lies within the
thinking, that it is more external, because it lies in the observation.
And The Categories Are…
We will first tackle the idea of Categories. This is an essential part of the understanding of
not only Aristotelian thought but that of many later philosophers (like Kant). In a rash and
completely generalized statement we can state that Socrates and Plato really did not care as
to the minutiae when it came to thinking. They were more about the big ideas. Aristotle, on
the other hand, saw that not being exact led to errors in thinking, so he set out to formalize
thought and thinking. Not the ideas, but the methods are new. Many people before him have
mentioned many of the things he will explore, but his genius provides a formal structure to
the thinking.
Aside from just an obvious glee about how the world is put together, he really wants to get
down to a how we can think about things that will give us a consistent way to discuss them.
Now on Aristotle’s cue we must define the word categories. The Greek word is probably best
transliterated as ‘predicate’ as in subject and predicate. So, at their simplest, categories are
those things which can be the predicate or subject in a statement or an argument.
We might also say that one thing is predictable of or predicated on another, as in “this
sentence is predicated in the idea that I know what I’m talking about.”
So how do categories help us and how are they determined? The two questions are
actually the same question. The determining of categories helps us to understand them and
vice versa. Okay, okay, I hear the cynics (small ‘c’) among you saying ‘that sounds like a
load of…categories’. Were we not always taught that you cannot define a thing with itself?
Did not Aristotle himself classify that as a logical fallacy? Well, yes. Okay you caught me.
The main problem with categorizing categories is that there are so many ways to do it and
so many ways to understand it. Aristotle himself relies on categorizing yet his official list of
categories seems to be fluid. The main point is that when we are thinking about things we are
trying to get to their heart, not by stripping away everything but getting down to their basic
definition and their definition to everything else. Along the way we do not abandon what we
know about the thing, just come to greater understand of the thing in its larger context.
Meaning, for 100
How do I categorize things, let me count the ways. We tend to think in generals and
specifics. Sometimes the two can get in each other’s way. The meaning of words, the
concepts they represent need to be bounded, so that we can understand the context in which
we use them. Aristotle starts out by addressing this using three words:
1. Equivocally: That is to say something has the same name as something else but the
definition is different (equivalency) – world: the collection of people and the planet.
2. Univocally: Is the case when the name and the definition applied to that name are the
same (oneness) – car: same whether it is a Ford or a Toyota.
3. Derivatively: Something derives its name from something else (inheritance) –
computer: something which computes.
How do we get meaning? What are the ways in which something is the thing on which
other things depend? This definition is in a sense what a category is, that is, it is the thing on
which others are based, or the bucket into which they fall. Hence we can talk about humans
and birds as both being animals, even though they are not the same kind of animal. He ends
up by telling us that the definition of something, that by which we know it as it, is what we
have when we strip away everything which can exist apart from it. This is how I know a bird
from a tree.
Double Jeopardy
Why is definition and defining and categorizing things so important? Why did Aristotle
feel the need to go in this direction? What aspect of Platonic thought caused him diverge
from defining things by their Form? Taking three steps forward and two steps back we dance
back to Plato and take a look at that central tenet of Platonic thought: the Forms. There are
three theses about Forms which not only I conveniently left out till now but state they are:
1. Individual. Forms (or ideals or common natures) are individuals that express (and
explain) all features common to the individuals that share that nature.
2. Distinct from particulars. The common nature (goodness, humanity) is distinct from
any of the individual things that share it (good things, humans).
3. Self-predicable. The common nature must be predicable of itself. Goodness is good,
Humanity is human, etc.
From this Platonic definition, Aristotle, in a kind of Sherman and Peabody flight through
the Way-Back machine, runs into the Third Man paradox:
Human is predicable both of Socrates and of humanity. So human must be
distinct from both Socrates and humanity. So we need yet another common
nature human’ (human prime) distinct from human and from Socrates. And yet
another nature again that is distinct from human’, human and Socrates. But this
will go on forever, which means we really have no explanation for what makes
Socrates human. He tells us the same problem would also occur with “white”.
Basically Aristotle counters with the idea of Substance and Accidents. Recall from earlier
brief discussions (See Chapter 9) that Substance is that which makes something what it is –
human for example, and Accidents are what distinguish the individual Substances from one
another – hair color and height. This avoids the way-back argument because you distinguish
things from one another not by some external ‘form’ but by their accidents. As an extra
thought remember that definition-wise what for Aristotle could be a substance for one thing
might be an accident for another, but that is where having categories helps us (more on that
later).
Logic, for 500
Logic is the core tool or as Aristotle would call it, an instrument (organon) for all
thinking. Sound familiar? That aside, as you can see from the discussion of Categories why
their idea was necessary before he could even posit the idea of logical thinking, and that
logical thinking would be required to define the categories. Go back and look at the Square
of Opposition (Chapter 2) where you can see the categories at work.
Aristotle has works on both the a priori and a posteriori analytics, as he would call them.
Now, we do not want to re-hash all of the logic section, as helpful as that may be, but put it
into context. For Aristotle the reasoning for anything in the theoretical sciences was based in
true-false statements in relationship to one another. The idea of the syllogism, based on
‘truths’, is basically statements predicated about a subject, or more succinctly: propositions.
Aristotle believed that the flaw in so many explanations was the lack of logic. The idea and
imperative nature of logic meant that consistency is assured and that also ‘foundational
truths’ or demonstration can be established. As with the categories, this just means that you
do not have to go back a re-prove everything in order to proceed in an argument. You also
avoid confusing yourself and committing a fallacy.
Language, for 1000
“Spoken words are the symbols of mental experience and written words are the symbols
of the spoken word.” Thus spake Aristotle (De Interpretatione 16). Words have to be
understood. The words we use for communicating ideas must be understood. Aristotle
acknowledges that there are a variety of linguistic possibilities dealing with truths and the
means of communicating. These ideas, like so many others contained here, will be bounced
about by later philosophers.
But for now, our discussion is not so much on the words themselves, but word forms and
their definition such as nouns, verbs and the like are of concern here (that is language). Truth
and falsity are derived here by combining words together, which like thoughts have neither
validity nor non-validity in and of themselves, they just are. So this is a step beyond just the
categories, which in and of themselves are neither true nor false but in only context of an
argument, of predication, do they acquire some truth or falsity.
By reducing language down to these simple ideas, Aristotle makes it easier to create the
categories for which Science and we ourselves are so indebted. But is there a down side?
Does this reduce language to a very base and uninteresting phenomena in humans? Not for
Aristotle. Remember, he really wants to understand things and he knows that you can be
distracted when you say things like, but what about different languages and colloquial words
and phrases, etc., etc. Stay on target (Gold Five, Star Wars).
Final Jeopardy
“This is the understanding of what knowledge is.” And the question is “What is
Metaphysics?” Close; how much did you wager? Really the question we are trying to answer
is what knowledge (epistemology) was for Aristotle. Well, we know that it was important to
him; we know that there are types of knowledge (theoretical, practical and productive) but
how did he see the sciences (instruments of thinking) falling into those categories? Well here
are some quick examples:
Metaphysics, physics and mathematics fall under the theoretical knowledge realm, that is
to say their end aim is to provide knowledge that is of the thing itself not of the thinker.
Alternatively, practical knowledge, in which ethics and politics fall, concentrates on action
and it emerges from the doer not in some external reality.
Theoretical knowledge requires the understanding of the principles of and the application
of deductive thinking or Logic, with the capital ‘L’. Basically, how can you discuss/learn
anything unless you have a definition of argumentation?
Practical knowledge is an interesting distinction from productive knowledge, in that these
would seem to be ‘productive’ as anything practical would be productive, right? Not exactly;
think of the root more in terms of ‘practice’ instead of ‘pragmatic’ (which is a whole other
class).
Productive knowledge kind of speaks for itself, but just in case the voice is too quiet I will
boldly speak for it. Think back to Plato’s Ion. How did he see ‘practical’ knowledge? For
Aristotle it was not much different. He classified medicine, construction and the like here, as
Plato might say, ‘the arts’.
Putting It Together
This is a massive discussion, and yet very incomplete. The ideas and notions which lie
behind it press unseen like the water behind a dam. Aristotle cannot really be encapsulated
without some loss, so some reading is required. What we seek here is to understand how
important it was for Aristotle that distinctions be made, and not just arbitrarily, at the time
you want to prove your point but at all times, such that the point remains valid from there on.
Defining and understanding things in relationship to one another gave them distinction but
also kept them in the big picture. As for Plato, knowledge was the goal, and not just
knowledge but right knowledge.
Plato felt reason alone was the means to wisdom. Aristotle really wants to add observation
to the mix. He begins with our sense of wonder and awe of the world around us. This must
count for something. Consequentially, things are knowable in and from themselves (thing
qua thing). Think of it as the perfect is held within them as opposed to some external place.
This is a difference in Epistemology between the two.
“I’m not talking about clams in general; I’m talking about each clam individually. I mean, how
can you have each one generally? Well I guess you could, but it wouldn’t be, like…what I mean.”
Arlo Guthrie, The Story of Reuben Clamzo and His Strange Daughter in the Key of A.
Chapter 17a
CATEGORIES (Chapters 1-6)
1a25
1
a
11
1 a6
1a12
Things are said to be named 'equivocally' when, though they have a
common name, the definition corresponding with the name differs
for each. Thus, a real man and a figure in a picture can both lay
claim to the name 'animal'; yet these are equivocally so named, for,
though they have a common name, the definition corresponding
with the name differs for each. For should any one define in what
sense each is an animal, his definition in the one case will be
appropriate to that case only.
On the other hand, things are said to be named 'univocally' which
have both the name and the definition answering to the name in
common. A man and an ox are both 'animal', and these are
univocally so named, inasmuch as not only the name, but also the
definition, is the same in both cases: for if a man should state in
what sense each is an animal, the statement in the one case would
be identical with that in the other.
Things are said to be named 'derivatively', which derive their name
from some other name, but differ from it in termination. Thus the
grammarian derives his name from the word 'grammar', and the
courageous man from the word 'courage'.
2
1a16
1a20
Forms of speech are either simple or composite. Examples of the
latter are such expressions as 'the man runs', 'the man wins'; of the
former 'man', 'ox', 'runs', 'wins'.
Of things themselves some are predicable of a subject, and are
never present in a subject. Thus 'man' is predicable of the individual
man, and is never present in a subject. By being 'present in a
subject' I do not mean present as parts are present in a whole, but
being incapable of existence apart from the said subject.
Some things, again, are present in a subject, but are never
1b
1b3
predicable of a subject. For instance, a certain point of grammatical
knowledge is present in the mind, but is not predicable of any
subject; or again, a certain whiteness may be present in the body
(for color requires a material basis), yet it is never predicable of
anything.
Other things, again, are both predicable of a subject and present in a
subject. Thus while knowledge is present in the human mind, it is
predicable of grammar.
There is, lastly, a class of things which are neither present in a
subject nor predicable of a subject, such as the individual man or
the individual horse. But, to speak more generally, that which is
individual and has the character of a unit is never predicable of a
subject. Yet in some cases there is nothing to prevent such being
present in a subject. Thus a certain point of grammatical knowledge
is present in a subject.
3
1b10
1b16
1b20
When one thing is predicated of another, all that which is
predicable of the predicate will be predicable also of the subject.
Thus, 'man' is predicated of the individual man; but 'animal' is
predicated of 'man'; it will, therefore, be predicable of the individual
man also: for the individual man is both 'man' and 'animal'.
If genera are different and co-ordinate, their differentiae are
themselves different in kind. Take as an instance the genus 'animal'
and the genus 'knowledge'. 'With feet', 'two-footed', 'winged',
'aquatic', are differentiae of 'animal'; the species of knowledge are
not distinguished by the same differentiae. One species of
knowledge does not differ from another in being 'two-footed'.
But where one genus is subordinate to another, there is nothing to
prevent their having the same differentiae: for the greater class is
predicated of the lesser, so that all the differentiae
of the predicate will be differentiae also of the subject.
4
b
1 25
2 a4
Expressions which are in no way composite signify substance,
quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, action, or
affection. To sketch my meaning roughly, examples of substance
are 'man' or 'the horse', of quantity, such terms as 'two cubits long'
or 'three cubits long', of quality, such attributes as 'white',
'grammatical'. 'Double', 'half', 'greater', fall under the category of
relation; 'in a the market place', 'in the Lyceum', under that of place;
'yesterday', 'last year', under that of time. 'Lying', 'sitting', are terms
indicating position, 'shod', 'armed', state; 'to lance', 'to cauterize',
action; 'to be lanced', 'to be cauterized', affection.
No one of these terms, in and by itself, involves an affirmation; it is
by the combination of such terms that positive or negative
statements arise. For every assertion must, as is admitted, be either
true or false, whereas expressions which are not in any way
composite such as 'man', 'white', 'runs', 'wins', cannot be either true
or false.
2a34
2b
2b7
5
2a11
2a19
2a27
Substance, in the truest and primary and most definite sense of the
word, is that which is neither predicable of a subject nor present in
a subject; for instance, the individual man or horse. But in a
secondary sense those things are called substances within which, as
species, the primary substances are included; also those which, as
genera, include the species. For instance, the individual man is
included in the species 'man', and the genus to which the species
belongs is 'animal'; these, therefore-that is to say, the species 'man'
and the genus 'animal,-are termed secondary substances.
It is plain from what has been said that both the name and the
definition of the predicate must be predicable of the subject. For
instance, 'man' is predicted of the individual man. Now in this case
the name of the species man' is applied to the individual, for we use
the term 'man' in describing the individual; and the definition of
'man' will also be predicated of the individual man, for the
individual man is both man and animal. Thus, both the name and
the definition of the species are predicable of the individual.
With regard, on the other hand, to those things which are present in
a subject, it is generally the case that neither their name nor their
definition is predicable of that in which they are present. Though,
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however, the definition is never predicable, there is nothing in
certain cases to prevent the name being used. For instance, 'white'
being present in a body is predicated of that in which it is present,
for a body is called white: the definition, however, of the color
white' is never predicable of the body.
Everything except primary substances is either predicable of a
primary substance or present in a primary substance. This becomes
evident by reference to particular instances which occur. 'Animal' is
predicated of the species 'man', therefore of the individual man, for
if there were no individual man of whom it could be predicated, it
could not be predicated of the species 'man' at all. Again, color is
present in body, therefore in individual bodies, for if there were no
individual body in which it was present, it could not be present in
body at all. Thus everything except primary substances is either
predicated of primary substances, or is present in them, and if these
last did not exist, it would be impossible for anything else to exist.
Of secondary substances, the species is more truly substance than
the genus, being more nearly related to primary substance. For if
any one should render an account of what a primary substance is, he
would render a more instructive account, and one more proper to
the subject, by stating the species than by stating the genus. Thus,
he would give a more instructive account of an individual man by
stating that he was man than by stating that he was animal, for the
former description is peculiar to the individual in a greater degree,
while the latter is too general. Again, the man who gives an account
of the nature of an individual tree will give a more instructive
account by mentioning the species 'tree' than by mentioning the
genus 'plant'.
Moreover, primary substances are most properly called substances
in virtue of the fact that they are the entities which underlie every.
else, and that everything else is either predicated of them or present
in them. Now the same relation which subsists between primary
substance and everything else subsists also between the species and
the genus: for the species is to the genus as subject is to predicate,
since the genus is predicated of the species, whereas the species
cannot be predicated of the genus. Thus we have a second ground
for asserting that the species is more truly substance than the genus.
Of species themselves, except in the case of such as are genera, no
one is more truly substance than another. We should not give a
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more appropriate account of the individual man by stating the
species to which he belonged, than we should of an individual horse
by adopting the same method of definition. In the same way, of
primary substances, no one is more truly substance than another; an
individual man is not more truly substance than an individual ox.
It is, then, with good reason that of all that remains, when we
exclude primary substances, we concede to species and genera
alone the name 'secondary substance', for these alone of all the
predicates convey a knowledge of primary substance. For it is by
stating the species or the genus that we appropriately define any
individual man; and we shall make our definition more exact by
stating the former than by stating the latter. All other things that we
state, such as that he is white, that he runs, and so on, are irrelevant
to the definition. Thus it is just that these alone, apart from primary
substances, should be called substances.
Further, primary substances are most properly so called, because
they underlie and are the subjects of everything else. Now the same
relation that subsists between primary substance and everything
else subsists also between the species and the genus to which the
primary substance belongs, on the one hand, and every attribute
which is not included within these, on the other. For these are the
subjects of all such. If we call an individual man 'skilled in
grammar', the predicate is applicable also to the species and to the
genus to which he belongs. This law holds good in all cases.
It is a common characteristic of all substance that it is never present
in a subject. For primary substance is neither present in a subject
nor predicated of a subject; while, with regard to secondary
substances, it is clear from the following arguments (apart from
others) that they are not present in a subject. For 'man' is predicated
of the individual man, but is not present in any subject: for
manhood is not present in the individual man. In the same way,
'animal' is also predicated of the individual man, but is not present
in him. Again, when a thing is present in a subject, though the name
may quite well be applied to that in which it is present, the
definition cannot be applied. Yet of secondary substances, not only
the name, but also the definition, applies to the subject: we should
use both the definition of the species and that of the genus with
reference to the individual man. Thus substance cannot be present
in a subject.
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Yet this is not peculiar to substance, for it is also the case that
differentiae cannot be present in subjects. The characteristics
'terrestrial' and 'two-footed' are predicated of the species 'man', but
not present in it. For they are not in man. Moreover, the definition
of the differentia may be predicated of that of which the differentia
itself is predicated. For instance, if the characteristic 'terrestrial' is
predicated of the species 'man', the definition also of that
characteristic may be used to form the predicate of the species
'man': for 'man' is terrestrial.
The fact that the parts of substances appear to be present in the
whole, as in a subject, should not make us apprehensive lest we
should have to admit that such parts are not substances: for in
explaining the phrase 'being present in a subject', we stated' that we
meant 'otherwise than as parts in a whole'.
It is the mark of substances and of differentiae that, in all
propositions of which they form the predicate, they are predicated
univocally. For all such propositions have for their subject either
the individual or the species. It is true that, inasmuch as primary
substance is not predicable of anything, it can never form the
predicate of any proposition. But of secondary substances, the
species is predicated of the individual, the genus both of the species
and of the individual. Similarly the differentiae are predicated of the
species and of the individuals. Moreover, the definition of the
species and that of the genus are applicable to the primary
substance, and that of the genus to the species. For all that is
predicated of the predicate will be predicated also of the subject.
Similarly, the definition of the differentiae will be applicable to the
species and to the individuals. But it was stated above that the word
'univocal' was applied to those things which had both name and
definition in common. It is, therefore, established that in every
proposition, of which either substance or a differentia forms the
predicate, these are predicated univocally.
All substance appears to signify that which is individual. In the case
of primary substance this is indisputably true, for the thing is a unit.
In the case of secondary substances, when we speak, for instance,
of 'man' or 'animal', our form of speech gives the impression that we
are here also indicating that which is individual, but the impression
is not strictly true; for a secondary substance is not an individual,
but a class with a certain qualification; for it is not one and single as
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a primary substance is; the words 'man', 'animal', are predicable of
more than one subject.
Yet species and genus do not merely indicate quality, like the term
'white'; 'white' indicates quality and nothing further, but species and
genus determine the quality with reference to a substance: they
signify substance qualitatively differentiated. The determinate
qualification covers a larger field in the case of the genus that in
that of the species: he who uses the word 'animal' is herein using a
word of wider extension than he who uses the word 'man'.
Another mark of substance is that it has no contrary. What could be
the contrary of any primary substance, such as the individual man
or animal? It has none. Nor can the species or the genus have a
contrary. Yet this characteristic is not peculiar to substance, but is
true of many other things, such as quantity. There is nothing that
forms the contrary of 'two cubits long' or of 'three cubits long', or of
'ten', or of any such term. A man may contend that 'much' is the
contrary of 'little', or 'great' of 'small', but of definite quantitative
terms no contrary exists.
Substance, again, does not appear to admit of variation of degree. I
do not mean by this that one substance cannot be more or less truly
substance than another, for it has already been stated' that this is the
case; but that no single substance admits of varying degrees within
itself. For instance, one particular substance, 'man', cannot be more
or less man either than himself at some other time or than some
other man. One man cannot be more man than another, as that
which is white may be more or less white than some other white
object, or as that which is beautiful may be more or less beautiful
than some other beautiful object. The same quality, moreover, is
said to subsist in a thing in varying degrees at different times. A
body, being white, is said to be whiter at one time than it was
before, or, being warm, is said to be warmer or less warm than at
some other time. But substance is not said to be more or less that
which it is: a man is not more truly a man at one time than he was
before, nor is anything, if it is substance, more or less what it is.
Substance, then, does not admit of variation of degree.
The most distinctive mark of substance appears to be that, while
remaining numerically one and the same, it is capable of admitting
contrary qualities. From among things other than substance, we
should find ourselves unable to bring forward any which possessed
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this mark. Thus, one and the same color cannot be white and black.
Nor can the same one action be good and bad: this law holds good
with everything that is not substance. But one and the selfsame
substance, while retaining its identity, is yet capable of admitting
contrary qualities. The same individual person is at one time white,
at another black, at one time warm, at another cold, at one time
good, at another bad. This capacity is found nowhere else, though it
might be maintained that a statement or opinion was an exception to
the rule. The same statement, it is agreed, can be both true and
false. For if the statement 'he is sitting' is true, yet, when the person
in question has risen, the same statement will be false. The same
applies to opinions. For if anyone thinks truly that a person is
sitting, yet, when that person has risen, this same opinion, if still
held, will be false. Yet although this exception may be allowed,
there is, nevertheless, a difference in the manner in which the thing
takes place. It is by themselves changing that substances admit
contrary qualities. It is thus that that which was hot becomes cold,
for it has entered into a different state. Similarly that which was
white becomes black, and that which was bad good, by a process of
change; and in the same way in all other cases it is by changing that
substances are capable of admitting contrary qualities. But
statements and opinions themselves remain unaltered in all
respects: it is by the alteration in the facts of the case that the
contrary quality comes to be theirs. The statement 'he is sitting'
remains unaltered, but it is at one time true, at another false,
according to circumstances. What has been said of statements
applies also to opinions. Thus, in respect of the manner in which the
thing takes place, it is the peculiar mark of substance that it should
be capable of admitting contrary qualities; for it is by itself
changing that it does so.
If, then, a man should make this exception and contend that
statements and opinions are capable of admitting contrary qualities,
his contention is unsound. For statements and opinions are said to
have this capacity, not because they themselves undergo
modification, but because this modification occurs in the case of
something else. The truth or falsity of a statement depends on facts,
and not on any power on the part of the statement itself of admitting
contrary qualities. In short, there is nothing which can alter the
nature of statements and opinions. As, then, no change takes place
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in themselves, these cannot be said to be capable of admitting
contrary qualities.
But it is by reason of the modification which takes place within the
substance itself that a substance is said to be capable of admitting
contrary qualities; for a substance admits within itself either disease
or health, whiteness or blackness. It is in this sense that it is said to
be capable of admitting contrary qualities.
To sum up, it is a distinctive mark of substance, that, while
remaining numerically one and the same, it is capable of admitting
contrary qualities, the modification taking place through a change
in the substance itself.
Let these remarks suffice on the subject of substance.
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Quantity is either discrete or continuous. Moreover, some quantities
are such that each part of the whole has a relative position to the
other parts: others have within them no such relation of part to part.
Instances of discrete quantities are number and speech; of
continuous, lines, surfaces, solids, and, besides these, timeand
place.
In the case of the parts of a number, there is no common boundary
at which they join. For example: two fives make ten, but the two
fives have no common boundary, but are separate; the parts three
and seven also do not join at any boundary. Nor, to generalize,
would it ever be possible in the case of number that there should be
a common boundary among the parts; they are always separate.
Number, therefore, is a discrete quantity.
The same is true of speech. That speech is a quantity is evident: for
it is measured in long and short syllables. I mean here that speech
which is vocal. Moreover, it is a discrete quantity for its parts have
no common boundary. There is no common boundary at which the
syllables join, but each is separate and distinct from the rest.
A line, on the other hand, is a continuous quantity, for it is possible
to find a common boundary at which its parts join. In the case of the
line, this common boundary is the point; in the case of the plane, it
is the line: for the parts of the plane have also a common boundary.
Similarly you can find a common boundary in the case of the parts
of a solid, namely either a line or a plane.
Space and time also belong to this class of quantities. Time, past,
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present, and future, forms a continuous whole. Space, likewise, is a
continuous quantity; for the parts of a solid occupy a certain space,
and these have a common boundary; it follows that the parts of
space also, which are occupied by the parts of the solid, have the
same common boundary as the parts of the solid. Thus, not only
time, but space also, is a continuous quantity, for its parts have a
common boundary.
Quantities consist either of parts which bear a relative position each
to each, or of parts which do not. The parts of a line bear a relative
position to each other, for each lies somewhere, and it would be
possible to distinguish each, and to state the position of each on the
plane and to explain to what sort of part among the rest each was
contiguous. Similarly the parts of a plane have position, for it could
similarly be stated what was the position of each and what sort of
parts were contiguous. The same is true with regard to the solid and
to space. But it would be impossible to show that the arts of a
number had a relative position each to each, or a particular position,
or to state what parts were contiguous. Nor could this be done in the
case of time, for none of the parts of time has an abiding existence,
and that which does not abide can hardly have position. It would be
better to say that such parts had a relative order, in virtue of one
being prior to another. Similarly with number: in counting, 'one' is
prior to 'two', and 'two' to 'three', and thus the parts of number may
be said to possess a relative order, though it would be impossible to
discover any distinct position for each. This holds good also in the
case of speech. None of its parts has an abiding existence: when
once a syllable is pronounced, it is not possible to retain it, so that,
naturally, as the parts do not abide, they cannot have position. Thus,
some quantities consist of parts which have position, and some of
those which have not.
Strictly speaking, only the things which I have mentioned belong to
the category of quantity: everything else that is called quantitative
is a quantity in a secondary sense. It is because we have in mind
some one of these quantities, properly so called, that we apply
quantitative terms to other things. We speak of what is white as
large, because the surface over which the white extends is large; we
speak of an action or a process as lengthy, because the time covered
is long; these things cannot in their own right claim the quantitative
epithet. For instance, should any one explain how long an action
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was, his statement would be made in terms of the time taken, to the
effect that it lasted a year, or something of that sort. In the same
way, he would explain the size of a white object in terms of surface,
for he would state the area which it covered. Thus the things
already mentioned, and these alone, are in their intrinsic nature
quantities; nothing else can claim the name in its own right, but, if
at all, only in a secondary sense.
Quantities have no contraries. In the case of definite quantities this
is obvious; thus, there is nothing that is the contrary of 'two cubits
long' or of 'three cubits long', or of a surface, or of any such
quantities. A man might, indeed, argue that 'much' was the contrary
of 'little', and 'great' of 'small'. But these are not quantitative, but
relative; things are not great or small absolutely, they are so called
rather as the result of an act of comparison. For instance, a
mountain is called small, a grain large, in virtue of the fact that the
latter is greater than others of its kind, the former less. Thus there is
a reference here to an external standard, for if the terms 'great' and
'small' were used absolutely, a mountain would never be called
small or a grain large. Again, we say that there are many people in a
village, and few in Athens, although those in the city are many
times as numerous as those in the village: or we say that a house
has many in it, and a theatre few, though those in the theatre far
outnumber those in the house. The terms 'two cubits long, “three
cubits long,' and so on indicate quantity, the terms 'great' and 'small'
indicate relation, for they have reference to an external standard. It
is, therefore, plain that these are to be classed as relative.
Again, whether we define them as quantitative or not, they have no
contraries: for how can there be a contrary of an attribute which is
not to be apprehended in or by itself, but only by reference to
something external? Again, if 'great' and 'small' are contraries, it
will come about that the same subject can admit contrary qualities
at one and the same time, and that things will themselves be
contrary to themselves. For it happens at times that the same thing
is both small and great. For the same thing may be small in
comparison with one thing, and great in comparison with another,
so that the same thing comes to be both small and great at one and
the same time, and is of such a nature as to admit contrary qualities
at one and the same moment. Yet it was agreed, when substance
was being discussed, that nothing admits contrary qualities at one
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and the same moment. For though substance is capable of admitting
contrary qualities, yet no one is at the same time both sick and
healthy, nothing is at the same time both white and black. Nor is
there anything which is qualified in contrary ways at one and the
same time.
Moreover, if these were contraries, they would themselves be
contrary to themselves. For if 'great' is the contrary of 'small', and
the same thing is both great and small at the same time, then 'small'
or 'great' is the contrary of itself. But this is impossible. The term
'great', therefore, is not the contrary of the term 'small', nor 'much'
of 'little'. And even though a man should call these terms not
relative but quantitative, they would not have contraries.
It is in the case of space that quantity most plausibly appears to
admit of a contrary. For men define the term 'above' as the contrary
of 'below', when it is the region at the centre they mean by 'below';
and this is so, because nothing is farther from the extremities of the
universe than the region at the centre. Indeed, it seems that in
defining contraries of every kind men have recourse to a spatial
metaphor, for they say that those things are contraries which, within
the same class, are separated by the greatest possible distance.
Quantity does not, it appears, admit of variation of degree. One
thing cannot be two cubits long in a greater degree than another.
Similarly with regard to number: what is 'three' is not more truly
three than what is 'five' is five; nor is one set of three more truly
three than another set. Again, one period of time is not said to be
more truly time than another. Nor is there any other kind of
quantity, of all that have been mentioned, with regard to which
variation of degree can be predicated. The category of quantity,
therefore, does not admit of variation of degree.
The most distinctive mark of quantity is that equality and inequality
are predicated of it. Each of the aforesaid quantities is said to be
equal or unequal. For instance, one solid is said to be equal or
unequal to another; number, too, and time can have these terms
applied to them, indeed can all those kinds of quantity that have
been mentioned.
That which is not a quantity can by no means, it would seem, be
termed equal or unequal to anything else. One particular disposition
or one particular quality, such as whiteness, is by no means
compared with another in terms of equality and inequality but
rather in terms of similarity. Thus it is the distinctive mark of
quantity that it can be called equal and unequal.
Translation by E. M. Edghill
Making Sense Of It All: Categories Thought Sheet
Thought Point
Describe this Lecture
Section
Main Point
(What is he talking about?)
What is a Category?
What are the attributes of
a Category?
What does predicated
mean?
What is Substance?
What are the two types of
Substance?
What is Quantity? Why is
it separate from
Substance?
Points of Thought
Chapter 18
Aristotle’s More Physical Side
Okay we have an overview and a foundation, now let us examine the specifics of his
philosophy, specifically his more earthy side: Physics. Theoretical knowledge itself has
forms and while this subject may seem to be less theoretical than practical, for Aristotle it
still falls within the theoretical realm (never let it be said that if Aristotle thought that if it
was good enough to be categorized, it was not good enough to be sub-categorized). It is
because of the type of thinking involved that Physics falls under the theoretical sciences,
which would seem odd to our ‘modern’ minds except that we cognoscenti understand the
way Aristotle classifies knowledge (see Chapter 16).
More Than Just Good Looks
That said, the depths to which we plunge are still very shallow, after all looks are only
skin deep, right? With that in mind, in this episode let us examine what we might call the
‘hard’ sciences. Physics deals with things which have a separate existence but are changeable
or to put it another way, things which are in and of themselves what they are (regardless of
what I may think about them) but are able to be ‘changed’. The stars are the stars and are
subject to the laws of motion, i.e. they change positions.
To put it one more way, Physical things (nature) are the things that have form (substance)
but do not have within themselves causes or actions, that is, they are acted upon externally.
In the study of physical things, the first level is that of matter and form (define ‘star’). Next
comes the inquiry into movement (‘change’) and finally into the cause of movement (what is
the source of the change/movement). What all this means is that Aristotle will spend time on
the physical attributes of a thing but in order to fully understand it we must also understand
the forces which work upon it. Back again to the stars. Simply put, the motion of heavenly
bodies is part of who they are. If we merely look at the substance and accidents of stars but
do not look at planetary motion and the relationship of that to the star itself our knowledge is
incomplete. Further, if we do not understand the causes of planetary motion we still do not
understand stars and their significance. N’est-il pas?
A Rugged Exterior
So the physical is observable and the observable gives us knowledge. We know that the
categories help us to understand things and how they relate. We understand the idea of
primary and secondary substances as defining aspects of the thing. We understand all these
things, right?
Well, let us just move on anyway. Suffice it to say from all we understand that the thing
itself (not just the individual instances) needs to be kept separate in understanding from the
things which are part of it but are not necessarily the thing itself. That is to say, that while we
are bi-pedal (which is a thing-in-itself) we cannot say human = bi-pedal. We do know that bipedal separates us from quad-pedal dogs even though we are both animals, and therefore
defines us in the animal genus as different from dogs. As a geek aside, that little discussion
used both the substance and the quantity categories to discuss a thing or things. Rolling so
far?
So physics deals with the things which we encounter every day, the things that surround
us and make up our world. These are things which have meaning in and of themselves but
they also help us to understand deeper patterns and concepts. Ultimately Aristotle has a scale
of reality, from matter without form on one end (think: the ether) to form without matter
(think: ideas, similar to Plato’s Forms) at the other. All of these things are observable and
quantifiable in some sense even the theoretical ones. We know the sky exists because we see
the stars move through it. We know ideas exist because we can think them. All of these
things can be understood and not only understood but they allow us through their various
properties to understand other things.
So to state it formally, things have four defining features: an origin, a purpose, a matter
and defining characteristics. A thing's origin is its efficient cause; a thing's purpose is its final
cause; a thing's matter is its material cause; a thing's defining characteristics are its formal
cause.
Ch-Ch-Ch-Ch-Changes
Motion is basically change according to Aristotle. He postulates four types of motion:
substantive (particularly its beginning and its ending), qualitative (changing qualities),
quantitative (increasing and decreasing it), and locomotive (changing its place) and the ideas
of potentiality and actuality get thrown in for good measure. Recall back to our original
discussion (kindly referenced as such) of motion and the idea of something or nothing. We
know that Plato was in the something class (a pluralist) and Aristotle seems to follow in his
footsteps. So, if motion implies something and if motion stops, then the thing stops being
something. Well we just cannot have that, can we? For our man, activity can be thought of as
something even just being itself. Life is in an active state one might say. Couch Potato Alert:
you are what you are (aside from just being a slug) even at rest, because rest itself does not
stop you from being what you are.
So when one asks a question or better, makes a statement like Bono does in Mysterious
Ways, that we should see the boy inside the man, is the man the same as the boy was or has
the boy disappeared and stopped being and been replaced by the man? We can see that the
ideas and words used are intricately linked. Change/Motion/Activity then is more than just a
movement from here to there, i.e. of position but also state: bat to ball, boy to man, egg to
chicken. This idea of remaining the same even in change relies on the substance category we
saw earlier. Static states rely upon and are the result of some activity of the thing. So, the
primary substance defines the thing and secondary substance(s), which might be static, rise
from that.
Mysterious Ways
So just what causes a boy to become a man? This is the final idea physics talks about. In
what may once again seem a contrary notion to our modern ears, when Aristotle fixes
something into its place, he leaves it there. Physics does not imply evolution. The individual
contains the definition within it. There would be no dinosaur-to-bird evolutionary movement
because the bird would already have to be in the dinosaur (or better, be a dinobird); part of its
primary substance or to put it better, due to contraries (remember that from the reading?) it
would have to cease to be in order for the other to be (extinction aside).
Things do not really shift place because Aristotle believes in a hierarchical structure of
nature. Some things are ‘higher’ than others. Humans over animals over sponges over
rocks…you get the idea.
Again, remember way back when our discussion of movement and something or nothing?
We can place Aristotle in the something camp. Aristotle rejects the idea of space being a void
because empty space is simply impossible. In an Einsteinian move he links space, time and
motion together. Space is defined as the limit of the surrounding body towards what is
surrounded, that is, a relationship between bodies defining their limits (we know when a tree
stops being a tree and the bird on the branch starts being a bird). Time is defined as the
measure of motion in regard to before and after, and so depends for its very existence upon
motion (queue Twilight Zone theme).
Simply put, if there were no motion/change, there would be no time. This linking them
together proves them. Since Time is the measuring of motion, it also depends for its
existence on an intellect able to count (something must perceive it) and measure it. If there
were no mind to count, there could be no time (hmm, sounds suspiciously like a Biology and
Psychology segue).
…Don’t Know Much Biology
And so it shall be. Everything has a place and everything in its place (in time). Aristotle
provides in this groundwork the basis for the main idea for his physics: the study of the
hierarchy of being. Also called the scale of being, it is a movement from simplicity to
complexity, with the higher, more complex things being ‘worth more’ than the lower things
(think rocks versus humans). Organizing together into organisms is based on this idea of a
rising scale.
Without going into depth of the how on this subject, suffice it to say the more complex the
organism, the higher on the totem pole, the more ‘valuable’; hence humans, the animal that
thinks, which have a rational soul, is at the top.
Still, Aristotle struggles with classification. He knows that a single difference (differentia)
is insufficient to distinguish things, yet he really does not give hard and fast rules for
deciding which differences qualify. Again he turns to levels of general divisions and that (as
we can still see today) is fairly sufficient.
Put simply, Biology is the classification of the world around us. We divide and understand
things within this framework. Ultimately we understand, in his vein of contraries, what we
are by what we are not. For obvious reasons the Body rests here. The basic concepts of Being
and not-Being fall under this topic (people = being, rocks = !being so we do not study rocks
in Biology) but not at the level that we will discuss in the next section.
As a single aside, he also appears to be the first to realize that there are sea mammals, i.e.
that dolphins are mammals not fish.
A Heart Of Gold
Psychology is the classification of the world within us. The Soul rests here. The focus of
the study here is different than the study which will take place at other times. The focus here
is on the human. There really is not a psychology of non-humans (or rocks). The ‘soul’
within the contraries (i.e. not-humans) is of a different nature than that of humans, due to the
complexity of the human organism and therefore its height on the scale. Living or life or the
animating principle or the Soul (anima is most often translated ‘soul’) is the principle which
gives internal organization to the higher or organic items on the scale of being. That is to say,
the life-force of any animate object is part of the level of the organism.
Plants are the lowest forms of life on the scale, and their souls contain a nutritive element
by which it preserves itself. Animals are above plants on the scale, and their souls contain an
appetitive feature which allows them to have sensations, desires, and thus gives them the
ability to move (hmmmm Philosophy Action: stroke chin pensively). Finally, at the top, the
human soul shares the nutritive element with plants, and the appetitive element with animals,
but also has a rational element.
There really is no dichotomy between body and soul. They are distinguished but not
separate. The soul is the animating principle of the body, and the organization of the body
involves the soul. One cannot exist without the other.
Putting It Together
Metaphysics was the First Philosophy to Aristotle but he also recognized it was not the
only one. The physical had its understanding within the Metaphysical, because it is
understood by the Soul. Only by understanding these physical things first could we come to
understand the world around us and our place within it. Still, in opposition to Plato, you did
not have to leave the world to understand its forms and to be led to an understanding of the
metaphysical. There was no need to posit a Form when everything has within it its form, its
motion and its cause.
Relationships are what Aristotle is talking about. Everything is in relationship to
something else, whether it be in time, space or complexity. But even the complex things are
based on the simpler things and it is the relationship of those simpler things in the complex
which help us to understand them. Certainly we categorize and organize things based on
traits but that does not mean they are not dependent on each other, or in any way separate.
The reason to make distinct species or distinguish between things is to enable the
understanding of all things and ultimately ourselves.
PHILOSOPHICAL MOMENT: Do Aristotle’s idea of Substance and Leibniz’s idea of
Identity of Indiscernibles (from Chapter 1) correlate?
Chapter 19
Aristotle’s (Meta) Physical Side
We know he likes kids and long walks along on the Mediterranean but what kind of
puppies are his favorite? Not the other side we had in mind. Aristotle’s Metaphysics is as I
stated early on, about things that we would consider ‘beyond the physical’. But I also have a
confession to make. The original reason that it was called Metaphysics is that an early editor
placed these lecture notes after the ones on Physics; hence he called them meta-Physics. Not
as sexy, I know, so we will cling in ignorant bliss to our earlier understanding.
Still if we know an object, as Aristotle professed in Physics (Bk 1) by understanding its
substance, the ‘first principles’ and its ‘simplest elements’ what can we know about the
ineffable?
Accentuate The Positive
Oddly enough, the ineffable is not so ineffable. Cause is the differentia. If physical things
do not have within themselves their cause, then alternatively (contrarily) what are the things
which do have their cause within them and are not subject to change (as a single word on the
subject, mathematics studies objects that although not subject to change are nevertheless not
separate from matter)? In physics we study the thing through its substance/principles and its
change/cause; in metaphysics we study causes and principles, knowable through its being.
Again, in an observable world, first principles and causes are knowable.
What do we know? Let us approach this muddled beginning from another angle. For
Aristotle, Knowledge consists of particular truths that we learn through experience and the
general truths of art and science (observation). Wisdom on the other hand consists in
understanding the most general truths of all, which are the fundamental principles and causes
that govern everything. Remember, in Aristotle’s thought, Philosophy provides the deepest
understanding of the world and of all the other things by pursuing the sense of wonder and
awe we feel toward reality (our reason to even pursue knowledge). This is why Metaphysics
is the first science/philosophy, because in this hierarchical world it is the ultimate one.
As with all things, according to Aristotle, we start with what we know and move to what
we do not yet know. Similar to the four defining features discussed earlier (Chapter 18) there
are four kinds of cause (or kinds of explanation if you will): the efficient cause, which
explains the process by which it came into being; the material cause, which explains what a
thing is made of; the formal cause, which explains the form a thing assumes; and the final
cause, which explains the end or purpose it serves. Aristotle acknowledges (dialectically) that
Plato's Theory of Forms gives a viable accounting of the formal cause, but it fails to prove
that Forms exist and to explain how objects in the physical world participate in said Forms.
From The Beginning
So Aristotle wants to understand not just the thing, but the thing qua other thing (thing
understood by other thing). Plato would seem to argue that knowing the Form is sufficient.
But Aristotle wants more. The problem is how to get there. Metaphysics he tells us concerns
itself with the loftier thoughts and questions we have (wisdom, theology, and the like). How
do we begin to talk about them? Aristotle introduces us to the principle of non-contradiction.
Think back to some of our earlier discussions. “…the same attribute cannot at the same time
belong and not belong to the same subject and in the same respect” (Metaphysics 1005b19).
Things cannot both be and not be present in or defining of the subject they are part of at the
same time. Anti-matter and Matter cannot both be present in the essential make-up
(form/substance) of the universe (though to wander, both can be together as secondary
substances).
This understanding, Aristotle says, is the most primary and known of all principles, and it
is not just a hypothesis. It cannot, however, be proved, since it is used implicitly in all proofs,
no matter what the subject matter. It is a first principle, and as we know is not derived from
anything more basic. Aristotle performs a kind of George Jetson treadmill cry “Jane, stop
this crazy thing!” saying that we have to start somewhere, or else we keep running into a
Chicken and the Egg circular argument. This truth, that something cannot both have and not
have an attribute is a foundational statement, one we can and must, according to Aristotle,
take for granted; I think he dares us to deny it.
If you have noticed, we have returned to the idea of Substance (and you thought we read
that just for fun!) yet we are touching on the idea of the eternal, the Prime Mover/Cause or
the Unmoved Mover as well. God must exist because the idea of an infinite causal series is
absurd, and thus there must be a first cause which is not itself caused.
Mind Games
The idea of knowledge as we said is different than wisdom. The eternal things, which we
study here are only studied by humans. We can understand how a clam is put together or that
whales and dogs are mammals but what understanding do we gain from that.
Humans are different than every other being in the universe. Our sense of wonder and awe
causes us to ask the deeper questions, to seek something other than just the bare minimum
level of existence. We desire more than just sustenance and, procreation.
Why is this so? What is it about our mind which sets us apart from the minds of animals?
How do we come to know? Is the sensible world sufficient to tell us everything we know? I
can know a rock or a table as a rock or a table because its sensible (observable) properties
help me to not only identify it as such be even identify it to you by the mere action of
pointing. We on the other hand are defined by something more, we are in a sense responsible
for our own definition. We eat food, drink liquids but do not become those things. Unlike a
wet rock the water we drink becomes part of us. Our true nature is eternal and unchangeable.
So in terms of our last section, Metaphysics is the study of the One Substance (and its
Properties) which exists and causes all things, and is therefore the necessary foundation for
all human knowledge.
Knowledge is the key. Those that know the first principles, i.e. acquire wisdom, are wise
because they know the why of things, unlike those who only know that things are a certain
way based on their memory and sensations. Thus Aristotle's ideas are very important, for
within them are the clues to the solution of this most profound of all problems, 'what exists',
and thus what it means to be 'human'.
Soul Man
Aristotle was a soul man. He tells us that while metaphysics is the first science, the study
of the soul is the primary first science. The soul was the reason for the body. Sure we looked
at it in Psychology, because it is so bound to the body, but its realm of study of its nature is
here (actually it is not in this work but in the work De Anima and we tend to think of it as a
metaphysical subject so I lump it here). Substance and essence become closely identified in
Aristotle’s thought. Being, and the animating force which powers it, in this case is still called
substance but is more like be-ing. What he is really saying is that in the category of
substance, regardless of the study (physics or metaphysics), the thing is what the thing is
(thing qua being). The Soul defines the Body and asking if they are separate is as, Aristotle
says, like asking “whether the wax and the shape given it by the stamp are one…” However,
the soul does survive the body, at least “parts of it” do.
As to how and where, well there is some discussion on that. This author falls into the
camp that this is in relationship to the Prime Mover, per our earlier section discussions (and
some of Aristotle’s later). It is something from which we are separate (else we would be that
thing) and yet we participate within it via our soul, our mind and wisdom.
Being There
So now for a moment let us wander through this garden. The basic understanding of
categories and substance help us to arrive at the understanding or wisdom which helps us to
understand ourselves in terms of two things: the observable substances and the principle
substances. These two boundaries (in the simplest of terms) help us to understand our being.
Still, there are many forms of being and Aristotle explores them. Separability and 'this-ness'
are fundamental to our concept of substance. Our individuality relies on these concepts.
Along these lines Aristotle distinguishes within the human mind the active and passive
intellects. Aristotle says that the passive intellect receives the intelligible forms of things, but
that the active intellect is required to make the potential knowledge into actual knowledge, in
the same way that light makes potential colors into actual colors.
As part of all this discussion and because there could be objections to his teachings,
Aristotle also explores the idea Potentiality verses Actuality or you might say Actual (visible)
to Potential (unseen). As we have discussed there are fundamental questions about how we
know something is something, of potential possible and potential probable. Will a rock
always remain a rock? Is a boy a man? Does God or gods exist? Are there hidden and plain
natures?
Being is an action. Hence our words for life are active. Could you argue though that
someone sleeping is not truly alive? Do the things which define and explain a thing all have
to be present and active in order for the thing to be the thing? This is where the singular view
of Aristotle must be kept in mind. Nothing can be pigeon-holed, except that that pigeon-hole
is part of a cote. Though we categorize we categorize to separate for understanding, not for
isolation.
We derive such terms as kinetic energy from the Greek word Aristotle uses to define
cause within the thing (kinêsis). Cause within the thing is probably best re-worded as the
ability within the thing to change. We even tend to think of it that way. For instance a yo-yo
has potential or kinetic energy stored within it and we attribute its return up the string to that
internal force. Of course, we also use the other word he uses for actuality – energeia. So if
irony were not dead then the term kinetic energy could be used to describe the whole of
Aristotle’s thought on the subject.
Actuality is to potentiality, Aristotle tells us, as “someone waking is to someone sleeping,
as someone seeing is to a sighted person with his eyes closed, as that which has been shaped
out of some matter is to the matter from which it has been shaped”. (M 1048b) What does
this mean? Ultimately and for our purposes, it means that the thing remains itself regardless
of the state it finds itself. This is true of the ineffable as much as it is of the observed.
Putting It Together
There is a great struggle within this section. Besides the obvious struggle to put complex
works and ideas into some order, there is the challenge to follow Aristotle down some roads
we may or may not be willing to take. For Aristotle, Metaphysics is the ultimate goal of
thought and learning. With echoes of Plato ringing in our heads, knowledge in and of itself
has only wisdom as its end and is not an end in itself.
Physical Science is not the final answer. To reduce human thought and spirit down to a
couple of electrodes and hormones/chemical reactions really does injustice to the human
which is only slightly beneath the unmoved mover at the top of the being chain. The whole is
not just the sum of its parts, though without those parts one would not be what one is. How
do we understand/come to understand the distinctions which make us human and
individuals? And past that, where do we fit in the larger universe of being?
There are also many ramifications of this question and its answer which we will cover in
the next and final installment of the Aristotle series. For now, know that there are many
approaches to Aristotle and many aspects of his thought which overlap and the ability to
easily and chaotically shift from one subject to another is ably demonstrated here by this
humble author. Reading his works in order may be the best route, but the Metaphysics can be
daunting because of the sometimes disjointed nature of the notes, most probably redacted
together into the one work. Still, it is a good place to see the overlap of Aristotle’s thought
and how one aspect relies on another.
“The first philosophy (Metaphysics) is universal and is exclusively concerned with primary
substance. ... And here we will have the science to study that which is just as that which is,
both in its essence and in the properties which, just as a thing that is, it has.”
“The entire preoccupation of the physicist is with things that contain within themselves a
principle of movement and rest. And to seek for this is to seek for the second kind of
principle, that from which comes the beginning of the change”. (Aristotle)
What is he trying to say? Is this a good summary of Metaphysics?
Chapter 20
Aristotle’s Fourth Third
Are we worn out on Aristotle yet? I hope not, because if you are it is best to stop this train
and get off now, because honey, this becomes a non-stop to a far destination.
Transportation aside, we actually are close to our destination, but what we have to
remember is that the train of Western Thought is powered by and runs on Plato and Aristotle.
We will never get very far without it. So in this final stop before Grand Central Station, let us
explore some final aspects of Aristotle’s thought which will be the shuttle that carries us to
our hotel.
Logic: Syllogism In A And B Therefore C minor
Come on now, logically, do we really need another section on logic? Well frankly yes. If
Aristotle for all practical purposes defined Western Logic, then we just will not be able to get
enough. What we have spoken of until now is Aristotle’s method for how to think correctly.
In this section we will examine what the act of thinking correctly means and how it is
accomplished. Think of it just like we have looked at the physical/metaphysical, where one is
knowledge and the other wisdom.
Suffice it to say that you should know up front that there have actually been many things
left out of our discussion on Aristotelian Logic. That said, since this may seem like the last
word on the subject, we have discussed that we do see the world in both a priori and a
posteriori ways. Simplistically speaking we can put forth that this is pretty much what
Aristotle would call modal thinking.
These modes of thinking might be thought of as unqualified (deductive) or assertoric and
qualified, with the qualifications being possible and necessary, Again, and I cannot stress this
enough, in the simplest terms, deductive and inductive. We can use arguments but we must
be aware that things are relative to their mode. This does not mean that Aristotle is wishywashy or that relativism creeps into his thought, but more that we can weigh thoughts by
their mode.
The modes can be in the following combinations:
 Two necessary premises
 One necessary and one assertoric premise
 Two possible premises
 One assertoric and one possible premise
 One necessary and one possible premise
So what does this come down too? Well, aside from the oversimplification, it allows for a
bit of inductive reasoning to be part of our deductive reasoning. Just because something is
possible does not automatically mean that it is a legitimate argument, but in an argument we
can apply a certain amount of possible as long as we remember to qualify it. We argue in
many modes, syllogistically, dialectically and demonstratively.
Aristotle often contrasts dialectical arguments with demonstrations. The difference, he
tells us, is in the character of their premises, not in their logical structure: whether an
argument is a syllogism is only a matter of whether its conclusion results of necessity from its
premises. The premises of demonstrations must be true and primary, that is, not only true but
also prior to their conclusions. The premises of dialectical deductions, by contrast, must be
accepted, that is to say the majority of people would accept it as true, or it is commonly held
by the majority.
As one final note on argumentation, Rhetoric is more along the lines of persuasive speech,
kind of the opposite or more precisely the counterpoint of dialectic which Aristotle employs
liberally. It is used similarly because knowing what premises an audience of a given type is
likely to believe, and knowing how to find premises from which the desired conclusion
follows will accomplish the goal of convincing the audience of the point.
Ethics: Andante Ma Non Troppo
We are now good on thinking so now we look to the best end of thinking and we have to
ask “what is virtuous thinking?” In a word: moderation. Well that is too simple of an answer
to let it go at that, right (at least for me, because it would make for a short section as well)?
Ethics for Aristotle, is tied to his understanding of human nature (our being): that
everyone is intent upon the good (which we might call happiness, but only carefully), and
that which is good is good in and of itself. The soul, and specifically the human (rational)
soul, has one end. To that end, the activity of the rational soul guided by virtue is
(hierarchically) the supreme good (“happiness”).
How and when do we gauge happiness? Remember that some part of the soul survives
death. So we examine happiness or goodness of both the living and the dead. When talking
about happiness, we have to consider a person's life as a whole, not just brief moments of it.
This raises the paradoxical idea that a person can then only be considered happy after their
death, that is, once we can examine the person's life as a whole.
We know from Socrates and Plato that good person will always behave in a virtuous
manner. Aristotle feels the same way, but carries it even further: even when faced with great
misfortune, a good person will bear themselves well and will not descend into meanspiritedness. What we might call the human spirit displays itself and we call it virtuous.
Therefore some amount of happiness must be applied to a person during life.
But can we still be happy after death? Yes, but it probably will be based on your life
because once you are dead the accolades or derisions placed upon you or the actions of your
children can only have minimum effect.
We know that Plato and Socrates saw knowledge as virtue, and knowing oneself as
probably the greatest of virtues. Aristotle as we have seen likes to tie the Forms of Plato to
the reality of everyday life, so virtue is found all around us. Things have an end. Virtues are
really the middle ground between positive and negative traits. If we set up a contraries square
of opposition, we always find that what lies in the crossroads is a virtue. For example
Courage. Courage is a virtue placed between Rashness and Cowardice. Rashness consists of
too much confidence and not enough fear; Cowardice of too much fear and not enough
confidence. Where the contraries cross, there you have courage. It is the right balance of fear
and confidence.
Ethics, simplistically, consists of grasping the middle ground in a situation. This is not to
say the path of least resistance or even compromise. Middle ground does not mean giving up
but finding the truth, the balance. We only give to name courage to certain actions. We know
those actions to be courageous; other actions we recognize as not courageous or almost
courageous but not as courageous.
Politics: The Art Of The Possible
What is the most practical end of virtuous thinking? Why people living together in
harmony of course. Humans are a political animal, Aristotle informs us. Before we get too
far and people get their thoughts all out of whack, let us look at the term political. It derives
from the word Aristotle uses: polis, meaning city. What he is saying is not that we are
naturally Democrats and Republicans, but that we naturally gravitate together into societal
units, mainly cities and specifically the city-state (like Athens or Sparta).
Nothing we do will take place in a vacuum. Our natural propensity to do good, as hard as
it may be, benefits not only ourselves but everyone else as well.
As a short side note, in an extension of Plato’s Philosopher Kings, Aristotle does actually
defend (like Plato), slavery. This is because there are two kinds of people, thems what need
to be led and thems what do the leading (well really more like those that lead and those that
keep the state running). But he does differ as well. For Aristotle, slavery is not a natural
condition. That is to say, for example, persons born of slaves are not automatically slaves nor
are those conquered in battle. It is an individual assessment, based more on the person than
on their genetics or situation. This radical departure, though it may not seem so to us, means
that though one may find one’s self in slavery, one is not always destined to be a slave,
unless, that is your nature (although we might recall the story Socrates relates back in
Chapter N).
This innate right to human dignity (non-slavery) make sense in Aristotle’s system. If it is
the nature of each individual to seek the good (and to think otherwise just makes no sense
according to Aristotle), then it is the responsibility of the state (polis) to see that each
individual is able to achieve that goal. Almost ironically Aristotle holds that only as a
collective can each of us fulfill our full potential for “happiness”.
There are many types of political systems and Aristotle does disagree with Plato (and
most Americans) on the subject of which is best. When a single person rules, a system is a
monarchy if the ruler is good and a tyranny if the ruler is bad. When a small elite rules, a
system is an aristocracy if the rulers are good and an oligarchy if the rulers are bad. When the
masses rule, a system is a polity if they rule well and a democracy if they rule badly.
Aristotle does not fail to discuss the tension between individual liberty and the demands of
the state. The idea of a private life would seem absurd in a Greek city-state. All the highest
aims in life, from political debate to physical exercise, take place in and for the public sphere,
and there is no conception of a “private persona,” which would be different from the face
people present in public. Consequently, the interests of the individual and the interests of the
state are equivalent in Aristotle's view. We can see the echoes of this in his Ethics.
Putting It Together
Aristotle is a multi-faceted thinker. From just our short reading earlier we can see the
immense amount of thinking which must have gone into each work before the work was even
produced. Now multiply that by all the other works and we see a very impressive intellect at
work.
Still, it is based in some fairly simple ideas, which rely upon each other and are
interwoven within the whole of his thought. This is true of his thought and his thoughts on
human interaction and purpose. Friendship is so important to Aristotle that he devotes whole
sections of his work to the types, meaning and ramification of this relationship. Like his
thoughts on physical relationships between substances, our interactions start at the smallest
level and progress toward the whole of humanity. Small to big, lower to higher, what we
know to what we do not know, what we can perceive to what we cannot perceive everything
is in relation. Not a relation of relativistic nature but one of inter-dependence.
Keeping this in mind will keep us from falling into a trap of segmenting his thought into
separate boxes, creating a relativistic justification based on his thought
“Let me ‘splain…No, there is too much. Let me sum up.” Inigo Montoya – The Princess
Bride
Chapter 20a
Nicomachean Ethics
1
BOOK I
[2]
[3]
[4]
[6]
Every art and every investigation, and likewise every practical
pursuit or undertaking, seems to aim at some good: hence it has
been well said that the Good is That at which all things aim (It is
true that a certain variety is to be observed among the ends at which
the arts and sciences aim: in some cases the activity of practicing
the art is itself the end, whereas in others the end is some product
over and above the mere exercise of the art; and in the arts whose
ends are certain things beside the practice of the arts themselves,
these products are essentially superior in value to the activities).
But as there are numerous pursuits and arts and sciences, it follows
that their ends are correspondingly numerous: for instance, the end
of the science of medicine is health, that of the art of shipbuilding a
vessel, that of strategy victory, that of domestic economy wealth.
Now in cases where several such pursuits are subordinate to some
single faculty—as bridle-making and the other trades concerned
with horses' harness are subordinate to horsemanship, and this and
every other military pursuit to the science of strategy, and similarly
other arts to different arts again—in all these cases, I say, the ends
of the master arts are things more to be desired than the ends of the
arts subordinate to them; since the latter ends are only pursued for
the sake of the former (And it makes no difference whether the ends
of the pursuits are the activities themselves or some other thing
beside these, as in the case of the sciences mentioned.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
2
If therefore among the ends at which our actions aim there be one
which we will for its own sake, while we will the others only for the
sake of this, and if we do not choose everything for the sake of
something else (which would obviously result in a process ad
infinitum, so that all desire would be futile and vain), it is clear that
this one ultimate End must be the Good, and indeed the Supreme
Good. Will not then a knowledge of this Supreme Good be also of
great practical importance for the conduct of life? Will it not better
enable us to attain our proper object, like archers having a target to
aim at? If this be so, we ought to make an attempt to determine at
all events in outline what exactly this Supreme Good is, and of
which of the sciences or faculties it is the object.
Now it would seem that this supreme End must be the object of the
most authoritative of the sciences—some science which is preeminently a master-craft. But such is manifestly the science of
Politics; for it is this that ordains which of the sciences are to exist
in states, and what branches of knowledge the different classes of
the citizens are to learn, and up to what point; and we observe that
even the most highly esteemed of the faculties, such as strategy,
domestic economy, oratory, are subordinate to the political science.
Inasmuch then as the rest of the sciences are employed by this one,
and as it moreover lays down laws as to what people shall do and
what things they shall refrain from doing, the end of this science
must include the ends of all the others. Therefore, the Good of man
must be the end of the science of Politics. For even though it be the
case that the Good is the same for the individual and for the state,
nevertheless, the good of the state is manifestly a greater and more
perfect good, both to attain and to preserve. To secure the good of
one person only is better than nothing; but to secure the good of a
nation or a state is a nobler and more divine achievement.
This then being its aim, our investigation is in a sense the study of
Politics.
3
[2]
Now our treatment of this science will be adequate, if it achieves
that amount of precision which belongs to its subject matter. The
same exactness must not be expected in all departments of
philosophy alike, any more than in all the products of the arts and
crafts. The subjects studied by political science are Moral Nobility
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
and Justice; but these conceptions involve much difference of
opinion and uncertainty, so that they are sometimes believed to be
mere conventions and to have no real existence in the nature of
things. And a similar uncertainty surrounds the conception of the
Good, because it frequently occurs that good things have harmful
consequences: people have before now been ruined by wealth, and
in other cases courage has cost men their lives. We must therefore
be content if, in dealing with subjects and starting from premises
thus uncertain, we succeed in presenting a broad outline of the
truth: when our subjects and our premises are merely generalities, it
is enough if we arrive at generally valid conclusions. Accordingly
we may ask the student also to accept the various views we put
forward in the same spirit; for it is the mark of an educated mind to
expect that amount of exactness in each kind which the nature of
the particular subject admits. It is equally unreasonable to accept
merely probable conclusions from a mathematician and to demand
strict demonstration from an orator.
Again, each man judges correctly those matters with which he is
acquainted; it is of these that he is a competent critic. To criticize a
particular subject, therefore, a man must have been trained in that
subject: to be a good critic generally, he must have had an all-round
education. Hence the young are not fit to be students of Political
Science. For they have no experience of life and conduct, and it is
these that supply the premises and subject matter of this branch of
philosophy. And moreover they are led by their feelings; so that
they will study the subject to no purpose or advantage, since the end
of this science is not knowledge but action. And it makes no
difference whether they are young in years or immature in
character: the defect is not a question of time, it is because their life
and its various aims are guided by feeling; for to such persons their
knowledge is of no use, any more than it is to persons of defective
self-restraint. But Moral Science may be of great value to those who
guide their desires and actions by principle.
Let so much suffice by way of introduction as to the student of the
subject, the spirit in which our conclusions are to be received, and
the object that we set before us.
4
To resume, inasmuch as all studies and undertakings are directed to
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
the attainment of some good, let us discuss what it is that we
pronounce to be the aim of Politics, that is, what is the highest of all
the goods that action can achieve. As far as the name goes, we may
almost say that the great majority of mankind are agreed about this;
for both the multitude and persons of refinement speak of it as
Happiness, and conceive ‘the good life’ or ‘doing well’ to be the
same thing as ‘being happy.’ But what constitutes happiness is a
matter of dispute; and the popular account of it is not the same as
that given by the philosophers. Ordinary people identify it with
some obvious and visible good, such as pleasure or wealth or
honor—some say one thing and some another, indeed very often the
same man says different things at different times: when he falls sick
he thinks health is happiness, when he is poor, wealth. At other
times, feeling conscious of their own ignorance, men admire those
who propound something grand and above their heads; and it has
been held by some thinkers that beside the many good things we
have mentioned, there exists another Good, that is good in itself,
and stands to all those goods as the cause of their being good.
Now perhaps it would be a somewhat fruitless task to review all the
different opinions that are held. It will suffice to examine those that
are most widely prevalent, or that seem to have some argument in
their favor.
And we must not overlook the distinction between arguments that
start from first principles and those that lead to first principles. It
was a good practice of Plato to raise this question, and to enquire
whether the true procedure is to start from or to lead up to one's first
principles, as in a race-course one may run from the judges to the
far end of the track or the reverse. Now no doubt it is proper to start
from the known. But ‘the known’ has two meanings—‘what is
known to us,’ which is one thing, and ‘what is knowable in itself,’
which is another. Perhaps then for us at all events it proper to start
from what is known to us. This is why in order to be a competent
student of the Right and Just, and in short of the topics of Politics in
general, the pupil is bound to have been well-trained in his habits.
For the starting-point or first principle is the fact that a thing is so;
if this be satisfactorily ascertained, there will be no need also to
know the reason why it is so. And the man of good moral training
knows first principles already, or can easily acquire them. As for
the person who neither knows nor can learn, let him hear the words
of Hesiod:
“Best is the man who can himself advise;
He too is good who hearkens to the wise;
But who, himself being witless, will not heed
Another's wisdom, is a fool indeed.”
[7]
[8]
5
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
But let us continue from the point where we digressed. To judge
from men's lives, the more or less reasoned conceptions of the
Good or Happiness that seem to prevail are the following. On the
one hand the generality of men and the most vulgar identify the
Good with pleasure, and accordingly are content with the Life of
Enjoyment—for there are three specially prominent Lives, the one
just mentioned, the Life of Politics, and thirdly, the Life of
Contemplation. The generality of mankind then show themselves to
be utterly slavish, by preferring what is only a life for cattle; but
they get a hearing for their view as reasonable because many
persons of high position share the feelings of Sardanapallus.
Men of refinement, on the other hand, and men of action think that
the Good is honor—for this may be said to be the end of the Life of
Politics. But honor after all seems too superficial to be the Good for
which we are seeking; since it appears to depend on those who
confer it more than on him upon whom it is conferred, whereas we
instinctively feel that the Good must be something proper to its
possessor and not easy to be taken away from him. Moreover men's
motive in pursuing honor seems to be to assure themselves of their
own merit; at least they seek to be honored by men of judgment and
by people who know them, that is, they desire to be honored on the
ground of virtue. It is clear therefore that in the opinion at all events
of men of action, virtue is a greater good than honor; and one might
perhaps accordingly suppose that virtue rather than honor is the end
of the Political Life. But even virtue proves on examination to be
too incomplete to be the End; since it appears possible to possess it
while you are asleep, or without putting it into practice throughout
the whole of your life; and also for the virtuous man to suffer the
greatest misery and misfortune— though no one would pronounce a
man living a life of misery to be happy, unless for the sake of
maintaining a paradox. But we need not pursue this subject, since it
has been sufficiently treated in the ordinary discussions.
The third type of life is the Life of Contemplation, which we shall
consider in the sequel.
The Life of Money-making is a constrained kind of life, and clearly
wealth is not the Good we are in search of, for it is only good as
being useful, a means to something else. On this score indeed one
might conceive the ends before mentioned to have a better claim,
for they are approved for their own sakes. But even they do not
really seem to be the Supreme Good; however, many arguments
against them have been disseminated, so we may dismiss them.
6
[2]
[3]
[4]
But perhaps it is desirable that we should examine the notion of a
Universal Good, and review the difficulties that it involves,
although such an inquiry goes against the grain because of our
friendship for the authors of the Theory of Ideas. Still perhaps it
would appear desirable, and indeed it would seem to be obligatory,
especially for a philosopher, to sacrifice even one's closest personal
ties in defense of the truth. Both are dear to us, yet 'tis our duty to
prefer the truth.
The originators of this theory, then, used not to postulate Ideas of
groups of things in which they posited an order of priority and
posteriority (for which reason they did not construct an Idea of
numbers in general). But Good is predicated alike in the Categories
of Substance, of Quality, and Relation; yet the Absolute, or
Substance, is prior in nature to the Relative, which seems to be a
sort of offshoot or ‘accident’ of Substance; so that there cannot be a
common Idea corresponding to the absolutely good and the
relatively good.
Again, the word ‘good’ is used in as many senses as the word ‘is’;
for we may predicate good in the Category of Substance, for
instance of God, or intelligence; in that of Quality—the
excellences; in that of Quantity—moderate in amount; in that of
Relation—useful; in that of Time—a favorable opportunity; in that
of Place—a suitable ‘habitat’; and so on. So clearly good cannot be
a single and universal general notion; if it were, it would not be
predicable in all the Categories, but only in one.
Again, things that come under a single Idea must be objects of a
single science; hence there ought to be a single science dealing with
all good things. But as a matter of fact there are a number of
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[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
sciences even for the goods in one Category: for example,
opportunity, for opportunity in war comes under the science of
strategy, in disease under that of medicine; and the due amount in
diet comes under medicine, in bodily exercise under gymnastics.
One might also raise the question what precisely they mean by their
expression the ‘Ideal so and-so,’ seeing that one and the same
definition of man applies both to ‘the Ideal man’ and to ‘man,’ for
in so far as both are man, there will be no difference between them;
and if so, no more will there be any difference between ‘the Ideal
Good’ and ‘Good’ in so far as both are good. Nor yet will the Ideal
Good be any more good because it is eternal, seeing that a white
thing that lasts a long time is no whiter than one that lasts only a
day.
The Pythagoreans seem to give a more probable doctrine on the
subject of the Good when they place Unity in their column of
goods; and indeed Speusippus appears to have followed them. But
this subject must be left for another discussion.
We can descry an objection that may be raised against our
arguments on the ground that the theory in question was not
intended to apply to every sort of good, and that only things
pursued and accepted for their own sake are pronounced good as
belonging to a single species, while things productive or
preservative of these in any way, or preventive of their opposites,
are said to be good as a means to these, and in a different sense.
Clearly then the term ‘goods’ would have two meanings, 1) things
good in themselves and 2) things good as a means to these; let us
then separate things good in themselves from things useful as
means, and consider whether the former are called good because
they fall under a single Idea. But what sort of things is one to class
as good in themselves? Are they not those things which are sought
after even without any accessory advantage, such as wisdom, sight,
and certain pleasures and honors? for even if we also pursue these
things as means to something else, still one would class them
among things good in themselves. Or is there nothing else good in
itself except the Idea? If so, the species will be of no use. If on the
contrary the class of things good in themselves includes these
objects, the same notion of good ought to be manifested in all of
them, just as the same notion of white is manifested in snow and in
white paint. But as a matter of fact the notions of honor and wisdom
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[15]
[16]
7
and pleasure, as being good, are different and distinct. Therefore,
good is not a general term corresponding to a single Idea.
But in what sense then are different things called good? For they do
not seem to be a case of things that bear the same name merely by
chance. Possibly things are called good in virtue of being derived
from one good; or because they all contribute to one good. Or
perhaps it is rather by way of a proportion: that is, as sight is good
in the body, so intelligence is good in the soul, and similarly
another thing in something else.
Perhaps however this question must be dismissed for the present,
since a detailed investigation of it belongs more properly to another
branch of philosophy And likewise with the Idea of the Good; for
even if the goodness predicated of various in common really is a
unity or something existing separately and absolute, it clearly will
not be practicable or attainable by man; but the Good which we are
now seeking is a good within human reach.
But possibly someone may think that to know the Ideal Good may
be desirable as an aid to achieving those goods which are
practicable and attainable: having the Ideal Good as a pattern we
shall more easily know what things are good for us, and knowing
them, obtain them. Now it is true that this argument has a certain
plausibility; but it does not seem to square with the actual procedure
of the sciences. For these all aim at some good, and seek to make
up their deficiencies, but they do not trouble about a knowledge of
the Ideal Good. Yet if it were so potent an aid, it is improbable that
all the professors of the arts and sciences should not know it, nor
even seek to discover it. Moreover, it is not easy to see how
knowing that same Ideal Good will help a weaver or carpenter in
the practice of his own craft, or how anybody will be a better
physician or general for having contemplated the absolute Idea. In
fact it does not appear that the physician studies even health in the
abstract; he studies the health of the human being—or rather of
some particular human being, for it is individuals that he has to
cure.
Let us here conclude our discussion of this subject.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
We may now return to the Good which is the object of our search,
and try to find out what exactly it can be. For good appears to be
one thing in one pursuit or art and another in another: it is different
in medicine from what it is in strategy, and so on with the rest of
the arts. What definition of the Good then will hold true in all the
arts? Perhaps we may define it as that for the sake of which
everything else is done. This applies to something different in each
different art—to health in the case of medicine, to victory in that of
strategy, to a house in architecture, and to something else in each of
the other arts; but in every pursuit or undertaking it describes the
end of that pursuit or undertaking, since in all of them it is for the
sake of the end that everything else is done. Hence if there be
something which is the end of all the things done by human action,
this will be the practicable Good—or if there be several such ends,
the sum of these will be the Good. Thus by changing its ground the
argument has reached the same result as before. We must attempt
however to render this still more precise.
Now there do appear to be several ends at which our actions aim;
but as we choose some of them—for instance wealth, or flutes, and
instruments generally—as a means to something else, it is clear that
not all of them are final ends; whereas the Supreme Good seems to
be something final. Consequently if there be some one thing which
alone is a final end, this thing—or if there be several final ends, the
one among them which is the most final—will be the Good which
we are seeking. In speaking of degrees of finality, we mean that a
thing pursued as an end in itself is more final than one pursued as a
means to something else, and that a thing never chosen as a means
to anything else is more final than things chosen both as ends in
themselves and as means to that thing; and accordingly a thing
chosen always as an end and never as a means we call absolutely
final. Now happiness above all else appears to be absolutely final in
this sense, since we always choose it for its own sake and never as a
means to something else; whereas honor, pleasure, intelligence, and
excellence in its various forms, we choose indeed for their own
sakes (since we should be glad to have each of them although no
extraneous advantage resulted from it), but we also choose them for
the sake of happiness, in the belief that they will be a means to our
securing it. But no one chooses happiness for the sake of honor,
pleasure, etc., nor as a means to anything whatever other than itself.
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[8]
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[10]
[11]
[12]
The same conclusion also appears to follow from a consideration of
the self-sufficiency of happiness—for it is felt that the final good
must be a thing sufficient in itself. The term self-sufficient,
however, we employ with reference not to oneself alone, living a
life of isolation, but also to one's parents and children and wife, and
one's friends and fellow citizens in general, since man is by nature a
social being. On the other hand a limit has to be assumed in these
relationships; for if the list be extended to one's ancestors and
descendants and to the friends of one's friends, it will go on ad
infinitum. But this is a point that must be considered later on; we
take a self-sufficient thing to mean a thing which merely standing
by itself alone renders life desirable lacking in nothing, and such a
thing we deem happiness to be. Moreover, we think happiness the
most desirable of all good things without being itself reckoned as
one among the rest; for if it were so reckoned, it is clear that we
should consider it more desirable when even the smallest of other
good things were combined with it, since this addition would result
in a larger total of good, and of two goods the greater is always the
more desirable.
Happiness, therefore, being found to be something final and selfsufficient, is the End at which all actions aim.
To say however that the Supreme Good is happiness will probably
appear a truism; we still require a more explicit account of what
constitutes happiness. Perhaps then we may arrive at this by
ascertaining what is man's function. For the goodness or efficiency
of a flute-player or sculptor or craftsman of any sort, and in general
of anybody who has some function or business to perform, is
thought to reside in that function; and similarly it may be held that
the good of man resides in the function of man, if he has a function.
Are we then to suppose that, while the carpenter and the shoemaker
have definite functions or businesses belonging to them, man as
such has none, and is not designed by nature to fulfill any function?
Must we not rather assume that, just as the eye, the hand, the foot
and each of the various members of the body manifestly has a
certain function of its own, so a human being also has a certain
function over and above all the functions of his particular
members? What then precisely can this function be? The mere act
of living appears to be shared even by plants, whereas we are
looking for the function peculiar to man; we must therefore set
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[18]
aside the vital activity of nutrition and growth. Next in the scale
will come some form of sentient life; but this too appears to be
shared by horses, oxen, and animals generally. There remains
therefore what may be called the practical life of the rational part of
man. (This part has two divisions, one rational as obedient to
principle, the others possessing principle and exercising
intelligence). Rational life again has two meanings; let us assume
that we are here concerned with the active exercise of the rational
faculty, since this seems to be the more proper sense of the term. If
then the function of man is the active exercise of the soul's faculties
in conformity with rational principle, or at all events not in
dissociation from rational principle, and if we acknowledge the
function of an individual and of a good individual of the same class
(for instance, a harper and a good harper, and so generally with all
classes) to be generically the same, the qualification of the latter's
superiority in excellence being added to the function in his case (I
mean that if the function of a harper is to play the harp, that of a
good harper is to play the harp well): if this is so, and if we declare
that the function of man is a certain form of life, and define that
form of life as the exercise of the soul's faculties and activities in
association with rational principle, and say that the function of a
good man is to perform these activities well and rightly, and if a
function is well performed when it is performed in accordance with
its own proper excellence—from these premises it follows that the
Good of man is the active exercise of his soul's faculties in
conformity with excellence or virtue, or if there be several human
excellences or virtues, in conformity with the best and most perfect
among them. Moreover, to be happy takes a complete lifetime; for
one swallow does not make spring, nor does one fine day; and
similarly one day or a brief period of happiness does not make a
man supremely blessed and happy.
Let this account then serve to describe the Good in outline—for no
doubt the proper procedure is to begin by making a rough sketch,
and to fill it in afterwards. If a work has been well laid down in
outline, to carry it on and complete it in detail may be supposed to
be within the capacity of anybody; and in this working out of
details Time seems to be a good inventor or at all events coadjutor.
This indeed is how advances in the arts have actually come about,
since anyone can fill in the gaps. Also the warning given above
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1
[2]
[3]
must not be forgotten; we must not look for equal exactness in all
departments of study, but only such as belongs to the subject matter
of each, and in such a degree as is appropriate to the particular line
of enquiry. A carpenter and a geometrician both try to find a right
angle, but in different ways; the former is content with that
approximation to it which satisfies the purpose of his work; the
latter, being a student of truth, seeks to find its essence or essential
attributes. We should therefore proceed in the same manner in other
subjects also, and not allow side issues to outbalance the main task
in hand.
Nor again must we in all matters alike demand an explanation of
the reason why things are what they are; in some cases it is enough
if the fact that they are so is satisfactorily established. This is the
case with first principles; and the fact is the primary thing—it is a
first principle. And principles are studied—some by induction,
others by perception, others by some form of habituation, and also
others otherwise; so we must endeavor to arrive at the principles of
each kind in their natural manner, and must also be careful to define
them correctly, since they are of great importance for the
subsequent course of the enquiry. The beginning is admittedly more
than half of the whole, and throws light at once on many of the
questions under investigation.
BOOK II
Virtue being, as we have seen, of two kinds, intellectual and moral,
intellectual virtue is for the most part both produced and increased
by instruction, and therefore requires experience and time; whereas
moral or ethical virtue is the product of habit （ethos）, and has
indeed derived its name, with a slight variation of form, from that
word. And therefore it is clear that none of the moral virtues formed
is engendered in us by nature, for no natural property can be altered
by habit. For instance, it is the nature of a stone to move
downwards, and it cannot be trained to move upwards, even though
you should try to train it to do so by throwing it up into the air ten
thousand times; nor can fire be trained to move downwards, nor can
anything else that naturally behaves in one way be trained into a
habit of behaving in another way. The virtues therefore are
engendered in us neither by nature nor yet in violation of nature;
nature gives us the capacity to receive them, and this capacity is
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[8]
brought to maturity by habit.
Moreover, the faculties given us by nature are bestowed on us first
in a potential form; we exhibit their actual exercise afterwards. This
is clearly so with our senses: we did not acquire the faculty of sight
or hearing by repeatedly seeing or repeatedly listening, but the other
way about—because we had the senses we began to use them, we
did not get them by using them. The virtues on the other hand we
acquire by first having actually practiced them, just as we do the
arts. We learn an art or craft by doing the things that we shall have
to do when we have learnt it: for instance, men become builders by
building houses, harpers by playing on the harp. Similarly we
become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts,
brave by doing brave acts. This truth is attested by the experience of
states: lawgivers make the citizens good by training them in habits
of right action—this is the aim of all legislation, and if it fails to do
this it is a failure; this is what distinguishes a good form of
constitution from a bad one. Again, the actions from or through
which any virtue is produced are the same as those through which it
also is destroyed—just as is the case with skill in the arts, for both
the good harpers and the bad ones are produced by harping, and
similarly with builders and all the other craftsmen: as you will
become a good builder from building well, so you will become a
bad one from building badly. Were this not so, there would be no
need for teachers of the arts, but everybody would be born a good
or bad craftsman as the case might be. The same then is true of the
virtues. It is by taking part in transactions with our fellow-men that
some of us become just and others unjust; by acting in dangerous
situations and forming a habit of fear or of confidence we become
courageous or cowardly. And the same holds good of our
dispositions with regard to the appetites, and anger; some men
become temperate and gentle, others profligate and irascible, by
actually comporting themselves in one way or the other in relation
to those passions. In a word, our moral dispositions are formed as a
result of the corresponding activities. Hence it is incumbent on us to
control the character of our activities, since on the quality of these
depends the quality of our dispositions. It is therefore not of small
moment whether we are trained from childhood in one set of habits
or another; on the contrary it is of very great, or rather of supreme,
importance.
2
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[4]
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As then our present study, unlike the other branches of philosophy,
has a practical aim (for we are not investigating the nature of virtue
for the sake of knowing what it is, but in order that we may become
good, without which result our investigation would be of no use),
we have consequently to carry our enquiry into the region of
conduct, and to ask how we are to act rightly; since our actions, as
we have said, determine the quality of our dispositions.
Now the formula ‘to act in conformity with right principle’ is
common ground, and may be assumed as the basis of our
discussion. (We shall speak about this formula later, and consider
both the definition of right principle and its relation to the other
virtues.)
But let it be granted to begin with that the whole theory of conduct
is bound to be an outline only and not an exact system, in
accordance with the rule we laid down at the beginning, that
philosophical theories must only be required to correspond to their
subject matter; and matters of conduct and expediency have nothing
fixed or invariable about them, any more than have matters of
health. And if this is true of the general theory of ethics, still less is
exact precision possible in dealing with particular cases of conduct;
for these come under no science or professional tradition, but the
agents themselves have to consider what is suited to the
circumstances on each occasion, just as is the case with the art of
medicine or of navigation. But although the discussion now
proceeding is thus necessarily inexact, we must do our best to help
it out.
First of all then we have to observe, that moral qualities are so
constituted as to be destroyed by excess and by deficiency—as we
see is the case with bodily strength and health (for one is forced to
explain what is invisible by means of visible illustrations). Strength
is destroyed both by excessive and by deficient exercises, and
similarly health is destroyed both by too much and by too little food
and drink; while they are produced, increased and preserved by
suitable quantities. The same therefore is true of Temperance,
Courage, and the other virtues. The man who runs away from
everything in fear and never endures anything becomes a coward;
the man who fears nothing whatsoever but encounters everything
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[9]
becomes rash. Similarly he that indulges in every pleasure and
refrains from none turns out a profligate, and he that shuns all
pleasure, as boorish persons do, becomes what may be called
insensible. Thus Temperance and Courage are destroyed by excess
and deficiency, and preserved by the observance of the mean.
But not only are the virtues both generated and fostered on the one
hand, and destroyed on the other, from and by the same actions, but
they will also find their full exercise in the same actions. This is
clearly the case with the other more visible qualities, such as bodily
strength: for strength is produced by taking much food and
undergoing much exertion, while also it is the strong man who will
be able to eat most food and endure most exertion. The same holds
good with the virtues. We become temperate by abstaining from
pleasures, and at the same time we are best able to abstain from
pleasures when we have become temperate. And so with Courage:
we become brave by training ourselves to despise and endure
terrors, and we shall be best able to endure terrors when we have
become brave.
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3
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An index of our dispositions is afforded by the pleasure or pain that
accompanies our actions. A man is temperate if he abstains from
bodily pleasures and finds this abstinence itself enjoyable,
profligate if he feels it irksome; he is brave if he faces danger with
pleasure or at all events without pain, cowardly if he does so with
pain.
In fact pleasures and pains are the things with which moral virtue is
concerned.
For 1) pleasure causes us to do base actions and pain causes us to
abstain from doing noble actions. Hence the importance, as Plato
points out, of having been definitely trained from childhood to like
and dislike the proper things; this is what good education means.
2) Again, if the virtues have to do with actions and feelings, and
every action is attended with pleasure or pain, this too shows that
virtue has to do with pleasure and pain.
3) Another indication is the fact that pain is the medium of
punishment; for punishment is a sort of medicine, and the nature of
medicine to work by means of opposites.
4) Again, as we said before, every formed disposition of the soul
[8]
[9]
[10]
realizes its full nature in relation to and in dealing with that class of
objects by which it is its nature to be corrupted or improved. But
men are corrupted through pleasures and pains, that is, either by
pursuing and avoiding the wrong pleasures and pains, or by
pursuing and avoiding them at the wrong time, or in the wrong
manner, or in one of the other wrong ways under which errors of
conduct can be logically classified. This is why some thinkers
define the virtues as states of impassivity or tranquility, though they
make a mistake in using these terms absolutely, without adding ‘in
the right (or wrong) manner’ and ‘at the right (or wrong) time’ and
the other qualifications.
We assume therefore that moral virtue is the quality of acting in the
best way in relation to pleasures and pains, and that vice is the
opposite.
But the following considerations also will give us further light on
the same point.
5) There are three things that are the motives of choice and three
that are the motives of avoidance; namely, the noble, the expedient,
and the pleasant, and their opposites, the base, the harmful, and the
painful. Now in respect of all these the good man is likely to go
right and the bad to go wrong, but especially in respect of pleasure;
for pleasure is common to man with the lower animals, and also it
is a concomitant of all the objects of choice, since both the noble
and the expedient appear to us pleasant.
6) Again, the susceptibility to pleasure has grown up with all of us
from the cradle. Hence this feeling is hard to eradicate, being
engrained in the fabric of our lives.
7) Again, pleasure and pain are also1 the standards by which we all,
in a greater or less degree, regulate our actions. On this account
therefore pleasure and pain are necessarily our main concern, since
to feel pleasure and pain rightly or wrongly has a great effect on
conduct.
8) And again, it is harder to fight against pleasure than against
anger (hard as that is, as Heracleitus says); but virtue, like art, is
constantly dealing with what is harder, since the harder the task the
better is success. For this reason also therefore pleasure and pain
are necessarily the main concern both of virtue and of political
science, since he who comports himself towards them rightly will
be good, and he who does so wrongly, bad.
[11]
We may then take it as established that virtue has to do with
pleasures and pains, that the actions which produce it are those
which increase it, and also, if differently performed, destroy it, and
that the actions from which it was produced are also those in which
it is exercised.
[6]
4
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
A difficulty may however be raised as to what we mean by saying
that in order to become just men must do just actions, and in order
to become temperate they must do temperate actions. For if they do
just and temperate actions, they are just and temperate already, just
as, if they spell correctly or play in tune, they are scholars or
musicians.
But perhaps this is not the case even with the arts. It is possible to
spell a word correctly by chance, or because someone else prompts
you; hence you will be a scholar only if you spell correctly in the
scholar's way, that is, in virtue of the scholarly knowledge which
you yourself possess.
Moreover the case of the arts is not really analogous to that of the
virtues. Works of art have their merit in themselves, so that it is
enough if they are produced having a certain quality of their own;
but acts done in conformity with the virtues are not done justly or
temperately if they themselves are of a certain sort, but only if the
agent also is in a certain state of mind when he does them: first he
must act with knowledge; secondly he must deliberately choose the
act, and choose it for its own sake; and thirdly the act must spring
from a fixed and permanent disposition of character. For the
possession of an art, none of these conditions is included, except the
mere qualification of knowledge; but for the possession of the
virtues, knowledge is of little or no avail, whereas the other
conditions, so far from being of little moment, are all-important,
inasmuch as virtue results from the repeated performance of just
and temperate actions. Thus although actions are entitled just and
temperate when they are such acts as just and temperate men would
do, the agent is just and temperate not when he does these acts
merely, but when he does them in the way in which just and
temperate men do them. It is correct therefore to say that a man
becomes just by doing just actions and temperate by doing
temperate actions; and no one can have the remotest chance of
1
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
becoming good without doing them. But the mass of mankind,
instead of doing virtuous acts, have recourse to discussing virtue,
and fancy that they are pursuing philosophy and that this will make
them good men. In so doing they act like invalids who listen
carefully to what the doctor says, but entirely neglect to carry out
his prescriptions. That sort of philosophy will no more lead to a
healthy state of soul than will the mode of treatment produce health
of body.
BOOK VI
We have already said that it is right to choose the mean and to
avoid excess and deficiency, and that the mean is prescribed by the
right principle. Let us now analyze the latter notion.
In the case of each of the moral qualities or dispositions that have
been discussed, as with all the other virtues also, there is a certain
mark to aim at, on which the man who knows the principle involved
fixes his gaze, and increases or relaxes the tension accordingly;
there is a certain standard determining those modes of observing the
mean which we define as lying between excess and defect, being in
conformity with the right principle. This bare statement however,
although true, is not at all enlightening. In all departments of human
endeavor that have been reduced to a science, it is true to say that
effort ought to be exerted and relaxed neither too much nor too
little, but to the medium amount, and as the right principle decides.
Yet a person knowing this truth will be no wiser than before: for
example, he will not know what medicines to take merely from
being told to take everything that medical science or a medical
expert would prescribe. Hence with respect to the qualities of the
soul also, it is not enough merely to have established the truth of the
above formula; we also have to define exactly what the right
principle is, and what is the standard that determines it.
Now we have divided the Virtues of the Soul into two groups, the
Virtues of the Character and the Virtues of the Intellect. The
former, the Moral Virtues, we have already discussed. Our account
of the latter must be prefaced by some remarks about psychology.
It has been said before that the soul has two parts, one rational and
the other irrational. Let us now similarly divide the rational part,
and let it be assumed that there are two rational faculties, one
whereby we contemplate those things whose first principles are
[6]
[7]
2
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
invariable, and one whereby we contemplate those things which
admit of variation: since, on the assumption that knowledge is
based on a likeness or affinity of some sort between subject and
object, the parts of the soul adapted to the cognition of objects that
are of different kinds must themselves differ in kind. These two
rational faculties may be designated the Scientific Faculty and the
Calculative Faculty respectively; since calculation is the same as
deliberation, and deliberation is never exercised about things that
are invariable, so that the Calculative Faculty is a separate part of
the rational half of the soul.
We have therefore to ascertain what disposition of each of these
faculties is the best, for that will be the special virtue of each.
But the virtue of a faculty is related to the special function which
that faculty performs. Now there are three elements in the soul
which control action and the attainment of truth: namely, Sensation,
Intellect, and Desire.
Of these, Sensation never originates action, as is shown by the fact
that animals have sensation but are not capable of action.
Pursuit and avoidance in the sphere of Desire correspond to
affirmation and denial in the sphere of the Intellect. Hence
inasmuch as moral virtue is a disposition of the mind in regard to
choice, and choice is deliberate desire, it follows that, if the choice
is to be good, both the principle must be true and the desire right,
and that desire must pursue the same things as principle affirms.
We are here speaking of practical thinking, and of the attainment of
truth in regard to action; with speculative thought, which is not
concerned with action or production, right and wrong functioning
consist in the attainment of truth and falsehood respectively. The
attainment of truth is indeed the function of every part of the
intellect, but that of the practical intelligence is the attainment of
truth corresponding to right desire.
Now the cause of action (the efficient, not the final cause) is choice,
and the cause of choice is desire and reasoning directed to some
end. Hence choice necessarily involves both intellect or thought and
a certain disposition of character [for doing well and the reverse in
the sphere of action necessarily involve thought and character].
Thought by itself however moves nothing, but only thought
directed to an end, and dealing with action. This indeed is the
moving cause of productive activity also, since he who makes
[6]
1
[2]
[3]
something always has some further end in view: the act of making
is not an end in itself, it is only a means, and belongs to something
else. Whereas a thing done is an end in itself: since doing well
(welfare) is the End, and it is at this that desire aims.
Hence Choice may be called either thought related to desire or
desire related to thought; and man, as an originator of action, is a
union of desire and intellect.
(Choice is not concerned with what has happened already: for
example, no one chooses to have sacked Troy; for neither does one
deliberate about what has happened in the past, but about what still
lies in the future and may happen or not; what has happened cannot
be made not to have happened. Hence Agathon is right in saying
“This only is denied even to God,
The power to make what has been done undone.)
“ The attainment of truth is then the function of both the intellectual
parts of the soul. Therefore their respective virtues are those
dispositions which will best qualify them to attain truth.
BOOK VIII
Our next business after this will be to discuss Friendship. For
friendship is a virtue, or involves virtue; and also it is one of the
most indispensable requirements of life. For no one would choose
to live without friends, but possessing all other good things. In fact
rich men, rulers and potentates are thought especially to require
friends, since what would be the good of their prosperity without an
outlet for beneficence, which is displayed in its fullest and most
praiseworthy form towards friends? And how could such prosperity
be safeguarded and preserved without friends? For the greater it is,
the greater is its insecurity. And in poverty or any other misfortune
men think friends are their only resource. Friends are an aid to the
young, to guard them from error; to the elderly, to tend them, and to
supplement their failing powers of action; to those in the prime of
life, to assist them in noble deeds— “ When twain together go—”
for two are better able both to plan and to execute. And the
affection of parent for offspring and of offspring for parent seems to
be a natural instinct, not only in man but also in birds and in most
animals; as also is friendship between members of the same
species; and this is especially strong in the human race; for which
reason we praise those who love their fellow men. Even when
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
travelling abroad one can observe that a natural affinity and
friendship exist between man and man universally. Moreover, as
friendship appears to be the bond of the state; and lawgivers seem
to set more store by it than they do by justice, for to promote
concord, which seems akin to friendship, is their chief aim, while
faction, which is enmity, is what they are most anxious to banish.
And if men are friends, there is no need of justice between them;
whereas merely to be just is not enough—a feeling of friendship
also is necessary. Indeed the highest form of justice seems to have
an element of friendly feeling in it.
And friendship is not only indispensable as a means, it is also noble
in itself. We praise those who love their friends, and it is counted a
noble thing to have many friends; and some people think that a true
friend must be a good man.
But there is much difference of opinion as to the nature of
friendship. Some define it as a matter of similarity; they say that we
love those who are like ourselves: whence the proverbs ‘Like finds
his like,’ ‘Birds of a feather flock together,’ and so on. Others on
the contrary say that with men who are alike it is always a case of
‘two of a trade.’ Some try to find a more profound and scientific
explanation of the nature of affection. Euripides writes that ‘Earth
years for the rain’ when dried up, ‘And the majestic Heaven when
filled with rain Yearns to fall to Earth.’ Heracleitus says,
‘Opposition unites,’ and ‘The fairest harmony springs from
difference,’ and ‘'Tis strife that makes the world go on.’ Others
maintain the opposite view, notably Empedocles, who declares that
‘Like seeks after like.’
Dismissing then these scientific speculations as not germane to our
present enquiry, let us investigate the human aspect of the matter,
and examine the questions that relate to man's character and
emotions: for instance, whether all men are capable of friendship,
or bad men cannot be friends; and whether there is only one sort of
friendship or several. Those who hold that all friendship is of the
same kind because friendship admits of degree, are relying on an
insufficient proof, for things of different kinds also can differ in
degree. But this has been discussed before.
2
Perhaps the answer to these questions will appear if we ascertain
[2]
[3]
[4]
what sort of things arouses liking or love. It seems that not
everything is loved, but only what is lovable, and that this is either
what is good, or pleasant, or useful. But useful may be taken to
mean productive of some good or of pleasure, so that the class of
things lovable as ends is reduced to the good and the pleasant.
Then, do men like what is really good, or what is good for them?
For sometimes the two may be at variance; and the same with what
is pleasant. Now it appears that each person loves what is good for
himself, and that while what is really good is lovable absolutely,
what is good for a particular person is lovable for that person.
Further, each person loves not what is really good for himself, but
what appears to him to be so; however, this will not affect our
argument, for ‘lovable’ will mean ‘what appears lovable.’
There being then three motives of love, the term Friendship is not
applied to love for inanimate objects, since here there is no return of
affection, and also no wish for the good of the object—for instance,
it would be ridiculous to wish well to a bottle of wine: at the most
one wishes that it may keep well in order that one may have it
oneself; whereas we are told that we ought to wish our friend well
for his own sake. But persons who wish another good for his own
sake, if the feeling is not reciprocated, are merely said to feel
goodwill for him: only when mutual is such goodwill termed
friendship. And perhaps we should also add the qualification that
the feeling of goodwill must be known to its object. For a man often
feels goodwill towards persons whom he has never seen, but whom
he believes to be good or useful, and one of these persons may also
entertain the same feeling towards him. Here then we have a case of
two people mutually well-disposed, whom nevertheless we cannot
speak of as friends, because they are not aware of each other's
regard. To be friends therefore, men must 1) feel goodwill for each
other, that is, wish each other's good, and 2) be aware of each
other's goodwill, and 3) the cause of their goodwill must be one of
the lovable qualities mentioned above.
3
Now these qualities differ in kind; hence the affection or friendship
they occasion may differ in kind also. There are accordingly three
kinds of friendship, corresponding in number to the three lovable
qualities; since a reciprocal affection, known to either party, can be
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
based on each of the three, and when men love each other, they
wish each other well in respect of the quality which is the ground of
their friendship. Thus friends whose affection is based on utility do
not love each other in themselves, but in so far as some benefit
accrues to them from each other. And similarly with those whose
friendship is based on pleasure: for instance, we enjoy the society
of witty people not because of what they are in themselves, but
because they are agreeable to us. Hence in a friendship based on
utility or on pleasure men love their friend for their own good or
their own pleasure, and not as being the person loved, but as useful
or agreeable. And therefore these friendships are based on an
accident, since the friend is not loved for being what he is, but as
affording some benefit or pleasure as the case may be.
Consequently friendships of this kind are easily broken off, in the
event of the parties themselves changing, for if no longer pleasant
or useful to each other, they cease to love each other. And utility is
not a permanent quality; it differs at different times. Hence when
the motive of the friendship has passed away, the friendship itself is
dissolved, having existed merely as a means to that end.
Friendships of Utility seem to occur most frequently between the
old, as in old age men do not pursue pleasure but profit; and
between those persons in the prime of life and young people whose
object in life is gain. Friends of this kind do not indeed frequent
each other's company much, for in some cases they are not even
pleasing to each other, and therefore have no use for friendly
intercourse unless they are mutually profitable; since their pleasure
in each other goes no further than their expectations of advantage.
With these friendships are classed family ties of hospitality with
foreigners.
With the young on the other hand the motive of friendship appears
to be pleasure, since the young guide their lives by emotion, and for
the most part pursue what is pleasant to themselves, and the object
of the moment. And the things that please them change as their age
alters; hence they both form friendships and drop them quickly,
since their affections alter with what gives them pleasure, and the
tastes of youth change quickly. Also the young are prone to fall in
love, as love is chiefly guided by emotion, and grounded on
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
pleasure; hence they form attachments quickly and give them up
quickly, often changing before the day is out.
The young do desire to pass their time in their friend's company, for
that is how they get the enjoyment of their friendship.
The perfect form of friendship is that between the good, and those
who resemble each other in virtue. For these friends wish each alike
the other's good in respect of their goodness, and they are good in
themselves; but it is those who wish the good of their friends for
their friends' sake who are friends in the fullest sense, since they
love each other for themselves and not accidentally. Hence the
friendship of these lasts as long as they continue to be good; and
virtue is a permanent quality. And each is good relatively to his
friend as well as absolutely, since the good are both good absolutely
and profitable to each other. And each is pleasant in both ways also,
since good men are pleasant both absolutely and to each other; for
everyone is pleased by his own actions, and therefore by actions
that resemble his own, and the actions of all good men are the same
or similar.— Such friendship is naturally permanent, since it
combines in itself all the attributes that friends ought to possess. All
affection is based on good or on pleasure, either absolute or relative
to the person who feels it, and is prompted by similarity of some
sort; but this friendship possesses all these attributes in the friends
themselves, for they are alike, et cetera, in that way. Also the
absolutely good is pleasant absolutely as well; but the absolutely
good and pleasant are the chief objects of affection; therefore it is
between good men that affection and friendship exist in their fullest
and best form.
Such friendships are of course rare, because such men are few.
Moreover they require time and intimacy: as the saying goes, you
cannot get to know a man till you have consumed the proverbial
amount of salt in his company; and so you cannot admit him to
friendship or really be friends, before each has shown the other that
he is worthy of friendship and has won his confidence. People who
enter into friendly relations quickly have the wish to be friends, but
cannot really be friends without being worthy of friendship and also
knowing each other to be so; the wish to be friends is a quick
growth, but friendship is not.
In an effort to save some space I have not reproduced the complete work. Still it produces a fairly hefty tome. (Edited by H. Rackham)
Making Sense Of It All: Nicomachean Ethics Thought Sheet
Thought Point
Describe these Lecture
Sections
Main Point(s)
(What is he talking about?)
What is the Good?
What is Virtue?
What is Ethics?
What is Friendship?
What does the Mean
mean?
Do you agree with
Aristotle?
Points of Thought
Chapter 21
Science and the East
This may or may not be a legitimate chapter in our exploration. Valid or not it does rise
from a simple question: “Had there already been or did there develop in the East a similar
‘scientific’ thinker to Aristotle?”
The answer depends on how you define ‘science’. Does the East view ‘science’
differently? We can definitely say from our discussion of Aristotle that science is broader
than we define it today. If we bear that in mind, any system which seeks information on or
questions and examines nature can in some way be considered similar to Aristotle’s system
or vice-versa. It is the broadness of Aristotle’s system which makes it stand out, so to re-ask
the question is there a similar thinker in the East?
It’s Not Just The Speed Of Light, It’s The Law
In much of the Eastern philosophy we have examined, the natural world does not seem to
follow laws, but instead simply 'is'. Humans can look for regularities and pattern in the flow
of nature, but any 'laws' detected there are the product of human imposition, a personal,
interior way of organizing experiences (a posteriori), and are not the underlying basis of the
phenomena being observed. An ‘understanding’, or acknowledgment, of some phenomenon
would be considered accurate if it brings greater self-awareness not necessarily greater
awareness of the world.
By contrast and only in the broadest sense, the Western philosophy seems to prefer verbal
or logical models of reality evaluated along the criterion of an overall objective idea called
‘Truth’. In this case a model would be considered accurate if it expresses the ‘true’ nature of
reality regardless of individual ‘awareness’ (this may not sound odd, but it does go to the
struggle between science and faith in the West, whereas in the East you could have a
Confucian Buddhist, or an Atheist Buddhist).
Aristotle’s system of categories and hierarchy implies that there are slots into which
something fits, or is bounded if you so please. This system enables us to understand
ourselves and to understand ourselves in relationship to other things (everything has a place
and everything in its place). This would imply certain rigidity and makes our own selfawareness inter-dependent upon some external objective truth.
But can we not also say that despite all of their protestations to the contrary, certain
Eastern philosophers delved into similar sciences, divided the world up similarly for the
purpose of deeper understanding and enlightenment? Certainly we can see early development
of astronomical calculations, geometry, and metallurgy in the Indus civilization of the last
millennium BCE but does it compare (for lack of a better word) with the developments of
Aristotle?
Apples And Oranges
Part of the problem may still be the word science. In my limited research on this subject, I
find very few discussions in the East philosophical tradition of the word as applied by
Aristotle. That is not to say that there are not works that the authors consider to be
discussions of the subject, just that there are few real discussions on the comparative idea,
meaning that very little discussion can take place because it seems to this humble author that
everyone is interpreting the would science to fit the nature of the studies and knowledge put
forth by their respective areas or cultures and yet at the same time pointing out that their
understanding is the only possible understanding of the word.
Warning: author opinion induced statements ahead (but then do not look in the rearview mirror)! I think that we may be comparing apples and oranges, to use Aristotle’s
categorical thinking. The argument made by many pundits and authors is that the East was
miles ahead of the West in everything and that the theoretical, practical and productive arts of
the East were transferred (usurped?) to the West (and in some cases to the far East) and that
every thinking owes its existence to the Indus Valley civilization or the Buddhists of India,
who oddly enough according to themselves do not give a damn about any of it. So where
does that leave us in our innocent, nay, naive and humble search for knowledge and truth?
The Sound Of One Hand Clapping
Perhaps it is best to see this as a one sided discussion by both sides. If it is true that
Eastern civilization, especially the Indian, developed centuries ahead of the West and from
archeological and literary evidence it appears to be so in some areas, then why was it ‘lost’?
Did the West appropriate it and even if they did it seems that would have expanded its
influence not diminished it. They say history is written by the victors, but the Greeks (aside
from the fact that Alexander did not conquer the Indian peninsula, in fact aside from his
illness, it probably was his undoing) had a penchant for citing and referencing (if often only
in rebuttal or dialectically like Aristotle) which seems to imply (asides aside, I really do have
a point here) that the charge by modern authors of intellectual hubris by Western scholars
only applied to ancient cultures or that an idea can develop in isolation. And if that is the
case perhaps the Vedic culture stole their ideas from someone else as well. With pre-history,
we are left to decide from sketchy evidence.
There is no denying that the Vedic culture has some merit for exploration. If, as I
understand, vedic means ‘knowledge’ then it fits right into our discussion of knowledge and
virtue. Does Vedic science meet the definition which we give to Aristotle’s understanding of
the definition, as a tool to self-awareness and virtue? Does Aristotle’s compare to the Vedic?
Unfortunately this insufficiency we have of historical writing and historical-analytical
writing of our period (and an understanding of ‘historical’), and the writings we do have are
limited and/or slanted toward one end or another. What we can access and quantify is an
understanding of the results. While gunpowder was created in China, we see that very little
of it was used for war craft or industrial expansion and that mainly it was used for
entertainment purposes.
Some knowledge ends up being exploited merely for curiosities. For example the
harnessing of steam power by the Greeks was rarely used to move trains but to power
intellectual oddities, curiosities or toys. Speaking of venting, I guess that is what I am doing
here. Innovation can be an end in and of itself. In cultures which value stability, which most
do, innovation does not fuel new enterprises or thought but entertains and amuses. Why is the
vision of Atlantis populated by advanced beings which so many have, not true? Was
knowledge held only by an elite few while as in the West (according to some) the majority of
people starved in ignorance? Why must great human endeavors only be attributable to an
alien influence?
My guess is that at the time most cultural exchange is not seen as stealing or vindictive.
The intellectual community in any society seems to be more about the exchange of ideas than
bragging rights. Why else would you open a university? What a culture does with the
knowledge is what makes the difference.
Putting It Together
I am not sure about this chapter, but I found it to be a fascinating exploration of history,
culture, cultural bias and just plain bias. Now I am always open to being corrected if I am
wrong, and I will adapt and revise this text if enough information comes my way, but in my
humble and incomplete exploration of the ideas which have shaped all of civilization, the
decline of civilizations does not mean that the next one stole everything they knew from the
previous one – except maybe the Romans, I guess (poor Etruscans, and Greeks). Civilizations
rise and fall on their own merits. In relatively stable situations ideas flow freely and are
exchanged freely. The inability to adapt to changing conditions, ecological, political,
economic, or whatever, due to the cultural restrictions is probably more to blame than
usurpation.
There are many theories and books of theories out there about the movers of civilization,
both human and environmental. Salt, biological, geological, bio-geographical, technology,
resources; all of these have some legitimate hand in the furthering of human civilization. We
though seek to understand it from the philosophical, epistemological. The human mind and
spirit as it struggles with and passes through each of these factors.
Basically the investigation and writing of this chapter just made me frustrated. Objective
opinion was hard to come by, and much building up and tearing down of cultures (or more
appropriately tearing down to build up) was the lion’s share of what I found.
Actually, on second thought, a very important lesson indeed.
Chapter 22
Epicureans
Alright! Enough of that deep thinking stuff! Wahoo-woo! Let us get to the rowdiest bunch
of crazies to ever put forth a philosophy. Finally, a group of thinkers to which geek
philosophers can look to with as much admiration as engineers look to Apollo 13. There is
hope for us! Toga! Toga! Toga….
Seriously. What tends to happen when dour asceticism and intellectualism overcome good
sense? Intellectualism looses badly at a drinking game and good sense gets rough-shod by
hedonism. We seekers though, ask does Epicurus who has lent his name to this movement
have more to offer than just binge hedonism?
Let us see, and in the end remember, no matter who you hang out with, all the cool chicks
and dudes just think you are goofy anyway.
Putting It In Context: The Players
Dates
412?-320?
Philosophers
Diogenes
341-270
Epicurus
335-263
Zeno if Citium
298-230
Hsun-tzu
Main Points
Cynicism; stressed stoic self-sufficiency and the rejection of
luxury; searched for an honest man with a lantern in daylight.
There is no afterlife, live now to the fullest. Ethics should be
guided by feeling like Physics is guided by our senses.
Stoicism; peace and well being come from living in harmony
with nature.
Confucian; natural human evil tendencies must be overcome
with ritual and education. He distinguishes what is born in man
and what must be learned through rigorous education.
Table 16: Epicurus in Context
Epicurus marks the transition to the new century. Plato and Aristotle are dead but well
entrenched and thanks to Aristotle, larger observations on the meaning of life are being taken
on. Epicurus steps into this ordered, moral world. He was born some twenty years after the
death of Aristotle outside of Athens and began his teaching outside of Athens as well, but
eventually gravitated there, opening a school known as ‘the Garden’ because of the garden
within its walls wherein he taught (ironically placed halfway between the stoa of the market
and the Academy). He was known for his generosity and kept the school open for at least the
last 30 some odd years of his life then provided for it in his will, to allow it to stay open,
which it did. He was also the first to freely admit women (to learn of course, get your mind
out of the gutter despite the subject).
Epicurus lives in a period of constant struggle between Alexander’s generals to establish
control of his empire. In a sense the empire has already begun to decline. But he is long
enough after that the great patronage of the Ptolemaic rulers, establishing libraries and
universities does provide a stable and fertile ground for the development of thought. Still, one
could honestly look at the world and ask what good did Plato’s and Aristotle’s calls for
discipline and asceticism and philosopher kings do for the people of Greece?
Since we know that Socrates was reacting to a popular world view held by (among others)
the Sophists and that Plato and Aristotle established schools which lasted centuries, in such a
established garden what effect could a system which swung the pendulum back have? An
amazing amount apparently. Epicurus’ influence was great, his system becoming one of the
major philosophies of the Mediterranean, influencing even the Romans as late as the poet
Lucretius (mid first century BCE) who provided us with a fairly large summary of Epicurus’
wisdom and thoughts.
Let The Party Begin
Enough background. Let us get to the meat (and wine) of it. Epicurus basically debunks
every aspect of the moral philosophies of Plato and Aristotle. Shocking, I know. He does this
by denying the existence of an after-life of which he contends there is no proof. With no
after-life to worry about, there is only here and now. The gods leave us be and really have no
concern for us and any belief in an after-life is simple not rational (i.e. there is no rational
proof of it).
Epicurus does not propose or even really rely on any formal system of logic. For him, the
purpose of philosophy is to attain the happy, tranquil life, characterized by peace, freedom
from fear, the absence of pain, and by living a self-sufficient life surrounded by friends (an
important part of Aristotle’s thought as well which we read – Ethics Book VIII). Pleasure and
pain are the measures of what is good and bad. Our physical senses define these. Death is
demoted from a transition to another type of being and so the end of the body and the soul
should not be feared. Removal of this ultimate fear redefines life. Because death is the end,
the gods do not reward or punish humans, no tally being kept, one more fear down.
There are many echoes of Aristotle’s thought which seem to come through in Epicurus but
we do not want to get hung up there. Epicurus was not a disciple of Aristotle. In addition, this
lifestyle also called for a certain amount of detachment from social involvement, meaning
that social moral action was not as important. Working for the good did not really mean
politics like Aristotle taught, or Plato’s philosopher kings. The individual ‘pleasure principle’
dictated actions, almost dogmatically (oddly enough) because only fools would think
otherwise.
So if there is no after-life, no final external consequences save the immediate ones during
our life time, how do we learn to live and why should we live that way?
Everybody’s Workin’ For The Weekend
Epicurus’ works are not massive is scope, and for the most part only come down to us
through secondary sources. Like Aristotle before him, he divides his thoughts into parts, but
only three: The Canon, Physics, and Ethics.
The Canon, similarly to Aristotle’s Categories, are the criteria for all thinking in the other
two parts. Canon comes from the word for ‘list’ and has nothing to do with explosions
(contrary to the explosive nature of this thought).
The basic premise is that experience dictates knowledge and to place the root of
knowledge outside of ourselves would be to deny the validity of our experience and therefore
our ability to know anything. Without an experience of truth how could we tell it from
ignorance?
Knowledge is built from incremental sense experiences in an associative, concept-based
way. What that means is that we lump real-time and memory of similar sensory experiences
together until we grasp a concept, like when the sun is out it gets hot. So heat gets associated
with things which are hot. The idea of human comes to us through a reoccurring complex
pattern of qualities which are similar enough (even for different ‘objects’) that we call each
other humans. But we do not just take it on past knowledge. We must also continue to poll
our sensory information or else we might lump a mannequin in with humans.
There are no Forms as for Plato and no substance/being as for Aristotle. Knowledge from
sensory experience alone (ours and others) gives the form. Without getting into how he posits
we receive ideas and images, he does hammer language for being part of the problem.
Because we can give something a name, like death, we can extrapolate out and begin to fear
it. He really stresses the idea of understanding the base meaning of a word and avoiding
embellishing it with extra meaning, which according to the aforesaid lack of explaining is a
short-circuit of the actual meaning.
Let’s Get Physical
Epicurus’ Physics has only use within the scope of praxis. He feels that the only use for
natural science is the healing of people’s ills. All speculation of other life forms and rocks
only has use if it can be applied to human suffering.
Think about Aristotle. Knowledge leads to virtue and that is its main goal. Not so fast
Epicurus says. What good are the platitudes of philosophers to heal the ills of the world?
Knowledge must have a pragmatic purpose.
Interestingly, he attributes most sickness and suffering to superstitious beliefs which rise
from external forces and the incessant worry it causes. One tries to be what one is not or else
seeks constant escape from the reality of who one is to the final detriment caused by the
hatred of the self which one is trying to escape. Hmmm.
Democritus (mentioned but not really explored in Chapter 9), provides the natural world
explanation for Epicurus. His atomism explains how we get sensory information through the
free-range atoms bouncing around. So aside from the function and end of physics, Epicurus’
ideas are pretty much based on Democritus. This frees Epicurus up to wax on the nature of
nature.
Aristotle is thought of as the first ‘realist’, in that he looked to the observable world
around us for meaning. Still he connected to an objective outside of things. Epicurus goes
one step further and dismisses the objective as having any bearing. Sure there may be gods
but what observable evidence is there that they do anything? How therefore could we
‘participate’ in any way with them? So even our mind, the connecting point for Aristotle, is a
physical thing, connected as it is to the physical body. The mind hurts when the body hurts
the body moves when the mind tells it. End of story.
The gods, death and other seemingly observable things really do not matter to the physical
world. The universe is infinite and eternal, and events in the world are ultimately based on
the motions and interactions of atoms moving in empty space (he has a great observation
about the dust motes floating in sunbeams). So hakuna matata and hang loose.
Feelings, Woh, Woh, Woh, Woh, Woh, Feelings
If all of that is true, can there be an objective based lifestyle? Aristotle justified it with this
connectivity focused in the soul, as a natural off-shoot of an objective truth. Epicurus rejects
that. So how do you justify ethics when you remove that connection? Ethics, he tells us, is
based in feelings. Not mushy feelings but sensing (of or by the senses). Just as our fingers
can sense an object, so our minds can sense good and evil. We get a feeling, like the willies,
when we see something which does not feel right.
Ethics then is not based in external truths. We sense within ourselves the nature of
something. Death is so final there is no connection beyond it. If death is the end, there can be
no punishment after death, nor any regrets for the life that has been lost, only for the life not
lived.
In a way, contrary to what I said before, Aristotle himself prepared the way for the
hedonistic thoughts of Epicurus. His focus on ‘happiness’ (The Good) and the way he wrote
about it, could be taken to mean freedom from pain, suffering and sorrow. When we do good
things we are happy. Epicurus takes it a bit further. Pleasure is only attained when we
overcome pain. Food is not a pleasure until we overcome hunger. In this way, Epicurus kind
of presents a threshold based on contraries also similar to Aristotle but without the mean. We
can see this in many of his ideas for instance, justice and injustice arise from the laws made
to ‘correct’ wrongs or impose rights, not from some external understanding of what is just
and unjust.
Epicurus classifies desires into three types: some are natural, others are empty; and natural
desires are of two sorts, those that are necessary and those that are merely natural. Natural
and necessary ones are those that look to happiness, physical well-being, or life itself.
Unnecessary but natural desires are for pleasant things like sweet odors and good-tasting
food and drink (and for various pleasurable activities of sorts other than simple smelling,
touching and tasting; think passing, transitory pleasures). Empty desires are those that have
as their objects things designated by empty sounds, such as immortality, which cannot exist
for human beings and do not correspond to any genuine need. The same holds for the desire
for physical jones’ like great wealth or for the trappings of fame. Again, they cannot provide
the security that is the genuine object of the desire.
Such desires, because they have no basis in reality, can never be satisfied, any more than
the corresponding fears (like the fear of death) can never be alleviated, since neither has a
genuine concrete referent, i.e., death as something harmful (the fear of not being) or that of
wealth and power as panacea for anxiety). Such empty fears and desires, based on what
Epicurus calls empty belief, are themselves the main source of fear and pain in civilized life
(where you do not really have to worry about being eaten by something or starving to death
where the wall protects and the farmer provides), since they are the reason why people are
forever driven to strive for limitless wealth and power, subjecting themselves to the very
dangers they imagine they are avoiding.
Alright. Deep breath. Ethics then consists in seeking the right things judged by our
feelings. It is a natural desire to gravitate toward pleasure and avoid pain. For Epicurus this
sensual understanding must be valid (as we have discussed above), or else all else could be
called into question. Since that is so (that we can feel right and wrong), we are free, due to an
amount of randomness in the universe, to act (we are not determined by outside forces, which
gives us freedom). That is, true freedom comes from not being slaves to fears or irrational
ideas.
Still if one does not fear the gods or any sort of final punishment, what motive is there for
living a virtuous life or even justly? We want what is best for ourselves and our friends
which means we will always act in accordance with that desire. Because it is preferable not
to commit crimes, even secret ones, since there will always be anxiety over the possibility of
detection, and this will disrupt the tranquility that is the chief basis of happiness in life.
Justice, for Epicurus, depends on the capacity to make compacts neither to harm others nor
be harmed by them, and consists in such compacts; justice is nothing in itself, independent of
such arrangements. Someone who is incapable of living prudently, honorably, and justly
cannot live pleasurably, and vice versa. Finally and similarly to Plato and Aristotle, prudence
or wisdom (no matter how it is learned) is the chief of the virtues: on it depend all the rest,
including our actions. For example a wise man would feel the pains of a friend no less than
his own, and would die for a friend rather than wrong him in any way, otherwise his own life
would be in turmoil and he could not be happy.
Putting It Together
When the times are good there are good times to be had. The problem with systems which
require a lot of responsibility, self-discipline and self-regulating action like Plato’s and
Aristotle’s seems to be that they really require a lot of work. Self discipline and Selflessness
are sometimes a hard sell when things seem to be going well. Think late 20th early 21st
century and the SUV. People who would laugh at others as they ran over them with their
Hummers suddenly become the loudest proponents of conservation when it seems that they
really would not be able to get their gas for under $2 a gallon. They decried President Carter
in the Seventies only to echo his words in the Nineties and Aughts.
The pendulum of ‘philosophical’ thought swings wide as well. There is always a prophet
willing to tell you what you want to hear, like ‘lose weight while you eat what you want”.
Still, what do the Epicureans have to tell us? Is there a valid aspect to his thought? Is
Epicurus all about pleasure and no responsibility?
We would argue that the answer is no but ultimately it is a matter of perspective. When
Epicurus sloughed off the immortal coil, he began to look at a different end to life. He began
to focus on the things here and now, right in front of us. The immediacy of life became
apparent to him. His love of friendship even amidst suffering (his kidney stones are
eventually what killed him) is admirable and worth imitating. Life was simple enough: at the
end of the day we will do the right thing because it feels good, because we desire to avoid
feeling bad, and because others are so important that it must be the greatest virtue.
All this is not to say that there were not some fuzzy areas for him as well. As with others,
there were times when he said, well that matter is for a greater mind than mine.
Chapter 23
Stoicism
Zeno of Citium is the founder of Stoicism. The name for this system though derives from
the stoa or columns/porch in the agora from which Zeno taught. He arrives, like Epicurus,
soon after Aristotle’s death, and almost in parallel.
With this discussion, we cover the last of what Marcus Aurelius (a Stoic and philosopher
king himself) considered the four chairs of philosophy: Platonic, Aristotelian, Epicurean and
Stoic. These systems, in opposition to others like the Sophists (Chapter 9) or the Cyrenaics
(Chapter 15), tend to take the long-term or moral view which probably lent them to more
enduring adherents.
What that means is that for a while longer we are wading in the final foundations of
Western Philosophy.
Zeno (Of Citium)
Like Socrates, Zeno sought the public forum to espouse his teachings and so set up at the
painted (murals) porch colonnade in the marketplace of Athens. Therefore, like Socrates, it is
the foundation laid by his followers which we really know. Most of the writings of the Stoics
come to us from much later, mainly through the Romans. As is so often the case in the way
that Zeno extended Cynicism, the life of Stoicism is much larger than Zeno’s thought.
Still, we have to start somewhere and what better place than the beginning. As stated,
Zeno's ideas developed from those of the Cynics (Chapter 15), whose founding father,
Antisthenes if you recall, was a disciple of Socrates. In Zeno’s teachings, their call for ultraausterity is balanced by Aristotle’s call for rationality, though he remains faithful to the
Socratic call. And as appears to be the flavor of the post-Aristotle day, like Epicurus, Zeno's
philosophical system covered three main themes: physics, logic, and ethics (so designated at
a later time).
Feelings, No, No, No, No, No Feelings….
Where Epicurus embraced feeling and emotion as the foundation of knowledge (we know
what we sense) and therefore happiness (virtue), the Stoics took the opposite view: emotion
was the flaw which produced all suffering. Destructive emotions, such as anger or jealousy
kept us from happiness and therefore had to be kept in check.
Logic and reason rule the day. Self-control and fortitude are the means of overcoming
these destructive emotions.
Reason is the sole judge. The sensations and impressions of Epicurus are not the end of
truth. That is to say, where as Epicurus would say we sense or feel something to be true,
Stoics would argue that while that may be true, the final decision is made on those senses and
feelings by reason. The mind has the ability to judge (approve or reject) a sensation, enabling
it to distinguish a true feeling or sense of reality from one which is false. And in terms of that
judgment, we can say that some impressions can be agreed to immediately (everybody
automatically feels knows that killing is wrong), but that other impressions can only achieve
varying degrees of approval which can be labeled belief or opinion. It is only through the use
of reason that we can achieve clear comprehension and belief. Certainty and true knowledge
is achieved by verifying the belief with the expertise of peers and the collective judgment of
humanity.
Vulcans Have Feelings Too
Cultural Pause: Remember the Start Trek episode where the pretty flowers shot spore at
the crew and took away rational judgment for all practical purposes? Remember how Spock
cried because he was unable to express emotion for so much of his life? The episode was
about the struggle between getting in touch with one’s self and what that really meant.
Okay before I go on, I realize that there might be some out there who could possibly be
unfamiliar with the Start Trek series. If that is so and none of the previous statements make
any sense to you then, darn it go to your local library or video store and get a copy of This
Side of Paradise (Season 1 Episode 26) or The Naked Time and watch it! Get with the
program!
Anyway, Stoicism is not about no emotions, but about keeping our emotions in check,
balanced by the rational mind (which incidentally for those who do not know, is basically the
Vulcan approach, until the Kolinahr, which is the ceremony for the purging of all emotions).
Contrary to earlier thinkers of happy memory, Knowledge is not the Virtue. Virtue is the
Will in tune with Nature. One seeks to eliminate the destructive aspects of one’s life not so
much by asceticism but more of a discipline of will.
Stoicism is not just a lack of emotions but is a system based in rationality and action. In
the Faith vs. Works discussion (is this really a discussion or just a misunderstanding between
friends?), we can consider them part of the Works camp.
Logic, Captain?
The Stoics, in opposition to the Epicureans had a system of logic. In opposition to
Aristotle it was based in statements rather than just predicates. What that means is that
Aristotle (thought you were done?) started at the base term, like ‘star’ and combined it with
another term like ‘gaseous body’ (neither of which has conclusive truth or falseness
contained within it, though it can be a ‘truth’ itself from a previous argument) and stated a
conclusion from them as in the case All stars are made of burning gas; burning gas gives off
light; therefore, stars give off light (which must contain a truth within it). This method
spends time defining the thing and is very useful in discussions.
Stoic Logic on the other hand, connects propositions together via logical operators to
produce ideas and reflects in a way the Stoic propensity to action. The Earth is round; Paris
is the capital of France. Those are statements or propositions. To spend time on the terms, as
does Aristotle is to waste time on incomplete ideas. That is to say, The Earth is round tells us
about things which we do not have to worry about defining. To say The Earth is round AND
the Earth rotates means Therefore the Earth is a round thing which rotates. We can see it in
this quote from Zeno: “No evil is honorable: but death is honorable; therefore death is not
evil.”
Logic then, is the means of putting things in relationship to one another. This logic is
essentially about how the statements (propositions) connect together. The logical ways of
combining or altering statements or propositions to form more complicated statements or
propositions is the main focus of this type of logic. For that reason Stoic or propositional
logic can be thought of as (primarily) the study of logical operators, i.e. any word or phrase
used either to modify one statement to make a different statement, or join multiple statements
together to form a more complicated statement. For example “and”, “or”, “not”, “if-then”,
“because”, and “necessarily”, are all operators. The Stoics make several distinctions of the
types of operators but we will not worry about that here.
As to that, why spend any time on this? Well, later this form of logic will be of interest.
Physical reality is consistent with universal laws...18
Stoics have a sense of physics which is similar to earlier thinkers with a few twists. The
universe is a physical place of cause and effect. Basically there are antecedent causes and
principle causes. Think of it like a bowling ball. You flinging the ball down the lane is the
antecedent and the roundness of the ball (which allows it to continue rolling) is the principle.
If you flung a square box down the lane you would not have a principle which would allow it
to continue down the lane; you would observe a different effect. This ties into their logic.
Along those lines, there is a sort of central core, a prime mover, a universal or divine
reason, which can be called God (or Zeus or whatever you feel so inclined). What does that
have to do with physics you might insightfully ask? Nature is God, or at least what we can
understand of God. Something (everything) participates in God because it is part of the
universe (i.e. Nature). This nature is therefore ruled by reason (Logos) (Heraclitus Chapter 8;
Plato Chapter 13b), has laws and the world adheres to these laws. Physics is the study of the
operations (workings) of Divine Reason, which is the relation of causes to effects (just as
logic is the study of relations).
Matter is all there is. There is something rather than nothing. But what about those
nothings like ideas? How can things not exist (in the sense that only matter exists), yet be?
Stoics propose a simple solution similar to Aristotle: they belong to different species of the
same genus. There are material and immaterial things, in an order of nature, with the
immaterial things being of the highest order. I used our earlier something rather than nothing
because it still applies here. That is to say, space is something rather than nothing (something
capable of being occupied yet not occupied). Ideas follow the same route. Very roughly put,
they exist, physically, but they have a matter sensible only to the mind.
The idea of the soul, as with Aristotle, is approached in physics. The soul exists, but
unlike Plato and Aristotle, it is not eternal. Without going too deep, the whole universe is in a
cycle of destruction and creation/resurrection. Souls might hang around for a while, some
longer than others, for a hierarchy of reasons, but eventually all are caught up in the cycle.
It is curious how often you humans manage to obtain that
which you do not want.19
So once again we see physics and ethics tied together. “All things are parts of one single
system, which is called Nature; the individual life is good when it is in harmony with
Nature.” (Zeno) As stated before, the will, in tune with nature is Virtue{XE “virtue”}. So
what does that have to do with how we act toward one another?
18
Physical reality is consistent with universal laws. Where the laws do not operate, there is no reality -- we
judge reality by the responses of our senses. Once we are convinced of the reality of a given situation, we abide
by its rules. – Spock, Specter of the Gun – a bit long for a section title but presented here in full for your
edification.
19
Spock in ‘Errand of Mercy’
If God is Nature (in a somewhat pan-theistic way), then when we follow Universal Reason
(the Logos, the Natural Law which is also within us), we are in tune with God’s Will. We
have virtue. “Happiness is a good flow of life,” said Zeno, and this can only be achieved
through the use of right Reason coinciding with the Logos which governs everything. A bad
feeling “is a disturbance of the mind repugnant to Reason, and against Nature.” This rational
conscience, this soul, this convergence of God and the mind out of which morally good
actions spring is Virtue; true good can only consist in Virtue. We seek to do the good for one
another, because that is the Natural Law, the divine Will, the structure of the universe or
however you want to portray it.
Similar to Plato and Socrates’ idea of evil rising from ignorance, Stoics taught that evil
rose from the rejection of right Reason. Differently, it is all black and white for the Stoics.
Actions are either good or bad, they cannot be both nor can they even be a little of one and a
lot of the other. All errors must be rooted out, not merely set aside, and replaced with right
Reason. The suppression/eradication of the negative emotions which cause suffering and
sorrow (desire, fear, pleasure and pain) produces moral actions and immoral actions are
those not guided by right Reason. Period.
As a foundational aside, the idea of ‘freewill’ fluctuates within Stoic thought but basically
boils down to (because it is the one I want to emphasize) following the Will or choosing to
not follow the Will. There is a certain deterministic view present in the Stoic discussion as
shown in the example of a dog tied to a cart. If the dog chooses to go with the cart when it
moves, va bene. Or he can choose to not go with the cart, but in the end will be drug along
anyway.
True freedom is freedom from emotional control and attachment. Indifference is not
apathy but a refusal to be mastered by the thing, an indifference to it. Functionally, when you
think about it, if one did not care then what would be the point of living? How one cares and
acts is the rub. One does not want to help someone out of pity (an emotion) but out of the
rational understanding of the good. Freedom then is merely the choice between right Reason
and well, frankly, stupidity. Happiness will only come from (rational) moral actions. This
would also imply a certain amount of social interaction and Stoics as a whole are encouraged
to participate and even lead, in the philosopher king vein.
Damn it Jim, I’m A Doctor, Not A Greek!
In Star Trek the rational yet emotional Captain Kirk is advised by the cool rationality of
Mr. Spock and by the deep passion of Dr. McCoy. Kirk often plays the two off of each other,
provoking humorous situations, yet he seems to genuinely respect both men. He values both
their brilliance and their beliefs. Many of the best stories are those where the three banter and
struggle to look at the world as one mind, aside from the command structure.
Spock seeks the most rational course of action. He is not without a compass and he is not
strictly relativistic because the rational thing to do is of course the best thing to do. How
could it be seen otherwise? He cares about the mission, his friends and the ship he sails in but
he does it without emotional attachment. If logic dictated an emotionally charged action he
would still take it, because it is logical and therefore the right action.
Dr. McCoy on the other hand is a brilliant medical officer who often questions the
utilitarian decisions of Spock because they seem cold and calculating (in the sense of bean
counter). They chastise each other, and they often trade good-natured barbs. The question is
constantly raised between the good of the one and the good of the many and which one has
more value. Spock would approach the problem logically, rationally and the good doctor
often with compassion. In the end one sometimes defers to the other.
The Stoics approach life with the sense of balance, as said not so much with asceticism
but rationality. All are equal under God. One weighs the correct action based on reason, the
natural law and a preferred list of things. Wealth and health are to be preferred to poverty
and disease. But the why of the preference is the motive behind the decision. McCoy and
Spock might reach the same decision but for totally different reasons, for which Spock would
still disagree with McCoy.
We cannot control the things without us. The world pretty much runs itself, based rational
and rationally knowable set laws. What is in our power, then, is the ‘authority over ourselves’
that we have regarding our capacity to judge what is good and what is evil. Outside our
power are ‘external things’, which are ‘indifferent’ with respect to being good or evil.
The soul does have an irrational part (where else would the passions come from?), but if
kept in check only good things will happen. The even-keel judgment being promoted also
implies a certain unquestionable fairness when dealing with others. In the end it is the group
as a whole, as for the universe as a whole which is the measure of virtue.
Putting It Together
The Stoics bring not just an opposing view to the Epicureans, something that was certainly
the practice before Plato, they re-introduce the idea of stability and objectivity over
relativism and subjectivity.
Still, what is the best way of looking at the world? For that matter what are the basic
questions for which we seek answers? In the end it is a basis for action. What is the seat of
the mind? By that we are asking what is the role, the place and the composition of rationality
and epistemology. As we can see from our explorations so far, most of our discussion hinges
on this understanding. What does it mean to be human? Can I trust my senses and my mind?
How should we act? What is the best way to act and what is the best way to go about living
so that we find our purpose?
What is the good? Is it a healthy emotional life like the Epicureans espouse or a healthy
rational judgment in harmony with Nature as for the Stoics? Is knowledge virtue or freedom
from perturbation? Either way, a lack of extremes would be the order of the day for both
camps, and put them square in the camp of Aristotle’s understanding of moderation.
Live long and prosper.
Pertinent Star Trek Spock quotes:
 [being a Vulcan] means to adopt a philosophy, a way of life which is logical and
beneficial. We cannot disregard that philosophy merely for personal gain, no matter
how important that gain might be. Journey to Babel
 If I let go a hammer on a planet having a positive gravity, I need not see it fall to
know that it has, in fact, fallen. Court Martial
 After a time, you may find that 'having' is not so pleasing a thing, after all, as
'wanting.' It is not logical, but it is often true. Amok Time
 Where there's no emotion, there's no motive for violence. Dagger of the Mind
 McCoy: The release of emotion is what keeps us healthy. Emotionally healthy.
Spock: That may be, Doctor. However, I have noted that the healthy release of
emotion is frequently unhealthy for those closest to you. Plato's Stepchildren
Chapter 23a
Marcus Aurelius (Excerpts from Meditations)
 Always bear this in mind, what is the nature of the whole, and what


is my nature, and how this is related to that, and what kind of a part it
is of and what kind of a whole; and that there is no one who hinders
you from always doing and saying the things which are according to
the nature of which you are a part.
The period of human life is a point, and the substance is in a flux,
and the perception dull, and the composition of the whole body
subject to putrefaction, and the soul a whirl, and fortune hard to
divine, and fame a thing devoid of judgment. And, to say all in a
word, everything which belongs to the body is a stream, and what
belongs to the soul is a dream and vapor, and life is a warfare and a
stranger's sojourn, and after-fame is oblivion. What then is that
which is able to conduct a man? One thing and only one, philosophy.
But this consists in keeping the daemon within a man free from
violence and unharmed, superior to pains and pleasures, doing
nothing without purpose, nor yet falsely and with hypocrisy, not
feeling the need of another man's doing or not doing anything; and
besides, accepting all that happens, and all that is allotted, as coming
from thence, wherever it is, from whence he himself came; and,
finally, waiting for death with a cheerful mind, as being nothing else
than a dissolution of the elements of which every living being is
compounded. But if there is no harm to the elements themselves in
each continually changing into another, why should a man have any
apprehension about the change and dissolution of all the elements?
For it is according to nature, and nothing is evil which is according
to nature.
Throwing away then all things, hold to these only which are few; and
besides bear in mind that every man lives only this present time,
which is an indivisible point, and that all the rest of his life is either
past or it is uncertain. Short then is the time which every man lives,
and small the nook of the earth where he lives; and short too the
longest posthumous fame, and even this only continued by a


succession of poor human beings, who will very soon die, and who
know not even themselves, much less him who died long ago.
Body, soul, and intelligence: to the body belong sensations, to the
soul appetites, to the intelligence principles. To receive the
impressions of forms by means of appearances belongs even to
animals; to be pulled by the strings of desire belongs both to wild
beasts and to men who have made themselves into women, and to a
Phalaris and a Nero: and to have the intelligence that guides to the
things which appear suitable belongs also to those who do not
believe in the gods, and who betray their country, and do their
impure deeds when they have shut the doors. If then everything else
is common to all that I have mentioned, there remains that which is
peculiar to the good man, to be pleased and content with what
happens, and with the thread which is spun for him; and not to defile
the divinity which is planted in his breast, nor disturb it by a crowd
of images, but to preserve it tranquil, following it obediently as a
god, neither saying anything contrary to the truth, nor doing anything
contrary to justice. And if all men refuse to believe that he lives a
simple, modest, and contented life, he is neither angry with any of
them, nor does he deviate from the way which leads to the end of
life, to which a man ought to come pure, tranquil, ready to depart,
and without any compulsion perfectly reconciled to his lot.
Men seek retreats for themselves, houses in the country, sea-shores,
and mountains; and you too are wont to desire such things very
much. But this is altogether a mark of the most common sort of men,
for it is in your power whenever you shall choose to retire into
yourself. For nowhere either with more quiet or more freedom from
trouble does a man retire than into his own soul, particularly when he
has within him such thoughts that by looking into them he is
immediately in perfect tranquility; and I affirm that tranquility is
nothing else than the good ordering of the mind. Constantly then
give to yourself this retreat, and renew yourself; and let your

principles be brief and fundamental, which, as soon as you shall
recur to them, will be sufficient to cleanse the soul completely, and
to send you back free from all discontent with the things to which
you return. For with what are you discontented? With the badness of
men? Recall to your mind this conclusion, that rational animals exist
for one another, and that to endure is a part of justice, and that men
do wrong involuntarily; and consider how many already, after
mutual enmity, suspicion, hatred, and fighting, have been stretched
dead, reduced to ashes; and be quiet at last.- But perhaps you are
dissatisfied with that which is assigned to you out of the universe.Recall to your recollection this alternative; either there is providence
or atoms, fortuitous concurrence of things; or remember the
arguments by which it has been proved that the world is a kind of
political community, and be quiet at last.- But perhaps corporeal
things will still fasten upon you.- Consider then further that the mind
mingles not with the breath, whether moving gently or violently,
when it has once drawn itself apart and discovered its own power,
and think also of all that you hast heard and assented to about pain
and pleasure, and be quiet at last.- But perhaps the desire of the thing
called fame will torment you.- See how soon everything is forgotten,
and look at the chaos of infinite time on each side of the present, and
the emptiness of applause, and the changeableness and want of
judgment in those who pretend to give praise, and the narrowness of
the space within which it is circumscribed, and be quiet at last. For
the whole earth is a point, and how small a nook in it is this your
dwelling, and how few are there in it, and what kind of people are
they who will praise you.
This then remains: Remember to retire into this little territory of your
own, and above all do not distract or strain yourself, but be free, and
look at things as a man, as a human being, as a citizen, as a mortal.
But among the things readiest to your hand to which you shall turn,
let there be these, which are two. One is that things do not touch the
soul, for they are external and remain immovable; but our
perturbations come only from the opinion which is within. The other
is that all these things, which you see, change immediately and will
no longer be; and constantly bear in mind how many of these
changes you hast already witnessed. The universe is transformation:
life is opinion.
 You have existed as a part. You shall disappear in that which
produced you; but rather you shall be received back into its seminal
principle by transmutation.
 If souls continue to exist, how does the air contain them from
eternity?- But how does the earth contain the bodies of those who
have been buried from time so remote? For as here the mutation of
these bodies after a certain continuance, whatever it may be, and
their dissolution make room for other dead bodies; so the souls
which are removed into the air after subsisting for some time are
transmuted and diffused, and assume a fiery nature by being received
into the seminal intelligence of the universe, and in this way make
room for the fresh souls which come to dwell there. And this is the
answer which a man might give on the hypothesis of souls
continuing to exist. But we must not only think of the number of
bodies which are thus buried, but also of the number of animals
which are daily eaten by us and the other animals. For what a
number is consumed, and thus in a manner buried in the bodies of
those who feed on them! And nevertheless this earth receives them
by reason of the changes of these bodies into blood, and the
transformations into the aerial or the fiery element.
 Constantly regard the universe as one living being, having one
substance and one soul; and observe how all things have reference to
one perception, the perception of this one living being; and how all
things act with one movement; and how all things are the
cooperating causes of all things which exist; observe too the
continuous spinning of the thread and the contexture of the web.
 Thou art a little soul bearing about a corpse, as Epictetus used to say.
 Think continually how many physicians are dead after often
contracting their eyebrows over the sick; and how many astrologers
after predicting with great pretensions the deaths of others; and how
many philosophers after endless discourses on death or immortality;
how many heroes after killing thousands; and how many tyrants who
have used their power over men's lives with terrible insolence as if
they were immortal; and how many cities are entirely dead, so to
speak, Helice and Pompeii and Herculaneum, and others
innumerable. Add to the reckoning all whom you have known, one
after another. One man after burying another has been laid out dead,
and another buries him: and all this in a short time. To conclude,
always observe how ephemeral and worthless human things are, and
what was yesterday a little mucus to-morrow will be a mummy or
ashes. Pass then through this little space of time conformably to
nature, and end thy journey in content, just as an olive falls off when
it is ripe, blessing nature who produced it, and thanking the tree on
which it grew.
 Be like the promontory against which the waves continually break,
but it stands firm and tames the fury of the water around it.
 Unhappy am I because this has happened to me. Not so, but happy
am I, though this has happened to me, because I continue free from
pain, neither crushed by the present nor fearing the future. For such a
thing as this might have happened to every man; but every man
would not have continued free from pain on such an occasion. Why
then is that rather a misfortune than this a good fortune? And do you
in all cases call that a man's misfortune, which is not a deviation
from man's nature? And does a thing seem to you to be a deviation
from man's nature, when it is not contrary to the will of man's
nature? Well, you know the will of nature. Will then this which has
happened prevent you from being just, magnanimous, temperate,
prudent, and secure against inconsiderate opinions and falsehood;
will it prevent you from having modesty, freedom, and everything
else, by the presence of which man's nature obtains all that is its
own? Remember too on every occasion which leads you to vexation
to apply this principle: not that this is a misfortune, but that to bear it
nobly is good fortune
Chapter 24
Greco-Roman Thought
This chapter title is perhaps a bit deceptive. The Romans were great adapters and the
Greeks provided them with plenty to adapt. This period of transition, starting really with the
Roman conquering of the Ptolemaic empire of the Egypt, marks the decline of Greek
influence in political matters, but not in matters of the mind (much to Cato’s chagrin).
Though the library hey-day created by Alexander and Aristotle and perfected by the
Ptolemaists has begun serious decline if not ruin, the Roman leaders began to be influenced
by the cultures they were encountering. Even if Caesar accidently burned down the library in
Alexandria while trying to burn its fleet in the harbor, the importance of Greek thought to the
development of Rome and any other society which came into contact with it cannot be
overlooked.
So we can also look at this chapter as type of follow-on discussion of Chapter 21.
The Players
Dates
335-263
341-270
214-129
106-43
100-55
20-40
AD/CE
506-574?
Philosophers
Main Points
Stoicism; peace and well being come from living in
Zeno
harmony with nature.
There is no afterlife, live now to the fullest. Ethics should
be guided by feeling like Physics is guided by our
Epicurus
senses.
Skeptic; reason and senses are flawed so suspend
Carneades
judgment
Platonic, Stoic; an eclectic philosopher
Cicero
Student and connoisseur of Epicurean thought.
Lucretius
Jewish philosopher, main influence is on later nonPhilo of Alexandria
Jewish thinkers; synthesis of Greek and Jewish thought.
?
Bodhidharma?
Table 17: The Greco-Roman Players
I know, I know, I hear you. Look at that list! What are you thinking? How big a bucket do
you think we need to carry here? And besides have we not already pounded the Greeks into
the ground?
Well, yes…and no. We put forth here the influences of the Greco-Roman Empire (and
Republic, and, etc.). Why? Because the influences are not only great within Rome, but
because Rome touches (if not conquers) most of the civilized western world. Never
underestimate the influence of trade, not just in goods but in ideas. The standardization of
Roman rule and practices produces a certain amount of standardization of thought as well.
Take a moment and think of the influence of the French culture, or now, the American.
Today we can see the struggle between the two. The French academy of language struggling
to keep the china shop bull of Americanisms out of their language, something they failed to
do with blue jeans.
And look, there are a few new names there.
The Greek System
Let’s face it. The Greeks spread their idée semines like brothers at a frat house and it was
not like their partners were not willing either.
One example of the influences which bear mention would be that of Greek thought on
Buddhismand through that later into Zen and even Christianity. If you want a longer article
on this then probably a good intro would be the only one I stumbled across
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greco-Buddhism. The summation would be that the art,
philosophy and practice of Buddhism in the areas of Greek occupation drastically changed to
include Greek ideas and styles, not just during the occupation but permanently creating a new
synthesis of ideas and at the same time those Greek thinkers were also influenced by their
Buddhist counterparts.
Roman Hands and Russian Fingers
Talking about a finger in every pot, the Roman Empire, long in the making and in the
unmaking, extended throughout the world as known to the West. Interestingly enough and as
a total sidebar here, the religions which took hold in Rome were as varied as the countries the
Romans occupied – but that is another class. As always we must be careful in making
generalizations about periods of human history which took millennia to accomplish, but that
does not mean that it will not happen here.
The Romans were a practical lot. They stood on ceremony, but often not for long, as it
was difficult to get off the bottom of your sandal. It is the practical things which attract them
within a philosophy and the esoteric things which they dismiss. Cato, after hearing Greek
philosophical arguments during a dispute, dismissed the whole lot as, well, liars and idiots
(as well as those who might be influenced by them). He saw no use in rhetoric except to
confuse and misdirect. He bemoaned that Rome was being swayed and enamored with
philosophers and saw it as her downfall.
Oddly enough though it did not have the effects of his dire predictions, but it does show a
bit the Roman mindset. Other Romans embraced philosophy and what they perceived to be
its benefits. Greek replaced Latin as the language of the educated. The Roman ability to
integrate, synthesize and adapt provided a common cultural lingua franca if you will for the
exchange of ideas and since they were ‘everywhere’ in the known Western World, ideas in
India could be exchanged with ideas in Spain or England.
The In Crowd
Still, until later in time, the mindset of Rome was somewhat reserved for Roman citizens.
But who would not want to be a Roman citizen, what with its privileges and legal rights?
Okay, aside from the Jews and the Egyptians, and the Scots, and the Picts, and…okay frankly
there were a few but other than them? I mean the Germans invaded to become Roman.
Somewhat akin to Truman Capote in New York, the Romans often embraced ideas for
vogue effect until something better came along or the quaint country cousin pointed out some
flaw or failing.
Alright, what am I getting at, right? Citizens enjoyed rights in which the common rabble
could not participate. Sure they kept local customs and law, and in some cases even religion,
but they were always within the context of the larger Roman culture. This could translate into
a freedom of thought which meant freedom within Roman thinking. Groups that might rise
up based on independent thinking often found themselves in opposition to local Roman
leadership. Local things were only as protected at the pleasure of Roman leaders.
In the end the Greeks had a full sense of debate and the Romans had an un-erring sense of
law. The term Greco-Roman is probably akin to shooting and stuffing an endangered species
in order to preserve it.
Pre-nups: Get It In Writing
Let us take a moment and talk about the Skeptics (from the Greek for to look for).
Carneades, head of the Academy in Athens, was not the first Skeptic, but he did really
introduce it into the Roman mind.
Skepticism is not the automatic nay-saying of any idea (c.f. end note for Chapter 4) nor is
it just doubt. Skepticism basically states that we can make no definite statements about
anything. Think of it as merely an attitude of suspending judgment on something because
frankly no judgment can be made. The truth cannot be known, or even demonstrated so you
should refrain from defining truths.
We are back to the questions of where do we start and how do we know. For most of the
philosophers whom we have looked at until now there is comes a point where they say we
just have to accept an idea as reasonable (Chapter 1) and move on. The Skeptics would say
no. This may seem contrary to what we think. This also kind of flies in the face of Aristotle
and Logic the whole target of which is to discover truths. Skeptics do just that without
compunction, arguing that in actuality it is an endless regression of trying to determine the
truth, and each truth just leads you to the search for the basis of that truth. So in a Zen-like
state the Skeptic says, why even try?
The Blue Or The Red Pill (or One Pill Makes you Taller…)
Spoiler Alert: We can see this in yet another cultural reference, in the movie The Matrix
(again, haven’t seen it? Rent it!). As the main character Neo learns, reality is up for grabs.
That which we see, the very basis for any doubt we may have is bounded by a machine’s
construct which then is another reality in itself encased within yet another reality. Neo’s
journey of self-awareness shows us that to begin to doubt reality does not necessarily lead
one to understanding of what one knows to be true. In other words, Skepticism is the
philosophy which challenges the ordinary assumption that there is evidence available that can
help to discriminate between the real world and some counterfeit world that appears in all
ways to be identical to the real world. What we must come to understand is that ordinary
doubt develops within the context of other propositions of a similar sort taken to be known,
and it can be eliminated by discovering the truth of some further proposition of the relevant
type. Doubt then, can never really be answered within the context in which it arises. In the
end there really is just no way to know so just reserve judgment on the matter at hand.
It is the very layers of reality which prevent us, nay obstruct us from understanding
reality. When one makes decisions about reality and tries to order one’s life around those
decisions one (or really everyone) discovers the boundary within which one made the
decision, meaning that those decisions are only good within that boundary and so another set
of decisions are now called for, and so on and so on (whew!). In the very end, it is Neo who
sets the boundary of his reality, knowing that it still exists within a larger reality.
Doubt then, is not the central core of Skepticism, except the doubt that there can be any
known truths. It is more an understanding that questioning is really useless, that it leads to
unhappiness, frustration and futility. Better to go through life skeptical of proffered truths
and systems, and reserving judgment about any of the big questions in life.
I would not reduce the intellectual life of the Romans to Stoicism and Skepticism but in
our great condensing they can be considered two main currents to said intellectual life.
Putting It Together
The advancement of thought and culture sometimes go together. Sometimes not. We have
in a sense been looking at synthesizers, people who build upon or meld ideas from earlier
thinkers together. Then there are those who are more amassers than synthesizers. Ultimately
the camps usually divide, with those who synthesize more and those who synthesize less. The
Greco-Roman world was filled with adapters and conglomerates, creating a broad-based
philosophical movement subsisting mostly in existing systems. We can see the effects in the
society, its thinkers and its writers. They were great at it. The question for us then is what
does the amassing of ideas produce?
Often times our understanding of things is based on incomplete or sketchy memories and
facts. For example, if you were to ask people who would know about such things to tell you
the Christmas story, they would most likely tell you an amalgamation of stories rather than
the story contained in Luke or Matthew specifically (yes, they are different). If you were to
ask the specific reference for different parts of their story, they would most likely be unable
to tell you (if you even knew yourself). Okay you say, but is that a bad thing?
It can be. Let us not forget our early lessons about bias. Think back to your initial beliefs
about Epicurean hedonism. If we clump things together then we do not understand them
fully, though we may have the gist. Take this work for instance, with often condenses deep
philosophical systems and thoughts to one-liners. Full understanding only comes with depth.
The stability of political systems, even though they seem chaotic on the surface, especially
the Pax Romana can lead to a type of stagnation of thought. And why should it not? If it ain’t
broke don’t fix it. We can see further refinements and clarification but little innovation (c.f.
Chapter 22). It is nothing new, nor will it continue to be.
The seeking of spiritual truth can lead one down varied paths, and into the error of
mediocrity.
Relevant scene from Monty Python’s Life of Brian.
Reg: What have the Romans ever done for us?
Various Attendees: Sanitation? Medicine? Education? Wine? Public order? Irrigation?
Roads? The fresh water system? Public health?
Reg: All right, but apart from the sanitation, medicine, education, wine, public order,
irrigation, roads, the fresh water system and public health, what have the Romans ever done
for us?
Attendee: Brought peace?
Reg: Oh, peace - shut up!
Chapter 25
Philosophical Weaknesses
Okay. As I’ve probably said someplace before and will most likely say again, most people
might think that this is a strange chapter for a couple of reasons. One: Weaknesses? Isn’t it a
bit late for that? Two: But isn’t that why we are here? Valid, true, but again, bear with me.
Technically this is the second part of the previous chapter (and therefore a third part to
Chapter 21). We have examined the foundational systems of Western and Eastern thought
and we can be relatively cocky about the future of these philosophical systems. Even with the
introduction of religious based ideas the themes and views expressed by these systems pretty
much rule the day and influence everything we hold to be true about humanity and the world.
Philosophical Synthesis
Who is right? Plato? Aristotle? Confucius? Zeno? Buddha? Epicurus? Are they all right in
their own way?
We can see that each seems to hit upon an aspect of the human condition which makes
sense. Scientifically, perhaps some have a better handle on the structure of things than others,
and we must have science in order to bring understanding (or do we?). We who have the
benefit of hind-sight and some great experimental science under our belt understand the
universe at a different level than they did (right?). Can we then, pick and choose better than
they? Perceived advances in understanding (via faith or science) may seem to give us an
advantage that these poor misguided saps did not as they muddled through. In some things,
this is most definitely true. We have a greater understanding of the brain and the body, of the
stars and of atoms, yet we still struggle with the fundamental questions and come no further
sometimes than they.
The thinkers to come will exercise a bit of mental gymnastics in order to come up with
explanations for things which are really actually very hard to explain. In a way they are like
us. Certainly the educated populous knows the ideas of the Greeks, has possibly even argued
about them and even decided to live by them. We begin to move into a time when the society
as a whole will be introduced to these ideas at the grassroots level.
Forget them for a moment. Let us concentrate on ourselves.
Philosophical Exercises
Alright then, let us engage in a bit of our own philosophical gymnastics. Examine your
own beliefs and try to plug them into the philosophies we have examined so far. Our first
task is to once again not pigeon-hole any of the thinkers we have encountered. We do not
care about where they are from, what cultural situation from which they arose, nor do we
care about things they say which we may think ridiculous or offensive. We want to look at
them within the context of their thought alone (logically), and not what we think of them.
So slough off those biases and stereotypes and cast your mind back to the ideas which
struck you, excited you, gave you pause. Try to classify yourself in one type of system, or the
follower of one system or philosopher. It is okay, I will wait. (hmm, hmmm, la, la, la, bumde-bum, la, la, la) Good? Got it?
Whether you answered yes or no, begin to formulate an argument for your choice. Write it
here (or someplace in your notebook, you are keeping a notebook aren’t you?). Once again, I
will wait:
My raison d’être by [insert your name here]:
Exercise 2: My Raison d’être
Philologus Ludi
Wait, that is Latin right? Does that make it a fallacy? Ha, ha, good memory (well, at least
I do, except when it comes to my car keys), but no, though we are looking for a bit of fun.
We have stretched our minds in the last section so let us take some time to put that expanded
mind to the test.
Thought
Philosopher/y
“Life comes at you pretty fast; if you don’t stop and look
around once in a while, you could miss it.”
“We are what we repeatedly do. Excellence, then, is not an
act, but a habit.”
“You know freedom’s just a stupid superstition, ‘cause life’s
a highway that you travel blind.”
“Hey, hey, hey, hey-now. Don't be mean; we don't have to be
mean, ‘cuz, remember, no matter where you go, there you
are.”
“Quite simply captain, I examined the problem from all
angles, and it was plainly hopeless. Logic informed me that
under the circumstances, the only logical action would have
to be one of desperation. Logical decision logically arrived
at.”
“Everything I needed to know, I learned in Kindergarten.”
Exercise 3: Thought to Philosopher
Not too hard, eh? Game one down. Now, game two. Match the philosophy/philosopher to
the thought.
Socrates
Virtue
Skeptics
Inner Peace
Confucius
Aristotle
The Soul
Reality is not what it seems
Epicurus
Friendship is everything
Stoics
Reincarnation
Buddha
Be in harmony
Exercise 4: Philosopher to Thought
Not so easy this time you say? Okay so I put some tricky ones in there. As was intimated
in the previous chapter, sometimes we can confuse or lump together ideas. Sometimes a
single idea has many iterations and sometimes a different idea means the same thing in
different systems.
What you should have noticed by now (and shame on me if you did not) is that often these
systems are not very far from one another. At their base is a particular idea and at their goal
is a particular idea, and though the pathways may be different often even those share similar
ideas or methods. We can see parallels between East and West, between Greeks and Chinese,
Modern and Ancient.
BONUS: what logical fallacy(ies) did I employ in the last puzzle?
Putting It Together
How we put things together says much about us. We have looked at this idea earlier, but
without the benefit of the basic (and I emphasize basic) knowledge of these fundamental
systems. Now, with some hindsight we look at the ‘problem’ again. Sometimes how someone
puts an argument is as effective as the argument itself. Two philosophers may state the same
point, but one has an argument which appeals to us personally over what the other argues.
The true name of this chapter then is OUR Philosophical Weaknesses. This is more or less
a heads up chapter, because soon we will be entering into a period similar to the Roman
period, where ideas can become muddled, or our own biases and prejudices can easily come
into play. It is always important to keep in mind where we have come from, as well as where
we want to go, though in philosophy the goal can sometimes get lost amid the rhetoric.
Buck up campers! Do not get discouraged and be up for the ride to come!
“What was that middle thing?” Otto, A Fish Named Wanda
Chapter 26
Early Jewish and Christian Philosophy
How do different societies and civilizations change when they come into contact with one
another? No, this is not a continuation of the previous continuations. This time we are going
to look at it from the other direction. These thinkers are not concerned with the citystate/empire in which they reside but an understanding of the God which resides within
which they reside. Jewish culture is built upon the monarchy of the one God and Christianity
is built upon the Jewish Messianic culture. Unlike the later Roman Emperor cult, God is the
ultimate leader of the society, religiously, politically, and ethically.
The idea of a human leader usurping God is not viable within this framework as God will
always usurp any upstart human (usually because they die20). With the wide scale acceptance
of the human/God Jesus by Christians the idea of a political/religious state lessens (I know, I
know, but that is later). The functions of the state are separate from the functions of Faith.
Within Christianity one is called to live ethically within the state, even if the foundation of
that state is unethical because the foundation of life is within God. This may sound like
Socrates, but it is not because of, as he would say, some sort of agreement between the state
and the individual (remember Crito).
What this means is that the drive to Wisdom, or ethical behavior is not driven by
human/worldly concerns but by concerns of the divine (divine reason, objective truth,
whatever you want to call it), who can be the only source for such behavior. So how does one
reconcile the seeking of Wisdom with the desire to seek God?
Philosophy VS. Theology
This brings us to the sticky subject. If philosophy is literally the love of wisdom then we
can literally define theology as the study of God. In this period of time the line between the
two blurs somewhat. Is there a difference? Well there are many arguments for and against
that statement, but let it suffice us to say yes and no. In some ways they stand apart from one
another, in others they stand upon one another. If one takes the sole reason route, then
philosophy and theology cannot be reconciled. If one takes the ethics route then they are
definitely complimentary. This can create something of a quandary for us, but only if we let
it. As with Plato, Aristotle and the rest, we seek to understand the philosophical nature of the
thought and its ramifications within a system, not argue its merits or deficiencies on the God
question.
Each of the following groups is philosophically guided by a system of thought. The
question becomes one of authority. By what authority do we make pronouncements? Is it
purely by reason, and what can be reasoned, or is there a single authority which makes it
reasonably so? We are back to our earlier discussion of Prime Mover: is it physics or
God(Chapter 4)? How the thinkers of this time resolve that question is larger than we can
really cover here, but it does have effect not just now, but in philosophies to come.
Initially we will see the Wisdom/Logos—God connection being made, seeming to
reconcile the two. We also will see an argument develop known as the ‘what does Athens
20
God is dead – Nietzsche; Nietzsche is dead – God.
have to do with Jerusalem’. Some saw a basis for understanding God within philosophy.
Others saw philosophy as a tool of theology. Still others saw philosophy as the root of all
error within theology (hence the Athens/Jerusalem reference).
The Players
Dates
20-40
AD/CE
?-65
100?-165
Philosophers
Main Points
Jewish, but main influence is on later non-Jewish
thinkers; synthesis of Greek and Jewish thought.
Christian, used Greek thought to spread Christian ideas
Paul of Tarsus
Stoic; Logos is Christ; we must accept what comes to us
Justin Martyr
because of our faith.
Table 18: Early Jewish and Christian Players
Philo of Alexandria
Jewish Philosophers
As we have previously discussed, the spread of Greek thought was not without effect. The
Jews did have a run-in with Hellenistic culture (recall the feast of Hanukkah as recounted in
the Old Testament book of Maccabeus). In fact besides the influence it had on them (c.f. the
Hellenists references in Scripture) they had influence within it themselves. The term Lovers
of God (also mentioned in Scripture) referred to Greek/non-genetic Jews who had devoted
themselves to the practice of Judaism.
First and foremost is Philo of Alexandria. As the name implies he lived in that Egyptian
city named for Aristotle’s pupil. While his fusion of Greek and Hebraic thought was not
really influential among the Jews, it does influence later Christian writers.
Philo saw himself not only as a Jew but also as a Platonist/Stoic. He really sought a
synthesis of Hebraic and Greek thought mainly aimed at -- big word warning! -- exegesis or
the critical discussion/interpretation of scripture. He used Greek philosophy to expound and
explain aspects of the Hebrew Scriptures (most probably the Septuagint, the Greek
translation of the Hebrew Scriptures) which he views in both a literal and allegorical light.
We might place him in the Hermeneutics branch of philosophy if we were so inclined.
For Philo, God is the only efficient cause, in the mode of divine reason immanent in the
world. The powers emanating from God and suffusing the world and the doctrine of the
Logos figure within his thought. We can begin to see a pattern which, eh? Still, Philo does
make a distinction between philosophy and wisdom. Philosophy is the devotion to wisdom
and Wisdom is the knowledge of divine things. A subtle difference in thought from some
earlier systems as we have already noted.
As a tidbit, most of what we know of Philo aside from his writings comes to us through
another familiar name, Josephus, the Jewish historian. In the end, these are not the only
philosophers who were Jews, but as we shall see in time to come, while philosophers
continue to shade their thought with their religious affiliation, it becomes less about being a
Jewish or Christian or whatever philosopher and more about being a philosopher which is of
that faith (or lack thereof). But those are later chapters.
Early Christian Philosophers
WARNING: Oversimplifications Ahead! We can actually start with Paul of Tarsus. Most
people might not think of him as a philosopher, but his adaptation of Hellenistic thought to
Christianity and vice versa was significant. From the book known as the Acts of the Apostles
we know that he engaged in philosophical debate. Spurred on by Epicureans and Stoic
philosophers, Paul mounted the Areopagus in Athens (a large flat hill above the agora and
just beneath the Acropolis: the soapbox of its day) and was challenged to a discussion of
ideas. The outcome was mixed, and while some derided his thought (most probably the
Epicureans because he discussed the soul) some did follow his teachings (Acts 17:16-34)
which means he had some rhetorical ability and had to have some knowledge of their
thought.
We can see it in his writings, known as Epistles (literally letters). For example Paul’s
discussion of body and soul is a direct appeal to the Greek mind. In Hebraic thought there
was no dichotomy of body and soul, they were of one substance. If there was any division it
would be between heart and mind, not between the physical and the metaphysical.
With the rise of Christianity, and in the vein of Paul, Apologists arise to spread their
message using the rhetorical formula familiar in the Near East and the West. These are not
just speakers but writers and we have the results of several of their efforts.
The significance of this may not seem large except for the fact that they are also an insight
into the mindset of the Roman empire, its leaders, its citizens and its inhabitants. What kind
of argumentation are they using? What does that say about the audience of these works?
Many Christians are ‘converts’ and the thinkers are often well-educated especially in the arts
and philosophy.
Justin Martyr
Of specific note along those lines was Justin Martyr who lived in the second century, and
died about 100 years after the events he is defending, ironically during the reign of the
philosopher-king Marcus Aurelius. As a quick note, early Christianity was identified with
Judaism, and because Judaism was an ancient religion, its practice was protected under
Roman law. Jews were not bound by Roman custom where it interfered in the practice of
their own religious beliefs. Christianity shared this protection until someone argued that they
were not the same, at which time, Christians became obligated to follow Roman religious
customs, such as military service and offering sacrifice to the gods, the emperor, etc. This
they refused to do and needless to say, it got them into trouble with the local constabulary.
Justin opened a Christian school in Rome, training many students in Christian apologetics
and theology as well as philosophy. But his main works are apologetic. He wrote to the
Emperor, the Senate, to Greeks, to Roman officials, whoever he thought might have
influence and might be influenced by his arguments, hoping to keep Christianity and
Christians safe.
As a philosopher, Justin was intent on showing how Christianity brought completeness to
the pagan philosophies. One of the ways he does this is to use of the idea of the Logos. By
now the idea of the Logos was widely familiar to educated men, and the designation of the
Son of God as the Logos was not new to Christian theology. The manner in which Justin
identifies the historical Christ with the rational force operative in the universe leads up to a
claim of all truth and virtue being contained within Christianity and the adoration of Christ
(which aroused so much opposition) is the only reasonable attitude, that is, as we have seen
philosophers state before, it is the only reasonable way to think.
It is not so much that Justin depends upon understood philosophical concepts to explain
Christology or Trinitarian doctrine or other Christian beliefs but that he wants his audience to
see that what they believe is contained within and perfected by belief in Christ.
Cynics
Another ancient group which bears some expansion of discussion here are the Cynics (c.f.
Chapter 15). The asceticism of the Cynics appealed to Christian thinkers. Paul of Tarsus
seemed to espouse the idea that the end was coming soon, that the return of Jesus to once and
for all set the world right was imminent. For this reason, strict asceticism was called for,
denouncing the things of the world and embracing virtue.
The Cynics still saw themselves as Platonists, almost as Socratic in their view of their role
as gad-fly, using satire and bull-dog tactics to constantly point out the flaws within society
and calling it forward. This too has a certain appeal within Christianity.
A growing sense of the expanse of the empire also played to the Cynic idea of ‘citizen of
the world’, not just a city or country. People belonged to something larger, not just provincial
concerns. The translation of this into concern for others outside ones family or city also had
great appeal to Christians, which we can see from the earliest decisions to provide aid to
communities no matter where they were established (c.f. Acts), as well as the concept of
community extending even beyond death (aka the Communion of Saints).
Still certain practices, such as a complete disregard for modesty, were derided by
Christian writers, such as Augustine, and understandably, not integrated into the mainstream
thinking.
Heresy
Speaking of deriding, while the thinkers and writers of this period were focused mainly on
secular powers and thinkers, there also developed an internal strife between thinkers within
Christianity. The early attempts at apologetics also produced lines of thinking based within
the Greco-Roman mindset which fell into conflict with orthodox teachings.
As time goes by and less and less effort was needed to convince the populous, the writings
and argumentation turned more toward Christian ideas and the discussion of whether or not
the ideas had merit within the Christian ethos.
Both of these situations produced what has become known as heresy. Heresy comes from
the Greek for to choose, as in choosing what you want to believe, and in a no-brainer, the
conflict of that belief with orthodoxy (right belief). Some disputes were in terms of
orthodoxy to lunatic fringe kind of issues, like some Gnostics (from Gk to know) and other
mystery cults but others were the product of sincere and intellectually honest efforts to reach
understanding using the philosophical concepts of the day.
Most of the earliest heresies deal with the nature of Christ as both human and divine, or
what is called the hypostatic union. This idea is central to the Christo-centric Christians, and
informs not only many doctrines but many future theologians and philosophers. Because of
this, the ideas of nature, substance, accidents, the soul, the divine and many other previously
discussed subjects all come into play. At the same time the meaning of a term, the way in
which it is used and its use to describe a single aspect of Christology could often be
misconstrued and/or over-developed, resulting in conflict.
Ecumenical Councils
In line with this and especially with the legitimization of Christianity, the cosmopolitan
nature of the believers lent itself to the solving of global problems and standardization of
doctrinal issues. The means of accomplishing this was the council, specifically an ecumenical
(meaning non-regional, or with everybody) council and the theological discussions were
informed by philosophical and scriptural language. The conflict over the nature of Christ
took many forms and the arguments from both philosophical and scriptural sources raged
over centuries.
The idea of an ecumenical council was not new in the 4th century. In fact it has a long
history within Christianity and Judaism. The development of the council allowed Christianity
and Judaism to a certain extent, to finalized the means of establishing authority and
uniformity (orthodoxy) . The norms fall under three titles: Scripture (both Hebrew and
Christian), Tradition (both Jewish and Apostolic) and Magisterium (which is just a big Latin
word for teachers – Rabbis and Bishops); Scripture as the written word, Tradition is the
spoken words and sanctioned actions practiced but not ‘written down’ and Magisterium as
the teaching/conserving body. Appeals to reason will often refer to one of these bodies.
Theology is not necessarily limited to these authorities, because it is the exploration of
God using human intellect (both a priori and a posteriori experience), and as such is often
brought into conflict with the established authority. In the end, any appeal, either theological
or doctrinal will be made to these authorities.
Putting It Together
At this time, the main thinkers I bring up here did not have a large influence. So why
bring them up? In the 70’s Jerusalem is destroyed and the Jews are dispersed. Soon,
Christianity will become a major influence in Roman society. By the time Constantine
arrives on the scene (the 320s), a majority of the bureaucracy of the Roman Empire is
actually Christian. The previous pogroms and persecutions have failed to rout the society of
the mal-content Jews or the blasphemous Christians. Not only failed but the people you begin
to rely on to carry them out really have no incentive to disperse, arrest or crucify themselves.
What we are beginning to see is not just the synthesis of ideas but the codification of
beliefs as ideas and the insinuation of ideas into belief.
Until now, while most systems referenced a divinity or prime cause, often calling it God
or the gods or divine reason, the systems were about the systems themselves and how the
god/gods fit into them. Here we begin to see the movement toward God as being the reason
for the system. Not to say this is not present in the earlier systems but not to the extent we see
now. Now we begin to see the rationalization or justification of these systems in light of the
religious/theological framework/system.
So maybe this chapter is really about the Philosophy v Theology problem. Perhaps we
really need to spend some more time exploring that idea and I am sure we will.
“I fell in love with the prophets and these men who had loved Christ; I reflected on all their words and found
that this philosophy alone was true and profitable.”
“No one who is rightly minded turns from true belief to false.” Justin Martyr
Chapter 26a
Apologetic Writers
Here is a sampling from various authors. Notice the use of various concepts within them which might be familiar to us. There may
be some theological concepts which are unfamiliar but that is okay, because we are examining the context for them.
Father, just as you can see even in your own writers, one man being the
writer of the whole, but introducing the persons who converse.
Justin Martyr: First Apology
XVIII
PROOF OF IMMORTALITY AND THE RESURRECTION.
For reflect upon the end of each of the preceding kings, how they died
the death common to all, which, if it issued in insensibility, would be a
godsend to all the wicked. But since sensation remains to all who have
ever lived, and eternal punishment is laid up (i.e., for the wicked), see
that you neglect not to be convinced, and to hold as your belief, that
these things are true. For let even necromancy, and the divinations you
practice by immaculate children, and the evoking of departed human
souls, and those who are called among the magi, Dream-senders and
Assistant-spirits (Familiars), and all that is done by those who are
skilled in such matters--let these persuade you that even after death
souls are in a state of sensation; and those who are seized and cast
about by the spirits of the dead, whom all call demoniacs or madmen;
and what you repute as oracles, both of Amphilochus, Dodana, Pytho,
and as many other such as exist; and the opinions of your authors,
Empedocles and Pythagoras, Plato and Socrates, and the pit of Homer,
and the descent of Ulysses to inspect these things, and all that has been
uttered of a like kind. Such favor as you grant to these, grant also to us,
who not less but more firmly than they believe in God; since we expect
to receive again our own bodies, though they be dead and cast into the
earth, for we maintain that with God nothing is impossible.
XXXVI
DIFFERENT MODES OF PROPHECY.
But when you hear the utterances of the prophets spoken as it were
personally, you must not suppose that they are spoken by the inspired
themselves, but by the Divine Word who moves them. For sometimes
He declares things that are to come to pass, in the manner of one who
foretells the future; sometimes He speaks as from the person of God the
Lord and Father of all; sometimes as from the person of Christ;
sometimes as from the person of the people answering the Lord or His
XLIII
RESPONSIBILITY ASSERTED.
But lest some suppose, from what has been said by us, that we say that
whatever happens, happens by a fatal necessity, because it is foretold as
known beforehand, this too we explain. We have learned from the
prophets, and we hold it to be true, that punishments, and
chastisements, and good rewards, are rendered according to the merit of
each man's actions. Since if it be not so, but all things happen by fate,
neither is anything at all in our own power. For if it be fated that this
man, e.g., be good, and this other evil, neither is the former meritorious
nor the latter to be blamed. And again, unless the human race has the
power of avoiding evil and choosing good by free choice, they are not
accountable for their actions, of whatever kind they be. But that it is by
free choice they both walk uprightly and stumble, we thus demonstrate.
We see the same man making a transition to opposite things. Now, if it
had been fated that he were to be either good or bad, he could never
have been capable of both the opposites, nor of so many transitions. But
not even would some be good and others bad, since we thus make fate
the cause of evil, and exhibit her as acting in opposition to herself; or
that which has been already stated would seem to be true, that neither
virtue nor vice is anything, but that things are only reckoned good or
evil by opinion; which, as the true word shows, is the greatest impiety
and wickedness. But this we assert is inevitable fate, that they who
choose the good have worthy rewards, and they who choose the
opposite have their merited awards. For not like other things, as trees
and quadrupeds, which cannot act by choice, did God make man: for
neither would he be worthy of reward or praise did he not of himself
choose the good, but were created for this end; nor, if he were evil,
would he be worthy of punishment, not being evil of himself, but being
able to be nothing else than what he was made.
Athenagoras Of Athens
V
A PLEA FOR THE CHRISTIANS: TESTIMONY OF THE
POETS TO THE UNITY OF GOD.
Poets and philosophers have not been voted atheists for
inquiring concerning God. Euripides, speaking of those who,
according to popular preconception, are ignorantly called gods,
says doubtingly: “If Zeus indeed does reign in heaven above, He
ought not on the righteous ills to send.” But speaking of Him
who is apprehended by the understanding as matter of certain
knowledge, he gives his opinion decidedly, and with
intelligence, thus:- “See you on high him who, with humid arms,
Clasps both the boundless ether and the earth? Him reckon Zeus,
and him regard as God.”
XV
ON THE RESURRECTION OF THE DEAD: ARGUMENT
FOR THE RESURRECTION FROM THE NATURE OF MAN.
But while the cause discoverable in the creation of men is of
itself sufficient to prove that the resurrection follows by natural
sequence on the dissolution of bodies, yet it is perhaps right not
to shrink from adducing either of the proposed arguments, but,
agreeably to what has been said, to point out to those who are
not able of themselves to discern them, the arguments from each
of the truths evolved from the primary; and first and foremost,
the nature of the men created, which conducts us to the same
notion, and has the same force as evidence of the resurrection.
For if the whole nature of men in general is composed of an
immortal soul and a body which was fitted to it in the creation,
and if neither to the nature of the soul by itself, nor to the nature
of the body separately, has God assigned such a creation or such
a life and entire course of existence as this, but to men
compounded of the two, in order that they may, when they have
passed through their present existence, arrive at one common
end, with the same elements of which they are composed at their
birth and during life, it unavoidably follows, since one livingbeing is formed from the two, experiencing whatever the soul
experiences and whatever the body experiences, doing and
performing whatever requires the judgment of the senses or of
the reason, that the whole series of these things must be referred
to some one end, in order that they all, and by means of all,
namely, man's creation, man's nature, man's life, man's doings
and sufferings, his course of existence, and the end suitable to
his nature,--may concur in one harmony and the same common
experience. But if there is someone harmony and community of
experience belonging to the whole being, whether of the things
which spring from the soul or of those which are accomplished
by means of the body, the end for all these must also be one.
And the end will be in strictness one, if the being whose end that
end is remains the same in its constitution; and the being-will be
exactly the same, if all those things of which the being consists
as parts are the same. And they will be the same in respect of
their peculiar union, if the parts dissolved are again united for
the constitution of the being. And the constitution of the same
men of necessity proves that a resurrection will follow of the
dead and dissolved bodies; for without this, neither could the
same parts be united according to nature with one another, nor
could the nature of the same men be reconstituted. And if both
understanding and reason have been given to men for the
discernment of things which are perceived by the understanding,
and not of existences only, but also of the goodness and wisdom
and rectitude of their Giver, it necessarily follows that, since
those things continue for the sake of which the rational
judgment is given, the judgment given for these things should
also continue. But it is impossible for this to continue, unless the
nature which has received it, and in which it adheres, continues.
But that which has received both understanding and reason is
man, not the soul by itself. Man, therefore, who consists of the
two parts, must continue forever. But it is impossible for him to
continue unless he rise again. For if no resurrection was to take
place, the nature of men as men would not continue. And if the
nature of men does not continue, in vain has the soul been fitted
to the need of the body and to its experiences; in vain has the
body been lettered so that it cannot obtain what it longs for,
obedient to the reins of the soul, and guided by it as with a
bridle; in vain is the understanding, in vain is wisdom, and the
observance of rectitude, or even the practice of every virtue, and
the enactment and enforcement of laws,--to say all in a word,
whatever is noble in men or for men's sake, or rather the very
creation and nature of men. But if vanity is utterly excluded
from all the works of God, and from all the gifts bestowed by
Him, the conclusion is unavoidable, that, along with the
interminable duration of the soul, there will be a perpetual
continuance of the body according to its proper nature.
2,3
Irenaeus: Against Heresies, Book II
2,1 It is proper, then, that I should begin with the first and most
2,2
important head, that is, God the Creator, who made the heaven
and the earth, and all things that are therein (whom these men
blasphemously style the fruit of a defect), and to demonstrate
that there is nothing either above Him or after Him; nor that,
influenced by any one, but of His own free will, He created all
things, since He is the only God, the only Lord, the only
Creator, the only Father, alone containing all things, and
Himself commanding all things into existence.
For how can there be any other Fullness [Pleroma], or Principle,
or Power, or God, above Him, since it is matter of necessity that
God, the Pleroma (Fullness) of all these, should contain all
things in His immensity, and should be contained by no one?
But if there is anything beyond Him, He is not then the Pleroma
of all, nor does He contain all. For that which they declare to be
beyond Him will be wanting to the Pleroma, or, [in other
words,] to that God who is above all things. But that which is
wanting, and falls in any way short, is not the Pleroma of all
things. In such a case, He would have both a beginning, middle,
and end, with respect to those who are beyond Him. And if He
has an end in regard to those things which are below, He has
also a beginning with respect to those things which are above. In
like manner, there is an absolute necessity that He should
experience the very same thing at all other points, and should be
held in, bounded, and enclosed by those existences that are
outside of Him. For that being who is the end downwards
necessarily circumscribes and surrounds him who finds his end
in it. And thus, according to them, the Father of all (that is, He
whom they call Proön and Proarche), with their Pleroma, and
6,1
the good God of Marcion, is established and enclosed in some
other, and is surrounded from without by another mighty Being,
who must of necessity be greater, inasmuch as that which
contains is greater than that which is contained. But then that
which is greater is also stronger, and in a greater degree Lord;
and that which is greater, and stronger, and in a greater degree
Lord— must be God.
Now, since there exists, according to them, also something else
which they declare to be outside of the Pleroma, into which they
further hold there descended that higher power who went astray,
it is in every way necessary that the Pleroma either contains that
which is beyond, yet is contained (for otherwise, it will not be
beyond the Pleroma; for if there is anything beyond the Pleroma,
there will be a Pleroma within this very Pleroma which they
declare to be outside of the Pleroma, and the Pleroma will be
contained by that which is beyond: and with the Pleroma is
understood also the first God); or, again, they must be an infinite
distance separated from each other — the Pleroma [I mean], and
that which is beyond it. But if they maintain this, there will then
be a third kind of existence, which separates by immensity the
Pleroma and that which is beyond it. This third kind of existence
will therefore bound and contain both the others, and will be
greater both than the Pleroma, and than that which is beyond it,
inasmuch as it contains both in its bosom. In this way, talk
might go on forever concerning those things which are
contained, and those which contain. For if this third existence
has its beginning above, and its end beneath, there is an absolute
necessity that it be also bounded on the sides, either beginning
or ceasing at certain other points, [where new existences begin.]
These, again, and others which are above and below, will have
their beginnings at certain other points, and so on ad infinitum;
so that their thoughts would never rest in one God, but, in
consequence of seeking after more than exists, would wander
away to that which has no existence, and depart from the true
God.
…For though it is true, as they declare, that they were very far
separated from Him through their inferiority [of nature], yet, as
His dominion extended over all of them, it behooved them to
know their Ruler, and to be aware of this in particular, that He
9,1
13,8
who created them is Lord of all. For since His invisible essence
is mighty, it confers on all a profound mental intuition and
perception of His most powerful, yea, omnipotent greatness.
Wherefore, although no one knows the Father, except the Son,
nor the Son except the Father, and those to whom the Son will
reveal Him (Matthew 11:27) , yet all [beings] do know this one
fact at least, because reason, implanted in their minds, moves
them, and reveals to them [the truth] that there is one God, the
Lord of all.
That God is the Creator of the world is accepted even by those
very persons who in many ways speak against Him, and yet
acknowledge Him, styling Him the Creator, and an angel, not to
mention that all the Scriptures call out [to the same effect], and
the Lord teaches us of this Father who is in heaven, and no
other, as I shall show in the sequel of this work. For the present,
however, that proof which is derived from those who allege
doctrines opposite to ours, is of itself sufficient—all men, in
fact, consenting to this truth: the ancients on their part
preserving with special care, from the tradition of the firstformed man, this persuasion, while they celebrate the praises of
one God, the Maker of heaven and earth; others, again, after
them, being reminded of this fact by the prophets of God, while
the very heathen learned it from creation itself. For even
creation reveals Him who formed it, and the very work made
suggests Him who made it, and the world manifests Him who
ordered it. The Universal Church, moreover, through the whole
world, has received this tradition from the apostles.
…For they maintain that Logos and Zoe were sent forth by him
(i.e., Nous) as fashioners of this Pleroma; while they conceive of
an emission of Logos, that is, the Word after the analogy of
human feelings, and rashly form conjectures respecting God, as
if they had discovered something wonderful in their assertion
that Logos was I produced by Nous. All indeed have a clear
perception that this may be logically affirmed with respect to
men. But in Him who is God over all, since He is all Nous, and
all Logos, as I have said before, and has in Himself nothing
more ancient or late than another, and nothing at variance with
another, but continues altogether equal, and similar, and
homogeneous, there is no longer ground for conceiving of such
30,9
production in the order which has been mentioned. Just as he
does not err who declares that God is all vision, and all hearing
(for in what manner He sees, in that also He hears; and in what
manner He hears, in that also He sees), so also he who affirms
that He is all intelligence, and all word, and that, in whatever
respect He is intelligence, in that also He is word, and that this
Nous is His Logos, will still indeed have only an inadequate
conception of the Father of all, but will entertain far more
becoming [thoughts regarding Him] than do those who transfer
the generation of the word to which men gave utterance to the
eternal Word of God, assigning a beginning and course of
production [to Him], even as they do to their own word. And in
what respect will the Word of God— yes, rather God Himself,
since He is the Word — differ from the word of men, if He
follows the same order and process of generation?
For if the Savior formed the things which have been made, by
means of him (the Demiurge [a craftsman]), he is proved in that
case not to be inferior but superior to them, since he is found to
have been the former even of themselves; for they, too, have a
place among created things. How, then, can it be argued that
these men indeed are spiritual, but that he by whom they were
created is of an animal nature? Or, again, if (which is indeed the
only true supposition, as I have shown by numerous arguments
of the very clearest nature) He (the Creator) made all things
freely, and by His own power, and arranged and finished them,
and His will is the substance of all things, then He is discovered
to be the one only God who created all things, who alone is
Omnipotent, and who is the only Father rounding and forming
all things, visible and invisible, such as may be perceived by our
senses and such as cannot, heavenly and earthly, by the word of
His power; Hebrews 1:3 and He has fitted and arranged all
things by His wisdom, while He contains all things, but He
Himself can be contained by no one: He is the Former, He the
Builder, He the Discoverer, He the Creator, He the Lord of all;
and there is no one besides Him, or above Him, neither has He
any mother, as they falsely ascribe to Him; nor is there a second
God, as Marcion has imagined; nor is there a Pleroma of thirty
Æons [personified spiritual power emanating from the Supreme
Being], which has been shown a vain supposition; nor is there
any such being as Bythus or Proarche; nor are there a series of
heavens; nor is there a virginal light, nor an unnamable Æon,
nor, in fact, any one of those things which are madly dreamt of
by these, and by all the heretics. But there is one only God, the
Creator— He who is above every Principality, and Power, and
Dominion, and Virtue: He is Father, He is God, He the Founder,
He the Maker, He the Creator, who made those things by
Himself, that is, through His Word and His Wisdom— heaven
and earth, and the seas, and all things that are in them: He is
just; He is good; He it is who formed man, who planted
paradise, who made the world, who gave rise to the flood, who
saved Noah; He is the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac,
and the God of Jacob, the God of the living: He it is whom the
law proclaims, whom the prophets preach, whom Christ reveals,
whom the apostles make known to us, and in whom the Church
believes. He is the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ: through His
Word, who is His Son, through Him He is revealed and
manifested to all to whom He is revealed; for those [only] know
Him to whom the Son has revealed Him. But the Son, eternally
co-existing with the Father, from of old, yea, from the
beginning, always reveals the Father to Angels, Archangels,
Powers, Virtues, and all to whom He wills that God should be
revealed.
Book IV
6,6 For by means of the creation itself, the Word reveals God the
Creator; and by means of the world [does He declare] the Lord
the Maker of the world; and by means of the formation [of man]
the Artificer who formed him; and by the Son that Father who
begot the Son: and these things do indeed address all men in the
same manner, but all do not in the same way believe them. But
by the law and the prophets did the Word preach both Himself
and the Father alike [to all]; and all the people heard Him alike,
but all did not alike believe. And through the Word Himself who
had been made visible and palpable, was the Father shown forth,
although all did not equally believe in Him; but all saw the
Father in the Son: for the Father is the invisible of the Son, but
the Son the visible of the Father. And for this reason all spoke
with Christ when He was present [upon earth], and they named
Him God. Yea, even the demons exclaimed, on beholding the
Son: We know You who You are, the Holy One of God
(Mark 1:24). And the devil looking at Him, and tempting Him,
said: If You are the Son of God (Matthew 4:3; Luke 4:3); — all
thus indeed seeing and speaking of the Son and the Father, but
all not believing [in them].
Clement of Alexandria: Exhortation to the
Greeks
I Whether, then, the Phrygians are shown to be the most ancient
people by the goats of the fable; or, on the other hand, the
Arcadians by the poets, who describe them as older than the
moon; or, finally, the Egyptians by those who dream that this
land first gave birth to gods and men: yet none of these at least
existed before the world. But before the foundation of the world
were we, who, because destined to be in Him, pre-existed in the
eye of God before—we the rational creatures of the Word of
God, on whose account we date from the beginning; for in the
beginning was the Word. Well, inasmuch as the Word was from
the first, He was and is the divine source of all things; but
inasmuch as He has now assumed the name Christ, consecrated
of old, and worthy of power, he has been called by me the New
Song. This Word, then, the Christ, the cause of both our being at
first (for He was in God) and of our well-being, this very Word
has now appeared as man, He alone being both, both God and
man— the Author of all blessings to us; by whom we, being
taught to live well, are sent on our way to life eternal. For,
according to that inspired apostle of the Lord, the grace of God
which brings salvation has appeared to all men, teaching us,
that, denying ungodliness and worldly lusts, we should live
soberly, righteously, and godly, in this present world; looking
for the blessed hope, and appearing of the glory of the great God
and our Savior Jesus Christ (Titus 2:11-13).
Clement of Alexandria: The Instructor of
Children Book III
1,1,1 It is then, as appears, the greatest of all lessons to know one's
self. For if one knows himself, he will know God; and knowing
God, he will be made like God, not by wearing gold or long
robes, but by well-doing, and by requiring as few things as
1,1,5
possible.
Passions break out, pleasures overflow; beauty fades, and falls
quicker than the leaf on the ground, when the amorous storms of
lust blow on it before the coming of autumn, and is withered by
destruction. For lust becomes and fabricates all things, and
wishes to cheat, so as to conceal the man. But that man with
whom the Word dwells does not alter himself, does not get
himself up: he has the form which is of the Word; he is made
like to God; he is beautiful; he does not ornament himself: his is
beauty, the true beauty, for it is God; and that man becomes
God, since God so wills. Heraclitus, then, rightly said, Men are
gods, and gods are men. For the Word Himself is the manifest
mystery: God in man, and man God. And the Mediator executes
the Father's will; for the Mediator is the Word, who is common
to both— the Son of God, the Savior of men; His Servant, our
Teacher.
Word when It declares and with which is the Reason when It
orders, and over which is the Power when It executes. This, we
have learned, was brought forth from God, and by this Forthbringing, was Begotten, and therefore is called the Son of God,
and God, from being ‘of one substance with’ Him; for that God
also is a Spirit. Even 'when a ray is put forth' from the sun, it is a
part of a whole; but the sun will be in the ray because it is a ray
of the sun, and the substance is not divided, but extended. So
comes Spirit of Spirit and ‘God of God’, as ‘light’ is kindled ‘of
light’, ‘the parent matter’ remains entire and without loss,
although one should borrow from it many channels of its
qualities. So likewise that which has come forth from God is
God, and the Son of God, and Both are One. And so this Spirit
of Spirit, and God of God, has become 'the second' in mode not
in number, in order not in condition, and has (Mic. 5:1) gone
forth, not gone out, of the original Source. Therefore this ‘ray of
God’, as was ever foretold before, entering into a certain virgin,
and in her womb endued with the form of flesh, is born Man
joined together with God. The flesh many may be kindled, but
remaining the same.
Tertullian: Apology
XXI We have already set forth, that God formed this universal world
by His Word, and His Reason, and His Power. Among your own
wise men also it is agreed, that Logos, that is, ‘Word’ and
‘Reason’, should be accounted the Maker of all things. For Zeno
determines that this Maker, who has formed all things and
ordered them, should also be called Fate, and God, and the Mind
of Jupitery, and the Necessity of all things. These titles
Cleanthes confer upon the Spirit which, he affirms, pervades the
universe. And we also ascribe, as its proper substance, to the
Word and the Reason and the Power also, through which we
have said that God has formed all things, a Spirit, in which is the
From New Advent; Translated variously by Alexander Roberts and William Rambaut,
William Wilson
1.
2.
Mark and notate passages by philosophical system.
Try to find specific ideas within each thinker and mark them.
Thought Point
What are these guys talking
about?
Which arguments are
reminiscent of Plato?
Is there a dialectical style
reminiscent of Aristotle?
What are the Stoic
elements?
What are some
characteristics of the Word?
How are the arguments
different from the Stoics?
Points of Thought
Chapter 26b
Interlude: The Divided Empire
If you had two sons and control of the known Western world, what would you do?
Figure 4: The Divided Empire
What You See Is What You Get
History and my opinion can often be unkind, but for me, at least, it is rarely with malice.
Ramming Speed
Constantine had found an empire in decline, which through a series of actions, some of
which might be shocking to our 21st century sensibilities, he stabilized. One of the things he
found was that persecution had not really rooted out Christians, in fact most of his
bureaucracy was Christian.
Putting It Together
What does the split mean?
Chapter 27
Late Roman And Early Medieval Philosophy
This period of philosophical development relies heavily on the Christian world-view.
Roman ‘pagan’ ideas do not disappear, but as the medieval period gets going they definitely
decline. In earlier chapters we introduced the idea of static and dynamic styles of thinking
(Chapter 6) and as we intimated in the last chapter, we are entering a period of ‘static’
thinking. So in that way this chapter provides an overlap with the last chapter and provides a
more in-depth look at this rather long period of philosophical history.
First thing to realize is that the people at this time did not really see the Roman Empire as
‘fallen’ (except perhaps in the Biblical sense). In the West the Church was stepping into the
role previously held by secular Romans government. In the East, the Empire was becoming a
theocracy with a tight relationship between Church and State. The stability of the State rests
in the stability of the Church (and vice-versa, early on).
The main concerns are still about ‘how to live’ with both the Church and secular
philosophers offering advice.
The Players
Dates
55-135
?-165
121-180
160-240
150-213
185-255
204-270
354-430
480-525
810-877
1033-1109
Philosophers
Main Points
Stoic; concentrated on ethics; what is really good? Big
Epictetus
on fate.
Stoic; Logos is Christ; we must accept what comes to us
Justin Martyr
because of our faith.
Stoic, philosopher king. Persecuted Christians.
Marcus Aurelius
Anti-philosophy apologist.
Tertullian
Founded Alexandrian school; Develops Philo’s thoughts
Clement Alexandria
Heir to Clement; really applies Platonic thought
Origen
‘Pagan’. Founds Neo-Platonism; interpreted and
Plotinus
defended Plato’s thought and teachings
Platonist; sin, salvation, natural law, time.
St. Augustine
Translated Aristotle; the world is transitory, only the
things of the mind have lasting value; Plato and Aristotle
Boethius
are compatible with Christian thought
Attempted to create a consistent, systematic, Christian
John Scotus Eriugena
Neo-Platonism using mainly Christian sources.
True Medieval Man; Proofs for God.
St. Anselm
Table 19: Late Roman and Early Medievals
Calling Mr. Plato…Call for Mr. Plato…
As said (and I swear I will stop saying it after this chapter…maybe), Greek thought played
heavily into early religious philosophy. There is an explosion of Platonic thought and
influence…well maybe not an explosion, probably more like a harmonic convergence21,
especially as promulgated in secular society through Stoic philosophy, and the coming to the
21
As opposed to a harmonica convergence where a bunch of harmonica players come together.
forefront of Platonic thinkers. The Apologists of earlier times utilized Plato and Cynics and
Stoics to make their arguments for Christianity understandable to the common people and
their leaders. Plato gave a platform for speaking about the one perfect God, about the soul
about justice and virtue and living well. The Logos of the Stoics applied directly to Jesus.
Still, in the end, one had to say (especially in order to make their argument), that Jesus
was the only true fullness of understanding, especially as Wisdom/Reason or the Logos.
Until Jesus all understanding was incomplete. This was a simple step for them to make as
how could it be complete if Jesus, the fullness of the revelation of God was not known to
these thinkers? They had glimpsed the truth, because as Socrates taught, the truth is within us
(as we are created) and as they could see from the Hebrew Scriptures various foreshadowing
of Jesus. As Aristotle understood and the Stoics taught, the divine will and the knowledge of
that will lay within us, within our very substance and was the very reason we could think.
But in the end only Jesus gives the full understanding of the human and the divine. Following
Jesus led one to understand all the answers for which these mere mortals could only know
pieces.
This is not to say that paganism disappeared overnight.
It’s Fate
Fate is not really a philosophical concept, but more of a Greek theological one. So why
deal with it here? Well, we have to because most people have a tendency to confuse the two.
It is a powerful concept which can creep into any system, whether for faith or reason.
Theologically it is an actual controlling force. In a Stoic philosophical sense fate is related to
the overall divine rational. It is ‘the way of the world’ one might say and like Fate, how can
you fight that (recall the sense of the dog tied to the cart)?
Epictetus, a former slave turned philosopher, states: “When I see a man anxious, I say,
‘What does this man want?’ If he did not want something which is not in his power, how
could he be anxious?” (Discourses, Long). In an almost Epicurean manner he continues on
about those things on which most of us, most of the time, spend our time. The things that we
consider will fulfill us are usually things that are not within our power to obtain, and
therefore the hope we have for securing these things is placed in the hands of others or in the
hands of fate. So fate is seen as an outside force, the order of the universe which provides
things by design. You may therefore, either get it or not, depending upon some external
operator. And when we are thwarted in our efforts to gain what we desire we become
frustrated (or depressed or envious or angry, or all of these things). Like a good Stoic, he
attributes all these ills to ‘passions’. Instead of trying to remove these unpleasant emotions by
working harder to secure what we desire, he tells us, we should rather place our hope not in
‘external’ things which are not in our power, but in our own reason and moral character,
which is within our power. In short, we should limit our desire to virtue and to becoming (to
the best of our ability) examples of ‘excellence’. If we do not do this, we are basically
screwed in a downward spiral of self-fulfilling angst. And as is the common experience of all
people at some time or other, when we are in the grip of such emotions we run the risk of
becoming blind to the best course of action; that is, we lose reason.
Okay, Maybe It’s Will
A very quick word about the concept of Will. Until now, the will has been closely related
to reason, the Logos, the Divine Will, etc. With Christianity, the will takes on a second
meaning: volition. This somewhat goes within our earlier discussion (Chapter 23) but with a
twist: the human will within each individual, while a reflection of The Will, is a special gift
of the Creator to each individual outside of The Will (though an integral part of divine
reason). This is the idea of freewill which means that each individual is free to follow The
Will or not and that, unlike the dog dragged about by the cart, you can act outside of the Will,
and for eternal reward remain outside of the Will (think back to the sensation of the soul in
Justin’s First Apology).
Basically this is the idea that the human will exists outside of the divine will, in parallel to
it while still participating in it. This comes partially from the theology of the two natures of
Christ (human and divine) co-existing within him, as well as the Creation story in Genesis,
among other things. The ramifications of this teaching will have far reaching meanings and
consequences.
Party Line
Plotinus also was neither a Christian nor a Jewish thinker. He was however a strict
Platonist (as opposed to a Stoic or the like), and responsible for the Neo-Platonic movement.
This was basically a resurgence of Platonic thinking and ideas in and of themselves (as
opposed to a Stoic or Christian adaption) as well as the call for living virtuously as called for
by Plato. He found sufficient reason within Plato, and thought that the Christians were wrong
when they called his thought ‘incomplete’. In fact, somewhat ironically, he will provide some
points within Christian thought, while the movement was probably, shall we say at the least
antagonistic toward the Christian thinkers and sect.
Plotinus was said to have had ecstatic visions (visions which proceed from a
condition/trance of an extreme out-of-body-kind-of-thing/mystical nature). From these he
posited a God who was both the ultimate inconceivable and the source of all first principles
(is this sounding more and more familiar?). Of course, like Plato he sees these as knowable
even though they are not imminent.
While a Platonist, it is some of his extensions of Platonic thought which produces the
Neo-Platonist movement. We can recall the idea of the Unity of Virtues (Chapter 11), where
in the end all virtues follow a single pattern of sorts. Plotinus also saw everything as a unity,
on a sliding scale of perfection. We can know this in a way similar to knowing the Forms.
Recall that for Plato, the material world was flawed so for Plotinus, nothing sensible can be
true Unity, for even we, who are probably the closest to perfect unity, are still a body and a
soul(not one thing). Think of it along the lines of a person, though made up of parts is close
to Unity, whereas a bunch of people at a football game doing The Wave, though hopefully
acting in unity are not as unified as each individual person.
Plotinus also distinguishes four kinds of knowledge (utilize the Cave):
 Sense knowledge, which is an obscure representation of truth (think subjective
reasoning);
 Reason cognition, which gives us knowledge of the essences of things (think
substance and essence);
 Intellectual cognition, which gives us knowledge of ourselves (think ourselves);
 Ecstasy, which consists in a supernatural intuition of God, in which our natural
knowledge ceases in the divine unconsciousness (think whatever you want).
So this ‘ecstasy’ thing we might consider ‘new’ or at least a new way of thinking about
Platonic objective truth/reason. We will also see it in Christian terms through what we will
call Mysticism, though the term can apply secularly as it does here.
We can probably also add here that since he is focusing on Plato, there is not a system of
logic. Knowledge and logic are therefore not tied together as for Aristotle. This allows for a
bit of latitude when making a conclusion, especially when relying on ecstatic visions for
rational. This also sets him somewhat at odds with Stoics as well, because even though they
are based in Plato, they have extended his system to include logic (c.f. Chapter 23).
Neo-Platonism deserves more discussion than I give it here but hopefully some of its
characteristics will become clearer as we explore its proponents and effects. To that end,
between Epictetus and Plotinus we can see that the general thinking in the late Empire was
very similar to Christian thinking and vice versa. That does not mean they are always good
bed fellows.
The Imperfect Tense
Ergo sum, there is a bit of a clash of ideas here. Let us pause a moment and take on the
idea of ‘incomplete’. Whereas the Mahayana Buddhists integrated and transformed
Buddhism with Greek thought, the religious writers of the West were developing a different
viewpoint as to the seat of all wisdom. The instantiation of God in systems as a necessary for
the system is increasing in the West. This means, as we have been intimating, that God and
Jesus are becoming central to the reason for the system. It is not so much that Plato and the
group did not get it right, they just did not get it right enough. Jesus, in their arguments, has
existed forever, just not in human form. It is only when the incarnation (the in-fleshing)
takes place that the true knowledge can be imparted. Think of it like, until then we could not
read the clues, did not have enough information to solve the mystery.
So, in the end one had to say (especially in order to make their argument), that Jesus was
the only true fullness of understanding, especially as Wisdom or the Logos. Until Jesus all
understanding was incomplete and any Wisdom there was, came through God (this is a major
condensation of theological points, but we just do not have that time for anything else). So
the rational is how could it be complete if Jesus, the fullness of the revelation of God was not
known/revealed to these thinkers? They glimpsed the truth, because as Socrates taught, the
truth is within us, because God himself created us that way. As Aristotle understood and the
Stoics taught, the divine will and the knowledge of that divine will lie within us, within our
very substance, our soul (do not forget them meaning of substance!). But in the end only
Jesus, as true God and true human, gives the full understanding of the human and the divine.
Following Jesus led one to understand all the answers for which these mere mortals could
only know pieces.
On a tangent, Tertullian a Roman lawyer turned theologian, represents the trend within the
growing Christian sect to eschew secular (or as he would call it, pagan) philosophy.
Philosophers, he feels were not just incomplete but inadequate. He is of the school which,
while using some philosophical methods and ideas, really sees philosophy as the mother of
heresy, and the cause of the introduction of error into theological thought.
What Was That Middle Thing?
Medieval (from the words for ‘middle ages’) philosophy then has the advantage of
hanging on a more stable theological and philosophical basis than did earlier Roman thinkers.
Neo-Platonism has taken hold and is finding many proponents within the Christian
theological community. It is not that Aristotle and the like were forgotten though, it is more
that the ability to synthesize some of Aristotle’s thought with Christianity was more difficult.
Still theologian/philosophers are borrowing the terms they need to explain the ineffable to as
we said when we defined philosophy so long ago, allow us to come to Wisdom.
We put things into the medieval realm through the arbitrarily dated ‘fall’ of the Roman
Empire at the end of the 5th century until the ‘discovery’ of America at the end of 15th
century22. These dates roughly follow the end of true Romans being in charge until the
triumph of nationalism. But that is a later understanding. Keep in mind that although things
did not look that good in the West, most people during these times did not consider the
decline, sacking and shifting of power as a fall. Still there was, because of these things, a
shift in the direction of the Empire. The Church (and through it the concept known as the
‘Kingdom of God’) is seen as the new Empire (c.f. Augustine’s City of God). This shift also
lends credence to the naming of the transition to this time, like declaring a 21 year old to be
an adult.
Augustine
Okay, the cat is out of the bag. I have bandied the name about already so let us get to it.
Though the next chapters will deal deeper with him and, as in the previous chapter, there
were many thinkers not mentioned here, Augustine stands out. Augustine wandered through
philosophies and belief systems finally settling in his thirties on Plato, Neo-Platonism and
Christianity (especially as proposed by St. Paul). Even in that path he wandered through at
least one heresy. In the end what he managed to do was use Platonic ideas and thinking to
develop a quite complex explanation Christian beliefs and development of Christian doctrine.
While apologists utilized philosophical thought to explain Christianity, Augustine as they
say ‘baptized’ it, transformed it from secular, pagan thought into Christian thought. His
reasoning moved reason and wisdom to be aspects of God, of a gift given to humans in order
to understand how to live correctly, and make sense of the conflicts within the world.
Augustine wants to understand how God and especially as revealed in Jesus put things
together, how to make sense of them in terms of reason. So he wants to put the tools of the
intellect to use. In other words, the thought of Augustine is more concerned with the solution
of religious, ethical and moral problems than with those of pure speculation.
A quick look at some of Augustine’s main themes:
 Evil and Sin
 Grace
 Human will
 Time
Time you say? The others you can understand but time? Well give me some time and you
will see.
22
I would argue, arguably all by myself, that really the 13 th century, right before what is known as the High
Middle ages and the true advent of humanism is the end of the philosophical Middle Ages. In my mind, and
again most likely in my mind alone, the Scholasticism of the 14 th – 15th centuries is a different animal.
Historically most would probably argue that medieval times coincide with the fortunes of the Roman Church,
hence the dating, but I am arguing philosophically, and since this is my work, decision made, case closed.
Boethius
Not what you might call a mainstream thinker. Translated and introduced Aristotelian
thought into the fray. Boethius is described as the last representative of ancient Roman
culture and the first of the Medieval intellectuals. Boethius started out making translations of
and commentaries on Aristotle, who had be somewhat denigrated due to the overwhelming
acceptance of Neo-Platonism. Logic, Aristotelian Logic to be exact, became a favorite topic
of this addendum to our hall of fame. He held that it did not conflict with Plato’s teachings
(the thinking of the day) because it functioned only in the sensible world, to which our
language refers, as opposed to the rational world. Because of him, Neo-Platonists accepted
the importance of Aristotelian logic, and the harmony between Platonic and Aristotelian
teaching which helped keep Aristotle from becoming lost.
He held that philosophy, in the sense of the quest for true wisdom, was the true medicine
of the soul (Book I). Philosophy was life’s consolation (hence the name of his final work,
Consolation of Philosophy). Adversa fortune (not by Carl Orff) not only reveals how fleeting
and short-lived life is, but can help us see and keep authentic relations among human beings
(does any of this sound familiar – ten points if you can get it). That is to say, life's
difficulties, makes it possible to discern false from true friends and makes one realize that
nothing is more precious than a true friendship (five points if you get it here). Suffering then
has a positive power and the fatalistic acceptance of a condition of suffering is the opposite
of God’s will, because “it eliminates at its roots the very possibility of prayer and of
theological hope, which form the basis of man's relationship with God” (Book V, 3). “So
combat vices, dedicate yourselves to a virtuous life oriented by hope, which draws the heart
upwards until it reaches Heaven with prayers nourished by humility. Should you refuse to lie,
the imposition you have suffered can change into the enormous advantage of always having
before your eyes the supreme Judge, who sees and knows how things truly are” (Book V, 6).
Will overcomes Fate.
For you literature (and French Quarter) fans out there, A Confederacy of Dunces by John
K. Toole has a main character named Ignatius J. Reilly who pronounces that, among other
things, the world lacks enough theology and geometry. Ignatius's, the main character’s life
reflects the structure of his favorite book, Boethius’ Consolation of Philosophy; to the length
that Dunces is even structured like Boethius’ work. Suffice it to say without giving away too
much, a copy of the Consolation of Philosophy is even part of the story. Ignatius’ sufferings
reflect Boethius’ suffering. Okay, really that does not tell us much about Boethius, but I
really love that book.
Anselm
Who’s the baddest mother of all medieval philosophers?
(Hush yo’ mouth!)
I’m just talking about Anselm.
(Anselm!)
Okay it is no Shaft but it is what we can say about Anselm, the widest-ranged Christian
thinker between Augustine and Thomas Aquinas. Okay and I also know he technically is not
an ‘early’ medieval philosopher and ‘what happened to everyone else’, blah, blah, blah.
Write your own book.
Like Aristotle, Anselm thought about everything, but through the eyes of Faith. Still it is
the ‘proofs for God’ for which he is probably most remembered (a shame). Again, these are
not proofs in the scientific sense but in the logical (geometrical, might we say?) sense (c.f.
Chapter 4).
Anselm defined theology as Faith seeking reason (or understanding depending on how
you choose to translate intellectum). This battle cry, picked up from Augustine, was a driving
force in his life.
Putting It Together
Alright…this was kind of a long one, if not muddled. So many things are coming together
during this rather long time that it is hard not to try to shove at least an introduction to the
concepts into this chapter, which also means shifting characters around a bit.
We know that a long time ago, I said that theology was a ‘branch’ of philosophy (Chapter
5) though we can see that some think it is the other way around. The ultimate point is: what
does theology have to do with philosophy? From our study of Aristotle we know that the
desire of the human spirit is to know, and not just the things around us but of even those
things which we cannot quantify. It points us toward the other. We seek not just knowledge
or happiness but understanding, wisdom. The medieval Christian thinkers saw this basic
human drive as the seeking of God, or Wisdom itself, through God the Son, Jesus Christ or
Wisdom himself. They operate from the notion that we are built to worship the Divine, know
we should through the very gift of Wisdom; we desire to know Wisdom, also a gift, to reach
perfection in Wisdom and eventually dwell within Wisdom.
Plato offered the best platform for discussing this journey, this desire and the reasons for
it. But blind faith rarely suffices for itself. True freedom derives from truly free choices for
which head and heart must work together. This extra understanding through Faith, subtly
shifts Platonic thought, and with the addition of Aristotle, creates an atmosphere not of proof
seeking but wisdom seeking. As with Aristotle, all scientific activity serves the function of
Wisdom, serves to help us to understand the ineffable. It is, as Anselm says, Faith seeking
understanding.
“Possession of anything new or expensive only reflected a person’s lack of theology and geometry; it could
even cast doubts upon one’s soul.
Ignatius himself was dressed comfortably and sensibly. The hunting cap prevented head colds. The voluminous
tweed trousers were durable and permitted unusually free locomotion....The outfit was acceptable by any
theological or geometrical standards, however abstruse, and suggested a rich inner life.” A Confederacy of
Dunces by John K. Toole (Chapter 1)
“But what is philosophy? Does it not mean making preparation to meet the things that come upon us?”
Epictetus Discourses (3.10.6, trans. Oldfather)
Chapter 28
A Closer Look
Because of their impact Augustine and Anselm deserve a bit more of our time. Though
they are six hundred years apart they are still fighting the same fight of understanding and
defining what it means to be a Christian in the world. In a way they are the bookends of
Medieval thinking, especially if you ignore everyone else.
Just A Closer Walk With Thee…
We can view the people and thoughts of this time as the final closure of apologetics and
the move to doctrinal development (especially, again, if we ignore everyone else). The
legitimization of the Church by Constantine (there really is no Orthodox/Roman division
until much later) means that theological exploration has moved out in the open and becomes
part and parcel of ordinary conversation. Christian doctrine is moving to the forefront, and
the concerns of Christian thought and lifestyle are beginning to change the Empire. The
number of Christians is becoming so great that disagreements within the Church are
threatening the stability of the empire. This hand-in-hand nature of the society and politics
also sounds the decline of ‘pagan’ thinking and influence.
The other thing we need to remember is the almost exclusive use of Platonic thought by
these philosophers; we are not really dealing with non-Platonic based thought. Until the reintroduction of Aristotle, the issues, the language and the nature of the arguments are
Platonic and even afterwards it remains the main foundation of Medieval thought.
The Players
Dates
Philosophers
354-430
St. Augustine
480-525
810-877
1033-1109
1079-1144
Main Points
Platonist; sin, salvation, natural law, time.
Translated Aristotle; the world is transitory, only the
things of the mind have lasting value; Plato and Aristotle
Boethius
are compatible with Christian thought
Attempted to create a consistent, systematic, Christian
John Scotus Eriugena
Neo-Platonism from mainly Christian sources.
The consummate Medieval Man. Proofs for God.
St. Anselm
Notorious romantic and know-it-all.
Peter Abelard
Table 20: The Early Medieval Players
Augustine Again
Augustine stands as another one of those thresholds in philosophic history. He dwells in
that hinterland between the late Roman World (and all that implies) and the early Medieval
World (and all that implies). He pulls the wisdom of the past forward into the time to come.
In a way then, we can consider him as the last Roman, with a view toward the future.
Augustine was not always a believer. In the proof of the statement that Christianity was
still not the dominant thought, Augustine, though raised Christian, roamed from system to
system, fathering a child out of wedlock and generally causing his mother Monica much
heartache (and probably headaches as well). His mother, no slouch in her own right, prayed
long and hard for the conversion of her wayward son (as do most mothers) which apparently
(eventually) took. He did the majority of his studies in Carthage in North Africa, eventually
opening a school of rhetoric there. Eventually the deep questions of life drove him outward,
first to Rome and finally to Milan, as Rome was declining in importance as an intellectual
center. He dies, bishop of Hippo in Africa, just as the Vandals attack (literally). His death
coincides with what is traditionally thought of as the ‘fall’ of the Roman Empire.
Augustine personifies the changing of the playing field from earlier apologists. Whereas
they used Greek philosophy to help their pagan hearers understand Christian concepts and
doctrines, Augustine is using it to produce and refine Christian doctrine. He is by no means
alone in this, but for our purposes, since we are not mentioning any of the others, he is.
But Neo-Platonism is not always in sync with Judeo-Christian Scripture and doctrine.
Something Rather Than Nothing
It never really goes away; it just keeps showing up in a different costume. We are not
looking at every argument in this line, just Plato’s since that is where Augustine is coming
from. Augustine is a proponent of ex nihilo creation (or creation from nothing) as opposed to
Plato who posits that God created from a primitive matter (from something rather than from
nothing). In this case God creates substance as well as form. Recall that for Stoics/NeoPlatonists, The Will (Reason) gives form and order to creation, that is to say something
cannot come from nothing but structure can be given to something. And that is to say Reason
is the potter for the clay of the universe.
At the risk of over-simplifying this whole argument23, on the other hand Genesis states
that God creates something out of nothing (hence the ex nihlio) and that argument is good
enough for Augustine because God is more than just The Will. God is not only the potter but
the creator of the clay. He accomplishes this through his very nature, which is triune (divided
into thirds). The Father is Creator, the Son/Logos is the means of that creation and the Spirit
is action of creation. So the Son, the Logos is the means, as for the Platonists, for structure
and since the person of the Father is not limited to just being the Son he can be responsible
for the substance. As said, for Augustine the triune God means that there is no necessary
explanation needed beyond them for this fact.
It’s A Shame, Bless His Heart
Okay, jump back a bit and recall that Epicurus thought that evil was worrying about things
you should not, and Stoics think it is worrying about things you cannot change. And before I
jump forward, let me put here that one of Augustine’s wanderings led him to the follow the
thought of one named Mani from Persia, and what was called Manichaeism. Mani combined
elements of Zorasticism, Buddhism, and Christianity. Maybe you can see where this is going.
Maybe not. Evil is a force and basically the world is forever locked into a battle of Good and
Evil, Light and Darkness.
Augustine’s mission is to not balance these ideas, as did Mani (heresy) but put their
correct meaning into words (in light of Faith). His thoughts on Sin24 and Evil are bound up
23
A risk I am apparently often willing to take.
Sin will be very loosely defined as the anti-social actions of humans and evil will be similarly defined as the
root of that anti-social behavior, or in the Platonic sense: ignorance, or…well, you get the picture.
24
not in some external powers but in his thoughts on the human will. Sin is a perversion of the
will away from The Will. Yet the human will is “…all important. Because, if it is wrong,
these emotions of the soul will be wrong, but if it is right, they will be not merely blameless,
but even praiseworthy. For the will is in them all; truly, none of them is anything else than
will” (City Of God, Book XIV). “And I inquired what iniquity [sin/evil] was, and
ascertained it not to be a substance, but a perversion of the will, bent aside from You, O God,
the Supreme Substance, towards these lower things….” (Confessions VII: Chapter 16). “I
knew as well that I had a will as that I had life: when, therefore, I was willing or unwilling to
do anything, I was most certain that it was none but myself that was willing and unwilling;
and immediately I perceived that there was the cause of my sin.” (Confessions VII: Chapter
3)
In a sense we can see the Stoic idea of Reason playing in here, with human will playing
the part of Reason. But, we also see that Augustine has placed this will as an extension of
reason, not just Reason itself. The wisdom of the world (Reason) is insufficient without the
Will and the Logos.
Grace Period
If sin is the perversion of the will and evil is its result, what makes it all better?Non
Christians blamed the sack of Rome by the Goths on Christianity because it had caused so
many to turn away from the old gods who, apparently due to nostalgia on the part of their
adherents, had kept Rome safe. Augustine saw it differently; the old Rome was being swept
away in favor of the new Jerusalem. Like Plato and his perfect Republic based in laws and
run with Wisdom by philosopher kings, Augustine saw the perfect city based in love and run
by Christ the King, who was the Logos, Wisdom personified.
Grace is the gift of God to help us on our way. We are free to take it or leave it. But only
by humble submission of the human will to the divine will does peace and happiness come.
Augustine does not see this as weakness, as might Epicurus, but like the Stoics or Plato, as
the adjustment of our thinking to the natural flow of the universe.
It’s About Time!
So what you ask. Well, if there was a time when things were not (remember that ex nihilo
thing?), then there was a time when time was not. Augustine begins to explore an
understanding of history, a reason for it, an understanding and that understanding is based in
Wisdom. For him God is timeless, eternal. All time is present to him (that is available, even
for interaction) and I mean all (that is all time all the time). By creating from nothing, God is
obviously placed outside of that creation. He is not along with the form that already existed
as for Platonists; he formed it and created it. God is therefore outside of time, hence he is
eternal.
Time then, only comes into being with creation. More on this later.
John Scottus Eriugena
As someone must have so wisely pointed out by now, we are getting back to the prime
mover thing so we are just going to slip this guy in here in light of Augustine’s cosmological
thought. Eriugena (not to be confused with John Dun Scottus whom we shall meet later) was
a monk (possibly Irish) who developed a highly complex cosmology, where the highest
principle, the ‘the immovable self-identical one’ (unum et idipsum immobile), creates all
things and retrieves them back.
The God he is discussing is the familiar ‘omni-everything’ God. So, in short, like all good
theologians at the time, Eriugena developed a cosmology using a Neo-Platonic foundation
according to which God - infinite, transcendent and ‘unknown’ (who, as the monikers
intimate, is beyond being and non-being, an idea which we see in the apologists) moves
through a process of ‘self-creation’ (in the sense of becoming known not of being created –
this is tied up in complex Christology but that is for another time).
He moves from ‘darkness’ (or ‘non-being’ or not being known) into the light (of ‘being’,
that is knowable), speaking the Word who is understood as Christ. At the same timeless
moment (re: Augustine) He brings forth the Primary Causes of all creation (recall the
Genesis creation story of God speaking the Word and all being created). These causes in turn
proceed into their Created Effects and as such are creatures entirely dependent on, and will
ultimately return to, their sources (re: Plato), which are the Causes or Ideas in God (as from
Isaiah 15:11, So shall my word be that goes forth from my mouth; It shall not return to me
void, but shall do my will, achieving the end for which I sent it -- NAB).
These ‘Causes’, considered as diverse and infinite in themselves, are actually one single
principle in God (the divine ‘One’). The whole of reality or nature, then, is involved in a
dynamic process of outgoing from and return to God, the One or the Good or the highest
principle, which transcends all. In an original departure from traditional Neo-Platonism this
first and highest cosmic principle is called ‘nature’ and is said to include both God and
creation.
This does not mean that God is pan-en-theistic (within everything; one more time: heresy).
This ‘nature’ is the ‘totality of all things’, including both the things which are as well as
those which are not (harkening to the nominalism of Peter Abelard), and since God is neither
but, as the Prime Mover, is part and parcel of it. Clear? Nature is all that is, and all that God
makes…is. He is both the reason of and the reason for nature. The divine nature may be
divided and these divisions of nature taken together are to be understood as God, presented as
the ‘beginning, middle and end of all things’.
Apart from having a minor influence later on, Eriugena's really did not catch on with
philosophers and theologians of his time, and his philosophical system was generally
neglected until sometime about the seventeenth century, but in the nineteenth century interest
in him grew, especially among followers of Hegel who saw Eriugena as a forerunner to
speculative idealism. So he gets special mention here, but again, more on that later.
Anselm
Anselm really lays the groundwork for the High Middle Ages period to come or as some
would call it the Scholastic Age. He is best known for having designed and proffered what is
called by Kant the ontological argument (basically – and I mean really basically – because
we can conceive of God there must be a God – which we touched on in Chapter 4) but his
work is much more complex and touches on the aspects and the unity of the divine nature;
the extent and limitations of human understanding of the divine nature; the complex nature of
the will and its involvement in free choice; the interworkings of the human will and action
and divine grace; the natures of truth and justice; the natures and origins of virtues and vices;
the nature of evil as twisting or negating of what is good; and the condition and implications
of original sin (things that we saw in Augustine as well as Plato).
Anselm’s life was similar to many at that time. He settled into the monastic life and was
eventually elevated into ecclesiastical office. There, historically at least, he is probably best
known as the Archbishop of Canterbury (though he was born in North Italy, which shows
you the renewing breadth of societal structures of both the rising nations and the Church)
under Rufus and Henry the First, and for creating the compromise which muddled many of
the lines between Church and State.
The times in which he lived were becoming better that those of his predecessors, in that
the Vikings and other invading groups had pretty much stopped invading and were settling
down and adopting the cultural and religious practices of their ‘host’ countries. This stability
allowed a rise in monasteries and schools. Anselm was highly influenced by Augustine and
somewhat by Boethius and perhaps slightly by our previously mentioned friend, Eriugena
(thought that was just a fluke, eh?). What this means to us is that in Anselm, the high NeoPlatonism of Augustine and Eriugena and the Logic of Aristotle as proffered by Boethius
come together.
Say What?
This is not to say that Anselm was merely spouting the words of former greats. The
ontological argument has in itself has spawned critics, defenders, and adaptors over the
centuries, least among them Bonaventure, Aquinas, Descartes, Spinoza, Locke, Leibniz,
Kant, Hegel, and an even into this last century, with people like Heidegger. As Augustine
straddled the Roman and Medieval worlds, Anselm straddles the more chaotic and unsure
times of the late first millennium and the developing somewhat more stable scholastic world.
One of the distinguishing aspects of Anselm’s thought is to attempt to explain or ‘prove’
ideas without appeal to scripture, that is, through reason alone. “[I was challenged that]
nothing whatsoever in these matters should be made convincing by the authority of Scripture,
but whatsoever the conclusion, through individual investigations, should assert…the
necessity of reason would concisely prove, and the clarity of truth would evidently show that
this is the case. They also wished that I not disdain to meet and address simpleminded and
almost foolish objections that occurred to me.” (Monologion: Prologue) Apparently he had
quite the gift for reasonable argumentation and persuasion. While this may sound similar to
the earlier Apologists, he is writing for people who already believe or at least have had
explicit exposure to the ideas he is confronting. So like the apologists he has to rely on
language outside of the authority of scriptural texts, but unlike them he is not just explaining
but is offering ‘proofs’ which end any argumentation on the subject.
You Would Argue With A Brick Wall, Wouldn’t You?
The methods he employed were many. One we have spoken of was reductio ad absurdum
(Chapter 4 again), the running an of idea to its logical but silly extreme. If you could push it
without reaching an extreme which was unreasonable, then you must have arrived at the
correct idea. But what we want to focus on is Anselm’s use of deductive reasoning, as laid
out by Aristotle and championed by Boethius, to provide ‘necessary reasons’ for the
teachings of Faith. In the end it is this synthesis of thought which sets him apart.
This has led to some discussion about the ‘validity’ of his thought. This may seem odd
because his method seems to imply that he will use reason alone and that the arguments will
be legitimate and ironclad. But as we have seen in the past, the prime mover is hard to nail
down and open to many interpretations. Anselm himself attempts to address many of these
concerns, creating arguments which are designed to answer any objection in a
dialogue/dialectical style reminiscent of Plato and Aristotle respectively. Once again though,
we must remember that Anselm is trying to achieve arguments which put articles of Faith
into reasonable light, that is, he is seeking to understand the Faith he already has, and really
has no desire to understand them outside of that Faith.
Putting It Together
Okay another long one. Augustine, Eriugena and Anselm all seek to expound on the
Christian Faith. One note here is that the word Faith did not mean belief in the active sense.
The act of believing or ‘having faith’ was based in Faith. Faith was the truths handed down
or revealed which were immutable and foundational. When Anselm invokes Faith seeking
understanding, he is using understanding in the active sense and Faith in the nominative
sense. So, they are seeking to give reasonable meaning to doctrinal ideas, not increase their
belief. Many later arguments will be leveled for and against their thought based on that
misconception.
Also, as you may have noticed, I have begun some serious name dropping in this section. I
know I probably could (if not do) say this every time that these thinkers influenced the
thinking of those that came after them, but more so in that they have distilled and expanded
the ideas of Plato and Aristotle. We must understand Plato and Aristotle to understand these
guys and we must understand them to understand those who follow them. It is the ‘triumph’
of Plato over Aristotle, an argument for something beyond just the physical world which is
gathering force here, and throughout the Medieval period.
In the end, once again, these men are not beholden to worldly reason to the exclusion of
divine reason; they practice it because they see it practiced by God.
“I do not seek to understand that I might believe but I believe in order to understand. For I believe this: unless I
believe, I will not understand.” Anselm Proslogium Chapter 1
“Eternity's a terrible thought. I mean, where's it all going to end?” Tom Stoppard Rosencrantz And
Guildenstern Are Dead (1967)
Chapter 28a
Augustine Confessions
2
Book XI
The design of his confessions being declared, he seeks from God the
knowledge of the Holy Scriptures, and begins to expound the words of
Genesis 1:1, concerning the creation of the world. The questions of
rash disputers being refuted, What did God before he created the
world? That he might the better overcome his opponents, he adds a
copious disquisition concerning time.
1
By Confession He Desires to Stimulate Towards God His Own
Love and That of His Readers.
1. O Lord, since eternity is Yours, are You ignorant of the things
which I say to You? Or see You at the time that which comes to pass
in time? Why, therefore, do I place before You so many relations of
things? Not surely that You might know them through me, but that I
may awaken my own love and that of my readers towards You, that
we may all say, Great is the Lord, and greatly to be praised. I have
already said, and shall say, for the love of Your love do I this. For we
also pray, and yet Truth says, Your Father knows what things you
have need of before you ask Him. (Matthew 6:8) Therefore do we
make known to You our love, in confessing to You our own miseries
and Your mercies upon us, that You may free us altogether, since You
have begun, that we may cease to be wretched in ourselves, and that
we may be blessed in You; since You have called us, that we may be
poor in spirit, and meek, and mourners, and hungering and thirsty
after righteousness, and merciful, and pure in heart, and peacemakers.
(Matthew 5:3-9) Behold, I have told to You many things, which I
could and which I would, for You first would that I should confess to
You, the Lord my God, for You are good, since Your mercy endures
forever.
He Begs of God that Through the Holy Scriptures He May Be
Led to Truth.
2. But when shall I suffice with the tongue of my pen to express all
Your exhortations, and all Your terrors, and comforts, and guidance,
whereby You have led me to preach Your Word and to dispense Your
Sacrament to Your people? And if I suffice to utter these things in
order, the drops of time are dear to me. Long time have I burned to
meditate in Your law, and in it to confess to You my knowledge and
ignorance, the beginning of Your enlightening, and the remains of my
darkness, until infirmity be swallowed up by strength. And I would
not that to anything else those hours should flow away, which I find
free from the necessities of refreshing my body, and the care of my
mind, and of the service which we owe to men, and which, though we
owe not, even yet we pay.
3. O Lord my God, hear my prayer, and let Your mercy regard my
longing, since it bums not for myself alone, but because it desires to
benefit brotherly charity; and You see into my heart, that so it is. I
would sacrifice to You the service of my thought and tongue; and do
You give what I may offer to You. For I am poor and needy, You rich
to all that call upon You, (Romans 10:12) who free from care, cares
for us. Circumcise from all rashness and from all lying my inward and
outward lips. (Exodus 6:12) Let Your Scriptures be my chaste
delights. Neither let me be deceived in them, nor deceive out of them.
Lord, hear and pity, O Lord my God, light of the blind, and strength
of the weak; even also light of those that see, and strength of the
strong, hearken to my soul, and hear it crying out of the depths. For
unless Your ears be present in the depths also, whither shall we go?
Whither shall we cry? The day is Yours, and the night also is Yours.
At Your nod the moments flee by. Grant thereof space for our
meditations among the hidden things of Your law, nor close it against
us who knock. For not in vain have You willed that the obscure secret
of so many pages should be written. Nor is it that those forests have
not their harts, betaking themselves therein, and ranging, and walking,
and feeding, lying down, and ruminating. Perfect me, O Lord, and
reveal them to me. Behold, Your voice is my joy, Your voice
surpasses the abundance of pleasures. Give that which I love, for I do
love; and this have You given. Abandon not Your own gifts, nor
despise Your grass that thirsts. Let me confess to You whatsoever I
shall have found in Your books, and let me hear the voice of praise,
and let me imbibe You, and reflect on the wonderful things of Your
law; even from the beginning, wherein You made the heaven and the
earth, to the everlasting kingdom of Your holy city that is with You.
4. Lord, have mercy on me and hear my desire. For I think that it is
not of the earth, nor of gold and silver, and precious stones, nor
gorgeous apparel, nor honors and powers, nor the pleasures of the
flesh, nor necessaries for the body, and this life of our pilgrimage; all
which are added to those that seek Your kingdom and Your
righteousness. (Matthew 6:33) Behold, O Lord my God, whence is
my desire. The unrighteous have told me of delights, but not such as
Your law, O Lord. Behold whence my desire is. Behold, Father, look
and see, and approve; and let it be pleasing in the sight of Your
mercy, that I may find grace before You, that the secret things of
Your Word may be opened to me when I knock. I beseech, by our
Lord Jesus Christ, Your Son, the Man of Your right hand, the Son of
man, whom You made strong for Yourself, as Your Mediator and
ours, through whom You have sought us, although not seeking You,
but sought us that we might seek You, — Your Word through whom
You have made all things, (John 1:3) and among them me also, Your
Only-begotten, through whom You have called to adoption the
believing people, and therein me also. I beseech You through Him,
who sits at Your right hand, and makes intercession for us,
(Romans 8:34) in whom are hid all treasures of wisdom and
knowledge. (Colossians 2:3) Him do I seek in Your books. Of Him
did Moses write; (John 5:4-6) this says Himself; this says the Truth.
3
He Begins from the Creation of the World— Not Understanding
the Hebrew Text.
5. Let me hear and understand how in the beginning You made the
heaven and the earth. (Genesis 1:1) Moses wrote this; he wrote and
departed—passed hence from You to You. Nor now is he before me;
for if he were I would hold him, and ask him, and would adjure him
by You that he would open to me these things, and I would lend the
ears of my body to the sounds bursting forth from his mouth. And
should he speak in the Hebrew tongue, in vain would it beat on my
senses, nor would anything touch my mind; but if in Latin, I should
know what he said. But whence should I know whether he said what
was true? But if I knew this even, should I know it from him? Verily
within me, within in the chamber of my thought, Truth, neither
Hebrew, nor Greek, nor Latin, nor barbarian, without the organs of
voice and tongue, without the sound of syllables, would say, He
speaks the truth, and I, immediately assured of it, confidently would
say to that man of Yours, You speak the truth. As, then, I cannot
inquire of him, I beseech You—You, O Truth, full of whom he spoke
truth—You, my God, I beseech, forgive my sins; and do Thou, who
gave to that Your servant to speak these things, grant to me also to
understand them.
4
5
Heaven and Earth Cry Out that They Have Been Created by
God.
6. Behold, the heaven and earth are; they proclaim that they were
made, for they are changed and varied. Whereas whatsoever has not
been made, and yet has being, has nothing in it which there was not
before; this is what it is to be changed and varied. They also proclaim
that they made not themselves; therefore we are, because we have
been made; we were not therefore before we were, so that we could
have made ourselves. And the voice of those that speak is in itself
evidence. You, therefore, Lord, made these things; You who are
beautiful, for they are beautiful; You who are good, for they are good;
You who art, for they are. Nor even so are they beautiful, nor good,
nor are they, as You their Creator art; compared with whom they are
neither beautiful, nor good, nor are at all. These things we know,
thanks be to You. And our knowledge, compared with Your
knowledge, is ignorance.
God Created the World Not from Any Certain Matter, But in His
Own Word.
7. But how did You make the heaven and the earth, and what was the
instrument of Your so mighty work? For it was not as a human
worker fashioning body from body, according to the fancy of his
mind, in some way able to assign a form which it perceives in itself
by its inner eye. And whence should he be able to do this, had not
You made that mind? And he assigns to it already existing, and as it
were having a being, a form, as clay, or stone, or wood, or gold, or
such like. And whence should these things be, had not You appointed
them? You made for the workman his body—You the mind
commanding the limbs—You the matter whereof he makes anything,
— You the capacity whereby he may apprehend his art, and see
within what he may do without—You the sense of his body, by
which, as by an interpreter, he may from mind to matter convey that
which he does, and report to his mind what may have been done, that
it within may consult the truth, presiding over itself, whether it be
well done. All these things praise You, the Creator of all. But how do
You make them? How, O God, did You make heaven and earth?
Truly, neither in the heaven nor in the earth did You make heaven and
earth; nor in the air, nor in the waters, since these also belong to the
heaven and the earth; nor in the whole world did You make the whole
world; because there was no place wherein it could be made before it
was made, that it might be; nor did You hold anything in Your hand
wherewith to make heaven and earth. For whence could You have
what You had not made, whereof to make anything? For what is, save
because You are? Therefore You spoke and they were made, and in
Your Word You made these things.
6
He Did Not, However, Create It by a Sounding and Passing
Word.
8. But how did You speak? Was it in that manner in which the voice
came from the cloud, saying, This is my beloved Son?
(Matthew 17:5) For that voice was uttered and passed away, began
and ended. The syllables sounded and passed by, the second after the
first, the third after the second, and thence in order, until the last after
the rest, and silence after the last. Hence it is clear and plain that the
motion of a creature expressed it, itself temporal, obeying Your
Eternal will. And these your words formed at the time, the outer ear
conveyed to the intelligent mind, whose inner ear lay attentive to
Your eternal word. But it compared these words sounding in time
with Your eternal word in silence, and said, It is different, very
different. These words are far beneath me, nor are they, since they
flee and pass away; but the Word of my Lord remains above me
forever. If, then, in sounding and fleeting words You said that heaven
and earth should be made, and thus made heaven and earth, there was
already a corporeal creature before heaven and earth by whose
temporal motions that voice might take its course in time. But there
was nothing corporeal before heaven and earth; or if there were,
certainly You without a transitory voice had created that whence You
would make the passing voice, by which to say that the heaven and
the earth should be made. For whatsoever that was of which such a
voice was made, unless it were made by You, it could not be at all. By
what word of Yours was it decreed that a body might be made,
whereby these words might be made?
7
8
By His Co-Eternal Word He Speaks, and All Things are Done.
9. You call us, therefore, to understand the Word, God with You,
God, (John 1:1) which is spoken eternally, and by it are all things
spoken eternally. For what was spoken was not finished, and another
spoken until all were spoken; but all things at once and for ever. For
otherwise have we time and change, and not a true eternity, nor a true
immortality. This I know, O my God, and give thanks. I know, I
confess to You, O Lord, and whosoever is not unthankful to certain
truth, knows and blesses You with me. We know, O Lord, we know;
since in proportion as anything is not what it was, and is what it was
not, in that proportion does it die and arise. Not anything, therefore, of
Your Word gives place and comes into place again, because it is truly
immortal and eternal. And, therefore, to the Word co-eternal with
You, You dost at once and for ever say all that You dost say; and
whatever You say shall be made, is made; nor dost You make
otherwise than by speaking; yet all things are not made both together
and everlasting which You make by speaking.
That Word Itself is the Beginning of All Things, in Which We
are Instructed as to Evangelical Truth.
10. Why is this, I beseech You, O Lord my God? I see it, however;
but how I shall express it, I know not, unless that everything which
begins to be and ceases to be, then begins and ceases when in Your
eternal Reason it is known that it ought to begin or cease where
nothing begins or ceases. The same is Your Word, which is also the
Beginning, because also It speaks to us. Thus, in the gospel He speaks
through the flesh; and this sounded outwardly in the ears of men, that
it might be believed and sought inwardly, and that it might be found
in the eternal Truth, where the good and only Master teaches all His
disciples. There, O Lord, I hear Your voice, the voice of one speaking
to me, since He speaks to us who teaches us. But He that teaches us
not, although He speaks, speaks not to us. Moreover, who teaches us,
unless it is the immutable Truth? For even when we are admonished
through a changeable creature, we are led to the Truth immutable.
There we learn truly while we stand and hear Him, and rejoice greatly
because of the Bridegroom's voice, (John 3:29) restoring us to that
whence we are. And, therefore, the Beginning, because unless It
remained, there would not, where we strayed, be whither to return.
But when we return from error, it is by knowing that we return. But
that we may know, He teaches us, because He is the Beginning and
speaks to us.
9
Wisdom and the Beginning.
11. In this Beginning, O God, have You made heaven and earth—in
Your Word, in Your Son, in Your Power, in Your Wisdom, in Your
Truth, wondrously speaking and wondrously making. Who shall
comprehend? Who shall relate it? What is that which shines through
me, and strikes my heart without injury, and I both shudder and burn?
I shudder inasmuch as I am unlike it; and I burn inasmuch as I am like
it. It is Wisdom itself that shines through me, clearing my cloudiness,
which again overwhelms me, fainting from it, in the darkness and
amount of my punishment. For my strength is brought down in need,
so that I cannot endure my blessings, until Thou, O Lord, who hast
been gracious to all mine iniquities, heal also all mine infirmities;
because You shall also redeem my life from corruption, and crown
me with Your loving-kindness and mercy, and shall satisfy my desire
with good things, because my youth shall be renewed like the eagle's.
For by hope we are saved; and through patience we await Your
promises. (Romans 8:24-25) Let him that is able hear You
discoursing within. I will with confidence cry out from Your oracle,
How wonderful are Your works, O Lord, in Wisdom have You made
them all. And this Wisdom is the Beginning, and in that Beginning
have You made heaven and earth.
10
11
The Rashness of Those Who Inquire What God Did Before He
Created Heaven and Earth.
12. Lo, are they not full of their ancient way, who say to us, What was
God doing before He made heaven and earth? For if, say they, He was
unoccupied, and did nothing, why does He not for ever also, and from
henceforth, cease from working, as in times past He did? For if any
new motion has arisen in God, and a new will, to form a creature
which He had never before formed, however can that be a true
eternity where there arises a will which was not before? For the will
of God is not a creature, but before the creature; because nothing
could be created unless the will of the Creator were before it. The will
of God, therefore, pertains to His very Substance. But if anything has
arisen in the Substance of God which was not before, that Substance
is not truly called eternal. But if it was the eternal will of God that the
creature should be, why was not the creature also from eternity?
They Who Ask This Have Not as Yet Known the Eternity of God,
Which is Exempt from the Relation of Time.
13. Those who say these things do not as yet understand You, O You
Wisdom of God, You light of souls; not as yet do they understand
how these things be made which are made by and in You. They even
endeavor to comprehend things eternal; but as yet their heart flies
about in the past and future motions of things, and is still wavering.
Who shall hold it and fix it, that it may rest a little, and by degrees
catch the glory of that ever standing eternity, and compare it with the
times which never stand, and see that it is incomparable; and that a
long time cannot become long, save from the many motions that pass
by, which cannot at the same instant be prolonged; but that in the
Eternal nothing passes away, but that the whole is present; but no
time is wholly present; and let him see that all time past is forced on
by the future, and that all the future follows from the past, and that all,
both past and future, is created and issues from that which is always
present? Who will hold the heart of man, that it may stand still, and
see how the still-standing eternity, itself neither future nor past, utters
the times future and past? Can my hand accomplish this, or the hand
of my mouth by persuasion bring about a thing so great?
12
13
What God Did Before the Creation of the World.
14. Behold, I answer to him who asks, What was God doing before
He made heaven and earth? I answer not, as a certain person is
reported to have done facetiously (avoiding the pressure of the
question), He was preparing hell, says he, for those who pry into
mysteries. It is one thing to perceive, another to laugh—these things I
answer not. For more willingly would I have answered, I know not
what I know not, than that I should make him a laughing-stock who
asks deep things, and gain praise as one who answers false things. But
I say that Thou, our God, art the Creator of every creature; and if by
the term heaven and earth every creature is understood, I boldly say,
That before God made heaven and earth, He made not anything. For if
He did, what did He make unless the creature? And would that I knew
whatever I desire to know to my advantage, as I know that no creature
was made before any creature was made.
Before the Times Created by God, Times Were Not.
15. But if the roving thought of any one should wander through the
images of bygone time, and wonder that You, the God Almighty, and
All-creating, and All-sustaining, the Architect of heaven and earth, for
innumerable ages refrained from so great a work before You would
make it, let him awake and consider that he wonders at false things.
For whence could innumerable ages pass by which You did not make,
since You are the Author and Creator of all ages? Or what times
should those be which were not made by You? Or how should they
pass by if they had not been? Since, therefore, You are the Creator of
all times, if any time was before You made heaven and earth, why is
it said that You refrained from working? For that very time You
made, nor could times pass by before You made times. But if before
heaven and earth there was no time, why is it asked, What were You
doing then? For there was no then when time was not.
16. Nor dost You by time precede time; else would not You precede
all times. But in the excellence of an ever-present eternity, You
precedes all times past, and survives all future times, because they are
future, and when they have come they will be past; but You are the
same, and Your years shall have no end. Your years neither go nor
come; but ours both go and come, that all may come. All Your years
stand at once since they do stand; nor were they when departing
excluded by coming years, because they pass not away; but all these
of ours shall be when all shall cease to be. Your years are one day,
and Your day is not daily, but today; because Your today yields not
with tomorrow, for neither does it follow yesterday. Your today is
eternity; therefore You begot the Co-eternal, to whom You said, This
day have I begotten You. You have made all time; and before all
times You are, nor in any time was there not time.
14
15
Neither Time Past Nor Future, But the Present Only, Really is.
17. At no time, therefore, had You not made anything, because You
had made time itself. And no times are co-eternal with You, because
You remains for ever; but should these continue, they would not be
times. For what is time? Who can easily and briefly explain it? Who
even in thought can comprehend it, even to the pronouncing of a word
concerning it? But what in speaking do we refer to more familiarly
and knowingly than time? And certainly we understand when we
speak of it; we understand also when we hear it spoken of by another.
What, then, is time? If no one ask of me, I know; if I wish to explain
to him who asks, I know not. Yet I say with confidence, that I know
that if nothing passed away, there would not be past time; and if
nothing were coming, there would not be future time; and if nothing
were, there would not be present time. Those two times, therefore,
past and future, how are they, when even the past now is not; and the
future is not as yet? But should the present be always present, and
should it not pass into time past, time truly it could not be, but
eternity. If, then, time present— if it be time— only comes into
existence because it passes into time past, how do we say that even
this is, whose cause of being is that it shall not be— namely, so that
we cannot truly say that time is, unless because it tends not to be?
There is Only a Moment of Present Time.
18. And yet we say that time is long and time is short; nor do we
speak of this save of time past and future. A long time past, for
example, we call a hundred years ago; in like manner a long time to
come, a hundred years hence. But a short time past we call, say, ten
days ago: and a short time to come, ten days hence. But in what sense
is that long or short which is not? For the past is not now, and the
future is not yet. Therefore let us not say, It is long; but let us say of
the past, It has been long, and of the future, It will be long. O my
Lord, my light, shall not even here Your truth deride man? For that
past time which was long, was it long when it was already past, or
when it was as yet present? For then it might be long when there was
that which could be long, but when past it no longer was; wherefore
that could not be long which was not at all. Let us not, therefore, say,
Time past has been long; for we shall not find what may have been
long, seeing that since it was past it is not; but let us say that present
time was long, because when it was present it was long. For it had not
as yet passed away so as not to be, and therefore there was that which
could be long. But after it passed, that ceased also to be long which
ceased to be.
19. Let us therefore see, O human soul, whether present time can be
long; for to you is it given to perceive and to measure periods of time.
What will you reply to me? Is a hundred years when present a long
time? See, first, whether a hundred years can be present. For if the
first year of these is current, that is present, but the other ninety and
nine are future, and therefore they are not as yet. But if the second
year is current, one is already past, the other present, the rest future.
And thus, if we fix on any middle year of this hundred as present,
those before it are past, those after it are future; wherefore a hundred
years cannot be present. See at least whether that year itself which is
current can be present. For if its first month be current, the rest are
future; if the second, the first has already passed, and the remainder
are not yet. Therefore neither is the year which is current as a whole
present; and if it is not present as a whole, then the year is not present.
For twelve months make the year, of which each individual month
which is current is itself present, but the rest are either past or future.
Although neither is that month which is current present, but one day
only: if the first, the rest being to come, if the last, the rest being past;
if any of the middle, then between past and future.
20. Behold, the present time, which alone we found could be called
long, is abridged to the space scarcely of one day. But let us discuss
even that, for there is not one day present as a whole. For it is made
up of four-and-twenty hours of night and day, whereof the first has
the rest future, the last has them past, but any one of the intervening
has those before it past, those after it future. And that one hour passes
away in fleeting particles. Whatever of it has flown away is past,
whatever remains is future. If any portion often be conceived which
cannot now be divided into even the minutest particles of moments,
this only is that which may be called present; which, however, flies so
rapidly from future to past, that it cannot be extended by any delay.
For if it be extended, it is divided into the past and future; but the
present has no space. Where, therefore, is the time which we may call
long? Is it nature? Indeed we do not say, It is long, because it is not
yet, so as to be long; but we say, It will be long. When, then, will it
be? For if even then, since as yet it is future, it will not be long,
because what may be long is not as yet; but it shall be long, when
from the future, which as yet is not, it shall already have begun to be,
and will have become present, so that there could be that which may
be long; then does the present time cry out in the words above that it
cannot be long.
16
17
Time Can Only Be Perceived or Measured While It is Passing.
21. And yet, O Lord, we perceive intervals of times, and we compare
them with themselves, and we say some are longer, others shorter. We
even measure by how much shorter or longer this time may be than
that; and we answer, That this is double or treble, while that is but
once, or only as much as that. But we measure times passing when we
measure them by perceiving them; but past times, which now are not,
or future times, which as yet are not, who can measure them? Unless,
perchance, any one will dare to say, that that can be measured which
is not. When, therefore, time is passing, it can be perceived and
measured; but when it has passed, it cannot, since it is not.
Nevertheless There is Time Past and Future.
2. I ask, Father, I do not affirm. O my God, rule and guide me. Who is
there who can say to me that there are not three times (as we learned
when boys, and as we have taught boys), the past, present, and future,
but only present, because these two are not? Or are they also; but
when from future it becomes present, comes it forth from some secret
place, and when from the present it becomes past, does it retire into
anything secret? For where have they, who have foretold future
things, seen these things, if as yet they are not? For that which is not
cannot be seen. And they who relate things past could not relate them
as true, did they not perceive them in their mind. Which things, if they
were not, they could in no way be discerned. There are therefore
things both future and past.
18
Past and Future Times Cannot Be Thought of But as Present.
23. Allow me, O Lord, to seek further; O my Hope, let not my
purpose be confounded. For if there are times past and future, I desire
to know where they are. But if as yet I do not succeed, I still know,
wherever they are, that they are not there as future or past, but as
present. For if there also they be future, they are not as yet there; if
even there they be past, they are no longer there. Wheresoever,
therefore, they are, whatsoever they are, they are only so as present.
Although past things are related as true, they are drawn out from the
memory, — not the things themselves, which have passed, but the
words conceived from the images of the things which they have
formed in the mind as footprints in their passage through the senses.
My childhood, indeed, which no longer is, is in time past, which now
is not; but when I call to mind its image, and speak of it, I behold it in
the present, because it is as yet in my memory. Whether there be a
like cause of foretelling future things, that of things which as yet are
not the images may be perceived as already existing, I confess, my
God, I know not. This certainly I know, that we generally think before
on our future actions, and that this premeditation is present; but that
the action whereon we premeditate is not yet, because it is future;
which when we shall have entered upon, and have begun to do that
which we were premeditating, then shall that action be, because then
it is not future, but present.
24. In whatever manner, therefore, this secret preconception of future
things may be, nothing can be seen, save what is. But what now is is
not future, but present. When, therefore, they say that things future are
seen, it is not themselves, which as yet are not (that is, which are
future); but their causes or their signs perhaps are seen, which already
are. Therefore, to those already beholding them, they are not future,
but present, from which future things conceived in the mind are
foretold. Which conceptions again now are, and they who foretell
those things behold these conceptions present before them. Let now
so multitudinous a variety of things afford me some example. I behold
daybreak; I foretell that the sun is about to rise. That which I behold is
present; what I foretell is future—not that the sun is future, which
already is; but his rising, which is not yet. Yet even its rising I could
not predict unless I had an image of it in my mind, as now I have
while I speak. But that dawn which I see in the sky is not the rising of
the sun, although it may go before it, nor that imagination in my
mind; which two are seen as present, that the other which is future
may be foretold. Future things, therefore, are not as yet; and if they
are not as yet, they are not. And if they are not, they cannot be seen at
all; but they can be foretold from things present which now are, and
are seen.
19
20
We are Ignorant in What Manner God Teaches Future Things.
25. You, therefore, Ruler of Your creatures, what is the method by
which You teaches souls those things which are future? For You have
taught Your prophets. What is that way by which Thou, to whom
nothing is future, dost teach future things; or rather of future things
dost teach present? For what is not, of a certainty cannot be taught.
Too far is this way from my view; it is too mighty for me, I cannot
attain to it; but by You I shall be enabled, when You shall have
granted it, sweet light of my hidden eyes.
In What Manner Time May Properly Be Designated.
26. But what now is manifest and clear is, that neither are there future
nor past things. Nor is it fitly said, There are three times, past, present
and future; but perchance it might be fitly said, There are three times;
a present of things past, a present of things present, and a present of
things future. For these three do somehow exist in the soul, and
otherwise I see them not: present of things past, memory; present of
things present, sight; present of things future, expectation. If of these
things we are permitted to speak, I see three times, and I grant there
are three. It may also be said, There are three times, past, present and
future, as usage falsely has it. See, I trouble not, nor gainsay, nor
reprove; provided always that which is said may be understood, that
neither the future, nor that which is past, now is. For there are but few
things which we speak properly, many things improperly; but what
we may wish to say is understood.
21
22
How Time May Be Measured.
27. I have just now said, then, that we measure times as they pass, that
we may be able to say that this time is twice as much as that one, or
that this is only as much as that, and so of any other of the parts of
time which we are able to tell by measuring. Wherefore, as I said, we
measure times as they pass. And if anyone should ask me, Whence do
you know? I can answer, I know, because we measure; nor can we
measure things that are not; and things past and future are not. But
how do we measure present time, since it has not space? It is
measured while it passes; but when it shall have passed, it is not
measured; for there will not be anything that can be measured. But
whence, in what way, and whither does it pass while it is being
measured? Whence, but from the future? Which way, save through
the present? Whither, but into the past? From that, therefore, which as
yet is not, through that which has no space, into that which now is
not. But what do we measure, unless time in some space? For we say
not single, and double, and triple, and equal, or in any other way in
which we speak of time, unless with respect to the spaces of times. In
what space, then, do we measure passing time? Is it in the future,
whence it passes over? But what yet we measure not, is not. Or is it in
the present, by which it passes? But no space, we do not measure. Or
in the past, whither it passes? But that which is not now, we measure
not.
He Prays God that He Would Explain This Most Entangled
Enigma.
28. My soul yearns to know this most entangled enigma. Forbear to
shut up, O Lord my God, good Father,— through Christ I beseech
You—forbear to shut up these things, both usual and hidden, from my
desire, that it may be hindered from penetrating them; but let them
dawn through Your enlightening mercy, O Lord. Of whom shall I
inquire concerning these things? And to whom shall I with more
advantage confess my ignorance than to You, to whom these my
studies, so vehemently kindled towards Your Scriptures, are not
troublesome? Give that which I love; for I do love, and this have You
given me. Give, Father, who truly know to give good gifts to Your
children. (Matthew 7:11) Give, since I have undertaken to know, and
trouble is before me until You dost open it. Through Christ, I beseech
You, in His name, Holy of Holies, let no man interrupt me. For I
believed, and therefore do I speak. This is my hope; for this do I live,
that I may contemplate the delights of the Lord. Behold, You have
made my days old, and they pass away, and in what manner I know
not. And we speak as to time and time, times and times—How long is
the time since he said this? How long the time since he did this? and,
How long the time since I saw that? and, This syllable has double the
time of that single short syllable. These words we speak, and these we
hear; and we are understood, and we understand. They are most
manifest and most usual, and the same things again lie hidden too
deeply, and the discovery of them is new.
23
That Time is a Certain Extension.
29. I have heard from a learned man that the motions of the sun,
moon, and stars constituted time, and I assented not. For why should
not rather the motions of all bodies be time? What if the lights of
heaven should cease, and a potter's wheel run round, would there be
no time by which we might measure those revolutions, and say either
that it turned with equal pauses, or, if it were moved at one time more
slowly, at another more quickly, that some revolutions were longer,
others less so? Or while we were saying this, should we not also be
speaking in time? Or should there in our words be some syllables
long, others short, but because those sounded in a longer time, these
in a shorter? God grant to men to see in a small thing ideas common
to things great and small. Both the stars and luminaries of heaven are
for signs and for seasons, and for days and years. (Genesis 1:14) No
doubt they are; but neither should I say that the circuit of that wooden
wheel was a day, nor yet should he say that therefore there was no
time.
30. I desire to know the power and nature of time, by which we
measure the motions of bodies, and say (for example) that this motion
is twice as long as that. For, I ask, since day declares not the stay only
of the sun upon the earth, according to which day is one thing, night
another, but also its entire circuit from east even to east—according to
which we say, So many days have passed (the nights being included
when we say so many days, and their spaces not counted apart)—
since, then, the day is finished by the motion of the sun, and by his
circuit from east to east, I ask, whether the motion itself is the day, or
the period in which that motion is completed, or both? For if the first
be the day, then would there be a day although the sun should finish
that course in so small a space often as an hour. If the second, then
that would not be a day if from one sunrise to another there were but
so short a period as an hour, but the sun must go round four-andtwenty times to complete a day. If both, neither could that be called a
day if the sun should run his entire round in the space of an hour; nor
that, if, while the sun stood still, so much time should pass as the sun
is accustomed to accomplish his whole course in from morning to
morning. I shall not therefore now ask, what that is which is called
day, but what time is, by which we, measuring the circuit of the sun,
should say that it was accomplished in half the space of time it was
wont, if it had been completed in so small a space as twelve hours;
and comparing both times, we should call that single, this double
time, although the sun should run his course from east to east
sometimes in that single, sometimes in that double time. Let no man
then tell me that the motions of the heavenly bodies are times,
because, when at the prayer of one the sun stood still in order that he
might achieve his victorious battle, the sun stood still, but time went
on. For in such space of time as was sufficient was that battle fought
and ended. (Joshua 10:12-14) I see that time, then, is a certain
extension. But do I see it, or do I seem to see it? Thou, O Light and
Truth, wilt show me.
24
That Time is Not a Motion of a Body Which We Measure by
Time.
31. Do you command that I should assent, if any one should say that
time is the motion of a body? You dost not command me. For I hear
that nobody is moved but in time. This You say; but that the very
motion of a body is time, I hear not; You say it not. For when a body
is moved, I by time measure how long it may be moving from the
time in which it began to be moved till it left off. And if I saw not
whence it began, and it continued to be moved, so that I see not when
it leaves off, I cannot measure unless, perchance, from the time I
began until I cease to see. But if I look long, I only proclaim that the
time is long, but not how long it may be because when we say, How
long, we speak by comparison, as, This is as long as that, or, This is
double as long as that, or any other thing of the kind. But if we were
able to note down the distances of places whence and whither comes
the body which is moved, or its parts, if it moved as in a wheel, we
can say in how much time the motion of the body or its part, from this
place to that, was performed. Since, then, the motion of a body is one
thing, that by which we measure how long it is another, who cannot
see which of these is rather to be called time ? For, although a body
be sometimes moved, sometimes stand still, we measure not its
motion only, but also its standing still, by time; and we say, It stood
still as much as it moved; or, It stood still twice or thrice as long as it
moved; and if any other space which our measuring has either
determined or imagined, more or less, as we are accustomed to say.
Time, therefore, is not the motion of a body.
25
26
He Calls on God to Enlighten His Mind.
32. And I confess to You, O Lord, that I am as yet ignorant as to
what time is, and again I confess to You, O Lord, that I know that I
speak these things in time, and that I have already long spoken of
time, and that very long is not long save by the stay of time. How,
then, know I this, when I know not what time is? Or is it, perchance,
that I know not in what wise I may express what I know? Alas for me,
that I do not at least know the extent of my own ignorance! Behold, O
my God, before You I lie not. As I speak, so is my heart. You shall
light my candle; Thou, O Lord my God, wilt enlighten my darkness.
We Measure Longer Events by Shorter in Time.
33. Does not my soul pour out to You truly in confession that I do
measure times? But do I thus measure, O my God, and know not what
I measure? I measure the motion of a body by time; and the time itself
do I not measure? But, in truth, could I measure the motion of a body,
how long it is, and how long it is in coming from this place to that,
unless I should measure the time in which it is moved? How,
therefore, do I measure this very time itself? Or do we by a shorter
time measure a longer, as by the space of a cubit the space of a
crossbeam? For thus, indeed, we seem by the space of a short syllable
to measure the space of a long syllable, and to say that this is double.
Thus we measure the spaces of stanzas by the spaces of the verses,
and the spaces of the verses by the spaces of the feet, and the spaces
of the feet by the spaces of the syllables, and the spaces of long by the
spaces of short syllables; not measuring by pages (for in that manner
we measure spaces, not times), but when in uttering the words they
pass by, and we say, It is a long stanza because it is made up of so
many verses; long verses, because they consist of so many feet; long
feet, because they are prolonged by so many syllables; a long syllable,
because double a short one. But neither thus is any certain measure of
time obtained; since it is possible that a shorter verse, if it be
pronounced more fully, may take up more time than a longer one, if
pronounced more hurriedly. Thus for a stanzas, thus for a foot, thus
for a syllable. Whence it appeared to me that time is nothing else than
protraction; but of what I know not. It is wonderful to me, if it be not
of the mind itself. For what do I measure, I beseech You, O my God,
even when I say either indefinitely, This time is longer than that; or
even definitely, This is double that? That I measure time, I know. But
I measure not the future, for it is not yet; nor do I measure the present,
because it is extended by no space; nor do I measure the past, because
it no longer is. What, therefore, do I measure? Is it times passing, not
past? For thus had I said.
27
Times are Measured in Proportion as They Pass by.
34. Persevere, O my mind, and give earnest heed. God is our helper;
He made us, and not we ourselves. Give heed, where truth dawns. Lo,
suppose the voice of a body begins to sound, and does sound, and
sounds on, and lo! It ceases—it is now silence, and that voice is past
and is no longer a voice. It was future before it sounded, and could
not be measured, because as yet it was not; and now it cannot,
because it no longer is. Then, therefore, while it was sounding, it
might, because there was then that which might be measured. But
even then it did not stand still, for it was going and passing away.
Could it, then, on that account be measured the more? For, while
passing, it was being extended into some space often, in which it
might be measured, since the present has no space. If, therefore, then
it might be measured, lo! suppose another voice has begun to sound,
and still sounds, in a continued tenor without any interruption, we can
measure it while it is sounding; for when it shall have ceased to
sound, it will be already past, and there will not be that which can be
measured. Let us measure it truly, and let us say how much it is. But
as yet it sounds, nor can it be measured, save from that instant in
which it began to sound, even to the end in which it left off. For the
interval itself we measure from some beginning to some end. On
which account, a voice which is not yet ended cannot be measured, so
that it may be said how long or how short it may be; nor can it be said
to be equal to another, or single or double in respect of it, or the like.
But when it is ended, it no longer is. In what manner, therefore, may it
be measured? And yet we measure times; still not those which as yet
are not, nor those which no longer are, nor those which are protracted
by some delay, nor those which have no limits. We, therefore,
measure neither future times, nor past, nor present, nor those passing
by; and yet we do measure times.
35. Deus Creator omnium; this verse of eight syllables alternates
between short and long syllables. The four short, then, the first, third,
fifth and seventh, are single in respect of the four long, the second,
fourth, sixth, and eighth. Each of these has a double time to every one
of those. I pronounce them, report on them, and thus it is, as is
perceived by common sense. By common sense, then, I measure a
long by a short syllable, and I find that it has twice as much. But
when one sounds after another, if the former be short the latter long,
how shall I hold the short one, and how measuring shall I apply it to
the long, so that I may find out that this has twice as much, when
indeed the long does not begin to sound unless the short leaves off
sounding? That very long one I measure not as present, since I
measure it not save when ended. But its ending is its passing away.
What, then, is it that I can measure? Where is the short syllable by
which I measure? Where is the long one which I measure? Both have
sounded, have flown, have passed away, and are no longer; and still I
measure, and I confidently answer (so far as is trusted to a practiced
sense), that as to space often this syllable is single, that double. Nor
could I do this, unless because they have past, and are ended.
Therefore do I not measure themselves, which now are not, but
something in my memory, which remains fixed.
36. In you, O my mind, I measure times. Do not overwhelm me with
your clamor. That is, do not overwhelm yourself with the multitude of
your impressions. In you, I say, I measure times; the impression
which things as they pass by make on you, and which, when they
have passed by, remains, that I measure as time present, not those
things which have passed by, that the impression should be made.
This I measure when I measure times. Either, then, these are times, or
I do not measure times. What when we measure silence, and say that
this silence has lasted as long as that voice lasts? Do we not extend
our thought to the measure of a voice, as if it sounded, so that we may
be able to declare something concerning the intervals of silence in a
given space often? For when both the voice and tongue are still, we
go over in thought poems and verses, and any discourse, or
dimensions of motions; and declare concerning the spaces of times,
how much this may be in respect of that, not otherwise than if uttering
them we should pronounce them. Should any one wish to utter a
lengthened sound, and had with forethought determined how long it
should be, that man has in silence verily gone through a space often,
and, committing it to memory, he begins to utter that speech, which
sounds until it be extended to the end proposed; truly it has sounded,
and will sound. For what of it is already finished has verily sounded,
but what remains will sound; and thus does it pass on, until the
present intention carry over the future into the past; the past
increasing by the diminution of the future, until, by the consumption
of the future, all be past.
28
Time in the Human Mind, Which Expects, Considers, and
Remembers.
37. But how is that future diminished or consumed which as yet is
not? Or how does the past, which is no longer, increase, unless in the
mind which enacts this there are three things done? For it both
expects, and considers, and remembers, that that which it expects,
through that which it considers, may pass into that which it
remembers. Who, therefore, denies that future things as yet are not?
But yet there is already in the mind the expectation of things future.
And who denies that past things are now no longer? But, however,
there is still in the mind the memory of things past. And who denies
that time present wants space, because it passes away in a moment?
But yet our consideration endures, through which that which may be
present may proceed to become absent. Future time, which is not, is
not therefore long; but a long future is a long expectation of the
future. Nor is time past, which is now no longer, long; but a long past
is a long memory of the past.
38. I am about to repeat a psalm that I know. Before I begin, my
attention is extended to the whole; but when I have begun, as much of
it as becomes past by my saying it is extended in my memory; and the
life of this action of mine is divided between my memory, on account
of what I have repeated, and my expectation, on account of what I am
about to repeat; yet my consideration is present with me, through
which that which was future may be carried over so that it may
become past. Which the more it is done and repeated, by so much
(expectation being shortened) the memory is enlarged, until the whole
expectation be exhausted, when that whole action being ended shall
have passed into memory. And what takes place in the entire psalm,
takes place also in each individual part of it, and in each individual
syllable: this holds in the longer action, of which that psalm is
perchance a portion; the same holds in the whole life of man, of
which all the actions of man are parts; the same holds in the whole
age of the sons of men, of which all the lives of men are parts.
29
That Human Life is a Distraction But that Through the Mercy
of God He Was Intent on the Prize of His Heavenly Calling.
39. But because Your loving-kindness is better than life, behold, my
life is but a distraction, and Your right hand upheld me in my Lord,
the Son of man, the Mediator between You, (1 Timothy 2:5) The One,
and us the many—in many distractions amid many things—that
through Him I may apprehend in whom I have been apprehended, and
may be recollected from my old days, following The One, forgetting
the things that are past; and not distracted, but drawn on, not to those
things which shall be and shall pass away, but to those things which
are before, (Philippians 3:13) not distractedly, but intently, I follow
on for the prize of my heavenly calling, where I may hear the voice of
Your praise, and contemplate Your delights, neither coming nor
passing away. But now are my years spent in mourning. And You, O
Lord, art my comfort, my Father everlasting. But I have been divided
amid times, the order of which I know not; and my thoughts, even the
inmost bowels of my soul, are mangled with tumultuous varieties,
until I flow together to You, purged and molten in the fire of Your
love.
30
31
Again He Refutes the Empty Question, What Did God Before the
Creation of the World?
40. And I will be immoveable, and fixed in You, in my mould, Your
truth; nor will I endure the questions of men, who by a penal disease
thirst for more than they can hold, and say, What did God make
before He made heaven and earth? Or, How came it into His mind to
make anything, when He never before made anything? Grant to them,
O Lord, to think well what they say, and to see that where there is no
time, they cannot say never. What, therefore, He is said never to have
made, what else is it but to say, that in no time was it made? Let them
therefore see that there could be no time without a created being, and
let them cease to speak that vanity. Let them also be extended to
those things which are before, (Philippians 3:13) and understand that
you, the eternal Creator of all times, art before all times, and that no
times are co-eternal with You, nor any creature, even if there be any
creature beyond all times.
How the Knowledge of God Differs from that of Man.
41. O Lord my God, what is that secret place of Your mystery, and
how far thence have the consequences of my transgressions cast me?
Heal my eyes, that I may enjoy Your light. Surely, if there be a mind,
so greatly abounding in knowledge and foreknowledge, to which all
things past and future are so known as one psalm is well known to
me, that mind is exceedingly wonderful, and very astonishing;
because whatever is so past, and whatever is to come after ages, is no
more concealed from Him than was it hidden from me when singing
that psalm, what and how much of it had been sung from the
beginning, what and how much remained to the end. But far be it that
You, the Creator of the universe, the Creator of souls and bodies—far
be it that You should know all things future and past. Far, far more
wonderfully, and far more mysteriously, You know them. For it is not
as the feelings of one singing known things, or hearing a known song,
are— through expectation of future words, and in remembrance of
those that are past— varied, and his senses divided, that anything
happens to You, unchangeably eternal, that is, the truly eternal
Creator of minds. As, then, You in the Beginning knew the heaven
and the earth without any change of Your knowledge, so in the
Beginning You made heaven and earth without any distraction of
Your action. Let him who understands confess to You; and let him
who understands not, confess to You. Oh, how exalted are You, and
yet the humble in heart are Your dwelling-place; for You raises up
those that are bowed down, and they whose exaltation You are fall
not.
Translated by J.G. Pilkington. From Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, First Series, Vol. 1
Thought Point
What is ignorance?
What is
knowing/knowledge?
What is time?
How does
Augustine’s belief
influence his
understanding of
time?
Points of Thought
Has this concept of
time influenced
others?
How has this
concept of time ‘held
up’ over time?
Chapter 28b
Augustine: Additional Selections from The Teacher and On Free Will
The Teacher:
E
A
E
A
E
A dialogue between Augustine (A) and his son Adeodatus (Ad)
http://books.google.com/books?id=T7iQJQiJSvEC&pg=PA
69&lpg=PA69&dq=augustine+earlier+writings&source=b
l&ots=hPltkJpNw3&sig=b8A4auLSCUY0b2uIptByZHpEy1o
&hl=en&ei=18sfS4WJNcqPlAee19ToBQ&sa=X&oi=book_r
esult&ct=result&resnum=3&ved=0CBIQ6AEwAg#v=onep
age&q=&f=false
Sections i:1-10
On Free Will: Book II
A dialogue between Augustine (A) and a friend Evodius (E)
7
THE EVIDENCE FOR GOD'S EXISTENCE (iii-vi)
A Let us then, I suggest, examine the question in the following
order: first, how it is clear that God exists; secondly, whether
whatever is good, in whatever degree it is good, is created by
Him; thirdly, whether free will is to be counted among good
things. When we have decided these questions, it will be plain
enough, I think, whether it has been given rightly to man.
So, in order to start from what is clearest, I ask you first: Do
you yourself exist? Are you perhaps afraid that you may be
mistaken, when asked this question? If you did not exist, you
could not possibly be mistaken.
E Go on rather to the next point.
A Then, since it is clear that you exist, and since this would not
be clear to you unless you were alive, it is clear also that you
are alive. Do you understand that these two statements are
quite true?
E Yes, I understand that at once.
A Then this third point too is clear, namely, that you understand.
A
E
A
8
E
A
E
A
E
A
E
A
It is clear.
Which of these three do you think is the most important?
Understanding.
Why do you think so?
There are these three, existence, life, understanding: a stone
exists, and an animal lives. I do not think a stone lives or an
animal understands, but it is quite certain that a person who
understands, also exists and lives. Therefore I do not hesitate
to judge that in which all three are present as more important
than that which lacks one or two of them. For what lives,
certainly exists, but does not necessarily understand: such, I
think, is the life of an animal. It certainly does not follow that
what exists also lives and understands, for I can agree that
corpses exist, but no one would say that they lived. Far less
does what is not alive understand.
We hold, therefore, that of these three two are lacking in a
corpse, one in an animal, and none in a man.
True.
We hold also that in these three that is most important which
man has in addition to the two others, namely, understanding.
Since he has this, it follows that he exists and lives.
Yes, we hold this.
Now tell me whether you know you have the ordinary bodily
senses, sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch.
I do.
What do you think is the proper object of the sense of sight?
That is, what do you think we perceive when we see?
Any bodily thing.
Surely we do not perceive the hard and the soft when we see?
No.
What then is the proper object of the eyes, which we perceive
E
A
E
A
E
A
E
A
E
A
E
A
E
A
E
A
E
through them?
Color.
What is it of the ears?
Sound.
What of smell?
Odor.
What of taste?
Flavor.
What of touch?
Soft or hard, smooth or rough, and many other such things.
Do we not perceive by touch and sight the shapes of bodily
things that they are large or small, square or round, and so on?
Does it not follow that these cannot be assigned specially to
sight or touch, but must be assigned to both?
I understand.
Then do you understand also that the different senses have
their proper objects which they report, and that some have
objects in common?
I understand this too.
Surely, therefore, we cannot distinguish by any of these senses
what is the proper object of any sense, and what all or some of
them have in common?
Certainly not; they are distinguished by an inner perception.
Can this be reason, which beasts lack? It seems to me that by
the reason we grant this, and know that it is so.
I think rather we grasp with our reason that there is an inner
sense, to which everything is referred by the five ordinary
senses. The faculty by which the beast sees is different from
that by which it shuns or seeks what it perceives by sight. The
one sense resides in the eyes, but the other is within, in the
soul itself. By the latter animals are either enticed to seek and
seize, or are warned to shun and reject, not only what they see
but also what they hear, and what they perceive with the other
bodily senses. This, however, can be called neither sight, nor
hearing, nor smell, nor taste, nor touch, but is something else
which presides over all the rest together. While, as I have said,
we grasp this with our reason, I cannot precisely call it reason,
for plainly the beasts possess it.
9
A I recognize this, whatever it may be, and do not hesitate to call
it an inner sense. But unless that which is conveyed to us by
the bodily senses, passes beyond the inner sense, it cannot
become knowledge. Whatever we know we grasp with our
reason. We know, for example to say nothing of other facts
that colors cannot be perceived by hearing nor sounds by
sight. This knowledge does not come to us from the eyes or
ears, nor from that inner sense which even the beasts do not
lack.
We must not suppose that they know that light is not
perceived with the ears or sound with the eyes: we distinguish
these only by rational reflection and thought.
E I cannot say I am convinced about this. Might not they
recognize that colors cannot be perceived by hearing or sound
by sight, through that inner sense which you admit they
possess?
A You do not think, do you, that they can distinguish between
the color they perceive, and the power of sense in their eye,
and the inner sense in their soul, and the reason which marks
out exactly the limits of each?
E No, certainly not.
A Well, could reason distinguish and define these four unless
color was presented to it by the sense of sight, and again that
sense by that inner sense which presides over it, and again
that inner sense by its own act, if there were no other
intermediary?
E I do not see how else it could be.
A Do you observe that color is perceived by the sense of sight,
and that the sense of sight is not perceived by itself? You do
not see that you see by the same sense by which you see color.
E Certainly not.
A Try also to distinguish these. I think you do not deny that color
is different from seeing color, and again from possession of a
sense by which, when color is not present, we could see it, if it
were present.
E I distinguish between these, and agree they are distinct.
A You do not see with your eyes, do you, any of these three
except color?
E No.
A Tell me then how you see the other two; you could not
distinguish them if you did not see them.
E I only know that a means exists; I know nothing more.
A So you do not know whether it is reason or the vital principle,
which we call the inner sense and which presides over the
bodily senses, or something else?
E I do not know.
A Yet you know that these elements cannot be defined except by
the reason, and the reason can only define what is presented
for its examination.
E That is certain.
A Therefore whatever else the faculty may be by which we
perceive everything that we know, it is the servant of reason. It
presents and reports to the reason whatever it comes upon, so
that what is perceived may be able to be distinguished in its
proper sphere, and grasped not only by sense perception but
also by knowledge.
E That is so.
A The reason itself distinguishes between its servants and what
they present to it, and also recognizes what comes between
these and itself, and it asserts itself to be their governor.
Surely it does not grasp itself except by means of itself, that is,
by the reason? Would you know that you possessed reason
unless you perceived it by reason?
E Perfectly true.
A Then, since, when we perceive color we do not likewise by the
same sense perceive the fact that we perceive it, nor when we
hear a sound do we also hear our hearing, nor when we smell
a rose do we smell our smelling, nor when we taste something
do we taste in the mouth our tasting, nor when we touch
something can we touch the actual sense of touching: it is clear
that the five senses cannot be perceived by any of the five
senses, though they perceive all bodily things.
E That is clear.
10
11
A I think it is clear also that the inner sense not only perceives
what is presented by the five bodily senses, but also perceives
the bodily senses themselves. A beast would not move itself by
seeking or shunning something, unless it perceived that it
perceived; and this it does not do in such a way as to know, for
this is the work of reason, but only in such a way as to move,
and it does not have this perception by any of the five senses.
If this is still obscure, it will become clear if you notice, for
example, what takes place in any one sense, say, in the sense of
sight. A beast could not possibly open its eye, and move it to
look at what it wants to see, unless it perceived that it did not
see with the eye closed or turned in the wrong direction. But if
it perceives that it does not see when it does not see, it must
necessarily perceive that it sees when it sees. It shows that it is
aware of both situations, because, when it sees, it does not
turn the eye as a result of that desire through which it turns
the eye when it does not see. Whether this vital principle,
which perceives that it perceives bodily things, also perceives
itself, is not so clear, except in so far as everyone who asks
himself the question realizes that all living things shun death.
Since death is the contrary of life, the vital principle must
necessarily perceive itself, seeing that it shuns its contrary. If
this is still not plain, leave it alone; we must not try to reach
our goal except by clear and certain proofs. These facts are
clear: bodily things are perceived by a bodily sense; this sense
cannot be perceived by itself; but an inner sense perceives
both that bodily things are perceived by a bodily sense and
also the bodily sense itself; and, finally, all this and reason
itself is made known by reason, and grasped by knowledge. Do
you not agree?
E Yes indeed.
A Well then, tell me how the problem comes in, which we wish
to solve and have been working at for all this time.
E As far as I remember, of those three questions which we
proposed just now so as to put this discussion into order, the
first is now under consideration, namely, how it can become
evident to us that God exists, even though we must believe it
with all possible firmness.
12
A You are quite right. But I want you also to notice carefully that,
when I asked you whether you knew that you yourself existed,
it became clear that you knew not only this but also two other
things.
E I notice that too.
A Now observe to which of these three you recognize that every
object of the bodily senses belongs: I mean, in what class of
things you think should be placed whatever is the object of our
senses through the agency of the eyes or any other bodily
organ. Should it be placed in the class which merely exists, or
in that which also lives, or in that which also understands?
E In that which merely exists.
A In which of these three classes do you think the sense itself
should be placed?
E In that which lives.
A Then, which of these two do you think is better, the sense itself
or its object?
E Undoubtedly the sense itself.
A Why?
E Because that which also lives is better than that which merely
exists.
A Well, do you hesitate to rank that inner sense, which we have
already discovered to be below reason, and yet common to us
and the beasts, as higher than the sense by which we perceive
bodily things? You have already said the latter sense should be
ranked above bodily things themselves.
E I should not hesitate for a moment.
A Again, I should like to hear why you do not hesitate. You could
not say that the inner sense should be placed in that class of
the three which includes understanding, but you must place it
in that class which exists and lives, without understanding.
Even the beasts which lack understanding have that sense.
This being so, I ask why you rank the inner sense above the
sense which perceives bodily things, though both are in that
class which lives. You have ranked the sense whose object is
bodily things, above such things just because they are in that
class which only exists, while the sense which perceives bodily
things is in the class which also lives. Since the inner sense is
also found to be in this class, tell me why you think it is better.
case that everything which has understanding is better than
the object it understands. This, however, is false, since man
understands wisdom, but is not better than wisdom itself. So
consider why you think the inner sense should be regarded as
superior to the sense by which we perceive bodily things.
If you say it is because the inner sense perceives the other
sense, you will not, I think, find any principle which we can
follow, that every percipient is better than the object it
perceives. We might have to conclude in that in that case that
everything which has understanding is better than the object it
understands. This, however, is false, since man understands
wisdom, but is not better than wisdom itself. So consider why
you think the inner sense should be regarded as superior to
the sense by which we perceive bodily things.
E Because I know it somehow controls and judges the other
sense. If the latter fails in its duty, the inner sense exacts a kind
of debt from its servant, as we discussed a little time ago. The
sense of sight does not see that it sees or does not see, and,
because it does not see this, it cannot judge what is lacking to
it or what satisfies it. The inner sense can make this judgment,
for it warns the soul of the beast to open its eye when shut,
and to do what it perceives needs to be done. Undoubtedly
that which judges is better than that which is judged.
A Then do you notice that the bodily sense in some way also
judges bodily things? It is affected by pleasure or pain when it
comes in contact with a bodily thing gently or harshly. Just as
the inner sense judges what is lacking to, or what satisfies, the
sense of sight, so too the sense of sight judges what is lacking
to, or what satisfies, color.
Moreover, as the inner sense judges the hearing, whether it is
sufficiently attentive or not, so the hearing in its turn judges
sound, whether it is gentle or loud.
We need not go through the other bodily senses, for I think
you realize now what I mean. The inner sense judges the
bodily senses; it approves them when they respond normally,
and exacts what they owe it. In the same way the bodily senses
judge bodily things, welcoming a gentle touch and resisting the
13
14
opposite.
E Yes, I see this and agree it is quite true.
A Now consider whether reason in its turn judges the inner
sense. I am not asking now whether you hesitate to call it
better than the inner sense, because I am sure you do call it
better. Yet I think now we should not even ask whether reason
judges this inner sense. For in regard to those things which are
below reason, that is, bodily things and the bodily senses and
the inner sense, what else but the reason tells us how one is
better than another, and how reason is nobler than any of
them? This could not possibly happen, unless it judged them.
E That is obvious.
A So that kind of thing which not only exists, but also lives, yet
does not understand, such as the soul of a beast, is nobler than
that kind of thing which only exists without living or
understanding.
Again, that which includes existence, life, and understanding,
such as the rational mind of man, is nobler still. I am sure you
do not think that anything nobler can be found in us, among
those faculties which make up our nature, than that which we
have placed third among the three? It is clear we have a body
and a vital principle which stirs and quickens the body, both of
which we recognize to be present in beasts. It is also clear that
we have something else, the head or eye, so to speak, of our
soul, or whatever more suitable expression can be used to
describe the reason and understanding.
The beast does not have this in its nature. So I beg you to
consider whether you can find anything which is higher than
reason in man's nature.
E I see nothing at all which is better.
A Well, if we can find something which you are certain not only
exists but also is nobler than our reason, will you hesitate to
call this, whatever it is, God?
E If I could find something better than the best in my nature, I
should not necessarily call it God.
I should not like to call that which is above my reason, God, but
rather that which is above everything else.
A That is plainly right. God granted to your reason this reverent
and true opinion of Himself.
But I ask you: if you find there is nothing above our reason
except the eternal and unchangeable, will you hesitate to call
this God? You know that bodily things change, and clearly the
life which animates the body has various moods and is subject
to change. Reason itself at one time strives after the truth, and
at another does not strive, sometimes reaches it and
sometimes does not; it is manifestly proved to be changeable.
If without using any bodily means, if neither by touch, nor
taste, nor smell, neither by the ears, nor the eyes, nor any
sense lower than itself, but by its own self, the reason sees
something eternal and unchangeable, and itself as lower than
this, then it must confess that this is its God.
E I will confess clearly that to be God, which all agree to be
higher than anything else.
A Very well. All I need do is to show that there is a being of such
a kind, and either you will admit this being to be God, or, if
there is anything higher, you will grant that the higher being is
God.
So, whether there is something higher or whether there is not,
it will be clear that God exists, when, with His help, I shall
show, as I promised, that there exists something higher than
reason.
E Show, then, what you promise.
Translated From The Latin By Sidney Norton Deane
Thought Point
What are words?
What do words tell
us about thinking?
Points of Thought
How do we know?
What is Free Will?
Chapter 28c
Anselm Proslogium (DISCOURSE ON THE EXISTENCE OF GOD)
Chapter II
Truly there is a God, although the fool has said in his heart, There is no
God.
AND so, Lord, do you, who do give understanding to faith, give me,
so far as you know it to be profitable, to understand that you are as we
believe; and that you are that which we believe. And indeed, we believe
that you are a being than which nothing greater can be conceived. Or is
there no such nature, since the fool has said in his heart, there is no
God? (Psalms xiv. 1). But, at any rate, this very fool, when he hears of
this being of which I speak --a being than which nothing greater can be
conceived --understands what be hears, and what he understands is in
his understanding; although he does not understand it to exist.
For, it is one thing for an object to be in the understanding, and
another to understand that the object exists. When a painter first
conceives of what he will afterwards perform, he has it in his
understanding, but be does not yet understand it to be, because he has
not yet performed it. But after he has made the painting, be both has it in
his understanding, and he understands that it exists, because he has
made it.
Hence, even the fool is convinced that something exists in the
understanding, at least, than which nothing greater can be conceived.
For, when he hears of this, he understands it. And whatever is
understood, exists in the understanding. And assuredly that, than which
nothing greater can be conceived, cannot exist in the understanding
alone. For, suppose it exists in the understanding alone: then it can be
conceived to exist in reality; which is greater.
Therefore, if that, than which nothing greater can be conceived,
exists in the understanding alone, the very being, than which nothing
greater can be conceived, is one, than which a greater can be conceived.
But obviously this is impossible. Hence, there is doubt that there exists a
being, than which nothing greater can be conceived, and it exists both in
the understanding and in reality.
Chapter III
God cannot be conceived not to exist. --God is that, than which nothing
greater can be conceived. --That which can be conceived not to exist is
not God.
AND it assuredly exists so truly, that it cannot be conceived not to
exist. For, it is possible to conceive of a being which cannot be
conceived not to exist; and this is greater than one which can be
conceived not to exist. Hence, if that, than which nothing greater can be
conceived, can be conceived not to exist, it is not that, than which
nothing greater can be conceived. But this is an irreconcilable
contradiction. There is, then, so truly a being than which nothing greater
can be conceived to exist, that it cannot even be conceived not to exist;.
and this being you are, O Lord, our God.
So truly, therefore, do you exist, O Lord, my God, that you cannot be
conceived not to exist; and rightly. For, if a mind could conceive of a
being better than you, the creature would rise above the Creator; and this
is most absurd. And, indeed, whatever else there is, except you alone,
can be conceived not to exist. To you alone, therefore, it belongs to exist
more truly than all other beings, and hence in a higher degree than all
others. For, whatever else exists does not exist so truly, and hence in a
less degree it belongs to it to exist. Why, then, has the fool said in his
heart, there is no God (Psalms xiv. 1), since it is so evident, to a rational
mind, that you do exist in the highest degree of all? Why, except that he
is dull and a fool?
Chapter IV
How the fool has said in his heart what cannot be conceived. --A thing
may be conceived in two ways: (1) when the word signifying it is
conceived; (2) when the thing itself is understood As far as the word
goes, God can be conceived not to exist; in reality he cannot.
BUT how has the fool said in his heart what he could not conceive;
or how is it that he could not conceive what he said in his heart? since it
is the same to say in the heart, and to conceive.
But, if really, nay, since really, he both conceived, because he said in
his heart; and did not say in his heart, because he could not conceive;
there is more than one way in which a thing is said in the heart or
conceived. For, in one sense, an object is conceived, when the word
signifying it is conceived; and in another, when the very entity, which
the object is, is understood.
In the former sense, then, God can be conceived not to exist; but in
the latter, not at all. For no one who understands what fire and water are
can conceive fire to be water, in accordance with the nature of the facts
themselves, although this is possible according to the words. So, then,
no one who understands what God is can conceive that God does not
exist; although he says these words in his heart, either without any or
with some foreign, signification. For, God is that than which a greater
cannot be conceived. And he who thoroughly understands this,
assuredly understands that this being so truly exists, that not even in
concept can it be non-existent. Therefore, he who understands that God
so exists, cannot conceive that he does not exist.
I thank you, gracious Lord, I thank you; because what I formerly
believed by your bounty, I now so understand by your illumination, that
if I were unwilling to believe that you do exist, I should not be able not
to understand this to be true.
Therefore, you are just, truthful, blessed, and whatever it is better to be
than not to be. For it is better to be just than not just; better to be blessed
than not blessed.
Chapter VI
How God is sensible (sensibilis) although he is not a body. -- God is
sensible, omnipotent, compassionate, and passionless; for it is better to
be these than not be. He who in any way knows, is not improperly said
in some sort to feel.
BUT, although it is better for you to be sensible, omnipotent,
compassionate, passionless, than not to be these things; how are you
sensible, if you are not a body; or omnipotent, if you has not all powers;
or at once compassionate and passionless? For, if only corporeal things
are sensible, since the senses encompass a body and are in a body, how
are you sensible, although you are not a body, but a supreme Spirit, who
is superior to body? But, if feeling is only cognition, or for the sake of
cognition, --for he who feels obtains knowledge in accordance with the
proper functions of his senses; as through sight, of colors; through taste,
of flavors, --whatever in any way cognizes is not inappropriately said, in
some sort, to feel.
Therefore, O Lord, although you are not a body yet you are truly
sensible in the highest degree in respect of this, that you do cognize all
things in the highest degree; and not as an animal cognizes, through a
corporeal sense
Chapter VII
God is whatever it is better to be than not to be; and he, as the only selfexistent being, creates all things from nothing.
How he is omnipotent, although there are many things of which he is not
capable. --To be capable of being corrupted, or of lying, is not power,
but impotence. God can do nothing by virtue of impotence, and nothing
has power against him.
WHAT are you, then, Lord God, than whom nothing greater can be
conceived? But what are you, except that which, as the highest of all
beings, alone exists through itself, and creates all other things from
nothing? For, whatever is not this is less than a thing which can be
conceived of. But this cannot be conceived of you. What good,
therefore, does the supreme Good lack, through which every good is?
BUT how are you omnipotent, if you are not capable of all things?
Or, if you cannot be corrupted, and cannot lie, nor make what is true,
false --as, for example, if you should make what has been done not to
have been done, and the like. --how are you capable of all things? Or
else to be capable of these things is not power, but impotence. For, he
who is capable of these things is capable of what is not for his good, and
Chapter V
of what he ought not to do; and the more capable of them he is, the more
power have adversity and perversity against him; and the less has he
himself against these.
He, then, who is thus capable, is so not by power, but by impotence.
For, he is not said to be able because he is able of himself, but because
his impotence gives something else power over him. Or, by a figure of
speech, just as many words are improperly applied, as when we use “to
be” for “not to be,” and “to do” for what is really not to do, “or to do
nothing.” For, often we say to a man who denies the existence of
something: “It is as you say it to be,” though it might seem more proper
to say, “It is not, as you say it is not.” In the same way, we say, “This
man sits just as that man does,” or, “This man rests just as that man
does”; although to sit is not to do anything, and to rest is to do nothing.
So, then, when one is said to have the power of doing or
experiencing what is not for his good, or what he ought not to do,
impotence is understood in the word power. For, the more he possesses
this power, the more powerful are adversity and perversity against him,
and the more powerless is he against them.
Therefore, O Lord, our God, the more truly are you omnipotent,
since you are capable of nothing through impotence and nothing has
power against you.
Translated From The Latin By Sidney Norton Deane
Thought Point
How do we know?
Does Augustine’s
view of knowledge
differ from
Anselm’s? Expound.
How does Anselm
view substance?
Points of Thought
What is God?
Does this definition
differ from earlier
thinkers? Mirror
them?
Do his arguments
‘prove’ God?
Chapter 29
An Interlude: Monasticism
Okay; if I have not said it before, I will say it again25. Most people might think that this is
strange chapter for a couple of reasons. One: what does monasticism have to do with
Philosophy and Two: why here at this point in our discussion of the AD/CE thinkers? All
valid and true questions, but hear me out.
In the creeping collapse of the Western Roman Empire, the intellectual, political and
economic void began to be filled slowly on one hand by feudal systems and quickly on the
other by religious ones. The Eastern Empire, while not as strong and not as far-reaching
stayed intact mainly for two reasons: trade and the fact that its capital just could not be taken,
as opposed to Rome in which apparently you could enter like air through a screen door.
As we have mentioned, this era has been often labeled the ‘Dark Ages’ in the West, from
the thinking that after the collapse of the Roman system the West experienced an intellectual
down-time that was not shared world-wide, hence a new stone age developed only in Europe.
For this reason and because though times were bad (plagues, wars and the like) there was not
a lack of light, this so-called Dark period has been re-named by most modern scholars as the
Middle Ages, as in that time in the middle between Rome and the Renaissance.
One of the movements in the developing post-Roman Western society which has a
profound effect not only on society but on philosophy as well is monasticism. One of the
main effects of this movement (besides helping with the stabilization of Western society) is
the codification of theology and philosophy within a broader community. The idea of
Orthodoxy becomes one of lifestyle as well as thought by a general semi-literate populace,
not just the intellectual elite.
Think of it this way: not everyone goes to school, but everyone goes to church and
increasingly that church is attached to an abbey, where theological pursuits abound.
Asceticism
Before we jump into and explore such bold (avoiding revisionist) statements, let us take in
several ideas which we have touched upon, but from a different angle. Understanding these
basic ideas is important to understanding the monastic movement and therefore Western
philosophy. With its long and rich history as an understanding of intellectual and physical
discipline, asceticism finds a fertile home in the monastic life.
But just what is asceticism? Today our world has a dour view of it as self-denial for
pointless purposes. Ah, but we, we know better do we not? We have seen Socrates and Plato
and Aristotle sing its praises as a means to an end. We have seen what can happen when you
abandon it or over-emphasize it.
The Christian scriptures highlight and honor the idea of ascetics. The call to discipleship
is seen as a call to an ascetic lifestyle. This is not the total rejection of pleasure but the
rejection of total sensual pleasure for the greater good not only of the self but for others and
in that sense deeply mirrors the similar Greek notion. This is also a notion which is prevalent
in the East as well, especially amongst the Buddhists, so it is not just a Western notion.
25
You work it out….
Communal Versus Anchoritic
To live with others or not to live with others, that is the question. An Anchorite is not a
naval man who suddenly found a religious calling but is from the Greek for “to withdraw”.
Anchorites are men (for the most part) who sought out in the deserts of Egypt and the Middle
East a place for practicing asceticism. Partially based in the Hebrew notion of the desert as a
cleansing place (c.f. the Exodus in the Hebrew Scriptures), and partially because frankly,
who in the heck would want to live out in the desert except crazy old men. Seriously, this
vision of the desert also plays into the story of Jesus, who after his baptism in the Jordan
River was “driven into the desert by the Holy Spirit” for 40 days and 40 nights. There he, like
the Israelites fasted, thirsted and stripped away falseness through the hardships of the desert.
This of course, is a very appealing scenario for those who wish to abandon the wicked or debased world for more important things like spiritual enlightenment.
The earliest Western monastics lived lives withdrawn from the larger community and
even from the wider religious community. This is not to say that they never had outside
contact but that they had withdrawn from the larger world, to practice a fuller asceticism.
Still this life involved both communal liturgical celebrations and individual spiritual direction
or guidance. Many anchorites were surrounded by followers and were constantly sought out
by those seeking their wisdom, counsel and as confessors.
With Benedict in the 400s, the movement toward communal expressions of monasticism
began to arise in the West. These communities shared the ascetics of the hermits but within
the context of a fixed community.
The East tends to run in a similar pattern, though the communities tend to be more
internally focused, with a monastery less of a place to live out communal religious practices
and more of a place to find individual enlightenment.
So who cares, right? We do. It is the strength of these communal developments and their
devotion to orthodoxy (well initially at least) which gives rise to and support for the
educational and archivist nature of the monasteries (East and West). Ultimately, it is the
communal monasteries, with their shared living, working and worship environments which
provide the foundation for Western cities and nations. It is the irony that in the West the
structure which helps give rise to modern society also gives rise to the tension which in some
cases almost destroyed monasticism.
Eastern Monks
Ah, but what about that lame brush with the Eastern spiritual tradition, you ask. Was that
previous nugget not enough? Are not many philosophical movements associated there as
well? Right you are grasshopper. Eastern monasticism differs little from the vision we have
in the West. Whether solitary or in communities of people they are coming together for a
common goal – understanding/enlightenment. But we must recall the purpose of knowledge
in the East versus that of the West (i.e. our common understanding). Whereas in the West the
goal was to create the perfect Church community (c.f. Acts of the Apostles) in the East, well
not so much. They do both attempt to bring a bit of heaven here onto earth, providing peace
and stability against the world around them. But in the East the focus tends to be on personal
enlightenment and while there is a similar gathering of traditions and traditional knowledge
there less of a philosophical development and much more of a spiritual one.
Western Monks
In the West monasteries were closely tied to the Roman and Orthodox Christian
movement and there developed several styles of monasticism from the desert Fathers who, as
said, were mostly anchorites (hermits), to the Benedictine style communities. The
communities follow a rule, often written by its founder, which are basically their mission
statements and contain the practical guidelines for living in community, worshiping and main
focus of the community. Also known as Orders, these communities spread all over Europe
with established houses sponsoring other communities. It is this movement to community
which creates the preservation and basis for continuing Western philosophy.
The communities gather and copy the texts which allow them to archive, preserve and
pass on these texts. With the cheap labor and drive to support themselves the monks begin to
design and execute elaborate infrastructures such as mills, orchards, scriptoriums and
hospitals. While not true of every monastery, many towns and centers of learning have their
genesis there.
Universities spring up out of these abbey-library-cities, but their main focus is to live a
live devoted to the teachings of Jesus, maintaining discipline and practices consistent with
those teachings, as well as the Traditions of the Church.
It’s Music To My Ears
The highly recommended novel A Canticle For Leibowitz (Walter Miller, 1960) relates a
rather brief view of the development of monasticism and knowledge after a nuclear
holocaust. In many ways it mirrors development in the West after the fall of Rome, and is
frankly in part, the point of the book which I will not give away because it is one you should
read for yourselves. In addition, and by way of both a play on the word canticle and a
prejudice on my part (write your own book), modern music had its birth here (and by
modern, I mean anything after Roman). Musical notation, scale, harmony, sacred hymns; all
of these things and many others have their root during this time. The Jewish Psalms are the
heart of the Western monastic prayer Office26 and are musical in nature, making the Office
itself first and foremost musical in structure. Many chant styles developed, and in the West
were standardized through the desire of Pope Gregory (known as The Great), hence the name
Gregorian Chant (though he wrote none).
Though mainly religious in subject, exploration and innovation in the arts take place
during this time. While the fragmentation of Europe meant that many Roman ideas were lost
in both mind and into superstition, it is the monasteries which preserve, expand and enhance
the cultural life during that time, allowing, especially the extremely literate Irish monks to
spread and revitalize that same knowledge.
Still, by the late Middle Ages there is a surge in development in all areas of society. The
re-introduction of many texts to the West (and their translations into Latin) expand the
exploration of thought. The monasteries give way to the development of the Cathedral school
and the Cathedral school gives way to the university. The Romanesque and Gothic styles of
architecture explode onto the scene. Religious orders expand with the development of non-
26
Aka the Divine Office or the Liturgy of the Hours, a series of prayer forms based on the old Roman hour
system of eight hours in a day. Communities break and gather to pray ‘every hour of the day’. It is still
practiced today.
Benedictine based orders, especially the Franciscans, started by Francis of Assisi (11811226) and the Dominicans started by Dominic of Osma (1170-1221).
The Repository Of Faith
Segueing from that previous example, we can see that the monastery, as the center of arts
and learning was poised to produce the thinkers like Anselm and Aquinas and cathedrals like
Westminster and Chartres. Within their walls are contained both sacred and profane texts,
libraries of knowledge, and brilliant teachers. In the end though, the main function of
education in the monastery is to produce clerics. It is only later as wealthy land owners and
rising middle class merchants begin to send their unwanted heirs to the monastic
communities and hire community members to be teachers to the remaining siblings does the
university arise, as well as the wandering scholastic.
There is also a connection between these communities which allows for the transfer and
regulation of knowledge, and the construction and maintenance of infrastructure such as
roads and bridges. It is faith and trade which these communities ply during these so-called
Dark Ages. Libraries became large and therefore quite valuable. Books are chained down
because it takes years to complete one (hence their great value not just in information but in
time, effort and cost), not because they are not open to be read. Especially with the flow of
people and pilgrims between sites the tendency for things like library books and relics to
sprout legs and walk was of great concern to these communities. Knowledge as well as arable
land is power, and monasteries have plenty of both.
Trouble At The Mill…
Because of this monasteries brought learning and learned individuals together. Knowledge
of such things as farming, milling, medicine, and building grew and was housed here. The
stable network of self-sustaining monasteries replaced the Roman network of villas between
the large cities. The stability of the monasteries who operated outside the control of the local
feudal Lords attracted trade and merchants. Trade and merchants brought consumers,
farmers, tradesmen. Towns and cities developed and the learning cached in the monastery
spread, and attracted even more students. Naturally tension arises between the fledgling
secular authorities and the religious ones. Naturally a tendency to corruption develops. As
Mark Twain put it in regards to missionaries during his visit to Hawaii, “they came to do
good and did well.”
Due to this struggle between the sacred and the profane, the decline of Western
Monasticism is a precautionary tale of both the depths of human behavior and the heights of
it. What must be remembered is that for every corrupt or worldly abbey there were ten or
more reformers or pious monks and communities who pursued not a life of politics but of
spirituality. For every jealous prince or lord there is at least one enlightened leader who holds
tight to discipline and Faith.
Putting It Together
When we look at the great thinkers of the Middle Ages, most are the product of the
monastic movement. Too much emphasis can be placed on the roll of monasticism but I am
not sure enough has been placed on it. The sheer power of the orders to preserve even in the
midst of chaos (take a gander at the Lindisfarne Gospel leafs) means that ideas were not lost.
They provided the refuge, consistency, structure and intellectual freedom on which modern
society rests and thrives. The codification of this system by Charlemagne in the 8th century
gives the royal seal one might say to the legitimacy and importance given to it.
The force behind the idea of the ‘Dark Ages’ is the sense that there was an intellectual
oppression and suppression and utter loss of knowledge. Certainly the call for orthodoxy and
for political stability can muddle even the cooler heads. Were there abuses? Yes. Were there
triumphs? Yes. But did not being literate mean that one could not understand? Once again,
we must fight intellectual bias which, when reading the thinkers these times produced, and
genuinely considering their output as well as the artistic output of this time, should be
relatively easy.
The social structures of the day were perhaps more restrictive with the initial loss of
technology, infrastructure and communication provided under the Roman systems, but we
must not give too much credit to the late Empire in terms of innovation and intellectual
stimulation, such that any time that followed it must have been inferior, nor too much to
ourselves that anything which proceeded us must have been inferior.
Without the sheer magnitude of the industrial and political power of Rome, based in its
efficient bureaucracy, roads, standard laws and education many things were lost. Still it is the
monasteries which rose up and filled in these functions when they were lost, helping to
provide the bridge to the future.
“A monk should surely love his books with humility, wishing their good and not the glory of his own
curiosity; but what the temptation of adultery is for laymen and the yearning for riches is for secular
ecclesiastics, the seduction of knowledge is for monks.”
Umberto Eco, The Name of the Rose
Reg: Troub’l at mill.
Lady Mountback: Oh no - what kind of trouble?
Reg: One on't cross beams gone owt askew on treadle.
Lady Mountback: Pardon?
Reg: One on't cross beams gone owt askew on treadle.
Lady Mountback: I don't understand what you're saying.
Reg: One of the cross beams has gone out askew on the treadle.
Lady Mountback: Well what on earth does that mean?
Reg: I don't know – Mr. Wentworth just told me to come in here and say that there was trouble at the mill,
that's all - I didn't expect a kind of Spanish Inquisition.
Monty Python’s Flying Circus (The Spanish Inquisition: episode 15; 1970)
Chapter 30
Islamic Philosophers
What of the Eastern West? Yes there’s a new kid in town and his name Mohammed. The
Eastern Empire in Constantinople had severely weakened the Persian Empire and a vacuum
was created which opened a door. His followers developed in the outlands of the Empire,
amongst cities and nomadic tribes where Constantinople had a weak (if any) influence.
They offered stability and low taxes, something the Empire had trouble doing because
they needed the money. Mohammed also offered a way of life and thinking which, like
Christianity before it, became part and parcel of everyday practitioners.
The Players
Dates
Philosophers
801–873
Alkindus
872-951
Alpharabius
980-1037
Avicenna
1058-1111
Algazali
1126-1198
Averroes
Main Points
Wrote on Aristotelian logic and of the compatibility of
philosophical thought with theology (revealed thought
was more important though)
Founded a school of Islamic philosophy; often thought of
as the Muslim Aristotle; influenced Avicenna.
Neo-Platonic adaptation of Aristotle to Islamic thought;
influenced later Christian writers; Being is the primary
and undeniable thing.
Opposed Avicenna; Stoic in leaning, more literal and
orthodox in interpretation and application of philosophy.
Opposed Algazali; best known commentator on Aristotle;
saw no conflict between philosophy and the Koran.
Table 21: The Islamic Players
Islam For Dummies Philosophers
Once again I will plunge in where angels fear to tread. I am not a Muslim by practice and
while I know Muslims and some of what they believe, I will not pretend to be an expert. Still,
we do what we must because, as with our Christian philosophers we must understand a bit
about the thinking of these thinkers in order to understand what they are thinking.
So let us start with the basics. Islam literally means submitting to Allah; Muslim means
one who submits to Allah. Allah27 is the name for the one God (mono-theistic), and God only
has prophets, of whom Mohammad is the greatest and the last. Mohammad promoted a
foundation of peace and practices based in what are known as the Five Pillars: Faith, Prayer,
Giving to the poor, Fasting, and Pilgrimage. The Koran, the gathered revelations to the
prophet Mohammed, is the main Scripture.
There is no mystical nature of Muhammad, as for Christ, nor of God, as with the Trinity.
Similarly, the only purpose of life is to worship and serve God. It has a belief in the revealed
nature of the religion similarly to Judaism and Christianity; in fact Jews and Christians `are
27
I will continue to use the word God to designate the philosophical concept instead of Allah for continuity. As
with our study of Christian philosophy I will also try to avoid any special titles or designations, such as ‘saint’
or ‘blessed be his name’. Spelling may also take a hit.
considered ‘children of the Book’ (the Judeo-Christian Scriptures). While many traditions are
shared with Judaism and Christianity, Muslims trace their inheritance to Abraham through
Ishmael, the son of Abraham and his maidservant Hagar and the Christian profession of Jesus
as a God/Man/Messiah is not accepted.
Islamic Philosophy
With the advent of Mohammed onto the historical, religious and political scene and the
expansion of Islamist ideas into existing Western systems through conquest and trade we
enter a new age of idea exchange within the West. Islamist philosophers will be influenced
by the Greeks, and in turn will influence Western Christian philosophers. This became
possible because soon after the death of the Prophet Muhammad, Muslim thinkers resort to
‘reason’ in order to interpret religious tradition and in order to make sense of the political and
spiritual chaos that ensued upon the death of Mohammed. Similar to Christians, early Islamic
ethical and philosophical discourse was grounded in the religious tradition but eventually
opened up to external ideas until most thinkers were at least aware of the major Greek
philosophers.
As in the West during this time, philosophy is at the service of theology and vice-versa. In
Islam it is mainly concerned with being and the nature of God, and less, as stated above, with
any mystical aspects.
Before you say anything, I know we do not cover every Islamic philosopher (see Chapter
15 for a mention) but then this is a survey. They deserve better than I will give them here, but
then so do you, so look up some works on them by someone who knows them well.
Avicenna (Not His Real Name)
Abu ‘Ali al-Husayn ibn Sina or Avicenna as he is known (most probably as a
westernization of Ibn Sina by which he is most often referred), was born of Persian decent in
what is now southern Russia. Once again a fellow who fits the bill for our perusal of
philosophy: a precocious child prodigy who sucked down information like it was mother’s
milk, except for one thing: Aristotle’s Metaphysics. For some reason this really stumped him
until he read a commentary on it (disclaimer: no inference is being made on any participant
or reader of this material or its author). He is probably best known as a physician and for his
medical texts, most likely because he also had a varied career as a politician and we all know
how politicians like to put their past behind them and highlight their achievements.
For us his greatest achievement is of course philosophical. He wrote extensively on the
subjects of logic, metaphysics and ethics. Like Anselm he sought a synthesis of Neo-Platonic
and Aristotelian ideas, or perhaps more correctly to interpret Aristotelian concepts through
Neo-Platonism. In some ways he is very similar to Augustine in that he is not an apologist for
Islam but a theologian, making philosophical sense of theological doctrine. His major work
The Cure (spiritual not physical) had a great influence upon European Scholasticism and
especially upon Thomas Aquinas, whom we will meet later.
What? Yet More Logic?
Logic is very important to Avicenna’s philosophy. After starting with Aristotle, Avicenna
developed a new strain of logic (appropriately called Avicennian Logic) which became
dominant in Muslim philosophy and medicine. Mainly he put forth a method for inductive
reasoning called a hypothetical syllogism. Basically it deals with inferences you can make in
an argument; in other words, this kind of argument states that if one thing implies another,
and that other implies a third, then the first implies the third, something like:
If I do not go to the store, then I cannot get any food.
If I do not have any food, then I will have nothing to eat.
Therefore, if I do not go to the store, then I will not eat.
We can also see a bit of the Stoic propositional aspect in this logic system (see Chapter
23).
To Be, Not Necessarily To Be….
Remember that whole thing qua thing business in Aristotle (Chapter 15, 19)? Avicenna is
definitely on that boat. One of the ideas he adds for us to think about is not just that there is a
difference between essence (what a thing is) and existence (the instance of the thing) but he
contemplates what is the difference? He presents sort of (at least for our purposes) a
compression of the Greek thinking we have discussed already. The specific argument is that
the fact of existence cannot be inferred from or even construed by the essence of existing
things (that is, I can think of a table but I cannot infer that table exists) and that form and
matter by themselves cannot interact and originate the movement of the universe or the
progressive actualization of existing things (that is, the idea of a table and real wood or even
two real tables do not a table make or force the earth to turn).
Therefore there is a sense of things which are necessary and things which are possible.
Existence must, therefore, be due to an agent or cause that necessitates, imparts, gives, or
adds existence to an essence. To do so, the cause must be an existing thing and coexist with
its effect (in other words is not destroyed by the making of the new thing, like might happen
when you mix fire and wood creating ash). He posits, therefore, that something must
necessarily exist which is the cause for all (real or imagined), because for it not to exist is
simply unthinkable. For Avicenna, this ultimate being is the one God, the Prime
Cause/Mover.
Metaphysics
Why mention that first? Well he defines Metaphysics as the science of supernatural being
and therefore of God because God is the ultimate being (we could insert a dash: be-ing).
Avicenna’s thoughts (and writings) on the subject are concerned with first, the existence of
God, which is nicely proved from the necessity of a First Cause (there has to be something
which got the ball rolling). It also examines the providence (a gift if you will) of God, which,
is basically the fixed and unbending universal laws of nature (these exist mainly because God
is just too busy to deal with the everyday workings of the Universe). One of the things he
develops (which, ultimately, brings him into conflict with Orthodox Islam) is a complex
cosmology springing from his study of Plato and Aristotle. Simply put there is a hierarchy of
mediators between God and material things, all of which emanated from God (the Prime
Mover) and correspond to spheres of influence (Jews and Christians might talk about angels
in a similar way).
The first emanation from God is the world of ideas. This is made up of pure forms, free
from change, composition, or imperfection (similar to Plato). Next to the world of ideas is the
world of souls, made up of forms which are discernable and can be grasped by the intellect,
but not entirely separated from matter. It is these souls that animate and energize the
heavenly spheres (agents of movement and change). Next to the world of souls is the world
of physical forces, which are more or less completely embedded in terrestrial matter and
obey its laws; they are, however, to some extent amenable to the power of intelligence in so
far as they may be influenced by magic. Lastly comes the physical world, from the NeoPlatonists’ concept, which is completely passive, not capable of acting but merely of being
acted upon.
In this hierarchical arrangement of be-ing, the Aristotelian idea of the Active Intellect
which plays a necessary role in the genesis of human knowledge, belongs to the world of
Ideas (Plato), and is of the same stuff as the spirits which cause the heavenly spheres to
move.
That Daring Young Man On The Flying Trapeze…
Humans therefore fit into a specific sphere, but yet, he argues they are separate, selfaware. Part of Avicenna’s argument involves an allegory called The Flying Man. Nothing
fancy, he just invites us to imagine a man floating with all sensory input and perception
removed. He is unaware of his body, the world around him (flying, or perhaps floating would
be a better word, removes any touch sensation), anything which we perceive of as the
physical world. Still, he is aware of himself, that is to say he can conceive of himself without
conceiving of a physical existence (think: Helen Keller). The self then is something
immaterial but substantive, which exists outside of the material world (in a pre-Cartesian
kind of cogito-ergo-sum moment). The soul is consequentially a separate substance from the
body and is therefore also able to conceive of immaterial things.
So? Well that means that we can discuss things which do not seem to have a physical
counterpart, like the soul. We can discuss things which do not have to be real, like unicorns.
We can know that we are or that God is, because we can ‘perceive’ things without sensual
perception.
Ethics
Take a moment to notice this growing sense of ‘self’. Okay? Then we will move on.
Avicenna focused most of his ethics on medicine and the idea of each person as an
individual. So along those lines we can see a connection with Augustine and his Godcentered thoughts on free-will and the individuality of each person as a foundation for ethical
thought.
Suffice it to say then that Ethics is concerned with understanding the self’s existence in
this world in relation to other individuals and to God.
Algazali
Algazali deserves a quick mention mainly for his opposition to Avicenna. Primarily he
fought with Avicenna’s use of Neo-Platonic ideas to interpret Aristotle and then try to apply
the whole thing to Islamic doctrines. The notion that nothing is necessary (in and of itself)
except God and that God’s ordering of the universe (providence) does not allow for anything
out of the ‘ordinary’ to happen gets on Algazali’s last nerve. He provides an argument for a
more flexible understanding of cause and effect which gives God much more freedom to
influence the universe.
Algazali argued against the sequential nature of events. Perception did not automatically
guarantee connection. For him, logically, causes and effects have no necessary relation
between them. That is to say, X need not cause Y because if X always causes Y then there
can be no room for X to happen without Y happening. Confused? Well Algazali gives us a
small example of what he means. When you touch a flame to cotton it burns. You could infer
that the flame causes the cotton to ignite, but you cannot prove it. As he puts it “observation
only proves a simultaneity, not a causation” if by causation we mean ‘necessary connection’
(We will see this thinking later in Hume). Ultimately the only cause is God; everything else
is just a result.
Averroes
Averroes hailed from Spain which, forgive any pun, places us at the other end of the
crescent of Islamic influence. He really argued that theology and philosophy were not and
could not be at odds. A bit of an elitist, he classified people by their ability to understand this.
You can guess where he place Algazali.
Averroes disagrees with the need to prove (as Algazali insisted) effects from causes. For
him, this connection is so primary that the obviousness of it requires no proof. Certainly there
was a prime cause, and effects could all be traced through their causes back to that prime
cause, i.e. (wait for it) God. He agreed with Aristotle that God was the ‘unmoved mover’.
Precisely because of this, and in opposition to Algazali, the natural structure was not only
wondrous but allowed for this wonder.
Putting It Together
Islam, like Judaism and Christianity combines philosophical and theological thought
which then pervades the everyday thinking of its adherents. Similarly Theo-centric in nature
and expression, similar problems from the introduction of Greek philosophy are caused
among Islamic thinkers as well.
Our two main focuses here are the final decision that Plato and Aristotle are not at odds in
terms of theological thought and the increasing humanism in theological thought in both
Islamic and Christian circles, essentially Western thought. This means there is really no more
conflict when integrating Greek thought and the way we look at individual rational thinking
is beginning to balance out universal, objective truths.
As with the split of the Roman Empire, eventually with the almost total eradication of
Muslims from Western Europe and the uneasy truce in the Eastern Europe there develops a
split within Islamic philosophy between the East and the West with a decline in philosophy
as well.
Even so we owe them a great debt. The full expansion of Aristotelian thought into NeoPlatonism is due to these thinkers, as well as new translations of Greek works, which helped
to increase the spread of the ideas contained within them.
By his own wisdom and Word, who is our Lord and Savior Christ, the all-holy Father (whose excellence far
exceeds that of any creature), like a skilful steersman guides to safety all creation, regulating and keeping it in
being, as he judges right. It is right that creation should exist as he has made it and as we see it happening,
because this is his will, which no one would deny. For if the movement of the universe were irrational, and the
world rolled on in random fashion, one would be justified in disbelieving what we say. But if the world is
founded on reason, wisdom and science, and is filled with orderly beauty, then it must owe its origin and order
to none other than the Word of God. Athanasius, Against the Pagans
Chapter 31
Scholasticism and The Like
Can the last one out of the Middle Ages turn off the light28? Looks like that may be us.
With this chapter we are exploring both the height and the end of medieval philosophy per
se. We can look at Scholasticism and the High Middle Ages, if we so desire and in this case
we do, as the culmination and fulfillment of Augustine, led by Anselm with its poster-child
being Thomas Aquinas.
The Players
Dates
1079-1144
1135-1204
1206-1280
1214-1292
1221-1274
1225-1274
1260-1327
1266-1308
1285-1349
Philosophers
Main Points
Universals: nominalism.
Jewish philosopher; Aristotelian in thought, apophatic
Moses Maimonides
argumentation.
Dominican. Teacher of Aquinas; Natural philosopher
Albert the Great (Magnus)
Reason and experience give knowledge.
Roger Bacon
Aristotle is wrong on so many levels and the Islamic and
Christian thinkers are incorrect in their assessment of
Bonaventure
him. Defended Augustine and Plato, using Aristotle only
sparingly.
Dominican. Influenced by earlier Christian and Islamic
thinkers. Aristotle is completely compatible with Christian
Thomas Aquinas
doctrine.
German Dominican Neo-Platonist free spirit of the
Middle Ages. Mystical bent; God is all intellect and no
Meister Eckhart
being.
Scottish Franciscan Aristotelian
Duns Scotus
Franciscan best known for his Razor
William of Ockham
Table 22: Scholastic Players
Peter Abelard
Before Scholasticism
I know we have been moving in a generally chronological order but I want to jump back,
since the last chapter really allows me to. Here I want to throw in Albert Magnus and Peter
Abelard.
Albert was the Renaissance Man’s Renaissance Man. A brilliant thinker, theologian, and
teacher he dabbled in many of the ‘new’ sciences, inspired by Aristotle. He taught (and outlived) Thomas Aquinas, and was responsible for so much inspiration for Thomas.
Peter is pretty much a contemporary to Anselm (Chapter 28), and is somewhat
overshadowed by him in the survey of philosophy and is mainly (vaguely?) remembered for
his dalliance with Heloise. But not by us! Abelard provides an interesting little addition to the
debate about reality (an extension of the something vs. nothing strain) dealing with the ideas
of universals and time.
28
Ha, ha. A bit of ‘Dark Ages’ humor there.
You would think that with the entrenching of Neo-Platonic ideas there would be little
debate about the nature of the universe and of God. But remember back a bit to Boethius
(Chapter 27) who was able to integrate Aristotelian concepts into his thought and made
distinctions between the universals of the rational and the words of the sensible.29 Think of
universals as something which is common to many things, like all birds have wings.
Abelard explores the nature of universals, that is, what are universals and how is common
to be understood? Now there are two ways to think about universals, as real or as ideas.
People who argue that they have substance are realists, and those who say they do not have
substance are nominalists. Being careful to avoid pantheism he determined three ways to talk
about them: that universals could be considered as really existing and separate from bodies
(ante rem: before the thing), as intrinsic to bodily things (in re: in the thing) and as concepts
(post rem: following the thing); in other words, ante rem :similar to Platonic Forms, in re:
similar to Aristotelian substance or post rem: as things not tied to either but arising from
both.
He concluded that while Universals do exist they do not exist in reality, but only in
thought (they are non-substantive – they have no substance: tie into Avicenna’s idea of
being). He argued that existence is not inexorably tied to substance; we have thoughts but we
cannot put our arms around them. And thoughts, are of two sorts: those which derive from
their object in the way it is (corresponding thoughts) and those which do not (noncorresponding), that is to say, you are able to just understand a universal in itself or you look
at something sensible and come to a general conclusion. Therefore, if the thoughts that are
universals were corresponding thoughts, then universals would also have to exist in reality.
Since they do not (they are non-substantive), universals are therefore non-corresponding
thoughts and non-corresponding thoughts are empty (have no substance).
Think about it this way: Plato would say that there is the Form Tree and so we can name
things trees; Aristotle would say that because there is a tree substance there must be a
concept of trees; Boethius would say that universals are non-substantive but are part of the
substance of all the objects of that type, that the idea of Tree and trees are part and parcel of
one another.
Wha…?
Peter Abelard’s Universals are opposite of the realism view. Peter states that they are
merely words (nominalism from the Latin for name), basically real words (which have
substance) describing not real things. In his view the world is so full of enough real things
that we do not have to worry about populating it with generalities (universals). In opposition
to Boethius, he holds that there cannot be any real object in the world that would satisfy
Boethius's criteria for the universal, namely something present (as itself) in many at once so
as to constitute their substance (i.e. to make the individual in which it is present what it is).
Hence, Abelard concludes, universality is not an ontological feature of the world but a
semantic feature of language.
29
Recall only if you did read it, the section from The Teacher by Augustine; if not then do not try to recall it
because that would take much more time than we have here on earth, much less this discussion, though there
may be enough time in eternity but either way I believe the results would be the same.
Now he does throw in the Mind of God, which means they can exist there (because, being
omniscient, it contains everything) but they do not have to exist in the ‘real’ world.
Moses Maimonides
Moses Maimonides was a Jewish thinker. I include him here as opposed to earlier because
his influence is more in the Christian West than in Islamic circles, and he is considered by
some to be a scholastic. Born in Spain, he fled persecution (Muslim not Christian
surprisingly) and eventually ended up in Egypt.
Another of our overachievers, Maimonides was the first person to write a systematic code
of all Jewish law, the Mishneh Torah (Torah is the first five books of the Bible, containing
the Law as given by God30); he produced one of the great philosophic works of Judaism, The
Guide to the Perplexed (how not to be religiously confused by secular philosophy); published
a commentary on the entire Mishna; served as physician to the sultan of Egypt; wrote
numerous books on medicine; and, in his spare time, served as leader of Cairo's Jewish
community. A popular Jewish expression of the Middle Ages declared: “From Moses [of the
Torah] to Moses [Maimonides] there was none like Moses.”
Like Averroes he championed Aristotle, and between them they really helped to restore
the fullness of Aristotelian thought back to the Christian West, where if you recall it had been
almost totally sublimated to neo-Platonic thought. His influence is seen even in modern
Jewish thinkers.
That Is Not What I Meant To Say…
One of Maimonides's main ideas is that it is impossible for the truths arrived at by human
intellect to contradict those revealed by God if they are true. This is pretty much in line with
what we have seen before. And like the others, it means that human reason while imperfect
still has the ability to inform. He was big on how we can think about things. Maimonides was
a proponent of apophatic (negative) statements in which only negative statements toward a
description of God may be considered correct. That is to say, you do not state that “God is
One”, but, “God is not multiple” because we really do not understand what God is One
means (Christian thinkers tended toward cataphatic or positive statements like omniscient).
This did not make him a negative fellow though. He felt that an omnipotent and good God
exists, adopting the Aristotelian view that defines evil as the lack of (or at least the reduced)
presence of a God (as seen in those who exercise the free choice of rejecting belief and act
accordingly). This negative statement and behavioral view combination comes out in his
discussions of morality for example. We cannot say what God is because that would limit
Him. We can see what he is not, as in he is not one of us. So when the Scriptures talk about
God being ‘angry’, especially with bad behavior (sinning) that language cannot be taken at
face value as when we say that God is not multiple.
30
Okay, this is a complex discussion for such a short piece and I will not pretend to try to do justice to all of
Hebrew history. Suffice it to say that the Decalogue or what we know commonly as the Ten Commandments are
only a portion of the Law given at Sinai, hence the comprehensive gathering of all the laws contained in the first
five books. All other books in the Hebrew Scriptures are commentaries on or reflective of the living of (or
failure to live) that Law.
Truth guides our active intellect, truth which comes from God. Still, we have to think and
explain things in ways everyone can understand. God does not like evil therefore God is
‘angry’ when we act evilly. It is a ‘true’ belief that God does not like evil, but his ‘anger’ is
merely a ‘necessary’ belief which guides our actions.
Scholasticism
Now that I have bandied it about let me say that the term scholasticism comes from the
Latin for of the school. We can recall from our earlier simplistic discussion of monasticism
(Chapter 29) the rise of the monastery as the center of learning. This center transferred to the
Cathedral (as towns rose up later, they did not always rise up around a monastery, but the
seat or cathedra of the local bishop which was located in his church, ergo sum the cathedral,
think: Chartres), which as the new ‘center’ of town and of learning started schools known as
cathedral schools, controlled not by the abbey but by the local bishop. Eventually these were
outgrown and the idea of the university arose. Scholastics were the people who taught at
these schools.
The aim of the scholastic was to live “religiously in a studious manner”. In a sense then,
scholasticism started with Anselm (Chapter 28), who established a position by ‘rational’
argument rather than appeal to authority to ‘prove’ why what he believed on authority must
be the truth. It relied heavily on the dialectical method of Aristotle and sought, like its
inspiration to really address every question.
Monasticism: The Sequel
As stated above, with the move away from abbey schools and toward university, two
orders which rose in this period became the main (and rival) teaching (scholastic) orders: the
Franciscans (founded by Francis of Assisi) and the Order of Preachers also known as the
Dominicans (founded by Dominic) or the Black Friars, both founded in the 13th century.
Both of the orders were mendicants (begging orders), based not so much in the fixed
community as were the Benedictines, with a ministry aimed more at the developing cities and
their problems therefore lending themselves more to the newer university system. They were
also ‘preaching’ orders, less devoted to the cloistered life and more devoted to the street
corner preaching and teaching, which also lent itself to university life. The importance of
preaching meant that education was a necessity for both orders, especially since some of the
corruption and misguided practices they were reforming were often based in ignorance.
So, in yet another sidebar wandering, let us take another moment to look at what was not
really an intellectual interlude after all.
Franciscans
Let us touch on a few of the differences and mention a couple of the players along the
way. The Franciscans are the order you think of when you think of the word mendicant (and
some amount of touchy-feely new age environmentalism). The image of Francis begging and
preaching in threadbare robes and no shoes is very common. Moral living and person
responsibility were high on their list of preaching subjects. Francis himself is credited with
the catch phrase “preach the Gospel at all times, and when necessary, use words”.
One Franciscan of note is William of Ockham. Best known for his shaving habits,
William promoted, like Peter Abelard, nominalism, reinforcing that only individual things
exist, rather than objective universals, essences, or forms outside or beyond individuals.
Universals are the products of abstraction from individuals (Table from a table) by the
human mind and have no existence outside of the human mind. This is not to say that there
are no universals, only that those universals are concepts only and have no existence outside
of our minds. Note also, that they are not a product of God’s mind.
One of the results of this (and most likely also influenced by the simplicity of the founder)
is that William becomes the father of K.I.S.S.31, by proposing the heuristic idea known as
Ockham’s Razor (or the law of parsimony). Simply put (from the perhaps more complex
Latin), it is the principle that “Plurality should not be posited without necessity” or to put it
another way, entities must not be multiplied beyond necessity, with the conclusion being that
the simplest explanation or strategy tends to be the best one.32
Dominicans
Whereas the Franciscans pushed Augustine and Neo-Platonism, the Dominicans thought
more along the lines of Aristotle. Like the Franciscans, they were dedicated in their teaching,
way of life, and preaching to promoting the ideal of man’s self-discovery and improvement.
As such the goal of the rational life (of humans) is living in and from the One God.
This is taught and preached by one Dominican especially: Eckhart von Hochheim. Meister
Eckhart, as he was known, was born in Germany. He was also one of the first to write in the
vernacular as well as Latin.
Eckhart contends that the absolute principle (or the absolute cause, i.e. God) is pure
intellect and not being. This is not to say that God does not exist, but that intellect is the
highest form of being, kind of like the starchild in 2001: A Space Odyssey. As the absolute
principle/cause, intellect is absolutely unlimited only if it is thought of as totally without
being. Sort of, if God is omniscient, then there can be nothing which ‘taints’ that intellect and
as the ultimate form or principle or cause of being, is the model for it. Basically then,
intellect becomes the principle/cause for absolute as well as contingent being. So God must
be pure intellect, because all being comes from him.
That said, much is made, in this day and age of the nature of Eckhart’s (and other High
Middle Ages thinkers) life. The fluid nature of vocation is much different than we understand
it today. There was not the separation of Church and State in the sense that has even
developed in the last 60 plus years. Suffice it to say that like most of the thinkers we have
explored he had his detractors as well as his supporters, which meant his thought and his
fortunes rose up and down the scale of acceptance.
Thomas Aquinas
Then there is the Dominican of Dominicans. When people say the word scholasticism,
they usually mean Thomas Aquinas, and it is probably better described by its other moniker:
Thomism.
But more on him later.
31
Keep It Simple Stupid for all you non-engineers, which is why I do not even begin to discuss the Avignon
Papacy here.
32
Ha, ha…put it in reverse that time.
Putting It Together
Okay, so I lied; well not so much lied as confused the truth. Neo-Platonism was never
truly overcome by Aristotle. There existed even within Scholasticism a struggle for
intellectual as well as political power. Not everyone accepted the thinking, and even the
thinkers within it were at odds about what it taught. Still it is the presence of these teachers
everywhere (eventually given power to teach anywhere sanctioned by the Pope), and so most
educations consisted of their teaching. We are also seeing an explosion of thinkers and a
movement out of the definition of doctrine, and into more of the disciplines of philosophy
(like ontology and epistemology).
Still, Scholasticism is a dirty word for some people. With the rise of Aristotelian
influence, touchy-feely stuff seems to be overrun by hairsplitting. Many had problems with
the nature of the exploration. From the Renaissance forward it has been put to bed and
revived a number of times, with most people feeling its death knell finally came in the
1960’s. Not so fast, says Scholasticism, the reports of my death have been greatly
exaggerated (Mark Twain), and a resurgence of Thomistic thought is in progress.
We have talked about ‘schools of thought’ which ironically or not are often the result of a
founded place of teaching or school. These mainstream teachers and teachings (like
Scholasticism) exert great influence on the discussion not only of the day but also through
time. This is not to say that other thinkers and thoughts were not there, or did not exert some
influence, only that, as in most things, something always rises to the top, even if it is only the
cream.
When we look at other thinkers, like Moses Maimonides, we are not belittling or
dismissing the effect they had in favor of the ‘major players’. Often for the people who read
them in the areas in which they operated they had profound effect. For us though, it is the
overall effect that we seek. The cream really does rise to the top, and their creamy thoughts
rise up amidst the mainstream and contribute to the whole.
“… the believer and the philosopher consider creatures differently. The philosopher considers what belongs
to their proper natures, while the believer considers only what is true of creatures insofar as they are related to
God, for example, that they are created by God and are subject to him, and the like.” Thomas Aquinas (Summa
Contra Gentiles, book II, chap. 4)
“To love is to will the good of another.” Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologica, I-II, 26, 4)
Chapter 32
Thomism
If scholasticism and Thomism are dead, then this is the most pathetic of chapters 33. And
again, why worry about a re-hashing of Aristotle or at least the ‘Medieval Aristotle’? Was the
last chapter was already too long?
Thomas Aquinas is a major player in our journey. Reviled, rebuked, praised and followed,
he is at once an influential and enigmatic character. Exonerated and excoriated he is none the
less no better or worse for it than those before him; he simply is.
But First A Word From Our Sponsor….
In an increasingly obvious method of introduction, this is the moment I sneak in a mention
of a contemporary of Thomas’, the long lived if not long winded Roger Bacon (1214-1292).
Roger is not to be confused with his namesake Francis Bacon (1561-1626) who later utilized
some of his thinking. Leonardo before there was a Leonardo, Roger was heavily into
scientific experimentation and saw a vision of the future which included self-powered
machines and the like. He was also a Franciscan and a proponent of Aristotle and a
contemporary of Aquinas, so I mention him here rather than earlier to avoid too much
confusion.
But really, the main reason I mention him here is that he, after tiring of what he
considered poor translations of Aristotle and therefore a poor teaching and understanding of
him (and hence a rejection of so much of Aristotelian thought), he set out to learn Greek and
understand these texts for himself. He became a spirited translator and commenter.
In the end, Bacon withdrew from the scholastic world and devoted himself to languages
and experimental research.
And Now, Back To Our Show!
Thomas Aquinas then, owed much to those who came before him. Knowledge and the
Will became big topics in these times and we have seen glimpses of each. The Platonic
hierarchy of being, the Stoic Logos, the Aristotelian understanding of substance, and
Christian and Islamic theology is solidifying humans being viewed as the boundary where
matter and spirit meet. This increasing humanism drives many of the new debates and
philosophical explorations and an increased honing of existing ones. It becomes very
important as to what we can know, how we can know it and are we able to not only know it
but understand and act on it.
Thomas becomes sort of the pinnacle or apex of all this thought, not only as a thinker but
also as a beneficiary as well as a contributor. Still, like most thinkers at the time he had his
detractors as well, so let us take a moment and recall Meister Eckhart (who, though he comes
after Thomas and eventually disagrees with him still reflects the dynamic of the time).
Because of our connection to God, who is pure intelligence, the dignity of humanity results
from a certain way of knowing which is peculiar to humans, and which is called intelligence.
33
With all apologies to Paul.
The old question of perception raises its head in this debate where we hear the echoes of the
ghost of Aristotle drowning out the ethereal protestations of Plato.
There are two types of knowledge, sense knowledge (I see and feel the table so it must be
a table) and intellectual knowledge (I know tables, even different kinds because of an
abstract understanding of table). Sense knowledge has many forms, as in I can remember
how a tree’s bark feels or I can paint a tree from previous sense encounters with a tree of that
type or even the basic knowledge that if I climb too high in the tree I could fall and hurt
myself. These are concrete forms of knowledge, even though they seem abstract, because
they come to us from sensation of concrete forms. In addition, and this seals it, I also have an
awareness of the thing itself. The second form differs from the previous in that instead of
concrete and individual it is abstract and general. The idea of trees, or the essence or
substance (in the Aristotelian sense) for trees is what is ‘known’ here. Thomas uses the term
quiddity(On Being and Essence, Chapter 1) to refer to this essence, or the thing in itself.
For you OO programmers out there, it is the difference between the class and the object; it
is all about the level of abstraction. And if you are listening, there is no real reason for Forms
in the Platonic sense because we can, like the mind of God in which we share, hold those
ideas within ourselves. “Knowing beings are differentiated from non-knowing beings by this
characteristic: non-knowing beings have only their own reality, but knowing beings are
capable of possessing also the reality of something else. For in the knowing being there is a
presence of the thing known produced by this thing.” (Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 14, art. 1) So
in the end, any type of human knowledge is guided by reason, that peculiar human trait, and a
sense of the thing which separates this knowldege from the knowledge my dog has that it is
six o’clock and time to eat or that he must incessantly chase and bark at squirrels which are
high up in trees, which he has and can never catch.
As for the Will, as Thomas says “A man has free choice to the extent that he is rational.”
Sound familiar?
Thomas
Thomas Aquinas was born in central Italy in sight of the home base of the Benedictines,
Monte Casino. At an early age (surprise) he began studies and was a product of the new
system of education. He studied with Albert Magnus among others and finally ended up in
Paris.
It is the perfect storm of learning. Theological and philosophical thought was being
revisited. The (re)introduction of Aristotle meant that the questions which had seemed to be
answered for so long were being re-examined. Because he is driven by the same things which
drove Augustine, the idea that this re-questioning needed to be put to rest in light of new
thinking was more of a motivation other than the need to debunk earlier thinking.
So while some of Thomas’ thought may have been seen as radical, he was answering the
same questions in a different way and was not about abandoning earlier thought. He would
also explore questions which were of a nature that perhaps would never be asked under the
Neo-Platonic schools.
What Is And What Should Never Be…
So, Being, Ethics, Will, Politics, Nature. Like Aristotle before him he writes on it all; like
Aristotle before him he places it within the context of the human being. Unlike Aristotle
before him he does not shy away from giving a concrete understanding to divine reason, the
name God. It is not so much that science and religion cannot get along, but like Aristotle
there is physics and there is metaphysics.
… it should be noted that different ways of knowing (ratio cognoscibilis) give us different
sciences. The astronomer and the natural philosopher both conclude that the earth is round,
but the astronomer does this through a mathematical middle that is abstracted from matter,
whereas the natural philosopher considers a middle lodged in matter. Thus there is nothing to
prevent another science from treating in the light of divine revelation what the philosophical
disciplines treat as knowable in the light of human reason. (Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 1, a.,
ad 2)
Notice the small reference to the world being ‘round’. Hmmm. What year is this? Yet
another caution to intellectual hubris?34
What Is And What Can Be…
Aquinas tells us that Faith and reason are not incompatible. There are the revealed truths
of Faith, some of which, in certain people can be arrived at by reason without the benefit of
Revelation (not the book). There is a limit though to human reason and some truths will
never be known unless they are revealed.
So there is a place for natural reason, as he calls it (in opposition to divine reason or
Revelation), and this is the moniker he gives to Aristotelian thought (as Bonaventure states
“we follow him [Aristotle] where he spoke well, not where he was in the dark”). And as we
have already discussed, where natural reason is correct, it is and can only be in perfect
harmony with Faith.
So Aquinas turns to Aristotle’s concrete world of substance and accident, potential and
actual and gleans an understanding of an extra little bit. If wood is a substance with specific
accidents and we know it is wood, what about burned wood. Obviously there must be a
potential within the substance wood which is also ash and smoke. If that is true, there must be
a potential in every object to turn into another object even if only through some wild path.
This would mean that there must be some ‘prime matter’ at the heart of everything which
is ‘pure potential’. That is to say everything must have some spark in it which has the
potential to be anything. Think of it in biological/genetic terms: stem cells have the potential
to be any cell you want to grow.
Aquinas On Being And Existence
Here he is starting to diverge from many of the other medieval (read Platonic/NeoPlatonic) thinkers, especially Augustine. Things had specific roots for Augustine: an acorn
becomes an oak, etc. etc.; Thomas is saying that this idea of pure potentiality allows for that
not to be the case. Form and essences only exist in combination with the individual matter
(existence). The reason everything is not everything else depends upon the individual
instantiation of that thing. Form is not different for every human – that is how we know they
are human, but, the matter allows for so many different humans.
We also begin to wander into previously touched on notion of necessity versus possibility.
We can imagine the Phoenix, Aquinas tells us, but our conceiving of it does not bring it into
34
Not to take away from that point but well, that said, he also did not think the world rotated because that would
mean it would basically wobble to destruction.
existence. This is because there are two elements to the thing: its form or essence which
determines what it is and some action which determines that it is.
Okay, so what? Well among other things, this thinking allows for things which are not just
form and matter, but also existence, like angels (or even God). Angels are non-corporeal, so
they cannot have matter, but they exist so that has to happen somehow. Existence and
essence are separate. Recall the thinking that the conceiving of something does not bring it
into existence. So whereas Aquinas agrees with the Anselm thing that God is that of which
nothing greater can be thought, he does not agree that our thinking so, makes God so.
Whew!
For Aquinas human knowledge is sense generated. As for Aristotle, this knowledge helps
us to understand the outside world, and categorize it. Abstraction allows us to understand
things outside of their physical/sensual manifestations and also things which we cannot
‘sense’ physically, as well as general things which we can understand from sensual
experience (universals and the like). So this is true for things like angels and for God. This
involves (once again) the experience of cause and effect. Let us just get this out in the open:
for Aquinas God is the unmoved mover, the prime cause, the prime necessity. Surprise.
Without spending too much time on Aquinas’ God arguments, let us take a moment
looking at the thinking behind them. “It is possible to demonstrate God's existence, although
not a priori, yet a posteriori from some work of His more surely known to us.” Put all of the
things we have said about Aquinas together here. Take a moment, I’ll wait. Got it? No? Yes?
Like thinkers before him (recall our Islamic friends too), Aquinas sees life as a series of
interdependent events not just a chain of reactions. The balance of a priori and a posteriori
experience, the importance of perception, the mind as the place of all understanding, the
world as a place of universals and individuals, as understood by the rational mind; the cause
and effect where a generic spark powers endless possibilities. Take a moment and let the
possibilities and the ramifications of this sink in.
Was That It?
Okay, perhaps not a very satisfying exploration of Aquinas’ musings, but in a sense we
have seen them all before. Suffice it to say that we are created, God is the creator; our spark
of divine reason comes from him and is at his service. The Law is a combination of the old
Mosaic Law and the new Law as taught by Jesus. Like physics and metaphysics, reason and
Faith, these Laws work together, the old concerned with worldly, sensual needs and the new
concerned with heavenly intellectual needs. People are social animals and as such need rules
by which to live. This is nothing new and we would expect Thomas’ ethics to reflect his
Christian roots. So while humans are ‘political animals’ there are so because God created
them to be that way, and they seek to operate within that boundary and without God, human
law is fickle.
“Because of the diverse conditions of humans, it happens that some acts are virtuous to
some people, as appropriate and suitable to them, while the same acts are immoral for others,
as inappropriate to them.”
Putting It Together
So just how many angels can dance on the head of a pin? This question seems silly
nowadays, but in context, what is the substance/nature of angels? How corporeal are they?
Do they take up space? How do we know about them?
Okay so this was really a poster-child review lesson. Thomas is the archetype for many of
the ideas which come to fruition during the medieval times. But also, like Augustine, he is
the last of the old guard, a passing glimpse of a changing world. Science is becoming a
discipline in its own right, separating from its theological roots. Humanism (humans being
the center of things) too is rising beyond its theological roots. Many of the modern ideas
about the person, intelligence, science itself, are generated during this period. Aquinas is
place where we see so many of these things coming together.
No philosopher appears out of a vacuum. There is no way to completely separate thought
from the person. Just like separation of Church and State, theology and philosophy, science
and religion, there is a certain artificiality to it. What we hope to do is carefully expose the
truths which lie apart from yet within those experiences. The rise of independent thought
could not have taken place outside the collective thinking.
“Moreover, carefully distinguishing reason from Faith, as is right, and yet joining them together in a
harmony of friendship, so he guarded the rights of each, and so watched over the dignity of each, that, as far as
humans are concerned, reason can now hardly rise higher than she rose, borne up in the flight of St. Thomas;
and Faith can hardly gain more helps and greater helps from reason than those which St. Thomas gave her.”
Pope Leo XIII (1879)
“The end of all my labors has come. All that I have written appears to me as much straw after the things that
have been revealed to me.” Thomas Aquinas (from a letter)
Chapter 32a
Thomas Aquinas: On Being and Essence
Prologue
A small error at the outset can lead to great errors in the final conclusions, as
the Philosopher says in I De Caelo et Mundo cap. 5 (271b8-13), and thus,
since being and essence are the things first conceived of by the intellect, as
Avicenna says in Metaphysicae I, cap. 6, in order to avoid errors arising from
ignorance about these two things, we should resolve the difficulties
surrounding them by explaining what the terms being and essence each
signify and by showing how each may be found in various things and how
each is related to the logical intentions of genus, species, and difference.
Since we ought to acquire knowledge of simple things from composite ones
and come to know the prior from the posterior, in instructing beginners we
should begin with what is easier, and so we shall begin with the signification
of being and proceed from there to the signification of essence.
Chapter 1
As the Philosopher says in V Metaphysicae cap. 7 (1017a22-35), being has
two senses. In one sense, being signifies that which is divided into the ten
categories; in another sense, that which signifies the truth of propositions. The
difference between these is that, in the second sense, anything can be called a
being about which an affirmative proposition can be formed, even if the thing
posits nothing in reality. In this way, privations and negations are called
beings, as when we say that affirmation is opposed to negation, or that
blindness is in the eye. But in the first sense, nothing can be called a being
unless it posits something in reality, and thus in this first sense blindness and
similar things are not beings.
The term essence is not taken from being in the second sense, for in this sense
some things are called beings that have no essence, as is clear with privations.
Rather, the term essence is taken from being in the first sense. Thus in
Metaphysicae V, com. 14, the Commentator explains the cited text from
Aristotle by saying that being, in the first sense, is what signifies the essence
of a thing. And since, as said above, being in this sense is divided into the ten
categories, essence signifies something common to all natures through which
the various beings are placed in the various genera and species, as humanity is
the essence of man, and so on.
Since that through which a thing is constituted in its proper genus or species is
what is signified by the definition indicating what the thing is, philosophers
introduced the term quiddity to mean the same as the term essence; and this is
the same thing that the Philosopher frequently terms what it is to be a thing,
that is, that through which something has being as a particular kind of thing.
Essence is also called form, for the certitude of everything is signified through
its form, as Avicenna says in his Metaphysicae I, cap. 6. The same thing is
also called nature, taking nature in the first of the four senses that Boethius
distinguishes in his book De Persona et Duabus Naturis cap. 1 (PL 64,
1341B), in the sense, in other words, that nature is what we call everything
that can in any way be captured by the intellect, for a thing is not intelligible
except through its definition and essence. And so the Philosopher says in V
Metaphysicae cap. 4 (1014b36) that every substance is a nature. But the term
nature used in this way seems to signify the essence of a thing as it is ordered
to the proper operation of the thing, for nothing is without its proper
operation. The term quiddity, surely, is taken from the fact that this is what is
signified by the definition. But the same thing is called essence because the
being has existence through it and in it.
But because being is absolutely and primarily said of substances, and only
secondarily and in a certain sense said of accidents, essence too is properly
and truly in substances and is in accidents only in a certain way and in a
certain sense. Now some substances are simple and some are composite, and
essence is in both, though in the simple substances in a truer and more noble
way, as these have existence in a nobler way: indeed, the simple substances
are the cause of the composite ones, or at least this is true with respect to the
first simple substance, which is God. But because the essences of these
substances are more hidden from us, we ought to begin with the essences of
composite substances, as learning is easier when we begin with the easier
things.
Chapter 2
In composite substances we find form and matter, as in man there are soul and
body. We cannot say, however, that either of these is the essence of the thing.
That matter alone is not the essence of the thing is clear, for it is through its
essence that a thing is knowable and is placed in a species or genus. But
matter is not a principle of cognition; nor is anything determined to a genus or
species according to its matter but rather according to what something is in
act. Nor is form alone the essence of a composite thing, however much certain
people may try to assert this. From what has been said, it is clear that the
essence is that which is signified by the definition of the thing. The definition
of a natural substance, however, contains not only form but also matter;
otherwise, the definitions of natural things and mathematical ones would not
differ. Nor can it be said that matter is placed in the definition of a natural
substance as something added to the essence or as some being beyond the
essence of the thing, for that type of definition is more proper to accidents,
which do not have a perfect essence and which include in their definitions a
subject beyond their own genus. Therefore, the essence clearly comprises
both matter and form.
Nor can it be said that essence signifies the relation between the matter and
the form or something superadded to these, for then the essence would of
necessity be an accident and extraneous to the thing, and the thing would not
be known through its essence, contrary to what pertains to an essence.
Through the form, surely, which is the act of the matter, the matter is made a
being in act and a certain kind of thing. Thus, something that supervenes does
not give to the matter existence in act simply, but rather existence in act in a
certain way, just as accidents do, as when whiteness makes something
actually white. Hence, when such a form is acquired, we do not say that the
thing is generated simply but only in a certain way.
The only possibility, therefore, is that the term essence, used with respect to
composite substances, signifies that which is composed of matter and form.
This conclusion is consistent with what Boethius says in his commentary on
the Categories, namely, that ousia signifies what is composite; ousia, of
course, is for the Greeks what essence is for us, as Boethius himself says in
his book De Persona et Duabus Naturis. Avicenna even says, Metaphysicae
V, cap. 5, that the quiddity of a composite substance is the very composition
of the form and the matter. And commenting on Book VII of Aristotle's
Metaphysicae, the Commentator says, “The nature that species in generable
things have is something in the middle; that is, it is composed of matter and
form.” Metaphysicae VII, com. 27. Moreover, reason supports this view, for
the existence of a composite substance is neither form alone nor matter alone
but is rather composed of these. The essence is that according to which the
thing is said to exist; hence, it is right that the essence by which a thing is
denominated a being is neither form alone not matter alone but both, albeit
that existence of this kind is caused by the form and not by the matter.
Similarly, we see that in other things that are constituted from many
principles, the thing is not denominated from just one or the other of the
principles but rather from that which embraces both. Thus, with respect to
flavors, sweetness is caused by the action of a warm animal body digesting
what is wet, and albeit that in this way warmth is the cause of the sweetness,
nevertheless a body is not called sweet by reason of the warmth, but rather by
reason of the flavor, which embraces both the warmth and the wetness.
But because matter is the principle of individuation, it would perhaps seem to
follow that essence, which embraces in itself simultaneously both form and
matter, is merely particular and not universal. From this it would follow that
universals have no definitions, assuming that essence is what is signified by
the definition. Thus, we must point out that matter understood in the way we
have thus far understood it is not the principle of individuation; only signate
matter is the principle of individuation. I call signate matter matter considered
under determinate dimensions. Signate matter is not included in the definition
of man as man, but signate matter would be included in the definition of
Socrates if Socrates had a definition. In the definition of man, however, is
included non-signate matter: in the definition of man we do not include this
bone and this flesh but only bone and flesh absolutely, which are the nonsignate matter of man.
Hence, the essence of man and the essence of Socrates do not differ except as
the signate differs from the non-signate, and so the Commentator says, in
Metaphysicae VII, com. 20, “Socrates is nothing other than animality and
rationality, which are his quiddity.” Similarly, the essence of a genus and the
essence of a species differ as signate from non-signate, although in the case of
genus and species a different mode of designation is used with respect to both.
For, the designation of the individual with respect to the species is through
matter determined by dimensions, while the designation of the species with
respect to the genus is through the constitutive difference, which is taken from
the form of the thing. This determination or designation, however, which is
made in the species with respect to the genus, is not through something that
exists in the essence of the species but in no way exists in the essence of the
genus. On the contrary, whatever is in the species is also in the genus as
undetermined. If animal were not all that man is but rather only a part of him,
then animal would not be predicated of man, for no integral part is predicated
of its whole.
We can see how this happens by considering how body as a part of animal
differs from body as the genus of animal. In the way body is the genus of
animal it cannot be an integral part of animal, and thus the term body can be
accepted in several ways. Body is said to be in the genus of substance in that
it has a nature such that three dimensions can be designated in the body.
These three designated dimensions are the body that is in the genus of
quantity. Now, it sometimes happens that what has one perfection may attain
to a further perfection as well, as is clear in man, who has a sensitive nature
and, further, an intellective one. Similarly, above this perfection of having a
form such that three dimensions can be designated in it, there can be joined
another perfection, as life or some similar thing. This term body, therefore,
can signify a certain thing that has a form such that from the form there
follows in the thing designatability in three dimensions and nothing more,
such that, in other words, from this form no further perfection follows, but if
some other thing is superadded, it is beyond the signification of body thus
understood. And understood in this way, body will be an integral and material
part of the animal, because in this way the soul will be beyond what is
signified by the term body, and it will supervene on the body such that from
these two, namely the soul and the body, the animal is constituted as from
parts.
This term body can also be understood as signifying a certain thing that has a
form such that three dimensions can be designated in it, whatever form this
may be, and such that either from the form some further perfection can
proceed or not. Understood in this way, body will be the genus of animal, for
there will be understood in animal nothing that is not implicitly contained in
body. Now, the soul is a form through which there can be designated in the
thing three dimensions, and therefore, when we say that body is what has a
form from which three dimensions can be designated in the body, we
understand there is some kind of form of this type, whether soul, or
lapideousness, or whatever other form. And thus the form of animal is
implicitly contained in the form of body, just as body is its genus.
The relation of animal to man is the same. For if animal named just a certain
thing that has a perfection such that it can sense and move by a principle
existing in itself, without any other perfection, then whatever further
perfection may supervene would be related to animal as a component part,
and not as implicitly contained in the notion of animal; and in this way animal
would not be a genus. But animal is a genus in that it signifies a certain thing
from the form of which sensation and motion can proceed, whatever this form
may be, whether a sensible soul only, or a soul both sensible and rational.
Therefore, the genus signifies indeterminately the whole that is in the species
and does not signify matter alone. Similarly, the difference also signifies the
whole and does not signify the form alone, and the definition, or even the
species, signifies the whole. But these nevertheless signify the same thing in
different ways. For the genus signifies the whole as a certain denomination
determining that which is material in the thing without a determination of its
proper form, whence the genus is taken from the matter, although it is not the
matter. This is clear in the case of bodies, as we call something a body in that
the thing has a perfection such that in the thing three dimensions can be
designated, and this perfection is related materially to some further perfection.
Conversely, the difference is like a certain denomination taken from the
determined form, beyond the first conception of the form by which the matter
is determined. So, when we say something is animated (that, in other words, it
has a soul), this does not determine what the thing is, whether it is a body or
some other thing. Hence, Avicenna says, Metaphysicae V, cap. 6, that the
genus is not understood in the difference as a part of its essence but only as a
being beyond its essence, even as a subject is with respect to the concept of a
passion. And thus the genus is not predicated per se of the difference, as the
Philosopher says in III Metaphysicae cap. 8 (998b24) and in IV Topicorum
cap. 2 (122b22-26), unless perhaps as a subject is predicated of a passion. But
the definition or the species comprehends both, namely, the determined matter
that the term genus designates and the determined form that the term
difference designates.
From this is it clear why the genus, the difference, and the species are related
proportionally to the matter, the form, and the composite in nature, although
they are not the same as these things. For, the genus is not the matter, though
it is taken from the matter as signifying the whole; nor is the difference the
form, though it is taken from the form as signifying the whole. Thus we say
that man is a rational animal, but not composed of the animal and the rational
in the sense that we say that man is composed of soul and body: man is said to
be composed of soul and body as from two things from which a third thing is
constituted different from each of the two. Man, surely, is neither body nor
soul. But if man is said in some sense to be composed of the animal and the
rational, it will not be as a third thing composed from these two things, but as
a third concept composed from these two concepts. The concept of animal is
without determination of a special form and expresses, with respect to the
ultimate perfection, the nature of the thing from that which is material; the
concept of the difference, rational, consists in the determination of the special
form. From these two concepts are constituted the concept of the species or
the definition. Thus, just as a thing constituted from other things does not
have predicated of it these other things, so too a concept does not have
predicated of it the concepts of which it is constituted: clearly, we do not say
that the definition is either the genus or the difference.
Although the genus may signify the whole essence of the species,
nevertheless there is not just one essence of the various species under one
genus, for the unity of the genus proceeds from its very indetermination or
undifferentiation. Nor is it the case that what is signified through the genus is
numerically one nature in the various species such that to it there supervenes
some other thing, which is the difference that determines it, as a form
determines matter, which is numerically one. Rather, the genus signifies some
form (though not determinately this one or that one), which the difference
expresses determinately, the very one that is signified indeterminately through
the genus. And thus the Commentator says in Metaphysicae XII, com. 14, that
prime matter is called one by the removal of all forms, but the genus is called
one through the commonality of forms signified. Hence, the indetermination,
which was the cause of the unity of the genus, having been removed through
the addition of the difference, the species remain essentially diverse.
Furthermore, since, as said above, the nature of the species is indeterminate
with respect to the individual just as the nature of the genus is with respect to
the species, and since, further, the genus, as predicated of the species, includes
in its signification (although indistinctly) everything that is in the species
determinately, so too does the species, as predicated of the individual, signify
everything that is in the individual essentially, although it signifies this
indistinctly. In this way, the essence of the species is signified by the term
man, and so man is predicated of Socrates. If, however, the nature of the
species is signified in such a way as to exclude designate matter, which is the
principle of individuation, then the species is related to the individual as a
part; and this is how the term humanity signifies, for humanity signifies that
by which a man is a man. Designate matter, however, is not that by which a
man is a man, and it is in no way contained among those things that make a
man a man. Since, therefore, the concept of humanity includes only those
things by which a man is a man, designate matter is excluded or pretermitted,
and since a part is not predicated of its whole, humanity is predicated neither
of man nor of Socrates. Thus Avicenna says, Metaphysicae V, cap. 5, that the
quiddity of a composite thing is not the composite thing of which it is the
quiddity, even though the quiddity itself is composite, as humanity, while
composite, is not man. On the contrary, it must be received in something that
is designate matter.
But since, as said above, the designation of the species with respect to the
genus is through the form, and the designation of the individual with respect
to the species is through matter, the term signifying that from which the
nature of the genus is taken thus excludes the determinate form that completes
the species and signifies the material part of the whole, as the body is the
material part of the man. However, the term signifying that from which the
nature of the species is taken, excluding designate matter, signifies the formal
part. Thus, humanity is signified as a certain form, and it is said that it is the
form of the whole, not, certainly, as a form superadded to the essential parts
(the form and the matter), but rather as the form of a house is superadded to
its integral parts; and that is better called the form which is the whole, in other
words, that which embraces the form and the matter, albeit excluding those
things through which the designatability of matter arises.
Therefore, the term man and the term humanity both signify the essence of
man, though in diverse ways, as said above. The term man signifies the
essence as a whole, in other words, insofar as the essence does not exclude
designation of matter but implicitly and indistinctly contains it, in the way in
which we said that the genus contains the difference. Hence, the term man is
predicated of individuals. But the term humanity signifies the essence of man
as a part because it contains in its signification only what belongs to man
insofar as he is man, and it excludes all designation, and so it is not predicated
of individual men. And for this reason the term essence is sometimes found
predicated of the thing, as when we say that Socrates is a certain essence; and
sometimes the term essence is denied of the thing, as when we say that the
essence of Socrates is not Socrates.
Chapter 3
Having seen what the term essence signifies in composite substances, we
ought next see in what way essence is related to the logical intentions of
genus, species, and difference. Since that to which the intentions of genus or
species or difference is appropriate is predicated of this signate singular, it is
impossible that a universal intention, like that of the species or genus, should
be appropriate to the essence if the genus or species is signified as a part, as in
the term humanity or animality. Thus, Avicenna says, Metaphysicae V, cap. 6,
that rationality is not the difference but the principle of the difference. For the
same reason, humanity is not a species, and animality is not a genus.
Similarly, we cannot say that the intention of species or genus is appropriate
to the essence as to a certain thing existing beyond singulars, as the Platonists
used to suppose, for then the species and the genus would not be predicated of
an individual: we surely cannot say that Socrates is something that is
separated from him, nor would that separate thing advance our knowledge of
this singular thing. And so the only remaining possibility is that the intention
of genus or species is appropriate to the essence as the essence is signified as
a whole, as the term man or animal implicitly and indistinctly contains the
whole that is in the individual.
The nature, however, or the essence thus understood can be considered in two
ways. First, we can consider it according to its proper notion, and this is to
consider it absolutely. In this way, nothing is true of the essence except what
pertains to it absolutely: thus everything else that may be attributed to it will
be attributed falsely. For example, to man, in that which he is a man, pertains
animal and rational and the other things that fall in his definition; white or
black or whatever else of this kind that is not in the notion of humanity does
not pertain to man in that which he is a man. Hence, if it is asked whether this
nature, considered in this way, can be said to be one or many, we should
concede neither alternative, for both are beyond the concept of humanity, and
either may befall the conception of man. If plurality were in the concept of
this nature, it could never be one, but nevertheless it is one as it exists in
Socrates. Similarly, if unity were in the notion of this nature, then it would be
one and the same in Socrates and Plato, and it could not be made many in the
many individuals. Second, we can also consider the existence the essence has
in this thing or in that: in this way something can be predicated of the essence
accidentally by reason of what the essence is in, as when we say that man is
white because Socrates is white, although this does not pertain to man in that
which he is a man.
The nature considered in this way, however, has a double existence. It exists
in singulars on the one hand, and in the soul on the other, and from each of
these there follow accidents. In singulars, furthermore, the essence has a
multiple existence according to the multiplicity of singulars. Nevertheless, if
we consider the essence in the first, or absolute, sense, none of these pertain to
the essence. For it is false to say that the essence of man, considered
absolutely, has existence in this singular, because if existence in this singular
pertained to man insofar as he is man, man would never exist outside this
singular. Similarly, if it pertained to man insofar as he is man not to exist in
this singular, then the essence would never exist in the singular. But it is true
to say that man, but not insofar as he is man, has whatever may be in this
singular or in that one, or else in the soul. Therefore, the nature of man
considered absolutely abstracts from every existence, though it does not
exclude the existence of anything either. And the nature thus considered is the
one predicated of each individual.
….We have thus made clear how the essence or nature is related to the notion
of species, for the notion of species is not among those that pertain to the
essence considered absolutely; nor is it among the accidents that follow from
the existence that the essence has outside the soul, as whiteness or blackness.
Rather, the notion of species is among the accidents that follow from the
existence the essence has in the intellect. And in this way as well do the
notions of genus or difference pertain to essences.
Chapter 4
We should now see how essences exist in separated substances, that is, in the
soul, in the intelligences, and in the first cause. Now, while everyone
concedes the simplicity of the first cause, some people have tried to introduce
into the intelligences and the soul a composition of form and matter, a
position that seems to have begun with Avicebron, the author of the book
called Fons Vitae. But this view is repugnant to the common teaching of the
philosophers, for they call these things substances separated from matter, and
they prove them to be wholly without matter. The most cogent demonstration
of this proceeds from the excellence of understanding found in these
substances. For we see that forms are not actually intelligible except as they
are separated from matter and its conditions, and forms are not made actually
intelligible except by virtue of an intelligent substance, which educes the
forms and receives them in itself. Hence, in any intelligent substance there is a
complete absence of matter in such a way that the substance has neither a
material part itself nor even is the substance like a form impressed in matter,
as is the case with material forms.
Chapter 5
….Having treated these matters, we can see clearly how essence is found in
various kinds of things. There are three ways in which substances may have
an essence. First, surely, is the way God has his essence, which is his very
existence itself, and so we find certain philosophers saying that God does not
have a quiddity or essence because his essence is not other than his existence.
From this it follows that he is not in a genus, for everything that is in a genus
has a quiddity beyond its existence, since the quiddity or nature of the genus
or species is not in the order of nature distinguished in the things of which it is
the genus or species, but the existence is diverse in diverse things.
Avicebron: Spanish-Jewish religious poet, moralist, and philosopher (1020-1070)
Translation © 1997 by Robert T. Miller
Thought Point
What is Aquinas talking
about? What is a signate?
How is this work similar to
Aristotle?
How is it different?
Why is intelligence
important?
How does Aquinas define
existence, essence and
substance?
Points of Thought
PART III
Late Medieval to Kant
th
th
14 thru 17 Centuries
(Chapters 33 - 45)
Chapter 33
Reconsidering Where We Are
We are starting to see a lot of disagreement among the players as to the validity of the
arguments put forth by their elders and their contemporaries. Not that this is anything new,
but we are also seeing a divergence from previous thinker’s foci. So let us pause and take
stock of where we are and then where we are going.
So Who Is Right?
It is becoming obvious that just as in religious circles philosophical and scientific
adherents can fight like cats and dogs35 about who is right, or at least righter. Unless we take
a subjective position at this point, it is hard to determine who is ‘right’. Certainly we all have
our favorites and there are some thoughts which ring true across all of the thinkers we have
examined. But can we declare a winner?
For us today, the last 400 years there seem to follow a specific trend. Does that mean that
the post-scholastic modern thinkers won? Maybe not when you take into account that the
medieval trend lasted twice that long and the trend that one is based on lasted over a
millennia (if not still active today). But does that mean that this latest trend has not still won?
Let us not get stuck there. And so without further ado, and in no particular order, I give
you the following for your consideration.
Fire Good….
The Greeks defined the four elements as fire, water, air and earth. We see the world
differently now. This is symptomatic of the first struggle we look at: ideal versus real. Okay,
perhaps an oversimplification (what hasn’t been, eh?), but the question is what constitutes
reality, or one way we have put it in the past is there something or nothing? What is ‘real’
has been answered in several ways. Plato felt that what was truly real was something outside
of us and our sensual understanding. It was only fully knowable in an intellectual way. The
better we understood the closer to reality we came. For Aristotle, the thing in itself contained
the reality that we can understand, not some pie in the sky non-sensible idea, so the better we
understood the thing the closer we came to the truth.
When we use the words real and ideal, we have a bit of a different take than when most
people talk about these things. Ideal things can be real. We talked a bit about how that can be
during the nominal discussion. So perhaps a better set of words for us to think about this with
would be universal and particular, with universal being ideal and particular being real.
For that reason the movement from universal to particular also comes in here. Where
reality is located begs the question of are there things which are not known through the
senses and only through the intellect?
So what is important about this? It is the answer to what defines reality, that is to say,
what gives us the basis for understanding what is real and how that reality applies to physical
objects as well as ideas.
35
That of course would not be in reference to the souls/intellects in these people being equivalent to those of
dogs and cats, or of all animals for that matter.
Sunshine On My Shoulder….
So, knowing…is it purely an intellectual exercise or do the senses play an important role?
As we said above, for Plato matter was bad; for Aristotle it was good.
But we have to look at more than just matter. Can I trust my senses to tell me what is real
and what is not real? If there are no universals, then how does one understand universal
ideas? If they can be known through sensual observation, is there a need God, or can
individual instances understand because of a shared substance? What is the source of
universal ideas? Can imperfect senses know them unless there was some perfect source for
them?
So what is important about matter versus form? The question is about how we are
constructed. Are we constructed in such a manner that we can understand things? Is the
intellect alone sufficient to help us understand the world or is it merely the senses which
inform the intellect? Basically we ask, what can we trust, our minds, our eyes or does it take
both?
The Heart And Soul Of The Matter
Ha, ha. I like that one.
If we are the source of what we know, what is the essence of humanity? If that source lies
outside of us, what is the essence of humanity? Is it the ‘soul’ or something else which
approximates that idea? What is the soul? What is its nature? What is its fate?
If there is a soul, what is its source and what is its end. And what does that mean for my
behavior? If there is no soul, what is my source and what is my end and what does that mean
for my behavior?
The Prime Mover/Cause also jumps into the fray. What is the primary truth? How does
that primary truth affect me? Do I share in it or am I separate from it? Does it play into
defining me or not. Are we dichotomized into body and soul, matter and spirit? Are we
singletons, wholly and completely autonomous?
So what is important about essence? This is another ‘how are we constructed’ question,
but it also takes into account the ‘how is the universe constructed’ question. Are we
sufficiently separate from the universe that we are not slaves to its laws? How much is me
and how much is it?
Professional Logician
So where does the argument start? How do we define basic truths? So this is where logic
falls in. In a way, the re-introduction of Aristotelian thought was like the finding of the Dead
Sea Scrolls. Limited discussion exploded. One of the mines is ‘how do we know/think?’
Epistemology has always been a part of philosophy, but now it is coming into its own, that is
for its own sake. So far we have looked at why we know and how we know something; now
we begin to look at just how we know.
In order to do this, most philosophers turn to Logic, establishing the rules for discussing
this new learning and thinking. Because of that Logic has seen many flavors and
developments, and there are more to come. So stretch your mind backwards. Beginning with
the Greeks, discussions of some elements of logic and a focus on methods of inference
developed; the Sophists, and later Plato displayed an interest in sentence analysis, truth, and
fallacies, but it is not until Aristotle that we see the beginning of a system of logic. His ideas
of contraries, affirmative and negative statements, and the syllogistic approach (premise,
premise, and conclusion) solidify the understanding of the definition and role of logic.
Aristotle introduced the idea of the interrelationship of the terms within the argument, and
the deductive nature of logic but there were other forms. Propositional logic looked less at
the terms within the premises and more at the propositions those terms added up to, within
the deductive form. This is most often associated with the Stoics, hence the name Stoic
Logic. The movement was then from Aristotle’s categories to a more hypothetical basis for
logic. This led to many people trying to reconcile the two forms of logic, often to poor or
unsatisfactory results.
In the end, Muslims and Scholastics produce a somewhat Neo-Platonized form of
Aristotle, but they are really interpretations of Aristotle’s logic. What we start to see is logic
serving the disciplines for which they are promulgated, like science or math or medicine, as
opposed to just philosophy.
We also give a nod to those like the Epicureans who rejected logic.
So what is important about logic? We have been establishing the base ideas from which
we can operate and the underlying meanings in everything we say and think. How we
accomplish that is relative to the means by which we make those decisions.
Why So Negative?
Though it may not seem that way, Apophatic thinking is part and parcel of several of the
thinkers we have covered. Does the idea that it is easier to prove what something is not than
what it is affect thinking? Is it even a legitimate path? How is not-proving equivalent to
proving? Moses Maimonides was our poster child for this but if we look at Anselm’s
ontological argument, he uses ad absurdum to prove his point. Aristotle uses contraries.
What kind of thinking is involved; a priori or a posteriori; deductive or inductive; both or
all? So this plays somewhat into the a priori/a posteriori or modal thinking. What is the best
way to think about the world?
So what is important about thinking? Is it merely the optimists versus the pessimists? How
we look at the world, our basic attitude toward matter, form, truth, logic or any of the other
things we have discussed does make a difference. Is it a matter of one way or the other or
does it also take a combination of methods?
So, What Are The Main Points?
Quiz Time.
Thought
What is the reason philosophies
develop?
What were the Greeks mainly
concerned with?
What were the Romans mainly
concerned with?
Thoughts
What were the Apologists mainly
concerned with?
What were the Medievals mainly
concerned with?
What were the Scholastics mainly
concerned with?
What effect does the previous era
have on the next?
What did each group develop in
terms of a system in order to
support and explain their
philosophies?
Greeks
Romans
Apologists
Medievals
Scholastics
Exercise 5: Main Concerns
So What?
Let us examine this. Ultimately, none of these questions exists in a vacuum. Each one
impinges somehow on the other. Our ability to think, to perceive, to understand ourselves as
separate, as individual yet part of a whole, does that mean that we are different or is that just
hubris? What defines us as different than the apes; than God?
This sure is a lot of questions.
Putting It Together
Where are we now? The cusp of the wave we have always been on. Human development
and human thought are not separate entities, and both influence and are influenced by the
path of civilization. The questions we ask frame the discussions which take place. Sometimes
they are the same questions, but the answers are different. That does not mean the same
questions do not come up again (and again, and again…).
What is the nature of knowledge and knowing? As the centrality of humanity rises, as well
as the ‘hard’ sciences, what is the basis of truth becomes the central question. So, we actually
take this respite because everything we have learned so far is about to be challenged, if not
turned upside down outright. Certainly it is still true that without the knowledge which we
have, we will be unable to understand what is to come. Our task is to hold onto that idea even
when those around us have not.
“...I'm afraid I seem to have strayed somewhat from my original brief. But in a nutshell: sex is more fun than
logic. One cannot prove this, but it is in the same sense that Mount Everest is, or that Alma Cogan isn't.
Goodnight.” Professional Logician, Monty Python
Chapter 34
Later Than Medieval Philosophy
As per our last discussion, we lovers of wisdom are not in some sort of competition. We
each come to contemplate life, mainly our own life, that is, to examine for ourselves,
ourselves. Only then can we cast out, by our living of our beliefs like Socrates, for others to
benefit. Still, philosophy does begin to reach a kind of ‘publish or perish’ functionality. The
promulgation and proliferation of competing ideas (and I do use the word competing) takes
on a new level with the expansion of printing and relative ease and safety of movement.
Scholasticism opens the door not only to the Enlightenment to come but also to its own
demise.
The Players
Dates
1466-1536
1469-1527
1472-1529
1478-1535
Philosophers
Main Points
Master of Latin and Greek; first to use print; antiErasmus
philosophy
Political philosopher;
Niccolo Machiavelli
Neo-Confucian; championed Mencius; innate knowing;
knowledge and action are one; our mind shapes our
Wang Yang-Ming
world.
Lord Chancellor of England; Utopia
Thomas More
Table 23: Late Medieval Players
The Final Bow
Medieval philosophy sits in the balance between Plato and Aristotle as well as the ancient
and the modern periods. It is the movement from the more theological Platonic thought to
Aristotelian thought which was more suited to the rising ‘natural sciences’36.
As we discussed before, this does not mean that it is a smooth transition from Plato to
Aristotle. Still the Medievals have been put on notice. The run was good but now it is over.
The blatant dualism of theological explorations is giving way to the seeming monism of
humanism and scientific research. No longer is God and Humanity the focus as much as is
Humanity and Nature (of which humanity is part).
A Brief Historical Interlude (The Ebb Of History)
Okay. So a brief mention of some of the historical events which are happening here and
may seem to have some bearing on our conversation as well but first a quick timeline.
‘Modern’ Philosophy -- The divisions of the history of modern philosophy are as follows:
 The Renaissance (1453-1690) — from the end of the Middle Ages to the publication
of Locke's Essay on Human Understanding.
36
Not opposed to ‘Natural Philosophy’

The Enlightenment (1690-1781) — to the publication of Kant's Critique of Pure
Reason.
 German Philosophy (1781-1831) — to the death of Hegel.
 The Nineteenth Century Philosophy (1820—1900.)
So as you can see, it looks like we are on a pretty short road to the present, except for all of
the historical markers we will stop at along the way.
Renaissance And Reformation
Aside from the two hundred or so years in between them, we often see these two as one
thing. They are not one in the same, nor does one lead necessarily to the other. That said of
course there is a connection. But first: the Renaissance was about re-birth and the
Reformation was about renewal; the Renaissance hinged on the ‘re-discovery’ of classical
(read Greek and Roman) art and writings. The Reformation hinged on the rising call for
renewal against abuses in the Church against doctrine.
The call for renaissance was answered by the likes of da Vinci, Gutenberg, and
Michelangelo. The call for reformation was answered by the likes of Francis of Assisi,
Erasmus and Martin Luther.
When we think of the term ‘Renaissance Man’37, we think of a person who did it all; their
interests and pursuits were not limited to one subject or area of interest. This is nothing new
as we have seen, and even though it is an echo back to the classical period, we understood
that these guys exist in every time and place. What we are really talking about are people
who have egos large enough to allow them to think that they can be an expert on/conquer any
subject or problem.
So what is the difference and why do we care? The Renaissance was a relatively short
period contained within the timeframe of the Reformation. The Reformation lasted much
longer, and took on different forms depending on the times38. We care because both impact
the philosophical timeline. The rejection of Scholasticism meant that doctrine was once again
called into question. It also meant that the answers to some of life’s persistent questions were
open to new interpretation. The rejection of Scholasticism also meant an end to the scholastic
system of education.
The Rising Tide
The Renaissance produced a new tide of Skepticism, so much so that it earned that name
in academic circles (i.e. Renaissance Skepticism). Think back to the original Skeptics, at least
our introduction to them (Chapter 24). The idea that nothing can be known or known for
certain plays into the rise in apophatic thinking.
So what? Well, what kinds of discussion do you think will arise from this? Are there those
who will embrace this thinking and those who will reject it? Add that to the circles they run
in, religious, scientific. Think about each group and then think about their reaction to earlier
No sexism implied….
And by the way, there was no Counter-Reformation. These reformers saw themselves as reforming the
Church and should not be confused with the effects of the reforming, which was seen as a separation, and lent
itself to the idea that the Roman Church countered their movements.
37
38
thinkers. Think about their reaction to contemporary thinkers who might utilize earlier
thinking.
Now think about the topics which will be discussed in this new ethos. Add humanism into
the mix, shake or stir lightly and you get the picture.
A New Reason?
What kind of world will it be where everything can be called into question? How far has
this circle come from our first discussion of people like Pythagoras?
What becomes the basis for fact/truth? Take a moment and think about it. What has the
history of philosophy shown us (notice the clever segue produced from the last class)?
It is the rise of science that begins to weaken the Scholastic system. The move from
deductive to inductive reasoning. We begin to see the application of knowledge not just for
the glory of God
Against the background of humanistic scholarship, the rise of the new science, and the
challenge of skepticism, modern philosophers were preoccupied with philosophical issues in
several distinct areas which we should recognize without much effort:
 Epistemology: Can human beings achieve any certain knowledge of the world? If so,
what are the sources upon which genuine knowledge depends? In particular, how
does sense perception operate in service of human knowledge and vice versa?
 Metaphysics: What kinds of things ultimately compose the universe? In particular,
what are the distinctive features of human nature, and how do they function in
relation to each other and the world at large? Does God exist? Is God necessary for
what we can observe about the universe?
 Ethics: By what standards should human conduct be evaluated? Which actions are
morally right, and what motivates us to perform them? Is moral life possible without
the support of religious belief?
 Meta-philosophy: Does philosophy have a distinctive place in human life generally?
What are the proper aims and methods of philosophical inquiry? Is philosophy
relevant in the face of ‘hard science’?
Although not every philosopher addressed all of these issues and some philosophers had
much more to say about some issues than others, our survey of modern philosophy will trace
the content of their responses to questions of these basic sorts, which of course sounds a lot
like what we have already been doing. Okay. All of that said, let us take a look at some of the
players.
Desiderius Erasmus
Erasmus was truly another one of those folks which fits the bill. Considered the greatest
scholar of his day he wrote and published copious amounts. In the scheme of things he is
representative of the movement from the Church-sponsored universities to individual
accomplishment, relying on the printers to get his message out. This is not to be confused
with or to say that itinerate teachers were not everywhere, but more along the lines that
people now came to him as the expert; if they wanted to look smart they hung out with
Erasmus.
So start thinking printing. The dissemination of ideas does not require the university
anymore. More and more people can afford books, and literacy is therefore on the rise (rise, I
said, not arrived – the majority of people saw Shakespeare’s plays, they never read them,
much to the chagrin of high school students everywhere).
To Erasmus, the philosophers and sages of pre-Christian antiquity were good and worthy
of study, but they are far inferior to Christ or any saintly Christian. “Of the philosophers I
should recommend the Platonists because in much of their thinking as well as in their mode
of expression they are the closest to the spirit of the prophets and of the gospel.”
(Enchiridion, Erasmus)
Eastward Ho!
The Eastern thinkers of this period are not in the same situation. The political and social
movements are different than the West. That is not to say that there were not similarities.
Political corruption was rampant.
Wang Yang-Ming is perhaps more practical than metaphysical. Wang studied Buddhism
and Taoism but finally settled on Neo-Confucianism. He championed the individual’s
responsibility for investigating their own mind and developing their own knowledge to its
potential. What he called the intuitive faculty, an innate characteristic of all people, is the one
thing an individual has to cling to. Though often obscured, it is hard to obliterate. It is not
solely an intellectual function, but is manifested in sympathetic feeling, true sincerity and
commiseration. Wang concluded that a person’s original nature is to be used in daily tasks in
order to investigate and firmly grasp the truth. This is to be supported by development of the
intuitive faculty, development of sincerity of purpose, and guidance of the mind into clear
thinking.
Similar to Plato and Aristotle, Wang also concluded that knowledge implies action: that
there can be no real knowledge without action. Ethically, the individual should act in the
ways that his intuitive knowledge of good enables him to do. And in our Prime mover
moment for this section, this innate knowledge shows that there is an all-pervading unity that
encompasses heaven, earth, and the individual (call it the logos if you will).
In advocating a person’s responsibility for seeking and following fundamental principles
and moral laws, Wang Yang-Ming strongly criticized the prevailing philosophy of rote
learning of texts practiced in his day, similar to Roger Bacon. In this and in his emphasizing
the strong moral obligation of the individual, he was in conflict with the corrupt
philosophical and political circumstances of his own time.
“The mind of the philosopher considers heaven, earth, and all things as one substance. He
makes no distinctions between the people of the empire. Whosoever has blood and life is his
brother and child. There is no one whom he does not wish to see perfectly at peace, and
whom he does not wish to nourish. This is in accordance with his idea that all things are one
substance.
Mind, nature, and heaven are one all-pervading unity. Thus, when it comes to knowing
them completely, it all amounts to the same thing. But with regard to these three, the actions
of men and their strength have degrees, and the regular order should not be overstepped.”
(The Great Learning, Wang Yang-Ming)
You’re A Prince!
Niccolo Machiavelli is like Erasmus in that he is not what we would think of as a
philosopher. His best known books, The Prince, Discourses on Livy and The Art Of War are
political in nature and deal with the most effective means of securing and maintaining power.
It is a political philosophy which emphasizes the prowess of the individual as the reason for
success. According to Machiavelli, morality in political life is based on the skill of the actors
in terms of their ability to achieve noble ends. In the end it is relative to the amount of
success and glory gained.
So morality is more related to the political outcome than the other way around. In the end,
bad political decisions produce disquiet and turmoil. Being mean to people in order to further
your own ends is bad because it makes people mad.
“As for the rest, for whom it is enough to live securely, they are easily satisfied by making
orders and laws that, along with the power of the king, comprehend everyone's security. And
once a prince does this, and the people see that he never breaks such laws, they will shortly
begin to live securely and contentedly” (The Prince, Machiavelli).
What? There’s More?
Whereas Machiavelli is a ‘political philosopher’, Thomas More is a ‘moral philosopher’.
To be virtuous is to live according to nature and the dictates of reason. In his work Utopia he
set out three key principles:
 The soul of a person is immortal which binds us to and makes us aware of God
 God has designed the soul to be happy which helps us to help with the happiness of
others
 God has appointed rewards for good and virtuous acts and punishments for vice.
These rewards and punishments are distributed after this life which causes us to seek
out others and work for the good of all
“As to moral philosophy, they have the same disputes among them as we have here: they
examine what are properly good both for the body and the mind, and whether any outward
thing can be called truly good, or if that term belong only to the endowments of the soul.
They inquire likewise into the nature of virtue and pleasure; but their chief dispute is
concerning the happiness of a man, and wherein it consists? Whether in some one thing, or
in a great many? They seem, indeed, more inclinable to that opinion that places, if not the
whole, yet the chief part of a man's happiness in pleasure; and, what may seem more strange,
they make use of arguments even from religion, notwithstanding its severity and roughness,
for the support of that opinion so indulgent to pleasure; for they never dispute concerning
happiness without fetching some arguments from the principles of religion, as well as from
natural reason, since without the former they reckon that all our inquiries after happiness
must be but conjectural and defective.” (Utopia, Thomas More)
Putting It Together
How does philosophy change? Does philosophy change? What effects do historical events
have on philosophy? Do the questions remain the same, just with changed names to protect
the innocent?
What we look at here is a small transitional period. The decline of scholastic thought and
the rise of printing are creating a new mix of thinkers. Many do not consider themselves
‘philosophers’ as we have been thinking of them. But what is philosophy; the love of
wisdom, the seeking of understanding. Does that mean that any pursuit of knowledge is
philosophy? The term natural philosophy for science is a telling statement. We are seeing a
transition, recognition that while science seems to be about thinking, there is a certain
amount of separation from other ‘philosophy’, such as theology. For the most part, no one
during this time is seeing themselves as separate from religious thinking, nor as separate
from philosophy in general, though Machiavelli is beginning to show us that trend.
We are certainly seeing the division of the camps though. Morality still plays a hand here,
though it seems that sometimes it is the low hand. We can see the changing attitudes toward
knowledge, its function and its goal. When we look at Machiavelli and More, do we hear any
echoes of earlier thinkers? How is moral thinking changing? What are the roots of that
change?
If we no longer dichotomize humans as body and soul, then what effect does that have on
thinking? Recall thinkers of the past; what is the function of the soul? We have also looked at
the struggle of universals; is there an over-arching set of universals or is it merely a
subjective view of who’s right and who’s wrong? (Bonus: name that philosophy).
“A majority of the time a majority of the chairs in the world are empty.” SK
Chapter 35
The Enlightenment
With the questioning of all ‘conventional’ wisdom, we begin to see a rise in human based
intellectualism and rationalism; after all, if the basics are questioned what else can be the
source of knowledge? Along those lines, a certain prejudice is present in the titles often
bestowed by History. Apparently the participants in the Renaissance were only renaissed not
enlightened. But that is a rant for another time.
The Players
Dates
1561-1626
1588-1679
1596-1650
1623-1704
Philosophers
Frances Bacon
Thomas Hobbes
Rene Descartes
John Locke
Main Points
Father of the Inductive method.
Human as machine; human nature is evil.
Certainty is everything, and everything is certain.
Knowledge comes from sense perception
Table 24: The Enlightenment Players
The Age Of Enlightenment
At the risk of beating a dead horse, let us begin to explore the rational for this period in
the context of this discussion. If everything we know is suspect, both Platonic and
Aristotelian, then what is the prime cause/source of/for knowledge? Certainly the sliding
scale rise of humanism has produced even more change in the meaning of the term. So, let us
take a moment and chart its course and enter into some unfounded pop philo-sociology.
Initially (simplistically?), humanism was a concentration on things human. As time
progressed, it came to mean the centrality of individuals to understanding the world.
Eventually it would come to mean an emphasis on human so great that it eclipses any other
prime cause.
So let us also take a parallel look at the course of development. For this exercise we will
use some terms very loosely, like ‘Greek’, as in, for the Greeks, humans existed as ‘social
animals’. Now we know that that pretty much loosely applies to most Greek philosophy, so
do not get excited by any terms we bandy about here. That said, for the Greeks, humans
existed as ‘social animals’; that is to say, the natural environment for humans was not as
individuals, but the group. There is a certain truth in this social order for the Romans as well;
think of the reason for the state (again across time, very non-specific to republic or empire);
think now of the individual’s place in that state.
With some confidence then, we can say that for a long time the individual was only seen
in terms of the group. Along come the Medievals. They contend that the individual, while
part of the group is also independent of the group. The purpose of the individual is to rise to
the ultimate potential of that individual for the enhancement of the group and for individual
salvation; from this the whole group benefits. It is the purpose of the group to guide and
contain the individual. Still sounds a bit like the Greeks, but the twist is not just the
importance of each individual to the success of the group but also the importance of each
individual to the success of the individual. What we call Free Will, is the factor which makes
the difference in the understanding from earlier groups.
Individual knowledge, understanding and good decisions are imperative to the function of
the individual and therefore the group. What can the individual rely upon to help? The
struggle becomes one of immanence. What do I believe? What I can see and touch or what I
think to be possible. Empiricism is the term which applies to both a reliance on sensual
observation for learning (i.e. the scientific method) and as a basis for all human knowledge
(i.e. all of our knowledge is sensory based -- where have we heard this kind of stuff before)?
The End Of The Innocence
Paul of Tarsus tells us we should cast off the things and thoughts of childhood and in an
ironic twist, so does the Enlightenment. Apparently we keep getting older and discovering
that our adolescence lasts longer and longer and there appears to be more and more to throw
away.
In reaction to scholasticism and spurred by Renaissance Skepticism, empiricism
challenged Aristotle's metaphysics so successfully that doubt was cast on the rest of his
philosophy too. Not so much on the ‘meat’ but more on the ‘bone’; that is to say more on the
prime causes. For instance, many used his scientific method of observation (empirical), and
his Nicomachean Ethics remains viable even today because it does not rely on non-material
entities such as souls or rights or on a deterministic view of causation as do the more
Platonic/Christian/Muslim philosophies.
So Empiricism is that ‘well here it is right in front of me, I do not have to look anywhere
else’ kind of attitude that while hints of Aristotle, is more similar to the Epicureans. It differs
from Aristotle in that it is complete within itself. Aristotle argued that you could not have
physics without metaphysics and vice versa. Empiricism relies on the individual and the form
and function of that individual, that is to say, how we are built is sufficient to the needs of
knowledge. It also implies the knowledge of a thing within the thing.
We can see this in Frances Bacon. Bacon used terms we have heard earlier, but like the
term humanism, he has changed them. Nature is the natural phenomena of heat, sound, light,
or of any other actual object of the investigations of physical science; Form is the inherent
laws of these natures.
We can hear the echoes of Aristotle and Aquinas in these thoughts and terms, but we also
see the humanistic bent.
Calvin And Hobbes
Just a quick theo-historical note on John Calvin within this philosophical context. Calvin
was a Frenchman who fled to Switzerland after some run-ins with theological authorities
around 1530. Simplistically understating Calvin’s theological thoughts, we focus in on one
which he expounded upon in the second book of his major work. There he develops the
Augustinian notion of sin and original sin, stating that the theological nature of humans is
evil. This differs slightly from the earlier more popular notion that the theological nature of
humans is good.
‘So what’, you say (and I must say, you say that a lot). Well take a moment and think
about it. Thomas Hobbes, father of modern materialism, publisher of a translation of
Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian War and one of the great killjoys of philosophy,
certainly did. For Hobbes, human nature is evil and good is a function of society. In a
nutshell, human nature is inherently selfish and violent, doomed to endless civil strife (‘war
of all against all’) but the state provides stability and security for the people.
Peace and security are more important than liberty and rights so benevolent dictators or
some other such strong centralization of power is necessary. Without strong laws and strong
enforcement, people will revert to the mud from which they came crawling. The laws of the
country (designed to maintain peace and security) are the equivalent of the laws of nature
(designed to maintain order).
We can see here a certain amount of that ‘here and now’ thinking. Everything for Hobbes
is based in physical processes. And I mean everything; humans, human history, you name it.
This dependence is known as Materialism. Hobbes thought about everything and was quite
comprehensive in his decisions about how things worked, of course limited as they were to
the physical world. But interestingly enough, he does take on some of those early niggling
little discussions we looked at so many chapters before: is there something or nothing? What
is motion? There is a substance filling the void between bodies, and interestingly enough, it
is God.
All that said, Nature is a mechanism, like a clock. Therefore, the human body is a
mechanism and the soul is the cog representing its ‘vital’ (living) quality. So, the body has a
soul, but the driving force is not knowledge or understanding or morality but is tied to the
concept of motion. Things happen due to force. The contacting of bodies transmits force
from one to the other (passing through that substance which is God). Motion is the effect of
this force and for living beings it is manifested in a pain and pleasure response, that is to say,
he motion of living beings is due to a force to eschew pain and a force to desire pleasure (we
move toward pleasure, away from pain). Human behavior basically comes down to
competing motivations of appetite and aversion, all of which is caused by material
phenomena.
In the end, I think, his main concern is the problem of social and political order: how
human beings can live together in peace and avoid the danger and fear of civil conflict
considering that their evil nature will quickly descend them into murderous anarchy.
Basically for Hobbes, one cannot avoid the fact that, as said, in the end without a strong arm
to govern them, people would degenerate into selfish, ruthless individuals. One might see
within this the change from the community centered moral philosophies of the Medievals,
but instead of a strong central Papacy, we can see the rise of the nation-state. We can also see
this classic question pulling away from Platonic idealism39 as well. Though it also differ from
realism, it hints of the nominalism, that is universals being part of the thing itself.
Do Not Put Descartes Before The Horse40
For what he means to us I really hate to sandwich him here but if you look at the time line
Rene Descartes does come before Locke and is a contemporary of Hobbes, so he does
deserve a brief introduction. But then, he is French, born near Tours. Everything you think
you know from school comes in some way from Descartes.
Descartes is very important to us, in that he really is the formal break with Scholasticism,
actively showing that system produces doubt, of which he was certain there was none. This
39
Not the starry-eyed kind, the Form kind.
One of the oldest jokes in the book…beat only by several unrepeatable ones found scratched on stoa in the
Agora about Socrates; not as funny in French.
40
also brought him into conflict with many of the skeptics which had developed causing him to
show his certainty principle.
Descartes is often called the Father of Modern Philosophy, because he begins to develop a
new system, which while completely based in all of our previous thinkers, is based in part on
the movement from a causal (cause and effect) to a mechanical (things work together like a
machine) model of how the universe works. I think we shall deal with him more in-depth but
for now, in the context we are exploring let us dip in our philosophical toes.
For Descartes, Skepticism and apophatic thinking rule, but only so far as they lead us to
certainty. The juxtaposition of these two ideas may take a moment to get your mind around.
Doubt is the beginning, and yet certainty is everything. Distrustful of forcing the world to
match perceptions. The skepticism which showed the flaws in previous thinking, give way to
the certainty of his model.
Descartes differs from Hobbes in that the human soul is not part of the mechanism.
Knowledge distinguishes us from the rest of the machines. We are the plane wherein meets
the two substances: matter and thought.
More on this later.
Locke Your Doors
Now I know that he is a bit out of our time but John Locke is often seen in opposition to
Hobbes, especially in the realm of political philosophy. It is not that Locke did not think that
man was of evil nature, but more along the lines that, yes he was, but society was to blame.
While he agreed with the mechanical nature of things, he differed on understanding of
what was the composition and cause of things. Locke saw particles in everything (harkening
back to atomism), with ideas being the particles of the mind. Our senses are bombarded by
particles which zoom down our nervous systems to our brain. Consequentially, what we
ultimately know are the sensations of the things not the thing itself. This mode of perception
means that the world may not be what we perceive it to be.
Aristotle spoke of substances and accidents, Locke speaks of primary and secondary
qualities. These qualities are properties which are bound up with the thing itself and, per
above, are only known to us empirically (through the senses). The primary qualities (think
form and operations) are what make up the thing, and to remove them would destroy it.
Secondary qualities (think of them as sensible accidents) are produced by the primary ones,
and are therefore only understandable through the primary quality.
In a way, Locke is kind of the middle ground between Hobbes and Descartes.
All knowledge derives from experience, though we are able to also combine ideas to form
new ones but they are still based in experience. Basically that means that our minds start out
as a Tabula Rasa, basically a blank slate, until they are filled with sense experience. This,
Locke tells us is part of the problem; it is this that allows us to be corrupted by the world
around us as well as learn from it. The mind therefore is the central processing ground. It is
there that sense data lands and is processed. As said before in not so many words, ideas are
the primary quality of the mind, that is -- to use the Aristotelian term-- its substance. The
mind is really incapable of protecting itself from the barrage of sensory data, but it can form
ideas from these particles. It is the mind which combines, relates and abstracts ideas to form
other ideas.
Which somehow leads us to his political philosophy. People are all equal and have rights
which are built in; the Government has the duty to protect their rights and first and foremost
their property rights; it needs three branches of government for ‘checks and balances’; there
must be a separation of church and state (to protect both); the rule of the majority
(liberalism)…stop me if any of this seems familiar.
Warning: ultimate simplification of ideas ahead!
All men are created equal; okay this is really where it all starts and is the true segue from
the earlier discussion. If everyone starts out as a tabula rasa, then we really are on equal
footing. Basically if no one mind is better than any other mind, then we must be equal.
Separation of Powers; corruption is the problem (not only corruption as we think of it:
money, power, etc., but the corruption of purity of the tabula rasa). The only way to protect
power is to keep it separate but under check by other power. Separation does not mean
killing off the connection and producing a sterile environment for these separate powers to
operate within, but more like a levee, which keeps the water from the land so that both can
operate effectively for the betterment of all.
Both of these mean that Hobbes’ powerful central government is wrong. People, guided
correctly can operate fairly well together. The checks and balances of the powers mean that
the interests of the individual can be protected from ruthless dictators.
Putting It Together
Scientists? Mathematicians? Theologians? What can we say about these guys? All of the
above? Most likely. What about the times in which they live? This is once again (in an
increasingly obvious trend) a moment to reflect on all of the thinking which has come before
and how it plays into what these thinkers are proffering as well as the ramifications their
thinking is having.
The new empirical sciences combine a large number of the earlier thinkers we have
covered. Many of the ideas put forth by them have been shifted (via greater understanding of
the physical world), extended and combined to produce a very practical vision of the
universe. The mechanical nature of the cosmos, of the body, observable ‘laws’ of motion; all
of these combine within these guys to lay out a new path of philosophy.
Church Police: Oh, Lord, we beseech thee. Tell us who croaked the Bishop of Leicester.
[Thunder] [Chanting]
God: The one in the braces, he done it.
[Chanting]
Husband: It's a fair cop, but society is to blame.
Church Police: Right, we'll arrest them instead! (Monty Python Live At The Hollywood Bowl)
Chapter 36
The American Founding Fathers As Philosophers
Now might be an appropriate time to wander into the realm of historical philosophical
conjecture and consider the philosophical nature of the early American fathers. Can we
consider them philosophers or were they merely spouting the conventional wisdom of the
time (well, of the time right before them)? Were their ideas so radical and new that the
American system can in and of itself be considered a system? This chapter is designed more
to be a vehicle for discussion than an exhaustive journey into American political philosophy.
The Players
Dates
1706 -1790
1735 -1826
1743 -1826
1752 -1816
Philosophers
Benjamin Franklin
John Adams
Alexander Hamilton
Thomas Jefferson
Gouverneur Morris
Main Points
Diplomat; scientist; moral philosopher
Drafter of the Declaration of Independence;
Drafter of the Constitution;
Table 25: The Founding Fathers
The Rise Of The Nation State
Let us take another meander, which is somewhat outside the box (as if anything really is)
but only because philosophy has begun to put on so much weight 41. As you can see, political
philosophy is becoming high on everyone’s’ list. The stability of the nation state is replacing
the stability of the Roman Church which replaced the stability of the Roman Empire which
replaced a whole lot of little guys.
Think about Plato, Aristotle, and Augustine. What was the focus of their political
philosophy, that is, why did they develop a political philosophy?
Now think about Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Locke. What was the focus of their political
philosophy?
Locke, Stock And Barrel
So when we look at the Founding Fathers, should we say that they are thieves? Well
perhaps that is a bit harsh but we can see from our terse discussion of Locke, that they pretty
much just lifted his ideas right from his wallet (in opposition to the English who pretty much
stuck with Hobbes).
Part of the argument is the natural order of things. Natural Law is seen somewhat
different by these guys. We would recognize the concept of the Logos and such giving order
to the universe, but remember that at this time they are mainly adhering to the mechanistic
vision of the universe. Natural Law is revealed by reason, i.e. you look at a clock and you can
reason how it works. “The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges
everyone: and reason which is that law, teaches all mankind who will but consult it, that
41
Once again, thank you Monty Python.
being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty or
possessions...” (The Second Treatise of Government, book 2, John Locke)
Hobbes and his the-natural-state-for-humans-is-selfish-chaos position argued for the
strong central government based in his thought that peace and security were the most
important things. That thinking was probably the prompt for Franklin’s famous quote: “They
who can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety, deserve neither liberty
nor safety.” This is not to say that Locke thought there should be no government…far from
it. Locke’s thought is summed up in two works:
 The First Treatise of Government: a work aimed at refuting the doctrine of the Divine
Right of Kings which was based in biblical arguments but mainly focused on the fact
that people are not naturally free, that is, there is an order to things, and some people
do not get to be at the top of the order.
 The Second Treatise of Government: this is really the source for Locke's specific
thinking on politics. He feels compelled to write this “lest men fall into the dangerous
belief that all government in the world is merely the product of force and violence.”
Something we see in Hobbes’ ideology. Government for Locke is a natural
progression not born of force and violence. Locke's argues the natural rights theory
and the social contract. Natural rights are those rights which are innate in human
beings as created, long before government comes into being. Locke also argues a next
step: we have a right to the means to survive because that is our nature as God created
us. So not only do we have basic, fundamental rights, we each have a right to life and
the means to bring that life to fruition, basically be able to live those natural rights.
Government then, is a common agreement that we each have with one another to secure
the rights of each individual. We agree to transfer some of our rights to a central government,
while individually retaining others (think: the right of justice is turned over to the courts).
This is the theory of the social contract. It is the radical nature of these arguments which
influence the American and French revolutions.
Basically, a legitimate civil government seeks to preserve the life, health, liberty and
property of its subjects, as long as this is compatible with the public good (i.e. murder may
seem like an individual right, but really is incompatible with the public good). Because it
does this, it deserves obedience (i.e. you subvert some rights and subject yourself to the
rules). This means that you can spot an illegitimate government by the way it treats those
basic rights and therefore the use of rebellion is justified (as well as the assassination of
royals) in order to overcome that government which has no right to exist any way.
The Bottom Of The Barrel
Locke differed from Machiavelli and Hobbes in what constituted happiness, but like
Aquinas, Locke mirrored Aristotle's dictum that man is a social animal and is happy in a state
of social harmony. Unlike Aquinas's belief in revealed, innate knowledge aiding in the
salvation of the soul from original sin, Locke believes man's mind comes into this world as
blank as a tabula rasa. For Locke, knowledge is neither innate, revealed, nor based on some
external authority but is subject to uncertainty guided by reason, tolerance and moderation
(how Stoic of him). Consequentially, an absolute ruler as proposed by Hobbes is
unnecessary, for natural law is based on reason and equality, naturally having a tendency for
seeking peace and survival for man.
So the idea of authority tied to the idea of legitimacy plays heavily in Locke’s thinking.
Authority comes from the natural law, as said rather than some innate, revealed, nor based on
external authority, that is, each person has the right of self-determination and therefore the
power over their own life. By social contract though, we agree as a group to how that power
will be legitimately exercised over us. So authority comes from each individual by way of the
common-think of the group; this means that the group can decide to arrange itself in anyway
the individuals see fit. Ergo what could be considered legitimate in one group may not be for
another (and vice versa). Now the hope is that reason, the law of nature as Locke states, will
create a common set of ‘virtues’ for lack of a better word (or a least for lack of a better way
to manipulate the conversation) so pretty much any society will set itself up in the same way.
Alternatively Plato if you recall, or at least may have heard, thought that democracy was
the lowest form of government. For him the enlightened philosopher king was the way to go,
and that the arbitrary and often un-enlightened view of the masses was the path to chaos. The
idea of personal authority without reliance on some external standard would be unthinkable.
So what did Plato and Hobbes have in common on political theory?
Does anyone else reflect the American Experiment’s thinking other than Locke?
Can Someone Wind The Clock Before You Leave?
In an increasingly tendency to bold and broad statements, most of the founding fathers
considered themselves or were considered Deists. Deism (from the Latin for God) is the
theological system describing God's relationship with the natural world and is reflective of
the empirical system. Actually, empiricism really permeates its tenets. Briefly, Deism holds
that God is completely transcendent, that is, he does not intervene with the functioning of the
natural world in any way, allowing it to run according to the laws of nature that he
configured when he created everything. This differs greatly from the immanent God (in
Jesus) of the Medievals. Somewhat similar to the idea of knowing God through the Logos
(Jesus), humans can only know God through reason and observation. This is not divine
reason but human reason and human observation of nature (recall that the thing is knowable
in itself through observation). There is no revelation or supernatural phenomenon. These
‘facts’ of faith are viewed by most deists with caution if not skepticism.
Deism says that there is some higher power responsible for the formation of life and the
universe which designed natural processes to govern creation but really spends no time or
effort understanding or defining the nature of God. The word Providence is often used to
describe this power (we can think of Marcus Aurelius). There is a belief (if I can be so bold
as to use that word) that the workings of the universe indicate that we should act well toward
one another.
Okay why go through all that? We can see that the ‘religious’ and ‘scientific’ thinking are
merging, but more in the way that one informs the other – and it provides me a bit of a segue.
Thomas Jefferson
Another little feature of Locke’s thought was on religious freedom. Oddly enough this did
not extend to Roman Catholicism (definitely unenlightened and since it relied on external
authority, illegitimate – but that is for another time), and many of the fathers shared that
view. Locke’s vision of the separation of Church and State was for the protection of the
religious beliefs of the individual. His skepticism precludes the belief in any religious system
because basically none can be proved empirically to be the One True Church. Jefferson
reflects almost directly many of the religious and political thoughts of Locke.
Think about the religious freedom statute he proposed for the Virginia Constitution. He is
especially targeting the Episcopal Church in its intertwining with the state government.
The idea of the educated electorate spurs the need for a state sponsored education system.
Ignorance is a bad thing and ignorance of how the world works renders one unable to
effectively participate in government, which is established by the individuals to protect their
rights. You can see how it all fits together.
Think of the design of the Declaration of Independence. The coercive nature of any entity
is considered bad whether it be state or church. Take some time to look at the wording, not
just of the pre-amble but of all of the whole statement. What elements can you pick out
which are based in Locke’s thought and which do you think are original?
We can definitively place Jefferson into the Locke camp.
John Adams
Where Jefferson was a Democrat, Adams was a Federalist.
When the English offered reconciliation and amnesty to Americans after the declaration of
independence, they held out John Adams from that offer.
Benjamin Franklin
If we were to name the true philosopher in the bunch, Franklin would probably fit that
bill.
Franklin was the elder statesman and diplomat for the Colonies for over 50 years, with a
reputation which long proceeded and often out-stripped his contemporaries in the American
movement. His wisdom was more than just Poor Richard’s Almanac. A natural and moral
philosopher, Franklin’s influence is strong in these areas. Education he felt, via the reading of
books, is directly related to the improvement of the mind which of course is the basis for
reason and therefore of understanding. During his times in England, he was friend to David
Hume (as a matter of fact Hume stated that Franklin was the ‘first American philosopher’)
and Adam Smith. Immanuel Kant reckoned him as one of the great thinkers of their time.
Franklin had a Hume bent, as opposed to say Jefferson, who was all Locke. Changed “we
hold these truths to be sacred and God-given” to the more familiar “we hold these truths to be
self-evident”. While not anti-religious and not strictly a Deist (he felt like God did have some
influence in the world), he saw morality from a somewhat practical and what may be
considered utilitarian vantage.
Continually obsessed with self-betterment and practical living, Franklin dedicated his life
“to the bold and arduous project of arriving at Moral Perfection.” (Autobiography, Ben
Franklin) and social and political service. He creates a list of 13 virtues by which one should
live that are, in order: Temperance, Silence, Order, Resolution, Frugality, Industry, Sincerity,
Justice, Moderation, Cleanliness, Tranquility, Chastity, and in a late addition, Humility. He
sees these as virtues worthy of any religion and necessary to practice, and yet, reaching moral
perfection is not necessary, as it might have been for Plato, Aquinas and so many others.
The practice of individual moral responsibility was key to Franklin’s thought. What does
that mean for a government? Is a government bound by the same 13 virtues as the individual?
Alexander Hamilton
Hamilton is our opposing position. The Federalist Papers outlines his view of a strong
central government. Let’s just say he took a shot at42 arguing the structure of the new
government. Where should government’s power lie? Certainly the principle of social contract
was recognized by all, but what was the structure of that social contract. Were the states
sufficient enough to provide for and protect the rights of the individual?
How does Hamilton’s position differ from Jefferson? Adams?
Morris Enough
Gouverneur Morris may be a name you do not recognize. Okay, I have to be honest, this is
the guy I have been holding against my chest in this discussion. Suffice it to say he was a
theistic rationalist. Now we have not really gotten to rationalism yet, but basically rational
theism is a combination of natural religion, Christianity and rationalism (the idea that
universals exist innately within the mind), really all governed by rationalism. In this system
the primary role of a person's religion is to encourage and support morality, and in opposition
to the mechanical view of a totally transcendent God, allows for active intervention by God
in workings of the universe (similar to Franklin).
What effect do you think that had in contrast to the Deist principles of the other founders?
Are they really that different?
Morris also believed in a strong aristocracy and cast a suspicious eye on democracy.
How does the Constitution reflect the Declaration of Independence? Where do they differ?
A Slave To Fashion
A simple side note to an issue which we have not really covered. What about slavery?
There has definitely been an undercurrent of conflict which has been untouched by our
discussion. Slavery has been justified in one form or another by the society of every
philosophical system we have examined. Several thinkers have weighed in on the subject and
it is perhaps a discussion for another time, so we will only brush it here, as the political as
well as moral and philosophical implications are becoming more imperative. That said,
within just this discussion, if everyone has innate rights, and it is the task of the government
to secure and protect those rights for everyone, how can slavery be justified?
Thinking this through, Locke argues that monarchies and the like subjugate the individual
to a position of having no power over themselves, most specifically life, liberty and property.
One is basically a slave to the ‘Lord’ (translated: one who has power over life and death), and
therefore has no freedom. Locke was against this type of slavery. The slavery he did support
was justified it only in the sense that those who take away the rights of others have no rights
(hence the whole rebellion and regicide thing being okay). In cases where an aggressor who
is illegitimate in power (an oppressor of rights) is defeated in war, the just victor has the
option to either kill the aggressor or legitimately enslave him. Not just any aggressor mind
you, or just any prisoner of war but only those who were engaged in a systematic and
illegitimate effort to violate the rights of others.
42
Just one of many things he took a shot at….
It’s All Right, It’s All Right….
So how does all of this play into the development of the American system? What
originality did they add to the thinking of Locke? How much did it influence the early
development of the government? How much remained in the years between the Declaration,
the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution? How much of the system we know today
is really still related to Locke’s thinking, or any of the founding fathers for that matter?
Putting It Together
Can we say, or try to say as we did several chapters ago, that a group can be considered
philosophers outside of Aristotle’s categories? Or in that vein, should they be considered
scientists or strictly politicians? Jefferson is a true Renaissance Man, and Franklin should be
considered one as well. How much did their attitude toward knowledge, religion and politics
rely on Locke and other similar thinkers? How much did the intervening 70-100 something
years between Locke and the Constitution shape the discussion?
Jefferson, Adams, Hamilton, Franklin, Morris; each brings a particular nuance to the
development of the American democracy. How does each man change or channel the general
teachings of the political philosophers which shaped the argument for American
independence? How does the shift to political praxis based on political philosophy show in
the American system?
We can credit these thinkers with establishing the country. Still the way that Locke
permeates our very thinking as a culture is almost startling and probably is startling but only
in the way people interpret it. The radical nature of his thought is not that it was so different
than anyone else (it wasn’t), but more in the radical actions which should be taken place
because of it.
“…there never was, nor ever will be a civilized Society without an Aristocracy.” (Gouverneur Morris)
“It has been said that democracy is the worst form of government except all the others that have been tried.”
(Sir Winston Churchill)
Chapter 37
Descartes
Transitional times in philosophical thought occur even within historical movements, and
Rene Descartes represents that transition. Descartes has been dubbed the “Father of Modern
Philosophy, but what does that mean in the context of our study? What did he do that was so
different from ‘non-modern’ philosophy? When we look at Descartes, we place him, not on
his own (we know better than that) but in the pantheon of thinkers who shifted the thinking
of humanity as we search for answers.
He Is
Born a poor black child.
Whaddya Know?
This may begin to sound like a broken record, but what can we know? Everyone so far
thinks they have this figured out, but apparently not because here we are, right? This is the
question that bugs Descartes the most. The skepticism of the time has called into question the
static answers and the reason for those answers, and if Descartes is about anything he is
about certainty. Certainty; sounds like another common theme right? We want to know, so
what are the means and the end of knowledge? How do we achieve knowledge, not just for
knowledge’s sake but for certainty’s sake? Recall Pythagoras and the purpose of his thinking;
so what is new in this search?
Descartes also represents the movement to separate epistemology and morality from
theology. For Descartes, the very basis of Scholasticism introduces doubt, ergo it cannot be
certain, ergo it is not valid. It teaches us nothing. And if we cannot learn from it, what good
is it?
How Did You Come Up With That?
With causality abandoned for mechanisim, Descartes sets out to define a fundamental set
of principles that one can know as true without any doubt. As with his evaluation of
Scholasticism, his basic method was to consider false any belief that falls prey to even the
slightest doubt. This apophatic thinking, sometimes referred to as methodological skepticism,
he calls hyperbolic doubt (apparently because it goes waaaaay beyond any normal bolics43).
Ultimately he rejects Platonic external Forms and Aristotle’s sense based origin of
knowledge and what the Scholastics called quiddity (the thing in itself) and backs the
mechanical view of nature. He concluded that the senses sometime deceive and ergo are
unreliable and not certain (putting him at odds of course with the likes of Locke).
Mathematics and mechanics were certain because they allowed one to establish a certainty
without reference to substantial forms or final causes but only through deductions made from
the configuration and motion of parts.
43
Ha, ha; a humorous play on the English term bollocks, since he was French.
Wait…Where Did I Leave My Keys?
Aristotle held that inquiry begins with wonder and awe. Apophaticaly, Descartes believes
that doubt is the foundation of philosophy, but only in the way that all our beliefs based on
our sense data can and for that reason probably should be doubted. Descartes creates for
himself a type of tabula rasa, one that serves to allow him an unprejudiced search for the
truth. He sees this wiping out of previously held beliefs and tenets as placing him in an
epistemological free-zone, where all ideas are able to be freely examined without prejudice,
and we are free to find the ideas which can truly be called certain.
Sounds like a tough assignment for a weekend. Wipe out everything you think you know
and start from scratch; but wait, what is that scratch? Well there has to be some reason I
believed those things, so let me see if they can be believed. Initially, Descartes arrives at only
a single principle: thought exists. Thought cannot be separated from me, therefore, I exist.
I Am, I Cried…To No One There….
‘Cogito ergo sum’ (Discourse on the Method, part IV): I think therefore I am; everything
can be doubted except my own existence, obviously because I am thinking about it. Sounds a
bit like a circular argument, or at least some logical fallacy, but recall we are abandoning
even Aristotelian logic, because it cannot be trusted. We may re-arrive at the fact that it is
legitimate, but for now, “I exist” is the only thing which is impossible to doubt and is,
therefore, absolutely certain. Descartes arrived at this conclusion, because if he doubted, then
something or someone must be doing the doubting, therefore the very fact that he doubted
proved his existence. “The simple meaning of the phrase is that if one is skeptical of
existence, that is in and of itself proof that he does exist.”44 But that is not to say that doubt is
the whole of it. He also sees the deception of doubt as a means of despair, and further proof
of or a rallying cry for if you will, seeking the certain.
From this certainty, Descartes demonstrate the certainty of God’s existence and if that is
certain, then, God being God, would not deceive us on this certainty. This, in turn, serves to
fix the certainty of everything that is clearly and distinctly understood and provides the
epistemological foundation Descartes set out to find.
What’s The Matter?
The scientific world is establishing facts about the world, based in earlier thinking but also
observation. One of those irrefutables is that matter is matter, period and everything material
can be reduced to mechanics or what we might call the laws of the universe. Everything is
made up of the same substances (atoms, etc. not Aristotelian substances) so there is even
equivalence between living and non-living matter. But is that all there is? Remember that
vague reference to the seeming monism of the coming thinkers back in Chapter 34? Well that
is because Descartes re-introduces a dualism, but it is not the dualism of body and soul as for
the Greeks. Descartes posits that there are actually two substances: matter (has body as an
extension45), and mind (has thought), each has its laws and they communicate via the pineal
44
Could not find a decent reference for this, but I liked it. If this is the simplest then the debate rages for the
most complex.
45
Extension is a developing word used to mean of the type of, in a sense; the extension of red is the class of red
things. See Leibniz.
gland. Like others of this time he sees human bodies as machines but not the soul, that is to
say that the soul is not a mechanism of the body.
Okay, then, what does it mean for humans? Descartes concludes that he can be certain that
he exists because he thinks (or doubts as the case may be). But in what form does he exist?
He perceives his body through the use of the senses; however, these have concluded to be
unreliable. So Descartes determines that the only certain knowledge is that he is a thinking
thing; simply put thinking is his essence as it is the only thing about him that cannot be
doubted. Descartes defines “thought” as “what happens in me such that I am immediately
conscious of it, insofar as I am conscious of it”. Thinking is thus every activity of a person of
which he is immediately conscious. (The Principles of Philosophy IX) Humans are
conscious; animals on the other hand are machines.
The Show Must Go On!
Once again, there is equivalence between living and non-living matter and everything
material can be reduced to mechanics. So what is unique about humans is thought. The mind
is capable of representing the world of objects. The mind is a stage where ideas are
illuminated by the inner light of reason (this is called Cartesian theater). Sounds suspiciously
like the Cave, but it is different.
Are You Sure?
As stated above, Mathematics is certain knowledge (what cannot be doubted), from which
other certain knowledge can be derived (Shades Of Boole). We can arrive at “useful
knowledge – by which, knowing the force and action of fire, water, air the stars, the heavens,
and all the other bodies that surround us – we might also apply them in the same way to all
the uses to which they are suited, and thus render ourselves the lords and possessors of
nature.” (Discourse On Method)
Is This Just Some Kind Of Movement?
Okay, this one is really just another
one liner for us, but I will stretch it out for my own amusement. Remember that age old
question what is motion? Descartes has a fascinating theory. If there are no prime causes per
se, but mechanisms have movement which is observable and we can see that the planets
revolve around the sun, how does that happen? Planets revolve around the sun because it is
surrounded by a vortex, kind of like the giant spring in a clock. The planets are basically
stuck in a swirling movement and are really drug about by that action.
I only bring that up because of the implications for movement as we have examined it
before. What happens to that question?
That’s Just Perfect….
Unfortunately for us, Descartes restates his argument for God in several ways. Simply put
the arguments are very similar, and are in the vein of God is the perfect thing; existence is
one of the perfections; thus God exists or the I exist; I conceive of a perfect being; I am
imperfect so the idea of a perfect being must come from outside me and therefore God, who
therefore exists or the whatever I can conceive of which is certain must be certain; I conceive
of the existence of God; therefore God exists…you get the idea.
Descartes arrives at the existence of God through simple arguments but remember that
whole essence and existence thing? He states that God’s existence comes from his essence
(“true and immutable essence, nature, or form” to be slightly more exact) and is in fact
contained within it. This has sparked many discussions, on which I will not weigh in on or
add to. Still it is tantalizing that he hints at the existence = essence arguments of the
scholastics.
Thought Exercise: how does the nature of his argument compare to Anselm’s? How is it
different?
The Soul Of Tact
Descartes conceived the soul as essentially thinking (i.e. conscious) substance, and body
as essentially extended substance. The two are thus simply disparate realities, with no vital
connection between them. This is significantly marked by his theory of the soul's location in
the body. Unlike the Scholastics he confines it to a single point — the pineal gland — from
which it is supposed to control the various organs and muscles through the medium of the
“animal spirits”, a kind of fluid circulating through the body. Thus, to say the least, the soul's
biological functions are made very remote and indirect, and were in fact later on reduced
almost to a nullity.
Putting It Together
Doubt is the start of reason and the mind is the seat of reason. Descartes is a rationalist as
opposed to an empiricist, like Locke. The mind is the only thing certain, so mental constructs
are the only certain things we can know. So starts the movement away from sense and
experience toward rational explanation. The thing to keep in mind is the fact that this is
beginning to take place strictly within the human. God’s place is as watchmaker.
Descartes signals the change of the primary aim of philosophical thought from ontology to
epistemology and the Aristotelian dogmatism inherited in philosophy from Scholasticism
while simultaneously raising some of the most fundamental problems for future generations
of philosophers.
So what else do we hear? A priori and a posteriori; analytic versus synthetic? This
struggle of how we know is really part of the tone of the coming periods of philosophy and
we will examine it next.
“I have convinced myself that there is nothing at all in the world, no heaven, no earth, no minds, no bodies;
have I not then convinced myself that I do not exist? On the contrary: there is no doubt that I existed, if I
convinced myself of anything. - But there is some deceiver, in the highest degree powerful and ingenious, who
uses all his efforts to deceive me all the time. - Then there is no doubt that I exist, if he is deceiving me; let him
deceive me as much as he likes, he can never bring it about that I am nothing, so long as I think that I am
something. So after every thought and the most careful consideration, I must hold firm to this conclusion: that
the proposition I am, I exist, must be true, whenever I utter it or conceive it in my mind.” Rene Descartes
“I cannot forgive Descartes. In all his philosophy he would have been quite willing to dispense with God.
But he had to make Him [snap his fingers] to set the world in motion; beyond this, he has no further need of
God.” Blaise Pascal (Pensées: The Misery of Man without God, 77) - contemporary of Descartes
Chapter 38
The Seventeenth Century
All that thinking took place in a context, and this context is known by several monikers:
The Enlightenment, The Age of Reason, among others. Technically started by Descartes’
rationalism, this time is marked by a great attempt to see knowledge as unified, that is, all
inter-related. It is the time of one-stop philosophy/etc.
The Players
Dates
1596-1650
1623-1662
1634-1677
1632-1677
1646-1716
1666-1731
1668-1744
1685-1753
Philosophers
Main Points
Rationalist; historical place-holder
Rene Descartes
Rationalist;
Blaise Pascal
Rationalist; symbolic thinking
Baruch Spinoza
Empiricist; historical place-holder
John Locke
Rationalist; best of all worlds; prime principles
Gottfried Leibniz
English writer; education of women
Mary Astell
Professor of Rhetoric;
Giambattista Vico
Empiricist; sense impressions; immaterialism
Bishop George Berkeley
Table 26: Seventeenth Century Players
Where To Begin?
The Sixteenth Century really was the transition between the medieval/scholastic and the
modern philosophical systems making the Seventeenth the beginning of the modern only
path.
Theology/Faith ceased to be a basis for philosophy. So what could replace that? Well of
course the Empiricists and the Rationalists have the answer to that question.
Physical Sciences: Empiricists point to the physical sciences as the basis for philosophical
understanding. Like Aristotle, observation teaches us the basics of what we need to know in
order to understand the higher brain function activities like morality and politics.
Mathematics: Rationalists think that mathematics provides the best basis of philosophical
exploration. Like Aristotle, the rationalists see logic and morality and such as based in the
certain and demonstrable (you know, like theorems and proofs) principles provided by the
abstract universal concepts.
So we have to take a moment and ponder the effect of such beliefs.
Pascal
More than just a programming language, and worth far more than this passing reference,
Blaise Pascal was a thinker. Located in France he is part of what some call the Continentals,
meaning he was not an English thinker, once again reinforcing the English us-against-them
insecurity. He helped invent the mechanical calculator, showing that the principles of math
contained in the human machine were viable outside of that in a human-made machine.
Obviously in the math-provides-basis-for-thought camp, some might leave him out of the
philosophical camp. I place him within our pantheon because he shows the fine line between
science and philosophy which comes about from the search for unifying theories. His random
phenomena theories (probability theory) have influenced economic and political theory. Isaac
Asimov even uses it in his psycho-historical system contained within his Foundation Trilogy,
where mathematics can be used to map out (and predict) human activity at a societal level.
Once again we see the tendency away from the medieval/scholastic trend and the
placement of understanding within the human to the point that it is predicative. On a personal
authorial note, Pascal, in his short life, would not have ultimately seen himself as a humanist.
He abandoned (mostly) science for faith, though his unifying tendencies still led him to
propose theories while at the same time writing spiritual tracts.
Spinoza
Dutch, Jewish, Stoic, Baruch Spinoza, is placed in the niche of great Rationalists with
Descartes, and as a matter of fact started out by expounding upon the philosophy of
Descartes (with some minor improvements, of course). As an indication of his genius, after
struggling to find an appropriate way to present his rationalistic conviction that the universe
is a unitary whole, using the method of deductive reasoning and the precision of the Latin,
Spinoza wrote his philosophy in a geometrical form using Euclidean ideas.
This symbolic expression of ideas has a powerful influence on the thinking of
mathematics and the thinking of future philosophers.
So along that line he proposed both the necessary existence and the unitary nature of the
unique, single substance that comprises all of reality. Spinoza called this unifying
principle/being ‘god’ or ‘nature’, and he argued that its infinite attributes account for every
feature of the universe. This means that (because he is a rationalist) there are universals, and
(as a follower of Descartes’ rationalism) there are absolutes or certainties. And (because of
the rationalist/unitary nature of things) it is absolutely necessary for the two substances best
known to us, thought and extension, be paralleled in structure that we, with our similar dual
nature (mind and matter/extension), comprehend as the ideas and things which surround us in
our everyday world. From this he posits the possibility of genuine human knowledge, which
must be based ultimately on the coordination of these seemingly different contexts, which
though they seem different are the same. In other words, the knowledge of one guarantees the
correctness of the knowledge of the other.
Because of the importance of the mind, Spinoza develops a philosophy of the mind, from
which psychology takes a cue. Among other things, he discusses the mind and emotions,
which he sees as cognitive, that is, thought-based. Now this may sound odd, but remember,
there are innate ideas and everything flows rationally from the innate ideas, meaning that
emotions too follow the unbreakable unitary path.
In a final note on the death of the importance of the university system as noted previously,
private circulation of his philosophical treatises earned him quite a reputation throughout
Europe (similarly to Erasmus), but Spinoza so treasured his intellectual independence that he
declined to teach at the university at Heidelberg, preferring to continue his endeavors alone.
Leibniz
You might remember Gottfried Leibniz from an earlier discussion (Chapter 1) we had where
we mentioned the Identity of Indiscernibles. But we will not start there. Instead, in another nod
to computer geeks everywhere, as Pascal made calculating machines possible, Leibniz created
the binary system, which made computers possible.
In an odd turn within our skeptical world-view, Gottfried is also our best-of-all-worlds guy,
an optimist.
In another seemingly out of place nod to the scholastics, he centers much of his thought on
logic. In fact he thinks that logical principles are part of the innate knowledge we have. So once
again logic rears its head and like the hydra only produces more heads the more you hack at it.
Not to leave the search for unity behind, Leibniz proffers the idea of monads, the ultimate
elements of the universe. Monads are “substantial forms of being” (Monadology), each
monad having specific properties like being eternal, not decomposing, individual, subject to
their own, self-directed laws, (and because they are individual) non-interacting, ergo each
one reflecting the entire universe in a pre-established harmony. In a ‘no-causal zone’ monads
act as the centers of force (substance is force, while space, matter, and motion are merely
phenomenal),i.e. they supply the ‘cause’, so in a sense they are the reason we see motion.
Okay, finally that other thing. The two principles we discussed earlier are actually part of
a larger set of principles, seven to be exact, known, in true engineering tradition, as ‘The
Principles’.
1. Identity/Contradiction: Logically, if a proposition is true, then its negation is false
and vice versa (duh).
2. Identity of Indiscernibles: This is the paring down of something until it is
undistinguishable from another thing, that is, all of their properties are identical,
meaning that the things themselves are for all practical purposes the same. Another
way to look at it is that two things are identical if and only if they share the same and
only the same properties.
3. Sufficient Reason: The acceptance of a premise because at this point no reasonable
argument can be made against it. Alternately, there must be a sufficient reason for
anything even to exist for it to exist.
4. Pre-established harmony: “[T]he appropriate nature of each substance brings it
about that what happens to one corresponds to what happens to all the others, without,
however, their acting upon one another directly.” (Discourse on Metaphysics, XIV) In
other words, the effects of something happening happen internally and are not the
effect of an outside compulsion.
5. Continuity: Nature does not leave gaps.
6. Optimism: A thing is the best of all things it could be.
7. Plenitude: If this is truly the best of all worlds, then all possibilities exists, even
though we mere mortals are unable to comprehend them.
List 10: Leibniz’s Principles
These principles guide all thinking, and they show the ‘practical’ side to Leibniz’s
thinking, that is, rational thought is very simple and clear, and is therefore better. “Reality
cannot be found except in One single source, because of the interconnection of all things with
one another….I do not conceive of any reality at all as without genuine unity.”
(Philosophical Writings)
Vico
Giambattista Vico was an Italian professor whose contributions may not be as large as the
others mentioned here, but do require a moment of our attention. He was not as concerned
with the big questions and in fact he thought that realms of verifiable truth and human
concern share only a slight overlap. Still, as a rationalist, he felt that reasoning is required in
equal measure on the questions of both spheres (basically, let God take care of the things
God needs to take care of and let us focus on the rest, using our God given intellect and
powers of reason to divine – no pun intended – maybe – to understand what God’s plan is for
all of those other things).
His big catch-phrase, verum esse ipsum factum (truth is itself a fact) was designed to
remind all thinkers that there are some basic facts from which we work.
Vico also sought a unified theory of things, but it was more along the lines of human
behavior. He explored the convergence of history, from the one side, and the more systematic
social sciences, from the other, so that their interpenetration could form a single science of
humanity.
Berkeley
George Berkeley is a favorite of rationalists everywhere. Not that he was a rationalist, he
was every bit a Locke empiricist. He is a favorite because he is empiricism to the extreme, or
as some, my daughter included, prefers to think of as crazy.
Now we know not to pronounce such verdicts (at least before the evidence is in). So let us
take a quick look. Berkeley was a man of the cloth who proposed the idea of immaterialism,
or the thinking that if our senses produce all our reality and we can only therefore really
know sensations of reality, then perhaps the ‘reality’ we perceive through our senses, or at
least the abstractions we make based on our sensations really does not need to exist.
Okay, maybe that was a bit obtuse, but we know that empiricists thought that useless ideas
were, well useless and therefore unnecessary, the same goes for ideas like ‘matter’. What is
the point? We can only perceive things and then only the perception of them not the thing
itself, so what need is there of such things (and can we even prove they exist)? All we have
proof of is our perception of things.
Simply put, the theory contends that ideas are dependent upon being perceived by minds
for their very existence, as shown in the mirror of Descartes’ adage, esse est percipi (to be is
to be perceived).
Not only does this show some of the difference between rationalism and empiricism but
this really makes perfect sense in the empirical model, and does have some bearing on the
discussion to come.
Astell
Feminist is a modern word we use to distinguish uppity women from non-uppity
women46. Mary Astell is not a philosopher per se, but she, like the printing press, has some
small mention in our journey. The Wikipedia article puts it best so I’ll just steal, er, quote it
“Her two most well known books, A Serious Proposal to the Ladies, for the Advancement of
Their True and Greatest Interest (1694) and A Serious Proposal, Part II (1697), outline
Astell's plan to establish a new type of institution for women to assist in providing women
with both religious and secular education. Astell suggests extending women's career options
beyond mother and nun. Astell wanted all women to have the same opportunity as men to
spend eternity in heaven with God, and she believed that for this they needed to be educated
46
Ha, ha – as if we could distinguish the two…what? Ouch! Yes ma’am….
and to understand their experiences. The 'nunnery' style education she proposed would enable
women to live in a protected environment, without the influences of the external patriarchal
society.
Her proposal was never adopted because critics said it seemed ‘too Catholic’ for the
English. Later her ideas about women were satirized by the writer Jonathan Swift. Despite
this, she was still an intellectual force in London's educated classes.”
So what? Well the thought that women were made the same as men and deserved the
same place in heaven was never questioned, but then it was never thought about either. The
meaning being that most of this thinking we have been discussing really was not directed at
women (a mind and a soul? That’s nice dear). As I said, with the advent of printing, all sorts
of crazy ideas start popping up.
Actually we begin to see a rise in and the development of female intellectuals (as almost
normative) during this period, but certainly accepted only in higher, perhaps one should say
rarified, circles.
Putting It Together
Publishing brought a wide range of thinkers and cultures together. Science and philosophy
become the new bedfellows, science pushing out theology like the ant who calls out ‘roll
over’. Still, that does not mean that faith has left the room (it is merely laying on the floor at
the side of the bed). Roman Catholicism does not die out with the rejection of scholasticism,
and the trend toward faith alone denominations is not hampered by the movement toward
intellectualism. Even though we have moved into the ‘modern’ period matters of faith are
still discussed and influence/are influenced by the intellectual movements, as we could see if
we read any of these thinkers.
Many of the intellectual trends which develop during this century are the foundation for
most of the thought we easily recognize. Bound up too is much of the science and religion we
have today, which are the expressions of the scholarly developments laid out here.
Perhaps now you get not only a better feel for the concepts like the Identity of
Indiscernibles, but also their development.
“So, anyway, Descartes goes into a bar and sits down. He’s looking pretty glum so the bartender says, ‘Can
I get you anything?’ Descartes replies ‘I think not,’ and disappears.”
Second oldest Descartes joke
Chapter 39
The Fight Of The Century
We see, we feel, we know things by accessing them (just watch how a baby learns about
things by putting them in her mouth), yet there are things which we mentally perceive which
have no solid matter about them, and which we say we know. Another way to frame this fight
is what is sufficient to help us to understand and know? Epistemology is not something new,
in fact we have discussed it again and again, every time we talk about ‘how/what do/can we
know’.
Here it is but is it a TKO? We have looked at two examples, Empiricism and Rationalism.
Being a rationalist, Descartes holds that knowledge can be achieved through reason. Locke as
the empiricist maintains that only through experience can a person have knowledge about
something. So here we are once again: innate ideas existing prior to concrete experience vs.
tabula rasa; a priori versus a posteriori. Let’s get ready to rummmmmmblllllllllle!
Past Champions
Epistemology is not really a new thing, but it is the major focus of this time. Take a
moment and try to classify some of the thinkers we have looked at as either empiricists or
rationalists, Locke and Descartes aside, of course.
Thinker
Camp
Pythagoras
Plato
Aristotle
Epicurus
Stoics
Augustine
Aquinas
Exercise 6: Who Thought What?
And now, on with the fight!
In This Corner, Wearing Visually Stunning Trunks…
The Empiricist: Weighing in on the side of the body and the physical world, Empiricists
have amazing footwork that states knowledge is derived from experience (either sensed via the
five senses or reasoned via the brain or mind from experience) and that there is no such thing as
innate knowledge.
And In This Corner, Wearing Practical Trunks…
The Rationalist: Weighing in on the side of the mind and abstract ideas, Rationalists have an
effective jab stating that there is innate knowledge and that sensual experience and idea building
is flawed and therefore cannot be relied upon to produce valid knowledge.
Round One
First punch thrown by Empiricism to the head:
Kiss It: Compared to Empiricism, Rationalism has one more entity that has to exist
along with matter and mind: Innate knowledge. Add to that, innate knowledge is
unobservable and inefficacious; that is, it does not do anything. The knowledge may
sit there, never being used, so if it serves no purpose why would it exist? Using
Ockham’s Razor (KISS, remember), Empiricism is the better theory.
Rationalism counters with a blow to the solar plexus:
Poor Little Rich Boy: Ah, but if experience is all there is, it cannot accomplish all
that we do. Three year olds use language in ways that they are not explicitly (read
experientially) taught. For example, they form original sentences from words that
they haven’t heard put together in precisely that way before. Also, they start to
understand grammatical rules before they even know what a noun or a verb is. If we
can only say what we’ve heard said by others, how can three year olds speak as well
as they do? You have only managed to deliver a poverty of stimulus (i.e. there is not
enough experiential stimulus to account for the result). You may think that
Rationalism is strange, but it does a better job of explaining this problem than
Empiricism. In a return Ockham’s Razor we ask, “Which theory explains the
phenomena better?”
Empiricism, somewhat up against the ropes throws a Rabbit Punch to the torso:
Ultimate Triumph of Science: Much of science is founded on empiricist principles, and
would not have advanced without it. If we base our conclusions about the world on
empiricism, we can change our theories and improve upon them and see our
mistakes. A rationalist seems to have to say that we’ve discovered innate knowledge
and then be embarrassed if they’re ever wrong (“Nature abhors a vacuum”).
Rationalism blocks:
On What Basis: Locke says that our experiences tell us about the nature of reality,
but how can we ever check our experience with what reality really is, in order to
know that, if we only understand it from the experience of it, which is based in
possibly flawed information? We have to rely on reason to do that.
Empiricism, off the ropes, bobs and weaves:
The Reality of the Physical World: How would you know what the color blue looks
like if you were born blind? The only way to come to have the idea of blue is to
experience it with your senses.
The Reality of Imagination and Experience: How can we get the idea of perfect
squareness? We can extrapolate from our experience with crooked and misaligned,
sensible squares and use our imagination to straighten out what is crooked and see what
perfect squareness is.
Rationalism Throws Two Lefts:
The Reality of Innate Math and Logic: Is it not obvious that mathematical and
logical truths are true not because of our five senses, but because of reason’s ability to
connect ideas which do not necessarily come from experience?
The Reality of Innate Morality: How do we get a sense of what right and wrong are
with our five senses? Since we cannot experience things like justice, human rights,
moral duties, moral good and evil with our five senses, what can the empiricist’s ethical
theory be based in? Locke says experience can provide us with data to show what is
morally right and wrong? How can we understand perfection from imperfection without
rational, logical thought?
The Bell Rings.
Round Two
Empiricism opens with a One/Two uppercut combination:
No Real Evidence of Innate Knowledge: If one approaches a problem only rationally,
with no external data to support it, and relying only on mistaken internal concepts, then
one is bound to fall into error from which one cannot recover. Remember that bruise we
gave you earlier? For example, some medieval rationalists claimed that the notion of a
vacuum was rationally absurd and hence it was impossible for one to exist. However,
empirically we have shown that it is possible. Reason is not the only way to discover
the truth about a matter.
Can 500 Frenchmen be wrong?: At least one can for sure! Rationalists claim that there
is innate knowledge that gives us fundamental truths about reality, but even among
rationalists (e.g., Plato, who believes in reincarnation and Forms and Descartes, who
does not believe in either but does believe in a soul), there is disagreement about the
nature of reality, the self, etc. How can this be, if there is innate knowledge of these
things?
Rationalism crying out ‘cut me’ plows back into the ring swinging:
Imagination Is Not Creativity: According to Empiricism, you can combine things,
separate them, and nothing else. By not allowing for flaws in sense experience, you
undermine the very skepticism which drives you. With Rationalism, we come to
experience with ready-made tools for creativity. Plato would say that we’re in touch
with abstract, immutable realities, which provide lots of material with which to create.
No Freedom Of Spirit!: By your reasoning, human beings can be controlled and
manipulated exceptionally easily because there are no objective measuring sticks,
nothing within us which gives us a sense of right or wrong or even of ourselves. If we
are nothing other than what we experience, then we can be made to do whatever we’re
taught. Rationalism allows for an invariable core (call it “human nature”) that refuses to
be manipulated, which is what makes us unique.
The referee calls time with both fighters hanging on the ropes.
Round Three
Apparently the first two rounds show no clear winner, so a new strategy is called for.
Perhaps it is time for the objective judge to add up the points and come to a clear decision.
Point one: So just what is the source of knowledge? Empiricists claim that sense
experience is the ultimate starting point for all our knowledge. The senses give us all our raw
data about the world and this raw data makes up the sum and whole of all knowledge.
Perception gives us the building blocks to begin to build a domicile of knowledge and
beliefs. So, in its purest form, empiricism holds that sense experience alone is the genesis of
all our beliefs and all our knowledge; the senses are the active constructors and reason
merely plays the part of a passive operator. Rationalists claim that reason is the ultimate
starting point for all knowledge. Without some sort of prior existing categories and principles
supplied by reason, we couldn't organize and interpret our sense experience in any way. We
would be faced (like a two-year old with sensory overload) with just one huge,
undifferentiated, cacophony of sensation, a tale told by an idiot, signifying nothing47.
Rationalism, in its purest form, holds that all our rational beliefs, indeed, the entirety of
human knowledge, consists in first principles and innate concepts that are (somehow)
generated and certified by reason, along with anything logically deducible from these first
principles. Reason then, is an active participant and the senses are mere rubes of information.
Oh wait. So the real fight is one of origin, and there really is no other foundation. Locke
calls it a blank slate, a place free from prejudices and muddled misconceptions. This clean
room of the mind means that like all good molecules, ideas will bond naturally to the things
they can bond too, without some artificial rationalization duct tape trying to force them
unnaturally together (especially in a vacuum, ha! Take that one rationalism48). The machine
of the body follows the natural rules and does not stray (as does the mind). This means that
everything works as it should.
But then, Descartes also starts with a clean slate, though it is free from the flawed
observations and prejudices of muddled perceptions. Thought is the only pure form (as we
saw in Avicenna’s Flying Man in Chapter 30), as it is free from faulty external influences.
We think correctly because the parts of the machine mean that there can only be certain
thoughts which base all other thoughts.
So our origin, our prime mover, our first cause, is questioned by both sides, and the
conclusion is that the other side is wrong. If we limit this argument to present thinkers then
we know that the idea of origin is humanist based (i.e. internally), for the empiricist in
sensation, and for the rationalist in internal abstract principles; if we wander backwards a bit,
this distinction is not as clear, as the exercise above shows us. So, is it a question of the
origin of the origin? Are the earlier thinkers worried as much about this problem? Some
certainly are, though, even they are pretty certain about the boundaries within which the
question is asked, whereas these later thinkers are not given to such boundaries.
Regardless, if you think back to the woefully slim (yet appropriate) first discussion of this
idea of origin, we posited God and Physics as the prime movers (Chapter 4), both being
concepts for explaining first origins, with God as the sort of rationalist abstract principle and
Physics as the empirical world. In this present historical discussion, is that as true, or should
we ask, is it applicable? Has it been totally decided in the physical, that is, within the human
and so there is no need for the God (even though the abstracts of rationalism smack of the
God)?
If that is true, that there really is no God anymore, then we have to ask the question
between the two epistemologies: who decides the origin best. Can reason supply any mental
category or first principle at all? Some rationalists have claimed that we are born with several
fundamental concepts or categories in our minds ready for use. Examples might be certain
categories of space, of time, and of cause and effect. What viable first principle can the
physical world give us? Empiricists tell us that it is painfully obvious from the world around
us, that the innate ‘first principles’ are easily observable and therefore understandable (and
similarly are part and parcel of nature), albeit by some experimentation and the like. There
does not need to be any categories of innate knowledge because everything is the same,
works by the same principles, the same rules. The microcosm and the macrocosm are not
47
48
Once again, thank you, Mr. Shakespeare.
Referee deducts one point from empiricism for taking a cheap shot outside of a regulation round.
only intricately linked they are mirrors of one another (think of the nature of an atom and the
nature of the solar system, or a one-celled animal and a human).
This seems to leave behind some of the questions we were originally asking when we
posited cause and effect back in Chapter 4. Humans seem to naturally think in terms of cause
and effect, and this thinking helps to organize our experiences of the world and even our
vision of universal concepts. Okay then, point two: What about cause and effect? There is
implicitly a struggle of how we overcome this problem, especially if we are the origin and
the judge of knowledge. Certainly, the mechanistic view of the universe addresses this
problem (by abandoning it). But hey, were not the earlier arguments based in the observation
that some things seem to cause other things to happen; yet have we also seen arguments that
in terms of our raw sense experience, we just see certain things happen before other things,
and remember having seen such before-and-after sequences at earlier times and therefore are
merely and incorrectly associating them?
Let us go back to the Chapter 4 pool table example to which we have so dearly used, if not
over-used: do we really know what happened when we saw the ball roll through our field of
view? Let us look at it another way. A rock hits a window, and then the window breaks. We
assume that the rock broke the window but all we saw was a rock and a window, we did not
see a third thing called causation. We believe it has happened, that is, that the rock hitting the
window caused it to break. But this is not experienced like the flight of the rock or the
shattering of the glass.
Rationalist would say that experience does not seem to force the concept of causation on
us, we just use it to interpret what we experience. Cause and effect are categories that could
never be garnished from our experience and must therefore be brought to that experience by
our innate mental wiring, allowing us to attribute such a connection (take a short mental
break and chew on that). For its part, Empiricism does not feel the need to define this third
thing, and furthermore, feels that the definition of it is a waste of time. There is no causation,
there only is. There is a rock; there is physics which dictates its path because of the force
applied to the rock by the lever machine of the arm and the distribution of that force across
the window which breaks due to the tensile forces being overcome (though at the time they
would be more likely to argue that because of the mechanism of the universe the window just
knows it should break if something like this happens, but that is a knowledge for another
discussion).
Rationalist philosophers counter this by the claim that at the foundations of our knowledge
are propositions that are self-evident, or self-evidently true, just like the laws of the universe
put forth by the empiricists. However, these innate self-evident propositions have the strange
property of being such that, on merely understanding it, and without any further checking or
special evidence of any kind, we can just intellectually ‘see’ that it is true. like any surface
that is red is colored or the classic, A is greater than B, and B is greater than C, then A is
greater than C. It is just obvious. Once these statements are understood, it takes no further
sense experience whatsoever to see that they are true. This, of course, makes empiricists
apoplectic.
Putting It Together
Is there really a fight? It seems that in many ways, the bases of the ideas are similar, and
that it is the conclusions drawn from them which are wildly different. The Empiricists work
hard to define a world based on scientific observation, where our God-given gifts of sense
and mind come together to understand internally an external pre-defined world. Rationalists
work hard to allow the God-given mental gifts to apply meaning on an un-defined world.
So, the final decision?
We can probably say that Descartes did not completely succeed in perfecting the by
reason alone argument. Still, Rationalism has remained a seductive idea for those attracted to
mathematics and to the intricate beauty of unified theories and a strictly ordered world, but it
has never been made to work as a practical matter, because there are just too many loopholes.
Still it was worth a try.
But Empiricism suffers a like fate. It's easy to see how empiricism has been able to
similarly win over many converts. Take a moment and try to identify a belief that you have
that didn't come your way by means of some sense experience — sight, hearing, touch, smell,
or taste, some sort of interaction with something external. It is somewhat difficult. It's
natural, then, to come to believe that the senses are the sole source and ultimate grounding of
belief. It is almost the faith alone argument.
Hold the presses! If all that is the case, then what is the question? It really boils down to
understanding some middle ground. What about those beliefs that cannot be read off sense
experience, or proved from any perception that we might be able to have or those
experiences in life for which we are unable to rationally explain them away? There is a knock
at the door, wait a chapter and I’ll go answer it.
“To put it more simply: [Rationalists are] those who joined the [mystics] by abandoning reality—and
[Empiricists] those who clung to reality, by abandoning their mind.” Ayn Rand: For the New Intellectual
Chapter 40
‘Modern’ Philosophy
Modern is one of those terms which is outdated the moment you apply it and for that
reason I quote it. When people want to seem progressive they use words like modern and
out-of-date49 and lapse into a kind of historicalism, where either my time is better than your
old time or that the good old days were better than today. The same thing happened to art, but
that is another lesson. Anyway, we still consider ourselves in the post-modern (see the
problem?) philosophical environment, that is, a direct result of the modern period, but we
have to keep coming up with new names to describe the ‘period’ which is child-of-yetseparate-from the ‘modern’ period.
Well part of the problem as we are beginning to see is the blurring of lines between what
most would call science (science, political science, psychology, etc.) and what we still call
philosophy. Recall our discussion in Chapter 1, where we talked about the muddled
understanding of what constitutes philosophy; well, welcome to its roots.
Alright, let us move on. If Descartes is the father of modern philosophy50, then there must
be some children right?51
The Players
Dates
1689-1755
1711-1776
1712-1778
1723-1790
1724-1804
1744-1803
1748-1832
1762-1814
1770-1831
Philosophers
Main Points
French; political philosophy of the separation of powers
Scottish; Empiricist; naturalism and material causes;
David Hume
influenced Kant and Adam Smith
Swiss; the basis of morality is conscience, not reason
Jean-Jacques Rousseau
English; sympathy is the basis for moral action; wealth is
Adam Smith
not money but added value
German; critical and systematic philosophy; the
Immanuel Kant
Categorical Imperative
German; reconcile sentiment and reason; philology
Johann Herder
(language)
English; Utilitarianism
Jeremy Bentham
German; Idealism; social origin of self-consciousness;
Johann Fichte
bridges Kant and Hegel; practical reason
German; rationalist; extends Kant;
thesis/antithesis/synthesis; philosophy can save
Georg Wilhelm Hegel
humanity
Table 27: The 'Modern' Players
Montesquieu
Some Pun On The German Enlightenment
The Enlightenment took place in various forms in various areas; that is to say, that the
English and the Continent approached it from different ways to somewhat different results. If
49
Though, to their credit, they could be talking about milk.
Not sure who the mother is, probably necessity, the mother of so many things.
51
Though some might consider them bastards, especially students in exams.
50
we want to look at this in terms of ‘schools’, the Continent can probably be split further into
the French, the Germans, and everybody else.
So why is this important? Well the German cast on things begins to dominate thinking. It
differed from the enlightenment movements in other parts of Europe as Germany did not
have the economic, political and religious friction which characterized the other groups. For
the Germans the movement lead to a cultural and then national unity and sense of identity, as
well as greater freedom of the press and an enhanced judicial system. Overall, the German
Enlightenment helped to develop German philosophy, which primarily differed from French
philosophy in that Germans rejected empiricism and embraced a kind of mysticism. The
Germans really saw this as defining who they were, and many of the writers would provide
fodder for later, shall we say less tolerant movements.
This German mystique, if we want to call it that, is the main difference between the
Germans and everyone else. There becomes an identification of ‘German’ with this
‘thought’.
Empiricism And The East
Not to seem to digress (any more than we already have) but some time back we asked the
question of whether or not someone similar to Aristotle had arisen in the East. We will take a
small moment here to re-examine that question. Chinese empirical science, developed by the
School of Principle group of Neo-Confucianists (especially Chu Hsi 1130-1200), is probably
closest to European empiricism, though there are some rationalist elements as well. They
championed a unified theory path where the universe operated by a single principle which
emanated from the Great Ultimate, a kind of all-encompassing principle, and that principle
operating through the material force explained all phenomena. Humans could understand that
principle by studying anything for the human mind is perfectly identical with the Universal
Mind or Universal Principle. Because this principle is innate in all things: one's mind,
biology, politics, or whatever, empirical study of a particular phenomenon would (to the
discerning mind) reveal the principle at work in the universe.
As later in the West, the result was many advances in knowledge and invention (more so
than just the curiosities of earlier times). In the end, the comparison once again fails because
the focus of the knowledge; while this group is similar to Aristotle (though more ‘unified’)
they are different than the Europeans because of the integration of knowledge and empirical
study.
The Body Politic
Not surprisingly during the period, as we have seen, there is a rise in what are strictly
thought of (historically) as political and moral philosophers. Now, we know that any
academic end is often the leaf of some basic philosophical thought. Politics and morality are
often the result of a basic philosophical view of the world, which give rise to and are often
the rational for certain understandings of human interaction and governments (as we saw
with Hobbes and Locke). And at this time the discussion of what constitutes government are
burgeoning. So know that there are many more political thinkers than are dreamt up in this
philosophy session, Horatio.
As a slight aside, for us today (and even during this time) that becomes the thing.
Philosophy becomes a way of thinking about living and less of a way of thoughtful living.
Politics and morality philosophy become cerebral exercises in theory and political science
and ethics become the practicum. Me thinks Aristotle would be aghast and Socrates would
reach for a second round of hemlock.
Montesquieu
Charles-Louis de Secondat, baron de La Brède et de Montesquieu. I was once asked if
philosophers were funny, and I said only when mocking other philosophers. This guy breaks
the mold. Extremely witty and droll, he proffers a political philosophy also worthy of
mention. In his Persian Letters he devised a sort of Screwtape commentary of how European
customs must look to those on the outside. He also manages to, like Thomas More before
him, set forth his thoughts in the work such as the inability of humans to attain the goal either
of self-knowledge or virtue.
Not to beat a dead horse but like most thinkers at this time God creates nature and its laws
and having done so, wanders off playing no further role52. He does articulate one distinction
which most of the other thinkers only imply. There are God-made laws which govern nature
(physical) and human-made laws which govern conduct (positive). Unlike physical laws,
which are instituted and sustained by God, positive laws and social institutions are created by
fallible human beings who are “subject ... to ignorance and error, [and] hurried away by a
thousand impetuous passions” (The Spirit of the Laws 1.1).
The key, then, to understanding different laws and social systems is to recognize that they
are/should be adapted to a variety of different factors, and cannot be properly understood
unless one considers them in this light. Specifically, laws should be adapted “to the people
for whom they are framed..., to the nature and principle of each government, ... to the climate
of each country, to the quality of its soil, to its situation and extent, to the principal
occupation of the natives, whether husbandmen, huntsmen or shepherds: they should have
relation to the degree of liberty which the constitution will bear; to the religion of the
inhabitants, to their inclinations, riches, numbers, commerce, manners, and customs. In fine,
they have relations to each other, as also to their origin, to the intent of the legislator, and to
the order of things on which they are established; in all of which different lights they ought to
be considered” (The Spirit of the Laws 1.3). What this means is that things which are
legitimate in one culture may on the surface be incomprehensible to another. Yet, when we
consider legal and social systems in relation to these various factors, we will find that many
laws and institutions that had seemed puzzling or even perverse are in fact quite
comprehensible. Humans and human society are really the yardstick by which we measure
the morality of law and actions, and the absolute, immutable and universal physical laws
really do not play into morality.
Oh, and did I fail to mention in our little stroll through American political philosophy that
this was the guy who saw despotism as a constant danger for any government (not already
under the thumb of a despot), and argued that it could best be curtailed by a system in which
different bodies exercised executive, legislative, and judicial power, and all those bodies be
bound by the rule of law. As is obvious, this structuring of the powers had an enormous
influence on the framers of the Constitution.
Rousseau
52
Well, not technically dead, we have not gotten to Nietzsche yet.
Eventually, there is a backlash to over-emphasizing the rational aspects or the intellectual
aspects of the human. Somewhat complicated and ambiguous, Rousseau's general philosophy
tried to grasp an emotional and passionate side of man which he felt was left out of most
previous philosophical thinking.
In his early works, Rousseau contended that man is basically good, a ‘noble savage’ when
in the ‘state of nature’ which is basically the natural order for animals and for humans before
the creation of civilization and society. The problem is that good people are made unhappy
and corrupted by their experiences in society which he viewed as “artificial” and “corrupt”.
Any enhancement or furthering of civilization and society only compounds that unhappiness.
Rousseau's essay, Discourse on the Arts and Sciences, argued that the advancement of art
and science had not been beneficial to mankind. He proposed that the progress of knowledge
had made governments more powerful, and crushed individual liberty. From this he
concluded that so-called ‘progress’ had actually undermined the possibility of sincere
friendship, replacing it with jealousy, fear and suspicion.
In a kind of opposition to Montesquieu, one of the primary principles of Rousseau's
political philosophy is that politics and morality should not be separated. When a state fails to
act in a moral fashion, it ceases to function in the proper manner and ceases to exert genuine
authority (or as Locke would say, legitimate) over the individual. The second important
principle is freedom which, in a familiar sounding ring, the state is created to preserve. In
opposition to Locke though, he thought that the social contract surrenders the individual's
rights to the community in return for protection.
Smith
We all think we know Adam Smith’s works and thought. Let us shift them from economic
theory to the realm of philosophy. As a moral philosopher, Smith does not see money as the
basis of interaction but ‘value’, in the sense we might use ‘value added’. So there is a
distribution of ‘wealth’ based on the ‘value’ one brings to the production. The ‘value’ of a
commodity (and that is defined not just by the end product) is the amount of labor that it
commands, more work is more value.
Simplistically speaking (as if that were something new) everyone gets paid by what they
bring to the table, so free competition and free trade are essential; everyone must be able to
get to the table. Now, that does not mean that just because you come to the table you get
something. Competition works for the common good (“invisible hand of the market” idea),
because the value of a commodity will increase either through innovation or volume.
Every commodity deserves reward, and surplus value is a legitimate reward when
innovation or volume produces it. In other words, the brains of the operation who do not
seem to ‘produce’ anything, are just as valued and part of that value is the surplus. So
everyone works together to produce things from which everyone benefits.
Herder
Johann Herder brings a different kind of view to the table. He felt that pure rationalism
produced an unfeeling, cold world. Abstract theorizing weakens sentiments (feeling,
empathy) generally, and hence moral sentiments in particular. The rationalists’ theories are
wrong, nay implausible even. They bring morality itself into disrepute, because if the experts
cannot agree, then morality must certainly be a sham, and I may as well ignore it and do as I
please. Their reasoning keeps people from recognizing, and working to reinforce, the real
foundations of morality: not an imaginary theoretical insight of some sort, but a set of causal
mechanisms for teaching and sustaining moral sentiments. Instead of trying to reconcile this,
Herder turns instead to discovering theoretically and then promoting in practice just such a
set of causal mechanisms.
Along these lines, if one is to teach, then thought is essentially dependent on, and bounded
in scope by, language — i.e. one can only think if one has a language, and one can only think
what one can express linguistically. Meanings or concepts are to be equated with the usages
of words. Language and meaning are not bound up in some abstract way as say Aristotle
talked about them, but strictly by their use, that is, we use the words we use to get across the
meaning we want.
This all comes from Herder's quasi-empiricist theory of concepts. Conceptualization is
intimately bound up with (perceptual and affective) sensation. More precisely, sensation is
the source and basis of all our concepts (not the innate concepts of the rationalists), but we
are able to achieve non-empirical concepts by means of a sort of metaphorical extension from
the empirical ones — so that all of our concepts ultimately depend in one way or another on
sensation. This is different than pure empiricism, because the mechanism for understanding
these rarer concepts is not merely a piling on and extrapolation from existing experience.
What this involves is a somewhat rational, linguistic symbology where meaning comes not
from the sum of our experiences but also from concepts we can extend from other concepts
(like reading Aesop’s fables).
Finally we see that Herder is ripe for puns which I have so graciously avoided, but which
upon my mentioning it, are now stuck in your head.
Bentham
Bentham's general philosophy is really nothing radical, and like others here, combines
some earlier ideas which we have seen. That said, it does articulate ideas which, we shall see,
become very popular.
First, human nature is governed by two fundamental motivations: seeking pleasure and
avoiding pain. Again, nothing earth-shattering and we have seen it in Hobbes. It really is all
about me and people really only come together out of selfish self-interest, basically masking
the selfishness with ‘altruism’. He pooh-poohed earlier thinkers and the ideas of natural
rights and such calling such thinking a “perversion of language”,
“ambiguous,”
“sentimental” and “figurative”, pushing instead a rational reward-punishment kind of system
of laws.
The ramifications of that are that moral values are based on the principle of utility: every
action has to be judged based on how it augments or diminishes happiness, which means that
the moral character of an action is relative to the perceived happiness or pain it causes.
Again, similar to Epicurus but different. He expressed it as “the greatest happiness for the
greatest number of people”. Sound familiar?
Hume, Kant, And Hegel
Talk about your horsemen of the Apocalypse (and we will).
Putting It Together
Perhaps it can be argued that original thinking is dead. The big questions are answered by
various systems and all we are doing now is haggling over the motes and fighting over the
scraps or worse, being reduced to talking about talking. Sort of gives some legitimacy to
Marcus Aurelius’ divisions, eh?
In the end, what we do see is the foundations of modern society, the industrial revolution,
scientific and political progress. The next thinkers really push the epistemological envelope
and give some depth and direction to the broad thinking of this time.
So take a moment and go back and reflect over these guys and postulate what each brings
to the table. If the rules have been established, what further explanations or understandings
are gleaned from further discussion? What effect do you think they have on the thinkers to
come?
Chapter 41
Hume
Welcome to David Hume, a Scotsman of great ambition who pushed Locke’s empiricism
to its limits. Okay this is a fairly short lesson and he seems a bit out of place, but what makes
him important to us and worthy of some individual mention is that he influences our next
denizen Kant (not necessarily in a good way) as well as hammering out some pretty
interesting and provocative ideas.
Hume-idity
By way of padding, Hume was of course, precocious as a child, attending university at age
twelve. His father died when he was very young and his mother undertook the task of
educating all of her children, sensing especially in him (at least according to his
autobiography) an extraordinary curiosity, talent and drive. Now, in terms of that, when I
called him ambitious earlier, it is because his ambition to be a permanent student tied nicely
into his ambition to re-write all of philosophy. But, as sometimes happens with ambition,
reality can get in the way. Still he did manage to right his course, abandon useless nonphilosophical jobs and begin to publish (sometimes anonymously) influential works of
philosophy.
Sure, many of Hume's contemporaries denounced his thinking as reeking of skepticism
and atheism, but he awakened Kant from his “dogmatic slumbers”. His influence is evident
in his close friend Adam Smith’s economic and moral philosophy. Jeremy Bentham said that
he “caused the scales to fall” from his eyes. Charles Darwin touted Hume as a major
influence. So I think we can safely say that while his empiricism is evident, he is a major
hitter in many of the thoughts we take for granted. Still, there is debate as to whether that rewriting philosophy ambition ever really reached fruition.
An Exercise In Exercising Futility
Why re-write all of Western philosophy? According to Hume it had reached an all-time
low so he set about the arduous and thankless task to correct that by deconstructing it and remaking it in his own image. Starting subtly, he proposed that we “cultivate true metaphysics
with some care, in order to destroy the false and adulterate” (Enquiry Concerning Human
Understanding, 12), that is, what he saw as lies and misleading thinking in current
philosophical systems. He appeals first to what many might think of as the normal foundation
of philosophy, but what he does next alarms most people. When he elaborates on what ‘true
metaphysics’ is, it turns out not to be the classical understanding of metaphysics, but a new
way of looking at what it means to philosophize, and a total abandonment of metaphysics.
First, he attacks rationalism (of course), arguing for an abandoning of the a priori
theoretical explanations that are supposed to give us insight into the ultimate nature of
reality. To him, things like physics are impossible, because they are theoretical and therefore
useless. Not surprisingly he wants to replace this ‘unintelligible’ theorizing with an empirical
inquiry that answers questions about “the science of human nature”.
He ironically does this didactically by describing the ways in which philosophy operates,
or at least how it has come to operate. He states that there have been two camps of human
nature observers, those (and you know who you are) that look on humans as active creatures,
and those (ditto) who regard humans as reasonable creatures. The first see humans as driven
by desires and feelings and “influenced…by taste and sentiment,” engaging in some
activities and avoiding others according to their perceived value (so we can see in here the
pain/pleasure camp and its iterations). These are the folks whose metaphysics champion
virtue as the greatest human pursuit and who attempt “to excite and regulate our sentiments”
in order to “bend our hearts to the love of probity and true honor.” They make us feel what
they say about our feelings, and what they say is so useful and agreeable that ordinary people
jump at the notions they put forth. Think of it this way: How did Socrates set about to
convince people of what was knowledge?
Alternatively, those who regard humans as reasonable focus on our understanding of
things and of the ‘big picture’ (universals; we can of course see the rationalists here). This
will drive us to act correctly and make good judgments, once we understand the workings of
the world (later on virtue is not such a big deal, as it is less of an option and more of a given).
These philosophers study human nature “to find those principles, which regulate our
understanding, excite our sentiments, and make us approve or blame any particular object,
action, or behavior.” They tell us that our innate knowledge is designed to “fix, beyond
controversy, the foundations of morals, reasoning, and criticism.” That is, give a solid
foundation from which to operate. Universals give the meaning from which we understand
the specific instance but they argue from the instance out to the universal (“push on their
enquiries to principles more general”) until they arrive at “those original principles, by
which, in every science, all human curiosity must be bounded” (Enquiry Concerning Human
Understanding, 6). This over-puffs up reason and appeals to it in its emphasis on speculation
and abstract argument, to the detriment of the true understanding of humans, which is of
course, sensible beings. This too appeals to the ego and vanity of humanity.
Wait, he says. So, apparently there is a problem with both of them. Hmmm. What to
do…hmmm. Not shy he comes in for the kill. Metaphysics, he boldly contends, has so far
been based on wispy sentimentalism or unyielding and cold rationalism and for those reasons
should be rejected (per empiricism’s rule of the useless), and a new understanding put in its
place. As said, he proposes that it is an empirical inquiry not an a priori one (surprise),
making it a genuine alternative to the empty and useless speculations of earlier philosophical
approaches. This radically different approach, this “mental geography” or “anatomy of the
mind” as he calls it, is an anti-metaphysical alternative to previous, classical ways of
theorizing about human nature. We can see how some might find this alternative distasteful;
alternately we can see how some might see it as pure genius. We can also see how this has an
influence on the perception of philosophy (or at least metaphysics at this time) as purely
speculative or fluff.
Come Together, Right Now…Over Me….
Okey-dokey. Impressive. So how does that play out? As we have pointed out before, in
this sense philosophy is becoming thought of as less of a science in itself and, as idle
speculation, should be replaced by science (non-idle speculation?). Where does that leave
thinking and how does one accomplish the task of empirical enquiry? What tools do we have
which can get us there? Who will lead us?
First, like any good empiricist, Hume reasserts that all ideas come from perception,
induction is not always right, the rational scientific method does not always lead to truth (at
least a truth worth worrying about), blah, blah, blah. Okay, good enough. Hume is not
satisfied to stay there and begins to look at the ramification of all of that. His conclusion?
Well, frankly in the interest of time, the one that jumps out at us is that the human mind is
merely a bundle of inter-related mental events. That is to say, for Hume, the mind, is just a
concept, a convenient way of talking about how we combine perceptions together (think of
the nominalism of Abelard). The thing we think of a ‘Mind’ is a set of perceptions or ideas
created from perceptions. Our mental life is merely a series of thoughts, feelings, and
sensations. In fact even the understanding of ‘self’ is an illusion, a collection of perceptions
about things which we combine together and think of as our ‘self’.
Building on our earlier political discussion think of the self like a republic. Members have
an independent life within the republic and the members of the republic change all the time
but are (loosely) united by a common constitution. The identity of the republic is provided
not by its fleeting and mutable contents but by the causal relationship that holds its members
together. The self is a story that we construct in order to define what binds these events
together. Like the mind then, it is merely a convenient way of thinking about how all of these
things come together.
Now, What Caused You To Think That Was True?
So if everything is just floating around, then where does he get off telling us it is a causal
relationship? That is simple! There really is no question of what would constitute its basis,
since empiricism rocks, right? Correct. Well, like our definition of what constitutes
metaphysics, we only have to re-think it to make it so. Experience determines our belief in
cause and effect. In a reflection of the earlier Islamic thinker Algazali (Chapter 30), causality
is probability not certainty. What that means is that the connection between the two events
exists in the mind of the observer, not necessarily between the two events. So since I
perceived the cue ball rolling toward the other ball, and the other ball starts moving after it is
perceived to be touched by the cue ball, my ‘mind’ puts them together, or should I say I put
them together in my ‘mind’ (woooo, subtle, Hume).
You Want Fries With That?
This associative vision, which is appropriately called associationism, becomes the basis
for how we operate (human nature). Hume breaks it down further by telling us that thought is
governed by two laws of association:
 Contiguity: ideas that occur frequently together get associated
 Resemblance: anything that is associated to an idea is also automatically associated to
any other similar idea (assigning similar behavior to similar things)
We can see how some of the earlier empirical thinking is coming together here. Starting
with the tabula rasa, we come to understand how things work by observation. Hume
extrapolates the inner workings of that (forgive me) relationship, refining it to just two forms
of association. This produces a certain serialization (connectedness and retention) of thought
and gives some legitimacy to the earlier empirical thinking, allowing for a flexible, creative
association of ideas, unbound by external rules (universals).
What is the side effect of this? Well, again in the empirical vein of no innate or universal
laws, since our knowledge is merely a string of associated sensations, there can be no
absolute truth: any belief is as justified as any other.
So How’s That Working For You?
By way of expounding on this, let us take a brief jaunt with Hume’s good friend Adam
Smith. Remember that competition works for the common good idea? There is some sort of
external force, which while not universal or absolute, is universally and absolutely there (c.f.
the mechanistic view of the universe). So the ‘invisible hand of the market’ guides and
compels individuals to action. That means that we will by nature work toward a common
goal, it is just that my way of doing it can be different than yours because of the associative
events which we have compiled together into our world view53.
We can also see it in his idea of value. Wealth and value are associative ideas, that is the
value of a commodity is commensurate with the amount of labor that it takes to produce it.
Wealth is not hard currency, but an associative experience of value, the desire for the
commodity whether it be a thing or a person skilled at the production of a thing. These things
make no judgment as to the actual value of the thing, because no such ‘actual’ value can be
assigned. This is part and parcel of the laissez-faire idea imbedded within capitalism.
Putting It Together
Hume wants to throw the final blow in the empiricism/rationalism bout. He want to show
us that empiricism is separate and superior to any previous or current way of thinking. Those
other systems have allowed their minds to be distracted by metaphysics. Metaphysics has
clouded the issue by leading people down wandering paths not only to intellectual dead-ends
but dead-ends with ‘No Outlet’ signs.
This happened in classic skeptic de-constructional fashion. Locke and Descartes throw out
all previous understanding as flawed, not just in the medieval skeptic fashion of doubting the
world’s explanation over God’s but in the very way we think that we know something.
Working from Descartes’ understanding of the mind as being the first principle, Berkeley
continued by even denying the existence of material substances, which he reduced merely to
a series of impressions in the mind. This means that, because we can trust nothing but
ourselves, mind becomes the only substance. Hume finishes the argument by dismantling
even the mind itself into its phenomena, a loose collection of “impressions and ideas”,
because really it is all the body and its senses. The end result is that even the idea of a first
principle is reduced to a non-argument.
So, if God is not the first principle, and nature is not the first principle and the human self
is not the first principle and the human mind is not the first principle, then what are we left
with? How does one determine anything? Hume seems to be okay with that, and in fact, he
relies on it to produce the ultimate relativistic system. Truth is associative.
Another thing we can see is that the mechanistic view of the world is so ingrained now
that it, like belief in God before it, has become undistinguishable as a point within the
philosophical discussion.
Algernon: Did you hear what I was playing, Lane?
Lane: I didn't think it polite to listen, sir.
53
More on this later.
Algernon: I'm sorry for that, for your sake. I don't play accurately – anyone can play accurately--but I play
with wonderful expression. As far as the piano is concerned, sentiment is my forte. I keep science for Life.
Lane: Yes, sir.
Algernon: And, speaking of the science of Life, have you got the cucumber sandwiches cut for Lady
Bracknell?
The Importance Of Being Ernest, Oscar Wilde
Chapter 42
Hegel
Hegel is yet another German philosopher. Wait, you say, he comes later right? Yes,
historically we should probably cover Hegel after Kant especially because some of his
thoughts come from Kant. Still there is a bookend nature to both Hegel and Hume with
Descartes and Locke, and we can perhaps introduce some ideas which might make our
examination of Kant a bit easier.
For us, he is the end of the major rationalists, a brief side trip down the path less taken
after Kant. Like others, he is worthy of deeper exploration, but do not worry, we will most
likely re-visit him briefly after Kant.
What You See Is Not What You Get
Hegel was born in Stuttgart, Germany. Unlike many of his counterparts and
contemporaries, his end is not particularly glorious, more in the vein of Epicurus, dying in
Berlin of cholera at the age of 61. Still he did reach great heights in publishing and in
academia as rector of several universities, the prestigious University of Berlin being the last,
though I guess, not the luckiest.
He was well-traveled and well thought of during his lifetime, though there was a decline
in his popularity, and similarly his travels, after his death. This may not seem that important
but, as with printing in the centuries before, traveling was a means of spreading his influence.
Like many before and after him, Hegel's influence waxed and waned within a short period of
time. Though he was influential both in philosophy and the emerging sciences, within a
generation his thought was opposed, ridiculed, and discarded. Kierkegaard, Marx, and
Engels, just to name a few, were deeply influenced by him (for good or for ill). His Idealism
was ultimately deemed dangerous by the far-right and radical by the far-left. Certainly,
therefore, a man worthy of a deeper look.
One note: Early on I spoke about the use of words within philosophy for which there is
basically no English translation. The German word geist is one such word. It is here
translated spirit but might also be translated mind, which is an interesting discussion all in its
own.
Let’s Talk About It…
As said, Hegel is sort of a quandary for this author, because he is really a man of his time
yet he is also a sort of a throwback. Like Kant before him (or in our case after him), Hegel
seems to be trying to reconcile thought beyond the limits which he feels are developing in
other systems. Hume used the didactic or “teaching” method in his philosophical exposition
of metaphysics (basically, listen and you will understand, unless you are just stupid). In what
seems a reluctance to abandon earlier thinking, and perhaps, because he is a teacher, Hegel
employs the dialectical method, as did the likes of Plato, Aristotle and the Scholastics. Hegel
saw the dialectical process as truly the means of first opening meaning and then leading one
to deeper understanding and, as we shall see, ultimately becoming the basis for everything.
The dialectical method allows one to see the contradictions within ideas and move past or
reconcile them into the true idea, and this movement is central to understanding all of
Hegel’s thought, a refreshingly simple change, I know. Anyway, recall Aristotle’s use of the
dialectic in order to teach, peeling apart every idea in the context of a single idea. Think of it
as a honing of ideas until the final idea is reached.
This Is Absolutely, Positively The Beginning
Okay, back to our original track54. Speaking of basis, as we saw, Hume took empiricism to
its furthest end (at least in our discussion). Well, as I intimated, Hegel does the same thing
for rationalism. He reasons that if rationalism is based on innate ideas, and if those ideas
guide, inform, and are the boundary of all thinking, then only the absolute exists and
everything else is an illusion. Sounds like a stretch but read it again. Everything we know, he
tells us, is based in some absolute, say something similar to the Platonic Form, and if
everything we know is a reflection of that absolute, which is unbounded by and free of
human fallibility, then anything we understand past those absolutes is questionable.
This may appear a bit like the immaterialism of Berkeley, but Berkeley is basing his on
the fact that empirical sensory data cannot prove there is a material world out there, whereas
Hegel focuses on the innate, universal idea as being unable to prove that material world55.
Still they both do seem to reach the same conclusion56. Furthermore, Hegel broadens the
rationalist view of the absolute, consigning it to both the infinite universe and infinite pure
mind, not strictly to innate ideas built into the universe, postulating the Absolute57.
Why you may ask, is this idea of the external absolute coming back? As mentioned
earlier, the Germans have a mystical side. For Hegel there is a spiritual nature to all reality.
But how can one reconcile and meld rationalism and spirituality? Quite handily, apparently.
Hegel defines the Absolute58 as thought that thinks itself. Think back to Descartes: I think
therefore I am; recall essence is existence (from Aquinas as well). So, the Absolute must be
thinking and being together, and vice versa. Think of it this way. There must be some
absolutes, because absolutes inform everything we think. If we can rationally conceive of
absolutes then they must exist because they inform our rational conceptions of them. If there
are absolutes, then they must come from something, sort of the absolute Absolute.
In addition, and this may be where it gets a bit out there, as we understand more of the
absolute, the absolute knows more of itself. This is where part of the reason for his use of the
dialectical comes into play because he felt that its process allows the Absolute to progress
towards the Absolute's full self-knowledge (‘God is God only in so far as he knows
himself’59). So, from above, if the Absolute’s essence is thinking, then the Absolute must
think, because if it does not think, then it could not be the Absolute. He hammers everyone
54
And no comments about there even being an original track.
Like Plato, except that Plato just saw the material world as imperfect compared to the Form; he never
questioned the reality of that material world.
56
Okay, so I said that Berkeley was crazy and that Hume at least took empiricism someplace not crazy. Hegel
kind of fills both roles for the Rationalists. His arguments are not crazy but how he uses them sometimes can be
considered ‘fringe-ish’ in polite philosophical circles.
57
This is probably too many footnotes for one paragraph.
58
So I’ll add it in this paragraph. This is one of the situations where I will substitute the philosopher’s term
instead of using the term ‘God’. This is not to say that Hegel does not use the term himself, as in "God is not an
abstraction but a concrete God." The Christian Religion: Lectures on Philosophy of Religion, Part 3
59
“God is God only in so far as he knows himself: his self-consciousness is, further, a self-consciousness in
man and man’s knowledge of God, which proceeds to man’s self-knowledge in God” Philosophy
of Spirit, 564 to be exact.
55
for limiting the Absolute to ‘remain in effect always in its primitive condition’, only being
understood by the ‘knowing subject’ who assigns different meaning based on what has
already been provided by the familiar (Phenomenology of Spirit, 15). This means that it is a
dynamic thing, and the dialectical process means that it remains dynamic because it
continues to know itself better (in a leap back to Socrates’ know thyself). This dynamic nature
points to a true freedom, which is built-in and not earned and is the result of living right (i.e.
correctly), one might say.
I Have Conflicting Feelings About This
So, there is something other than nameless, faceless ideas and sensations or merely a
physical world. Implied in the nature of the Absolute is the fact that we participate it in.
How? How do we understand it exists? How do we come to understand it better? “It is a
natural assumption that in philosophy, before we can start to deal with its proper subjectmatter, the actual cognition of what truly is, one must first of all come to an understanding
about cognition, which is regarded either as the instrument to get a hold of the Absolute, or
as the medium through which one discovers it.” (Phenomenology of Spirit, 73)
So Hegel begins an epistemological exploration to understand the instrument of
understanding or the medium of discovery. He comes up with the idea that knowledge arises
from the concept of things in conflict with one another; that is, part of the progress of
knowledge is the awareness of conflict within an idea. This, in a sense, is part of the
dialectical process. Hegel pushes the idea outward to embrace everything (as he does with
the idea of the Absolute). For instance, History is due to the conflict of forces and nations.
Reality (natural as well as human history) is the dialectical unfolding of the Absolute.
Logic Is King
Whoa! Where did this come from? We just can’t seem to get away from this, can we?
Hume wanted to eliminate metaphysics. Hegel wants to re-fashion it. Sure, there are some
flaws, but not nearly the problems which Hume assigns to it (especially, for some reason,
those assigned against rationalism). Hegel replies to all doubters that Metaphysics is logic
(“what is rational is real and what is real is rational”)60. In other words, the rational,
deductive process of logic provides, like/through the dialectic, the basis for exploring the
Absolute, or to put it another way, the function of Metaphysics.
Philosophy investigates the Absolute through logic. Metaphysics, and logic for that
matter, have purpose and validity. Now logic, in the Aristotelian sense of thesis, thesis, and
conclusion is not necessarily what he is getting at, but he does like the way it sounds. Hegel
develops what he called ‘speculative reason’ , which is different than other logics, makes it
more difficult to follow and leads to some of the, shall we say, less identifiable aspects of his
thought. Simply put, what he hoped was, using the dialectic, to develop a synthesis of the two
conflicting styles using a slightly different method which involved the thesis, anti-thesis,
synthesis format.
You Say Potato and I Say Potato…
60
Which may or may not have brought a tear to Aristotle’s eye.
Of many differences between Kant and Hegel, the use of language stands out 61. Kant
aimed at a philosophical understanding of the world, turning from the unknowable world of
things in themselves to the world as we encounter it, the world of objects, or as he calls them
noumena and phenomena. But to do this, he creates an objective style, one which cannot be
influenced by the individual understandings and misunderstandings. One avenue of
individual variation is linguistic, and Kant undertook to purify philosophy of this error by
using terms drawn “from a dead and learned language.” He accomplishes this by introducing
terms that are not part of the living language and hence not, as we discussed in the past,
subject to its changes like “the subreption of hypostasized consciousness” or “the euthanasia
of pure reason.”62
Hegel is more concerned with the way language is experienced. Language is the means by
which we translate and exchange experience. Many of the turns of the argument (mostly in
the opening chapters) depend on linguistic factors, very often puns that do not translate into
English. He felt that the language itself supplied the meaning.
Ramblings aside, let us begin put it together. Hegel divined that human understanding is
furthered by exploring opposites (think back on Aristotle’s Contraries in the Square Of
Opposition from Chapter 2). Think about it, he invites us: if we explore all of human history,
we see a pattern of altercation.63 Progress then, is the result of the conflict of opposites that
arise in these moments. Any attempt to state the reality of something new (thesis) results in a
contradiction (antithesis) that can only be resolved at a higher level than either one
(synthesis). This is a level where both are true, which yields a new thesis, for which there
exists an antithesis, which can be resolved in a synthesis, which, well, you get the picture, all
the way to the highest level, the Absolute, hence the link between Metaphysics, Logic,
Dialectic and the Absolute.
The way this happen, he says, is that a synthesis resolves the two on a higher plane,
whereas other logics resolve to the same level (he invites us to think about those crazy
Frenchmen: ‘revolution’ is opposed by ‘reaction’ and the synthesis is a new social order).
This cycle of an entity throwing down the gauntlet, which becomes a thesis and from that an
antithesis arises, ending in synthesis, means that continuing the process to the highest level
leaves one with the Absolute, the raison d’être for everything, rationally and logically arrived
upon.
Hmm, I hear you saying, stroking your chin. Is that different than postulating a First
Cause or First Principle?
All Is Loss 64
Is there an Absolute? Yes, says Hegel. How do we come to an understanding of the
Absolute? Human thought and activity informs us. The process of dialectic, conflict, human
history, all of these things bring out the Absolute. The two main human endeavors which
make all of this clear? Art and Religion: Art investigates the absolute through forms of
beauty and Religion investigates the absolute through symbols (remember that any
61
This section contains some introduction to some thoughts, which since we have not studied Kant yet may or
may not make sense. We will visit them again in the next chapter.
62
They sound even funnier in German.
63
This could be seen as building upon earlier political thinkers, but that is perhaps a discussion for another time.
64
Or, if you prefer, ‘The rest is silence’ Hamlet, William Shakespeare
thesis/antithesis/synthesis eventually leads us to the Absolute, and boy is there conflict in art
and religion). These ideas become important flash points for later thinkers, and as we said,
led to many of the rejections of his thought or the accepted ideas of the day (as we will see in
the likes of Nietzsche and the Existentialists in general).
So what is the problem? If this is so clear, why is humanity in the dumps? Taking a drag
on an unfiltered cigarette while sitting at a small bistro table, Hegel contemplates the reality
of humanity. The human condition is one of alienation, because the individual sees the self as
being distinct, instead of being united with the Absolute. Just look at Hume! There is not
even really a self…even further evidence of the alienation caused by such thinkers.
What? Almost 300 years of thinking wasted?!
Never Fear, Underdog Is Here!
Alienation. That is a new word for us in the context of our journey, is it not? But it is a
familiar word for our times.
It could be argued that earlier thinkers hinted at this problem. And think about Hegel’s
world: the Industrial Revolution; the embarkation on the road of scientific discovery, the rise
of capitalism, the rise of the empire. There can be considered in these events a certain
coldness, or loss of human worth and dignity, a devaluing of the individual in the middle of
championing the individual, especially if you consider Smith, Hume, and to an extent as we
shall see, Kant. Into this rises a voice: ‘Do not worry,’ says Hegel. ‘All of you who thought
that Philosophy is becoming irrelevant and fluffy, well, you just need to take a second look.
See? Metaphysics has meaning and not just meaning, efficacy! Life has meaning, and I can
show it.’
Recognizing our selves helps us to understand the dialectic, which of course connects us
to the Absolute, which leads to greater understanding of self, and so on.
Your Mission Jim, Should You Choose To Accept It….
It is in the very nature of thinking (as per the quote from above) to reach the Absolute, that
is, it is the only result of any thinking. True thinking, not the junk that has been served up so
far, will bring us to the Absolute and that arrival will set us free. Hegel thought that
philosophy had a mission and that mission is to emancipate people from millennia of
alienation, bring them face to face (at least in dialogue) with the Absolute and thereby free
themselves.
Perhaps a Mission: Impossible, but one which bears some small bit of honoring, at least
for the effort. Ironically, we can also see the road of things to come.
Putting It Together
Ultimately, both Hume and Hegel represent positions which for most people become
untenable in the long run. With his concentration on the Absolute, however, Hegel brings up
an interesting point. He renews or at least attempts a renewal of religious thinking which
harkens back to Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, the Scholastics and to some degree, Kant. In a
way, it is probably part of the reason for the waning of his thought, doomed like Thomas
Aquinas before him to rise up and then be relegated to a shelf of thinking which has perhaps
been ‘out-grown’ by the thinking of the time. Often we see the pendulum swing of faith and
reason in or at least mirrored in the rise and fall of religious or scientific fervor, and this time
is no different than those before it or after it.
Hegel has been saddled with the blame for many of the thinkers that came after him (that
whole relegating of God-being-God-only-because-we-think-of-him thing among others).
While this author does not feel that was the intention of this particular philosopher, his
thought did give impetus to existentialists, Marxists and other such seemingly nefarious
characters. History can be a harsh judge and with Hegel’s obscure writing style, I am sure
you can interpret it any way you want.
When deciding on whether to place Hegel before or after Kant, it came down to what do
we need to teach here? Well obviously, when it comes to teaching Hegel he Kant do it!65
Hegel presents the grand tradition of German Idealism, full of optimism and certainty; his
thought can save the world. Kant did not pave the way for Hegel, but he did provide him with
the inspiration to put forth a bold and provocative system, which would perhaps one day
bring down Western Civilization as we know it.
With the waning of the Enlightenment (though some argue that it never went away…of
course if that is true neither did any other period or system that we have discussed so far) the
age-old struggle returns. Go back to Chapter 8 and look at our overview of Western
Philosophy. You can see that we have divided our studies somewhat differently than that
table shows, but you can still see the overall themes.
And one final thought. Conflict and Art as movers of the world. Only the Germans.
Any man who afflicts the human race with ideas must be prepared to see them misunderstood.
H. L. Mencken
65
Oldest Hegel joke.
Chapter 42a
G. W. Hegel: Phenomenology Of Spirit (or Mind)
Preface
On scientific knowledge
1
In the case of a philosophical work it seems not only superfluous,
but, in view of the nature of philosophy, even inappropriate and
misleading to begin, as writers usually do in a preface, by explaining the
end the author had in mind, the circumstances which gave rise to the
work, and the relation in which the writer takes it to stand to other
treatises on the same subject, written by his predecessors or his
contemporaries. For whatever it might be suitable to state about
philosophy in a preface – say, an historical sketch of the main drift and
point of view, the general content and results, a string of desultory
assertions and assurances about the truth – this cannot be accepted as
the form and manner in which to expound philosophical truth.
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It is natural to suppose that, before philosophy enters upon its
subject proper — namely, the actual knowledge of what truly is — it is
necessary to come first to an understanding concerning knowledge,
which is looked upon as the instrument by which to take possession of
the Absolute, or as the means through which to get a sight of it. The
apprehension seems legitimate, on the one hand that there may be
various kinds of knowledge, among which one might be better adapted
than another for the attainment of our purpose — and thus a wrong
choice is possible: on the other hand again that, since knowing is a
faculty of a definite kind and with a determinate range, without the
more precise determination of its nature and limits we might take hold
on clouds of error instead of the heaven of truth.
This apprehensiveness is sure to pass even into the conviction that
the whole enterprise which sets out to secure for consciousness by
Introduction
means of knowledge what exists per se, is in its very nature absurd; and
that between knowledge and the Absolute there lies a boundary which
completely cuts off the one from the other. For if knowledge is the
instrument by which to get possession of absolute Reality, the
suggestion immediately occurs that the application of an instrument to
anything does not leave it as it is for itself, but rather entails in the
process, and has in view, a moulding and alteration of it. Or, again, if
knowledge is not an instrument which we actively employ, but a kind of
passive medium through which the light of the truth reaches us, then
here, too, we do not receive it as it is in itself, but as it is through and in
this medium. In either case we employ a means which immediately
brings about the very opposite of its own end; or, rather, the absurdity
lies in making use of any means at all. It seems indeed open to us to
find in the knowledge of the way in which the instrument operates, a
remedy for this parlous state; for thereby it becomes possible to remove
from the result the part which, in our idea of the Absolute received
through that instrument, belongs to the instrument, and thus to get the
truth in its purity. But this improvement would, as a matter of fact, only
bring us back to the point where we were before. If we take away again
from a definitely formed thing that which the instrument has done in the
shaping of it, then the thing (in this case the Absolute) stands before us
once more just as it was previous to all this trouble, which, as we now
see, was superfluous. If the Absolute were only to be brought on the
whole nearer to us by this agency, without any change being wrought in
it, like a bird caught by a limestick, it would certainly scorn a trick of
that sort, if it were not in its very nature, and did it not wish to be,
beside us from the start. For a trick is what knowledge in such a case
would be, since by all its busy toil and trouble it gives itself the air of
doing something quite different from bringing about a relation that is
merely immediate, and so a waste of time to establish. Or, again, if the
examination of knowledge, which we represent as a medium, makes us
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acquainted with the law of its refraction, it is likewise useless to
eliminate this refraction from the result. For knowledge is not the
divergence of the ray, but the ray itself by which the truth comes in
contact with us; and if this be removed, the bare direction or the empty
place would alone be indicated.
Meanwhile, if the fear of falling into error introduces an element of
distrust into science, which without any scruples of that sort goes to
work and actually does know, it is not easy to understand why,
conversely, a distrust should not be placed in this very distrust, and why
we should not take care lest the fear of error is not just the initial error.
As a matter of fact, this fear presupposes something, indeed a great
deal, as truth, and supports its scruples and consequences on what
should itself be examined beforehand to see whether it is truth. It starts
with ideas of knowledge as an instrument, and as a medium; and
presupposes a distinction of ourselves from this knowledge. More
especially it takes for granted that the Absolute stands on one side, and
that knowledge on the other side, by itself and cut off from the
Absolute, is still something real; in other words, that knowledge, which,
by being outside the Absolute, is certainly also outside truth, is
nevertheless true — a position which, while calling itself fear of error,
makes itself known rather as fear of the truth.
This conclusion comes from the fact that the Absolute alone is true
or that the True is alone absolute, It may be set aside by making the
distinction that a knowledge which does not indeed know the Absolute
as science wants to do, is none the less true too; and that knowledge in
general, though it may possibly be incapable of grasping the Absolute,
can still be capable of truth of another kind. But we shall see as we
proceed that random talk like this leads in the long run to a confused
distinction between the absolute truth and a truth of some other sort, and
that “absolute”, “knowledge”, and so on, are words which presuppose a
meaning that has first to be got at.
A – CONSCIOUSNESS1
I: Certainty at the Level of Sense Experience – the “This”, and
“Meaning"
1. The Object of Sense Certainty
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The knowledge, which is at the start or immediately our object, can
be nothing else than just that which is immediate knowledge,
knowledge of the immediate, of what is. We have, in dealing with it, to
proceed, too, in an immediate way, to accept what is given, not altering
anything in it as it is presented before us, and keeping mere
apprehension (Auffassen) free from conceptual comprehension
(Begreifen).
The concrete content, which sensuous certainty furnishes, makes
this prima facie appear to be the richest kind of knowledge, to be even a
knowledge of endless wealth – a wealth to which we can as little find
any limit when we traverse its extent in space and time, where that
content is presented before us, as when we take a fragment out of the
abundance it offers us and by dividing and dividing seek to penetrate its
intent. Besides that. it seems to be the truest, the most authentic
knowledge: for it has not as yet dropped anything from the object; it has
the object before itself in its entirety and completeness. This bare fact of
certainty, however, is really and admittedly the abstractest and the
poorest kind of truth. It merely says regarding what it knows: it is; and
its truth contains solely the being of the fact it knows. Consciousness,
on its part, in the case of this form of certainty, takes the shape merely
of pure Ego. In other words, I in such a case am merely qua pure This,
and the object likewise is merely qua pure This. I, this particular
conscious I, am certain of this fact before me, not because I qua
consciousness have developed myself in connection with it and in
manifold ways set thought to work about it: and not, again, because the
fact, the thing, of which I am certain, in virtue of its having a multitude
of distinct qualities, was replete with possible modes of relation and a
variety of connections with other things. Neither has anything to do
with the truth sensuous certainty contains: neither the I nor the thing has
here the meaning of a manifold relation with a variety of other things, of
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mediation in a variety of ways. The I does not contain or imply a
manifold of ideas, the I here does not think: nor does the thing mean
what has a multiplicity of qualities. Rather, the thing, the fact, is; and it
is merely because it is. It is – that is the essential point for senseknowledge, and that bare fact of being, that simple immediacy,
constitutes its truth. In the same way the certainty qua relation, the
certainty “of” something, is an immediate pure relation; consciousness
is I – nothing more, a pure this; the individual consciousness knows a
pure this, or knows what is individual.
But, when we look closely, there is a good deal more implied in that
bare pure being, which constitutes the kernel of this form of certainty,
and is given out by it as its truth. A concrete actual certainty of sense is
not merely this pure immediacy, but an example, an instance, of that
immediacy. Amongst the innumerable distinctions that here come to
light, we find in all cases the fundamental difference – viz. that in
sense-experience pure being at once breaks up into the two “thises”, as
we have called them, one this as I, and one as object. When we reflect2
on this distinction, it is seen that neither the one nor the other is merely
immediate, merely is in sense-certainty, but is at the same time
mediated: I have the certainty through the other, viz. through the actual
fact; and this, again, exists in that certainty through an other, viz.
through the I.
It is not only we who make this distinction of essential truth and
particular example, of essence and instance, immediacy and mediation;
we find it in sense-certainty itself, and it has to be taken up in the form
in which it exists there, not as we have just determined it. One of them
is put forward in it as existing in simple immediacy, as the essential
reality, the object. The other, however, is put forward as the nonessential, as mediated, something which is not per se in the certainty,
but there through something else, ego, a state of knowledge which only
knows the object because the object is, and which can as well be as not
be. The object, however, is the real truth, is the essential reality; it is,
quite indifferent to whether it is known or not; it remains and stands
even though it is not known, while the knowledge does not exist if the
object is not there.
We have thus to consider as to the object, whether in point of fact it
does exist in sense-certainty itself as such an essential reality as that
certainty gives it out to be; whether its meaning and notion, which is to
be essential reality, corresponds to the way it is present in that certainty.
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We have for that purpose not to reflect about it and ponder what it
might be in truth, but to deal with it merely as sense-certainty contains
it.
Sense-certainty itself has thus to be asked: What is the This? If we
take it in the two-fold form of its existence, as the Now and as the Here,
the dialectic it has in it will take a form as intelligible as the This itself.
To the question, What is the Now? we reply, for example, the Now is
night-time. To test the truth of this certainty of sense, a simple
experiment is all we need: write that truth down. A truth cannot lose
anything by being written down, and just as little by our preserving and
keeping it. If we look again at the truth we have written down, look at it
now, at this noon-time, we shall have to say it has turned stale and
become out of date.
The Now that is night is kept fixed, i.e. it is treated as what it is
given out to be, as something which is; but it proves to be rather a
something which is not. The Now itself no doubt maintains itself, but as
what is not night; similarly in its relation to the day which the Now is at
present, it maintains itself as something that is also not day, or as
altogether something negative. This self -maintaining Now is therefore
not something immediate but something mediated; for, qua something
that remains and preserves itself, it is determined through and by means
of the fact that something else, namely day and night, is not. Thereby it
is just as much as ever it was before, Now, and in being this simple fact,
it is indifferent to what is still associated with it; just as little as night or
day is its being, it is just as truly also day and night; it is not in the least
affected by this otherness through which it is what it is. A simple entity
of this sort, which is by and through negation, which is neither this nor
that, which is a not-this, and with equal indifference this as well as that
– a thing of this kind we call a Universal. The Universal is therefore in
point of fact the truth of sense-certainty, the true content of senseexperience.
It is as a universal, too, that we3 give utterance to sensuous fact.
What we say is: “This”, i.e. the universal this; or we say: “it is”, i.e.
being in general. Of course we do not present before our mind in
saying, so the universal this, or being in general, but we utter what is
universal; in other words, we do not actually and absolutely say what in
this sense-certainty we really mean. Language, however, as we see, is
the more truthful; in it we ourselves refute directly and at once our own
“meaning”; and since universality is the real truth of sense-certainty,
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and language merely expresses this truth, it is not possible at all for us
even to express in words any sensuous existence which we “mean”.
The same will be the case when we take the Here, the other form of
the This. The Here is e.g. the tree.
I turn about and this truth has disappeared and has changed round into
its opposite: the Here, is not a tree, but a house. The Here itself does not
disappear; it is and remains in the disappearance of the house, tree, and
so on, and is indifferently house, tree. The This is shown thus again to
be mediated simplicity, in other words, to be universality.
Pure being, then, remains as the essential element for this sensecertainty, since sense-certainty in its very nature proves the universal to
be the truth of its object. But that pure being is not in the form of
something immediate, but of something in which the process of
negation and mediation is essential. Consequently it is not what we
intend or “mean” by being, but being with the characteristic that it is an
abstraction, the purely universal; and our intended “meaning”, which
takes the truth of sense-certainty to be not something universal, is alone
left standing in contrast to this empty or indifferent Now and Here.
If we compare the relation in which knowledge and the object first
stood with the relation they have come to assume in this result, it is
found to be just the reverse of what first appeared. The object, which
professed to be the essential reality, is now the non-essential element of
sense-certainty; for the universal, which the object has come to be, is no
longer such as the object essentially was to be for sense-certainty. The
certainty is now found to lie in the opposite element, namely in
knowledge, which formerly was the non-essential factor. Its truth lies in
the object as my (meinem) object, or lies in the “meaning” (Meinen), in
what I “mean”; it is, because I know it. Sense-certainty is thus indeed
banished from the object, but it is not yet thereby done away with; it is
merely forced back into the I. We have still to see what experience
reveals regarding its reality in this sense.
The force of its truth thus lies now in the I, in the immediate fact of
my seeing, hearing, and so on; the disappearance of the particular Now
and Here that we “mean” is prevented by the fact that I keep hold on
them. The Now is daytime, because I see it; the Here is a tree for a
similar reason. Sense-certainty, however, goes through, in this
connection, the same dialectic process as in the former case. I, this I, see
the tree, and assert the tree to be the Here; another I, however, sees the
house and maintains the Here is not a tree but a house. Both truths have
102
103
104
the same authenticity – the immediacy of seeing and the certainty and
assurance both have as to their specific way of knowing; but the one
certainty disappears in the other.
In all this, what does not disappear is the ‘I’ qua universal, whose
seeing is neither the seeing of this tree nor of this house, but just seeing
simpliciter[a simple seeing], which is mediated through the negation of
this house, etc., and, in being so, is all the same simple and indifferent
to what is associated with it, the house, the tree, and so on. I is merely
universal, like Now, Here, or This in general. No doubt I “mean” an
individual I, but just something as little as I am able to say what I
“mean” by Now, Here, so it is impossible in the case of the I too. By
saying “this Here”, “this Now”, “an individual thing”, I say all Thises,
Heres, Nows, or Individuals. In the same way when I say “I”, “this
individual I”, I say quite generally “all I's”, every one is “I”, this
individual I. When philosophy is.requested, by way of putting it to a
crucial test – a test which it could not possibly sustain – to “deduce”, to
“construe”, “to find a priori”, or however it is put, a so-called this thing,
or this particular man,4 it is reasonable that the person making this
demand should say what “this thing”, or what “this I”, he means: but to
say this is quite impossible.
Sense-certainty discovers by experience, therefore, that its essential
nature lies neither in the object nor in the I; and that the immediacy
peculiar to it is neither an immediacy of the one nor of the other. For, in
the case of both, what I “mean” is rather something non-essential; and
the object and the I are universals, in which that Now and Here and I,
which I “mean”, do not hold out, do not exist. We arrive in this way at
the result, that we have to put the whole, of sense-certainty as its
essential reality, and no longer merely one of its moments, as happened
in both cases, where first the object as against the I, and then the I, was
to be its true reality. Thus it is only the whole sense-certainty itself
which persists therein as immediacy, and in consequence excludes from
itself all the opposition which in the foregoing had a place there.
This pure immediacy, then, has nothing more to do with the fact of
otherness, with Here in the form of a tree passing into a Here that is not
a tree, with Now in the sense of day-time changing into a Now that is
night-time, or with there being an other I to which something else is
object. Its truth stands fast as a self-identical relation making no
distinction of essential and non-essential, between I and object, and into
which, therefore, in general, no distinction can find its way. I, this I,
assert, then, the Here as tree, and do not turn round so that for me Here
might become not a tree, and I take no notice of the fact that another I
finds the Here as not-tree, or that I myself at some other time take the
Here as not-tree, the Now as not-day. I am directly conscious, I intuit
and nothing more, I am pure intuition; I am-seeing, looking. For myself
I stand by the fact, the Now is day-time, or, again, by the fact the Here
is tree, and, again, do not compare Here and Now themselves with one
another; I take my stand on one immediate relation: the Now is day.
2. The Subject of Sense Certainty
105
106
107
Since, then, this certainty wholly refuses to come out if we direct its
attention to a Now that is night or an I to whom it is night, we will go to
it and let ourselves point out the Now that is asserted. We must let
ourselves point it out for the truth of this immediate relation is the truth
of this ego which restricts itself to a Now or a Here. Were we to
examine this truth afterwards, or stand at a distance from it, it would
have no meaning at all; for that would do away with the immediacy,
which is of its essence. We have therefore to enter the same point of
time or of space, indicate them, point them out to ourselves, i.e. we
must let ourselves take the place of the very same I, the very same This,
which is the subject knowing with certainty. Let us, then, see how that
immediate is constituted, which is shown to us.
The Now is pointed out; this Now. “Now”; it has already ceased to
be when it is pointed out. The Now that is, is other than the one
indicated, and we see that the Now is just this – to be no longer the very
time when it is. The Now as it is shown to us is one that has been, and
that is its truth; it does not have the truth of being, of something that is.
No doubt this is true, that it has been; but what has been is in point of
fact not genuinely real, it is not, and the point in question concerned
what is, concerned being.
In thus pointing out the Now we see then merely a process which
takes the following course: First I point out the Now, and it is asserted
to be the truth. I point it out, however, as something that has been, or as
something cancelled and done away with. I thus annul and pass beyond
that first truth and in the second place I now assert as the second truth
that it has been, that it is superseded. But, thirdly, what has been is not;
I then supersede, cancel, its having been, the fact of its being annulled,
the second truth, negate thereby the negation of the Now and return in
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so doing to the first position: that Now is. The Now and pointing out the
Now are thus so constituted that neither the one nor the other is an
immediate simple fact, but a process with diverse moments in it. A This
is set up; it is, however, rather an other that is set up; the This is
superseded: and this otherness, this cancelling of the former, is itself
again annulled, and so turned back to the first. But this first, reflected
thus into itself, is not exactly the same as it was to begin with, namely
something immediate: rather it is a something reflected into-self, a
simple entity which remains in its otherness, what it is: a Now which is
any number of Nows. And that is the Genuinely true Now; the Now is
simple day-time which has many Nows within it – hours. A Now of that
sort, again – an hour – is similarly many minutes; and this Now – a
minute – in the same way many Nows and so on. Showing, indicating,
pointing out [the Now] is thus itself the very process which expresses
what the Now in truth really is: namely a result, or a plurality of Nows
all taken together. And the pointing, out is the way of getting to know,
of experiencing, that Now is a universal.
The Here pointed out, which I keep hold of, is likewise a this Here
which, in fact, is not this Here, but a Before and Behind, an Above and
Below, a Right and Left. The Above is itself likewise this manifold
otherness – above, below, etc. The Here, which was to be pointed out,
disappears in other Heres, and these disappear similarly. What is
pointed out, held fast, and is permanents a negative This, which only is
so when the Heres are taken as they should be, but therein cancel one
another; it is a simple complex of many Heres. The Here that is “meant”
would be the point. But it is not: rather, when it is pointed out as being,
as having existence, that very act of pointing out proves to be not
immediate knowledge, but a process, a movement from the Here
“meant” through a plurality of Heres to the universal Here, which is a
simple plurality of Heres, just as day is a simple plurality of Nows.
3. The Concrete Experience of Sense Certainty
109
It is clear from all this that the dialectic process involved in sensecertainty is nothing else than the mere history of its process – of its
experience; and sense-certainty itself is nothing else than simply this
history. The naïve consciousness, too, for that reason, is of itself always
coming to this result, which is the real truth in this case, and is always
having experience of it: but is always forgetting it again and beginning
110
the process all over. It is therefore astonishing when, in defiance of this
experience, it is announced as “universal experience” – nay, even as a
philosophical doctrine, the outcome, in fact, of skepticism – that the
reality or being of external things in the sense of “Thises”, particular
sense objects, has absolute validity and truth for consciousness. One
who makes such an assertion really does not know what he is saying,
does not know that he is stating the opposite of what he wants to say.
The truth for consciousness of a “This” of sense is said to be universal
experience; but the very opposite is universal experience. Every
consciousness of itself cancels again, as soon as made, such a truth as
e.g. the Here is a tree, or the Now is noon, and expresses the very
opposite: the Here is not a tree but a house. And similarly it straightway
cancels again the assertion which here annuls the first, and which is also
just such an assertion of a sensuous This. And in all sense-certainty
what we find by experience is in truth merely, as we have seen, that
“This” is a universal, the very opposite of what that assertion
maintained to be universal experience.
We may be permitted here, in this appeal to universal experience, to
anticipate5 with a reference to the practical sphere. In this connection
we may answer those who thus insist on the truth and certainty of the
reality of objects of sense, by saying that they had better be sent back to
the most elementary school of wisdom, the ancient Eleusinian mysteries
of Ceres and Bacchus; they have not yet learnt the inner secret of the
eating of bread and the drinking of wine. For one who is initiated into
these mysteries not only comes to doubt the being of things of sense,
but gets into a state of despair about it altogether; and in dealing with
them he partly himself brings about the nothingness of those things,
partly he sees these bring about their own nothingness. Even animals
are not shut off from this wisdom, but show they are deeply initiated
into it. For they do not stand stock still before things of sense as if these
were things per se, with being in themselves: they despair of this reality
altogether, and in complete assurance of the nothingness of things they
fall-to without more ado and eat them up. And all nature proclaims, as
animals do, these open secrets, these mysteries revealed to all, which
teach what the truth of things of sense is.
Those who put forward such assertions really themselves say, if we
bear in mind what we remarked before, the direct opposite of what they
mean: a fact which is perhaps best able to bring them to reflect on the
nature of the certainty of sense-experience. They speak of the
“existence” of external objects, which can be more precisely
characterized as actual, absolutely particular, wholly personal,
individual things, each of them not like anything or anyone else; this is
the existence which they say has absolute certainty and truth. They
“mean” this bit of paper I am writing on, or rather have written on: but
they do not say what they “mean”. If they really wanted to say this bit
of paper which they “mean”, and they wanted to say so, that is
impossible, because the This of sense, which is “meant”, cannot be
reached by language, which belongs to consciousness, i.e. to what is
inherently universal. In the very attempt to say it, it would, therefore,
crumble in their hands; those who have begun to describe it would not
be able to finish doing so: they would have to hand it over to others,
who would themselves in the last resort have to confess to speaking
about a thing that has no being. They mean, then, doubtless this bit of
paper here, which is quite different from that bit over there; but they
speak of actual things, external or sensible objects, absolutely
individual, real, and so on; that is, they say about them what is simply
universal. Consequently what is called unspeakable is nothing else than
what is untrue, irrational, something barely and simply meant.
If nothing is said of a thing except that it is an actual thing, an
external object, this only makes it the most universal of all possible
things, and thereby we express its likeness, its identity, with everything,
rather than its difference from everything else. When I say “an
individual thing”, I at once state it to be really quite a universal, for
everything is an individual thing: and in the same way “this thing” is
everything and anything we like. More precisely, as this bit of paper,
each and every paper is a “this bit of paper”, and I have thus said all the
while what is universal. If I want, however, to help out speech – which
has the divine nature of directly turning the mere “meaning” right round
about, making it into something else, and so not letting it ever come the
length of words at all – by pointing out this bit of paper, then I get the
experience of what is, in point of fact, the real truth of sense-certainty. I
point it out as a Here, which is a Here of other Heres, or is in itself
simply many Heres together, i.e. is a universal. I take it up then, as in
truth it is; and instead of knowing something immediate, I “take”
something “truly”, I per-ceive (wahrnehme, per-cipio[6]).
Translation From Harper Torchbooks' edition of the Phenomenology of Spirit (1807), from
University of Idaho, Department of Philosophy by Jean McIntire.
1. In addition to the works mentioned on p. 40 (note), the reader may be referred to the
analysis of Sensation and Perception in Plato's Theaetetus, and to Bradley's Appearance and
Reality, Chaps. II, V, VIII and XIX.
2. i.e. For the purposes of philosophical analysis.
3. i.e. the naïve consciousness here analyzed.
4. Cf. Encyclo. § 250.
5. Cf. Analysis of Desire, p. 220 ff.
6. [Literally: I through-seize, that is to understand or to know, etc. but in a very deep way]
Thought Point
What is Hegel talking
about?
What is SenseCertainty?
What is the object of
Sense-Certainty?
What is the subject of
Sense-Certainty?
How does the dialectic
figure in all of this?
What is knowledge?
What is truth?
What is the Absolute?
Compare and Contrast
Hume and Hegel based
on these passages; take
a moment to defend
both systems.
Points of Thought
Chapter 43
Kant
What do you get when you cross science with metaphysic? If Hume and Hegel are
bookends, Immanuel Kant is the guy who tries to referee the previous empirical/rationalist
bout (Chapter 39). This was a massive undertaking, as you can imagine and I will tell you up
front that we have not done multiple chapters on an individual in a while, but this guy
requires, nay it is imperative that we do so66.
Why? What about Kant is so important? Kant is mostly remembered for his moral
philosophy but that is really an end result of his thinking. Like so many before him, it is
mainly because of how he arrived at those moral conclusions, and what the ramification of
that thinking has on all thinking which follows it that concerns us the most. If Descartes is
the father of modern philosophy, Kant is the father of modern thinking. This is a difficult set
of chapters because trying to succinctly summarize Kant's influence on modern philosophy is
like trying to summarize Newton's influence on science. But that is no reason to let it stop us.
Just like Newton, not everything is applicable for answering all questions but it changes
thinking such that these and larger truths may be explored. In his Copernican Revolution
Kant attempts to explain the relation of the mind to the world around us, or better, how the
relation between the mind and the world affects us and our place in it. It is difficult to itemize
those changes in a simple summary, but as we have so often in the past, let us attempt to
identify some of the main parts.
Kant Be
Though it may seem an odd opening statement, let us start by saying that Kant was
German. Remember the earlier remark about Continental philosophers? Well this plays into
that. Kant is part of the movement away from English empirical thinkers toward German
idealist thinkers, which will eventually be fought – and won? – by the English Idealists (like
as opposed to German Idealists like Kant and Hegel). If you have ever seen what VW calls
‘German Engineering’67, then you have a sense of these guys. Rational and Practical, yet
with a mystical sense of great purpose.
Biographically, Kant is also a fascinating individual. Though born German, he shared
Scots roots68 through his grandfather Cant. Later, as master of his own fate, he changed his
name from Emanuel Cant to Immanuel Kant. He was brought up in a strict religious home
and never really traveled that far from where he was born in Konigsberg. Not that he really
had to; it was after all the capital of Prussia, and he was the king of German philosophy. And
of course, also not surprisingly, Kant showed a great intelligence at an early age, enrolling at
the University of Konigsberg at the age of 16 never to leave. Kant spent his long life in the
pursuit of the necessary and important task of recapturing what he felt was being lost: a pure
and practical understanding of thinking and of the end result of such correct thinking. He
sums up his own journey quite nicely: “All the interests of my reason, speculative as well as
Pun early and often; you’ll see.
Not to be confused with or associated with Eugenics.
68
The land of many thinkers, including David Hume
66
67
practical, combine in the three following questions: 1. What can I know? 2. What ought I to
do? 3. What may I hope?” (Critique of Pure Reason)
In this milieu, Kant becomes the man, the Plato of his age. Everyone wants to be Kant;
everyone wants to understand Kant; everyone wants to have Kant’s approval; unfortunately
for us they all want to write like him too.
Ideally, We Would Start Here
But let us not get bogged down in particulars, at least not yet. Idealism is one word of
several which we have brought up without much fanfare or explanation as I have
conveniently ‘forgotten’ to do so. That will change in this chapter. Idealism is not just a
dreamy expression or naiveté, but the thinking that ideals are really where it is at. The term
‘German Idealism’ has its origin in the Enlightenment as implemented by the Germans, as
opposed to the English and French Enlightenments, which emphasized sensation over reason
(meaning most had become empiricists and skeptics and not rationalists – science is a
powerful force)69. As somewhat mentioned earlier, the situation in Germany was just the
opposite. Though rational thought was given precedence over empirical sense data, it
produced not a rationalism but an idealism which both echoed and influenced a lot of
German thinking to come.
Idealism is not rationalism. Rationalism places all meaning in the mind, and pretty much
discounts sense data. Kant felt somewhat differently about what role rationality played. Not
as bound to the rational as most at the time, he advanced what he called a ‘transcendental
idealism’. We will talk more about this, but basically, the individual is the seat for the
understanding of the thing as it appears to us, that is, it transcends the thing as it is. Alright, I
know, but hopefully it will make more sense. Kant really wants to simplify everything (as
Hegel will attempt to do with the dialectic), perhaps in what can be considered the most
complex way ever.
What it means is that the human mind shapes all sensory experience and thought. The
mind has an active role in producing our conception of reality by acting as a filter, an
organizer, and an augmenter. So Kant’s Idealism springs from the fact that he believes that a
thing-in-itself (remember? What the scholastics called quiddity) exists …but it is unknowable
to us. All we can know is the appearance of the thing. This means that the ‘empirical world’
is my representation of things in themselves – or ideals (in other words like Hume, Kant
concedes that empirical data is all we can know about the world and, unlike Hume, the object
still exists in itself independent of my perceptions). That means that things like space, time
and causal relationships are not aspects of reality in itself but are imposed on it by us as a
means of ordering what is real, or at least what we perceive to be real (somewhat similar to
Hume’s association idea, but different in that the mind is the determinate of what it all
means, regardless of the thing in itself or of our perceptions). For Kant, a priori knowledge is
transcendental, or based on the form of all possible experience, while a posteriori knowledge
is empirical, based on the content of experience.
100% Pure
69
But wait, you ask, what about Descartes? Let us just say briefly that he lost out.
Taking our cue from the above section, and in a totally new procedure, let us take a
moment up front and attempt to understand what Kant is trying to accomplish before we
jump in. Reason and Experience with a heaping dose of spirituality…that is what Kant is
made of. Kant wrote many things, but his pivotal work, A Critique of Pure Reason (and the
Critique of Pure Reason for Dummies: the Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysic) stands
out as the one that most focus on. And for good reason; therein Kant manages to come up
with that unified theory of knowledge which so many have sought. He ties philosophy
(metaphysics), mathematics, and science back together, showing that how we think (or our
judgments, as he called them) in any situation is based on a ‘simple’ process.
Kant wrote several Critiques and Critiques of Pure and Practical things, but what did he
mean by ‘pure’70? Pure refers to the thing in itself, that is, without any empirical content
rattling around to muddy the waters71. As we have talked about before72, the idea that we
understand something a priori means that the thing which we postulate, the thesis, is
contained already within the thing; ‘Aristotle is a man’, for instance. We would know that
‘Aristotle is a fish’ is wrong because the substance fish just is not part of Aristotle (the
substance man), mainly because that understanding (of his ‘manliness’73) exists before
experience (hence the a priori) because we have established the meaning of the substance
which constitutes what it means to be a man outside of our own experience. The judgment is
analytic because it is arrived at by analyzing the generalities of the subject not by
experiencing the individual subject (thinking about things which possibly not external
characteristics of a thing, but which we ‘know’ are just part of it). We have often seen this in
the contradiction means of establishing a truth (‘Aristotle is not a man’ = absurd, therefore
‘Aristotle is a man’)74. He also allows that we can understand things a posteriori, meaning
that we synthesize things together (often using experience), after the fact (so to speak), but
that knowledge falls under that category of practical.
So, in an attempt to stop slogging through, this paragraph will take a stab at summing all
previous thinking up, which from an Aristotelian point of view says there can be
distinguished two kinds of ‘judgments’:
1. Analytic judgment: those a priori understandings which are judgments based
exclusively upon an analysis of the subject without use of experience/sense-data. For
example, ‘The angles of a triangle always add up to 180 degrees’.
2. Synthetic judgment: a posteriori judgments that are based on a synthesis or a
compilation of different facts which come to us through experience. For example, ‘the
earth goes around the sun’.
Nice but, Kant disagrees. What analysis (by itself) will lead you to understanding a
triangle? Certainly, a triangle has 3 sides, no matter how many you may want to give it; that
is a priori (rationalism). And what amount experience alone tells you that something with
70
Once again, nothing to do with Eugenics.
So things involving reason are ‘pure’ when dealing with innate ideas and are ‘practical’ when dealing with
things like ethics.
72
Really, we have.
73
From our legal dept: no assertions as to the quality of ‘manliness’ aside from the ‘quality of manliness’
attributable to the man Aristotle is in any way implied or should in any way be construed.
74
Once again, way too many footnotes for one paragraph, but since we are here, quick – what kind of thinking
is that?
71
three sides is a ‘triangle’ (empiricism)? So that brings up the rub for Kant; there must be a
third way of thinking about things. He assigns this to math. Mathematical thinking (three
sides always add up to 180 degrees = triangle) he says is composed of analytic synthetic
judgments or as he puts it “synthetic a priori’ (a one-two combo: knowing that it has only
three angles and experience with measuring many different iterations of triangles). Think
about it: spout out one of those theorems which you memorized in Geometry. They are a
priori in that they exist without piecing together facts and yet our understanding of them is
based on a compilation of other a priori facts and a posteriori experience which confirms it.
It seems therefore, that there are three kinds of thinking, synthetic, analytic and syntheticanalytic, or Science, Metaphysics, and Mathematics in that order.
Remember that earlier quote from the bio section? Kant divides those three questions up
the same way: “The first question is merely speculative….The second question is purely
practical….The third question…is at once practical and speculative….” (Critique of Pure
Reason) In the end it is a view that some things are just obvious to us, some things come to
us through experience yet some things seem to be a combination of the two, but with an extra
twist – they are things which we can know but can prove neither through experience or some
rational argument.
Kant expends a lot of effort distinguishing what kinds of judgments fall under each
category (analytic or synthetic and as a priori or a posteriori). Through this process he came
to believe that synthetic a priori judgments are everything which is noble and right about
humanity because they produced the greatest of human thoughts; this is because they happen
only when the mind gives structure and meaning to the conditions of its own experience
(sense-data or innate idea), that is, makes its own judgment about them. The human mind
becomes the mediator in a way that either experience or innate universals by themselves can
allow.
Kant Take It Any More
Think of it this way. A priori means it is fixed and there is not much we can do about it. A
posteriori? Well that is pretty much determined too, right? I mean, we cannot make our eyes
see something that is not there, nor deny the overwhelming evidence of something. So he
pretty much agrees with both the rationalists and the empiricists on these points. But,
synthetic a priori, well, that is where we come into play because we bind the two together,
within ourselves and give them new meaning, beyond just the bare facts. Here is where
things begin to sound a bit familiar again. This is the subject calling the shots. We are not so
much the creators of our world, but it is we who impose the forms of space and time upon all
possible sensation using mathematics, and it is we who give meaning to all scientific
knowledge as experience governed by traditional notions of substance and causality through
the application of pure concepts of the understanding to all possible experience (whew!). In a
slap at Hume’s idea of mind and self, Kant places all meaning within the subject as the agent
of the rational imposition of order on a posteriori experience and upon all a priori
understandings as has been previously postulated. In addition, he adds one more clarification
on the idea of universals, in opposition to the rationalists. Those universal principles hold
only for the world as we know it (experience it), and since metaphysical propositions like
God, or Truth, or Beauty seek a truth beyond all experience, they cannot be established
within the bounds of reason alone, which Descartes thought (double whew!).
After reading that, you are probably in a stupor; after reading Hume, Kant awoke from his
“dogmatic slumber” (Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysic), obviously in a cold sweat,
chilled and troubled by Hume’s skepticism. Being a bit rich for his blood, like other things,
Kant sees the need for skepticism but shifts its focus. This is the meaning of that phrase and
we see it in his thinking. He is no longer satisfied to dogmatically and unquestioningly accept
what is laid before him as might an empirical scientist or accept blindly untested universals.
Taking his cue from earlier thinkers and their heavy emphasis on epistemology (and this is a
cue for Hegel) he thought that once we understand the sources and limits of human
knowledge (which recent trends in skepticism ultimately questioned, but pretty much stopped
on) we can then continue on to ask fruitful metaphysical questions.
For this reason, Kant soundly rejects Hume. But, Kant, influenced by the works of Hume,
held that we could only know what we experience (its appearance to us), and that we could
never know that which is beyond experience (the thing in itself). But what does that do to
universals? Kant spends some time with this, kind of saying that skepticism, similarly to the
way the Medievals viewed it, causes us to ask questions without necessarily ruling out things
we cannot know (as Berkeley might do). So Metaphysics can still exist, but we can only
know it as we can know it, not as the thing in itself, but only as our mind can grasp the thing.
This somewhat flies in the face of earlier rational and empirical thinkers, who put everything
in one basket (us), by saying that something can exist outside and independent of us and our
ability to rationally or empirically prove it. So, including what we said above, Kant rules out
the possibility that we could prove God but does not rule out the existence of God75.
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So Kant perceived problems with the rational-only and the empirical-only camps. Each by
themselves does not answer the whole question of knowledge, and in a sense because they
are mutually exclusive, have pretty lame attempts at explaining the aspects of the other which
appear in each system. So, as a kind of philosophical Justice of the Peace, Kant marries the
Empirical to the Rational.
Reason is important. Perception is important. K