Budgeting for accountability in Social Services – A Micro level study
Akhila Chawla
Ph.D. Candidate in Accounting
Schulich School of Business, York University,
Toronto, Canada - M3J 1P3
1
Budgeting for accountability in Social Services – A Micro level study
I.
Introduction
In line with Roberts (1991, p.355) “the analysis of accounting in systems of accountability (also) offers
alternative ways to conceive of the transformation of accounting”, this study aims to contribute to the
understanding of budgeting practice and systems of accountability in the field of social services at the micro
and meso level. With the considerable debate to define the form, function and dimensions of accountability
(Ezzamel & Robson, et al, 2007; Goddard, 2005), the relationship between accounting and accountability
has emerged to be an increasingly important one. Though accountability in the public sector-welfare
services and international NGO’s has attracted significant attention, national level social services programs
that connect these sectors (Smythe, 2012; Ebrahim, 2003) to local governance, civil society and community
based organizations (CBO) remain largely under-explored (Llewellyn, 1998; Chenhall, Hall & Smith,
2010). I draw on practice theory and Bourdieu’s perspective on Practice theory to frame and study a specific
accounting practice supported by accounting artifacts. Bourdieu’s concepts of field, structure and capitals
allow an exploration of the habitus associated with accountability at the micro level (Bourdieu, 1977). In
so doing, I highlight the manner in which the budget construction processes becomes enlisted in the
constitution of a social space that encourages and supports certain types of financial and non-financial
visibility and learning - and through (re) production, makes it more amenable to the creation and demanding
of an account at a micro level (Carmona, Ezzamel & Gutierrez, 2002, p. 240). The study focuses on a
specific social services program - the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGS)
program in rural India.
Interpretive and critical research perspectives, in comparison to mainstream literature, offer more expansive
conceptions of both accounting and accountability - not universal, neutral or functioning in a vacuum but
deeply connected to the functioning of both organizations and society (Hopwood, 1983; Tinker et al., 1982;
2
Miller & O’Leary, 1987). Extant literature reflects this variation arising from, among other things, the
context in which such accountability is situated (Patton, 1992, p. 167). Roberts & Scapens (1985, p.447)
well known definition “giving and demanding reasons of conduct” can be considered somewhat simplistic.
Willmott (1996, p. 24) offers a more nuanced definition of accountability as an endemic, continuous
practice where the act of giving and receiving accounts is a way of making sense of the world and ourselves
in it. Ahrens & Chapman (2002, p. 152) outline the social connection of accounting with accountability “It (Accountability) emphasizes the demanding and giving of reasons for action as the most important social
function of accounting”. Contextual accounts like Llewellyn (1998) explore the role of delegated budgets
in creating individual and collective responsibility and argue that the assigning of responsibly and authority
precedes the demanding of accountability. Similarly, Broadbent & Laughlin (2003, p.23) associate
accountability with the giving of an account, that comes with the grant of responsibility or authority.
Drawing on these definitions, accounting conversations have moved far beyond the technical to generate a
growing literature connecting to notions of accountability through rich and diverse interdisciplinary
research frameworks (Roberts, 1991; Ahrens, 1996) and sites. These include corporate governance
(Brennan & Solomon, 2008); financial and managerial transparency; corporate social responsibility; and
social and environmental accountability (Gray 1992; Gray & Laughlin, 2012) in the private sector; New
Public Management, devolved budgeting and performance measurements in the public sector (Mayston,
1998; Llewellyn, 1998); NGO’s (Ebrahim, 2003; O’Dwyer & Unerman, 2008) and CBO’s (Gray,
Bebbington & Collison, 2006). However, not all accountabilities are explored as hierarchical and economic.
Moral and theological elements of accountability are explored in studies where account givers answer to a
higher law like the “Dreaming Law” in Australian aboriginals or a higher power such as religion or God
(Quattrone, 2004; Carmona & Ezzamel, 2006). So much so that studies now question the limits of giving
an account and resistance from account givers (Messner, 2009; Joannides, 2012).This literature finds
accountability and change to be deeply embedded and mobilized through accounting processes.
3
The unique form of budget practice in MGNREGS is an expression of federal governance vision for the
meso-micro level and the structure is largely identical across the provinces. However, optional decisions
and choices at the provincial government make it possible to implement this practice through the
engagement of local governance and civil society, constructing a particular form of accountability among
participants. Consecutive cycles of budget construction have not only contributed to the accumulation of
financial and process information at the local village level but enlisted citizens in the accountability
practice, moving the accountability loop to include rural citizens (UNDP, 2006). This study draws on 70
interviews at the federal, state, district, block, local governance levels, non-governmental organizations and
program beneficiaries; as well as secondary data including government guidelines, legislatures, government
and research reports.
This research adds to the current literature in the many ways. First, it looks at an innovative public
accounting practice different from existing frameworks of devolved budgeting in the public sector and
participative budgeting in the private and developmental sector. Second, it provides an empirical
understanding of a practice-based notion of accountability at the micro level and its intersection with
accounting practices. Third, it speaks to a deep need to explore the potential role of social and critical
accounting as an agent for emancipation (Spence, 2009; Molisa, 2011). Finally, workfare and social
services programs are an underrepresented area in accounting research as are research sites in less
developed countries (LDC’s). Workfare programs, albeit in remarkably different institutional and sociocultural settings, are increasingly being used in countries like India, Brazil, Liberia, Argentina and
Philippines. The Indian Central Government, for example, committed approximately Rupees (Rs.) 31,100
crores or CAD 7 billion to a single program in 2009, providing employment opportunities to more than 44
billion rural Indian households (Financial Express, 2009). Workfare programs that reach grassroots and
involve budgeting, dispersal, control and accountability of public funds at a local level, it is hard to not
envision an important role for accounting systems at the micro level. In response to calls for more current,
relevant research for management control system (Chenhall, 2003, p. 130) in general and LDC in particular
4
(Hopper et al., 2009), this study provides an empirical opportunity to study a non-euro centric workfare
program built around its innovative multi-hierarchical budgeting system where the consolidated budget
serves as both input and output.
II.
Budgeting and the public sector
Budgeting systems in mainstream research, both in the private and public sector, are traditionally been
conceptualized as a technical tool for hierarchical planning and control with power cresting at the top where
“its purpose is either to increase subordinate motivation or attitude, or to share information between a
superior and a subordinate in order to improve motivation, performance and attitudes” (Shields & Shields,
1998, p. 66) or “Two purposes of budgets are to motivate subordinate performance and facilitate planning”
(Chow, Cooper & Waller, 1988, p.111). Overview papers like Chenhall (2003) look at two decades of
empirical research on MCS and emergence of contingency theory as a dominant framework. However
budgeting literature still struggles with the tension between budget flexibility to meet organizational and
environment needs; and budgets as “impeding efficient resource allocation, encouraging myopic decision
making and encouraging budget games” (Waal et al., 2011, p. 317).
Within the MCS literature, participative budgeting has emerged as one of the most extensively researched
areas in non-public accounting research. Defined as “a process in which a manager is involved with, and
has influence on, the determination of his or her budget” (Shields & Shields, 1998, p. 49), it has been
connected to enhancing organizational effectiveness through employee empowerment and motivation. This
literature has shown intense interest in the effect of participative budgeting on subordinate job satisfaction,
motivation, subordinate and organizational performance (Brownell, 1981; Merchant, 1981; Chow et al.,
1988; Chenhall & Brownell, 1988) and employee productivity (Young, 1985). Papers such as Brownell &
Merchant, 1990) further connect budgetary participation and flexibility with product standardization and
the effect on departmental performance. Shields & Shields (1998) provide a comprehensive review of forty
seven empirical studies on participative budgeting, to argue that a majority of literature focuses on the
5
effects of budgeting and that future research should look towards multi-dimensional, contextual study of
interrelationships between participative budgets and the larger system (p.66). More recent literature
explores the role of MCS in innovation and “collaborative creativity” (Adler & Chen, 2011, p.63),
organizational change and new product development (Davila, 2000; Chenhall & Euske, 2007).
Participative budgeting literature has traditionally compared the effects of an involved budgeting process
on performance - where the employee has influence (participative) through a voice or a vote (Libby, 1999)
or a pseudo participative budget where there is no employee influence (consultative) and no weight is given
to employee budget inputs. However, research also reflects that though participative budgeting can usually
take the form of a negotiation process, top management may retain major or total control over the final
budget (Fisher, Fredrickson & Peffer, 2002). In fact in situation where such a negotiation fails, control and
decision making power have been found to be taken over by top management (Fisher, Frederickson &
Peffer, 2000). Though these literatures in the public and private sectors use devolved and participative
budgeting processes for different purposes, the public sector devolvement is limited to local bodies and
governance levels. Participative budgeting on the other hand is designed to include the feedback and
knowledge of employees for employee participation but managers are not bound to have to include this
information, decisions or knowledge.
III.
Budgeting and Accountability in Social Services
Workfare programs in developing countries reflect a markedly different set of demographics, ideologies,
structures, and socio-political environment (Tinker, 1980, p. 158). The changing boundaries between
public, private and non-profit sector and new relationships between federal, provincial and municipal
governments as well as NGO’s and civil society, have focused the research spotlight on public sector
collaboration. This literature includes public sector reforms in local governments (Goddard, 2005) and
NGO’s (Awio, Lawrence & Northcott, 2007; Ebrahim, 2003); institutions like hospitals and schools and
6
accountability and performance measurement. One of the very few studies that look at the welfare sector
and the MCS and budgeting system used by the NGO’s is Chenhall, Hall & Smith (2010).
Accountability built into the public sectors of democratic nations is associated with governance, financial
efficiency and performance management connected to public and political accountability. Wildavsky’s
(1964) seminal work on the political underpinnings of public sector budgeting has sparked a huge
accounting literature. Gray & Jenkins (1993, p. 53) define accountability in the public sector as - “an
obligation to present an account for and answer for the execution of responsibilities to those who entrusted
those responsibilities. On this obligation depends the allocation of praise and blame, award and sanction so
often seen as the hallmarks of accountability in action”. With NPM and public and social responsibility
(Bracci & Llewellyn, 2012; Spense & Rinaldi, 2012), government departments have witnessed strong
changes in environment (Smyth, 2012, p. 230) and regimes of accountability (Roberts, 1991, p. 363). A
connected strand of this research, the budgeting-accountability literature is quite established, though
strongly attentive to developed country settings. It answers to vertical and horizontal internal accountability
in public organizations.
Current research focuses on accountable management (Humphrey, Miller & Scapens, (1993) and changing
nature of accountability in the government sector in light of New Public Management (Parker & Gould,
1999) with greater delegation in budgeting (Mayston, 1998; Collier, 2001) and implementation of
government services (Broadbent, Laughlin & read, 1991; Lapsley, 2008) with some papers exploring
developing nation contexts (Iyoha & OyerInde, 2010). Devolved budgeting has seen some exploration at
the municipal and city government level, largely in the U.K. (Llewellyn, 1998, Ezzamel et al., 2007). Of
special interest in public accountability defined as Sinclair (1995) as the “informal but direct accountability
to the public, interested community groups and individuals” (p. 225). Connected to this topic are also the
participatory and civil engagement models used by the World Bank in their social development work in
developing and emerging economies (worldbank.org).
7
Accountability as a contextual and sequential phenomenon
Accounting literature offers several types of accountability - vertical and horizontal; public and internal;
formal and informal wherein vertical and public accountability have been studied quite extensively
(Roberts, 1991; Goddard, 2005; Pallot 2003). Of particular importance is Sinclair’s (1995) work on
subjective forms of accountabilities for public sector CEO’s - political, managerial, public accountability,
professional and personal; as well as managerially defined accountabilities – fiscal, process and program
accountability, which Goddard’s (2005) finds limited in its lack of inclusion of external political elements
and peer effect. The creation of accounts can be a process based, sequential and interrelated phenomenon.
The creation of a simple record of a transaction is an account, as is the creation of a budget, an audit activity;
financial statements or performance indicators. These build a progressive account that contributes to the
identification, outlining, recording and measuring of accountability through latent or overt mechanisms. As
Messner (2012, p. 924) quotes Butler (2005) – “An account is a type of narrative and, as such, it ‘‘depends
upon the ability to relay a set of sequential events with plausible transitions”. In line with this Dubnik &
Justice (2004) suggest investigating accountability not as a word but a concept with specific processes.
The literature outlined also strongly reflects the variation in notions of accountability in different sociocultural settings. Hopwood (1987) call to investigate social and organizational settings (p.289) points to the
creation of accounts as a social activity deeply affected by its environment. Accountability, in turn, can
also be stylized and impacted by its environment and medium of transmission (Davison & Warren, 2009).
As Hopper et al. (1987) write “accounting is a set of practices which is both the medium and the outcome
of the politico-economic context in which accounting is embedded. Goddard (2005, p.195) explores
culturally distinct frameworks of accountability while Roberts (1991) contrasts and connects formal,
hierarchical “individualizing” accountability in organizations to informal “socializing” accountability,
outlining the social origins of accountability.
8
Socio-political and cultural environments are critical elements in understanding how accounting and
accountability is shaped by local contexts. Broadbent’s (1999, p. 53-54) call is specific to international
research (and the public sector). She notes that the socio-cultural complexity of different international
accounting processes systems and accounting’s vision of objectivity do not speak to each other, and is a
critical need for researchers in developed nations like the UK to invest in better understanding how other
accounting processes and systems work. However, there still remains a significant gap in detailed accounts
of the form and function of accounting in accountability practices in non-developed nations. This study
speaks to a framework of accounts where differently defined forms of accountability reflect different
ontologies, contexts and produce varying practices (Roberts, 1991, p. 363).
Visibility and underlying notions of accountability
Hopwood’s work on broadening the role and reach of accounting systems from organizations to society at
large and Burchell et al., (1980) argument on accounting’s ability to become implicated in organizational
processes have come to be foundation stones for alternative accounting research. This literature points to
the selective information and economic visibility granted by accounting systems in control, governance,
monitoring, measurement-quantification (Hopwood, 1987, p. 209-213; Miller & O’Leary, 1987). In so
doing, accounting artifacts contribute to the constitution of a space or field that becomes visible and
amenable to the creation and demanding of an account (Carmona, Ezzamel & Gutierrez, 2002, p. 240). In
turn, the production of such fields is intertwined with underling threads of accountability and interaction
that frame the social structure, meanings and forms of accounting processes.
Accounting researchers have pointed to the need to focus on non-technical context (Roberts & Scapens,
1985; Ahrens, 1989), underlying socio-economic processes and the taken-for-granted (Hopwood, 1987;
Humphery & Miller, 2012). However, research in accounting practice is still considered “piecemeal” in
9
terms of analysis of practice (Roberts & Scapens, 1985, p. 443; Baldvinsdottir et al., 2010, p. 80) with
fragmented focus on particular aspects like efficiency and increased accountability (Roberts & Scapens,
1985, p. 445). Accountability studies in accounting largely focus on a single organization accounts or
activity at non-micro level, offering limited insight and connection to practice (Gray et al., 1997; Pallot,
2003; Gray 1999, 2002; Bebbington & Gray 2001). A significant portion of social accountability studies
focus on private sector organizations (Unerman & O’Dwyer, 2006, p. 350; Gray et al., 1997) in developed
nations such as the US, United Kingdom, and Australia. On the other hand, the third sector is seeing
increasing demands for performance and transparency (Ebrahim, 2005; Unerman & O’Dwyer, 2006)
though accounting conversations around responsibility, visibility and accountability in NGO’s and civil
society remain somewhat sparse.
Budgeting and its connection to accountability
Drawing on the above, this study connects to these sets of literatures by exploring the practice of
devolved/participative budgeting in the implementation of a social services program in India. It focuses on
its unique micro-budgeting system that engages local governance and civil society, exploring micro
construction of the budget and accountability at the micro-meso level. It connects accountability in social
services to accounting practices in several ways:
First, as the definitions above attempt to outline - accountability is a notion and a concept that stands for
different ideas (responsibility, answerability, decision usefulness); relationships (accounting to
organization, family, society, citizens), types (verbal, quantitative, formal, vertical) and actions (recording,
account giving, inquires, audits). However, accountability has to be enacted. It is implemented through
various practices including recording, policies, mechanisms, frameworks and processes where each
moment of accountability is both circumscribed within and congruent with the creation or giving of a formal
or informal account. Thus, as aptly voiced by Ahrens (1996), the connection between accounting and
10
accountability goes much beyond the traditional budgeting, financialization and targets. These study
answers the call for linking accounting with modern “wider rationales” (p. 139) of accountability that
mobilize accounting today.
Second, accounting practices have moved far beyond organizational boundaries to deeply connect and
interact with the “social”, impacting and impacted upon by socio-cultural human interpretations and
interactions. Scott & Lyman (1968) is perhaps one of the earliest sociology papers exploring the link
between “accounts” and social order – as a device that “bridges the gap between action and
expectation…and is standardized within cultures” (p.46). The designing of accountability and “the
languages of accountability” (p.11), as Armstrong (2000) writes, can not only be discursive but also
constrained by its audience, account makers and contextual elements where vocalizing of an account is
sensitive to specific translations of accountability (Hines, 1988; Neu & Graham, 2005). This study will add
to literature allowing a nuanced understanding of the variation in design, delivery and styles of
accountability (Ahrens, 1996) and its connection to accounting practices in the context of social services
programs in developing countries.
Third, the complexity of conceptual/contextual accountability space benefits from in-depth and empirically
grounded research that account for process, structure, history, context and human actions across different
sites. Arrington & Schweiker (1992) argue that not only accounting but also accounting research should be
placed within social context (p. 512). The socio-cultural and institutional background provides the structural
setting to explore how accounting practices are conceived and constructed by human intent and actions.
This detailed account delves into the activities of agents, specific issues and the particular set of policies,
programs and actions that become an accounting practice (Ahrens & Chapman, 2007) delivering
accountability. The practice based research methodology enlisted in this study offers a crucial tool to
explore rich accountability activity in this site and the different ways in such accounting systems get
defined, “embodied” and implicated in systems of accountability.
11
Fourth, the field of social services, which straddles the public, private and third sector, is a particularly
under-explored area in accounting-accountability research (Bracci & Llewellyn, 2012) with a conspicuous
lack of diversity in research sites. Various types of organizations (Llewellyn, 1997; Ebrahim, 2003) sectors
involved in social services are also undergoing a period of strong changes in terms of participation,
accounting and accountability, which facilitate a unique set of observations and understandings. This study
provides a link to the role played by a newer stakeholders like civil society and village governance in
systems of accountability in the social services sector.
IV.
Theoretical Framework
History makes people but people make history (Ortner, 2003, p. 277)
My research orientation and topic lead me to the practice theory framework and in particular to Bourdieu’s
theory of practice and his conceptual machinery of field, habitus and capitals. I also borrow, in part, from
Schatzki’s (2001, p.11) ideas of practice mediated by artifacts and interactions (Schatzki, 2001, p.11).
Management accounting has expanded to include alternate (Hopwood, 1972; Chapman, 1997, p. 192),
pluralistic schools of thought (read Baxter & Chua, 2003) that shed light on diverse aspects of what MCS
touches. Sociological management accounting research views budgets as socially and politically
constructed (Coveleski & Dirsmith, 1988) and socially embedded (Baxter & Chua, 2003). Here “realistic
budgets are an expression of practical politics” (Wildavasky, 1975, p. xii) and constitutive of a specific
reality instead of merely representing an organizational reality (Covaleski & Dirsmith, 1986). These
literatures open dialogues using frameworks from sociologists like Bourdieu and Foucault, to situate and
understand accounting and budgeting systems not only within larger organizational and socio-political
contexts but also connect to systems of power, legitimacy and control (Covaleski & Aiken, 1986; Covaleski
12
and Dirsmith, 1988)…Ezzamel and Bourn, 1990 - The roles of accounting information systems in an
organization experiencing financial crisis
Drawing on this, this study explores accountability as a constructed practice. It draws attention to the a
different type of account and activities through which the practice of accountability is articulated and the
ways in accounting systems are engaged to frame, shape and deliver a specific notion of accountability.
Practice theory
Social theory of practice is the study of the interaction between practice, its socio-cultural background and
human action (Ortner, 1984, p. 150). It focuses on researching practices and practical understandings. Here
practices are not just bodily actions or activities (Reckwitz, 2002) like walking or writing but a represent a
specific “bundle” (Neu, Ruff & Saxton, Forthcoming) or “field” of practices (Schatzki, 2001, p. 11) that
combine internalized knowledge, action and mental settings. They are specific grouping of human
constructed activities that are “embodied and materially mediated around shared practical understandings”
(Schatzki) within the social. This social space or field is the setting in which the nature and transformation
of practices is studied (Schatzki, 2001, p. 11).
A practice theory framework is specifically pertinent to the study of organizational processes as they are
both built around structures, perpetuated practices and shared internalized meanings. Such programs consist
of a space that brings together funding, organizations, people and interactions. Their structure includes an
assemblage of a particular kind of environment (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 72), arrangement of stakeholders,
habitus of accountability and “objective potentialities” (p. 76) that can be looked upon as a field. Specific
notions of accountability represents an assembled cluster of field-specific practices, a “sequence of
programmed actions” (p. 73) that embody structure, agency, action as well as conscious and unconscious
history. The structure could potentially include existing legal and administrative regulations, positional
13
connections and arrangements between donors, implementers and recipients; and specific accounting
artifacts connected to accountabilities required. Within the setting of a field, accounting artifacts represents
physical objects like reports, statements and account registers but also physical activities like meetings and
public gathering around which interactions take place. The specific arrangements in each sub-field allow
selected contextual information to become visible but also provide physical, public objects around which
interactions are structured. The building of a budget or performance indicator or conducting of a social
audit allows the division of the program cycle into separate moments where the practiced notions of
accountability can be isolated and studied. Each such moment constituted by its field, habitus and
positioning of players enlists its specific combination of artifacts and communication/interactions.
Bourdieu’s habitus aids in an investigation of sense-making frameworks and internalized coherence that
represent taken-for-granted accountability and accounting dispositions in NGO’s, government and CBO’s
that can inform and be expressed in structure and action but are no longer questioned by players (Bourdieu,
1977, p. 80; Schtazki, 2001, p. 57). It also allows me to delve into empirical micro-meso level inquiry in
international fields to figure out how practices in such sub-spaces are configured differently.
Theories of practice are gathering increasing interest and employment in the organizational and accounting
literature. They do not have a unified theory or methodology (Ortner 1984, p. 127) but draw on different
theoretical and methodological perspectives. Ahrens & Chapman (2007) are among the earliest to locate
management control as a strategic practice while others like Jorgensen & Messner (2010) extend this
perspective. In organizational theory, studies like Whittington (2006) and Rasche & Chia (2009) pave the
way for a more nuanced understanding of the approach. Schatzki divides practice theorists into
philosophical practice thinkers, social theorists, ethno-methodologists and culture theorists (Schtazki,
2001). Reckwitz (2002) finds all practice theorists including Bourdieu, Foucault, Giddens and Schtazki
(2001) to fall under the definition of culture theorists while Ortner (1984) considers them to be “modern”
practice theorists. Two elements foreground the Practice approach as outlined (Rouse, 2006; Reckwitz,
2002) by theorists such as Bourdieu, Giddens and Schatzki:
14
First, practice theory calls for detailed, empirical accounts and analysis of the everyday activities/practices
that would otherwise be hidden or taken-for-granted. Such practices form “the smallest unit of social
analysis” (Rekwitz, 2002, p. 249). The focus is on “publically accessible” (Rouse, 2006, p. 505) activities
that happen on a physical level external to the actors rather than internal or mental activity. This leads to
logic, process and practice questions regarding how and why certain activities are done a certain way and
be aware of the objective structures and embedded, internalized meanings and understandings (Ahrens &
Chaman, 2007, p.9) underlying such practices.
Second, practice theory represents the interconnectedness rather than dichotomy of social structure/social
order and individual agency/human action. The Social/Culture plays a significant role through embedded
and shared understandings both supported and constrained by the structure of the field. In turn, social order,
structure and culture are understood through the production and transfer of such practices (Rouse, p. 505).
Individual actions and agents that constitute practice are components of the larger social. Accounts drawing
on the practice approach question how practices make up the social field and how the social becomes
embedded in such practices. This leads to questions regarding how the contextual and environmental
elements influence practices and how players create/perpetuate practices within social and cultural settings.
In the words of Ortner (1984)
“The modern versions of practice theory appear unique in accepting all three sides of
the…Triangle: that society is a system, that the system is powerfully constraining, and yet the
system can be made and unmade through human action and interaction” (Ortner, 1984, p. 159)
Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice – Bourdieu’s reflexive construction of notions of field, habitus and capitals
provide excellent empirical tools to explore the hierarchical construction of accountability as a practice in
different socio-cultural settings. Bourdieu argues against the dialectic classical social theory divide between
15
objective and subjective as insufficient to understand social life1. His practice theory is relational and is
constituted by perpetuated objective structures, structural dispositions and subjective aspirations/actions
along with elements of embedded social and human agency (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 77). In order to better
understand it, it is essential to have a firm grasp on his concepts of field, habitus, dispositions and capitals.
Bourdieu’s field is a structured domain that runs on its own special logic and history as well as positioning
of players and capitals. The habitus is constituted by internalized and embedded structural and cultural
dispositions, sensibilities and references that give meaning to the field. It is “understood as a system of
lasting, transposable dispositions which, integrating past experiences, functions at every moment as a
matrix of perceptions, appreciations, and actions and makes possible the achievement of infinitely
diversified tasks” (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 83). The position of a particular player is a function of this habitus,
capital and game playing skills. The field structures the habitus and relational capitals or powers held by
players. It is also the background against which humans act and strategize using their capitals to their
advantage. This arrangement is the site for struggles to define new arrangements. However, not all moves
are based on logic and reason. Habitus, dispositions and doxa represent the internalized social order that
constrain these players and also determines which capitals hold greater legitimacy in the field.
Wacquant’s advice to us was also unequivocally a caution to those who in Valerie Hey’s phrase
use Bourdieu as ‘intellectual hairspray’. If, after removing references to Bourdieusian concepts,
our paper remains intact, then we have failed to really work with Bourdieu (Davey, 20082)
Schatzki’s (2001, p. 11, 51) views interconnected “nexus of practices” as a part of a social order, an
arrangement medicated by interaction of actors supported by artifacts. These theoretical concepts provide
the tools to explore the practices of PI, budgeting and Social audit through a combination of artifacts, which
could include physical accounting systems, accounting documents and reports; and the interactions that
1
2
A reflective understanding of society
CSERC Conference, University of South Hampton, United Kingdom
16
could comprise of gathering, forming, recording, communication and negotiation, around such artifacts
(Neu, Saxston & Ruff, forthcoming). For example, Neu et al., (2013) explore internal control practices in
government contracts and the social interactions around them to showcase the workings of corruption, while
Ezzamel et al., (2012) look at the artifacts of budgeting practices and the organizational interactions that
produce conflicting roles and meanings for budgetary representation (p. 301).
V.
MGNREGS-Background
The modern ideology of the “Welfare State” and the resulting Social Security System, a prominent element
of social life in developed nations, has become the centre of theoretical, political and practical debates from
diverse lenses including political science, political economy, economics, government policy and sociology.
These debates stem from its form, implementation, delivery, coverage, sustainability, efficiency and
efficacy. However, social security and its associated workfare programs in developing countries are based
on different national ideologies, a reflection of their contextual socio-political environment which has had
a significant impact on the economic shape of such programs (Tinker, 1980, p. 158). Workfare or “Workfor-Welfare” represents a type of non-entitlement welfare program where citizens receive state support and
benefits conditional on mandatory economic participation in the shape of paid work, job search and study
or training (Saunders, 2005). In many developed countries it has replaced traditional welfare services
support for the unemployed. In developing and underdeveloped countries, without a security net for the
unprotected, workfare programs have come to fill a variety of purposes – crisis cash & food, income,
employment, skill development and building public infrastructure, reflecting a variety of structures,
strategies and institutional arrangements. Some are called “cash-for-work” or “conditional cash exchange”
programs funded by International aid organizations like the WorldBank while others are “Public Works”,
short and long term programs are funded by the central/federal government. They all involve state support
in return for, usually, work.
17
The MGNREGA is a centrally sponsored, demand driven social security scheme with a public delivery
system that is considered by the Indian government to be a “paradigm shift from earlier wage employment
programs” as the government has legislated to allow citizen participation at the rural level. The program in
many ways is defined by its accounting and accountability systems. MGNREGA is ground breaking in
several ways – it is rights-based as the NREGA legislation gives the rural citizens and minorities the right
to work and the right to participate. It allows self-selection as rural citizens and households choose to enroll
and must be provided employment; it is demand driven, with the government releases funds in response to
the level of employment requested; and it is bottom-up, where planning, budgeting, implementation and
accountability is built from the ground level.
“NREGA is the first ever law internationally, that guarantees wage employment at an unprecedented scale.
The primary objective of the Act is augmenting wage employment” 3.
NRGEA grants employment and right to the poorest in India. It guarantees 100 days of employment in one
financial year to any rural family willing to do unskilled work. The program not only aims to enhance
livelihood but also aims to generate local assets, empower women and minorities and stem migration to
urban areas.. With the 2011 Indian government census showing approximately 83%4 of India’s population
of 1.21 billion as residing in rural India, this is a massive program in terms of coverage. It initially started
with 200 districts in phase one in 2006, and eventually covering all of India except 100% urban areas
(Outline, p.2). MNREGS is also unmatched in financial outlay, generating more than 11 billion persondays of work through an investment of approximately Rs. 15,000 million or $30 billion in the last six years
up to 2012 (Revision-p.1).
VI.
Unbundling the Budgeting Practice
3
4
http://nrega.nic.in/circular/Report_to_the_people.pdf
http://censusindia.gov.in/2011-prov-results/paper2/data_files/india/Rural_Urban_2011.pdf
18
NREGA is highly decentralized and based on India’s and Mahatma Gandhi’s concept of “Panchayati Raj”
or self governance system at the local/village level. It has three major local tiers – Village or Gram, Block
or Tehsil; and District or Zilla level. The “Gram Panchayat” or the governing committee at the village level
is the primary unit. At the village level, stakeholders include villagers, Gram Panchayat and Gram Sabha,
a village level public assembly. A block can have between 20-100 villages and consists of IntermediateBlock level Janpad Panchayat and the Block Officer. The District level is the third local tier consisting of
the District or Zilla Panchayat and the District Program Coordinator. Above this are the State Government
(State Government Guarantee Council) and the Central Government (Central Employment Guarantee
Council, Ministry of Rural Development). Currently India’s 35 states/provinces have a total of 655 districts,
239,510 Gram Panchayats, 6,316 Block Panchayats and 589 District Panchayats (Ministry of Panchayati
Raj, Govt. of India5). Job creation and therefore budgets are constructed on the basis of demand from the
village level. NREGA has devolved its financial dispersal system and stipulates that Gram Panchayats be
responsible for at least 50% of the works are to be implemented at the Gram Panchayat level. Given the
immense scale and scope of the program and the level of decentralization in planning, implementation management control systems are crucial to the program.
Field and Capitals
At the design level, MGNREGA is based on the regulative power granted through the MGNRGE Act; rights
of the citizens; and Policy and due process (ILO, 2010). Devolved budgeting and management systems are
connected to tradeoffs between empowerment and inefficiencies (Otley, 2003, p. 320). This is especially
relevant when local social processes are inscribed within institutional arrangements that “defined the logic
of the situation” (Lewellyn, 1998, p. 293) but also shaping such accounting systems to contextual
influences. In the MGNREG scheme, the federal and provincial governments are major players in the field
of delivery of this social services program but the Gram Panchayat at the Village level is the most important
5
http://panchayatdirectory.gov.in/
19
in terms of project decisions and implementation. The federal government sets out the base guidelines
(Guidelines, 2008, 2013), the provincial government’s meso vision has a strong impact on resources,
implementation and in-practice accountability (Interview 35). Other stakeholders include district, block and
village governance as well as beneficiaries, rural citizens, community based organizations and nongovernmental organizations. Each level of public governance has its hierarchy, so an administrative
structure aimed at citizen involvement can seem to be somewhat complex.
At the village sub-field level, the villagers are the primary stakeholders (Guidelines, 2013, p. 5). They are
represented by the elected governance committee, made up of the Panchayat Sarpanch or President and
usually 4 other Panch’s or ward members. The government is represented by the Panchayat secretary;
and/or panchayat clerk. The Block office is represented by the Deputy Block Development Officer. Each
of these are gatekeepers with specific capitals and power. The government employees hold administrative
power that comes from due process of the budget construction. The President and Ward members are
representatives accountable to the people who elect them. The President as the micro level citizen
representative holds social or cultural capital. He/She is already someone of importance in the village, based
on public support, caste, financial and physical resources; or personal connections. Interview with a Village
President (Number #8) outlines how his business connections and comparative wealth as a businessman
made him a prime candidate where the village insisted that he represent their financial interests as the
President. Once elected, his position allows him additional access to economic capital - he is key to the
making and signing off on financial decisions regarding works, materials and contractors. He is not only
part of program execution and finances but also the keeper of public records. All registers maintained in
the Panchayat office are under his keeping – “he is the connection between the village and the government.
He connects to the village, he connects to the government and they both connect each other” (Interview 25Page 2). Every budget resolution, budget document and supporting financial and non-financial register has
signatures from both the Village President and the Village secretary representing the citizens and the
government, respectively. Since funding is deposited straight from the state level to the account of village
20
beneficiaries and president (for materials), other government officials at the block and district offices are
largely holders of positional power. Their designation determines their level of power.
The structure and functioning of this sub-field is also impacted upon by individuals and positions that can
demand an account – through mechanisms such as includes monthly financial reporting; MIS reports or
audits by the National and state level monitors as well as audit and vigilance departments. Though reporting
is institutionalized, audits represent a strong mechanism for transparency and vigilance which can be a
strong deterrent to financial fraud. Since roles and responsibilities are clearly laid out, identifying
individuals who are at fault is possible. The legislative Act supporting this Scheme provides for symbolic
capital and power at the local citizen level. However, this was not in evidence in the beginning of program
implementation. This will be discussed in more detail later.
Construction of the Labour Budget - the major accounting artifact
The Labour budget is the major accounting artifact in this process, an expression of the anticipated amount
of work demanded as well as the timing for demand of such work (Guidelines, 2012, p. 49). According to
the Program guidelines (2005), it includes an assessment of the labour demand; identification of works to
meet the estimated labour demand; estimated cost of works and Labour; and benefits from employment and
asset generation (Guidelines, 2005, p. 15). Though it is the mandated responsibility of the District Program
Coordinator (DPC) at the District level, its construction begins at the Gram Sabha at the village level. The
village household is its basic unit (Interview #4)
6.1.2 Labour Budget (LB) entails planning, approval and funding under MGNREGA. Sub-section 6 of
Section 14 of the MGNREGA mandates that the District Programme Coordinator (DPC) under MGNREGA
shall prepare in the month of December every year, a labour budget for the next financial year containing the
21
details of anticipated demand for unskilled manual work in the district and the plan for engagement of
workers in the works covered under the programme. (Guidelines, 2008, p. 49)
6.1.3 It is mandated that LBs be prepared in accordance with the process prescribed in sections 13 to 16 of
MGNREGA. This process is detailed in later parts of this chapter. The DPC has to ensure strict adherence to
the principles of bottom-up approach from planning to approval of the selected shelf of projects by each of
the Gram Sabhas (GSs) in the district. (Guidelines, 2008, p. 49)
The first level of budgeting process is the village Gram Panchayat, responsible for the Annual Development
Plan, which involves the assessment of labor demand and construction of a prioritized “shelf of projects”
that have technical and administrative approval. The Gram Panchayat is the crucial implementing agency.
It is here that the most important element of this structure and process kicks in - the legislative power
granted to the micro village level. It creates the different between citizens that may contribute to the process
and citizens here, which by law, have a right to contribute to these decisions.
The Gram Sabha also decides the priority of the work to be taken up6.The Block and District Panchayat can
add to this list of works but Gram Sabha has the right to accept, amend or reject these additions. Gram
Sabha can also make a priority list of projects including or excluding these Block/district additions.
Administrative and technical approval for these projects is given by the Janpad Panchayat and processed
by the village secretary, who is also responsible for maintaining the muster roll and keeping track of
inventories of labour and materials. From the District level, each district has to prepare a shelf of projects
and Panchayat Raj Institutions (PRIs) have a principal role in planning and implementation.
“In the Gram Sabha, they call all the people of the village. In that they will read the resolutions, about what
works the Panchayat Secretary and ward members have selected. They will also ask the villagers in the Gram
6
http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article3401398.ece
22
Sabah, if needed. That will also be included in the list and the list will be getting approved from the people.”
(Interview 2)
“Every month there is a meeting with ward members. In the Gram sabha, Ward members will voice the
requirements of their area and after that works will be selected. If the funds they have is enough in the
Panchayat fund, then they will do that works. If more funds are required they will send it to the District
Collector, through the BDO. In the ward member meeting, they will collect a list of works which becomes
the shelf of works.” (Interview 2)
The Labour Budget process therefore begins with the government approved dates for these special Gram
Sabha’s to take place. Once the Block office and the Village Council is informed, steps are taken to have
this information available to the largely uneducated villagers. This includes public drummers, who walk
about drumming and make announcements of upcoming special Gram Sabha’s, wall paintings. In some
cases educated villagers, village presidents or volunteers or members of a local Non-governmental
organization could also be a part of this process. In the public hearing that is supposed to include but is not
limited to stakeholders like villagers, program beneficiaries, educated and retired village members who are
educated or have travelled beyond the village, Village governance committee, Block level representative,
District level representatives and others including NGO’s and other observers. Either through ward
members bringing in work project recommendations or a publicly collective decision on project that are
needed by the village and are a fit in terms of number of villagers who have demanded work, the village
comes to a decision.
Each village goes through a similar process and makes a a shelf-of-works which is converted into a written
budget document with the help of the relevant appointed government official like the deputy Block
development officer. After being passed by the Gram sabha, the labour budget is constructed and approved
by the BDO, block level and forwarded to Program Officer (PO).
23
“She (Deputy BDO) is a link between gram Panchayat, BDO and DRDO. Her sole responsibility is the
Labour Budget as she is the one who calls from the Panchayat to give all the works selected. She is the one
who talks to the BDO directly. She collects, compiles and with a covering letter submits the Labour Budget
to the BDO” (Translated interview of DY BDO)
Project plans and decisions made by rural citizens in this special Gram Sabha are largely binding, based on
the MGNREG Act. An approved budget that comes up from the village-block level, as legislated by the
NREGA law, cannot be turned down. MGNREGA regulation ensures that these decisions cannot be
overturned by higher authorities, except to conform to the law (Ministry of Rural Development, 2012).
4.4.6 Once all the Gram Panchayat Plans have been received, the PO will scrutinize the GP’s Development
Plan for its technical feasibility. The Programme Officer will not reject a work proposed by the Gram
Panchayat. If the proposal is not within the parameters of the Act, or appears technically unfeasible, the
Programme Officer will return it to the Gram Panchayat for it to replace it with a valid proposal. (Guidelines,
2005, p. 16)
4.4.7 The Intermediate Panchayat will maintain the priority among different works indicated by the Gram
Panchayats. It is possible that there may be a need for works that involve more than one Gram Panchayat.
Only such works will be included by the Intermediate Panchayat. (Guidelines, 2008, p. 17)
4.4.8 The District Programme Coordinator will scrutinize the Block plans, examining the appropriateness
and adequacy of works in terms of likely demand as well as their technical and financial feasibility…but in
doing so, the priorities of the Gram Panchayat and the priorities of inter Gram Panchayat works as
indicated in the Block Plan by the Intermediate Panchayats will be maintained. (Guidelines, 2008, p. 17)
This level of budget is built with the technical aid of the local Development Officer who works with the
Panchayat plan. Though there a master list of projects from the central government, the Gram Panchayat at
24
the base level has the right and the responsibility to prepare and approve the list of public-works projects
which will be undertaken when work is demanded. Decisions regarding types and duration of works and
site selections are discussed and ratified at the village level through an open village-level public
assembly/discussion called the Gram Sabha. The Gram Sabha is presided over by the head of the village
governance committee (SarPanch) or the Gram Panchayat President, committee ward members, who are
elected by the villagers as well as government employees including the technical officer, Panchayat
Secretary, Block development officer (BDO) and other officers (Interview # 38)
Supporting Accounting artifacts
Budgets require approval and consolidation at each level- the block, the district and then state level, which
are finally presented to the federal government and declared as the federal labour budget for this scheme.
The PO consolidates the GS proposals, scrutinizes plans for technical feasibility and forwards it to the
Intermediate Gram Panchayat for approval. PO then approves, collates and submits Block Plans to the
District Programme Coordinator (DPC). Through this process, the budget construction is supported by
many other accounting artifacts. Operations budget includes material, labour and administrative costs while
the financial budget includes fund flow and cash statements. Once the project decisions are approved at the
block level, they are turned into the operational budgets based on material and labour guidelines assigned
to specific projects and then consolidated into the financial budget. Each budget process ends with the
release of the first tranche of funds by the federal government. Since the state level budgets are based on
estimated demand for work at the village level, each new budget is evaluated at the provincial and federal
level in terms of the previous year’s household demand, days of employment demanded and expenditure.
Aside from actual monthly performance that are a part of the MIS and Management Control System (MCS),
a multitude of account registers are constructed at the village level and maintained at the block level office.
The labour budget is a function of work demanded and records maintained at the Gram Panchayat level.
Each of these records is essential to either the operations budgeting or financial budgeting process. These
25
registers are maintained at the Village level in the Gram Panchayat office, open to perusal and scrutiny of
the rural public. They form base inputs and starting points in the program and are imperative to the program
implementation. They facilitate the capture and visibility of financial and non-financial information at the
village, block and district level. This recording, visibility and access to records at the village and block level
make actual local governance involvement in implementation as well as transparency and accountability
possible. These accounts are also critical to assess program performance, outputs and outcomes (Guidelines,
2008, p. 48)
“There is the resolution register in the Gram Sabha. All the list of works will be entered in the register. That
register is called the Resolution Register. It will be with the Panachayat. The Panchayat clerk writes in it”
(Interview #2)
Operational Registers that record works, materials, work demand and employment granted include:

Job Card Application Register

Job Card Register

Muster Roll Issue Registers

Tender/Contract Register

Works Register

Complaints
Financial registers that deal with incomes and expenditures, assets and liabilities include:

Asset Register

Cash Book and Ledger

Monthly receipt and expenditure register

Bank Reconciliation statement folder

Materials procured register

Monthly Allotment and Utilization Certificate Watch Register
26

Financial records
Habitus of Accountability
“Habitus could be considered as a subjective but not individual system of internalized structures, schemes
of perceptions, conception and action common to all members of the same group or class” (Bourdieu, 1977,
p. 86). A habitus of Accountability at the micro level could include experiential, social and biological
factors, a product of objective structures and “collective history” (p. 85) where “history turned into nature”.
It would be a function of the objective structures and processes for accountability set up by the federal and
provincial government as well as the manner in which such accountability is expressed through actors,
positions and capitals at the local village level – consisting of rural citizens, scheme beneficiaries, elected
and government representatives. This accumulated habitus of accountability at the micro level in the first
years of the scheme seems to be distinctly influenced by the underlying habitus of rural social life, structure,
stratification and position holders. Interviews (# 51 & #55) reflect the power and status held by local
landlords and village President, who colluding with the secretary could have significant power to use
program funds effectively or subvert program finances with relative ease.
Giving the multitude of upward and downward reporting and accountability relationships as well as the
control and monitoring systems in this sub-field, demand capture and capacity building are big concerns.
This demand capture allows work to reach the rural citizen and the capacity includes program and rights
awareness, financial education, support for citizen vigilance and monitoring at the Gram Sabha level and
social audits. The capacity of this practice to increase accountability is dependent on feedback loops that
contribute towards accumulated learning, knowledge of due-process and rights and micro-regulation and
accountability. As Wignaraja & Balassanian (2006) mention, this applies to living organisms and people,
to organizations and to societies (p.4). Bourdieu discusses this in terms of fields and sub-fields gradually
adjusting to changed circumstances that enter and become integrated into their habitus over the longer term.
27
Interviews with largely uneducated rural citizens, presidents and ward members elicited consistent
responses mentioning asset registers, job cards, electronic fund management systems and bank books,
which was shocking to say the least. With successive years of scheme implementation and budget
construction, there seems to be a gradual change in both process and financial thinking and action at the
citizen level. Many beneficiary interviewees were vocal about their thoughts, now knew how and where to
demand work, and also to keep track of funds coming to their accounts. Compared to the first few years of
the program, there was an increased micro level confidence in their knowledge of works projects needed
and being proposed. At the village and block level, there was also an increased level of financial awareness
with regards to the costing of a project, specifically labour and materials used and contractors hired. With
an increased awareness of their financial rights, they would speak up in the Gram Sabha if things were not
as they should be. The provincial government supported this awareness through exercises like wall painting,
use of public drums, discussions between workers and grievance redressal mechanisms at the Gram Sabha,
Block and District level. At one site, the village women knew of weekly grievance redressal meeting at the
District Collector (DC). If they had an issue or grievance, they would bypass the village and block levels
to speak directly to the DC. Secondary support from the provincial government also came through an
increased focus on transparency from public personnel and records, regular financial audits and MIS also
contributed to higher levels of accountability at the micro level. In interviews, villagers sited higher
attendances at the special Gram Sabha’s and an increased interest in maintaining private accounts and
keeping track of their personal funds as this allotted funding. There was a sense of ownership that came
with knowledge of their financial rights. This was now their own money, money that belonged to their
village.
Consecutive cycles of budget construction, followed by grant of work and salaries and finally completion
of work, combined with efforts of the government and social audit organizations to increase process
awareness and to provide reliable recourse to complaints as well as discussions amongst the village
28
members. This gradually changed the way the scheme was perceived, implemented and monitored at the
village level, extending the traditional accountability loop to include rural citizens (Wignaraja &
Balassanian, 2006)
VII.
Conclusion
This study explores a unique set of budgeting practices that not only engage local governance and civil
society but also constructs a particular form of accountability among participants at the micro village level.
I explore the process through which this budget and through it accountability is constructed; the legislation
that powers it and the accounting artifacts that are a part of the delivery of this social services program. I
draw on Bourdieu’s theory of practice to outline the habitus of accountability within this sub-field and also
shifts in such habitus, capitals and powers held over the course of MGNREG program implementation. In
part from lack of awareness and recourse, rural citizens did not play the federal envisioned significant part
in financial and operational monitoring and accountability at the local level. With provincial focus on
transparency, the levels of information, monitoring and accountability have gradually increased at the
district, block and especially the village governance and citizen level. The changes have lead to a change
in the internalized ideas about accounting through work and project numbers. Also, changes in the way they
view project funds, project details and recourse there is a change in the habitus of accountability at the local
level. This is witnessed in the micro level changes in village level attitudes that have become normalized –
basic knowledge about beneficiary rights and who is responsible for providing them, where to get such
information or how and to whom to make your voice heard. This study adds to the literature that not only
outlines the intersection of the accounting and the field of social services but also investigates the role of
accounting artifacts and their role in structuring the field and construction of accountability at the micro
level.
29
References
Adler, P. S., & Chen, C. X. (2011). Combining creativity and control: Understanding individual
motivation in large-scale collaborative creativity. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 36(2), 63-85.
Ahrens, T. (1996). Styles of accountability. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 21(2), 139-173.
Ahrens, T., & Chapman, C. S. (2007). Management accounting as practice. Accounting, Organizations
and Society, 32(1), 1-27.
Armstrong, P. (2000). Designing accountability: the managerial semiotics project. Critical Perspectives
on Accounting, 11(1), 1-22.
Awio, G., Lawrence, S., & Northcott, D. (2007). Community-led initiatives: reforms for better
accountability? Journal of Accounting & Organizational Change, 3(3), 209-226.
Balassanian, D & Wignaraja, K. (2006). Institutional Reform And Change Management: Managing
Change In Public Sector Organisations; United Nations Development Programme.
Bebbington, J., & Gray, R. (2001). An account of sustainability: failure, success and a
reconceptualization. Critical perspectives on accounting, 12(5), 557-588.
Bourdieu, P. (1977). Outline of a Theory of Practice (Vol. 16). Cambridge university press.
Bourdieu, P. (1989). Social space and symbolic power. Sociological theory, 7(1), 14-25.
Bracci, E., & Llewellyn, S. (2012). Accounting and accountability in an Italian social care provider:
Contrasting people-changing with people-processing approaches. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability
Journal, 25(5), 806-834.
Brennan, N. M., & Solomon, J. (2008). Corporate governance, accountability and mechanisms of
accountability: an overview. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 21(7), 885-906.
Broadbent, J., & Laughlin, R. (2003). Control and legitimation in government accountability processes:
the private finance initiative in the UK. Critical perspectives on accounting, 14(1), 23-48.
Brownell, P. (1982). A field study examination of budgetary participation and locus of control.
Brownell, P., & Merchant, K. A. (1990). The budgetary and performance influences of product
standardization and manufacturing process automation. Journal of Accounting Research, 388-397.
Burchell, S., Clubb, C., Hopwood, A., Hughes, J., & Nahapiet, J. (1980). The roles of accounting in
organizations and society. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 5(1), 5-27.
Carmona, S., M. Ezzamel, et al. (2002). "The relationship between accounting and spatial practices in the
factory." Accounting, Organizations and Society 27(3): 239-274.
Chenhall, R. H. (2003). Management control systems design within its organizational context: findings
from contingency-based research and directions for the future. Accounting, organizations and society,
28(2), 127-168.
Chenhall, R. H., Hall, M., & Smith, D. (2010). Social capital and management control systems: a study of
a non-government organization. Accounting, organizations and Society, 35(8), 737-756.
Chenhall, R. H., M. Hall, et al. (2010). "Social capital and management control systems: A study of a
non-government organization." Accounting, Organizations and Society 35(8): 737-756.
Chow, C. W., Cooper, J. C., & Waller, W. S. (1988). Participative budgeting: Effects of a truth-inducing
pay scheme and information asymmetry on slack and performance. Accounting Review, 111-122.
30
Davila, T. (2000). An empirical study on the drivers of management control systems' design in new
product development. Accounting, organizations and society, 25(4), 383-409.
Davison, J., & Warren, S. (2009). Imag [in] ing accounting and accountability. Accounting, Auditing &
Accountability Journal, 22(6), 845-857.
De Waal, A., Hermkens-Janssen, M., & van de Ven, A. (2011). The evolutionary adoption framework:
explaining the budgeting paradox. Journal of Accounting & Organizational Change, 7(4), 316-336.
Dubnick, M & Justice, J.B. (2004). Accounting for Accountability. Paper presented at Annual Meeting of
American Political Science Association, September 2004.
Ebrahim, A. (2003). "Accountability In Practice: Mechanisms for NGOs." World Development 31(5):
813-829.
Edward Arrington, C., & Schweiker, W. (1992). The rhetoric and rationality of accounting research.
Accounting, Organizations and Society, 17(6), 511-533.
Ezzamel, M., K. Robson, et al. (2007). "Discourse and institutional change: ˜Giving accounts" and
accountability." Management Accounting Research 18(2): 150-171.
Financial Express (2006). "2009 Union Budget Highlights." 2013-2014, from
http://www.financialexpress.com/budget-2009-highlights#.
Fisher, J., Frederickson, J. R., & Peffer, S. A. (2002). The effect of information asymmetry on negotiated
budgets: An empirical investigation. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 27(1), 27-43.
Goddard, A. (2005). "Accounting and NPM (New Public Management) in UK local government
contributions towards governance and accountability." Financial Accountability & Management 21(2):
191-218.
Gray, A., & Jenkins, B. (1993). Codes of accountability in the new public sector. Accounting, Auditing &
Accountability Journal, 6(3).
Gray, R. (1992). Accounting and environmentalism: an exploration of the challenge of gently accounting
for accountability, transparency and sustainability. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 17(5), 399425.
Gray, R., & Laughlin, R. (2012). It was 20 years ago today: Sgt Pepper, Accounting, Auditing &
Accountability Journal, green accounting and the blue meanies. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability
Journal, 25(2), 228-255.
Gray, R., Bebbington, J., & Collison, D. (2006). NGOs, civil society and accountability: making the
people accountable to capital. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 19(3), 319-348.
Gray, R., Dey, C., Owen, D., Evans, R., & Zadek, S. (1997). Struggling with the praxis of social
accounting: stakeholders, accountability, audits and procedures. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability
Journal, 10(3), 325-364.
Hines, R. D. (1988). Financial accounting: in communicating reality, we construct reality. Accounting,
Organizations and Society, 13(3), 251-261.
Hopper, T., Tsamenyi, M., Uddin, S., & Wickramasinghe, D. (2009). Management accounting in less
developed countries: what is known and needs knowing. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal,
22(3), 469-514.
Hopwood, A. G. (1983). On trying to study accounting in the contexts in which it operates. Accounting,
Organizations and Society, 8(2), 287-305.
31
Hopwood, A. G. (1987). The archeology of accounting systems. Accounting, organizations and society,
12(3), 207-234.
India, G. o. (2008). Mahatma Gandhi Rural Employment Guarantee Act, 2005 - Operational Guidelines
2008. M. o. R. D. D. o. R. Development. New Delhi.
India, G. o. (2013). Mahatma Gandhi Rural Employment Guarantee Act, 2005 - Operational Guidelines
2013. M. o. R. D. D. o. R. Development. New Delhi.
Iyoha, F. O., & Oyerinde, D. (2010). Accounting infrastructure and accountability in the management of
public expenditure in developing countries: A focus on Nigeria. Critical Perspectives on Accounting,
21(5), 361-373.
Joannides, V. (2012). Accounterability and the problematics of accountability. Critical Perspectives on
Accounting, 23(3), 244-257.
Libby, T. (1999). The influence of voice and explanation on performance in a participative budgeting
setting. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 24(2), 125-137.
Llewellyn, S. (1998). "Boundary work: Costing and caring in the social services." Accounting,
Organizations and Society 23(1): 23-47.
Mayston, D. J. (1998). Devolved budgeting, formula funding and equity. Management Accounting
Research, 9(1), 37-54.
Merchant, K. A. (1981). The design of the corporate budgeting system: influences on managerial behavior
and performance. Accounting Review, 813-829.
Messner, M. (2009). The limits of accountability. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 34(8), 918-938.
Miller, P., & O'leary, T. (1987). Accounting and the construction of the governable person. Accounting,
Organizations and Society, 12(3), 235-265.
Molisa, P. (2011). A spiritual reflection on emancipation and accounting. Critical Perspectives on
Accounting, 22(5), 453-484.
Neu, D., & Graham, C. (2005). Editorial: accounting research and the public interest. Accounting,
Auditing & Accountability Journal, 18(5), 585-591.
Neu, D., Everett, J., Rahaman, A. S., & Martinez, D. (2013). Accounting and networks of corruption.
Accounting, Organizations and Society, 38(6), 505-524.
Ortner, Sherry B. (1984). Theory in Anthropology since the Sixties. Comparative Studies in Society and
History 26, 126-66.
O’Dwyer, B., & Unerman, J. (2008). The paradox of greater NGO accountability: A case study of
Amnesty Ireland. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 33(7), 801-824.
Parker, L.D., & Gould I. (1999), ‘Changing Public Sector Accountability: Critiquing New Directions’,
Accounting Forum, Vol. 23, No. 2, pp. 109–35.
Patton, J. M. (1992). Accountability and governmental financial reporting. Financial Accountability &
Management, 8(3), 165-180.
Quattrone, P. (2004). Accounting for God: accounting and accountability practices in the Society of Jesus
(Italy, XVI–XVII centuries). Accounting, organizations and society, 29(7), 647-683.
Rasche, A. & Chia, R. (2009). Researching strategy practices: a genealogical social theory perspective.
Organization Studies 30(7): 713-734.
32
Reckwitz, A. (2002). Toward a Theory of Social Practices A development in culturalist theorizing.
European journal of social theory 5(2): 243-263.
Roberts, J. (1991). "The possibilities of accountability." Accounting, Organizations and Society 16(4):
355-368.
Roberts, J., & Scapens, R. (1985). Accounting systems and systems of accountability—understanding
accounting practices in their organisational contexts. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 10(4), 443456.
Schatzki, T. R. (2001). Practice mind-ed orders. The practice turn in contemporary theory, 42-55.
Scott, M. B., & Lyman, S. M. (1968). Accounts. American sociological review, 46-62.
Shields, J. F., & Shields, M. D. (1998). Antecedents of participative budgeting. Accounting,
Organizations and Society, 23(1), 49-76.
Sinclair, A. (1995), “The chameleon of accountability: forms and discourses”, Accounting, Organizations
and Society, Vol. 20 Nos 2/3, pp. 219-237.
Smyth, S. "Contesting public accountability: A dialogical exploration of accountability and social
housing." Critical Perspectives on Accounting 23(3): 230-243.
Spence, C. (2009). Social accounting's emancipatory potential: a Gramscian critique. Critical
Perspectives on Accounting, 20(2), 205-227.
Tinker, A. M. (1980). Towards a political economy of accounting: an empirical illustration of the
Cambridge controversies. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 5(1), 147-160.
Tinker, A. M., Merino, B. D., & Neimark, M. D. (1982). The normative origins of positive theories:
ideology and accounting thought. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 7(2), 167-200.
Wignaraja, K. and D. Balassanian (2006) INSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND CHANGE
MANAGEMENT: MANAGING CHANGE IN PUBLIC SECTOR ORGANISATIONS.
Wildavsky, A. B. (1964). Politics of the budgetary process.
Willmott, H. (1996). Thinking accountability: accounting for the disciplined production of self.
Accountability: Power, ethos and the technologies of managing, 23-39.
33