TOPICS IN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
Ph.D. in Economics
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
2011/2012
Instructors: Albert Ma, Roger Feldman & Emmanuel Petrakis
1.- Industrial Organization Introduction
2.- Practise Work Analysis
3.- Skills in the Labor Market
4.- Health Insurances for consumers and suppliers payments
5.- Adverse selection in Health Market
6.- Medical Services Quality
COURSE OUTLINE AND OBJECTIVES
This course aims to get students ready for theoretical research in health markets matters.
It is designed as a discussion between researchers. The main subject is integration and
links between theory and practice in Health Economy.
The main objectives of the course is teaching skills within the IO literature and helping
students to develope the subjects ot their Master Thesis to make their first researching
steps as easy as they could be.
SOME READINGS
Zeckhauser, Richard, 1970, “Medical Insurance: A Case Study of the Tradeoff between Risk
Spreading and Appropriate Incentives,” Journal of Economic Theory, 2, 10-26
Pauly, Mark, 1968, “The Economics of Moral Hazard: Comment,” American Economic
Review, 58, 531-537
Ma, Ching-to Albert and Michael H. Riordan, 2002, “Health Insurance, Moral Hazard, and
Managed Care,” Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 11, 81-107
Blomqvist, Ake, 1997, “Optimal non-linear health insurance,” Journal of Health Economics,
16, 303 – 321
Ma, Ching-to Albert, 1994, “Health Care Payment Systems: Cost and Quality Incentives,”
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 3, 93-112
Ma, Ching-to Albert, 1998, “Cost and Quality Incentive in Health Care: A Reply,” Journal of
Economics & Management Strategy, 7, 139-142, 1998.
Barros, Pedro Pita, 2003, “Cream-skimming, Incentives for Efficiency and Payment System,”
Journal of Health Economics, 22, 419-443.
Jack, William, 2005, “Purchasing health care services from providers with unknown altruism,”
Journal of Health Economics, 24, 73-94.
Ma, Ching-to Albert and Thomas G. McGuire, 1997, “Optimal Health Insurance and Provider
Payment,” American Economic Review, 87, 685-704.
Jacob Glazer, and Thomas G. McGuire, 2000, “Optimal Risk Adjustment in Markets with
Adverse Selection: An Application to Managed Care,” American Economics Review, 90, 10551071.
David M. Cutler and Sarah Reber, 1998, “The Tradeoff between Competition and Adverse
Selection,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113, 433-466.
Miller, Nolan, 2004, “Pricing Health Benefits: A Cost-Minimizing Approach,” Journal of
Health Economics, 24, 2005, 931-949.
Richard G. Frank, Jacob Glazer, Thomas G. McGuire, 2000 “Measuring Adverse Selection in
Managed Health Care,”, Journal of Health Economics, 19, 829-854.
Ma, Ching-to Albert, 2004 “Managed Care and Shadow Price,” Health Economics, 13, 199202.
Ma, Ching-to Albert and Thomas G. McGuire, 2002, “Network Incentives in Managed Health
Care,” Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 2002, 11, 1-36.
Glazer, Jacob, and Thomas G. McGuire, 2006, “Optimal Quality Reporting in Markets for
Health Plans,” Journal of Health Economics, 25, 295-310