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Schedule:
Nov. 2014- Finish proposal. Chapter documents with relevant quotes in dropbox, including
marginal notes of Book II material.
Spring 2015- Ohm takes candidacy exams early semester.
Summer- Ohm and Cogburn work on book.
Fall 2015- Ohm teaches book (Cogburn sits in). Finish manuscript.
Spring 2016- Submit to Open Court.
NEITHER/NOR: TRISTAN GARCIA AND THE DIALECTICS OF PERSISTANCE
INTRODUCTION – TRISTAN GARCIA AND THE SPECULATIVE TURN
*From Speculations piece?
I. NEITHER SUBSTANCE, NOR PROCESS I: ANTI-REDUCTIONISM
Neither Undermining/Nor Overmining
Neither more than a thing/ nor less than a thing (overmining/undermining, anti-correlationism,
anti-reductionism, and anti-compactness here)
129-130 great quotes for undermining and overmining
Interlude: Theories of Reduction
Get in every relevant quote from Garcia and show exactly what he’s denying. Maybe
supervenience ontological dependence literature?
No-Matter-What-Is-Something
4, 12-13, 19-23 [(against different strategies to prevent no-matter-what from existing; move if
no-matter-what covered elsewhere). Affirmation of no-matter-what really is his critique of
reductionism, of which correlationism is one form.], 35, 39- , 114, 118 (really nice!)
De-determination as a method (tied to no-matter-what (19-23))
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No-matter-what-is-something
50-
II. NEITHER ANALYTIC NOR DIALECTIC
Note
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Analysis
Maybe use discussion in Kirkham truth book. Do some criticisms here because tends to equate
analysis with undermining (can quote Moore) ignoring ramsification and implicit definition, but
his criticism of relationism would kick in here, so just punt to that section. Also discuss analytic
dogma of consistency. Note that Garcia himself does credible analytic philosophy in time
chapter.
Dialectics
Maybe Hegel MLK notes?
102 Aufhebung (don’t understand what his argument is but he’s critiquing holism, which usually
goes with dialectics). 128 similar. 149 critiques monism.
Schelling quote here!
Contradictory Objects (can include stuff from Josh paper about ex falso quodlibet and
maybe Badiou as well), Maybe version of Russell’s Paradox here.
8, 26 (true contradictions),
Postmodern Metaphysics
Issue is how explanation might work given avoidance of under and overmining, would be place
to contrast Schelling with Garcia and bring in Lacan. But is this utilized in the next session? Will
in some way need to write this last, with a typology of all of the neither/nors, some of them
dialetheist, some not. A lot hinges on the payoff in book II.
Postmodern metaphysics (sense of Hebert/Cogburn article where metaphysics must now
explain its own impossibility) metaphysics neither possible nor avoidable.
71 (fits with his critique of analysis!)
84-85 (neo-Kantian strains! Mentions metaphysics and says “including the one in this
book”!!!!; shoot this presupposes notion of world, going to be weird to put it before
discussion of Russell’s paradox, but will be a good teaser)
108 §21
III. NEITHER SUBSTANCE NOR PROCESS I: GARCIA’S DIFFERENTIAL MODEL
6, 7, 8-13, 42 etc. (organize in terms of three models)
In intro section show how his critique of compactness and picture of comprehension (p. 109)
entails immediately that there is no substance. But this is quick and need to back up. Critique
of compactness- following from anti-reductionism
7, 112 (anti-reflexivity of being/comprehension)
Critique of compactness following from his model of being (but what motivates his model of
being? (1) problems with reductionism, substance and process metaphysics)
61, 63-64
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Substance: The Classical View
Stuff from first model. But also form/matter discussion circa pages 137-138.
Particulars: Bare and Clothed
Max black two spheres problem
Thing here on Geach/Kraut view of identity, numerical identity is relative to a sortal The
critique of Quine and his version of the Geach/Kraut model of identity (gets you solitude
weirdly with relational model of numerical identity)
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Bundles and Processes
Yet that can’t be the whole story because traditional problems (cite Harman on Deleuze!) and
problems with relationism (Cambridge problems, Harman on Husserl, and Garcia’s critique on
pages 80-82). So you get differential model as well as objective versus formal.
IV. NEITHER SIMPLE NOR WHOLE
Neither Contained nor Container: Between No-Matter-What And World
Show how this deals with problems from previous chapter!!!!
Things.
60, 71 (§12 defined in terms of no matter what and world)
No-matter-what again
World 69-74, 75- (stuff about Russell’s Paradox will have to be here), 83- (negative
theology of world, shown to be consistent) also neo-kantian stuff
111 really see how he gets relationism and atomism with a unitary notion of being as
being in. The latter is with respect to being in the world.
Neither Matter Nor Universe: Between Form and Object
Give quotes and show how this deals with Cambridge properties which arises due to the
ontological pluralism plus differential model. Maybe not discuss Cambridge properties above.
Objects.
78 (§4, §5), important to focus on ways that formal realm presupposed by objective (§12-17),
this is where Cambridge properties issue comes up, so maybe should discuss it here, 80 (why
he thinks object requires formal)!!!! 80-82 has critique of relationism. 85- on big things, since
big things are just objects as far as I can tell except big things allow replacement. 101- thing
versus object.
Matter. 135- weird because matter is like world, a limiting concept, while universe is not
really like that. So disanalogy. But matter is clearly objective, not formal. So put here.
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Universe
VI. NEITHER SUBSTANCE NOR PROCESS II: INTENSITY
Give overview of how each bit builds on the previous with intensity doing extra work.
Events (II) (pp. 168-176) contrast Kim and Davidson’s views
Time (III) (pp. 177-188)
Life (IV) (pp. 189-203) neither biologism nor vitalism
Animals (V) (pp.204-220)
VI. NEITHER DISCOVERED NOR CREATED
In critiquing this maybe set up Euthyphro dilemma and maybe go into Priest’s Domain Principle
stuff (can use me and Joshua’s paper), maybe my stuff against quietism (some old blog
posts)?
Note: some of this is relevant to the next chapter as well- Neither nominalist nor Platonist (or
neither universal nor particular, neither universalist/relativist):
6, 14, 50, 117-118 (§8, other stuff on 118 about reductionism helpful too)
Universe vs. World
Explain Kant necessity of doing metaphysics
Limits
Explain Kant the mathematical antinomies
circa p. 136 Kantianism about parts popping into existence 95, 132 on matter?,, circa 120 on
limits.
Scales
Beauty (mostly from Values (XII) (pp. 331-355)
Truth (mostly from Values (XII) (pp. 331-355)
Goodness (mostly from Values (XII) (pp. 331-355)
VII. NEITHER SUBSTANCE NOR PROCESS III: EXISTENCE AND RESISTANCE
Need brief history of this “to exist is to resist” trope, placing Garcia in the context of it
(Heidegger talks about Max Scheler in this context). Here it is not objects resisting our
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comprehension of them but resisting being comprehended by other objects. Contrast with
Harman’s views of objects resisting one another. Also need to discuss Lacan’s view (from Eyer’s
book) that contradiction is an engine of persistence, might do this earlier though.
Humanity (VI) pp. 221-241
Arts and Rules (VII)
Hate to leave out because one of the most brilliant in book, also have art works as agents of
resistance so maybe in VII
Gender (XIV) pp. 356-365
neither nominal nor natural, but all of these are that
Adolescence (XV) pp. 385-409
VIII. PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS
Need to be up to date with anything published on him.
Harman’s Critique
Epistemic Comprehension
A. Problematic symmetric mentions of comprehension with respect to subject
62-63, p. 98 clear that comprehension is anti-symmetric, because it is irreflexive and
transitive, but for that matter mental comprehension is clearly not transitive in any sense!
109- clearest statement of anti-symmetry.
106 §14 uses epistemic sense that leads to symmetry, 119 epistemic sense, 122 seems symmetric
again.
Tied to above, what to make of sentences that involve symmetric relations? This is the
importance of the discussion of lovers!!!!! 56-57 (this may need to go earlier in discussion of
comprehension)
125- §9, here suggests that we do comprehend the thing in itself, but it doesn’t comprehend us?
126- §13 weird thing about “oscillation”. But then §14 suggests symmetry. Maybe should be
“attempts” to do to the world? (note that Sartre would be helpful here, see notes in other
manuscript).
126- see notes in other document. Very clear statement of non-symmetric notion of
epistemic comprehension on page 127!!!!! Maybe solution.
This is in part a problem because the retreat to representation is so retrograde (cf. Heidegger
problematic). Could he say that the epistemic comprehender is actually comprehended by the
object of knowledge? Worry about univocal sense then because I can be contained in things that
I don’t know about. Need to get clear on what he says about representation in terms of this
very issue. Can his account of representation (and the role it would have to assume to have
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comprehension anti-symmetric) not give rise to the problems that motivate direct perception type
views?
Quietism and the Euthyphronic Dilemma
Just run a Euthyphronic dilemma on his neo-Kantian claims. Show how quietism can get one out
of the way, but that this is also problematic.
AFTERWARD BY GARCIA?
Some new Garcia translations to help sell the book!
----------------------------------------STUFF LEFT OUT ON CURRENT THING
Anti-Heidegger stuff on Das Nichts
47-48
His view of modality
89-93 critique of Lewis,
Anti-Heidegger stuff on Seinsfrage
108-110
VII Representations
Neither mimesis nor signification
VIII Arts and Rules
Hate to leave out because one of the most brilliant in book, also have art works as agents of
resistance so maybe in VII
Neither generic nor formal?
Really brilliant piece of analysis here, just like time chapter
IX. Culture
Neither nature nor universe
X. History
Neither nature nor universe
XI. Economy of Objects
Discussion of moral theories, relevant to exception to regime of objects earlier on
XIII. Classes
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XVI. Death