Chinese Wind Energy Disad
*** China Energy DA ................................................................................................................. 3
1NC DA—China Energy ......................................................................................................... 4
2NC/1NR Impact Overview .................................................................................................... 7
2NC/1NR Impact—CCP Lash out .......................................................................................... 8
2NC/1NR Impact—Taiwan ................................................................................................... 11
2NC/1NR—Turns Environment ............................................................................................ 13
2NC/1NR—Turns Warming ................................................................................................. 14
2NC/1NR—Turns Global Economy ..................................................................................... 16
China Growth Good—Trade ................................................................................................. 17
2NC/1NR UQ—No (Offshore) Wind.................................................................................... 20
2NC/1NR UQ—China Leading Wind Now .......................................................................... 22
2NC/1NR UQ—China Growth Now..................................................................................... 25
AT: China Growth Weak—Inflation/Overheating ................................................................ 26
2NC/1NR Link—OSW K2 Chinese Clean Tech .................................................................. 27
2NC/1NR Link—Wind K2 Clean Tech Leadership.............................................................. 28
AT: OSW is Small ................................................................................................................. 30
AT: Plan is Coop ................................................................................................................... 31
2NC/1NR Intrnl Link—Clean Tech Zero-Sum ..................................................................... 35
2NC/1NR Intrnl Link—Zero Sum......................................................................................... 36
2NC/1NR Intrnl Link—Zero-Sum (Supply Chain/Firm Relocation) .................................... 38
2NC/1NR Intrnl Link—Zero-Sum (Investment) ................................................................... 41
Affirmative Answers ................................................................................................................. 44
2AC UQ—China Wind Unsustainable .................................................................................. 45
2AC UQ—China Energy Unsustainable ............................................................................... 47
2AC Link UQ—US Offshore Wind Now ............................................................................. 48
Ext. Link UQ ......................................................................................................................... 49
2AC No Link—No Tradeoff ................................................................................................. 53
2AC Link Turn—US Offshore Wind Boosts Cooperation ................................................... 55
AT: Lash Out/Instability........................................................................................................ 58
AT: Transition Wars .............................................................................................................. 62
AT: CCP—No Collapse ........................................................................................................ 63
AT: CCP Instability Impact ................................................................................................... 64
AT: Economy (Global) .......................................................................................................... 66
*** China Energy DA
1NC DA—China Energy
China’s beating the US in offshore wind development now—it’s key to their
overall clean-tech leadership—the plan reverses this
Zoninsein 10—Manuela, writer for Climatewire, New York Times [“Chinese Offshore
Development Blows Past U.S.,” Sept 7,
http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2010/09/07/07climatewire-chinese-offshore-development-blowspast-us-47150.html?pagewanted=all]
As proposed American offshore wind-farm projects creep forward -- slowed by state legislative debates,
due diligence and environmental impact assessments -- China has leapt past the United States,
installing its first offshore wind farm. Several other farms also are already under construction, and even the
Chinese government's ambitious targets seem low compared to industry dreaming. "What the U.S. doesn't realize," said Peggy Liu,
founder and chairwoman of the Joint U.S.-China Collaboration on Clean Energy, is that China "is going from manufacturing
hub to the clean-tech laboratory of the world ." The first major offshore wind farm outside of Europe is located in the East
China Sea, near Shanghai. The 102-megawatt Donghai Bridge Wind Farm began transmitting power to the national grid in July and
signals a new direction for Chinese renewable energy projects and the initiation of a national
policy focusing not just on wind power, but increasingly on the offshore variety. Moreover, "it serves
as a showcase of what the Chinese can do offshore ... and it's quite significant," said Rachel Enslow, a wind
consultant and co-author of the report "China, Norway and Offshore Wind Development," published in March by Azure International for the World
Wildlife Fund Norway.
Chinese clean tech leadership is key to their economy, internal stability, and
solves extinction.
Paul Denlinger 10, consultant specializing in the China market who is based in Hong Kong,
7/20/10, “Why China Has To Dominate Green Tech,”
http://www.forbes.com/sites/china/2010/07/20/why-china-has-to-dominate-green-tech/
On the policy level, the Chinese government has to perform a delicate balancing act, it has to balance the
desire of many Chinese to live a Western lifestyle, together with its high energy consumption and waste, with the need to preserve the
environment, since China, and the world, would suffer enormous damage if 1.3 billion people got all
their energy needs from coal and oil, the two most widely used fossil fuels. China’s political and social
stability depends on finding the right balance, since the party has an implicit mandate: it will deliver economic
growth to the Chinese people. This is why the Chinese government has chosen to invest in developing
new green energy technology. The country is very fortunate in that most of the discovered deposits of rare earths used in
the development of new technologies are found in China. While these deposits are very valuable, up until recently, the industry has not
been regulated much by the Chinese central government. But now that Beijing is aware of their importance and value, it has come
under much closer scrutiny. For one, Beijing wants to consolidate the industry and lower energy waste and environmental damage.
(Ironically, the rare earth mining business is one of the most energy-wasteful and highly polluting industries around. Think Chinese
coal mining with acid.) At the same time, Beijing wants to cut back rare earth exports to the rest of the world, instead encouraging
domestic production into wind and solar products for export around the world. With patents on the new technology used in
manufacturing, China would control the intellectual property and licensing on the products that would be used all over the world. If
Beijing is able to do this, it would control the next generation of energy products used by the world for the next century. That is the
plan. It would be like if the oil-producing nations in the 1920s and 1930s said that they didn’t need Western oil exploration firms and
refineries to distribute oil products; they would do all the processing themselves, and the Western countries would just order the
finished oil products from them. This is how China obviously plans to keep most of the value-added profits within China’s borders.
Before any Western readers snap into “evil Chinese conspiracy to take over the world” mode, it’s worth pointing out that Chinese rare
earth experts and government officials have repeatedly warned Western visitors that this policy change would be introduced.
Unfortunately, these warnings have gone largely unheeded and ignored by the Western media and politicians who, it seems, have been
largely preoccupied by multiple financial crises and what to do about the West’s debt load. The debt crisis in the West
means that it is very hard for Western green energy companies to find financing for their
technologies, then to market them as finished products. New energy technologies are highly risky, and
initial investments are by no means guaranteed. Because they are considered high-risk and require high capital
expenditure (unlike Internet technologies which are very cheap and practically commoditized), banks
are reluctant to
finance them unless they are able to find government-secured financing. Because most U.S. banks are recapitalizing their
businesses after the debt bubble burst, there are very few, if any western banks who will finance new green
energy technologies. This has opened a window of opportunity for the Chinese government to
finance, and for Chinese technology companies to develop, then manufacture these new green
products. But just making these technologies is not enough; they need to be competitive against
traditional fossil fuels. When it comes to the amount of energy released when coal or oil is burned, the new green technologies are still
way behind. This means that, at least in the early stages of adoption, Chinese businesses will still be reliant on coal and oil to bridge
that energy chasm before the new energy technologies become economically competitive. Much depends on how much the Chinese
government is willing to spend to promote and incentivize these new technologies, first in China, then overseas. Because of
China’s growing energy demands, we are in a race for survival. The 21st century will be
remembered as the resurgent coal and oil century, or as the century humanity transitioned to
green technologies for energy consumption. While China is investing heavily now in green tech, it is still
consuming ever larger amounts of coal and oil to drive its economic growth. Right now, we all depend on
China’s success to make the transition to green energy this century. For all practical purposes, we’re
all in the same boat.
China’s economic rise is good --- they’re on the brink of collapse --- causes
CCP instability and lash out --- also tubes the global economy, US primacy,
and Sino relations
Mead 9 Walter Russell Mead, Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow in U.S. Foreign Policy at the
Council on Foreign Relations, “Only Makes You Stronger,” The New Republic, 2/4/9,
http://www.tnr.com/story_print.html?id=571cbbb9-2887-4d81-8542-92e83915f5f8
The greatest danger both to U.S.-China relations and to American power itself is probably not
that China will rise too far, too fast; it is that the current crisis might end China's growth miracle.
In the worst-case scenario, the turmoil in the international economy will plunge China into a major
economic downturn. The Chinese financial system will implode as loans to both state and private
enterprises go bad. Millions or even tens of millions of Chinese will be unemployed in a country
without an effective social safety net . The collapse of asset bubbles in the stock and property markets
will wipe out the savings of a generation of the Chinese middle class. The political
consequences could include dangerous unrest--and a bitter climate of anti-foreign feeling that
blames others for China's woes. ( Think of Weimar Germany , when both Nazi and communist politicians
blamed the West for Germany's economic travails.) Worse, instability could lead to a vicious cycle , as nervous
investors moved their money out of the country, further slowing growth and, in turn, fomenting evergreater bitterness. Thanks to a generation of rapid economic growth, China has so far been able to manage
the stresses and conflicts of modernization and change; nobody knows what will happen if the
growth stops.
Chinese lash out goes nuclear
The Epoch Times, Renxing San, 8/4/2004, 8/4, http://english.epochtimes.com/news/5-84/30931.html
Since the Party’s life is “above all else,” it would not be surprising if the CCP resorts to the
use of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons in its attempt to extend its life. The CCP,
which disregards human life, would not hesitate to kill two hundred million Americans, along with
seven or eight hundred million Chinese, to achieve its ends. These speeches let the public see the CCP for what
it really is. With evil filling its every cell the CCP intends to wage a war against humankind in its
desperate attempt to cling to life. That is the main theme of the speeches. This theme is murderous and utterly evil. In
China we have seen beggars who coerced people to give them money by threatening to stab themselves with knives or pierce their
throats with long nails. But we have never, until now, seen such a gangster who would use biological, chemical, and nuclear
weapons to threaten the world, that all will die together with him. This bloody confession has confirmed the CCP’s nature: that of
a monstrous murderer who has killed 80 million Chinese people and who now plans to hold one billion people hostage and
gamble with their lives.
2NC/1NR Impact Overview
China economic decline causes nuclear war
Yee and Storey 2 Herbert is a Professor of Politics and IR @ Hong Kong Baptist University,
and Ian is a Lecturer in Defence Studies @ Deakin University. “The China Threat: Perceptions,
Myths and Reality,” p. 5
The fourth factor contributing to the perception of a China threat is the fear of political
and economic collapse in
the PRC, resulting in territorial fragmentation, civil war and waves of refugees pouring into
neighbouring countries. Naturally, any or all of these scenarios would have a profoundly negative
impact on regional stability. Today the Chinese leadership faces a raft of internal problems, including the increasing
political demands of its citizens, a growing population, a shortage of natural resources and a deterioration in the natural
environment caused by rapid industrialization and pollution. These problems are putting a strain on the central
government’s ability to govern effectively. Political disintegration or a Chinese civil war
might result in millions of Chinese refugees seeking asylum in neighbouring countries. Such an
unprecedented exodus of refugees from a collapsed PRC would no doubt put a severe strain on the limited resources of China’s
neighbours. A
fragmented China could also result in another nightmare scenario- nuclear weapons
falling into the hands of irresponsible local provincial leaders or warlords . From this
perspective, a disintegrating China would also pose a threat to its neighbours and the world.
Chinese economic collapse causes World War III
Plate 3 Tom is the Distinguished Scholar of Asian and Pacific Studies at Loyola Marymount
University. Mr. Plate is a member of the Pacific Council on International Policy, the Century
Association of New York and the Phi Beta Kappa Society. “WHY NOT INVADE CHINA?”
June 30, The Straits Times, Lexis
But imagine
a China disintegrating -- on its own, without neo-con or CIA prompting, much less outright military invasion - because the economy (against all predictions) suddenly collapses. That would knock Asia into
chaos . Refugees by the gazillions would head for Indonesia and other poorly border-patrolled places, which
don't want them and can't handle them; some in Japan might lick their chops for World War II Redux and look to annex a
slice of China. That would send small but successful Singapore and Malaysia -- once Japanese
colonies -- into absolute nervous breakdowns. India might make a grab for Tibet, and while it
does, Pakistan for Kashmir. Say hello to World War III Asia-style!
2NC/1NR Impact—CCP Lash out
CPP decline bypasses all defense—the economy is key, decline causes lash out
Friedberg 10, Professor of Politics and International Affairs – Princeton, Asia Expert – CFR
(Aaron, “Implications of the Financial Crisis for the US-China Rivalry,” Survival, Volume 52,
Issue 4, August, p. 31 – 54)
Despite its magnitude, Beijing's
stimulus programme was insufficient to forestall a sizeable spike in
unemployment. The regime acknowledges that upwards of 20 million migrant workers lost their jobs in
the first year of the crisis, with many returning to their villages, and 7m recent college graduates are reportedly on the streets
in search of work.9 Not surprisingly, tough times have been accompanied by increased social turmoil. Even
before the crisis hit, the number of so-called 'mass incidents' (such as riots or strikes) reported each year in China had
been rising. Perhaps because it feared that the steep upward trend might be unnerving to foreign investors, Beijing stopped
publishing aggregate, national statistics in 2005.10 Nevertheless, there is ample, if fragmentary, evidence that things got
worse as the economy slowed. In Beijing, for example, salary cuts, layoffs, factory closures and the
failure of business owners to pay back wages resulted in an almost 100% increase in the number
of labour disputes brought before the courts.11 Since the early days of the current crisis, the regime has clearly been bracing
itself for trouble. Thus, at the start of 2009, an official news-agency story candidly warned Chinese readers that the country was,
'without a doubt … entering a peak period of mass incidents'.12 In anticipation of an expected increase in unrest, the regime for
the first time summoned all 3,080 county-level police chiefs to the capital to learn the latest riot-control
tactics, and over 200 intermediate and lower-level judges were also called in for special training.13 Beijing's stimulus was insufficient
At least for the moment, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) appears to be weathering the storm. But if in the
next several years the
economy slumps again or simply fails to return to its previous pace, Beijing's troubles will
mount . The regime probably has enough repressive capacity to cope with a good deal more turbulence
than it has thus far encountered, but a protracted crisis could eventually pose a challenge to the solidarity of
the party's leadership and thus to its continued grip on political power. Sinologist Minxin Pei points out that
the greatest danger to CCP rule comes not from below but from above. Rising societal discontent
'might be sufficient to tempt some members of the elite to exploit the situation to their own political
advantage' using 'populist appeals to weaken their rivals and, in the process, open[ing] up divisions within the
party's seemingly unified upper ranks'.14 If this happens, all bets will be off and a very wide range of outcomes, from a democratic
transition to a bloody civil war, will suddenly become plausible. Precisely because it is aware of this danger, the regime
has been very careful to keep whatever differences exist over how to deal with the current crisis within bounds and out of view. If
there are significant rifts they could become apparent in the run-up to the pending change in leadership scheduled for 2012. Short
of causing the regime to unravel, a sustained economic crisis could induce it to abandon its current, cautious
policy of avoiding conflict with other countries while patiently accumulating all the elements of 'comprehensive
national power'. If they believe that their backs are to the wall, China's leaders might even be tempted
to lash out , perhaps provoking a confrontation with a foreign power in the hopes of rallying
domestic support and deflecting public attention from their day-to-day troubles. Beijing might also choose to
implement a policy of 'military Keynesianism', further accelerating its already ambitious plans for military
construction in the hopes of pumping up aggregate demand and resuscitating a sagging domestic economy.15 In sum, despite its
impressive initial performance, Beijing is by no means on solid ground . The reverberations from the 2008-09
financial crisis may yet shake the regime to its foundations, and could induce it to behave in
unexpected, and perhaps unexpectedly aggressive, ways.
Growth decline threatens CCP rule—they’ll start diversionary wars in
response
Shirk 7 Susan L. Shirk is an expert on Chinese politics and former Deputy Assistant Secretary
of State during the Clinton administration. She was in the Bureau of East Asia and Pacific Affairs
(People's Republic of China, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Mongolia). She is currently a professor at
the Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies at the University of California,
San Diego. She is also a Senior Director of Albright Stonebridge Group, a global strategy firm,
where she assists clients with issues related to East Asia. “China: Fragile Superpower,” Book
By sustaining high rates of economic growth, China’s leaders create new jobs and limit the
number of unemployed workers who might go to the barricades. Binding the public to the Party through
nationalism also helps preempt opposition. The trick is to find a foreign policy approach that can achieve both these vital objectives
simultaneously. How long can it last? Viewed objectively, China’s communist regime looks surprisingly resil- ient. It may be capable
of surviving for years to come so long as the economy continues to grow and create jobs. Survey research in Beijing shows widespread support (over 80 percent) for the political system as a whole linked to sentiments of nationalism and acceptance of the CCP’s
argument about “stability first.”97 Without making any fundamental changes in the CCP- dominated political system—leaders from
time to time have toyed with reform ideas such as local elections but in each instance have backed away for fear of losing control—the
Party has bought itself time. As scholar Pei Minxin notes, the ability of communist regimes to use their patronage and coercion to hold
on to power gives them little incentive to give up any of that power by introducing gradual democratization from above. Typically,
only when communist systems implode do their political fun- damentals change.98 As China’s leaders well know, the greatest
political risk lying ahead of them is the possibility of an economic crash that throws millions of
workers out of their jobs or sends millions of depositors to withdraw their savings from the shaky banking system. A
massive environmental or public health disaster also could trigger regime collapse, especially if people’s lives
are endangered by a media cover-up imposed by Party authorities. Nationwide rebellion becomes a real
possibility when large numbers of people are upset about the same issue at the same time. Another
dangerous scenario is a domestic or international crisis in which the CCP leaders feel compelled to
lash out against Japan, Taiwan, or the U nited S tates because from their point of view not lashing
out might endanger Party rule.
CCP instability causes a nationalist takeover and a lash out resulting in war
over Taiwan
James Paradise, contributing writer, citing Susan Shirk, a professor at UC San Diego’s
Graduate School of IR and Pacific Studies. “Underestimating China's "resilient
authoritarianism"?”, ASIA MEDIA NEWS DAILY, May 1, 2007,
http://www.asiamedia.ucla.edu/article-eastasia.asp?parentid=68978)
Susan L. Shirk goes a long way to overcoming both of these problems (especially the latter) in regards to China. In her new book,
China: Fragile Superpower, Shirk, a professor at University of California, San Diego's Graduate School of International Relations
and Pacific Studies, offers an in-depth analysis of the major forces that drive Chinese politics. Her argument is that China's
political leaders feel insecure and threatened, and that because of the fragile internal political
order there could be war between the U nited S tates and China if relations between the two countries
and others are not properly managed.¶ "The weak legitimacy of the Communist Party and its leaders'
sense of vulnerability could cause China to behave rashly in a crisis involving Japan or
Taiwan, and bring it into a military conflict with the United S tates," she writes.¶ According to Shirk, there
are a number of dangers that China's political leaders have to contend with: the possibility of protectionism in the United States,
large economic inequalities at home, unemployment of industrial workers, rural unrest, disgust with government corruption, the
disintegration of China's state-run health care system and pollution. There is also the need for politicians to keep good relations
with the People's Liberation Army, a factor that could partially account for the generous military budgets of recent years. ¶ One
of the biggest potential dangers, however, is nationalism. While nationalism is used as a device
to give legitimacy to the C ommunist P arty (along with commercialization and economic growth), it
could also be turned against the Party. China's political leaders feel they cannot be too "soft" on Japan
(with whom China harbors a particular historical grudge), worry that "losing" Taiwan could be the death knell
for the regime and have a tricky balancing act with the U nited S tates, who many feel is out to
thwart China's rise while being a critical component in China's economic modernization
drive.¶ In the face of all these pressures, China's political leaders feel the need to exercise a
heavy political hand. Shirk throws light on recent political events in quoting a former provincial Party head: "The
Party's authority is gradually declining, and as a result, [Chinese President] Hu [Jintao] is less
confident and more insecure than the leaders before him. When a leader feels insecure, he
tightens controls."¶ Shirk also gives attention to analyzing the media. She notes that the Communist Party still has a lot of
control in determining the content of print and television news and points to heavy government censorship of the Internet. But she
says it is becoming more difficult to control information with media commercialization and new communication technologies.
She says that these media industry developments could help facilitate the emergence of a political opposition in China. ¶ One of
the great strengths of Shirk's book is its intimate accounts of the events it describes, often told through personal experience. As a
former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State during the Clinton administration, Shirk uses phrases such as "Mainland experts
privately admitted," "Chinese officials told me" and "When I traveled to China." Shirk also tells some stories, such as the issue of
a possible deployment of a U.S. theater missile defense system to protect Taiwan, from the Chinese point of view. This potential
deployment, she says, was worrying to leaders in China because it might embolden Taiwan "to act provocatively." ¶ The book is
also praiseworthy for explaining some of the international dynamics that are causing China to act the way it does. In describing
China National Offshore Oil Corporation's unsuccessful attempt to buy Union Oil Company of California (Unocal) because of
political or other opposition in the United States, she argues that China is beginning to view energy competition in geopolitical
terms rather than commercial terms.¶ The basic question about Shirk's argument, however, is whether China is really as fragile as
she makes it out to be.¶ Shirk does not boldly predict that the Communist Party is going to collapse or
that the authoritarian regime is in danger of being undermined. But
her analysis does point in this direction, and
she indicates that leaders fear such possibilities. To avoid such a fate, Shirk mentions a number
of strategies that the C hinese C ommunist P arty might use to survive such as co-optation of
opposition leaders, increasing freedom or, alternatively, increasing repression. She also notes that
the authoritarian regime's longevity might be enhanced if it encouraged a less xenophobic nationalism, created a role for private
business interests in foreign policy making, eased restraints on the media, increased civilian control of the military and started
direct talks with Taiwan. Apart from these measures, however, the question is whether China is as brittle as Shirk suggests or
whether its authoritarianism is highly, or at least moderately, resilient.
2NC/1NR Impact—Taiwan
China growth key to preventing Taiwan invasion
Lewis 7—Dan, Director of the Economic Research Council, “The Nightmare of a Chinese
Economic Collapse,” World Finance, 4-19-07,
http://www.worldfinance.com/news/137/ARTICLE/1144/2007-04-19.html
far
more serious though is the impact that Chinese monetary policy could have on many Western
nations such as the UK. Quite simply, China’s undervalued currency has enabled Western governments
to maintain artificially strong currencies, reduce inflation and keep interest rates lower than they
According to Professor David B. Smith, one of the City’s most accurate and respected economists in recent years, potentially
might otherwise be. We should therefore be very worried about how vulnerable Western economic growth is to an upward revaluation
of the Chinese yen. Should that revaluation happen to appease China’s rural poor, at a stroke, the dollar, sterling and the euro
would quickly depreciate, rates in those currencies would have to rise substantially and the yield
on government bonds would follow suit. This would add greatly to the debt servicing cost of budget deficits in the
USA, the UK and much of Euro land. A reduction in demand for imported Chinese goods would quickly entail a decline in China’s
economic growth rate. That is alarming. It has been calculated that to keep China’s society stable – ie to manage the
transition from a rural to an urban society without devastating unemployment - the minimum growth
rate is 7.2 percent. Anything less than that and unemployment will rise and the massive shift in population from the country to
the cities becomes unsustainable. This is when real discontent with communist party rule becomes vocal
and hard to ignore. It doesn’t end there. That will at best bring a global recession . The crucial point is that
communist authoritarian states have at least had some success in keeping a lid on ethnic tensions
– so far. But when multi-ethnic communist countries fall apart from economic stress and the
implosion of central power, history suggests that they don’t become successful democracies
overnight. Far from it. There’s a very real chance that China might go the way of Yugoloslavia or the Soviet
Union – chaos, civil unrest and internecine war . In the very worst case scenario, a Chinese government
might seek to maintain national cohesion by going to war with Taiwan – whom America is
pledged to defend. Today, people are looking at Chang’s book again. Contrary to popular belief, foreign investment has
actually deferred political reform in the world’s oldest nation. China today is now far further from democracy than at any time since
the Tianneman Square massacres in 1989. Chang’s pessimistic forecast for China was probably wrong. But my fear is there is at least
a chance he was just early.
China war causes extinction
Straits Times 2k (The Straits Times (Singapore), “No one gains in war over Taiwan”, June
25, 2000, L/N)
The doomsday scenario THE high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war
between the US and China. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a
full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries far and near and -horror of horrors -- raise the possibility of a nuclear war. Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers
any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the
region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If China were to retaliate, east Asia will be
set on fire. And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order.
With the US distracted, Russia
may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance of power in the Middle East
between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own
nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase. Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to
may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities
General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at
the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personal
account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that
US was confronted with two choices in Korea -- truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the
US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability, there is
little hope of
winning a war against China 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons. The US estimates that China possesses
about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option. A
Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear
weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the
Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there
were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the
country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said that should that come to pass, we
would see the destruction of civilisation. There would be no victors in such a war. While the prospect of a nuclear
Armaggedon over Taiwan might seem inconceivable, it cannot be ruled out entirely, for China puts sovereignty above
everything else.
2NC/1NR—Turns Environment
Turns the environment
Ethan Goffman 11, Associate Editor of the journal Sustainability: Science, Practice, & Policy,
May 2011, “China’s Surge in Renewable Energy,”
http://www.csa.com/discoveryguides/renewable/review.pdf
Global pressure to reduce greenhouse gas emissions is part of the reason for China’s turn to
renewables. Officially, China has long denied responsibility, claiming, along with many developing countries, that since it “came
late to the industrialization game, the core economies, with their significantly greater historical greenhouse gas contributions, must pay
for a global transformation away from fossil fuels” (Economy). Even today, as the largest greenhouse gas emitter, China “adamantly
refuses to commit to any binding, international carbon emissions reduction targets” (Ma), arguing that it is in many ways still a poor
country, and not historically responsible for the climate crisis. There is some substance to this argument, as each Chinese is
responsible for only 1/5 the emissions of the average American (Ma) (the U.S. currently has 313 million people while China has over
1.3 billion, according to the CIA World Fact Book). Yet China is now the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse
gases, and future projections are that the situation will only get worse. Despite clean energy efforts, China is
expected to “nearly double its coal-fired power capacity from 350 gigawatts (GW) in 2006 to 950 GW in 2030
and . . . will account for 74 percent of the total increase in the world's coal-related carbon dioxide emissions during that period” (Ma).
Clearly, such an increase would put tremendous stress on the world’s ecosystems.
2NC/1NR—Turns Warming
Only Chinese clean tech leadership solves global environmental sustainability
and runaway warming---they’re uniquely suited to South-South collaboration
that spreads clean tech globally through the developing world
Changhua Wu 12, Greater China Director, The Climate Group, July 2012, “CONSENSUS AND
COOPERATION FOR A CLEAN REVOLUTION,”
http://thecleanrevolution.org/_assets/files/TCG_ChinaCC_web.pdf
The global environmental threats that loomed on the horizon in 1992 are now real and
growing challenges. Climate change, for example, was then seen as a significant but still
distant threat. Emissions, however, have continued to rise, largely in developing countries ,
as governments have sought to raise living standards and free people from poverty. China’s
per capita emissions have risen fourfold, and today it is the world’s largest emitter. The
window for keeping the rise in global temperatures below 2°C to avoid the worst impacts
of climate change is now rapidly closing . Many believe it may already be shut.
In parallel to population and environmental changes, the global economic order has also been
transformed. In 1992, China’s economy was one fifth the size of the United States’; it is now
set to become the world’s largest within this decade. And where China has led, other emerging
economies have followed. Both Brazil and India, for example, have overtaken the UK, which
was until recently the world’s fifth largest economy*.
This rise of China and other emerging economies is shaping a new global political landscape –
one that is not yet fully reflected in international institutions and processes. This transition is
not only creating new centers of influence, but also tremendous economic, developmental and
business opportunities.
This report – a collaborative effort between The Climate Group and the Chinese Academy of
Sciences’ Institute of Policy and Management – was written with these profound changes, as
well as China’s upcoming leadership changeover, in mind.
The report highlights what Chinese decision and policymakers already know: that 20 years of
extraordinary economic growth have delivered major material and social benefits, but at
considerable environmental cost. But it also underlines that both China’s future, and the
world’s ability to undertake a ‘clean revolution’ to address global sustainability problems
while ensuring long-term prosperity for all, are closely intertwined.
The green development pathway for China sketched out in this report – and the essential
conditions necessary for its achievement – will not only shape the world of the coming
decades, but will depend on global cooperation to be truly attainable. For this reason, we
propose a simple framework for consensus and cooperation to help overcome the impasse in
so many international political arenas, and enable all countries to work together to solve global
sustainability issues.
The key point is that the old paradigm of industrialized countries driving change and pulling
the developing world behind, no longer holds true - if it ever really did. There is much other
countries can learn from China’s growth over the last two decades. The country’s success is
built on giving business long-term policy and investment certainty, providing active support
for industries of the future and focusing on structural change rather than shortterm profits. All
these are features central to a successful, long-term global strategy for sustainability – a
fact recognized by the handful of companies around the world that have put sustainability at
the heart of their business - but that are far from universally adopted. China could also take
the lead in more specific areas. A few ideas come to mind:
— The new Chinese leadership could guide the creation of the international consensus and
cooperation framework outlined in this report, helping break current distrust and negotiation
deadlocks.
— With its trade surplus and huge reserves , China could become the major financier of
green growth in the developing world . It could issue green infrastructure bonds that would
dwarf the funding available at present, that would drive markets for the higher value-add green
products that will be at the heart of China’s future growth .
— With growing investment in innovation and research and development, China could
pioneer a new model of South-South collaborative clean technology development and
deployment .
2NC/1NR—Turns Global Economy
China’s key to the global economy
Eichengreen et al. 11-Barry Eichengreen is George C. Pardee and Helen N. Pardee Professor
of Economics and Political Science, University of California, Berkeley,a Research Associate,
National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts, and Research Fellow,
Centre for Economic Policy Research, London, United Kingdom, Kwanho Shin is a professor in
the Department of Economics, Korea University, and Donghyun Park is Principal Economist at
the Economics and Research Department of the Asian Development Bank, March 2011, "WHEN
FAST GROWING ECONOMIES SLOW DOWN: INTERNATIONAL EVIDENCE AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR CHINA", NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH,
http://www.nber.org/papers/w16919.pdf?new_window=1
In addition, the
large and fast-growing Chinese economy is increasingly viewed as a k ey engine
of growth for the world economy . The advanced industrial countries, the traditional engines of global
growth, have inherited serious problems from the crisis: weakened household balance sheets, increased public
debts, and still troubled financial systems. In contrast, China experienced few problems as a result of the crisis. There were few
bank and enterprise failures. At the height of the crisis in 2009, growth “slowed” just to 9.2 per cent. Both advanced and
developing countries benefited from China’s resilience. Robust Chinese demand lifted capital
goods exports from Germany and Japan and commodity exports from Africa and Latin America. In particular, demand
from China contributed substantially to recovery in East and Southeast Asia, which has close trade
linkages with China.
China Growth Good—Trade
Chinese growth is key to multilateral free trade—this evidence answers all
turns.
Kenny 11—Charles Kenny is a senior fellow at the Center for Global Development, a Schwartz
fellow at the New America Foundation, a senior economist on leave from the World Bank, and
author [September 6, 2011, “Red Dawn,” Foreign Policy,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/09/06/red_dawn?page=full]
But if the world is underestimating the accelerating speed of China's rise, Subramanian's analysis
also suggests that we're overestimating the problems that an economically ascendant China will
impose on the rest of us. The country's rise, he points out, has been intimately connected with
globalization, including the expansion of trade under the World Trade Organization (WTO) umbrella as
well as growing cross-border flows of finance and technology. In 1820, during the last period in which China
was the world's economic heavyweight -- and a fiercely isolationist one -- exports accounted for 1 percent of global GDP and
considerably less than 1 percent of China's economy. In 2008, the same statistics were 29 percent for the world and 35 percent for
China. China is already a far more globally integrated economy than either Britain or the United States
was in their respective heydays. In 1870, exports accounted for only 12 percent of Britain's
output. In 1975, they accounted for a mere 7 percent of the U.S. economy. The same percentages
for imports were 7 percent for the United States in 1975 and 25 percent for China in 2008. And the
fact that much of today's trade is part of multicountry production processes for goods makes
China even more bound to an open global economic system than the raw numbers would suggest.
Furthermore, China will become the dominant economic power in a period where the international
trading regime appears likely to have weathered the threat of a retreat behind tariff walls that
doomed the last great period of globalization during the Great Depression. And it will do so as an
economy still benefiting from "catch-up growth" -- the low-hanging economic fruit that China, as a poorer country,
can grab by adopting innovations already widely used in richer countries -- which, because it involves exploiting
technologies and processes developed in those rich countries, demands a level of openness to the
world. Both of these points suggest that China will remain a fair-dealing member of the WTO out
of self-interest. Certainly, it is an active one. In 2009, half of the WTO disputes filed involved China on one side or the
other. Most are still working their way through the settlement process, so it is too early to say with certainty how law-abiding China
will be; nonetheless, Subramanian notes that the WTO has been a powerful mechanism for controlling the bullying instincts of
economic heavyweights in the past. The United States, for example, has been subject to complaints in 88 WTO disputes, leading to
findings of 33 violations, and the United States has complied or is complying in 26 cases.
Meanwhile, China's rise -- and the United States' concomitant decline -- is likely to increase the likelihood of the renminbi becoming a
global reserve currency, a prospect that economic prognosticators have begun to consider with some seriousness since the 2008
economic crisis. But if anything, this shift -- if it happens -- is likely to mitigate some aspects of China's role in the global economy
that the rest of the world finds most problematic. As Subramanian notes, China will have to develop financial markets
that are deep, liquid, and open to foreigners. At the moment, the country's capital market is
closed, the renminbi is undervalued and not fully convertible, and domestic financial markets are
rudimentary. At the same time, there are signs that the government is responding to some of these
challenges, for example by issuing 6 billion renminbi-denominated sovereign bonds to offshore
investors in Hong Kong in 2009. And further steps in that direction would increase the export
competitiveness of the rest of the world's goods as well as create an exciting investment
opportunity for those few in the rich world still actually saving money.
In short, China will be a different kind of global power because the nature of global power has
changed dramatically over the past two centuries. Geographical domination is no longer
necessary; today a considerable part of power does not even involve physical goods, let alone land,
but rather is tied up in finance, technologies, and services. Just as the United States demonstrated in
its eclipse of Britain that a sovereign empire wasn't needed to dominate the world economy,
China may not need even the military strength that the United States exercised for the last 50 years
to remain preeminent. And China's reliance on global trade and financial links, underpinned
neither by force of arms nor sovereign control, means the newly dominant power has
considerable self-interest in maintaining multilateralism.
That suggests the more China embraces its role as economic heavyweight in an integrated world, the
better for the rest of the world -- and perhaps in particular the United States -- in terms of national security and
economic opportunity. Even for Americans who fear the rise of China, then, the best advice is to embrace the
inevitable.
Interdependence empirically decreases the risk of conflict—prefer theoretical
backing for impacts
Griswold 98—CATO Institute Center for Trade Policy Studies Peace on Earth [Daniel
Griswold, “Free Trade for Men,” http://www.cato.org/dailys/12-31-98.html]
With the Christmas season and its promise of "Peace on earth, goodwill toward men" upon us, and protectionist sentiment stirring in
Washington, it is appropriate to revisit the question of whether free trade promotes world peace. Advocates of free trade have long
argued that its benefits are not merely economic. Free trade also encourages people and nations to live in peace with one another.
Free trade raises the cost of war by making nations more economically interdependent. Free trade
makes it more profitable for people of one nation to produce goods and services for people of
another nation than to conquer them. By promoting communication across borders, trade
increases understanding and reduces suspicion toward people in other countries. International
trade creates a network of human contacts. Phone calls, emails, faxes and face-to-face meetings are an integral part of
commercial relations between people of different nations. This human interaction encourages tolerance and respect between people of
different cultures (if not toward protectionist politicians). Ancient writers, expounding what we now call the Universal Economy
Doctrine, understood the link between trade and international harmony. The fourth-century writer Libanius declared in his Orations
(III), "God did not bestow all products upon all parts of the earth, but distributed His gifts over different regions, to the end that men
might cultivate a social relationship because one would have need of the help of another. And so He called commerce into being, that
all men might be able to have common enjoyment of the fruits of the earth, no matter where produced." Open trade makes war a less
appealing option for governments by raising its costs. To a nation committed to free trade, war not only means the destruction of life
and property. It is also terrible for business, disrupting international commerce and inflicting even greater hardship on the mass of
citizens. When the door to trade is open, a nation's citizens can gain access to goods and resources outside their borders by offering in
exchange what they themselves can produce relatively well. When the door is closed, the only way to gain access is through military
conquest. As the 19th century Frenchman Frederic Bastiat said, "When goods cannot cross borders, armies will." History
demonstrates the peaceful influence of trade. The century of relative world peace from 1815 to 1914 was
marked by a dramatic expansion of international trade, investment and human migration,
illuminated by the example of Great Britain. In contrast, the rise of protectionism and the
downward spiral of global trade in the 1930s aggravated the underlying hostilities that propelled
Germany and Japan to make war on their neighbors. In the more than half a century since the end
of World War II, no wars have been fought between two nations that were outwardly oriented in
their trade policies. In every one of the two dozen or so wars between nations fought since 1945, at least one side was
dominated by a nation or nations that did not pursue a policy of free trade. In the recurring Middle East wars between Israel and its
Arab neighbors, dating back to 1948-49, none of the direct participants were what could be described as open economies at the time of
conflict, with the Arab countries enforcing a virtual boycott of trade with Israel. Saddam Hussein, the instigator of the 1991 Persian
Gulf War, could be described in many ways, but not as a free trader. Wars have been fought between members of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, but only when at least one of the warring sides was protectionist in its trade policies. For example,
India and Pakistan were both members of GATT during their 1965 and 1971 conflicts, but they were also both committed to
protection as a trade policy. Great Britain and Argentina were members of GATT when they fought over the Falklands in 1982, but
Argentina, the aggressor in that conflict, was at the time still under the protectionist spell of Peronism. After the nightmare of two
world wars, the United States encouraged the nations of Western Europe to form a free-trade area not only to promote economic
development but also to reduce international rivalries. Decades of trade liberalization have helped to make war among members of the
European Union virtually unthinkable today or in the foreseeable future. A growing web of international investment has also
strengthened peace among nations. New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman has pointed out what he calls the
Big Mac thesis: that no two nations with McDonald's franchises have ever gone to war . A nation open
enough and developed enough to be a profitable home for an established international franchise such as McDonald's will generally
find war an unattractive foreign policy option.
Asian economic decline sparks multiple scenarios for nuclear war.
Auslin 9—Michael Auslin is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. [February
5, 2009, “Averting Disaster,” The Weekly Standard,
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/016/115jtnqw.asp]
AS THEY DEAL WITH a collapsing world economy, policymakers in Washington and around the globe must not forget that when
a depression strikes, war can follow. Nowhere is this truer than in Asia, the most heavily armed
region on earth and riven with ancient hatreds and territorial rivalries. Collapsing trade flows can
lead to political tension, nationalist outbursts, growing distrust, and ultimately, military
miscalculation. The result would be disaster on top of an already dire situation.
No one should think that Asia is on the verge of conflict. But it is also important to remember
what has helped keep the peace in this region for so long. Phenomenal growth rates in Japan,
South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, China and elsewhere since the 1960s have naturally turned
national attention inward, to development and stability. This has gradually led to increased
political confidence, diplomatic initiatives, and in many nations the move toward more
democratic systems. America has directly benefited as well, and not merely from years of lower consumer prices, but also
from the general conditions of peace in Asia.
Yet policymakers need to remember that even
during these decades of growth, moments of economic shock,
such as the 1973 Oil Crisis, led to instability and bursts of terrorist activity in Japan, while the
uneven pace of growth in China has led to tens of thousands of armed clashes in the poor interior
of the country.
Now imagine such instability multiplied region-wide. The economic collapse Japan is facing, and China's potential slowdown, dwarfs
any previous economic troubles, including the 1998 Asian Currency Crisis. Newly urbanized workers rioting for jobs or living wages,
conflict over natural resources, further saber-rattling from North Korea, all can take on lives of their own. This is the nightmare of
governments in the region, and particularly of democracies from newer ones like Thailand and Mongolia to established states like
Japan and South Korea. How will overburdened political leaders react to internal unrest? What happens
if Chinese shopkeepers in Indonesia are attacked, or a Japanese naval ship collides with a Korean
fishing vessel? Quite simply, Asia's political infrastructure may not be strong enough to resist
the slide towards confrontation and conflict.
This would be a political and humanitarian disaster turning the clock back decades in Asia. It
would almost certainly drag America in at some point, as well. First of all, we have alliance
responsibilities to Japan, South Korea, Australia, and the Philippines should any of them come
under armed attack. Failure on our part to live up to those responsibilities could mean the end of
America's credibility in Asia.
Secondly, peace in Asia has been kept in good measure by the continued U.S. military presence
since World War II. There have been terrible localized conflicts, of course, but nothing
approaching a systemic conflagration like the 1940s. Today, such a conflict would be far more
bloody, and it is unclear if the American military, already stretched too thin by wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq, could contain the crisis. Nor is it clear that the American people, worn out
from war and economic distress, would be willing to shed even more blood and treasure for lands
across the ocean.
The result could be a historic changing of the geopolitical map in the world's most populous region. Perhaps China would emerge as
the undisputed hegemon. Possibly democracies like Japan and South Korea would link up to oppose any aggressor. India might decide
it could move into the vacuum. All of this is guess-work, of course, but it has happened repeatedly throughout history. There is no
reason to believe we are immune from the same types of miscalculation and greed that have
destroyed international systems in the past.
2NC/1NR UQ—No (Offshore) Wind
U.S. offshore wind weak now—despite recent investment
Todd Woody 5/8, environmental and technology journalist for The New York Times, Quartz,
and was previously an editor and writer at Fortune, Forbes, and Business 2.0 [May 8 2014,
“Offshore Wind Farms Could Supply Much of the U.S.'s Electricity (If They Ever Get Built),”
The Atlantic, http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/05/how-to/361941/]
The United States, on the other, is generating not a watt from commercial offshore wind farms, despite 80
percent of its electricity demand coming from coastal states, according to the U.S. Department of Energy. In fact, the
offshore wind capacity of the country has been estimated at 4 million megawatts, or four times the entire generating capacity of
existing U.S. power plants.
The nation’s first offshore project, Cape Wind, has been mired in litigation and bureaucratic red tape
since 2001. Just on Friday, a federal judge dismissed the latest legal challenge to the 468-megawatt wind farm that would be built
in Nantucket Sound off Cape Cod, Massachusetts.
The Energy Department took a small step on Wednesday, however, to spur offshore wind, awarding $47
million for three experimental projects to test new technology to take advantage of the strong
winds that blow in coastal waters.
A New Jersey company called Fishermen’s Energy scored cash to build five, 5-megawatt turbines three miles off Atlantic City. The
project will test a twisted jack foundation, which is a new type of offshore platform that is cheaper to make and install than traditional
platforms.
On the West Coast, Seattle-based Principle Power will deploy five 6-megawatt turbines 18 miles off Coos Bay, Oregon, to test its
semi-submersible floating wind turbine platform. Developing such technology is crucial if wind farms are going to be built in the deep
waters off the West Coast, where anchoring platforms to the seabed would be prohibitively expensive. According to the Energy
Department, more than 60 percent of the U.S.’s offshore wind capacity is in the deep ocean. The Principle Power turbines, for
example, will be installed in the ocean where depths reach 1,000 feet.
Even further from shore, Dominion Virginia Power will test a hurricane-proof design for two 6-megawatt turbines and platforms to be
built 26 miles off Virginia Beach as well as demonstrate the viability of installing, maintaining and operating projects so far from land.
All the projects will deploy next-generation direct drive turbines from Alstom, Siemens and XEMC that use fewer moving parts than
conventional geared turbines. Given the high cost of fixing turbines far from shore, the fewer breakable parts the better.
“The three projects selected today are aimed at deploying offshore wind installations in U.S.
waters by 2017,” the Energy Department said in a statement.
But don’t hold your breath.
Wind use is tiny and falling now
Goldenberg 12—Suzanne, writer for The Guardian. “US government announces opening of
Atlantic coast for offshore windfarms,” December 1, 2012,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2012/dec/01/us-government-offshore-wind-farmsatlantic]
If any turbines do actually go up, they would constitute the first offshore wind projects in the US. Over the last few years vast wind
farms, with hundreds of turbines, have been built across the country – although wind power still makes up only 3% of
energy use. However, the wind industry is expected to slow down or even come to a halt at the end
of the year, with the expiry of tax credits.
Wind’s declining—our ev is future predictive
Kachan 12—Dallas, guest writer for the Christian Science Monitor [“Cleantech on the decline?
Predictions for 2013,” December 5, 2012,
http://www.csmonitor.com/Environment/2012/1205/Cleantech-on-the-decline-Predictions-for2013]
Long term risk emerges for solar and wind – The solar and
wind markets suffer today from margin erosion,
allegations of corruption, international trade impropriety and other challenges. In 2013, we think
poor progress in grid-scale power storage technology will also start to put downward pressure on
solar and wind growth figures. Prices per kilowatt hour are falling, yes, but the cost of flow
batteries, molten salt, compressed air, pumped hydro, moving mass or other storage technology
needs to be factored in to make intermittent clean energies reliable and available 24/7. When also
considering continued progress in cleaner baseload power from new, emerging nuclear
technologies, natural gas and cleaner coal power, the growth rates for solar and wind appear
increasingly at risk.
2NC/1NR UQ—China Leading Wind Now
China is leading the offshore wind market now—help from the UK
Jessica Shankleman 6/2, writer for BusinessGreen.com [June 2, 2014, “UK can help China
become world leader in offshore wind,” http://www.businessgreen.com/bg/news/2347602/ukcan-help-china-become-world-leader-in-offshore-wind]
The British offshore wind industry can play a major role in helping China install 5GW of new
capacity off its coastlines over the coming years, a series of new reports by the Carbon Trust has found.
China currently has a target to install 5GW of offshore wind power capacity by 2015 as it seeks to
reduce its reliance on coal and shift to cleaner sources of energy.
But a series of three reports by the Carbon Trust, unveiled on Friday, shows that the superpower has major hurdles to overcome if it
wants to meet this goal, including a shortage of technical expertise and inadequate subsidies to drive investment.
Specifically, the reports find that Chinese wind turbines are less reliable than those made by their European counterparts and face
problems with corrosion and heat when installed off the China coast.
The typically soft, silty soils off China's east coast can also create problems for traditional concrete monopile foundations used by
offshore turbines, meaning more innovative approaches such as suction bucket technology that is already being tested in the North Sea
may have to be used.
As a result, the reports highlight the contribution that more experienced European companies could play in helping China to scale up
its offshore wind market.
Al-Karim Govindji, technology acceleration manager at the Carbon Trust, said the report underlined the wider benefits that could
come from UK companies investing in offshore wind innovation.
"China's offshore wind resource is significant and will be critical for the country to help meet its
rising energy demand through developing low-carbon energy sources," he said. "The UK has an
important role in offering its experience and learning to ensure that China's vast resource is
efficiently exploited. Innovation across a number of areas will be essential to ensure targets are
met and to drive cost reduction across the whole sector."
China’s offshore wind development is high now
Liu Yuanyuan 5/22, Director of Operations and Co-Founder of Nanjing Shanglong
Communications and previously held the position of office manager at the London Financial
Times' China translation [May 22, 2014, “China Boosts Offshore Wind Power Development,”
http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2014/05/china-boosts-development-ofoffshore-wind-power]
BEIJING -- China
has taken steps to accelerate the development of its offshore wind power industry
in a bid to increase the installed capacity beyond its 428.6 MW installed at the end of 2013.
Some industry analysts expressed pessimism concerning the offshore wind power sector in China as the industry has experienced slow
progress with only 39 MW in installed capacity added last year, a year-on-year decline of 69 percent. However, the China
National Renewable Energy Centre (CNREC) said that a number of new offshore wind farms are
scheduled to kick off within this year, including the 100-MW Phase II expansion project of Donghai
Bridge in Shanghai and China Longyuan Power Group’ (Longyuan) Nanri Island project already under construction in Fujian
province. Two projects are also under contruction in Jiangsu province: China General Nuclear Power Group's new
offshore project in Rudong on track to start construction in the second half of this year and Longyuan's windmill project in Dafeng.
In early 2014, the National Energy Administration (NEA) issued a Notice on Developing Offshore Wind
Power Projects selecting Shanghai as well as Fujian and Zhejiang provinces as the locations for
the country’s key pilot construction projects for offshore wind power. The Shanghai government
announced in early May new initiatives to boost support for its new and renewable energy sectors,
providing subsidies of 0.1 yuan per kWh for onshore wind power projects and 0.2 yuan per kWh for offshore wind farms. However,
some industry analysts expressed concerns about the impact of regional subsidies on the nationwide feed-in tariff for offshore wind
projects.
The rapid growth of the Chinese offshore wind power sector requires a rational and clear tariff
structure, allowing offshore wind farm developers to have realistic expectations of what the return
on their offshore wind power investments should be and in turn, boost the development of the
whole sector, according to analysts.
China’s leading the globe in clean tech competitiveness---wind’s key---and it’s
key to offset their reliance on coal---turns the case because Chinese leadership
drives U.S.-China energy cooperation
Yu 12—Hongyuan, professor and deputy director of the Institute for Comparative Politics and
Public Policy, Shanghai Institutes for International Studies [12/28/12, “A revolution is here, and
clean energy is the spark,” http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/201212/28/content_16065380.htm]
Technological innovation is critical in the energy structure and, furthermore, next-generation energy will
determine not only the future of the international economic system but shifts in political power.
Since the modern international system was set up, the energy chain has undergone two important changes. The first was during the
Industrial Revolution in the 1860s, ushered in by Britain, which was marked by a transition from the era of fuel-wood, or the bio-fuel
era, to the era of coal. The second change was the second industrial revolution, in the United States in the 1920s, which saw a
transition from the era of coal to the era of oil. Today we are in the midst of a third revolution, a transition to an era of clean and lowcarbon energy.
Under the long-cycle theory, the ownership and use of new energy is closely related to national technological
and institutional advances. Countries with a dominant position in new energy must have an
institutional and technical advantage stemming from their possession and use of new energy. They have to break through
constraints imposed by previous economic structures, which leads to big changes in the global industrial chain, allocation of resources
and national competitiveness.
There is every reason to believe that those new-energy powerhouses will ultimately change the global
distribution of power through international competition. As history shows, every significant structural change in
the international system has been due to a revolution in energy. The country or non-state entity that seized a new energy chain or part
of it was challenging the status quo.
As the world debates collective action against climate change, most countries have found that economies based on new and clean
energy and on low-carbon and clean energy hold the keys to the future.
The European Union's carbon aviation tax aimed at boosting the bloc's competitiveness and promoting climate negotiations could also
boost its creativity and competitive edge. The Low Carbon Economy Report by the Royal Institute of International Affairs says that
the EU promoted climate negotiations not just because it was a pioneer in low-carbon economics, but because it also wanted to
predominate in global governance and lay the foundations for the future economy.
Considering China's huge economy and the rapid growth in its emissions, it clearly matters when
it comes to energy and climate change. China is developing many energy resources, and putting in place a
system that supplies stable, economic and clean energy. It is working hard to develop a recycling economy so it
can garner the highest possible economic and social benefits using the least energy possible. Since the late 1990s China has been
promoting clean, renewable energy to try to balance growth and environmental concerns and ultimately to
reduce its reliance on coal.
In 2010 it set the goal of meeting 15 percent of its primary energy consumption through non-fossil fuels by 2020. It is targeting the
development of non-fossil energy including wind power, solar power, biomass energy, solar energy, and thermal and nuclear power
equivalent to 480 million metric tons of standard coal by the end of 2015, according to the 12th Five-Year Plan (2011-15) for the
renewable energy industry issued recently by the National Energy Administration.
Hydropower is the leading source of renewable energy. It provides more than 97 percent of all electricity generated by renewable
sources. The dams and hydropower plants also play an important role in water resource planning, in preventing flooding, making
rivers navigable, solving irrigation problems and creating recreation areas. During the 12th Five-Year Plan China will begin building
more than 60 key hydropower projects, and the aim is to have 430 GW of total hydropower installed capacity in the country by 2020.
However, debate about the negative impacts of dams and hydropower plants is heated, most of it focused on environmental problems.
By the end of 2015 the country's wind power capacity is expected to reach 100 million kW, with
annual electricity output of 190 billion kW/h, the plan says. China's wind power will reach 100 million kilowatts by 2015 and annual
wind power generation will be 190 billion kilowatt hours. Of that, offshore wind power will account for 5 million
kilowatts; solar power will be 15 million kilowatts and annual solar power generation will hit 20 billion kilowatt hours.
China enjoys many advantages in developing solar energy. It has become a world leader in photovoltaic cell production. The demand
in the country for new solar modules could be as high as 232 mW each year from now until 2012. The government has announced
plans to expand the installed capacity to 1,800 mW by 2020. If Chinese companies manage to develop low-cost, reliable solar
modules, then the sky is the limit for a country that is desperate to reduce its dependence on coal and oil imports as well as the
pressure on its environment by using renewable energy.
China has overtaken the US to become the largest producer of zero-carbon energy. The US is the
hegemony and China is the rising power, but clean energy will create a new paradigm for relations between
the US and China in energy. Cooperation between the two on clean energy is noteworthy, and both
countries are leading the world in investing in renewable energy and should seek to resolve trade disputes and eliminate protectionist
trade policies. The US should closely look at sales of Chinese renewable energy products in the US market and seek to reduce trade
barriers.
The difficulty lies not in new ideas, but in escaping from old ones. Whatever the outcomes and motivations, in order to deal with the
energy-water-food nexus, China should understand it is in its economic and national interest to move ahead with clean and zerocarbon energy development. Together with recently announced plans, China's clean energy development marks a sea
change in the reform of the international system.
China’s leading the global race for wind now—long term strategy
Bozzato 12—Fabrizio Bozzato, Researcher Assistant at the Centre for International and
Regional Affairs of the University of Fiji [“The Wind Dragon: a Chinese tale of wind power,”
June 4, 2012, http://chinaforesight.net/2012/06/04/the-wind-dragon-a-chinese-tale-of-windpower/]
Because of the hectic pace of China’s economic and social development, Chinese energy demand will continue to grow rapidly in next
40 years. Beijing appears determined to pursue a low-carbon development strategy, and wind energy
is going to be one of the main resources for achieving China’s low carbon goals. According to figures
released in March 2012 by the China Wind Energy Association, last year China consolidated its position as the
global wind power leader in both newly and cumulative installed capacities, deploying an impressive 17.6
gigawatts of wind turbines. Notably, by the end of 2011, the added production capability took the national
cumulative installed wind power electrical generation to 62.4 gigawatts, up 39.4 percent from the
previous year. In December 2011, Longyuan Power, China’s largest wind power developer, connected 99.3 megawatts of wind
turbines to the grid in a pilot intertidal wind farm in the Eastern province of Jiangsu. Meanwhile, deep inland, the desert province of
Gansu is becoming the frontline of the country’s efforts toward a greener energy mix by massively investing in renewable energy,
which includes the erection of wind turbines at the rate of more than one per hour. As impressive as these figures and developments
are, so far wind power generation accounts only for 1.5 percent of national power generation. However,
China has a grand
vision for wind energy. Such a long-term “big plan” is outlined into China’s Wind Power
Development Roadmap 2050, a key-document recently issued by the Energy Research Institute of National Development
and Reform Commission. The Roadmap foresees Chinese wind power capacity reaching 200 GW by 2020, 400 GW by 2030 and 1
000 GW by 2050, making up 17 percent of the country’s electricity consumption.
2NC/1NR UQ—China Growth Now
China’s growing now---no alt causes
Ling 13—Li, writer at the Global Times. “China’s path gives global economy hope,” 2013,
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90778/8122121.html
At the recent 2013 World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos, China tops the agenda. The agenda on the first
day was about China's growth. When I opened the thick handbook, all I could see were China-related topics. This has never occurred
in the history of Davos. ¶ WEF Chairman Klaus Schwab told me the arrangement was made in response to feedbacks from
participants.¶ Hot discussions about China were not only reflected in the 115-page agenda, but also at forums where China was not the
main subject but was constantly mentioned. ¶ The theme of this year's Davos was "Resilient Dynamism." Currently, the prospect for
the recovery of developed economies is still gloomy. Though there have been signs that economies in Europe and the US are
rebounding, real reforms are few, which means that the mechanisms that caused the financial crisis haven't been changed. ¶
Meanwhile, almost all developed countries have overdrawn their fiscal expenditures and are not able to do anything more. ¶ China
has brought confidence and hope to a global economy that is still stuck in the mud. China's
economy is developing fast in the transformation process. ¶ In 2012 when it slowed its growth rate, it still
maintained a growth rate of 7.8 percent. It is expected that the figure will be about 8.2 percent in
2013. ¶ This trend has been admired by many. When I attended various forums and communicated with participants, they all
spoke highly of China's economic development.¶ Of course China has its own problems. When I discussed with
experts about the problems and solutions, I often heard that every country has problems, and different problems come at different
times. The changes China has experienced these years show that it has the capability to solve its problems.
AT: China Growth Weak—Inflation/Overheating
No overheating
WSJ 12—MarketWatch, “China’s inflation not such a worry for now”,
http://blogs.marketwatch.com/thetell/2012/12/09/chinas-inflation-not-such-a-worry-for-now/
Chinese data out Sunday showed that consumer prices picked up in November, but economists moved to
dispel concerns about a possible price shock from rising food costs.¶ The consumer price index is a key data
point for investors, with a desire to keep control of prices one of the main reasons behind China’ s post-2009
policy-tightening moves.¶ China’s November data out over the weekend saw CPI growth at 2%, accelerating from 1.7% in October, with
Jun Ma at Deutsche Bank noting the increase was due mainly to a sharp rise in vegetable prices, which climbed 11% month-on-month.¶ November’s
food-related rebound in consumer inflation “is sparking fears about another inflationary shock next year,” said Xianfang Ren
at Capital
Economics.¶ However, Ren also said that while inflation is expected to pick up in 2013, it won’t likely
be a dramatic rise. ¶ “China now is actually standing at the late stage of contraction and early
stage of expansion — likely a weak expansion cycle. Bottom line is that inflation won’t be the
No. 1 concern next year.” Ren said.¶ HSBC Greater China chief economist Qu Hongbin also focused on the growth
backdrop as a reason for expecting the data series to remain benign in 2013.¶ Demand is not running at full
speed, he said, while modest growth means imported inflation risks should be manageable , as
Chinese demand is so large that it plays a significant role in setting global commodities prices. ¶ Qu
said that “given that over 30% of China’s CPI basket is food, which is sensitive to weather conditions,” the CPI rate tends to be vulnerable to supply
shocks. But he went some way to try to dispel fears about food prices. ¶ “The good news is that the ninth consecutive good harvest – something not seen
for half a century – will help maintain the balance of food supply and demand. The supply of live pigs is sufficient to avoid large price rises,” the
economist said. ¶ Beijing will likely be happy with CPI in a range of between 3% and 4% in 2013, Qu said, adding that “
price stability
remains a priority , not only for economic development, but also for social stability.”
Their ev is overly-pessimistic—China’s growth is strong
Ezrati 13—Milton, economics writer at On Wall Street [“China's Economy Looking More
Secure,” 2013, http://www.onwallstreet.com/ows_issues/23_2/china-s-economic-outlooklooking-more-secure-2682937-1.html]
It seems China's economic outlook at last has stopped keeping investors up at night. For the last 18 months or
so, experts have worried about China's prospects. Pointing to the economy's slow growth and its bursting real estate bubble, they have
fretted over economic collapse, the possibility of a "hard landing," and the potential repercussions for the global economy and its
financial markets.¶ Deeper analyses and real-world probabilities always suggested that such fears
were overblown, but they have persisted nonetheless. Now recent data emerging from Beijing offers still
more reason for investors to set aside their worst fears about China. Its economy, of course, will not recapture
the astronomical growth rates of some years ago. But still, it looks quite capable of sustaining real growth in
the range of 7.5% to 8.5% a year. Considering that this rate of expansion is more than four times the pace
expected for the United States, it should provide considerable opportunity in Chinese investments, both directly and through
equity purchases.
2NC/1NR Link—OSW K2 Chinese Clean Tech
Offshore wind is key---only tech that can meet China’s needs
Martinot 10 Eric Martinot is research director with the Institute for Sustainable Energy
Policies in Tokyo, Japan. “Renewable power for China: Past, present, and future,” Frontiers of
Energy and Power Engineering in China Vol. 4, No. 3, pp. 287-294,
http://www.martinot.info/Martinot_FEPE4-3.pdf
It appears reasonable to expect that the proposed renewable energy development targets for 2020 introduced at the beginning of this
paper will be achieved, perhaps even before 2020. However, prospects for renewables development through 2020 and
beyond hinge on the degree to which renewable power technologies can be integrated into power
systems on increasing scales, at both centralized and distributed levels, with managed and coordinated approaches among utilities,
project developers, consumers, enterprises, and local governments. Wind power appears to exhibit the most promise
for China. Wind resources in China total at least 250 GW onshore and 750 GW offshore [14,15]. Thus,
there is considerable scope for further development for at least another 15 to 20 years. However, offshore
wind turbine technology and development planning will become increasingly important as the
best onshore sites are used up. The main constraints to wind power development do not appear to be resources or costs, but
rather power transmission constraints (between windy regions and population centers) and energy storage constraints. To approach
1000 GW of wind power in the long term would require significant amounts of electricity storage capacity to even out the variations in
wind power output on minute-by-minute, hourly, daily, and even seasonal scales.
2NC/1NR Link—Wind K2 Clean Tech Leadership
Wind is symbolically key to clean tech leadership
Asmus 11 Peter Asmus, president of Pathfinder Communications, is an internationally known
expert on energy and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) matters. “Wind: Leader of the
renewable power pack,” Oct 24, http://www.fierceenergy.com/story/wind-leader-renewablepower-pack/2011-10-24
As the most affordable renewable-energy choice, wind power has emerged as an icon of green
technology. With more than 200 GW of capacity currently up and running, and large companies
such as General Electric, Vestas, Siemens, Mitsubishi and BP all investing in the sector, it is clear
this technology has a bright future. While the North American wind energy industry lags in key
areas compared to Europe and Asia, many key industry players are optimistic about the North
American market as turbine costs continue to drop dramatically. A total of 5,784 MW of wind
capacity was added in North America in 2010, according to Pike Research's report, Wind Energy
Outlook for North America. Wind has been tapped as a source of mechanical powers for
centuries. Between the 14th and 19th centuries, for example, windmills of various kinds provided
as much as a quarter of Europe's total energy needs. Before the advent of the Industrial
Revolution, windmills ranked second only to wood fuel as a source of power. Wind, of course,
also provided the "fuel" for the sailing vessels of the Age of Discovery. Until the past three
decades, its variability and potentially destructive nature have hampered any comprehensive longterm program to convert free and abundant wind power into a major source of electricity. Utilities
face challenges Variability of wind power is probably the prime challenge for utilities. Energy
company officials worry about maintaining stability of the grid once wind power reaches 10 or 20
percent of total supply. However, smart grid technology as well as a variety of advanced storage
devices, will help address those issues. Another challenge for utilities is accessing the best
remaining wind resources. This will require investment in new transmission lines. Current
regulatory and policy frameworks governing transmission may be a bottleneck for future growth.
Grid operators, meanwhile, are changing scheduling protocols and placing a greater emphasis on
new wind forecasting technologies as wind becomes a larger and larger portion of total supply.
Wind resources are actually a form of solar energy. The uneven heating of the Earth's surface by
the sun results in air movements as the atmosphere continuously tries to reach equilibrium. The
tilt of the Earth and its daily rotation around the sun are the primary elements shaping wind
patterns. However, large bodies of water and the geographic contours of mountain, forest, and
desert landscapes (as well as other factors) also contribute to creating regions of the planet where
winds blow frequently enough to be harnessed as fuel to generate electricity. The determination
of whether potential wind resources can be developed into an economic source of electricity
depends upon numerous infrastructure choices, among them the following: Selection of wind
turbine technology Affordable interconnections to the transmission grid Siting issues that include
concerns of nearby human populations about scenic views and diminished land values
Environmental concerns regarding potential collisions of federally protected species of birds and
bats with the spinning wind turbine blades Historically, wind power has been one of the lowest
cost renewable technologies. This is one reason wind power has led the pack among renewable
energy technologies in terms of new capacity additions over the past decade. The diversity in
scale -- with wind turbines ranging from less than 1 kW for remote or residential applications all
the way up to designs of 10 or even 15 MW for offshore sites -- has allowed wind power to meet
the needs of a variety of applications around the world. Indeed, more efficient wind turbine
technology has enabled operators to capture more power more of the time, contributing to the
wind industry's 21st century growth. The next frontier Offshore wind power is the next frontier.
The vast majority of existing capacity is utility-scale wind farms deployed on land. The best wind
resources, however, are largely untapped because they are located at marine sites that cannot be
owned or controlled in the traditional way. These sites are located offshore, typically in shallow
ocean waters relatively close to urban population centers.
AT: OSW is Small
The link is unique but large---there are a huge number of OSW projects
planned now---the aff causes them to be built---massively increases clean
energy generation
NREL 10 National Renewable Energy Laboratory. “Large-Scale Offshore Wind Power in the
United States,” http://www.nrel.gov/wind/pdfs/40745.pdf
Although the United States has built no offshore wind projects so far, about 20 projects
representing more than 2,000 MW of capacity are in the planning and permitting process. Most of
these activities are in the Northeast and Mid-Atlantic regions, although projects are being considered along the Great Lakes, the Gulf
of Mexico, and the Pacific Coast. The deep waters off the West Coast, however, pose a technology challenge for the near term.
Untested regulatory and permitting requirements in federal waters (outside the three-nauticalmile state boundary)
have posed major hurdles to development, but recent progress is clarifying these processes. Most notably, after 9 years in the
permitting process, the Cape Wind project off of Massachusetts was offered the first commercial lease by the Department of Interior
in April 2010.The U.S. Department of the Interior bears responsibility for reducing the uncertainties and potential risks to the marine
environment and making the federal permitting process more predictable under the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (In June
2010, the Minerals and Management Service [MMS] was reorganized and renamed Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation
and Enforcement [BOEM]). Some states have been proactive in promoting offshore wind demonstration projects in their own waters
close to shore, which may provide a more efficient regulatory path to meet their renewable energy obligations, while jumpstarting a
new locally grown industry. 1.3 A Powerful U.S. Resource Offshore winds tend to blow harder and more
uniformly than on land, providing the potential for increased electricity generation and smoother,
steadier operation than land-based wind power systems. The availability of these high offshore winds close to
major U.S. coastal cities significantly reduces power transmission issues. The offshore wind resource in the United
States has been sufficiently documented at a gross level to suggest an abundance of potential
offshore wind sites as shown in Figure 1-2. The gross resource has been quantified by state, water depth, distance
from shore, and wind class throughout a band extending out to 50 nautical miles from the U.S. coastline. This total gross wind
resource is estimated at more than 4,000 GW, or roughly four times the generating capacity
currently carried on the U.S. electric grid . This estimate assumes that one 5-MW wind turbine could be placed on
every square kilometer of water with an annual average wind speed above 7.0 meters per second (m/s). As shown in Figure 1-2, this
gross resource is distributed across three main depth categories, increasing from 1,071 GW over shallow water (30 meters), to 628
GW over transitional waters (between 30 and 60 meters in depth), and to 2,451 GW over deep water (deeper than 60 meters).
However, this wind mapping effort does not currently account for a range of siting restrictions and public concerns. These gross
resource values will likely shrink by 60% or more after all environmental and socioeconomic constraints have been taken into account.
Further study is also required to determine optimal spacing of turbines based on array effects, which could reduce the density of the
potential offshore wind development.
AT: Plan is Coop
No impact to U.S.-China cooperation---it’s impossible to sustain
Aaron L. Friedberg 12, Professor of Politics and International Affairs at the Woodrow Wilson
School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University, September/October 2012,
“Bucking Beijing,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 91, No. 5, p. 48-58
Recent events have raised serious doubts about both elements of this strategy. Decades of trade and
talk have not hastened China's political liberalization. Indeed, the last few years have been marked by an intensified
crackdown on domestic dissent. At the same time, the much-touted economic relationship between the two Pacific
powers has become a major source of friction. And despite hopes for enhanced cooperation,
Beijing has actually done very little to help Washington solve pressing international problems,
such as North Korea's acquisition of nuclear weapons or Iran's attempts to develop them. Finally, far from accepting
the status quo, China's leaders have become more forceful in attempting to control the waters and
resources off their country's coasts. As for balancing, the continued buildup of China's military
capabilities, coupled with impending cuts in U.S. defense spending, suggests that the regional distribution of
power is set to shift sharply in Beijing's favor.
WHY WE CAN'T ALL JUST GET ALONG
TODAY, CHINA'S ruling elites are both arrogant and insecure. In their view, continued rule by the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) is essential to China's stability, prosperity, and prestige; it is also, not coincidentally, vital to their own safety
and comfort. Although they have largely accepted some form of capitalism in the economic sphere, they remain committed
to preserving their hold on political power.
The CCP'S determination to maintain control informs the regime's threat perceptions, goals, and policies. Anxious about their
legitimacy, China's rulers are eager to portray themselves as defenders of the national honor. Although they believe China is on
remain deeply fearful of encirclement and
ideological subversion. And despite Washington's attempts to reassure them of its benign
intentions, Chinese leaders are convinced that the United States aims to block China's rise and,
track to become a world power on par with the United States, they
ultimately, undermine its one-party system of government.¶ Like the United States, since the end of the Cold War, China has pursued
an essentially constant approach toward its greatest external challenger. For the most part, Beijing has sought to avoid outright
confrontation with the United States while pursuing economic growth and building up all the elements of its "comprehensive national
power," a Chinese strategic concept that encompasses military strength, technological prowess, and diplomatic influence. Even as they
remain on the defensive, however, Chinese officials have not been content to remain passive. They have sought incremental advances,
slowly expanding China's sphere of influence and strengthening its position in Asia while working quietly to erode that of the United
States. Although they are careful never to say so directly, they seek to have China displace the United States in the long run and to
restore China to what they regard as its rightful place as the preponderant regional power. Chinese strategists do not believe that they
can achieve this objective quickly or through a frontal assault. Instead, they seek to reassure their neighbors, relying on the attractive
force of China's massive economy to counter nascent balancing efforts against it. Following the advice of the ancient military
strategist Sun-tzu, Beijing aims to "win without fighting," gradually creating a situation in which overt resistance to its wishes will
appear futile.
The failure to date to achieve a genuine entente between the United States and China is the result not
of a lack of effort but of
a fundamental divergence of interests. Although limited cooperation on specific issues might
be possible, the ideological gap between the two nations is simply too great, and the level of trust
between them too low, to permit a stable modus vivendi. What China's current leaders ultimately
want -- regional hegemony -- is not something their counterparts in Washington are willing to
give. That would run counter to an axiomatic goal of U.S. grand strategy, which has remained constant for decades: to prevent the
domination of either end of the Eurasian landmass by one or more potentially hostile powers.
The reasons for this goal involve a mix of strategic, economic, and ideological
will continue to be valid into the foreseeable future .
considerations that
Companies in both countries say no
Conrad 11 – Research associates with the Global Public Policy Institute [Björn Conrad (PhD
candidate @ University of Trier. His research focuses on China’s domestic climate policy. MA in
Chinese Studies, Political Science and Economics from the University of Trier and a Master in
Public Policy from Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government.) & Mirjam Meissner (MA in
Chinese Studies, Political Science and Economics from the Free University), “Catching a Second
Wind Changing the Logic of International Cooperation in China’s Wind Energy Sector,” Global
Public Policy Institute, GPPi Policy Paper No. 12, February 2011
Seizing the opportunity to change the logic of international cooperation in China’s wind energy sector does not come without risk.
Business actors on both sides will be reluctant to enter into comprehensive partnerships fearing
that their engagement will follow the familiar unsustainable pattern of cooperation. Foreign
companies will be concerned about sharing technological expertise without getting significant
market entry in return. At the same time, skepticism about foreign companies’ willingness to share the
latest technology and cooperate on an equal footing will result in Chinese companies being
reluctant to provide entry points into the domestic market. Newly emerging incentive structures are currently
opening a window of opportunity for breaking this vicious cycle, but change will not occur without decisive action.
Both sides will have to credibly signal a fundamental change in approach in order to prepare the ground for
new models of cooperation. In addition, governmental actors on both sides will have to play an active role in facilitating this
development by providing additional incentives and minimizing possible risks for those companies willing to take the cooperative
logic to the next level.
Even if joint ventures are successfully set up, they won’t last because of
disappointment
Conrad 11 – Research associates with the Global Public Policy Institute [Björn Conrad (PhD
candidate @ University of Trier. His research focuses on China’s domestic climate policy. MA in
Chinese Studies, Political Science and Economics from the University of Trier and a Master in
Public Policy from Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government.) & Mirjam Meissner (MA in
Chinese Studies, Political Science and Economics from the Free University), “Catching a Second
Wind Changing the Logic of International Cooperation in China’s Wind Energy Sector,” Global
Public Policy Institute, GPPi Policy Paper No. 12, February 2011
Technology transfer¶ The approach to international cooperation by Chinese wind power equipment companies has been narrowly
focused on the acquisition of advanced technology. Therein, China’s business actors have been as thoroughly disappointed as foreign
companies with regards to gaining sustained access to China’s domestic wind power market. Due to the IPR concerns
described above, international
companies have been avoiding the setup of joint ventures with Chinese
partners and the few attempts at joint ventures between Chinese and foreign wind turbine
manufacturers have been unsuccessful. Even the original advantages of joint ventures formed under
the “Riding the Wind Program” were not enough to bring about effective partnerships. The inability to
establish a sustained market presence pointed to the ultimately disappointing yield of such
partnerships for both sides.¶ In absence of alternatives, licensing agreements became the only viable and legal way for
Chinese firms to attain technology from foreign companies. In the earlier stages of their development, Chinese companies such as
Sinovel and Goldwind based their success on a combination of licensed foreign technology and an ability to produce at low
manufacturing costs. However, foreign companies have been extremely careful not to provide cutting-edge technology to Chinese
counterparts, protecting their innovation advantage at all times. Furthermore, China’s capabilities in onshore wind technology are
rapidly catching up with those in Europe -- capabilities supported by public investments in technology development and R&D. This
trend renders traditional licensing agreements increasingly obsolete as a form of international cooperation in China’s wind sector.¶
China’s disappointment with the quality of transferred technology is one of the central reasons for
its lack of enthusiasm in facilitating international cooperation. China’s disdains also reflected in
lackluster wind-related efforts under the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). While over
250 CDM wind energy projects have been conducted in China between 2006 and 2010 31 , these
projects failed to meet Chinese stakeholders’ expectations regarding the introduction of advanced
technologies to the Chinese market. As Gao Guangsheng, director general of climate change at Beijing’s National
Development and Reform Commission explained, “CDM was making only a small difference to the attractiveness of wind power in
China” 32 . The perceived low transfer rate of high-end technology through the CDM framework
added to China’s tendency towards innovative self-reliance. Chinese officials are now expecting
to fund 90% of the necessary investment to allow self-achievement of renewable energy targets.
China’s government needs to change policies—the aff doesn’t cause that
Conrad 11 – Research associates with the Global Public Policy Institute [Björn Conrad (PhD
candidate @ University of Trier. His research focuses on China’s domestic climate policy. MA in
Chinese Studies, Political Science and Economics from the University of Trier and a Master in
Public Policy from Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government.) & Mirjam Meissner (MA in
Chinese Studies, Political Science and Economics from the Free University), “Catching a Second
Wind Changing the Logic of International Cooperation in China’s Wind Energy Sector,” Global
Public Policy Institute, GPPi Policy Paper No. 12, February 2011
China’s political leadership
Paradigm shift: An adjustment of the regulatory framework of domestic competition is an essential
prerequisite for the emergence of a new cooperation model. Thus far, the rules of competition
have effectively shut out international actors from large segments of China’s wind market. But
China’s strategy of protecting domestic industry at all costs in order to grow national champions produces diminishing returns. Chinese manufacturers
need less protection; they will have to face global competition in the future and can increasingly benefit from advanced technology cooperation with
international partners. At the same time, profit-making opportunities in China’s domestic wind market remain the main incentive for international
companies to engage in these partnerships. Therefore, China’s leadership will have to make a credible effort to change regulatory practices in order to
provide a more level playing field and convince European companies that advanced cooperation with Chinese partners will indeed open improved
business opportunities in the Chinese domestic market.
Alt cause—Chinese regulations
Conrad 11 – Research associates with the Global Public Policy Institute [Björn Conrad (PhD
candidate @ University of Trier. His research focuses on China’s domestic climate policy. MA in
Chinese Studies, Political Science and Economics from the University of Trier and a Master in
Public Policy from Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government.) & Mirjam Meissner (MA in
Chinese Studies, Political Science and Economics from the Free University), “Catching a Second
Wind Changing the Logic of International Cooperation in China’s Wind Energy Sector,” Global
Public Policy Institute, GPPi Policy Paper No. 12, February 2011
Market access¶ The Chinese government’s attempts to balance the protection of its domestic industry from foreign competition against
the positive effects of foreign companies’ involvement have shaped the regulatory framework of China’s wind power market.
During the infant stage of China’s wind sector development, when wind power had not been elevated to an issue
of high political priority, international
engagement represented a cost and time effective way of expanding
installed capacity and introducing new wind power technologies in China. With the growing
importance of wind energy as a strategic technology of China’s long-term economic planning, the
objective of fostering domestic innovation capacity and technological independence moved to the
center of its strategy. As a result, the corresponding regulations, from high local content rates to the different
pricing models as delineated above, created a highly uneven competitive environment. This effectively
excluded foreign-owned companies from direct market participation. The protective market
structures represent one of the central impediment s to the emergence of collaborative structures
in China’s wind energy sector.¶ After 2000, the tightly regulated avenues for international entry
into China’s wind sector were effectively limited to technology licensing and joint ventures. The
latter was utterly unsuccessful, primarily due to foreign companies’ reluctance to engage in the
comprehensive sharing of intellectual property with Chinese partners. Yet the former became the most
common model of international cooperation in China’s wind energy sector. Under licensing agreements, Chinese manufacturers
produce wind power equipment with a foreign company’s technological design and pay royalties to the license giver. However,
foreign companies only license older designs to Chinese manufacturers, whilst withholding the
distribution of cuttingedge technology. The contribution of licensing agreements to the
advancement and dissemination of effective climate technologies and the corresponding positive
effects for global climate protection are accordingly limited. In addition, given the technological
advancement of Chinese wind power equipment companies, the returns for China’s business
actors from licensing agreements are quickly diminishing, making this only remaining form of
international cooperation on China’s wind market increasingly obsolete .
Alt cause—IPR concerns
Conrad 11 – Research associates with the Global Public Policy Institute [Björn Conrad (PhD
candidate @ University of Trier. His research focuses on China’s domestic climate policy. MA in
Chinese Studies, Political Science and Economics from the University of Trier and a Master in
Public Policy from Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government.) & Mirjam Meissner (MA in
Chinese Studies, Political Science and Economics from the Free University), “Catching a Second
Wind Changing the Logic of International Cooperation in China’s Wind Energy Sector,” Global
Public Policy Institute, GPPi Policy Paper No. 12, February 2011
Intellectual property rights
The vast potential for profit-making ensures the continuous attractiveness of China’s wind market for foreign companies despite setbacks and
disappointments. As Lie Huihan of Suzlon Energy (China) put it: “Whatever the circumstances are, not being here is just not an option.” 30 However, the
necessity to protect their innovative edge puts limits on international companies’ willingness to
engage in comprehensive partnerships with Chinese counterparts. Especially in a relatively
young business sector like wind energy , where international competition is shaped by rapid technology improvements and large
competitive advantages through innovation, cutting-edge technology represents the basis for success. Therefore,
concerns about IPR infringements (see box 1) have significant influence on international companies’
business decisions when it comes to entry into the Chinese wind market. Foreign firms cautiously
avoid introducing sensible and up-to-date technology to China and have been reluctant to locate
R&D activities in China. More recently, concerns about safeguarding technological advantages have
been intensified by the prospects of Chinese manufacturers starting to export to markets outside
China, making them global competitors. In light of these concerns, joint R&D projects between foreign and
Chinese wind firms are exceedingly rare thus far. Given the Chinese side’s strong focus on technology advancement as the
primary benefit of international cooperation, this dynamic significantly limits the scope of workable
international collaboration in China’s wind sector.
2NC/1NR Intrnl Link—Clean Tech Zero-Sum
China’s ahead in clean tech development now and it’s zero sum—key to their
economic growth
Bennhold 10 Katrin is a writer for the New York Times. “Race Is on to Develop Green, Clean
Technology,” Jan 29,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/30/business/global/30davos.html?dbk&_r=0
DAVOS, SWITZERLAND — It
is shaping up to be the Great Game of the 21st century. To top officials and
the World Economic Forum, Topic A this year was the race to develop greener,
cleaner technology, which is emerging as one of the critical factors in reshaping the world economy as
emerging powers snap at the heels of battered Western economies. With the United States and China sizing each other
up across the Pacific and Europe seeking to maintain its economic stature, it is a battle for potentially millions of jobs
and trillions of dollars in export revenues. The outcome — which pits a venture capital-driven market approach
relying on government subsides against a top-down system of state capitalism — has the potential to influence how
economic and political systems evolve. Concern that China may be edging ahead in potentially
lucrative growth sectors like renewable energy was palpable here, where senior officials from the United States and
business executives here at
Europe warned that the West could not afford to be complacent. “Six months ago my biggest worry was that an emissions deal would
make American business less competitive compared to China,” said Senator Lindsay Graham, a Republican from South Carolina who
has been deeply involved in climate change issues in Congress. “Now my concern is that every day that we delay trying to find a price
for carbon is a day that China uses to dominate the green economy.” He added: “China has made a long-term strategic
decision and they are going gang-busters.” Christine Lagarde, the French finance minister, agreed. “It’s a race
and whoever wins that race will dominate economic development,” she said. “The emerging markets are
well-placed.”
2NC/1NR Intrnl Link—Zero Sum
China’s ahead in clean tech development now and it’s zero sum—key to their
economic growth
Bennhold 10 Katrin is a writer for the New York Times. “Race Is on to Develop Green, Clean
Technology,” Jan 29,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/30/business/global/30davos.html?dbk&_r=0
DAVOS, SWITZERLAND — It
is shaping up to be the Great Game of the 21st century . To top officials
and business executives here at the World Economic Forum, Topic A this year was the race to develop
greener, cleaner technology, which is emerging as one of the critical factors in reshaping the world
economy as emerging powers snap at the heels of battered Western economies. With the United States and China sizing
each other up across the Pacific and Europe seeking to maintain its economic stature, it is a battle for potentially
millions of jobs and trillions of dollars in export revenues . The outcome — which pits a venture
capital-driven market approach relying on government subsides against a top-down system of state capitalism — has the
potential to influence how economic and political systems evolve. Concern that China may be edging
ahead in potentially lucrative growth sectors like renewable energy was palpable here, where senior officials
from the United States and Europe warned that the West could not afford to be complacent. “Six months ago my biggest worry was
that an emissions deal would make American business less competitive compared to China,” said Senator Lindsay Graham, a
Republican from South Carolina who has been deeply involved in climate change issues in Congress. “Now my concern is that every
day that we delay trying to find a price for carbon is a day that China uses to dominate the green economy.” He added: “China has
made a long-term strategic decision and they are going gang-busters.” Christine Lagarde, the French
finance minister, agreed. “It’s a race and whoever wins that race will dominate economic
development,” she said. “The emerging markets are well-placed.”
China’s leading now but renewable incentives in the US reverse it
Ron Pernick 11, Managing Director, Clean Edge, “The Future of Clean Tech and Why I Can't
Stop Thinking About China”,
http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2011/11/the-future-of-clean-tech-andwhy-i-cant-stop-thinking-about-china
The China Development Bank (CDB) is being relentless in its funding of clean-tech concerns .
While American politicians battle it out over Solyndra’s collapse and potential loss to the government of $528 million,
the Chinese are pumping billions into their clean-tech concerns , knowing full well that some
of them will fail. The CDB put more than $30 billion in credit into its burgeoning solar companies in 2010, including
Suntech Power, Trina, and Yingli. It recently announced financial commitments to ensure that its fledgling wind industry can
join the ranks of GE, Vestas, and Siemens, allocating at least $15 billion in state-backed credit to China's biggest windmill makers
Sinovel Wind Group and Xinjiang Goldwind Science & Technology. And China has plans to invest some $45 billion in smart-grid
companies and technologies alone over the next five years. ¶ These investments haven’t gone unnoticed in
the U.S., and have been front and center in recent complaints that have claimed that China’s solar
industry, for example, has an unfair trade advantage.¶ One of the other things that make China and the U.S. so different
is that Chinese national and regional leadership is now fully aligned behind clean tech as an
economic development and jobs growth strategy. They aren’t fighting amongst themselves about
whether they should support clean energy, but are instead fighting to lead in the sector . To put it
China believes in renewables . At the same time, our inept Congress dukes it out over one
bad investment and seems increasingly polarized at every turn. We have states like California, Oregon,
Connecticut, New York, and Colorado that are committed to clean tech, but without federal support they
simply,
are left to figure out the puzzle mostly on their own. ¶ China is getting ready to outsmart us.
“When
you look at the political leaders in China they are mostly scientists and engineers, many
from the power industry,” says Jefferies managing director Jesse Pichel. “But in the U.S. politicians are mostly
lawyers.” And it’s not just business and policy talent that seems to be expanding, but student achievement. Chinese students in
Shanghai recently scored tops in the OECD Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) evaluation tests for math, science,
and reading. It’s important to note that PISA usually evaluates student performance for entire countries, so while Shanghai’s results
are impressive they are not necessarily representative of all of China. ¶ China’s clean-tech push, of course, will be
riddled with future obstacles, potholes, and challenges. For example, approximately a third of China’s wind power
had not been connected to the grid by the end of 2010, highlighting issues with grid connectivity keeping up with new capacity
additions. There have also been complaints of everything from exploding wind turbines to pollution concerns at solar PV
manufacturing plants, demonstrating serious environmental and quality control issues that could cause
significant roadblocks in the nation’s push for clean-tech dominance. And, ongoing issues surrounding weak
intellectual property protections in China continue to threaten foreign investment and participation within the country. ¶ But do you
think these business and infrastructure issues will unravel China’s commitment to its clean-tech
build out? I don’t think so. Instead, China is redoubling its efforts in order to own as much of
the clean-tech sector as it possibly can.¶ The U.S., on the other hand, has some political
leaders that are ready to call it quits. The U.S. “can't compete with China to make solar
panels and wind turbines ,” U.S. Representative Cliff Stearns (R-Fla.) recently told National Public Radio. Imagine if
our earlier tech revolutionaries in aerospace, computing, and the Internet had policymakers with
such weakened spines -- we’d be a mere shadow of our current selves. ¶ No doubt America
faces its own unique challenges, but it’s not time to give up . Instead, let’s tap our
entrepreneurial spirit, regain our clean-tech policy backbone , and get back in the business of
21st century innovation and leadership . The Chinese, I’m certain, will be doing nothing less.
2NC/1NR Intrnl Link—Zero-Sum (Supply Chain/Firm
Relocation)
The whole supply chain follows demand---means leadership is zero-sum---if
they solve their advantages they definitely link to the DA
Caperton et al 11 Richard W. Caperton is a Policy Analyst with the Energy Opportunity team
at the Center for American Progress; Kate Gordon is Vice President for Energy Policy at the
Center; Bracken Hendricks is a Senior Fellow at the Center; and Daniel J. Weiss is a Senior
Fellow and Director of Climate Strategy at the Center. “Helping America Win the Clean Energy
Race,” Feb 7, http://www.americanprogress.org/wpcontent/uploads/issues/2011/02/pdf/ces_brief.pdf
This is no way to build a modern industry. Already we
have seen cutting-edge solar power manufacturing
companies begin to close their doors, either permanently or to move to other countries with strong and
dedicated clean energy markets. Evergreen Solar Inc., for example, recently announced plans to
close its Massachusetts plant to put more funds into solar panel manufacturing in China. The
company followed on the heels of SpectraWatt Inc. in New York and Solyndra Inc. in California closing some of their facilities. As
General Electric Co.’s chairman and chief executive, Jeff Immelt, said at last year’s ARPA-E summit, those
countries with
strong demand for renewable energy products will naturally pull these companies into
their borders because “innovation and supply chain strength gets developed where the
demand is the greatest. Similarly, wind manufacturers in Iowa, once a state leader in this industry, are laying off workers
as new orders fail to materialize. Leading global financier Deutsche Bank decided to move billions of investment dollars out of the
U.S. clean energy market, and into China and Europe as soon as it was clear there would be no comprehensive climate and energy
legislation coming out of the 111th Congress. China and our other economic competitors in Asia, Europe, and emerging
markets are
not waiting for America to regroup. The home team can win the clean energy race These stories share a
common theme: investment dollars leav[e] ing the United States to be deployed among our global
competitors who have fully embraced the economic and environmental imperative to enter a new
era of cleaner, more sustainable and domestic energy. China is the most striking example. In 2009,
even as the United States was installing more wind turbines, China driven by stable long-term demand for its
products, became the world’s largest manufacturer of wind power systems. It was already the
world’s largest solar manufacturer and developer of efficient nuclear and coal technologies. All
these countries have comprehensive programs in place to spur robust and stable demand
for low-carbon energy, which then creates a market for businesses to manufacture and install
the technologies to meet that demand. Last June, China announced its plan to meet a renewable energy standard of 20
percent by 2020, matching the European Union’s target. Germany has set a target of 60 percent by 2050. The country already gets 16
percent of all its power from renewables, well on its way to meeting this ambitious goal, and some think it may reach 100 percent by
2050. Denmark has gone a step further, actually announcing its intention to become 100 percent independent of fossil fuels by 2050,
something that at least one of its islands has already achieved. This occurred in a country that in 1970 was almost completely
dependent on foreign fossil fuels. These countries prove that strong clean energy standards build growing economies. But even more
than that, strong clean energy standards are now imperative if we are to compete on the same playing
field as China and Europe. America over the course of the 20th century took command of the Industrial Revolution and the
communications revolution, and then led the world into the Information Age. It is time for us to lead the clean-tech revolution, too.
Today, others are beating us to the punch, not because we lack the technology and innovation to lead this new revolution, but because
we are not providing the market signals needed for our private-sector entrepreneurs need
to invest over the long haul . This clean energy investment gap is rapidly becoming the greatest threat to America’s
technology leadership.
Renewables companies are going to China now because of lack of
incentives—empirics prove
Freedman 11 David is a Guest Contributor @ MIT’s Technology Review. “China Beckons for
Green-Energy Startups,” Sept 27, http://www.technologyreview.com/article/425560/chinabeckons-for-green-energy-startups/
Many in the U.S. have an interest in getting clean-tech ventures off the ground. Among them are the
government, capital markets, industry, and science labs. But China seems ready to do more on every front to
make such projects happen, and to do it right now—without red tape or concern about economic turmoil. Leadingedge battery maker Boston Power appears to have come to that conclusion. The company is set to
move to China, where the government is helping to cut the firm a $125-million deal that no one else is
likely to match. The deal could leave the company poised to be a part of what could be a mushrooming market there in electric
vehicles. “This is really the next chapter for us,” says Christina Lampe-Onnerud, who founded Boston Power in 2005. LampeOnnerud, a former star technology consultant at Arthur D. Little and top scientist at Bell Communications Research, has been much
lauded in the world of high-tech green startups, thanks to Boston Power’s innovations in the chemistry of lithium-ion batteries, and to
the success the company has had in selling the resulting higher-capacity, faster-charging batteries to Hewlett-Packard for laptops.
Boston Power seemed even hotter in 2008 when Lampe-Onnerud announced she was setting her sights on producing batteries for the
electric-vehicle market. But this market has been slow to materialize and highly competitive, pitting Boston Power against other highflying startups, including A123 Systems, based in Waltham, Massachusetts. In 2009, Boston Power failed to win a
substantial loan guarantee from the U.S. Department of Energy that would have financed a Massachusetts
factory—the company currently manufactures via Taiwanese partner GP Batteries. That same year, a deal backed by the Swedish
government to help put the company’s batteries in electric vehicles from foundering Saab went nowhere. The new deal should put
Boston Power, which has raised nearly $200 million in funding, in a better position to compete for at least a foothold in what is
expected to eventually be a large global market for electric-vehicle batteries. The deal was set up by GSR Ventures, based in Beijing
and Palo Alto, California. GSR has more than $1 billion under management and is investing mostly in high-tech startups doing
business in China. Neither GSR’s managing director, Sonny Wu, nor Lampe-Onnerud would provide details on the exact breakdown
of the new financing, but both confirmed that the $125-million value represents a mix of private equity and Chinese-government
grants, low-interest loans, and financial and tax incentives. The equity investment comes from venture-capital firms Oak Investment
Partners and Foundation Asset Management, which are previous Boston Power investors, as well as from GSR. And the $125 million
might not be all there is to the deal, hinted Lampe-Onnerud. “Even more will unfold over the next six months,” she says. LampeOnnerud says the company will soon break ground on a new plant near Shanghai that is expected to turn out
18 million battery cells a year, about three times the company’s current capacity. And while the company is retaining some R&D
capabilities in the U.S.—it is headquartered in Westborough, Massachusetts—most of its engineering operations will
be based near Beijing, and the company is laying off about a third of its 100 U.S. employees. GSR’s
Wu is becoming chairman of Boston Power in the deal, essentially taking the reins from Lampe-Onnerud, who says she will
remain on the board and will continue to work closely with the company, but will not move to China. The company is currently
looking for a CEO to replace Keith Schmid, who took over the slot in February from Lampe-Onnerud. Lampe-Onnerud says
the company was driven to strike a China deal because the country has demonstrated an intention
to use generous incentives and funding to push its clean-tech markets, and its electric-vehicle market
in particular,
versus the shakier support in the U nited S tates. “China, by far, is the biggest
market for us, and this was a chance to get to profitability very quickly,” she explains. “We would
have loved to manufacture here, but every entrepreneur in this business who wants to stay in the
U.S. will have to make some tough choices.” Wu seconds the notion that China’s willingness to
throw government resources at electric-vehicle growth makes the country increasingly hard to resist for
startups in the industry. The Chinese government has already started building a large network of vehicle-recharging stations in major
cities, he says, and has stated goals to get at least 300,000 electric vehicles on the road within two years, goosing the market with
incentives worth more than $15,000 per car. “Being in China has become a necessary and sufficient condition for success in electric
vehicles,” he adds. “U.S. startups are feeling they need to be in China for this market in the same way
that Israeli high-tech companies in the early 1990s felt they had to be in the U.S.” Marianne Wu, a
partner at Mohr Davidow Ventures with experience in Asian markets, also agrees that China is likely to prove irresistible
to a growing number of startups in the electric-vehicle and other clean-tech markets. The fact that
China is simply buying more cars and just about everything else due to its rapid industrialization, along with its lower
manufacturing costs, are reasons enough to focus operations there, she says, adding that any government help with
financing is icing on the cake. “The Chinese government seems willing to provide large incentives to
companies in industries that it views as strategic, to foster these industries through infancy,” she says. “EV batteries
appear to be one of them, along with renewable energy in general.”
It’s zero-sum---demand is key---plan causes firms to relocate to the US
Bradsher 10 Keith is a writer at the NY Times. “China Leading Global Race to Make Clean
Energy,” 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/31/business/energyenvironment/31renew.html?pagewanted=all
The United States and other countries are offering incentives to develop their own renewable energy industries, and Mr. Obama called
for redoubling American efforts. Yet many Western and Chinese executives expect China to prevail in the energy-
technology race.¶ Multinational corporations are responding to the rapid growth of China’s market
by building big, state-of-the-art factories in China. Vestas of Denmark has just erected the world’s biggest wind turbine
manufacturing complex here in northeastern China, and transferred the technology to build the latest electronic controls and
have to move fast with the market,” said Jens Tommerup, the president of Vestas China. “Nobody
has ever seen such fast development in a wind market.Ӧ Renewable energy industries here are adding jobs
rapidly, reaching 1.12 million in 2008 and climbing by 100,000 a year, according to the government-backed Chinese Renewable
generators.¶ “ You
Energy Industries Association.¶ Yet renewable energy may be doing more for China’s economy than for the environment. Total power
generation in China is on track to pass the United States in 2012 — and most of the added capacity will still be from coal.¶ China
intends for wind, solar and biomass energy to represent 8 percent of its electricity generation capacity by 2020. That compares with
less than 4 percent now in China and the United States. Coal will still represent two-thirds of China’s capacity in 2020, and nuclear
and hydropower most of the rest.¶ As China seeks to dominate energy-equipment exports, it has the
advantage of being the world’s largest market for power equipment. The government spends heavily to
upgrade the electricity grid, committing $45 billion in 2009 alone. State-owned banks provide generous financing.¶ China’s top
leaders are intensely focused on energy policy: on Wednesday, the government announced the creation of a National Energy
Commission composed of cabinet ministers as a “superministry” led by Prime Minister Wen Jiabao himself.¶ Regulators have
set mandates for power generation companies to use more renewable energy. Generous subsidies
for consumers to install their own solar panels or solar water heaters have produced flurries of activity on rooftops
across China.¶ China’s biggest advantage may be its domestic demand for electricity , rising 15
percent a year. To meet demand in the coming decade, according to statistics from the International Energy Agency, China will need
to add nearly nine times as much electricity generation capacity as the United States will. ¶ So while Americans are used to thinking of
themselves as having the world’s largest market in many industries, China’s
market for power equipment dwarfs
that of the United States, even though the American market is more mature. That means Chinese producers
enjoy enormous efficiencies from large-scale production.
2NC/1NR Intrnl Link—Zero-Sum (Investment)
Investment is also zero-sum---plan causes flight from China by creating
certainty in the US
Luke Schoen 12, World Resources Institute, “CLEAN TECH’S RISE, PART I: Will the U.S.
and China Reap the Mutual Benefits?”, China FAQS issue brief, April 2012,
http://www.chinafaqs.org/files/chinainfo/ChinaFAQs_IssueBrief1_MutualBenefits.pdf
China itself, meanwhile, is becoming a critical market. In¶ recent years, it has become the world’s largest
source of,¶ and destination for, investment in clean energy.¶ 9¶ China is¶ expected to invest at
least $300 billion in domestic clean¶ energy technologies over the next five years¶ 10¶ as part of its¶ drive
to curb greenhouse gas emissions, gain economic¶ benefits, and improve energy security, in pursuit of¶ aggressive renewable energy
deployment targets in its¶ 12¶ th¶ Five-Year Plan¶ 11¶ (see table).¶ “There is no doubt that the¶ country remains
committed to the ongoing development¶ of its renewable energy sector ,” notes a recent analysis¶ from
The investment race , meanwhile,¶ is heating up. In 2010, China invested a worldleading $45¶ billion in clean energy, while the U.S. slipped to second¶ place with about $33.7
billion.¶ In 2011, however, the U.S.¶ recaptured the lead, with investment surging to¶ $48 billion, while China invested
$45.5 billion.¶ 13¶ China’s clear commitment to clean energy has made it¶ “ attractive to U.S. and
Ernst & Young.¶ 12¶
international investors ” because it¶ offers “the certainty they are looking for before
investing,Ӧ
notes Deborah Seligsohn, a China specialist with the ¶ World Resources Institute and WRI’s ChinaFAQs project.¶
Companies including First Solar, GE, Duke Energy,¶ American Electric Power, and many other U.S.
firms have¶ all
invested or expressed interest in investing in China ,¶ and “increasingly entrepreneurs with new
ideas are¶ looking to China to make those ideas become a reality.”
Financing is leaving the US for China now because of lack of production
incentives
Romm 11 Dr. Joseph Romm is a Senior Fellow @ American Progress. “United States slipped
to third in clean energy race,” March 29,
http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2011/03/29/207777/united-states-third-clean-energy-race/
“The
United States’ position as a leading destination for clean energy investment is declining
because its policy framework is weak and uncertain ,” said Phyllis Cuttino, director of Pew’s Clean Energy
Program. “We
are at risk of losing even more financing to countries like China, Germany and India, which
have adopted strong policies such as renewable energy standards, carbon reduction targets and/or
incentives for investment and production . In today’s global economic race, the United States can’t afford to be to
be a follower in this sector.” That China passed us a couple of years ago should have been a wake-up call (see Steven Chu on why
China’s bid for clean energy leadership should be our “Sputnik Moment”). Dropping to third behind Germany, though, should be
equally worrisome. It means U.S. clean energy manufacturing is being squeezed from every side. Michael
Liebreich, CEO of Bloomberg New Energy Finance, added, “The United States remains the global leader in clean energy innovation,
receiving 75 percent of all venture capital investment in the sector, a total of $6 billion in 2010, but the U.S. has not been
creating demand for deployment of clean energy. As a result it is losing out on opportunities to
attract investment, create manufacturing capabilities and spur job growth. For example, worldwide,
China is now the leading manufacturer of wind turbines and solar panels.”
Plan doesn’t access the impact since it doesn’t resolve Chinese growth and
offshore wind is key---it’s zero sum
Harvey 11 Fiona is an environment correspondent at the Guardian. “Developing world ups ante
in cleantech 'arms race',” Oct 18, http://www.guardian.co.uk/sustainable-business/evelopingworld-lead-wind-power-renewable-energy
Last year was a turning point in the global race to develop clean technology. It marked the first
time that more new wind power generating capacity was installed in developing countries than in
the rich world. China led the way, according to the Global Wind Energy Council (GWEC), and now has the most
wind generating capacity in the world, thanks to favourable government policies. A record capacity of 19 gigawatts was
added in China last year, taking the total to more than 42GW. India also showed strong growth, in line with the government target of
adding more than 10GW of new capacity by 2012, and there are industry estimates that 100GW is possible. According to GWEC, the
growth illustrates the advantages of investing in green power. "This puts an end to the assertion that wind power is a premium
technology only for rich countries which cannot be deployed at scale in other markets," it says in its annual report. " It is also
testament to the inherent attractiveness of wind power for countries striving to diversify their energy
mix, improve their security of supply in the face of rapidly growing demand and relieve national budgets of the burden of expensive
fossil fuel imports at volatile prices." In the developed world, by contrast, growth was inhibited by the financial
crisis and recession: while €50bn was invested and about 39GW added around the world, the overall market for wind energy was
static compared with 2009. The US market fared particularly badly, with only half as much new wind
capacity built as in the previous year. Europe's growth also slowed down, with 7.5% less capacity added than in 2009,
according to GWEC. Even an increase in the offshore wind market and growth in eastern Europe was not enough to make up for the
slack elsewhere. The rapid growth of wind energy in emerging economies also shows how power is
shifting in the clean technology world. Three of the world's top 10 wind turbine manufacturers are now Chinese, and the
country makes turbines capable of producing 30GW a year, of which an increasing number are now destined for the export market.
India also boasts 17 companies making wind power equipment, the biggest and best known being Suzlon. By 2013, according to
estimates for the World Institute for Sustainable Energy, Indian companies will be making turbines to produce 17GW a year, many to
be exported around the world. Other forms of clean technology are also growing rapidly in the developing world – China, for instance,
is also the world's biggest manufacturer of solar power equipment, the vast majority of it exported. European governments facing
severe fiscal crises have given less attention to promoting clean technology than in the past, and some have cut back on subsidies to
save money. But this neglect carries a potential cost and a risk, as if Europe falls behind it will struggle to make up the lost ground.
Connie Hedegaard, climate change commissioner for the EU, warned a European Wind Energy Association event earlier this year that
unless governments upped their game, Europe as a whole would lose out. "We should not be losing this race, because these are the
growth industries of the future, that will generate wealth and create jobs," she said. In the US, there are similar fears
among clean technology advocates. President Obama called in 2009 for a doubling of renewable
energy within three years, but this now looks less likely to be achieved. There are doubts over some of the
support available for renewables – many of the relevant grants and loans are due to expire this year, and there is hostility towards such
mechanisms from some quarters. The American Wind Energy Association (AWEA) has called for support to be stepped up, against
attacks from some politicians and sections of the media. Rob Gramlich, senior director of public policy for AWEA, claims that
conventional forms of electricity have benefitted from subsidies for years. "Tax incentives have been the most effective means of
bringing new energy sources to the market," he says. "Previously they brought us much of our domestic oil and gas supply, including
the new shale gas resources. They typically apply in the early and middle stages of development, so it's not surprising that in any given
year, new sources receive much more than conventional sources." Steven Lang, clean tech leader for the UK and Ireland at Ernst and
Young, says government policies are one of the key determinants for how fast new clean
technologies grow. "Governments need to send a very clear signal to the market, that they are committed to this. Financial
incentives are also very important," he says. Lang points to Alex Salmond, the leader of Scotland's devolved administration, who has
put renewable energy firmly at the heart of his economic agenda, and a particular focus on new marine technologies such as wave and
tidal power. The first minister told a conference in September: "I'm confident that by 2025 we will produce at least 100 per cent of our
electricity needs from renewables alone, and together with other sources it will enable us to become a net exporter of clean, green
energy." Salmond even won the praise of Al Gore recently for his "inspiration".
The world is engaged in a "clean
tech arms race" , Lang says, but he argues that all countries have opportunities in different types of clean technology. For
instance, in the UK offshore wind is likely to be a winner, and has been championed by the government because it avoids the
problems associated with obtaining planning permission for onshore wind farms. Carbon capture and storage is another potential
British winner, if government plans for as many as four demonstration projects are successful.
Wind is symbolically key to clean tech leadership
Asmus 11 Peter Asmus, president of Pathfinder Communications, is an internationally known
expert on energy and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) matters. “Wind: Leader of the
renewable power pack,” Oct 24, http://www.fierceenergy.com/story/wind-leader-renewablepower-pack/2011-10-24
As the most affordable renewable-energy choice, wind power has emerged as an icon of green
technology. With more than 200 GW of capacity currently up and running, and large companies such as General
Electric, Vestas, Siemens, Mitsubishi and BP all investing in the sector, it is clear this technology
has a bright future. While the North American wind energy industry lags in key areas compared to Europe and Asia, many key
industry players are optimistic about the North American market as turbine costs continue to drop dramatically. A total of 5,784 MW
of wind capacity was added in North America in 2010, according to Pike Research's report, Wind Energy Outlook for North America.
Wind has been tapped as a source of mechanical powers for centuries. Between the 14th and 19th centuries, for example, windmills of
various kinds provided as much as a quarter of Europe's total energy needs. Before the advent of the Industrial Revolution, windmills
ranked second only to wood fuel as a source of power. Wind, of course, also provided the "fuel" for the sailing vessels of the Age of
Discovery. Until the past three decades, its variability and potentially destructive nature have hampered any comprehensive long-term
program to convert free and abundant wind power into a major source of electricity. Utilities face challenges Variability of wind
power is probably the prime challenge for utilities. Energy company officials worry about maintaining stability of the grid once wind
power reaches 10 or 20 percent of total supply. However, smart grid technology as well as a variety of advanced storage devices, will
help address those issues. Another challenge for utilities is accessing the best remaining wind resources. This will require investment
in new transmission lines. Current regulatory and policy frameworks governing transmission may be a bottleneck for future growth.
Grid operators, meanwhile, are changing scheduling protocols and placing a greater emphasis on new wind forecasting technologies as
wind becomes a larger and larger portion of total supply. Wind resources are actually a form of solar energy. The uneven heating of
the Earth's surface by the sun results in air movements as the atmosphere continuously tries to reach equilibrium. The tilt of the Earth
and its daily rotation around the sun are the primary elements shaping wind patterns. However, large bodies of water and the
geographic contours of mountain, forest, and desert landscapes (as well as other factors) also contribute to creating regions of the
planet where winds blow frequently enough to be harnessed as fuel to generate electricity. The determination of whether potential
wind resources can be developed into an economic source of electricity depends upon numerous infrastructure choices, among them
the following: Selection of wind turbine technology Affordable interconnections to the transmission grid Siting issues that include
concerns of nearby human populations about scenic views and diminished land values Environmental concerns regarding potential
collisions of federally protected species of birds and bats with the spinning wind turbine blades Historically, wind power
has been one of the lowest cost renewable technologies. This is one reason wind power has led
the pack among renewable energy technologies in terms of new capacity additions over the past decade. The
diversity in scale -- with wind turbines ranging from less than 1 kW for remote or residential applications all the way up to designs of
10 or even 15 MW for offshore sites -- has allowed wind power to meet the needs of a variety of applications around the world.
Indeed, more efficient wind turbine technology has enabled operators to capture more power more of the time, contributing to the
wind industry's 21st century growth. The next frontier Offshore wind power is the next frontier. The vast majority of
existing capacity is utility-scale wind farms deployed on land. The
best wind resources, however, are largely
untapped because they are located at marine sites that cannot be owned or controlled in the traditional way. These
sites are located offshore, typically in shallow ocean waters relatively close to urban population centers.
Affirmative Answers
2AC UQ—China Wind Unsustainable
The Chinese wind industry is unsustainable.
Wanga 12 (Zhongying – Energy Research Institute of the National Development and Reform
Commission (NDRC), PR China, Haiyan Qinb – China General Certification Center (CGC), PR
China, Joanna I. Lewisc – Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University
– United States, China's wind power industry: Policy support, technological achievements, and
emerging challenges, Energy Policy, Volume 51, December 2012, Pages 80–88)
While China's wind power achievements are certainly remarkable, several challenges to its sustained
growth have emerged. The electric grid has become perhaps the biggest obstacle to the growth of
the Chinese wind power industry due to transmission and integration challenges . In addition, the
innovative capacity of Chinese wind turbine manufacturers is likely inadequate to continue to
sustain the industry. While systemic technical challenges in the form of possible equipment failures have yet to emerge,
there are some signs that this could a hidden challenge for the industry. Finally, the shortage of human resources
in the wind power industry is becoming evident and poses a long-term threat to the sustainability of
the industry.
3.1. Grid barriers
Although several regions in China have rich wind power resources conducive to becoming sites for gigawatt-scale wind farms, they
are primarily located far from electricity load centers. The geographical discrepancy between the location of
wind resources and electricity demand makes transmission crucial to wind power development. For example,
two of the wind power bases located in Taonan and Qian'an in the Tongyu area of Jilin Province have excellent wind potential, but
since no large cities nearby there are no major transmission lines in the area. The nearest 220 kV line is 150 km away, and the nearest
cities are around 300 km away. Several of the other large wind power bases face similar situations, including Chifeng in Inner
Mongolia, Zhangbei in Hebei Province, and Anxi of Yumen in the Hexi corridor. While other energy resources in China
are similarly located far from population demand, the geographic distribution of coal or
hydropower resources, for example, are still distinct from that of wind resources, so transmission
lines specifically to connect wind power facilities are frequently needed.
Once wind farms have been connected to the electric grid, additional challenges result when the
wind electricity must be integrated into the grid. Many wind farms in China are being curtailed due
to challenges in maintaining grid stability with other sources of electricity generation. China faces unique challenges in
this area due to its reliance on coal generation facilities that generally have long ramp-up times and therefore provide little
flexibility to grid operators in balancing the intermittent nature of wind power. Grid integration
challenges will likely be further exacerbated as the seven 10-gigawatt (GW) wind power bases are
developed over the next few years.
3.2. Policy and regulatory issues
The Renewable Energy Law and its associated measures have established a framework for the large-scale development of wind power
in China. While many of the core policies have only been in place for a short time, several deficiencies are already becoming clear. In
some cases, policies have unintended consequences which do not become clear until after they are implemented.
An example of a policy that resulted in both positive and negative consequences for the wind industry was the decision to change the
way that value-added tax (VAT) is levied on wind power. In January 1, 2009, China introduced a “Consumption Type VAT” regime
in which input VAT was to be included in the purchase price of fixed assets and could be credited against output VAT when
calculating VAT payable. The VAT reform also eliminated the problem of “double taxation” on fixed assets, reducing the overall
taxes on fixed assets investment (Lu and Chen, 2008). This change reduced the tax burden placed on wind power developers, and as a
result likely contributed to increased investment in wind power.
A less positive, perhaps unintended outcome from the shift has been the reduction of the direct benefit that local governments gain
from hosting wind projects. As a result, local governments have turned to other means of reaping direct
benefits from wind farm development in their regions, including by encouraging local
manufacturing. While local manufacturing can certainly be beneficial to a region, in some cases it has become a
bargaining tool that local officials use in approving wind projects. As a result, excess manufacturing
facilities have been reported around the country in order to meet local manufacturing requirements even when they
make little economic sense. Local content policies have also been increasingly subject to international
scrutiny under WTO disputes.
3.3. Limited innovation
China's wind turbine manufacturers have made great strides in developing advanced wind power technology. Some challenges remain,
however, in raising the technological level of Chinese wind turbines to that of the global leaders. While the number of Chinese firms
capable of conducting independent innovation without relying on foreign designs and intellectual property is increasing, as illustrated
in Fig. 4, there are still reliably few firms in the Chinese wind industry capable of sophisticated, world-
class innovation. In addition, quality control remains a concern, and there are many opportunities for improving
quality control across the supply chain. Finally, there remains a lack of transparency in evaluating performance
data from many Chinese turbine designs due the need for additional third-party certification and
testing.
3.4. Technical flaws
China has experienced dramatic wind power deployment in a relatively short timeframe. Few turbine designs have been indigenously
developed for local conditions, with many firms relying on foreign designs originally demonstrated in other countries and potentially
other wind and environmental conditions. Although there have not been reports of systemic wind equipment failures in China to date,
rumors of problems with key components are increasingly widespread. Blades, gearboxes,
generators, converters and pitch control systems have broken down, or in some cases have experienced
dangerous failures.
Systemic technology failures have been very common in the wind power industry, particularly in the
early stages of wind power technology development. An estimated 21,581 wind turbines were installed in China through the year
2009, and another 10,000 wind turbines will likely be installed in the next 5–10 years. A high profile technology failure
in China would be very costly for an individual firm, and by association it could be devastating
for the entire Chinese wind industry .
China wind collapsing now—their ev assumes the pre-2011 industry
Sally Blakewell, 1/4/13 [“China Windpower Sees ‘Significant’ Profit Drop on Sales, Output,
www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-01-04/china-windpower-sees-significant-profit-drop-on-salesoutput.html]
China Windpower Group Ltd. (182) expects to post a “significant drop” in 2012 profit on waning
growth in sales of stakes in projects and income from electricity output. It reported profit of HK$372
million ($48 million) in 2011. “The significant drop in net profit is mainly due to the decrease in the gain
on disposal of interests in our investments in our wind power projects, and the decrease in the income from
the electricity output generated by certain jointly controlled entities,” Hong Kong-based China Windpower said in a statement.
Expansion of China’s wind industry slowed in 2011 after the government curbed approvals
for farms to ease grid congestion. Installations probably slid 20 percent to 16.4 gigawatts last year, the first annual drop,
Bloomberg New Energy Finance said. China Windpower , which also makes equipment, saw first-half profit drop 90
percent to HK$24.8 million as the growth in demand for electricity slowed and approvals became
harder. The company expects to release its full-year earnings in March.
2AC UQ—China Energy Unsustainable
China will be dependent on coal for the foreseeable future—no policy shift in
sight
Joern HUENTELER, research fellow at Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Centre for Science
and International Affairs, 5/16 [May 16, 2014, “China's coal addiction a threat to its energy
security,” South China Morning Post, http://www.scmp.com/comment/insightopinion/article/1511893/chinas-coal-addiction-threat-its-energy-security]
So far, the
government has been too timid in its attempts to cut its dependence on coal in the energy
sector and develop meaningful alternatives. Only a grand push for energy technology innovation can set
the course for a secure and clean energy future.
China's coal consumption has grown rapidly in recent years, and is now far larger than anything the
world has ever seen, with more than 3.5 billion tonnes per year. Coal provides more than two-thirds
of China's total energy, and four-fifths of its electricity. Most of it is mined domestically, making China the
world's largest coal producer.
But coal use has its limits; the media have focused on coal's impact on air quality as well as water resources, not just in the coalmining provinces but also the large cities.
current rate of coal production growth is unsustainable . Data from the World
Energy Council shows that China's proven coal reserves will last 34 years given its annual production rates,
based on figures for 2011. That is down from about 100 years just a decade ago and means China will have exhausted its
reserves by 2049, if it keeps going at the current rate.
The fact is that the
The exhaustion of domestic coal reserves will have profound implications for China's economic development and its international
relations. The Ukraine crisis offers a glimpse for Chinese leaders into a future they surely want to avoid.
Recent weeks have made it clear that the West's ability to impose sanctions on Russia over its meddling in Ukraine is severely
constrained by Europe's dependence on Russia for a third of its oil and gas. China's national security interests therefore call for
replacing coal with new, domestic energy sources rather than imports of conventional fossil fuels.
But until now, Beijing's response to unmet energy demand has focused primarily on securing
resources overseas, and building infrastructure for imports. China now generates more electricity
from imported coal than from nuclear, wind and solar combined. Without a strong, coordinated policy shift,
the country will depend on fuel imports for most of its energy consumption by the time it
becomes a developed country.
2AC Link UQ—US Offshore Wind Now
Expansion of U.S. offshore wind coming now
Andrew Westney, reporter for Law360, 5/7 [May 7, 2014, “DOE Commits Up To $141M For
Offshore Wind Power,” http://www.law360.com/articles/535635/doe-commits-up-to-141m-foroffshore-wind-power]
Law360, New York (May 07, 2014, 7:11 PM ET) -- The U.S. Department of Energy pledged as much as $141
million
three cutting-edge offshore wind power programs in New Jersey, Oregon and Virginia as part of
the federal government’s push to cultivate innovation in the field.
Wednesday to
The department will provide up to $47 million over the next four years to each of three projects off the shores of New Jersey, Oregon
and Virginia. The projects will put grid-connected systems in place in federal and state waters by 2017,
according to a department statement.
The grants are in line with the government's national offshore wind strategy, which seeks to
develop a sustainable offshore wind industry to provide cleaner, renewable energy, the statement said.
Ext. Link UQ
Other countries swamp the link
Conathan 13 [Michael, Director of Ocean Policy at the Center for American Progress, “Making the
Economic Case for Offshore Wind,” February 28, 2013,
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/report/2013/02/28/54988/making-the-economic-case-foroffshore-wind/]
the United States still lags behind many
other industrialized countries when it comes to development of a resource that we have in abundance in
close proximity to some of our areas of greatest demand for electricity: offshore wind. As we have stood on
the sidelines over the past two decades, other countries such as Denmark, the United Kingdom,
Germany, and even China have leapt ahead of us, recognizing the inherent value of this strong,
commercially viable, renewable resource. As of June 2012, the rest of the world boasted 4,619 megawatts
of installed offshore wind energy capacity, while the United States has yet to begin
construction on its first offshore wind turbine.
Yet despite the booming expansion of onshore renewable energy facilities,
the Department of Energy announced its intention to close that gap by
developing 54 gigawatts of offshore wind capacity by 2030—more than 10 times
the amount currently installed worldwide—and has begun taking proactive steps to
achieve this target. In just the past five months, the administration has made major strides toward encouraging renewable
Under President Obama,
energy development on the outer continental shelf. In October the Department of the Interior signed its first lease under the “Smart
from the Start” program with NRG Bluewater Wind for a wind farm off the coast of Delaware. In November the department
announced the first-ever competitive lease sales, giving multiple companies the opportunity to bid for leases on previously identified
“wind energy areas” in federal waters off the coasts of Virginia, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island. And In December the Department
of Energy announced that it will fund seven offshore wind technology demonstration projects, including Fishermen’s Atlantic City
Windfarm in New Jersey; pilot projects in California, the Great Lakes, Connecticut, and Maine; and two turbines off the coast of
Virginia.
So does status quo US wind usage.
Spross 13 [January 22, 2013, Jeff, Reporter @ Climate Progress, Wind Beats Out Natural Gas To
Become Top Source Of New Electricity Capacity For 2012,
http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2013/01/22/1479961/wind-beats-out-natural-gas-to-become-top-source-ofnew-electricity-capacity-for-2012/]
Through June of 2012, renewable
energy was right behind natural gas in terms of the most new
energy generating capacity being installed in the United States, with wind making up most of
the renewables push. And now Business Insider has flagged the numbers for the remainder of the year.
Last week, they reported that wind ultimately pulled ahead of natural gas to become the
leading installer of new capacity in 2012, at 10,689 total megawatts.
Those numbers came from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s report on the trends and highlights in U.S. energy for the
past year. According to FERC’s update, natural gas installed 8,746 megawatts of new capacity, coal installed 4,510 new megawatts,
and solar came in fourth with 1,476 new megawatts. Here’s the relevant table from the report, conveniently highlighted by Business
Insider:
One thing to note here is the issue of capacity factor: That’s how much power an installation actually produces as a percentage of its
theoretical capacity. (Which is what’s listed in the table.) Natural gas plants do quite well in this regard: Their median performance
tends to come out to at least 80 percent, and they max out at 93 percent, according to the National Renewable Energy Laboratory’s
cost database.
Unfortunately, wind power doesn’t perform as well, due to the intermittency of, well, wind. Its median tends to be around 40 percent
offshore. Onshore it’s been at 30 percent, though arguably onshore performance is pulling alongside offshore. And both max out at 50
to 54 percent. So even though wind beat out natural gas for new capacity in 2012, the new natural gas installation will almost certainly
wind up generating more total electricity.
The good news for wind is that it’s still a relatively young technology, with lots of room to improve. The energy it does deliver is
produced much more efficiently in comparison to natural gas — the former loses less than one percent of its energy as waste heat,
while the latter can lose as much as 54 percent. Natural
gas production in the U.S. may be on track to
plateau, leading to predictions of rising prices, which will give wind power a further
economic opening.
And, of course, there’s the fact that, while cleaner than coal, natural gas remains a contributor to greenhouse gas emissions both
through leaks and combustion.
As it turns out, this post’s math
was unjustly critical of wind energy. The numbers for capacity
are theoretical, but as as an email commenter pointed out, the numbers for capacity utilization are
theoretical as well.
So how have wind and natural gas actually performed? Well, in 2010, nameplate capacity for natural gas
was 467.2 gigawatts, and 39.5 gigawatts for wind. That same year, natural gas generated 987,700 gigawatthours and wind generated
94,700 gigawatthours. Multiply the capacities by the 8760 hours in a year, and what you get is natural
gas produced 24.1
percent of its nameplate capacity in 2010, and wind produced 27.4 percent.
2AC No Link—No Tradeoff
No Chinese Energy race—not losing, not really competing. Cooperation is
the reality
COHEN 11 Executive Director, Clean Air Task Force [Armond Cohen,
Rethinking The Clean Energy “Race”, By http://energy.nationaljournal.com/2011/10/is-americalosing-the-clean-en.php]
For the last five years, the
Clean Air Task Force has been working with companies in China and the
United States on joint ventures to develop and market clean energy technologies in both countries and
around the world. Based on that experience, we believe that the metaphor of a zero-sum China-US
race on clean energy is misplaced and drives us to the wrong conclusions. Here are some
perspectives that may make for a more productive discussion:
China is a critical ally in moving forward low-carbon energy development. CATF is working in China not
only because it is the world’s largest carbon-emitting country, set to double its emissions by 2050, but also because China is a
can’t-miss place to demonstrate new clean technologies at scale. Why?
First, China actually has growing electricity demand and needs to build a lot of new capacity; it is far cheaper to
include low-carbon features into new designs than to retrofit them. In contrast, with stagnant energy demand in the US, the full cost of
new clean technologies here must compete against low marginal costs of existing plants.
Second, Chinese companies can build first-of-a-kind projects more quickly than in the US, due to
substantial infrastructure construction capability that has been lost in recent years in this country.
Third, Chinese firms are willing to spend significant funds to develop and launch new
technology; for example, China National Offshore Oil Corporation (one of the country’s largest energy companies) reportedly has
an alternative energy R&D budget that may be approaching the size of the entire US Department of Energy’s. And fourth, of
somewhat less importance, developing projects in China is less expensive, at least in the short term.
That’s why CATF is helping western companies—in coal gasification, CCS, solar thermal, and energy storage -- to
find local allies in China that can quickly build clean energy projects at scale. Because the highest stakes race is the one to
slow carbon emissions before we reach points of irreversible change. Winning that race requires commercializing every possible lowcarbon technology as quickly as we can, wherever we can.
China’s engagement also means flow-back of valuable innovation and capital from China. Aside
from being critical to helping the US and the world address climate change by being a test bed for innovative low-carbon technologies,
China’s engagement also brings direct economic benefits to the US. First, the knowledge acquired by US-based
companies developing first-of-kind projects in China will flow back to the US, reducing costs for clean
technology deployment here and elsewhere, creating “reverse innovation.” Second, as a result of this cooperation,
capital from Chinese companies is already flowing into US clean energy projects and manufacturing.
The Wanxiang Corporation last year opened up a solar panel manufacturing plant in the US; China-based ENN is investing in Duke
Energy solar projects in the US; and several Chinese companies are looking to gain valuable CCS experience by exploring joint
ventures to do enhanced oil recovery-based projects in the Gulf States region. Third, Chinese companies are themselves developing
innovative technology that can potentially be licensed to the US; emerging Chinese innovations in coal gasification and gas-cooled
nuclear reactors are especially notable.
The significance of the low-end manufacturing race may be overstated. Recent events, including the recent
trade petition submitted by seven US-based solar manufacturing companies (including SolarWorld, a German-owned company), have
suggested China is unfairly subsidizing its solar panel companies. Of course the WTO should rectify any trade rule violations. IP theft
must also be addressed. But it’s not clear how much retaining the low-end part of the clean energy supply chain matters in the end to
US employment (although it may matter to company stockholders), or to building innovative clean-energy companies in the US that
demand higher-end talent. First, much of low-end component manufacture in commodity items like solar cells and smaller turbine
blades is moving to automation in any case, both in the US and China. Second, large-component manufacture such as increasingly
supersized wind towers and turbines is likely to remain in the US, due to shipping costs. Finally, while much innovation undoubtedly
stems from manufacturing experience, US companies manufacturing through joint ventures in China can still internalize that
incremental learning.
Arguably, the US should focus on what it does best—high-end design, systems integration and
advanced manufacturing—and not declare defeat if we lose the commodity end of the supply chain offshore, which is, in
many cases, probably a losing battle anyway. We may have lost flat panel television and iPhone manufacture
to China and South Korea, but does anyone seriously talk about trying to recapture it, or suggest that
this development impedes US innovation in IT or electronics?
None of this means we should be complacent. American companies
should accelerate, not slow, their
partnerships with Chinese companies to demonstrate and commercialize technology. Government
should continue to insist that China and its companies play by international trade rules and abide by IP protection agreements and
rules. Finally, and most importantly, the US should play to its strengths at the higher end of the supply chain. That means adopting
policies that accelerate the pace of energy innovation on our own shores through research, demonstration, and commercial scale-up of
advanced energy systems—specific initiatives that we have detailed elsewhere: .
http://www.catf.us/resources/publications/view/102 and http://www.catf.us/resources/publications/view/101
Globalization is here to stay in clean energy, as in every other sector. Let’s be smart and play it to the
advantage of the atmosphere and the US economy, rather than trying to run futile, distracting
mercantile “races” that we are unlikely to “win.”
No tradeoff – Chinese projects have been finalized.
PRN 13 (China's Offshore Wind Market Expected to Grow to US$16 billion, February 27th,
2013, http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/chinas-offshore-wind-market-expected-togrow-to-us16-billion-193557891.html)
SHANGHAI, Feb. 27, 2013 /PRNewswire/ --Despite
the considerable challenges and bottlenecks faced by China's
offshore wind power market, the country's efforts in technologies for development of offshore
wind power have remained strong. Thanks to years of coordination and cooperation between the
government and domestic offshore wind power players, the first batch of offshore wind power license projects,
most of which have been idle for more than two years, are likely to go online in 2013. ¶ So far, Jiangsu, Shandong, Hebei,
Zhejiang and Guangdong provinces as well as Shanghai have completed their planning for offshore wind power development.
Liaoning, Fujian, Guangxi and Hainan provinces as well as the city of Dalian are currently finalizing their
plans. Primary statistics confirm potential wind resources along China's coasts and waterways capable of producing 43 million kW
in output. Preparations for 38 projects with designed combined capacity of 16.5 million kW in
output are already under way.
2AC Link Turn—US Offshore Wind Boosts Cooperation
The plan prevents collapse—it solidifies US-China strategic cooperation
Conrad 11 – Research associates with the Global Public Policy Institute [Björn Conrad (PhD
candidate @ University of Trier. His research focuses on China’s domestic climate policy. MA in
Chinese Studies, Political Science and Economics from the University of Trier and a Master in
Public Policy from Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government.) & Mirjam Meissner (MA in
Chinese Studies, Political Science and Economics from the Free University), “Catching a Second
Wind Changing the Logic of International Cooperation in China’s Wind Energy Sector,” Global
Public Policy Institute, GPPi Policy Paper No. 12, February 2011
China’s wind energy sector presents a vivid case of the fundamental dilemma of
climate technologies. On the one hand, the rapid development and global dissemination of
climate technology is highly desirable and necessary as part of an effective strategy to tackle
global climate change. On the other hand, these¶ technologies are commercial products, developed
and sold by companies on¶ a fiercely competitive market. The logic of climate protection
favors the open¶ exchange of technological expertise between corporations. Contrarily, the logic of the
market sets narrow boundaries for the sharing of profit-making innovation. Finding ways to reconcile these two
aspects will be a decisive challenge faced on¶ the way to solving the global climate crisis.
wind energy in China presents a crucial illustration of the effects of this
dilemma. The development of international cooperative structures that are able to provide
innovative answers to pressing climate challenges has been hampered by the perception of today’s
partners as tomorrow’s competitors in an economic zero-sum game. Chinese players tried to use partnerships
The case of
as a means to gain a technological edge without an intention to grant their partners a long-term stake in its domestic
market. International business actors tried to use partnerships as a means to gain access to China’s domestic wind power
market without any real incentive to improve their partners’ long-term technological advancement. Ultimately, neither side
got what it wanted. As a result, China’s wind sector stayed below its potential regarding its contribution to global climate
protection.
Opportunity - International
cooperation could catch a second wind in China’s renewable energy
sector. China’s wind market is on the verge of a new development phase heralding a
possible shift in the logic of international technology cooperation; the times of China simply
“catching up” to foreign technologies are coming to an end. To maintain its growth,
China’s wind sector will depend on original technological solutions to manage mounting problems of
efficiency, transmission and intermittency. Current technological obstacles threaten the swift expansion
of China’s wind power capacity, putting the achievement of China’s ambitious¶ renewable
energy targets for the year 2020 at risk. This creates strong political pressure to
explore viable solutions such as smart-grid transmission systems and offshore wind power generation .
The technological bottleneck of its wind energy sector significantly increases China’s incentives
to revisit structures of international cooperation as a means to create urgently needed
innovation. This situation in turn opens new opportunities for foreign political actors,
specifically the European Union, to promote the emergence of cooperative structures that can make a
tangible contribution to global climate protection.
From the business perspective, the growth of complementary capabilities between¶ Chinese
and international wind power companies increases the attractiveness of balanced and
mutually beneficial partnerships. Chinese companies can benefit greatly from strategic
alliances with international firms in their search for needed technological solutions, while
foreign companies can take advantage of the uniquely favorable conditions that China
offers for producing cutting-edge innovation¶ in wind power technology. At the core of this
mutually beneficial cooperative¶ model lies the creation of shared innovation based on
the joint exploration and joint ownership of original technological solutions. Joint
development, however, requires a mode of cooperation radically different from the model of international partnerships
that have characterized China’s wind sector in the past. It calls for deep working relationships and longterm strategic alliances rooted in mutual¶ interests. Looking at the sobering experiences
of the past, both sides will have to radically break with the current logic of
interaction in order to redefine¶ international partnerships. Pg. 8-9
US offshore wind is uniquely situated to boost cooperation.
Hopkins 12 – Partner @ Duane Morris LLP w/ with a concentration on transportation,
products liability and commercial litigation [Robert B. Hopkins, Duane Morris LLP, “Offshore
Wind Farms in US Waters Would Generate Both US and Foreign Maritime Jobs,” Renewable
Energy World, July 12, 2012, pg. http://tinyurl.com/9sbj8k6
With no offshore wind energy farms yet built off U.S. coastlines, various states over the last few years have proposed
offshore wind energy legislation as a future investment in renewable energy as well as a vehicle for American job creation.
The immediate future of U.S. offshore wind farms may depend on whether Congress renews certain tax credit and federal
loan guarantee programs. In
the event that offshore wind farms move forward, it is likely that
both U.S. maritime and foreign maritime workers will be involved in construction and
maintenance.
A recent study by The National Renewable Energy Laboratory estimated the potential generating capacity from offshore
The
construction and maintenance of offshore wind farms to tap into even a small percentage of this
potential will demand a robust and competent maritime workforce . The U.S. understandably
wind farms located off U.S. coastlines to be 4 times the present total U.S. electrical generating capacity.
wants to avoid the situation that occurred in England with the installation of the Thanet Wind Farm, currently the largest
operating offshore wind farm in the world (300 megawatts). The Thanet project received criticism for its lack of significant
British job creation.
U.S. wind farm developers, green energy advocates and some U.S. politicians have stressed that
offshore wind farms will create jobs for both U.S. maritime and U.S. shore-based
workers. In addition, some have pointed to a federal statute known as the Jones Act, to assert that foreign-flagged
vessels crewed by foreign maritime workers may not even be involved in U.S. offshore wind farm projects. However, such
a broad statement is not entirely accurate, and the issue is somewhat complex.
The Jones Act, which was enacted in 1920, establishes a system for protecting American maritime jobs and requires that
U.S.-flagged vessels be used to transport merchandise between points in U.S. territorial waters (i.e., up to 3 nautical miles
off the coastline). Moreover, this requirement is extended 200 miles offshore to the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) by the
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) in certain scenarios involving man-made objects that are affixed to the
seabed.
Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the federal agency that enforces the Jones Act, has issued a number of rulings
that conclude that the Jones Act in certain situations does not apply to the actual installation of wind turbines by largescale vessels known as jack-up lift vessels. Moreover, there has been some debate on whether the Jones Act would
apply to vessels travelling to an established wind farm located over 3 miles off the coastline in the OCS for such things as
maintenance and repair. A bill clarifying that the Jones Act would apply in this maintenance/repair scenario (HR 2360) has
recently passed the U.S. House of Representatives and is now awaiting a vote in the U.S. Senate. Thus, at present, from
a purely legal standpoint, foreign-flagged
vessels would likely be able to participate in the
installation of the proposed wind farms, but there is some uncertainty as to whether foreign-flagged vessels
would be able to participate in maintenance/repair work.
Complicating all of this is the dearth of U.S.-flagged jack-up lift vessels capable of undertaking much of the
very heavy work involved in the installation of offshore wind turbines. To further confound matters, with a
boom in offshore wind farm construction in Europe and China, many foreign-flagged jack-up lift vessels
capable of such work are now booked for the next several years.
it is likely that large foreign-flagged vessels will play a significant
role in the initial installation of wind turbines off U.S. coastlines, with an opportunity for smaller U.S.flagged vessels to render assistance. However, with the lack of available large scale foreign-flagged
vessels, there are obvious long term investment opportunities for the construction of
Factoring in all of the above,
large U.S.-flagged vessels or for the conversion of other large U.S.-flagged vessels to
undertake much of the above heavy work. One possible option is to convert U.S.-flagged vessels now working in
the oil and gas fields in the Gulf of Mexico for this purpose. Such investment opportunities will obviously
become more attractive if a large number of wind farms move forward in the U.S..
As to certain maintenance/repair, which could be done by smaller U.S.-flagged vessels already in existence, if Congress
passes HR 2360, U.S.-flagged vessels will be required to maintain and repair the wind turbines. Moreover from a practical
standpoint, even if HR 2360 does not become law, it may not make economic sense to employ smaller foreign-flagged
vessels for certain maintenance/repair work.
Thus if U.S. offshore wind farms become a reality, U.S.
maritime workers as well as foreign maritime workers will likely be involved in
construction and maintenance.
AT: Lash Out/Instability
The transition will be stable
Giley 7 [Bruce Gilley, January 2007. Assistant professor of political studies at Queen's
University in Canada, and former contributing editor at the Far Eastern Economic Review, “Is
China Stuck?” Journal of Democracy, 18.1, Project Muse]
Yet what
if the CCP is actually quite responsive? What if it is in tune with popular demands, and finds ways to move
if the party stays or goes because of [End Page 173]
popular pressures? Pei himself recognizes this possibility. He cites "rising public dissatisfaction" (p.14) as one
thing that would prod the regime to change. "A democratic opening may emerge in the end, but not as
a regime-initiated strategy undertaken at its own choosing, but more likely as the result of a
sudden crisis" (p. 44). Perhaps the word crisis is being used in two different senses here. One crisis and another can, after all, vary
and adapt as those demands change? In other words, what
in urgency: There are crises and there are crises. The crisis of which Pei speaks seems to be of the more benign sort, a mere shift in
public preferences that prods the regime to change. Such a crisis will not require democracy to rise upon the ashes of a razed
public square, but rather will stir
the regime to recognize that its time has come, and to do the right thing
by going fairly gentle into that good night. If so, then the prospects for a relatively smooth
democratic transition in China are bright and no collapse is likely.
Catastrophic consequences to CCP collapse are just fear-mongering—
instability is key to ensure democracy and won’t cause chaos.
Giley 4 [Bruce Gilley, 2004, PhD Candidate Politics @ Princeton U. and Adjunct Prof. Int’l
Affairs @ New School U. “China's Democratic Future: How it Will Happen and where it Will
Lead,” p. 115-116, Google Print]
Would the entire PRC edifice simply collapse from the accumulated pressures of crisis and mass protest? In cross-country
comparisons, "post-totalitarian" states like China are the most vulnerable to collapse because they are unable to respond creatively to
protest and yet there is no organized opposition to assume control. The East German regime was a perfect example. It simply
collapsed when huge defections from the state occurred at every level and there was no organized opposition ready to take over. In
the German case, there was a neighboring fraternal state whose arms provided some cushion for the collapse. China would not have
the same support. For this reason, the CCP and many of its supporters have warned of the dangers of collapse in words designed to
scare the regime's opponents into quiescence. Fear-mongering about the consequences of regime collapse in
China has been a staple of PRC propaganda since reforms began. Deng said: "If the political situation in china became
unstable the trouble would spread to the rest of the world, with consequences that would be hard to imagine." Foreign scholars have
taken up the histrionics with relish. One has worried about "societal disintegration" and even "the fragmentation of China into
several competing polities." Another warns: "At
worst the resulting chaos from a collapsing China would have
a profound effect on the stability of Asia and on the U.S. policy to guarantee the security of its Asian allies. At the
least, China could turn to the West for economic relief and reconstruction, the price tag of which would be overwhelming." Yet
these fears appear overblown or misplaced. First, as we saw in the last part, many of these dire predictions
are an accurate portrayal of China today. The problems of Party rule have created the very crisis that the fear-mongers
alluded to. China already has an AIDs crisis, an illegal emigration crisis, a pollution crisis, and an
economic crisis. Given its well-established state and social cohesion, China has far more to gain than to lose from political
liberalization. Second, there is a good argument that governance in China will not collapse further
even with a top leadership in crisis. The country actually functioned quite normally during the
Cultural Revolution, when there was often no rule at the top, as a result of strong local
governments and a social fabric that held together. At this state, with protests in full swing, a military on good
behavior and a regime trying to confront the possibility of change, there is no reason to believe that the country will abruptly
disintegrate. As in 1989, in fact, there is every reason to believe that people will act better toward
each other and that local governments will look kindly upon the movement, an outpouring of
civic behavior linked with the ideals of democracy. Finally, as above, if we are concerned with the creation of a
more just system, then some
degree of "chaos" relating to unstable government may be a worthwhile
price to pay, including for the world. Claims by some U.S. foreign policy analysts that "there is as great
a 'threat' to US interests from a weak and unstable China as there is from a strong and
antagonistic China" are based on a highly instrumental and even the flawed view of U.S., and
world, interests. A world community committed to the principles of justice through democracy
has an overriding interest in its realization in China. To the extent that instability in China worsens conditions for
greater justice there or abroad, it would indeed "threaten" world interests. But if the instability, despite its costs, leads
to greater gains through a more just order in China and, through it, abroad, then this is very much
in the world's interests. Few Americans, French, Croats, Romanians, South Africans, Filipinos, South Koreans, or Indonesians
would say the "chaos" of their democratic revolutions was not a price worth paying. China's people should be allowed to make the
same choice.
CCP collapse will be stable—Chinese pro-democracy forces are ready to take
power and the government is willing to give it up peacefully.
Ping 7 [Xin Ping, 10/23/2007. “Chinese Pro-democracy Forces Ready for CCP's Collapse,” The
Epoch Times, http://en.epochtimes.com/news/7-10-23/61127.html]
Recently I found that Chinese
pro-democracy activists and many other forces are making active
preparations for running the government after the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) collapses. I used to be
acquainted with many pro-democracy activists in the past, and, was considered one of them. But since I started to practice Falun Dafa,
I was no longer on a political path, so I gradually lost touch with them. Our acquaintance resumed only recently when I ran into some
of them, with whom I had a long talk. I was impressed with their changes. What shocked me most is that they have no more fear of the
CCP. Instead they are confident, and have no doubt in the victory over the CCP. As they said, since they have seen every trick of the
CCP, nothing can scare them away now. I told them about Falun Dafa practitioners' peaceful and rational anti-persecution
experiences, which inspired them a lot. Indeed, Falun Dafa practitioners have set a great example for all Chinese people and have
encouraged the world to stand up against persecution and tyranny. My pro-democracy friends told me that the CCP's secret
police, who used to be ferocious, are now treating them with courtesy, as if treating future
political leaders. This is not as weird as it seems, my friends say, because the secret police, who have kept
top secrets of the country, know better than anyone else that the CCP will collapse soon. Trying to leave
a way out for themselves, the secret police take care not to offend those who may become future
leaders of China. The pro-democracy activists share the belief that the CCP is on the brink of its demise. This
belief is in part built on the information they acquired from high-level Party officials. Some high
officials are quite open-minded, and have a clear understanding of the evil nature of the CCP and its demise, so they
have long been sympathizers and supporters of democratic movements. Other officials also have
sensed the imminent collapse of the CCP, so they waste no time in connecting with democrats
through various channels so as to leave a chance for their own future. The activists are concerned with the harms that the
CCP has done, and will continue doing, to China. As one of the activists said, if the CCP doesn't die out within 10 years, the Chinese
nation will perish. Another activist described Chinese economy as an empty shell, pointing out that with a 50 percent non-performing
assets rate of the national banks, a serious stock market bubble that has raised stock prices far past their value, and an astronomical
deficit, China is now running mainly on foreign investments, and will collapse immediately if such investments are no longer
available. They also mentioned that according to a high-ranking army officer, if China goes into war with Taiwan in the next ten
years, China will not be able to survive for a single week due to oil shortage. Therefore, the activists fear that the CCP will drag China
into abyss along with it. I was also impressed by their active preparation for the coming new China free of the CCP. What a friend said
may be typical of their attitude, "The CCP has millions of troops, but so what? They have no chance to win." According to the
democrats, various forces in China are planning how to maintain social stability and keep the
country running smoothly after the CCP's disintegration.
Prefer our evidence—western analysts often mistake progress towards
democratization as a crisis in CCP leadership.
Sydney Morning Herald 8 [11/27/2008. “Outbreak of transparency,”
http://www.smh.com.au/news/world/outbreak-of-transparency/2008/11/26/1227491636668.html]
A WAVE of protest and riots has spread across China, igniting debate over whether it shows
rising political instability or a new tolerance for democracy. Official media, predominantly the Government's
flagship Xinhua news agency, have promptly and prominently reported violent protests that began with thousands of taxi drivers in
China's largest city, Chongqing, on November 3. The nationwide coverage appears to have encouraged taxi drivers, disgruntled land
owners and laid-off workers to take to the streets in at least eight provinces. The Communist Party's Guangzhou Daily reported that
2000 toy factory workers had ransacked company offices and overturned a police car in Dongguan, a manufacturing city that has been
badly hit by the global financial crisis. This week Guizhou, Hunan and Shaanxi provinces and the city of Shantou in Guangdong have
also been rocked by mass unrest. Last night Xinhua quoted the Premier, Wen Jiabao, as telling a closed-door
meeting of advisers: "Difficult times require more scientific and democratic decision-making". The
report said Mr Wen had called for "strengthened democratic supervision". Some local governments appear to have legitimised the
right to protest by acceding to demonstrators' demands. In Chongqing, the local government promised taxi drivers lower licence fees
and stricter enforcement against unlicensed competitors following an audience with Chongqing's high-ranking party secretary, Bo
Xilai. "In the old thinking, strikes meant instability," wrote Zhang Yongsheng, a researcher at the State
Council's Development Research Centre, in an essay to be posted today on a blog affiliated with the Australian National University.
"But actually strikes are a sign that Chinese society is becoming more and more open, transparent
and democratic since the people can now protest publicly and the Government has to solve
problems through reforming and disciplining their own behaviour." Mr Zhang said some Western
media reports had mistaken progress towards democratisation for instability and even a crisis in
Communist Party rule.
Reformed CCP would be able to survive in a democratic China—they will
accept democracy if they have to.
Democracy Digest 7 [September 2007. * Bruce Gilley is Assistant professor of political
studies at Queen's University in Canada, and former contributing editor at the Far Eastern
Economic Review. “Chinese Democracy: Too Much of "a Good Thing"?”
http://www.demdigest.net/issues/sept07.html]
Party leaders realize that China's citizens will eventually aspire to dignity, participation and selfexpression, says Gilley. "All democratic transitions depend on the loss in belief in dictatorship
inside the ruling party itself," he argues, a process "now well under way" within the CCP.
"Democracy is a Good Thing", wrote party theorist Yu Keping earlier this year while an article in the party-backed Yanhuang
Chunqiu journal asserted that "only constitutional democracy can fundamentally solve the ruling party's
problems of corruption and graft." Yet a healthy degree of skepticism is justifiable so long as the party continues its monopoly on
power and repressive rule. One reason why the CCP has stressed "political order and technocratic governance rather than popular
participation and regime transformation," says Dali Yang, is that China remains one of the world's most unequal societies, according
to World Bank data. While the party's third generation of leaders opened up political space in the late 1990s, notes Merle Goldman,
the fourth generation has "arrested defense lawyers, freelance intellectuals, editors, journalists and cyber-dissidents… [and] reinforced
the authoritarian party-state." Gilley, a proponent of actively promoting democracy in China, believes a majority of the
party will accept democratization when its Yeltsin moment arrives and that "a reformed CCP
could enjoy electoral success in a democratic China." But the country's transition will not be determined by the
party elite alone. The process will be negotiated and contested by diverse interests, notes Yang. China's leaders will need
to "learn to lead and even to accommodate an increasingly educated and well-informed populace,
with its rising expectations in matters of liberty, political participation, and democratic governance."
Internal CCP reports already advocate reform to prevent social instability.
Zheng 2 [Yongnian Zheng, 2002, East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore, “State
Rebuilding, Popular Protest and Collective Action in China,” Japanese Journal of Political
Science 3.1,
http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=109229]
The report, written by a scholar from the State Planning Commission of the State Council,
advised the Chinese government that something had to be done to cope with rising social protests
in the country. A
latest report (2001) also recognized a spreading pattern of collective protests and group
report, produced by a research team
organized by the Department of Organization of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party,
incidents arising from economic, ethnic and religious conflicts in China. The
warned that the coming years of rapid change, driven by the opening of markets to foreign trade and investment, are likely to cause
greater social conflicts. The report made urgent recommendations for changes to save the party and the
nation by reducing popular grievances.3
AT: Transition Wars
Transition wars don’t apply to China—they have the pre-requisites for a
stable transition
Rowen 7 [Henry S. Rowen, July 2007. Professor emeritus in the Graduate School of Business
at Stanford University, and senior fellow at the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and
Peace, “When Will the Chinese People Be Free?” Journal of Democracy 18.3, Project Muse]
I observed in 1996 that a
democratic China in a region with many democracies would be good for peace
because democracies do not fight each other (which does not imply that democracies are inherently peaceable). Yet
all is not necessarily well. Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder find that countries making the transition
from authoritarian to democratic governance are more likely to start foreign broils than are consolidated
democracies because internal contests for power can cause a faction to identify, or to conjure up, a foreign enemy as a means of
rallying mass support.26 Mansfield and Snyder hold that this is most likely where elections are held
in
countries with a weak sense of nationhood, a shaky rule of law, feeble bureaucracies, poor
civilian control of the military, a winner-take-all attitude among contending parties, and few
safeguards for press freedom. This leads them to recommend that, where possible, elections should come on the heels and
not ahead of institution-building, with a competent central government and legal system needed most urgently of all. If these
premises are correct, China's prospects are not bad. The Chinese today possess a strong sense of
nationhood, a legal system that is moving in the right direction, a military that seems firmly under
civilian control, increased professionalism in many organizations, and nothing like the shadow of
"premature" elections on the horizon. Other positives for peace are China's high trade-to-GDP ratio and membership in
several international organizations.
AT: CCP—No Collapse
CCP won’t collapse
Time 8 [December 25 2008, “Will the Financial Crisis Bring Upheaval to China?”
www.time.com/time/world/article/0%2C8599%2C1868402%2C00.html]
Just as the political elite is united, the forces that would have to oppose them in any move to change
the country's political order are fragmented, says David Zweig, a political science professor at Hong
Kong's University of Science and Technology. Though it is miserable for those thrown out of work, millions of peasants
going back to their villages are highly unlikely to pose a threat to Beijing. "Remember, Beijing has done
this before: between 1998 and 2000, the government put tens of millions of workers at state-owned enterprises out of work. There
were plenty of strikes and protests that made the government a little nervous, but overall, they were able to survive pretty well."
Currently, the official figure is 4 million unemployed; but other estimates have the number at twice or three times that. (See pictures
here of China's dust bowl.) "For regimes to be overthrown you need an overriding ideology like democracy or
the mysticism of the Taiping and Boxer rebellions in the mid 1800s and early 20th Century," Says Zweig. "For regimes to collapse
now you also need the
middle class, and I just can't see that happening. They have been the core of Communist
Party support for a decade or more and their future is still very much tied up with the Party's." "You
can tell that the senior leaders know political change will come to China eventually and that the Party can't hang on indefinitely," says
the diplomat. "That's why 90% of their children are in business, not working their way up the Communist Youth League or whatever.
But that change is 15, 20 years down the road. That's not going to happen now, even if it is a very bad downturn. Change will come to
China. But not yet. Not now."
AT: CCP Instability Impact
Protests are not a serious threat to the regime.
Taipei Times 12 [September 19, 2012, “China not turning democratic: experts,”
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2012/09/19/2003543134]
A rising number of cases of civic unrest in China do not necessarily mean China will one day become a Western-style democracy
because mass protests there have focused on a great number of issues, but democracy has not been one of them, academics said in
Taipei yesterday. While the increasing number of mass protests is an alarming issue for Beijing, “the party-state regime is
getting better at containing public anger so it does not threaten the reins of the government,” said
Wang Hsin-hsien (王信賢), an associate professor at National Chengchi University. Wang was among four China experts who
spoke yesterday at a forum called “Facing Chinese society,” the second of four symposiums organized by the Democratic Progressive
Party (DPP) to increase the party’s understanding of China. Experts said it was imperative for the DPP to better understand Chinese
society, but added that the party also needed to be able to accurately ascertain societal differences between Taiwan and China.
Social instability in China likely reflects internal power struggles in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
based on differences of opinion on how to respond to specific instances of unrest, such as the riots
in Xinjiang in 2009, rather than a real threat to the authoritarian regime, Wang said, adding that in the case
of Xianjiang, the CCP was split over how to tame the unrest. Compared with Taiwan, where social movements
have shared a close connection with political movements since the late 1970s, social movements
in China have rarely been cross-class, cross-agenda or cross-geographical in nature, nor have they
attracted large numbers from the middle class, Wang said. Wang also said that academics have
underestimated the Chinese government’s technological control over the Internet and its
sophisticated control of demonstrations. Academia Sinica political scientist Hsu Szu-chien (徐斯儉) shared this view,
saying that China has listed “social management innovation” as one of its top priorities, meaning that
China’s leadership understands that social movements in the enormous country can only be
“contained,” not stopped. “[The CCP] has learned when to tighten the leash and when to let go. It
can even mobilize mass movements for its own agenda,” Hsu said, adding that the CCP has established a social
organization network to increase its influence. Recent anti-Japan protests in various cities across China were a
good example because “the only organization that could organize anti-Japan protests in 85 cities
on the same day is the CCP,” Hsu said. Academia Sinica sociologist Lin Thung-hong (林宗弘) said that social
movements in China were very different from those in Taiwan because Chinese protests focused
on basic rights, such as housing, wages and other elements related to livelihood, rather than
political rights.
Protests actually strengthen the regime—they are focused on specific issues
rather than on the regime itself.
Tang 12—Wenfang Tang, Professor and C. Maxwell and Elizabeth M. Stanley Family and Hua
Hsia Chair of Chinese Culture and Institutions and Comparative Politics at Iowa [November 26,
2012, “Viewpoint: Are protests moving China backwards?” BBC,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-20405224]
Every time a protest breaks out in China, the outside world sees it as a sign that the communist
regime is weakening, with China moving one step closer to democracy. Yet Chinese opinion polls consistently
show strong public support for the central government in Beijing, despite the protests that erupt
around the country. In fact, the protests can help the Communist Party gain support, slowing the development of
civil society and making democracy an increasingly distant hope. Public protests, or mass incidents, have risen rapidly in recent years.
There were 180,000 mass incidents in 2010, compared to only 10,000 in 1994 and 74,000 in 2004, the New York Times reported. The
scale of these incidents ranges from a few protesters or petitioners to as many as 100,000 - challenging the government is no longer
the business of a few dissidents and public intellectuals. Recent high-profile incidents - such as the land dispute
in Wukan, the mining plant dispute in Shifang, the waste water processing plant dispute in
Qidong, and protests against a chef's death in Shishou and a young girl's drowning in Wengan - have been reported by Western
media. These incidents have generated considerable excitement among Chinese dissidents and some
Western media outlets, who tend to describe them as the harbinger of political change, a stepping stone towards
democracy, or the beginning of the collapse of the authoritarian regime. If the "collapse" view is true, one should
expect declining public support for the Chinese government. But public opinion surveys conducted by Chinese
and Western scholars, including a recent survey by the Washington-based Pew Research Center,
show a persistently high level of support for the Beijing government. Obviously, such strong
support will not lead to the collapse of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) any time soon. Mob
mentality Part of the reason is the CCP's successful use of mass incidents to promote and
consolidate its own power. The protest in Wukan, where villagers drove out local officials in a widely-publicised stand-off
over a land grab, was ultimately calmed when provincial officials intervened and removed the local officials. State media subsequently
ran pieces censuring them and promising better ways of addressing such disputes. By shifting public anger to economic
organisations, local governments and individual government officials, the central and provincial
governments are bypassing normal judicial procedures and local bureaucratic institutions, and
establishing direct dialogue with the public. In return, they gain people's trust and support. Such an
approach, however, encourages the public to disobey the legal system and even nurtures the development of mob mentality as a way
of expressing frustration. China is returning to a populist authoritarian society in which the leaders and the masses are directly linked
without the "buffer zone" of a civil society, such as elections, the rule of law and autonomous social organisations like labour unions.
In its frantic appeal to public opinion, government leaders frequently disrupt the legal system - for example, by compensating
petitioners who refuse to accept court decisions. In the cases of the chef who fell to his death from a hotel building in Shishou and the
17-year-old girl who drowned in Wengan, both families and local residents refused to accept the medical examiners' reports because
they did not find evidence of murder. As a result, families and local citizens organised large protests. The higher-level governments
responded by appeasing the very public they feared, and so intervened by compensating the families, regardless of the medical
examiners' findings. Such interference cooled public anger temporarily, but in the process demonstrated a complete disregard for the
rule of law. Going backwards? Outside China, observers often view the internet as the hope for
democracy, based on the assumption that it will effectively organise the public, break through
news censorship and quickly disseminate information. Certainly the early stages of the Arab Spring seemed to
reinforce that view. In China, however, the internet is often used as "human flesh search engine" to
recklessly expose people's private information. It may be true that those exposed did unethical or unpopular things.
But such vigilantism neglects the legal process and urges people to take justice into their own hands. It is Red Guards in action all
over again, showing that in some situations the reflexes of the Cultural Revolution are still intact. Red Guard-like behaviour was also
seen in the protest against the waste water processing plant in Qidong. The protesters stripped the mayor and the party secretary, and
forced them to put on environmental protection T-shirts. Both officials were later fired by the higher-level government. In Jinan, a
female police officer triggered another mass protest when she got into a row with some street vendors. Demonstrators dragged her out
of a police car, poured water on her and made her kneel and apologise. As a result, she lost her job. These incidents seem a repeat of
rallies during the Cultural Revolution when frenzied mobs criticised government officials and even beat them. In the Wukan
and Shishou incidents as well as others, many protesters held banners calling for direct
intervention by Beijing, while condemning local officials. The response from the top satisfies
those at the bottom and in return, produces political loyalty and support for the CCP. But this
process moves China further away from civil society and democracy. For those who mistakenly see these
mass incidents as hopeful rays in a democratic pre-dawn, it may be time to consider that the dark side of Chinese mob mentality may
ultimately block the sun.
AT: Economy (Global)
Chinese hard landing has minimal impact on the US and Global economy–
feedbacks create a bounce back effect that quickly reverses the downturn
Davis 4 [Joseph, Analyst @ Vanguard China's slowing economy, September,
https://institutional5.vanguard.com/iip/pdf/chinaslowdown.pdf]
Overall, our
simulations indicate that a Chinese hard landing would have a minimal impact on the
U.S. economy. There would be the usual temporary effects of dramatic economic news-a few days or weeks of market swings,
together with much dire prophesizing in the media. But, as stated above, the true result of a sharp drop in China's
GDP should be much like that of past emerging-market hard landings, which have not
significantly detracted from U.S.-and hence, global-economic growth. Despite the initial drop-off in local
demand, global deflationary pressures would quickly act to stimulate demand worldwide. Indeed, the
VAR model demonstrates that the second-round feedback effects of lower commodity and import
prices would reduce input costs world-wide sufficiently to create a bounce-back effect: The lower
costs eventually would counteract the first-round fall-off in Chinese demand. Conclusion. While recent
Chinese policy responses suggest that a soft landing is the most likely outcome for the nation's economy, the risks to this assessment
lie overwhelmingly on the downside. Regardless of the path that China's economy takes over the next year,
our analysis shows that the potential ramifications for long-term investors are more modest and short-lived than commonly
feared. Using quantitative techniques, we find that the implications of a soft landing in China are relatively benign for the global
economy. A potential hard landing would have more harmful effects on the Asian economy and
emerging markets generally, but relatively minor impact on the U.S. economy.
No impact to Chinese economy
Coonan 8 [October 25, 2010, Clifford, IrishTimes.com, “China's stalling boom has globe
worried,” http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/opinion/2008/1025/1224838827729.html]
All of this downbeat news feeds into a growing suspicion that China has had its cake and eaten for way too long, and that there is
simply no precedent for a country growing and growing without some kind of respite. Establishing what that pause will look like and
what it means to the rest of the world is the latest challenge facing global analysts. A hangover is considered inevitable
and the Olympics, while meaningless economically, are widely considered the psychological trigger for China to face a slowdown.
Despite all this gloom, however, writing China off is premature. The Beijing government is well placed to help
protect the economy from the worst ravages of a global downturn. It has spent the last two years trying to
fight inflation and cool the overheating economy, so it's a lot easier for it to take the foot off the
brakes than it is to put them on in the first place. The central bank has lowered its benchmark interest rate twice
in the past two months, the first time in six years. The State Council is increasing spending on infrastructure,
offering tax rebates for exporters and allowing state-controlled prices for agricultural products to rise. Expect significant
measures to kick-start the property market to avoid house prices falling too drastically. China has a lot
of plus points to help out. Chinese banks did not issue subprime loans as a rule, and the country's €1.43
trillion in hard-currency reserves is a useful war chest to call on in a downturn. The currency is
stable and there are high liquidity levels, all of which give China the most flexibility in the world to
fend off the impact of the global financial crisis, says JP Morgan economist Frank Gong. China is now a globalised
economy, but its domestic market is still massively underexploited, and it is to this market that the
government will most likely turn. While it is a globalised economy committed to the WTO, China is also a centralised
economy run by the Communist Party, and it has no real political opposition at home to stop it acting however it sees fit to stop sliding
growth. Should the economy start to worsen significantly, public anger will increase, but China has been so successful in keeping a
tight leash on the internet and the media that it is difficult for opposition to organise itself in a meaningful way. Recent years of
surging growth in China have certainly done a lot to keep global economic data looking rosy, but perhaps China's influence
has been somewhat oversold. It is not a big enough economy by itself to keep the global economy
ticking over, accounting for 5 per cent of the world economy, compared to the United States with a
muscular 28 per cent. And whatever about slowing growth, 9 per cent is still an admirable rate, one that European leaders gathered
this weekend in Beijing for the Asian-Europe Meeting would give their eye teeth to be able to present to their constituencies.