Yavor Raychev
raychev@gmail.com
Master in International and European relations
Master Thesis (733A27)
LIU
“SECURITY, RELIGION AND POLITICS IN KAZAKHSTAN: IMPLICATIONS
FOR THE RELATIONSHIPS WITH EU” (1999-2013)
21.07.2014
1
Content
Chapter 1 Introduction ..……………………..………………………………………………… 3
Chapter 2 Theory ………..….…………………………………….................................................7
Securitization …………………………………….. ……………………………………………….7
Security culture ….. …………………………………………………………………………....7
Security ……….. …………………………………………………………………………………….…10
Religion …………………………………………………………………………………………………11
Theoretical concepts …………………………………………………………………………………..13
Chapter 3 Methods ……..……………………………………………………….……………...16
Research methods ……………………………………………………………………………16
Source and methods of gathering information ….……………………………………………19
Chapter 4 Kazakhstan security culture and EU security culture: a comparative look on
security threats ……….………………………………………………………………………….20
Regional context: EU-CA cooperation in the security field …………………………………20
European Union and Central Asia: strategy for new partnership (SNP) …………..……….20
Cooperation between Kazakhstan and EU in security field: short history …………………..22
Security culture of Kazakhstani ruling elites ………………………………………………...23
Security narratives of the opposition ………………………………………………………...27
Who does the public opinion support? ………………………………………………………28
EU and Kazakhstan: understanding security ………………………...……………………...30
Chapter 5 Religious extremism …………………………….…………………………………..31
Religious situation in Kazakhstan …………………………………………………………...31
Defining the vague term "religious extremism" ……………………………………………..31
Why securitization of Islam in Kazakhstan? ………………………………………………...32
How the securitization is taking place: “religious extremism” in the official political discourse .36
EU and Kazakhstan on religious extremism: comparing views …………………..…………39
Chapter 6 Terrorism and counter terrorism: comparing EU and Kazakhstani view ….….41
Terrorism in Kazakhstan ……………………………………………………………………..41
Defining the term …………………………………………………………………………….42
Kazakhstani understanding of terrorism ………………………...…………………………..43
Cooperation between Kazakhstan and EU in the counter terrorism field: mission possible ..46
Chapter 7 Cooperation in combating drug trafficking …………………………….…………48
Opium in Afghanistan ………………………………………………………………………..48
The mutual interest to cooperate …………………………………………...………………..49
Central Asia Drug Action Program (CADAP) ………………………………………………50
Border Management Programme in Central Asia (BOMCA) ………………………….51
Chapter 8 Instead of conclusion: Reconsidering security, religion and politics in Kazakhstan
and their implications for the relations with EU (1999-2013) ………………………………..54
Bibliography …………………...………………………………………………………………...57
List of experts interviewed for the purpose of this research ………………………………....62
List of abbreviations …………………………………..………………………………………...62
List of analyzed materials ………………………………………………………………………63
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1.
INTRODUCTION
This work, which concentrates on religion, politics and security in the biggest by
territory country in Central Asia - Kazakhstan - and their applications for the relations with
EU, is a fruit of my long interest in the region and my own experience.
With an area of about 2,717,300 square kilometres, possessing 2,5% of the world oil
and 12% of the world uranium resources, having practically all chemical elements of
Mendeleev’s table, being home of 125 ethnic and 16 confessional communities which proved
to be able to keep peaceful relations in the last 23 years, becoming one of the “growing
economies” with relatively liberal political regime, Kazakhstan is now-a-days the most
important partner of EU in the region.
In the zone, where Kazakhstan is situated, one can marvellously witness the dynamics
of the international relations in the modern multipolar world. The gas and oil-rich Central
Asia, and Kazakhstan in particular, is an exemplary scene of it - we can see from one side
Russia, which tries to maintain its historical, cultural and even political dominance in the
region. On the other side is China, which tries to become regional leader, through serious
donations and participation in many regional projects, some of which are at first sight
economically unprofitable. We can also see USA, which started withdrawing from the region,
except in cases related to what they perceive matter of security. And last but not list, we see
EU, which tries to promote democratization and human rights, becoming a purely normative
power.
In the recent years several academic works in the field of political science,
international relations, religion studies, economy, etc. examine different aspects of Central
Asia. Nevertheless, there is little about the relationship between security, religion and politics
in Kazakhstan; this topic was and is still somehow under-researched. Despite of the fact that
Kazakhstan is a secular state, and that its ruling elite is now strictly sticking the principle of
separation of the state and the religion, fixed in quite a lot of documents of the government starting with Constitution and ending with the Law of Republic of Kazakhstan on religious
activity and religious associations - the question about the relationships between security,
religion and politics is a sensitive part of the current political agenda.
One can ask the question - why deal with the relationship between politics and
religion when we speak about security in Kazakhstan? First of all, because “recent
international events in world politics, the rethinking of the concept of national security and
the transformation of the international system after the fall of communism in Europe, have
necessitated a reanalysis of the relationship between religion and politics.”1 Kazakhstan is a
good example of a country with predominant Muslim population, where the secular ruling
elite, despite of its strong leading positions, now a days sees “non-traditional” Islam as a
force it has to compete with – or to suppress, or at least to take into consideration. From
another point of view, a danger exists that in absence of oppositional parties, able to canalize
the normal for any democratic political system tensions, Islamist groups are the only who can
ride these tensions.
1
BARRINHA, André & MARCO, Rosa. 2013 'Translating Europe's security culture, Critical Studies on
Security', 1:1, 101-115, p. 109
3
The study of the role of religion in politics has emerged recently in the field of
political sciences; probably this is one of the reasons “my” topic to be under researched. As I
will point later, religion impact political systems through values, norms, beliefs, symbols,
institutions and movements. All of them have to do with its capacity to become political
ideology, a form of identity, an “interpretive community”, 2 a tool for political mobilization.
This is crucial to understand the differences between values of security cultures of EU and
Kazakhstan; the securitization of “non-traditional Islam” and the discussions about the
freedom of religion and human rights. This also makes understandable why cooperation in
security field between Kazakhstan and EU is easier and much more effective in areas which
have less to do with values and more with pragmatism (as for example cooperation in drug
prevention and trafficking).
Despite of the increasing secularization of the State (as a global trend), the impact of
religion on the State is still strong in the Third world countries and even in the “growing
economies” as Kazakhstan. Sometimes ago, Egyptian political science professor, Amr
Hamzawy, said in an interview with the pan-Arab daily ASHARQ AL AWSAT that the
claim to separate religion from the State “is wrong and needs to be replaced.” According to
him, the central question that needs to be addressed by society is: how can the relationship
between politics and religion be organized: “Politics is not only about the government. It
deals with the government including its institutions and apparatuses, in addition to the
citizens and all the organizations and parties, which serve as means to reflect what the
citizens want. Moreover, the constitution serves as a thread that organizes the relationship
between the government and the citizen. Therefore, the issue is not about joining or
separating religion and the state, but about organizing the relationship between the two in a
democratic way.”3 Some strong voices in Kazakhstan recently posed the same issue (in a
slightly different form) while insisting, that the “secular State is not an atheist State”.
The capacity of religion to cause political mobilization is executed also through the
transformation of religious into politically active groups. As far as religious groups can
become politically active, with their leadership, resource and ideology, they can impact the
distribution of power in a given political system and come to be important players in a
national political stage either when the State is separated from the religion or political parties
on religious basis are prohibited by the law, which is the case of Kazakhstan. But this process
has also another side: even when religious groups are not strong contenders for the power,
they put the ruling elites face to face with the temptation to introduce restricting legislation
which can become an obstacle for democratization process and a source of criticism of its
international partners.
Indeed, one does not have to think the religion is able to explain all aspects of the
current situation of the cooperation in the security field between EU and Kazakhstan. There
are another factors like security culture, identity differences and ways of legitimation (often
expressed in the discourse), that help to make a step towards the understanding of why EU,
the major trade partner of Kazakhstan, has much more limited impact in the region, in
comparison with other great powers, and why European understanding of security itself does
not wake up much enthusiasm in Kazakhstani ruling elite.
Next issue I would like to shed light on, is the chronological framework of my
research. I have chosen the relevant period, because, from one side, it marks the shift of
2
THOMAS, Scott. 2000 'Religion and International Conflict. In Religion and International Relations', edited by
K.R. Dark, pp. 1-24. Houndmills: Macmillan. 1-24
3
EDITORIAL. 2011.Separating Religion from Politics Needs to Be Revised. The Middle East Reporter 28.05.,
Page 10
4
understanding of the terms in question, and second, because in 1999 the Peace and
Cooperation Agreement was signed, which gave and is still giving the framework for the
partnership between Kazakhstan and European Union.
My main research questions are as follows:
1. Are the security, religion and politics related in Kazakhstan and if so, in which way?
2. Are there differences in the security cultures and in the interpretation of security
challenges between Kazakhstan and EU?
3. Which are the opportunities and the difficulties of the EU – Kazakhstan cooperation
in the security field, considering possible differences and similarities?
As a result of my preliminary research on the problem, I have formulated the following
hypotheses
1. Security, religion and politics are closely related in Kazakhstan, if we understand the
security in the broader sense established by B. Buzan
2. Despite of the difference in values of the strategic culture of the EU and Kazakhstan,
the cooperation between two is possible, even it meets some challenges
3. In order to cooperate effectively with Kazakhstan, EU should find the happy medium
between the value-based and pragmatism based approach to security matters
According to the main research question and hypothesis, the goals are as follows:
- Identify and analyse the concrete dimensions between security, religion and politics
- Identify the process of their construction and securitization
- Assess the effectiveness of the government response to them
- Analyse the contribution of EU to successfully countering the above mentioned
challenges
- Analyse the implications of all this processes for the cooperation between Kazakhstan
and EU
These goals are concretized in the next objectives:
- Study the evolution of the above mentioned security challenges
- Study the evolution of the government concept about countering them
- Study the EU vision on the regional security in Central Asia
- Compare the strategic culture of EU and Kazakhstan’s ruling elite and its impact on
the views on the security challenges
In chapter II, which is theoretic chapter, I define the main terms to be used: religion,
security, securitization and security culture; and also shed light on the connection between
them, at least in the way I see it. I also emphasize those aspects of the terms which will be
especially explored in the further text.
In chapter III I state the design of the work, the methods used, and commenting of
the used sources.
In chapter IV, I first study the regional context, i.e, the conceptual and institutional
aspects of the cooperation between EU and CA in the security field. Then, I briefly represent
the history of the relations between Kazakhstan and EU; and finally, I compare their
understanding of “security” and the main security challenges.
In chapter V, I first concentrate on the religious context of Kazakhstan and analyze
the Islam as a part of Kazakh identity. Then I try to define the term “religious extremism” and
5
explain reasons of securitization of Islam. Through discourse analysis of some laws and
several speeches of the president I show how exactly this process went out. I also point the
main objections of human rights activists which wrote several letters of protests to the
Delegation of EU in Astana.
In chapter VI, I acknowledge that the cooperation among Kazakhstan and EU is
going mainly in the framework of the Strategy for CA. Probably, this is a field which has not
been explored enough by both parties. That’s why, in order to identify future ways of
cooperation, I first make a brief analysis of the terrorist threat in Kazakhstan and define the
term. Then I expose EU and Kazakhstani view on the terrorism and finally, study the public
discourse in Kazakhstan on the root causes of terrorism.
In Chapter VII, I examine one of the clearest examples of existing cooperation
between European Union and Kazakhstan - the cooperation in the field of drug trafficking
and border control. I examine the common threat - the opium production in Afghanistan,
explain the mutual interest for cooperation and finally present the two main frameworks in
which this cooperation is established - BOMCA and CADEP.
In Chapter VIII, I reconsider the relations between security, religion and politics in
Kazakhstan and their implications for the relationships with EU (1999-2013) and make some
recommendations for the EU Central Asian policy in the future.
Said that, I can now proceed with the theory and the methods.
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2. THEORY
In this chapter, I define the main terms to be used here: religion, security,
securitization and security culture; and also shed light on the connection between them, at
least in the way I see it. I also emphasize those aspects of the terms which will be especially
explored in the further text. While following the academic debate on them, I set the
explanatory frameworks, needed for the analysis in the next chapters.
2.1. Securitization
The introduction of the concept of Securitization is often viewed as one of the biggest
contributions of the Copenhagen School, with Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde
as main representatives. This approach is more constructivist based and unlike classical
materialistic approaches, it is process oriented. It is much less interested in the material
projection of threats, such as military force, distribution of power etc., but is instead
interested in "who securitizes (Securitizing actor), on what issues (threats), for whom
(referent object), why, with what results, and not least, under what conditions."4, or in other
words, how certain issue becomes a matter of security, who does it and to whom.
"Securitization is an extreme version of politicization that enables the use of extraordinary
means in the name of security"5. The act can be successful or unsuccessful, this is dependent
of the cultural peculiarities of the country where this process occur. Some issues which are
successfully securitized in USA, might not be securitized in Europe or vice versa. The
approach is less interested also in how real objectively the threat is.
Securitizing is important tool for politics, as it can legitimize the use of extraordinary
means, which otherwise wouldn't be used and would be closed for public debates. According
to Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde the securitization can take place in five
sectors, sometimes also simultaneously - military, political, economic, society and
environment. Examples of securitization in USA include the invasion in Afghanistan and
Iraq, the immigration debate, while in Europe such examples can be the free market doctrine.
Following the methods of Copenhagen School, I will make an attempt to analyse what
is perceived to be a threat in Kazakhstan and EU states; what is meant by “security”
(respectively “insecurity”) which are the differences in the perceptions and which implication
they have for the cooperation of both.
2.2. Security culture
What follows below is about security culture. Through the insertion of this term, I will
try to explain why EU and Kazakhstan see in different way the main security challenges. I
argue that this is due to different security culture Kazakhstan and EU have. In order to prove
it, firstly I will discuss the term to which security culture is related and from which it steams
– “strategic culture”. Then I will review the academic debate in order to identify the
components of security culture and finally, I will design the methodology which I will use to
identify Kazakhstan strategic culture.
In order to do this, I plan to examine the normative basis of Kazakhstan, their
discourse and the public reaction. I will also include the discourse of the Kazakh opposition.
4
BUZAN, Barry, Ole WÆVER, and Jaap de WILDE. 1998, Security: A New Framework for Analysis
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, p. 32
5
BUZAN, Barry, Ole WÆVER, and Jaap de WILDE. 1998, Security: A New Framework for Analysis
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, p. 25
7
On opposite side, I plan to examine "European Union and Central Asia: Strategy for New
Partnership", which is the normative document regulating EU-Kazakh relations.
2.2.1. Strategic culture
The concept of strategic culture was suggested around 30 years ago by scholars after
what they perceived as impossibility of the classical rationalistic theory to explain every
aspect of the state behaviour, and since then is important part of the European security
debate.6 At the beginning it was used to distinguish between Western rationality and nonWestern ways of warfare,7 however now is applied in much broader sense.
The term was coined by Snyder in 1977. He stated that strategic cultures are the
product of each state’s unique historical experience, which is reaffirmed and sustained as new
generations of policy-makers are socialized into a particular way of thinking8 and defined it
as a sum “of ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behaviour that
members of a national strategic community have acquired through instruction or imitation
and share with each other regarding nuclear strategy.”9
Snyder’s questioning of the rationality of the actors was accepted by other scholars
who developed it further in the late 1970s and early 1980s and stated that factors such as
historical experience, political culture and geography can and often do act as constraints on
strategic thinking.10
A second generation of scholars of strategic culture observed that there is
inconsistency between what policy makers say and do. They stated that strategic culture was
not expected to have much effect on strategic behaviour and it remains more in the field of
political rhetoric.
The third generation of scholars who parted ways on the question of whether or not
behaviour was to be defined inside or outside of the term, creating distinction between
strategic culture and strategic behaviour. Colin Gray, for example, argued that strategic
Cornish, Paul and Edwards, Geoffrey. 2001‘Beyond the EU/NATO Dichotomy: The Beginnings of a European
Strategic Culture’, International Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 3, pp. 587–603; Paul Cornish and Geoffrey Edwards, ‘The
Strategic Culture of the European Union: A Progress Report’, International Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 4 (2005), pp.
801–820, Stine Heiselberg, ‘Pacifism or Activism: Towards a Common Strategic Culture within the European
Security and Defence Policy?’, IIS Working Paper 4, Danish Institute for International Studies, 2003; Adrian
Hyde Price, ‘European Security, Strategic Culture and the Use of Force’, European Security, Vol. 13, No. 4
(2004), pp. 323–343, Per Martin Martinsen, ‘Forging a Strategic Culture - Putting Policy into the ESDP’,
Oxford Journal on Good Governance, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2004), pp. 61–66; Janne Haaland Matlary, ‘When Soft
Power Turns Hard: Is an EU Strategic Culture Possible?,’ Security Dialogue, Vol. 37, No. 1 (2006), pp. 105–
121; Christoph O. Meyer, The Quest for a European Strategic Culture: A Comparative Study of Strategic Norms
and Ideas in the European Union (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); Per Martin Norheim-Martinsen,
‘European Strategic Culture Revisited: The Ends and Means of a Militarised European Union’, Defence and
Security Studies, Vol. 1, No. 3 (2007); Sten Rynning, ‘The European Union: Towards a Strategic Culture?’,
Security Dialogue, Vol. 34, No. 4 (2003), pp. 479–496; Kerry Longhurst and Marcin Zaborowski, ‘The Future
of European Security’, European Security, Vol. 13, No. 4 (2004), pp. 381–391; Jolyon Howorth, Security and
Defence Policy in the European Union (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2007); Asle Toje, The EU, NATO and Strategic
Culture: Renegotiating the Transatlantic Bargain (London: Routledge, 2008).
7
VELDE, Roel. 2013. Inteligence and strteic culture. Inteligence and national security, Routledge, 1-15
8
SNYDER, Jack. 1977, ‘The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations’, Santa
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, R-2154-AF, p. 7
9
SNYDER, Jack. 1977, ‘The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations’, Santa
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, R-2154-AF, p. 8
10
BOOTH, Ken. 1979. Strategy and Ethnocentrism. New York: Holmes and Meier; Colin Gray, ‘National
Styles in Strategy: The American Example’, International Security, Vol. 6, No. 2 (1981), pp. 21–47; Carnes
Lord, ‘American Strategic Culture’, Comparative Strategy, Vol. 5, No. 3 (1985), pp. 269–293; Richard Pipes,
‘Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War’, Commentary 1 (1977), pp. 21–34.
6
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behaviour must irrevocably be part of strategic culture, since culture represents the context
for all things.11
On another level, the strategic culture, as B. Neumann and H. Heikka observe, can be
defined as "dynamic interplay between discourse and practice,"12 understanding the discourse
as the way through which strategic culture manifests itself and the practice as the socially
recognized and acceptable behaviour that originates from it and ultimately defines the
strategic culture.
This view gives birth to another possible component of the strategic cultures which is
the strategic narrative. Lawrence Freedman, for example, states that: "Culture, and the
cognition which it influences, is rarely fixed but [are all the time] in a process of development
and adaptation. . . It is in this context that the concept of narratives – compelling story lines
which can explain convincingly and from which inferences can be drawn – becomes relevant.
Narratives are designed or nurtured with the intention of structuring the responses of others to
developing events. They are strategic because they do not arise spontaneously but are
deliberately constructed or reinforced out of ideas and thoughts that are already current. . .
Narratives are about the ways that issues are framed and responses suggested"13 He argues
that in modern times the role of strategic narratives has grown in importance, because the war
of ideas, which take place in media are often as important as the classic wars on ground.
2.2.2. Security culture
In its classical and modern understanding, “strategic culture” has to do mainly with
the external threats to the homeland security and warfare. However, as many authors point
out, “the world is in a new warfare state and new thinking is required.” 14
One of the first to define the term “security culture” was Andrew Latham, who
considered it consist “of widely held systems of meaning, expressive symbols, selfunderstandings and values that inform the way in which a state’s interests with respect to
security, stability and peace are constructed and articulated.”15
This trend – to broad the sense – was followed by Isabel Nunes, who distinguished
between “strategy” and culture”, “understanding strategy within the broader realm of
security”16 what meant “widening of the security concept beyond the military field”.17
Then, for the purposes of my analysis, I would accept that the security culture has the
next components: values, policies and practices, and security narratives. All they are
securitized by the discourse, understood in this context as a “communication tool that
disseminates meanings”, but also as “a unique social technology in terms of the construction,
GRAY, Colin. 2005, ‘Strategic Culture as Context: The First Generation of Theory Strikes Back’ (note 5).
See also Johnston and Gray’s subsequent replies and replies to replies. Johnston’s definition of culture has been
generally discredited, since it represents a sharp departure from definitions in sociological and anthropological
literature. For a detailed discussion, see Iver B. Neumann and Henrikki Heikka, ‘Grand Strategy, Strategic
Culture, Practice. The Social Roots of Nordic Defence’, Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 40, No. 1, pp. 5–23
12
NEUMANN, Iver and Heikka, Henrkikki. 2005. 'Grand Strategy, Strategic Culture, Practice' (note 20).
13
FREEDMAN, Einaudi. 2006. The Transformation of Strategic Affairs.Routledge (note 30), pp. 22–23.
14
SUTER, Keith. 2006 'The failure of international action against terrorism, Medicine, Conflict and Survival'
Volume 22, Issue 1, pp 26-37
15
LATHAM, A. 1998. “Constructing National Security: Culture and Identity in Indian Arms Control and
Disarmament Practice.” Contemporary Security Policy 19 (1): 129–158, p.13
16
BARRINHA, André & Marco, Rosa. 2013 'Translating Europe's security culture, Critical Studies on
Security', 1:1, 101-115, p. 104
17
BARRINHA, André & Marco, Rosa. 2013 'Translating Europe's security culture, Critical Studies on
Security', 1:1, 101-115, p. 104
11
9
reconstruction, deconstruction, articulation, or re-articulation of social meanings which give
meaning to social life, and consequently, to other social practices.”
2.3. Security
Security is a main subject in International Relations theory. One of the main
explanation about the creation of the state assumes that people united for the need of security.
For many years this term was related mainly to war and peace, but now it is used in much
wider sense.
Broadly speaking, security is about protecting people.18 There is ongoing debate on
how to understand it. The broadest definition is given by Buzan - “security is pursuit of
freedom from threats”,19 with the main notion here being "freedom from". This definition,
however, does not address the scope.
Most of the traditional thinkers, mainly from the realist school, such as Walt 1991, in
Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde,20 have argued that security studies “study the threat, use, and
control of military force” implying that the object of studies is the state and that threats are
result of objective material (military) factors, usually referring to security as a zero-sum
game. Such thinking has been further developed by neorealists such as Kenneth Waltz,
Stephen Van Evera, Organski and others, who created specific theories such as balance of
power theory, balance of threat theory, security dilemma theory, offense-defence theory,
hegemonic stability theory and power transition theory in order to enhance the security.
Liberalists, basing themselves on the philosophy of the German Idealism and Kant in
particular, on the other hand, proposed other ways to answer the threats, which include
economic freedom21, increased integration to international bodies22, etc.
Dr. Nayef Al-Rodhan proposed23 that the classical zero-sum principle cannot be
applied anymore, as it does not include states alone. For this, he coined the so-called "multisum" principle. He defined five dimensions of security - human, environmental, national,
transnational and transcultural and concluded that "global security and the security of any
state or culture cannot be achieved without good governance at all levels that guarantees
security through justice for all individuals, states, and cultures".
The main differences between realism and liberalism as security system can be seen
in the following table:24
Theoretical base
Structure of the
international system
Liberal (community
of law)
static;
Social;
dynamic;
self-help governance
without
Realist (alliance)
Material;
anarchic;
18
LIOTTA, P. H. 2006, and Taylor Owen. "Why Human Security?." Journal Of Diplomacy & International
Relations 7.1: p. 37-54.
19
BUZAN, Barry. 1991. People, states and fear: an agenda for international security studies in the post-cold war
era
20
WALT, S. M. 1991. The Renaissance of Security Studies. International Studies Quarterly in Buzan, B.,
Weaver, O. and de Wilde, J. 1998 Security – A New Framework for Analysis, Colorado: Lynne Rinner
Publishers, Inc., Boulder.
21
GARTZKE, E. 2005, 'Economic Freedom and Peace' in Economic Freedom of the World, Annual Report.
pp. 29-44
22
NAVARI, C. 2008. Liberalism. Security Studies: An Introduction. P. D. William. New York, Routledge.
23
RODHAN, Nayfer, R. F. al-. 2007 'The Five Dimensions Of Global Security: Proposal For A Multi-Sum
Security Principle'
24
ELMAN, C. 2008. Realism. Security Studies: An Introduction. P. D. William. New York, Routledge. p. 42.
10
Conceptions
security
of
Basic
principles
system
Accumulation
power
government
of
Integration
Democratization;
Military deterrence;
Strategies
conflict resolution; rule of
control of allies
Law
Institutional
Functiona
Military realm only
Multiple issue areas
features
l scope
Criterion
Democratic system of
for
Strategic relevance
rule
membership
Internal
Reflects distribution
Symmetrical;
high
power
of power; most likely
degree of interdependence
structure
hegemonic
DecisionWill of dominant
Democratically
making
power prevails
legitimized
Serves as an attractive
Relation of system
Dissociated;
model;
open
for
to its environment
perception of threat
association
The concept has been challenged by Barry Buzan and other representatives of the
constructivist school, who expanded the scope of the term. According to him the term should
extend from predominantly military onto economic, political, social and environmental
sectors. It should also not regard only the state, but super or supranational entities such as
individuals, social groups or humanity in general. This school also rejects the objective
factors as it accepts the reality as socially constructed and therefore, also the security is social
construct: “the theory does not take place after the fact. Theories, instead, play a large part in
constructing and defining what the facts are”. In this way, the difference between what other
scholars call "real" and "perceived" threats, has ceased to exist.
In this work, while keeping in mind the fundamental realistic and liberal theories, I
will make use of the constructivist view, especially in terms of how security is perceived,
constructed and presented, rather than its actual “objective” dimension. In the following
chapters, respectively, it will be examined how the security is presented in Kazakhstan and
European Union, with an attempt to present also how the population reacted to the official
discourse.
2.4. Religion
The definition of any term has to do with the epistemology of a word, that’s why I
shall start from this point.
In most Indo-European languages, the dominant word for the set of believes
denominating ‘transcendental reality’, ‘sacred cosmos’, etc. is "religion".25
St. Augustine proposes a possible derivation from the verb "legare", to tie + "re", with
the meaning of "which ties man to god". Modern scholars2627 are sceptic about such
25
MCGUIRE, Meredith B. 2002 Religion: the social context / Meredith B. McGuire. n.p.: Belmont, Calif. :
Wadsworth, cop. 2002, 2002, p. 9
11
interpretation, as they believe the early Christians distorted the original meaning of the word
to connect with the new monotheistic cult.
Gerardus van der Leeuw affirms that the word comes from "relegere", with the same
meaning, and opposes religiosus (careful) to negligens (negligent). This interpretation seems
more plausible, as for the Romans the religion was not matter of faith, but matter of
knowledge about the careful execution of the rituals.28 This pretty much supports the modern
interpretation of the religion as social phenomenon, especially those of Robinson.
In Arabic and also in Turkic languages, including Kazakh, the word for religion is
"din". It comes from the verb "‫ "دان‬with the meaning of "to obey"(first meaning) or "to
owe"29. In this meaning religion is very similar to what Kant meant30 by defining it as set of
duties the human needs to perform.
There are several approaches to the relationship between religion and politics; for the
purposes of my research I have chosen two of them: sociological and international relations
approach. The first is well established in social sciences and is related with the names of
several famous scholars, Webber, Durkheim, Geertz among them. The second is relatively
new, despite of the fact that in the last years it is becoming a “growing industry”.
The sociology of religion, which explain how religion, as one of the social
mechanisms, impact political systems, speaks about substantive and functional definitions.
The substantive try to explain what religion is, and the functional – which are the actions of
religion in society.
Among substantial definitions, I will put attention to these ones which see religion as
a part of a wider cultural system of the society that impact public behaviour and political
action of collective actors. According Yinger, religions are cultural systems, which could be
analysed through “the manifestation of their material expression: doctrines, rituals,
relationship to other social structures and their modifications in time”31 This is what also
emphasize Melford Spiro’s definition) that religion is “an institution consisting of culturally
patterned interaction with culturally postulated superhuman beings”.32
The classical functional definition is the Clifford Geertz’s one, according to which “a
religion is: (1) a system of symbols which acts to (2) establish powerful, pervasive, and longlasting moods and motivations in men by (3) formulating conceptions of a general order of
existence and (4) clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that (5) the
moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic”.33
Emile Durkheim emphasised that in defining religion one should not start from one’s
own “prejudices, passions or habits” but rather “from the reality itself”. From this
perspective, “religion is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that
LEEUW, Gerardus van der. 1933, Phanomenologie der Religion, Tübingen : Verlag von J. C. B. Mohr (P.
Siebeck), p.67
27
FILORAMO, Giovanni. 1993 Dizionario delle religioni. Torino, Einaudi
28
ANDO, Clifford. 2008. The Matter of the Gods: Religion and the Roman Empire. The Transformation of the
Classical Heritage, 44. Berkeley: University of California Press, p. 13.
29
Online Arabic dictionary - http://www.almaany.com
30
KANT, Immanuel. 2001. Religion and Rational Theology. Cambridge University Press. p. 177
31
YINGER, J. Milton. 1970. The Scientific Study of Religion. London: The Macmillan Company.p. 4-5
32
SPIRO, Melford E. 1966. Religion: Problems of Definition and Explanation. In Anthropological Approaches
to the Study of Religion, edited by Michael Banton, pp. 85-126. London: Tavistock Publications.
33
GEERTZ, Clifford. 1966, Religion as a Cultural System. In Anthropological Approaches to the Study of
Religion, edited by Michael Banton, pp. 1-46. London: Tavistock Publications Ltd.
26
12
is to say, things set apart and forbidden—beliefs and practices which unite into a single moral
community called a Church, all those who adhere to them”.34
If the sociological approach to religion is useful in defining the components and
functions of the religion, the international relation approach is more prone to look for its
interrelation with politics. This is what I will discuss further in my work.
On the basis of substantial definitions, I would conclude that the impact on political
systems is executed through religious values, norms, beliefs, symbols, institutions,
movements and networks. This is what I will implement in the chapter about religious
extremism, when religious situation in the country and Islam as part of Kazakh identity will
be analysed.
There are also elements of functional definitions that will be implemented further –
especially their emphasis of the constitution and political behaviour of religious institutions,
groups and movements. This is what I will implement when I analyse the positions of the
official institution dealing with religion - DUMK – Spiritual Administration of the Muslims
of Kazakhstan.
2.5. Theoretical concepts: identity, legitimacy, threats, cooperation in context
In this paragraph I shall place identity and legitimacy, as closely related to the
critical discourse analysis, in the context of Kazakhstan.
I shall try to explain in which way they are linked to the securitization, especially
of the so called “non-traditional Islam” which in official discourse is closely associated with
religious extremism and terrorism.
It will also study how this impacts the cooperation with EU.
I shall argue that the study of collective identity formation process, reflected in
the discourse of ruling elite, reveals much about security culture values, threats, securitization
and their impact on the cooperation between Kazakhstan and EU.
Let me start with identity.
Since the very creation of the new State, the ruling elite promoted next main
pillars of Kazakh identity: Islam; traditions, secular state; inter-ethnic and inter-confessional
tolerance, Eurasian nature of local culture. At least, these were the sub-categories which
appeared most often in relation with the category “Kazakhstani identity” in the Addresses of
the president Nazarbayev to Kazakhstani people.35
The revival of Islam after the independence (as shown in chapter 5 and 6) was
presented as one of the biggest achievements of the sovereign State. The narrative of Islam
became widespread in media and everyday speech. It was pointed out as a main feature of
“new Kazakh identity”; as a kind of marker which showed the “full independence of new
Kazakh elite of its Soviet past;” and as an “alternative to the old socialist ideology”. Because
of this reason, Kazakhstani official discourse started equalizing the revival of Islam with the
revival of the nation. Even in the book, dedicated to the security, under the title “Critical
decade”, Nazarbayev speaks about it as about “high ideals and factor, determining our world
vision”. The special attention of Islam, given to it in the discourse of ruling class lead to the
34
DURKHEIM, Emile. 1947. The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life. Translated by Joseph Ward Swain,
New York: The Free Press p. 24
35
The texts of the presidential addresses can be found in the web site of the Administration of the president www.akorda.kz/ru/mainpage/
13
affirmation of belief among Kazakhs that “everything that facilitates the development of
Islam is valuable and everything that prevents it – harmful and alien”36.
However, at the beginning of 2000s Islam gained significant strength and
threatened to become a challenge to the ruling class, putting in question the legitimacy of its
power and authority. This made ruling class to return to religion. In this sense Kazakhstan is
not an exception – almost all secular leaders in Islamic state recur to Islamic symbols in order
to consolidate their power and defeat their religious contenders. The specific for the country
is that the narrative of Islam was replaced by the narrative of “traditional Islam” (despite of
the fact that nobody never in Kazakhstan defined what does it mean) which gradually
converted to what Sherin Akiner calls “government-sponsored Islam”. Within this new
paradigm, the main concern of the government became “to promote "good" Islam, which… is
beneficial to the development of the state; and concomitantly to banish "bad" Islam, which
represents an insidious threat to stability”.37 The president Nazarbaev’s stated it in a quite
clear way: “In deed, we are Sunni Muslims….this is the way chosen by our forefathers, based
on the respect to national traditions. Now external forces recruit youth, pushing them to
choose the wrong trend in Islam…. We have seen which the results are. I lead youth to 21
and 22 century, they – to the medieval ages.” Thus, “traditional Islam” was identified with
the secular elite, which was said to be the only one in condition to ensure democracy,
development, and prosperity, and to warrant inter-ethnic and inter-confessional tolerance other two components of the “brand” of Kazakhstani identity.
With the gradual transformation of the narrative of “Islam” to “traditional Islam”,
and the public representation of the later as a pillar of Kazakh identity, the basis for
securitization of everything that remains out of the “state sponsored” or rather “statecontrolled” Islam was laid. The path was paved for legitimation of any action of the elite,
directed against non-traditional Islam as an action on defense of national security.
This identification with “traditional Islam” successfully convinced local public
opinion that all actions against what cannot be qualified as such, are in defense not of the
ruling class’ interests, but in defense of “our common identity”. This made possible to
produce a law of religion which enjoys wide support, despite of its restrictive character and
open violation of some important freedoms. Thus, what various authors (some of them
quoted later) call “insensibility of Kazakhstani political culture to human rights” is, rather,
result of a strong process of legitimation running parallel to the identification, both seen as
providing key to understand each other. All that sheds light not only on why any criticism
concerning restrictions of religious freedom is seen as threat to Kazakhstani identity, but also
as an act of “external hostile forces” that aim to undermine the stability of the country (rather
than the stability of the ruling elite.)
This could explain to certain extend the state of cooperation in the security field
between Kazakhstan and EU. As my research further shows, in areas, considered to be related
to Kazakh identity (even they are actually related more to the legitimacy of the elite), the
cooperation is more difficult. Vice versa, in areas, which are not related to identity and where
САВИН, Игорь. Источники экстремизма в Южном Казахстане. Центр изучения Центральной Азии,
Кавказа и Урало-Поволжья Института востоковедения Российской академии наук. http://www.centraleurasia.com/kazakhstan/articles/?uid=225
37
AKINER, Shirin. Religion's Gap. Harvard International Review, Spring 2000
36
14
the ruling class does not feel its legitimacy questioned (as for example in the fight against
drug trafficking), the cooperation is more easy-going and less problematic.
Let me summarize once again my main theoretical positions and their
contextualization for Kazakhstan. I started from the view that politics, religion and security
are closely related here. Implementing the method of discourse analysis, I proved that this
relation has complex character. It starts with the proclamation of Islam as an inseparable part
of Kazakh identity and passes through the securitization of “non-traditional Islam” and
reinvention of Kazakh identity as based on the “traditional Islam”. This legitimated actions
against what is considered to be non-traditional Islam, and lead to mass perception that any
criticism to those actions from abroad should be treated as expression of external hostile
forces and is a threat to Kazakh identity. Indeed, this impacts the cooperation between
Kazakhstan and EU, making it more difficult in areas which have to do in values and easier –
in more “remote” fields as for example, drug trafficking.
15
3.
METHODS
In this chapter, I would like to explain the methods for gathering information and
research methods I am going to use.
3.1. Research methods
This work is designed as a comparative study: I will try to make visible the similarities
and differences in the concepts, values, views and positions of EU and Kazakhstan
concerning the cooperation in security field, which will help to compare and contrast them.
This design gives the chance to understand differences in the two cultural models, which
eventually determines the difference in understanding security and carrying out a given kind
of security policy. It also allows me to mark similarities in needs, interests and positions,
which encourage the cooperation in security field and makes it more effective.
Two main research methods are implemented here: content analysis and discursive
analysis.
- Content analysis is a quantitative method for analysing content of several sources –
mainly, mass media, but also documentation of organizations or institutions, interviews, etc.
The purpose is to identify how given issues – images, positions, events – are represented. It
gives a statistics on word count, number of sentences, lexical density, etc.
There are several approaches to the content analysis; in the academic debate three
are most often mentioned: conventional, directed, or summative. I will use the summative
one, which is characterized by counting and comparison of words and sentences, as well as
by interpretation of the context. This will help me to deduce some ideas that are not explicitly
stated, but implicitly are present.
Starting from the point that "content analysis is any technique for making
inferences by objectively and systematically identifying specified characteristics of
messages"38, which is able "to determine the relative emphasis or frequency of various
communication phenomena",39 I implement it in the simplest form - for description of
phenomena and processes that are of my interest. Taking into consideration the limitation of
the method and its quantitative character, I use it mainly in the analysis of texts of human
right activists, published by the Kazakhstani branch of Radio Azzatyk (Radio Liberty) and in
the chapter of terrorism.
My research with the implementation of content analysis is organized following a
simple three-step model, including: conceptualization of the phenomenon, planning of
research design of the inquiry, and data collection and analysis.
During the first stage, I define the focus of my study as a description of the
messages in order to infer the messages’ meaning which, as a rule, requires just counting.
During the research design stage, I describe “specific time frame for the study,
communication source or medium, units of analysis, set of categories, type and size of
sample, plan for assessing reliability, and planned statistical analysis.” Data collected and
38
RIFFE, Daniel, Stephen Lacy &Frederick G. Fico. 1998. Analyzing Media Messages:Using Quantitative
Content Analysis in Research. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Mahwah, NJ.P. 19
39
RIFFE, Daniel, Stephen Lacy &Frederick G. Fico. 1998. Analyzing Media Messages:Using Quantitative
Content Analysis in Research. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Mahwah, NJ.P. 19
16
their analysis (third stage) help me to partially answer the second component of my research
question: Are there differences in the security cultures and in the interpretation of security
challenges between Kazakhstan and EU? It gives also an additional information about the
differences between ruling elite security culture and oppositional security culture, expressed
in statements and positions of human rights protection groups.
-Discourse analysis as a method exists since the 60s and it's based on the Russian
formalism and French structuralism. It requires interpretation of social aspect of the language
and of dependencies between the usage of language and different social factors and social
context, such as status, gender and others. Critical discourse analysis is related to power,
identity and legitimacy– all of them intimately linked to security, religion, politics and
cooperation which I study in this thesis.
While recognizing that “discourse infuses events with meaning, establishes
widespread social understandings, and constitutes social reality”40, I don’t share postmodernist view that all in social life can be reduced to language. Despite of the fact that
political identity, as a kind of social identity, is expressed in the way in which a group of
people speak, write and present important issues, not all its aspects can be found in the
discourse. Apart of speaking and writing, people act and create41, and this also contributes to
the construction of their identities. That’s why I use here discourse analysis not as the only
research method, but in combination with others.
Through critical discourse analysis I will show how exactly security, religion and
politics are related in Kazakhstan; in which way the process of securitization is carried out
and which is the form it provides legitimacy to the acts of the political elite, against what is
called here “religious extremism”, “extremists religious groups”, etc.
Adam Hodges says that representation of issues is an ongoing process, which
always is subject to challenges and new representations. A fragment of discourse, once
spoken, enter into subsequent contexts (intertextuality). These intertextual relations allow me
not only examine Kazakhstani public discourse about security, but understand how it is
reshaped and re-contextualized.
Intertextuality gives the chance to explicitly pose the connection between
discourse and identity. Since social identity is constructed as “a set of collectively articulated
codes, not as a private property of the individual or a psychological condition”42, I study how
these codes, expressed in the language, are shared by both, elites and extensive sectors of
Kazakhstani society. At the same time, I study why the codes of the opposition, insofar as it
exists, are not “collectively articulated” and look for the explanation why they are not widely
shared.
Collective identities are constructed around certain set of values, characteristic for a
given culture, but also in contrast with the “Other”. The core of the contrasting-to-other
process is the difference-production. However, “identities are not necessarily constructed
through juxtaposition to a radically different and threatening Other”; all this “can take on
40
HODGES, p. 5
FAIRCLOUGH, Norman. 2003. Analysing Discourse: Textual Analysis for Social Research. Routledge,
London, p. 160
42
HANSEN, Lene. 2006. Security as Practice. Discourse analysis and the Bosnian war. Routledge, London and
NY, p. 6
41
17
different degrees of ‘Otherness,’ ranging from fundamental difference between Self and
Other, to constructions of less than radical difference”43. This seems to be very much the case
of the Kazakhstani security culture values, which are always pointed out as distinguishing
(not contrasting) Kazakhstani approach to security from the EU one; an approach, as local
ruling elite considers, characterized with too many politics and too little economy.
While speaking of differences, I also mean differences between ruling class and
opposition’s concepts, values, positions and acts. As an example I shall mention divergent
understanding of such important values of security culture as: priority of the economy over
the politics; political stability; priority of the national security concerns over human
(individual) security concerns.
Accepting that “discourses are understood… as systems of meaning-production
rather than simply statements or language, encompassing narratives, texts and images,
systems that ‘fix’ meaning, however temporarily, and enable us to make sense of the world”,
I shall study the difference-production on the basis of a set of official texts. The list of
materials studied is given at the end of the thesis.
In order to organize the discourse analysis, I shall use the idea of Paul Chilton,
Norman Fairclough, and Jäger Siegfried, developed further by Florian Schneider, about a
discourse toolbox. More exactly, I shall use the ten-step model of Florian Schneider (and
adapt it to the need of my research, following the guidelines of the author), which will help
me to identify how specific actors in security field (in our case, Kazakhstani ruling elite,
human rights protection groups since it is hard to say that any political opposition exists)
construct an argument, and how this argument fits into wider social practices.
First, I shall define a set of materials to be analysed. These are official documents
of EU and Kazakhstan such as: laws and speeches of representatives of EU and Kazakhstani
ruling elite. This set of texts shows how the production and reproduction of socially valid
senses (concerning security, extremism, terrorism, drug trafficking) is done and in which way
it leads to imposition of relevant group interests, representing the later as national ones.
Then, I shall study the context and the process of production of selected
materials. This is needed for two reasons. First, the context contains the keys to the
understanding of the interpretation, thus I will be able to explain why the same categories are
interpreted in different ways. And second, categories and sub-categories will be defined and
coded. The main categories are certainly “security” and “threats”, and the sub-categories (the
already mentioned values of security culture) - priority of the economy over the politics;
political stability; priority of the national security concerns over human (individual) security
concerns, human rights and democratization, and discourse strands (related topics). In the
next chapters the relation of “security” (and respectively “insecurity”) will be studies to such
sub-categories as religious extremism, terrorism, drugs, international cooperation.
This will give me the chance to identify cultural references as well as to analyse
how they function on the level of the language. In other words, I will be able to draw certain
conclusions on what is the vocabulary of “security” and “threats” (what of the sub-categories
mentioned is related above all to); which is the logic the text implies; how the actors’
“statements and the frameworks of meaning they draw from proliferate through
communication practices”. Certainly, the security discourse will sound in one way if the
vocabulary of security is related to the stability and in much more different – if it is related to
43
Ibid
18
human rights. Also, talking about insecurity as caused mainly by “external factors” or
“external provocation” will be very different if talking of insecurity as a related to the lack of
good governance and other internal factors.
3.2. Sources and methods of gathering information
Here, I use mainly two bodies of literature: on EU-CA cooperation and on security
issues. As sources, I use analytical materials, official documents and text of Kazakhstani
State, sociological surveys, personal communications with experts, media publications. The
total number of the sources is 161. All of them are in English, Russian or Bulgarian
languages. The sources can be divided in:
- Textual sources. They include the EU’s policy documents, normative and legal acts;
publications by individual researchers, international organisations and think tanks;
current news, interviews and speeches of relevant European and Central Asian political
and public figures. One of the challenges here was that the local sources are strongly
biased, and several times instead of analysis, they offer ideology. The absence of political
opposition does not give chance alternative views or concepts to appear in public debate.
- In depth semi-structured interviews were probably the most exciting part of my field
work. The list of the interviewees includes EU staff and decision makers engaged in
EU’s Central Asia policies, local politicians, local and international experts,
representatives of the local political elite and security services, journalists. In-depth semistructured interview are especially, but not exclusively, used in the chapters on the
cooperation in terrorism and drug trafficking, when in personal communication with me
the experts in question presented final or partial findings of their field work and research.
- Important sources are secondary sources, which include data collected by other
researchers or by various institutions in the course of their business, or by some
sociological agencies. The challenge here was that not all the surveys concerning
security, are available to the academia; some of them are not public. The same can be
said about the statistical data.
The analyzed materials can be found at the end of the work.
19
4.
KAZAKHSTANI SECURITY CULTURE AND EU SECURITY CULTURE: A
COMPARATIVE LOOK ON SECURITY THREATS
In this chapter, I first study the regional context, i.e, the conceptual and institutional
aspects of the cooperation between EU and CA in the security field. Then, I briefly represent
the history of the relations between Kazakhstan and EU; and finally, I compare their
understanding of “security” and the main security challenges. I do that while implementing
discourse analysis understood as referring to identity and legitimacy and content analysis of
Kazakhstani media.
4.1. Regional context: EU-CA cooperation in the security field
The CA-EU official relations begin when URSS ceased to exist in the beginning of
the 90s. Despite opening of the region, the European countries failed to grasp the opportunity
to engage in the region in decisive way. Most of the initial cooperation was focused on
energy projects. The European countries were slow to open embassies, relying on their
ambassadors, usually in Moscow, to cover the region. In 1994 EU opened its first delegation
in Kazakhstan with sub-offices in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. By doing so, EU included the
region in some of its generic programs (such as TACIS) and put efforts to conclude
Partnership and Cooperation Agreements with most of the countries. Although the efforts
were successful, the ties between EU and CA remained relatively week.
The Western World focused the region more seriously after the 9/11 terrorist attacks
on Empire State building, due to its geographic position, close to the war theater in
Afghanistan. This led to the establishment of NATO military facilities in the region,
especially in Uzbekistan and in Kyrgyzstan. Russia and China immediately answered to this
military presence by expanding their influence through Shanghai Treaty Organization (China)
and CSTO, and other pre-CU forms of cooperation (Russia).
After 2001 EU improved the diplomatic ties on its own. Various aid programs were
launched, including Border Management in Central Asia (BOMCA) and Central Asian Drug
Assistance Programme (CADAP), which, as the name shows, aim at improving the border
control and security.
In 2005 EU reevaluated its diplomatic engagement in the region, appointing European
Union Special Representative for Central Asia.
In 2007 during the German presidency European Union has decided to upgrade the
relations with the eastern neighbors, including CA countries, in the case of which the upgrade
was made through Strategy for a New Partnership. This strategy ensures closer relations on
both regional and national level, led by the Special Representative, in order to improve the
cooperation in areas like energy, security, education, transport, democratization and human
rights. The EU attempt to improve the relations is hindered by the already strong presence of
Russia and China.
4.2. European Union and Central Asia: strategy for new partnership (SNP)44
44
European Union and Central Asia: strategy for new partnership, p.6
20
“The European Union and Central Asia: strategy for new partnership (SNP)” is based
on the same values that European Security Strategy (ESS), which was adopted by the
European Council on 12-13 December 2003. It provides the conceptual framework for the
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defence Policy
(CSDP) of EU. In this document, the European Union clarifies its security strategy, which is
aimed at achieving a secure Europe, identifying the threats facing the Union, defining its
strategic objectives and setting out the political implications for Europe.45
In the same document, EU also states its readiness to act as a global player in the
security field and to assume the correspondent responsibility: “Europe should be ready to
share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world”46 and its interest
in having its neighbourhood well-governed: “neighbours who are engaged in violent conflict,
weak states where organised crime flourishes, dysfunctional societies or exploding
population growth on its borders all pose problems for Europe.”47
The ESS states 5 main threats: terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, regional conflicts, state failure, and organized crime.
The ESS is based on the same core values of EU, set out at the beginning of the
Treaty of Lisbon: human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and the
respect for human rights. The same values we can see in the document “European Union and
Central Asia: strategy for new partnership”. Before being accepted, the strategy was
discussed among member states, which paid special attention to the balance between energy,
security, democracy and human rights. In June 2007 the EU presented the document,
claiming that security and stability are main EU interests.
The approach of SNP is based on the assumptions that:
• Strategic, political and economic developments as well as increasing trans-regional
challenges in Central Asia impact directly or indirectly on EU interests;
• With EU enlargement, the inclusion of the Southern Caucasus into the European
Neighbourhood Policy and the Black Sea Synergy Initiative, Central Asia and the EU are
moving closer together;
• Significant energy resources in Central Asia and the region’s aim to diversify trade
partners and supply routes can help meet EU energy security and supply needs. The EU
strongly believes that strengthening the commitment of Central Asian States to international
law, the rule of law, human rights and democratic values, as well as to a market economy,
will promote security and stability in Central Asia, thus making the countries of the region
reliable partners for the EU with shared common interests and goals.48
Through SNP and the Commission’s assistance programme for the period of 20072013, the EU defined the priorities of its cooperation with each Central Asian state according
to its specific needs, requirements and performance, including human rights, good
governance, democracy and social development.
According to the opinion of some analysts, EU was late in engaging in Central Asia;
this raised several challenges to the implementation of SNP. Russia, China and USA already
hold strong positions in the region. And what is more important, after 15 years of
45
"A Secure Europe In A Better World, European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 2003, p.1
"A Secure Europe In A Better World, European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 2003, p.1
47
"A Secure Europe In A Better World, European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 2003, p.7
48
European Union and Central Asia: strategy for new partnership, p.9
46
21
independence, domestic political forces with “little interest to EU ideas about democracy and
human rights”49 grew. I share Melvill’s point that “in this context, the implementation of the
EU Strategy for Central Asia will represent one of the severest tests for the EU approach to
external relations based, as it is, on sets of complex, multilevel and multidimensional
engagements built around a intermeshing of interests and values. Central Asia has thus
become a testing ground for the EU’s ability to maintain and advance its position in the world
in the face of new and rising powers with very different views of issues of democracy and
human rights and far more realist conceptions of foreign policy for the region.”50
4.3. Cooperation between Kazakhstan and EU in security field: short history
After the dissolution of USSR, Kazakhstan under the rule of the President Nazarbayev
achieved success in guaranteeing internal and external stability of the country, mixed with
steady economic growth. Since the first days of the independence, he clearly prioritized
economic development and the "multi-vector" foreign policy. Balancing between the
superpowers was a challenging thing to do, because the country is situated in important
geopolitical location and is rich in expensive fossils, such as gas, oil and uranium, and as a
result the country is palatable for the superpowers to have it in its own spheres of influence.
Although balancing between Russia, China, USA and Europe has not always been easy, the
country has achieved relative success, trying to maximize the benefits from the relations with
everybody.
In the field of security Kazakhstan actively cooperates with its neighbours, USA and of
course, with European Union.
The cooperation with EU starts in 1992, when the protocol for establishing diplomatic
relations has been signed. European Union acknowledged the need for intensive relations
with Kazakhstan, because of its political and economic interests in the area (as stated in
official documents of the Commission).
After intense diplomatic activities in 1995 it was signed an Agreement on Partnership and
Cooperation (APC). In 1999 the treaty was ratified and came into force in the same year
under the name Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) which is the legal framework
for Kazakhstani-European relations since then. Signing of this agreement gave the necessary
opportunity for the singing of sectorial agreements. In 2006 it was signed an agreement on
the peaceful use of nuclear energy and a Memorandum of Understanding on energy matters.
In June 2007 the "European Union Strategy Paper for Developing Cooperation with
Central Asia" has been approved by EU during a session of the European Council, under the
German presidency. Later, in the same month, the EU Strategy paper was presented at the
Troika EU-Central Asia Foreign Ministers' meeting in Berlin. In this document six priorities
has been defined:




Human Rights, Rule of Law, Good Governance and Democratization
Investing in the future: Youth and Education
Promotion of economic development, trade, investment and social development:
Strengthening energy and transport links
49
MELVIN, Neil J. 2008. "Engaging Central Asia: The European Union's New Strategy in the Heart of
Eurasia. CEPS Paperbacks. May 2008, p. 4
50
MELVIN, Neil J. 2008. "Engaging Central Asia: The European Union's New Strategy in the Heart of
Eurasia. CEPS Paperbacks. May 2008, p. 8
22


Environmental sustainability and water
Combating common threats and challenges
Currently there are ongoing negotiations over a new, second generation PCA. The start of
these negotiations for an enhanced agreement is an important milestone to further advance
relations and strengthen the EU and its Member States’ cooperation with Kazakhstan.
Today the diplomacy between Kazakhstan and European Union is guided on
European side by an expert German diplomat - Ambassador Patricia Flor, who devoted great
part of her career to build stronger economic, security and political ties between Europe and
Central Asia, including Kazakhstan. She propelled dialogue on various security related
topics, such as the post-2014 situation in Afghanistan after NATO withdrawal. Although both
sides agreed that in order to ensure higher security and stability in the region, an intense
regional approach to the issue is needed, concrete steps in that direction hasn't been made by
anybody, with exception of increased diplomatic ties with the neighbours.
4.4. Security culture of Kazakhstani ruling elites
Security culture seems to be a crucial point in identifying and meeting security
challenges. Guided by the idea of Lene Hansen, that “without theory there is nothing but
description, and without methodology there is no transformation of theory into analysis” 51, I
shall try to explain how these differences appear, and show which are their implications for
the relationships between Kazakhstan and EU. Based in the “discursive practices approach”,
and using the securitization explanatory framework, I will try to answer two questions: how
exactly the values of ruling elites security culture are socially constructed; and why the
security culture of ruling Kazakhstani elite gets more support by public opinion than the
security culture of the opposition.
Accepting that “discourses are understood here as systems of meaning-production
rather than simply statements or language, encompassing narratives, texts and images,
systems that ‘fix’ meaning, however temporarily, and enable us to make sense of the
world”52, I study a concrete meaning production on the basis of a set of official texts (The
Law of National Security of RK (6.01.2012, № 527-IV); messages of the President to the
people of Kazakhstan, interviews of the President and other official representatives of the
government.
4.4.1. The Law of National Security of RK (6.01.2012, № 527-IV)
In the law, national security is defined as "condition under which the national interests
of Republic of Kazakhstan are protected by real and potential threats, and guarantees
dynamic development of the people, the society and the state".
The law describes 6 kinds of security: social, military, political, economic,
informational, ecological security.
51
HANSEN, Lene. 2006. Security as Practice. Discourse analysis and the Bosnian war. Routledge, London and
NY, p.1
52
SHEPHERD, L. J. 2006. Veiled references: Constructions of gender in the Bush administration on the
attacks on Afghanistan post-9/11,International Feminist Journal of Politics , vol. 8, no. 1, p. 20.
23
Implementing discourse analysis as described before we can see how exactly
“security” is constructed – through simple omission of “human security” – a notion,
which is strongly presented in the oppositional discourse practice. Thus, security is
constructed not in the process of “bargaining” or “everyday decision making”, as some
traditional rationalist approaches admit, but in the “interaction of the language”, as Tomas
Diez points out.53 The codification of “security” in the law just in this way can be seen as
a starting point for its legitimization in the eyes of Kazakhstanis. This process, whose
final aim is to impose the values of the ruling elite as core values of Kazakhstani society,
can be also interpreted as a component of the identity construction process of the former
as an Eurasian society with its distinctive features and characteristics – different from
European and Asian societies, and unique by character and nature.
4.4.2. Security narratives of ruling elites
But legality is still not legitimacy; legitimacy cannot be reduced to the legality. In the
security narratives of the ruling elites, expressed in the Addresses of the President to the
people of Kazakhstan, his interviews and interviews or statements of other representatives of
the government, through usage of discourse analysis we can conclude that the process of
social construction and production of meanings goes behind the legislative discourse and
crystallizes in three main values, pretending to constitute the core of identity of Kazakhstani
society:
- Priority of the economy over the politics
- Political stability
- Priority of the national security concerns over human (individual) security concerns
The statements in the following paragraphs are results of implementation of discourse
analysis:
4.4.3. Priority of the economy over the politics
The relationship between economy and politics are always an important issue in the
political agenda of any regime; but its interpretations are differently constructed. This
relationship cannot be disregarded, as far as it is ontologically provable, but through the
discourse analysis the priority of one or another can be established.
The public discourse of Kazakhstani political elite strongly prioritizes economy over
politics. It is clearly stated in almost all the President addresses to the people of Kazakhstan
as well as of other high level representatives. The president of the Center of Military and
strategic studies (CMSR) at the Ministry of Defense, Bakytdzan Abdraim (now minister of
justice), for example, suggested that the main threat for Kazakhstan comes from economic
misbalance "We believe that the most critical threats for Kazakhstan are economic ones, as
this is the main sphere of every country, which includes all other spheres". 54 Secondly, Mr.
Abdraim pointed out the political security in relation to economic security explaining that
"the world practice shows that economically powerful states are less often subjects to
53
DIEZ, Tomas. 2001. Europe as a discursive battleground. Discourse analysis and European integration
studies. In Cooperation and conflict. Col 36 (1), p. 6
54
Казахстан: Угрозы национальной безопасности, 10.09.2013, Центрально азиатский портал
24
potential risks related to violations of constitutional order, human rights, the quality of life of
its citizens and the sovereignty and integrity of its territory."
The prioritization of economy over politics can be seen both as part of the process of
identification and self-identification, as well as of legitimization of the political actions of the
government and the responsibility of the ruling class to act when this balance is damaged. Its
supporters constantly emphasize that what differs Kazakhstan from the rest of the republics
of former Soviet Union, is just the special attention to the economy; at the same time, it
legitimizes some unpopular measures of the government, which are contested not only by the
political opposition, but also by some social groups.
4.4.4. Political stability
There are several reasons to suppose that the use of stability discourse has contributed
to the legitimation of the security culture values of Kazakhstani ruling elite. It could not be
rejected that political stability is strongly supported by Kazakhstanis and they are ready to
sacrifice in its name things that a Western would never do: freedom of speech, freedom of
expression and association, etc. At the same time, this is not reached only by force: despite of
lack of conditions for real political opposition and some expressions of State violence, as for
example in Zhanaozen in 2012, no large scale violence has been observed in the country.
In almost every presidential address, political stability goes hand by hand with
national security. It is clearly demonstrates in the Strategy 2030, where national security is
ranged as the first long term priority, and political stability – as a second one:
1. "National security - ensuring the development of Kazakhstan as independent
sovereign country in complete territorial integrity
2. Internal political stability and consolidation of the society - Maintaining and securing
the internal stability and the national unity, which will allow Kazakhstan to apply its
national strategy in the forthcoming decades"55
Recently, it has been confirmed in an unconditional way: "I underline that the stability
and national security remains main pillar for the execution of our long and short term plans" President Nazarbayev said. "Their priorities shall not be revised". 56 During a meeting of the
Committee of Security57 in February, 2014, the President again underlined the stability as
most important for the national security "The stability in the country, the equality and the
safeguarding of the rights of the people will be main courses in our policies. Everything else
remains after them. I am strong supporter of that and everyone else should do the same. This
is the way we handle the difficulties" - Nazarbayev said.
In the Strategy 2050, announced on December, 14, in the Message of the President, ten
global challenges of the 21 century to Kazakhstan are mentioned. Obviously, lack of stability
is grasped as a hugest threat to the national and international security; among 10 challenges, it
is mentioned twice: first, as a social (internal) instability and second, as a “global
destabilization”.
Процветание, безопасность и улучшение благосостояния всех казахстанцев, Казахстан - 2030,
послание Президента страны народу Казахстана, http://www.akorda.kz
56
НАЗАРБАЕВ, K. 2014. Приоритетность стабильности и нацбезопасности в РК не «подлежит никакой
ревизии» - 30.01, http://newskaz.ru/
57
Назарбаев поручил создать специальный штаб для обеспечения безопасности ЭКСПО-2017,
26.02.2014, http://today.kz
55
25
It could be concluded, that one of the reasons of the support of the stability-at-any-cost
has to do with the discourse, which managed to represent the challenges to the stability of the
government of Nazarbayev as a challenge to the stability of the Kazakhstani State and
society. The idea that an unstable Kazakhstan will be humiliated by its powerful neighbours
is implicitly put into head of general public by State controlled mass media. The loyalty to
the regime of Nazarbayev, understood as a needed condition for political stability, is seen as a
part of the new Kazakhstani patriotism, promoted by the media, regional leadership and
educational institutions; as a pre-condition for the consolidation of the new sovereign
independent citizens nation which is proclaimed in the Constitution.
When analysing the discourse of Chaina Comunist Party to stay in office after the tumuli
in 1989, Shoes writes that CCP no longer derives its legitimacy form its “technical capacity”
to deliver economic growth, but from its “political capacity” to create a stable environment in
which economic development could take place.58 It’s my opinion that this is very much also
the case of Kazakhstan.
4.4.4.1.Priority of the national security concerns over human (individual)
security concerns
Kazakhstani ruling elite discourse on the security is very much State-centered. As Tan
See Seng says, its result is the production of a “the State as ontological entity, apart from the
practices ….that go into its constitution”.59 Unlike it, human security is less about the security
that for the statecraft to ensure security not only for this entity, but for the individuals who
constitute it. Through the discourse, State-centered security is prioritized over human
security and conceptualized as one of the main values of Kazakhstani security culture. This
approach very much follows the classical one - as Hobbes argued, ‘state security’ is not just
one precondition it is the precondition for ‘individual security,’ but to achieve security
individuals have to give away their authority to define it.60
The trend to assert the priority of national security concerns over human security is
quite sustainable. In the Strategy 2030 it is said: "When our collective security is ensured,
every person gains much more compared to when only his personal interests are ensured, but
the safety of the society is on the edge of danger. No matter how lucky a citizen is, he is
always defenseless if his country is in danger. This has to be particularly clear the main
holders of the state capital, who has to give priority to the social interests above their own."61
This specific attitude is also seen in the Law, when human security is not explicitly
mentioned.
The construction of the priority of the national security concerns over human
(individual) security concerns, is also a part of the identity of Kazakhstani society as it is
imagined and aspired explicitly or implicitly, by the ruling elite. It forms part of its
paternalistic model, which represents the State always as a provider of security, and never –
58
SHUE, Vivienne. 2004. Legitimacy Crisis in China? In Peter Hays Gries and Stanley Rosen (eds.), State and
Society in 21st-century China. Crisis, Contention, and Legitimation. New York: Routledge Curzon, p. 11
59
TAN See Seng. 2001. Human security: discourse, statecraft, emancipation. Working papers N 11. Institute of
defence and strategic studies, Singapore, p. 3
60
Quoted according to Hansen, Lene. 2006. Security as Practice. Discourse analysis and the Bosnian war.
Routledge, London and NY, p. 30
61
Процветание, безопасность и улучшение благосостояния всех казахстанцев, послание Президента
страны народу Казахстана, Казахстан - 2030, http://www.akorda.kz
26
as a provider of insecurity. As Campbell writes, “underpinning the concept of ‘national
security’ is a particular form of identity construction—one tied to the sovereign state and
articulating a radical form of identity—and a distinct rhetorical and discursive force which
bestows power as well as responsibility on those speaking within it.”62Probably the
emancipation of the society from the State paternalism will give birth of another discursive
production, when human security will be treated as important as national one.
4.5. Security narratives of the opposition
Bulgarian researcher Julia Kristeva speaks about intertextuality, “constructed as a
mosaic of quotations; any text is the absorption and transformation of another”.63 This means
that any text is written on the basis of earlier texts, bearing legitimacy while confirmation or
rejecting them. The security narratives of the ruling elite and opposition (since there is such)
can be represented just in the framework of the intertextuality. Criticizing the absolute
priority of national security in the government discourse, the opposition discourse constructs
another view on security – individual or human security, affirming the later as no less
important than the first. This approach is much more people-centred and relates security with
the development, respect to the human rights and the admission, than when State does not
respect rights and freedoms, it by itself can become a provider of insecurity.
In order to analyse the opposition security discourse, following the methods stated in
the beginning of the paper, I shall use the materials published in the web site of Radio
Azzatyk (Liberty) which is considered to express ideas different than the ideas of the regime.
As far as there is no real political opposition in Kazakhstan, I have taken as example the
criticism of the human rights protection organizations.
Since 2005 to 2014, seven articles are published in which homeland security is one of
the topics discussed. One of the articles (Obama promises to eliminate Al-Qaeda and close
the jail in Guantanamo) is dedicated to the global security issues. The other six have to do
with Kazakhstan. In all the articles homeland security is discussed in relation with acts of the
regime which, according to the authors, restrict human rights.
As it can be expected, security values of ruling elites, or rather, their interpretation,
are contested. For example, the article “Foreign people or people on trial should not be
editors” (12. 04. 2005) states that the government restricts the free media in the name of its
own stability and comfort.64 (The implied meaning is that the regime identifies and presents
its own stability with the stability of the country.)
The next article – “The authorities consider religion as threat, as believers - free
people, believe experts" (30.10.2009) criticizes the restriction of religious liberty in the name
of national security: “But organizations watching human rights are convinced that, according
to the International Agreement on civil and political rights, which was enforced in
Kazakhstan in 2006, national security is not justifiable reason for limitation for freedom of
62
CAMPBELL, D. 1992. Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity,
Manchester: Manchester University Press, p. 68
63
KRISTEVA, J. (1980) Desire in Language: A Semiotic Approach to Literature and Art, New York:
Columbia University Press, p. 66
64
КАШКЕЕВА, Жибек. 16.04.2005 'Судимых и иностранцев – вон из редакторов, предлагают некоторые
депутаты', Радио Азаттык, http://rus.azattyq.org/
27
religion or belief”65 (Again, the implied meaning is that the ruling class identifies national
security with its own security.)
In the narratives of human rights activists the idea can be found that human rights
cannot be sacrificed in the name of security and stability. (The ideas of Saharov, or the
Beginning of the Human Rights movement, 20.05.2011). Ninel Fokina, one of the human
rights movement leaders says: “Even the highest ranked public servants say us directly: in the
name of the national security and in the name of our peace - human rights sometimes can be
ignored". According to her opinion, «the stability and the national security cannot be ensured
in expense of the human rights».66 (The implied meaning is that human rights are part of
human security, and that the State at itself can be a source of insecurity for its citizens.)
And finally, in the last article published, the idea is expressed that national security is
often used as a tool for removing opponents from the political stage of the country:
“Currently, national security became a reason for remove the opponents from the political
stage and do not allow them to take part in the process of decision making.”67
4.6. Who does the public opinion support?
Without any doubt public opinion supports and shares the values of security culture of
ruling elites. There are several reasons for this.
First, Kazakh society has an impressive economic development in the last 20 years in
comparison with other CA countries. This is due to several factors: “starting from a more
favourable base in the late Soviet period; more thorough and effective economic reforms,
including privatization and monetary stabilization; high levels of foreign investment; and oil
and gas wealth.”68 Thus, Kazakhstanis have experienced in their own way the vantages of the
priority of the economy over politics. A sociological survey from 2010 shows that 25,3%
from all responders believe that the socio-economic policy of the country is absolutely
correct, while 62,9% believe the socio-economic policy to be correct, but it needs some
adjustments. From all responders only 4% do not agree with the course of the government. 69
All this led to formation of an extensive middle class, whose representatives now-adays can buy cars and construct or receive homes from the State, can take credits in order to
celebrate freely the important for them days, and benefit from the system of social services.
That’s why, as Charles Ziegler says, “the great majority of the new middle class in
Kazakhstan seems more preoccupied with maintaining stability and preserving its newly
affluent lifestyle” than to challenge the regime. All their wellbeing and prosperity they due to
the State and it is not by chance they highly evaluate the government politics in the social
security field (67,5); at the same time, 44% consider that the next year the country as a whole
МАВЛОНИЙ, Дильбегим. 30.10.2009 'Власть рассматривает религию как угрозу, так как верующие –
свободные люди, считают эксперты', Радио Азаттык, http://rus.azattyq.org/
66
ТОГУЗБАЕВ, Uазис. 20.05.2011 'Идеи Сахарова, или Начало правозащитных движений в Казахстане',
Радио Азаттык, http://rus.azattyq.org/
67
АЗАРОВ, Алексей. 06.03.2013 'Дискуссии вокруг «Кок-Жайляу»: от экологии до идеологии', Радио
Азаттык, http://rus.azattyq.org/
68
GURGEN, et al. Economic Reforms in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and
Uzbekistan; Olcott, Kazakhstan’s Unfulfilled Promise.
69
КАЗАХСТАНСКИЙ ИНСТИТУТ СТРАТЕГИЧЕСКИХ ИССЛЕДОВАНИЙ ПРИ ПРЕЗИДЕНТЕ
РК. 2010. УРОВЕНЬ СОЦИАЛЬНОЙ КОНФЛИКТНОСТИ:ПОТЕНЦИАЛЬНЫЕ РИСКИ И УГРОЗЫ (по
результатам социологического исследования), Алмата, р. 20
65
28
will be more stable.70 Despite of this, some analysts think “the political stability that has
characterized the Nazarbayev era has increasingly come into question”71 because of the
events in Zhanaozen and labour conflicts in Western Kazakhstan.
The specific kind of civil society built here and its interaction with the State gave
space to what Robert Nisbet calls “quest for community” – an ideal which bands together
Kazakhstanis and makes them think that the interests of the whole in any field – including
security field – are more important than the individual interests. This, together with the active
participation in international society, make Kazakhs feel proud of their country.
In the next place, the specific paternalistic culture of Kazakh society does not pay
much attention to human rights and does not admit the view on the State as a source of
insecurity. As Riwkin notes, “official circles regard [democratic freedoms and respect for
human rights] as a call for ‘‘regime change’’ that represents an unwelcome intrusion into
justly earned independence and sovereignty. … Intellectuals see it as a cover-up for oil
policies and believe that business circles are more interested in the freedom to conduct
business unhindered by outside interference than in any other kind of freedom.”72 This is
confirmed by the results of several surveys. In 2010 only 4,2% were worried of the condition
of human rights in the country; 16,5% believe that the condition of human rights is
improving; 53,7% value it as more good than bad; 17% - as more bad than good, and only
3,2% believe it to be bad.73
If we add here the personal charisma of the president Nazarbayev, we will be able to
understand why the values of the ruling elites’ security culture are so strong supported by
Kazakh public opinion.
The same trend can be observed in another survey, made in 2011-2012 in 14 regions
in Kazakhstan.74 According to 55,16% of the respondents the major threat for the national
security is the "crisis of the elites". Although the popularity of the government has decreased,
62,48% of the Kazakhs believe that "the government sees perspectives for the development
of the country, while 72,98% of the respondents define the problems as "inevitable growth
difficulties". With this survey we can see again the trend of the Kazakhs to put growth over
politics and to relate the stability of the country with the stability of the ruling elites.
A survey from 201475 showed that around 50% of the young Kazakhs consider the
course of the country, given by President Nazarbayev, to be correct and mandatory to put in
practice. Almost 50% consider the tasks given by the president to be correct, but hard to
achieve, while only 3,6% think the tasks are unachievable. 91,6% of the young Kazakhs
support Nazarbayev to set the course of the country, while only 6,2% dislike this course. The
КАЗАХСТАНСКИЙ ИНСТИТУТ СТРАТЕГИЧЕСКИХ ИССЛЕДОВАНИЙ ПРИ ПРЕЗИДЕНТЕ
РК. 2010. УРОВЕНЬ СОЦИАЛЬНОЙ КОНФЛИКТНОСТИ:ПОТЕНЦИАЛЬНЫЕ РИСКИ И УГРОЗЫ (по
результатам социологического исследования), Алмата, р. 21
71
COOLEY, Alexander. 2012 'The New Great Power Contest In Central Asia' p. 22
72
RYWKIN, Michael. 2006 'Stability and Security in Central Asia: Engaging Kazakhstan, American Foreign
Policy Interests: The Journal of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy', 28:6, pp. 451-458
73
КАЗАХСТАНСКИЙ ИНСТИТУТ СТРАТЕГИЧЕСКИХ ИССЛЕДОВАНИЙ ПРИ ПРЕЗИДЕНТЕ
РК. 2010. УРОВЕНЬ СОЦИАЛЬНОЙ КОНФЛИКТНОСТИ:ПОТЕНЦИАЛЬНЫЕ РИСКИ И УГРОЗЫ (по
результатам социологического исследования), Алмата, р. 19
74
Оценка населением эффективности деятельности органов государственного управления
(региональный социологический срез), 26.11.2012, Сауран Информационно-аналитический центр
75
Современное состояние общественно-политической ситуации, глазами молодежи, 01.2014, НаучноИсследовательский Центр «Молодёжь»
70
29
"course" is based on the problems, addressed by Nazarbayev, in his speeches. Nine mains
problems have been identified there, and all of them regard economic growth and improving
quality of life, while none of them is related to democratization or human rights.
4.7. EU and Kazakhstan: understanding security
As we have seen, in "European Union and Central Asia: Strategy for New
Partnership" document, EU presented the security as main field of interest and it launched
different new programmes of cooperation. There are however substantial differences between
in EU and Kazakhstan in the concepts. The CA countries have demonstrated to have very
different understanding on fundamental questions about human rights, democratization,
security and others, which do not match exactly the European values.
The first difference is seen in the interpretation of the very concept of security. In the
Western world, security challenges on the national level are broadly understood as serious,
wide-ranging threats to the well-being of the citizenry that are best countered by concerted
government action. This definition presumes the existence of robust, transparent institutions;
elections in accord with international standards; and an elected political leadership that is
accountable to voters. As a result, it does not envision a contradiction between the actions of
government and the interests of citizens.76 Kazakhstan, and the rest of CA countries, lacks
functioning democracy in the sense EU understands it, as indicated often by organizations
which monitor democracy and human rights, such as OSCE.
In Kazakhstan, as in the rest of CA, the main understanding of security is as
"stability", usually referring to the preservation of the national elites and the status quo and
because of that they label "security challenge" anything that they perceive as a threat to them.
As such, the view is incompatible with the European one, and often leads to strange situations
in which certain CA country practices democracy for show, which include predetermined
elections and the existence of "legal" opposition in the Parliament, in order to increase their
international prestige and fulfil some formal requirements to be part of European-led
programmes, which are great source of money.
In general, Kazakhstan agrees with Europe on the need of more rule of law,
democratization and human rights, which has to come under the guidance of the ruling elite,
and which, of course, contains contradiction. This point has been made clear by Kazakhstan
which actively cooperates with EU in the mentioned fields. Example of this are the ongoing
European projects in one of the six fields of priority, defined by European Union and Central
Asia: Strategy for a New Partnership, " Human Rights, Rule of Law, Good Governance and
Democratization", which amounts to € 83 536 309.77 The money, are not so important to
Kazakhstan, as the prestige the country receives from the collaboration. A main reason for
this cooperation is the fact that the Kazakh ruling elite does not feel threatened, otherwise
probably it will disengage from the European partnership. In other security aspects, such as
preventing drug trafficking, border management, environmental threats and so on,
Kazakhstan commits significant resources together with EU in order to fight those problems.
76
MELVIN, Neil J. 2008. "Engaging Central Asia: The European Union's New Strategy in the Heart of
Eurasia. CEPS Paperbacks. May 2008
77
Official EEAS report on the EU Delegation in Kazakhstan, overview of the projects, 18.04.2014
30
5.
RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM
In this chapter, I first concentrate on the religious context of Kazakhstan and analyze
the Islam as a part of Kazakh identity. Then I try to define the term “religious extremism” and
explain reasons of securitization of what remains out of “traditional Islam”. Through analysis
of three laws and several speeches of the president I show how exactly this process went out.
I also point the main objections of human rights activists against the new law of religion,
which, according to their opinion, restricts religious freedoms under the flag of fight against
religious extremism.
5.1. Religious situation in Kazakhstan
According to the census of 2012, the total population of Kazakhs is 16 900 000.
Currently, there are approximately 3,088 registered religious organizations, representing 17
different confessions.
The dominant religion is Sunni Islam of the Hanafi school, to which belong around
70% of the Muslims. Other branches of Islam, such as Shia, or other Sunni schools, are less
than 1%. The Christianity is the second most prevalent religion; 23,9% of all the population
are orthodox and 2,3% belong to Catholicism, Protestantism, etc. Although there are other
religions, Judaism, Bahá’í Faith, Buddhism among them, their percentage is less than 0,4%.
2,8% of the population declares itself as atheists.
Despite the fact that the Hanafi school in Kazakhstan is quite conservative, the
Kazakh citizens are not rigid followers of the canons. Rather, the Islam is perceived through
the values, the moral code of the society, and the local traditions. It contains a strong pagan
component, like traditional popular rituals, celebration of the equinox, and does not require
strict fulfillment of religious norms (many Kazakhstani Muslims for example, drink alcohol
and not follow Ramadan). The need to reshape national identity in the post-Soviet society
made Islam one of the core features of it. The interest of young people towards the religion
sharply increased. At the beginning of 2000, nearly 80% of the ethnic Kazakhs declared
themselves Muslims; the same was percentage among youngest respondents under the age of
20. 78 Most of them follow Hanafi school; others have chosen to join to what is called here
non-traditional Islam.
5.2. Defining the vague term “religious extremism”
Generally speaking, an extremism is an ideology or will to power, which lies outside
the mainstream attitude of society and current political agenda, and is not supported by the
official state authorities. It is characterized by activities, beliefs, attitudes, actions etc. which
strongly differ from the ordinary in a given society, and manifests serious conflict
engagement.79
In the Western liberal societies, the term refers mainly to groups or individuals who
want to replace the democracy with more authoritarian regime, restricting the individual
liberties in the name of collective goals and advocating aggression against those, who
78
Interview with the deputy mufti of Kazakhstan, shaykh-ul-Islam, Muhammad Husayn ibn Usman Alsabekov.
Almaty, 22 April 2012 in Yemelinova, G.M. 2013. Islam, national identity and politics in contemporary
Kazakhstan
79
COLEMAN, Peter and Bartoli, Andrea: Addressing Extremism, pp. 3-4
31
disagree with their program. Alternatively, authoritarian regimes usually label extremists
those who call for more liberal and democratic ideas.
The difficulties in defining the term come mainly from the differences in moral values
and relations with the subject. Regardless of this, most contemporary scholars agree that there
are at least three characteristics, which define extremism80:
- tendency to use violence and to label their opponents “evil”
- anti-systemic character;
- restriction of the individual rights in the name of collective goals.
According to some scholars, in the 21st century there are four forms of extremism:
fascism, radical Islamism, communism and extreme nationalism. In all those cases the
ideology is used as vehicle for the extremist behavior.
Religious extremism is often defined as an “anti-social behavior that is based on
religious beliefs. Some peoples’ extreme religious views make them treat others and inferior
or wrong.”81 I am quite critical with this definition as far as it does not specify any generic
feature of the term. My criticism is based on the next. There are many kinds of “anti-social
behavior that is based on religious beliefs” – for example, terrorism, radical interpretations of
religion and acts, legitimated through them, etc. Also, this definition describes religious
attitudes as explanation of the view that others are wrong or inferior, but does not show how
exactly they are treated.
I also checked the data base www.questia.com and didn’t find any book containing
“religious extremism” in its title, even though 578 used the term in the text. No article in an
academic journal has in the title these key words even though 75 used it in the text. No of
these texts gives an explicit definition what actually “religious extremism” is.
The term enjoys more popularity in the political discourse of both EU 82 and non-EU
leaders.83
Above mentioned makes me thing that “religious extremism” is rather a vague term
poorly analysed in the academic debate, but widely used in the political and media discourse
of some non-Western (with small exceptions) countries. In the English speaking sources we
can find the terms “religious radicalism”, “jihadism”, “religious fundamentalism”, “political
Islam”.
5.3. Why securitization of Islam in Kazakhstan?
Even if Kazakhs, as has been stated above, are not followers of the canonic faith, there
can be little doubts that Islam is integral part of Kazakh identity and way of life. As a whole,
80
WINTROBE, Ron. Economics at Western
JAMES, Otto. 2006. Religious extremism. Evens Brothers Lmt., p. 4
82
For example, Tony Blair was cited by Telegraph (26 of January 2014) to say that “religious extremism has
become biggest source of conflict around the world and could be the defining battle of the 21st century, meaning
by religious extremism „abuse of religion“ and “perversion of faith”, In GRAHAM Georgia. 2014. Tony Blair:
Extremist religion will be the defining battle of the 21st Century. 26 January
83
Chines media discourse also recurs to the term: “Religious extremists were responsible for a “terrorist assault”
on Friday in China’s far western region of Xinjiang that left 11 people dead, state media said, and adding details
about the latest violence to hit the restive area with a large Muslim population.”, In MICHAEL Martina. 2014.
China
says
religious
extremists
behind
latest
Xinjiang
unrest.
16
of
February.
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/17/us-china-xinjiang-idUSBREA1G02V20140217
81
32
its manifestations have been largely peaceful, non-militant and apolitical, except some
bothering facts.84
Said this, I would ask the question: why “religious extremism” is a subject of
securitization and how it is done through the discourse?
Let me at the beginning pay attention to the context.
The first to be emphasized is the events and processes in the neighbor countries and
the perception of the Islam as a treat for State integrity. Russia, for example, has been
suffering for more than 15 years separatism and terrorist attacks of the Northern Caucasus
insurgency, which has as its flag the Islam. Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), “an
Islamic militant organization established in 1991 that aims to create an Islamic state governed
by Sharia law in Uzbekistan”85 for more than 20 years is challenging the legitimacy or
Karimov’s government in a neighbor country.
It can be reasonably supposed that in this specific regional context, the ruling elites of
Kazakhstan felt threatened by the non-traditional forms of Islam which were penetrating
since 1991 in Northern Caucasus and Central Asia and caused so many troubles to the
national governments. That’s why they adopted a form of official discourse, which presented
the non-traditional forms of Islam as threat to the security and the stability of the nation,
managing successfully to securitize the issue. Their occurrence was attributed to external
factors. Indeed, the situation can hardly be explained in this way. Nonetheless, we can see
how a generic framework of a “nation under attacks of hostile external forces” provides a
template for narrating religious extremism as a “result of external provocations”, putting
religious extremism just in this genre, rather than in the genre of criminal acts. Bringing
religious extremism under the common denominator of “external provocations”, together
with some conflicts that have shocked Kazakhstani society, makes the texts easy interpretable
for all sectors of the society. It is well known that the genre plays an important role in
“patterning discourse into culturally recognized types” and in “providing expectations
associated with those types”86. From this point of view, the pattering of discourse of religious
extremism into the culturally recognized type of “external provocations” wake up the
expectations for mobilization of Kazakhstani society to fight it.
I would like now to return to the non-traditional forms of Islam. They are usually grouped
together in the country under the name "Wahhabism". The narrative of the official discourse
says they are alien of Kazakh tradition and mentality, and are not rooted in Kazakh history,
thus, they are dangerous and threatening. The fact that they could be result of some internal
challenges, as for example, lack of good governance, corruption, limited life chances for
young people, are not even considered. Thus, we see how the language “sets up relations
among individuals, establishes shared meanings, and constructs the social reality in which we
live”87 not only through what is said, but also through what has been silenced.
84
According to the Head of the Committee of national security, around 300 Kazakhs went to Syria to joint
Islamic state.
85
BERKLEY
CENTER.
Islamic
Movement
of
Uzbekistan.
http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/resources/organizations/islamic-movement-of-uzbekistan
86
HODGES, Adam. 2011. The "War on Terror" Narrative: Discourse and Intertextuality in the Construction
and Contestation of Sociopolitical Reality, Routledge, p. 19
87
TAYLOR, Charles. 1979. “Interpretation and the Sciences of Man.” In Interpretive Social Science: A Reader,
Paul Rabinow and William M. Sullivan (eds.). Berkeley: University of California Press, p. 118
33
According to the Bulgarian researcher Todor Kondakov, there is another, most reasonable
explanation – namely, that Wahhabism attracts young people with its rationality,
accessibility, simplicity and seemingly unassailable internal logic: "It is this kind of
rationalism of the Wahhabism that allows it to overcome the elitist and closed nature of
Sufism and to "modernize" Islam purging the mystique out of it, together with superstitions
and patriarchal traditions which are difficult to reconcile with the consciousness of modern
man." In other words, Wahhabism can be seen as an ideological shell of the process of social
modernization and liberation of the individual from the system of clan relations on which
Kazakh society today is based. The rapid social stratification in past years, the change in
moral values and the impaired socialization process, affect particularly painfully the young
people, creating in them a protest against traditional, but already outdated, forms of social
organization and hierarchy. Traditional Islam proved unable to meet this challenge. In
contrast, Wahhabism creates the illusion that solves the problem, freeing the individual from
the power of the patriarchal clan traditions and asking from him only obedience to Allah. 88
The state body, which is in charge with defining the “allowed” forms of Islam is
DUMK – Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of Kazakhstan. Its settlement marked a
substantial shift of the discourse of the government, as before that, in the 90s, the national
authorities had stated clearly that Kazakhstan is poor soil for radicalization and that the State
is not vulnerable to associated threats.
Weldes states that to construct something as a threat to security most often involves a
mobilization of discursively important sub-security concepts, such as “strategic interests” and
“national interests.”89 Apart of the mentioned, DUMK mobilized additional “sub-security”
concepts, like “schism of Muslims in Kazakhstan”; “discrepancy with the authentic Islam”,
“challenge to the integrity of the State”, etc.90 By this securitization of non-traditional forms
of Islam as threatening stability and integrity of the State, the government discourse presented
as indispensable the need to fight against them. It constructed this task as an “objective
necessity” that should be meet with needed urgency. To use the words of Buzan, government
discourse managed to present this threat as existential, giving it “a sense of heightened
priority and drama”, arguing that if a security problem is not addressed “it will have fatal
consequences”. This untied its hands to declare radical Islam threat to the State;91 as a result
various religious groups have been prohibited because of being suspected in religious
extremism. The official position was that in the country there are certain conditions and
factors that might become precursors for politically motivated religious violence.92 In this
way religious problems took political saliency, which allowed the ruling elites to allocate
certain resources for funding the struggle against what they call religious extremism. They
are provided through several programs, as for example the State program for fighting
terrorism and religious extremism, programs of the State committee on Youth, State
committee on religion, regional authorities, etc.
KONDAKOV, Todor. 2009. The traditional against fundamentalist Islam – the example of Chechnia.
http://members.tripod.com/~konservativen_forum/doclad.htm (In Bulgarian)
89
WELDES, J. (1999) Constructing National Interests: The United States and the Cuban Missile Crisis,
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, p. 93
90
OFFICIAL PAGE of DUMK, http://muftyat.kz/ru/fatwa/
91
OMELICHEVA, M., 2011. Counterterrorism policies in Central Asia. New York: Routledge.
92
KURGANSKAIA, V., 2002. New spiritual trends in Kazakhstan. Central Asia and the Caucasus, 3 (12),
103–111.
88
34
In the same bed remain the speeches of Nazarbayev who warned against religious
extremism, portraying it as a threat to the security of the nation, especially during meetings
with his counterparts from Central Asia. This discourse hardened policies against certain
Islamic groups.93 In the recent years the President also depictured the religious extremism as
major security threat, putting it together to the “classical” threat of economic and political
instability. Concrete measures were undertaken – the National Security Committee called
KNB wrote reports on the situation, confirming the President concerns, and special branch of
the Kazakhstani Secret Services was created to protect the population from unconventional
threats, such as terrorism.
Again, what we see here, is that the process of securitization which is based on certain
kind of discourse, aims eventually to foster the legitimacy of the elite which is responsible to
carry out the struggle against religious extremism and to reaffirm the identity of Kazakhstan
as a secular state, which can be considered a reliable ally against it.
The process of securitization, however, was not pushed forward only by the state. The
official representatives of the two major religious groups, Islam and Orthodoxy, vividly
supported it. The arrival of new missionaries and religions worried them for losing part of
their followers, thus losing also control.94 The spread of these new forms is usually facilitated
by the aggressive approach to provide material support to the new members.95 Islam and
Orthodoxy were represented by their leaders as similar, sharing similar values, which are
fundaments of the Kazakh society and connected to the Kazakh history. Representatives of
both religions not only avoided religious disputes, but also started many forms and forums of
interreligious dialogue and jointly supported and encouraged the government to strengthen
the control over the new coming religions. In this way Orthodoxy and Islam guaranteed
themselves more secure and protected positions.
The securitization, as stated in the previous chapters, is significant political act. It
allows the government to close the problem to public debates and adopt certain actions,
which it wouldn’t be able to adopt otherwise in order to protect from the threat. 96 This is
what, properly saying, Kazakhstani ruling elites are doing. The specific discourse against
religious extremism allowed then to change the political agenda, or, more exactly, to
introduce the topic of religious extremism, identified with non-traditional Islam, as socially
relevant one.
Finally, the securitization of Islam enabled more drastic measures to be taken against
the spread of the radicalism, thus objectively increasing the security. Although some cases of
terrorist attacks occurred indeed in the country, the situation is stable and the risk of
religiously legitimated terrorism is minimal, especially compared to the countries in the
region. Moreover, Kazakhs are rarely associated with international terrorism and their
occasional participation is more an exception than a rule. Nevertheless, what we see in the
93
TURAKBAYEV, S., 2003. Security issues in Central Asia and foreign security policies of Kazakhstan and
Uzbekistan. UNISCI Discussion Papers 3. Madrid: Research Unit on International Security and Cooperation
(UNISCI) of the International Relations and Security Network (ISN).
94
PEYROUSE, S., 2008. The partnership between Islam and Orthodox Christianity in Central Asia. Religion,
State and Society, 36 (4), 393–405.
95
KHALID, A., 2007. Islam after communism: religion and politics in Central Asia. Berkeley: University of
California Press.
96
WÆVER, O., 1995. Securitization and Desecuritization. In: R. Lipschutz, ed. On security. New York:
Columbia University, 46–86.
35
last year, is increasing participation of Kazakhstani combatants in Syria on the side of the
opposition, including on the side of Al Qaeda and Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). This
gave a specific nuance of the government discourse; a nuance of a self-fulfilling prophecy.
5.4. How the securitization is taking place: “religious extremism” in the official political
discourse
In order to understand better the process of securitization of non-traditional forms of
Islam, I shall analyse the Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan “On counteractive measures
against extremism”, accepted on 26 February 2005, the establishment of the Program for
Counteractive Measures Against Extremism and Terrorism in the Republic of Kazakhstan
2013-2017 and the Law on Religion, accepted on 11 October 2013 № 483-IV97, as well as
statements, interviews, etc. of the President and another official representatives, published in
the media.
5.4.1. The Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan “On counteractive measures
against extremism”
The Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan “On counteractive measures against
extremism”, does not state explicitly what exactly extremism is, but says that an individual
or legal entity can be considered extremist if they strive extremist objectives .98
5.4.2. Programme for Counteractive Measures against Extremism and Terrorism
in the Republic of Kazakhstan 2013-2017
After joint efforts of several government institutions, the Programme for
Counteractive Measures against Extremism and Terrorism in the Republic of Kazakhstan
2013-2017 was adopted last year. The need of such program is described in the following
way: „At the present stage of the globalization and the growing potential for conflicts [several
factors] in the world have had a significant impact on the international and national security.
The threat of religious extremism and terrorism has become global, thus increasing the
protection of national interests of each state in the system of the international security.”
“Under these conditions, the current system needs to be improved to effectively address the
factors that contribute to the spread of radical religious ideology, as well as to prevent
extremist and terrorist acts.”
As it can be seen, even though the program is about countermeasures against
extremism in general, what is emphasized, is the religious extremism. The government
discourse is constructed in a way that securitizes not just the extremism, but a given form of
Закон Республики Казахстан о «религиозной деятельности и религиозных объединениях»
According to the Law of Extremism (Закону Республики Казахстан «О противодействии экстремизму».
http://stop-sekta.kz/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=99:-l-r&catid=37:2010-05-03-09-1142&Itemid=60) these objectives are: Forcible change of the Constitutional order, violation of the sovereignty of
the Republic of Kazakhstan, the integrity, the inviolability and inalienability of its territory, undermining of the
national security and the defence of the state, violent seizure of power or violent retention of power, creation,
management and participation in illegal paramilitary formations, organization of armed rebellion and
participation in it, incitement of social hatred. (political extremism), Incitement of racial, national and tribal
hatred, including violence or incitement to violence (national extremism); Incitement of religious hatred or
discord, including those related to violence or incitement to violence and the use of any religious practice,
causing security threats to the life, health, morals, and freedom and rights of the citizens (religions extremism)
97
98
36
it. Thus, “by conceptualizing Islam as a security threat, policy makers can resort to
unprecedented state-centred solutions, and use whatever means necessary to protect and
defend the nation from the threat.”99
According to the program, the growing impact of religious extremism is due first of
all the external factors which are eroding Kazakh identity: “In particular, the international
extremist and terrorist organizations, hiding behind religious rhetoric, are trying to form in
Kazakh society radical views and beliefs. Their intended impact on the consciousness of the
individuals leads to the loss of their sense of patriotism and national identity, and their
cultural, moral and family values.” As a prove it is stated that in the last years around 70
foreigners involved in the activities of international extremist or terrorist organizations have
been detained.
The programme warns that the “external factors” will look for local support, trying to
engage local people and structural unites, disseminating all over the country of religious
literature and other informational materials of questionable content.
Another “warring trend” is related to merging radical religious communities with
criminal structures that is most pronounced in the prison institutions.
In this way radical religious communities are constructed as a domestic enemy to be
fought against, and the identity of the regime as enjoying wide support by the people is
reaffirmed. The official discourse especially points out that the religious terrorism is not
home grown, but imported, what removes the responsibility of the government for its
appearance and present it as performing just representation of the interests of the all
Kazakhstanis.
In a personal communication with me (December, 2013, Atana), the only foreign
expert working on the programme (Prof. Tatyana Dronzina) shared that all her attempts to
convince local experts to put out the “religious” from the title of the programme, were
counterproductive. She considered that the term “religious extremism” will wake up criticism
to the document from East and West: from East, for lack of enough respect for Islam; from
West, for lack of enough respect to human rights. She insisted the local experts never took it
into consideration explaining that this wording of the title was required by the highest
authorities.
5.4.3. Official statements of the President
The same trend – of hardening of official position – can be observed in the official
statements and speeches of the President. “Religious extremism” was mentioned in his
speeches pronounced on the 21st and 20th anniversary session of the Assembly of people of
Kazakhstan, while during the 19th session, far less harsh terms were used.
In his speech in the 21st session of the Assembly of People of Kazakhstan, the
president said: “At the same time, our country is secular and religion is separated from the
state. We also completely reject extremism under religious slogans, attempts to politicize
religious teachings and to impose to our people alien for us religious views and ideas.”100
99
OMELICHEVA, M., 2011. Islam in Kazakhstan: a survey of contemporary trends and sources of
securitization. Central Asian Survey, Vol. 30, No. 2, June, 243 – 256
100
Стратегия «Казахстан-2050»: культура мира, духовности и согласия. Выступление Президента
Казахстана Нурсултана Назарбаева на XXI сессии Ассамблеи народа Казахстана. Kaзахстанская правда,
19 апреля 2014, http://www.kazpravda.kz/ida.php?ida=54848
37
The same position is observed in the speech of the 20th anniversary session of the
Assembly of people of Kazakhstan.
Significant space is devoted to the religious extremism in the Address of the President
of the Republic of Kazakhstan on the presentation of the Kazakhstan-2050 strategy in 2013:
Among the priorities are the determined resistance to all forms and manifestations of
radicalism, extremism and terrorism. With particular emphasis on the need to intensify
prevention of religious extremism in society, especially among young people, as well as
shaping public religious consciousness corresponding traditions and cultural values of the
secular state.101
5.4.4. Law on religion
The international experience shows that religious groups might acquire significant
amount of support among the masses witch could materialize in political power. Kazakh
government is very interested in preserving its own power, and by restricting radical
movements and forms of Islam, it eliminates potentially dangerous opponents. Moreover this
act gives mechanisms of control to the politics over the religion, which is not completely
independent from the state anymore. Now what is permitted and accepted in Islam depends,
to certain extend, on what the regime decides that it is, transforming the religion into
instrument to control the masses.102 Kazakhstani government successfully supervises
religious life through DUMK and other religious institutions.
Although the Constitution guarantees religious freedom, some of the laws in force
restrict it. The most notable example is the Law on Religions, which passed in 2011. There
are features in this law, which could possibly limit it, such as minimum quantity of people
needed to register religious association, needed registration on the missionaries, needed
inspection and approval of the religious literature and ban on religious practices in public
areas. The state body, which has the task to implement the law, is the Agency of Religious
Affair (ARA). This agency is responsible for analysis of the religious groups and their
literature, can initiate banning on a religious group and provides official interpretation of the
Law on Religion. There are reported cases in which ARA denied registration to religious
groups, based on theological views. These cases include the Church of Scientology and the
Unification church, which, according to ARA, do not meet the definition of religion.
In the sense of the new law, Art. 12(1-4) all religious communities needed to reregister to the place, where they operated.
There are three levels of registration – local, regional and republican, all of them
putting certain obstacles to the existence and the activity of the religious groups.103
Послание Президента Республики Казахстан - Лидера нации Нурсултана Назарбаева народу
Казахстана «Стратегия «Казахстан-2050»: новый политический курс состоявшегося государства»
14.12.2012,
http://www.akorda.kz/ru/page/page_poslanie-prezidenta-respubliki-kazakhstan-lidera-natsiinursultana-nazarbaeva-narodu-kazakhstana102
MARX, Karl. 1844. A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right
103
In the lowest possible, the local one, is possible to register upon the initiative of at least 50 people,
nationals of Kazakhstan, submitting names and addresses of those people. With this act of registration, the
religious group has rights to operate only within the oblast (or the city of national importance or the capital)
where it was registered. The regional registration is possible through initiative of 500 from at least 2 oblasts,
cities of national importance, or the capital. The national registration is possible when at least 5000 people fill
for it, which are evenly distributed among every oblast of Kazakhstan.
101
38
As a result of the new regulations, many religious groups were forced to close, unable
to meet the new requirements. Some Muslim groups decided to associate themselves with
DUMK in order to be registered, others, who refused, such as Ahmadiyya Muslim
Community, were denied registration. The number of legally recognized groups fell from
4,551 to 3,088. When a group is suspended, it is not allowed anymore to speak to the media,
hold meetings or services or undertake financial transactions, except contractual obligations.
If a religious group engages in forbidden activities or fails to put in order the violations, for
which it was suspended, the government can ban the group.
Another aspect of the law, which is often criticized, is the need for the local and
foreign missionaries to register for missionary activity. The whole procedure for this is
described in Art. 8. People, who want to register for missionary activity, should provide
information for their religious affiliation, the territory where they will conduct their activity
and the time period in which they will conduct it. They must also present all the materials
they will use during missionary work, and will be subject of sanctions for using additional,
non-declared materials later. Of course, in cases in which the missionary activity is presumed
to represent danger to the constitutional order, such is not granted permission. The state body
in charge to give permission is the Ministry of Justice, if the person who wants to engage in
missionary activities is foreigner, he or she needs preliminary approval by ARA, after the
Agency assess the religious aspect of the activity. The foreigner then will receive special
missionary visa, valid for six months. The vague description of missionary activity in the law
could provide legal basis for the government to interpret it in selective way in certain cases,
as described in the US Government report for 2012.104
The Law does not permit any religious education in schools on mandatory bases.
Parents might enroll their children to supplementary religion classes, provided by registered
religious groups. Its spirit is to limit as much as possible the underage persons involvement in
religious groups.
Despite the fact that EU and USA reports put emphasis on the bans of religious
groups and literature, associated with Christianity, a huge part of the bans occur on Muslim
related groups and literature, which are perceived as security threats, feature, not usually
attributed to Christian churches.
5.5. EU and Kazakhstan on religious extremism: comparing views
Without any doubt, religious extremism, especially when it creates conditions for
religiously inspired violence, is equally dangerous for EU and for Kazakhstan. However, this
threat is differently constructed in the discourse of Kazakhstani ruling elites and in EU
discourse. To the great extent, it is due to the different views of on the freedom of religion
and religious expression. This poses certain obstacles in the cooperation in the field, and even
negative reactions of EU to some acts of Kazakhstani government.
In its domestic politics, Kazakhstan follows the philosophy of the “three evils”,
established by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO): separatism, terrorism and
religious extremism. According to the official Kazakhstani discourse, the “responsible” for its
104
BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR. 2012. International Religious Freedom
Report for 2012
39
dissemination is the so-called non-traditional Islam, that’s why it should be restricted in the
way that will not allow him to destabilize the country.
The freedom of religion is guaranteed by Article 9 of the European Convention on
Human Rights, which all 47 members of the Council of Europe have signed: “Everyone has
the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to
change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in
public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and
observance.” Further, the article goes says that freedom of religion can be limited in the
interests of "public safety...the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the
protection of the rights and freedoms of others." Despite of this restrictions, courts in most
EU countries leaned towards respect for the "autonomy" of religious organizations—their
right to set their own rules in respect of internal organization and even hiring policy.105
EU expressed its negative attitude to the new Law of religion of Kazakhstan provoked
by the fact that: the new legislation is at odds with Kazakhstan’s international legal
obligations and OSCE commitments in the field of freedom of religion and belief; that the
registration requirements imposed by the new legislation, the ban on unregistered religious
activities, as well as the requirement for religious organizations to be examined by a
government body violates the freedom of religion; that the new legislation was passed by
Parliament without prior public debate. The discourse of EU is constructed around the need
to respect human rights even in the fight against violent radicalism: “we underline our
conviction that efforts to prevent violent extremism and radicalism will only be effective if
only they meet the international human rights standards.”106
As can be seen, the dialogue between Kazakhstan and EU is not always easy when it
concerns values. Values are the basis of the moral order, and “the moral order provides the
set of meanings through which they understand their experience and make judgments about
what is valuable and important;”107 they are the fundaments of the one’s own identity.
Because of different values, people might perceive, define, and deal in different way with
what they call security challenges. A more pragmatic approach, which is demonstrated in the
cooperation in fighting terrorism, could help resolve such disagreements.
105
THE ECONOMIST. 2014. How Europe defines religious freedom? 31 of March,
http://www.economist.com/blogs/erasmus/2014/03/europe-faith-and-liberty
106
EU STATEMENT ON KAZAKHSTAN.
PC.DEL/1035/11/Corr.1 8 November 2011,
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/vienna/documents/eu_osce/permanent_council/2011/20111103_886_statement
_on_kazakhstan_en.pdf
107
MAIESE, Michelle. "Moral or Value Conflicts." Beyond Intractability. Eds. Guy Burgess and Heidi
Burgess. Conflict Information Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder. Posted: July 2003
http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/intolerable-moral-differences
40
6. TERRORISM AND COUNTER TERRORISM: COMPARING EU AND
KAZAKHSTANI VIEW
The cooperation among Kazakhstan and EU is going mainly in the framework of the
Strategy for CA. Probably, the cooperation in the counter-terrorism field is that one which
has not been explored enough by both parties. That’s why, in order to identify future ways of
cooperation, I first make a brief analysis of the terrorist threat in Kazakhstan and define the
term. Then I expose EU and Kazakhstani view on the terrorism and finally, study the public
discourse in Kazakhstan on the root causes of terrorism. It analyses how the language of the
„fight against terrorism‟ discourse plays a role in the legitimation of the counter-terrorism
policy responses; how these responses are “normalized” as a ‘common sense” and how the
issue has been successfully securitized. Finally, the cooperation in the antiterrorism field
between Kazakhstan and EU is considered.
6.1. Terrorism in Kazakhstan
Kazakhstan has proven to be open to international cooperation in the counterterrorism
field. The government annually submits National Report on the progress of the work in the
UN Counter-Terrorism Committee. The country supports the creation and takes active part in
the international anti-terrorism coalitions. Kazakhstan also has joined all the thirteen
universal international conventions against terrorism and is member of several regional
antiterrorist structures, such as, CIS, RATS SCO, CSTO and others. In accordance with UN
Security Council resolutions in the country it was established system for combating money
laundering and financing of terrorist organizations. In the current moment, 14 organizations
have been defined terroristic and therefore banned.
According Erlan Karin, ex-secretary of the ruling Nur Otan party and ex-chairmen of
ATC, there are three main stages of the development of terrorism in the country (or it's
perception):
- Terrorism as external threat (90s-2000) - in this period Kazakhstan associated the
problem of the terrorism mainly with individuals accused of terrorism in other
countries, who came to Kazakhstan and founded illegal small cells, mainly to use
Kazakhstan as transit station. Those claims have never been confirmed by official
sources, but Kazakh secret services various times arrested persons for suspicion for
terrorist activity and expelled them to the countries where they came from, where they
were sued, mainly Russia, Turkey, China and Uzbekistan. For these actions, in
relations to the transfer of detained people for terrorist activities to the neighboring
countries, in particular Uzbekistan, President Nazarbayev's administration was under
criticism, due to reported cases of torture of these people.108 109
- Terrorist recruitment in Kazakhstan (2000-2005) - this period marks the evolution of
the perception of terrorist activity in Kazakhstan, as for the first time Kazakh citizens
were proven to be involved in terrorist activities in foreign countries. The most
famous examples for their involvement include the case of Jamaat Mujahedeens of
Central Asia, organization, which acted against the government of Uzbekistan, in
which several Kazakh nationals were members, participation of Kazakhs in Afghan
illegal militant groups, three of the prisoners of Guantanamo are also Kazakh citizens,
from Semey. In this period, 2003, the ATC was created. In this time the partnership
108
109
Kazakhstan: Do Not Deport Uzbek. Human Rights Advocate Human Rights Watch
UN concerned at disappearance in Kazakhstan. Scoop Independent News
41
-
-
between Kazakhstan and USA has been established in the field of terrorism. The USA
Center for Defense Information praises the Kazakh commitment to USA war against
terrorist, describing them as "extremely supportive".110 The same organization posted
their report "Global Map for the Future" in which they put Kazakhstan as a region
with potential threat for development of cells and structures of radical islamists. For
the first time Kazakhstan, which considered itself as the less vulnerable country,
started to be mentioned in expert reports.
Between 2005 and 2011 the threat for terrorism in the country became real. The
official sources claimed that in 2007-2008, 7 attacks were prevented. Kazakh citizens
involvement in terrorist activities in foreign countries and regions continued, notably
in Dagestan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and elsewhere. In 2006 Kazak court banned many
organizations with suspicion of terrorism, including Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan,
Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami, Jamaat of Central Asian Mujahedins, Islamic Party of
Eastern Turkestan, Kurdistan Workers Party, Boz Kurt, Lashkar-e-Toiba, Social
Reforms Society (in Kuwait), Asbat an-Ansar (in Israel), Al-Qaeda, Taliban, and the
Muslim Brotherhood111 and others. Saulebek Zhamkenuly, press secretary for the
Prosecutor-General's Office explained that not all of them are active in Kazakhstan,
but their ban is a preventive measure.
In 2011 it was acknowledged by Nurtai Abykayev, Kazakh official, that terrorism is a
real threat which Kazakhstan has to face. For 2011-2012 there were identified 14 big
terroristic acts, part of which are suicidal.112 Unfortunately there are not enough data
until now for 2013.
6.2. Defining the term
„Terrorism” comes from French113 referring to the "state terrorism", practiced by the
Reign of Terror (1793-1794). The French word "terrorisme" on the other hand comes from
the Latin word "terreo", with the meaning of "to frighten".
The first and original meaning of the term was used exclusively to describe actions of
state terrorism, but soon it became too narrow. In the next years to come until the mid of the
century, the word was associated with groups and organizations, fighting for national
liberation. During the second part of the past century, the organizations, in order to escape the
stigmatized meaning of "terrorism", preferred descriptions as "freedom fighters",
"mujahedeen", "guerilla" or others.
In modern world there is no consensus among the scholars on the meaning of the
word. Laqueur is convinced that any definition of terrorism is "bound to fail" 114and argued
that the study of terrorism can manage with minimum of theory115.
The impossibility to come with impartial view on terrorism, perhaps, as Hoffman
states, is due to the fact that terrorism is politically and emotionally charged. 116 For this
reason even today there is no broadly accepted definition at international level.
110
HENDERSON, Robert. 2003. Brassey's International Intelligence Yearbook 2003
Kazakhstan Updates List Of Banned Terrorist Groups RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty
112
Доклад Терроризм в Казахстане. 2012. RRREGNUM, 27.11., http://www.regnum.ru/news/1598478.html
113
http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=terrorism
114
Cited in Defining Terrorism WP 3, Deliverable 4, 2008
115
Cited in SCHMID A. and A. JONGMAN (2005) Political Terrorism, Piscataway, NJ: Transaction
Publishers.
116
HOFFMAN, Bruce. 1998. review in The New York Times Inside Terrorism, p. 32
111
42
The main difficulty is related to the legitimacy. If we don't accept that human rights
are universal values, and feel that violence is the “natural way” to achieve the goal, then we
would consider "legitimately" and "lawfully" annihilate as many people as it is need for the
achievement of this goal.
Although we cannot detach completely from the politics, it is indeed difficult to come
up with definitions of terrorism, listening to their discourse. This is a reason why different
approach is needed; approach, which identifies key characteristics of the phenomenon. In
perusing such an approach, Hoffman proposes the following characteristics:
 ineluctably political in aims and motives
 violent – or, equally important, threatens violence
 designed to have far-reaching psychological repercussions beyond the immediate
victim or target
 conducted by an organization with an identifiable chain of command or conspiratorial
cell structure (whose members wear no uniform or identifying insignia) and
 perpetrated by a subnational group or non-state entity 117
An interesting definition, to which I will stick, is Tatyana Dronzina's (a Bulgarian
scholar) who argues that “in order to distinguish terrorism from political assassination,
banditry, illegal trafficking, and other criminal acts, I define it hereby as a deliberate violence
against civilians or civil facilities, or against militaries and military facilities in non-war time,
aiming modification of the behavior of a target different than the attacked one.”118
6.3. European view of terrorism
Terrorism is not something new for Europe. In many countries, like Spain, Greece,
Great Britain, and others there are or were active terrorist organizations.
The first attempt to define and fight against terrorism on European level was made in
1977 with the European Convention on Suppression of Terrorism, which set a list of violent
acts, which should be understood as terrorist. This convention also underlined the distinction
between political acts and terrorism. Although some acts fits the cases, listed by it, there was
no common definition on what terrorism is. In 2003 this document was amended by the
Protocol Amending the European Convention on Suppression of Terrorism and in 2005 the
council adopted the Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, adopted in Warsaw. In none
of these documents there is a clear definition of terrorism again.
2001 was important year for the fight against terrorism for Europe. As a result of the
11/09 attacks, the Council gathered on extraordinary meeting with the aim to analyze the
global world security situation. It was concluded that the fight against terrorism is a priority
objective for the EU. For comparison, in 1999 in Tampere, the European Council called" to
combat trafficking in drugs and human beings as well as terrorism", understanding the
phenomenon more like ordinary cross border crime.
As a result of the modifications of this proposal, the Council adopted a non-binding
declaration, which served to provide the Member States with the necessary structure for
criminalization of the offenses under the national law. By that time, most of the Member
117
118
HOFFMAN, Bruce. 2006. Inside Terrorism, 2 ed., Columbia University Press, p. 34
DRONZINA, Tatyana. 2008. Female suicide terrorism, Sveto Georgi Pobedonocets, Sofia, p. 67
43
States already had included terrorism clauses in their criminal codes, although without clear
definitions.
At the EU level, terrorism is dealt with under all three institutional pillars with
exceptional attention concentrated in the second and third pillars following the events of
September 11 and the issuance of two Council Common Positions of 27 December 2001 on
combating terrorism and on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism, based
largely on UN Security Council Resolution 1373.119
Although the language used in the existing document gives us an idea what European
Union considers terrorism, the lack of political will has as a consequence lack of legal
definition, but the European Union definitions of terrorism are pretty much consistent with
other international definitions, although they might differ in formulations.
6.4 Kazakhstani understanding of terrorism
6.2.1. Legislation and programmes
The threat of terrorism in Kazakhstan has not been considered important until the
events in 11/09 in United States. For all these years terrorism was seen as an external threat.
The first initiative which gave institutional and legal framework for combating the terrorism
separately than ordinary crime, is the law from 1999 "On combating the terrorism". It also
defined the rights, the duties and the guarantees of the citizens in relation to the fight against
terrorism.
The Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated from 13 July 1999 № 416-I, On
Countering Terrorism, defines the following concepts, giving legal grounds for fighting the
terrorism.
Terrorism - the ideology of violence and practice of influencing the decisions of
public bodies, local authorities or international organizations by committing or threats of
committing violence, and (or) other criminal acts related to intimidate the population and
aimed at damaging the individual, society and the state.
Act of terrorism - carrying out or threatening to carry out an explosion, arson or other
acts that endanger the lives of people, causing significant property damage or causing socially
dangerous consequences, if committed for the purpose of violating public security, intimidate
the population or influence decision-making by public authorities of the Republic of
Kazakhstan, foreign states or international organizations, as well as encroachment on human
life, committed to the same purpose, as well as encroachment on a state or public figure, or
committed against public or state servant with the goal to terminate certain political activity
of his state or to revenge for such activity.
Terrorist organization - an organization that carries out terrorist activities or admitting
the use of terrorism in its activity in respect of which is accepted and has entered into force a
court decision on the recognition of a terrorist;
As we can see, the Law of Kazakhstan does not differ much from the law of other
countries, and provides a good legal ground for combating this form of violence. In other
words, the legal discourse of EU and Kazakhstan does not construct in substantially different
ways the terrorism threat. However, certain differences can be seen in the program.
119
Defining Terrorism. WP 3, Deliverable 4, 2008
44
After 2013 the fight against terrorism is carried out within the framework of the
Programme for Counteractive Measures against Extremism and Terrorism in the Republic of
Kazakhstan (2013-2017).
In the program, where religious extremism goes together with terrorism, the accent is
mainly on the government actions against them, which, on its turns, means: increasing of
education activity on the population, especially on the risk groups and explanation of the
unacceptability of the extremist ideology; education of religion in school aimed at creating
critical thinking among young people towards radical ideologies; improvement of the
religious education; development of consciousness among the young people, which reflects
the main moral and cultural values of the Kazakh society; organization and carrying out of
activities, aiming at teaching young people in the spirit of patriotism, based on fundamental
moral and cultural values; organization of child's, teenagers' and youth patriotic movement in
the school, in order to conserve and promote cultural-historic heritage of the people of
Kazakhstan; creation in all rural areas to the level of rural district, conditions for cultural,
moral, spiritual, patriotic and physical development and education of young people.
The other measure aims at the media and printed press. The program presumes
constant monitoring of the printed and electronic mass-media, including internet resources, in
order to identify materials, that promote religious extremism and terrorism, including the
usage of modern programs to detect such content; creation and promotion of array of
domestic religious literature and series of cultural and entertaining products, which promote
the traditional Kazakh spiritual and moral values; active dissemination through the massmedia of information and materials, aimed at uncovering the negative essence of radical
ideology, including that based on deliberate distortions of the truth of religious canons;
dissemination of information, revealing techniques and methods to involve citizens of
Kazakhstan in extremist and terrorist activities;
One of the measures includes development of effective measures to protect Kazakh
citizens during their stay abroad, from being susceptible to radical views. It also proposes
efficient functioning of the special rehabilitation centre for victims of the ideology of
religious extremism and terrorism, or those who had come under the influence of this radical
ideology.120
If the legal discourse (the Law) of Kazakhstan does not differ very much of the EU
one, the discourse of the program shows some differences. Both – the legal and the discourse
of the program reaffirm the identity of Kazakhstan as loyal member of the international antiterrorist coalition and member of OSCE. The image of the State is constructed as a reliable
provider of security and protection of its citizens against this form of political violence.
However, in difference of EU discourse, terrorism is very much seen as inseparable from the
religious extremism. The emphasis on this points out other feature of identity of the State –
the identity of member of SCO, which pretends to have different that the European view on
security threats. As far as “two evils” are dangerous for the stability of the State, they should
be combated even at the costs of limitation of some freedoms, as for example, the freedom of
speech and expression and the freedom of movement ("effective measures to protect Kazakh
citizens during their stay abroad").
О Государственной программе по противодействию религиозному экстремизму и терроризму в
Республике Казахстан на 2013 - 2017 годы, Указ Президента Республики Казахстан от 24 сентября 2013
года № 648 http://adilet.zan.kz/rus/docs/U1300000648
120
45
6.2.2. Public discourse on the reasons of terrorism
The scientific and media discourse are crucial to understand the Kazakhstani concept
of terrorism despite of the fact that this is very much controlled by the government.
In order to study the public discourse, I shall investigate the report “Terrorism in
Kazakhstan”, the only public document on the topic, issued by the think-thank Institute of
Political Decisions, which later was closed by the government, and public speeches of Mr.
Erlan Karin, ex-director of the Centre for counter-terrorism programmes, later one of the
leaders of Nur Otan party (the most influential political force in the country). I shall use here
content analysis as described in the chapter “Methods”.
Root causes of terrorism in Kazakhstan are investigates and are ranged according their
relevance. On the first place religious motives are stated followed by social, economic and
political reasons. The full text consists of 915 words; 175 out of them are devoted to religious
causes; to social – 190; to economic – 312; to political – 57. The report demonstrates the
typical for official discourse of Kazakhstan view that the leading motive of terrorism is
related to religious, social or economic causes, and are almost completely dissociated from
political causes.
This is also the view of Mr. Karin who says that according to his research, (2014)
73% out of terrorists are unemployed, while only 26 has a stable occupation.121 He also
considers that terrorism in Kazakhstan is induced by external factors as for example Islamist
propaganda in internet.
On the basis of the above said, it can be concluded that Kazakhstani public discourse
sees the rout causes of terrorism in: religious extremism, social problems of Kazakhstani
young people as: poor education, clan structure and tribalism, poor possibilities for leisure,
internal migration, lack of family planning;122 economic problems as: low incomes,
significant differences in the salaries, low economic culture, huge credits and great internal
debt of the population, but does not relate in any way terrorism with factors as: felling of
social injustice (one of the most influential view in academic debate); nature of political
regime, restriction of rights and freedoms and democratization. Just as an illustration,
political causes are described in the next way: "The main political reason for the growth
terrorism is the lack of political activity in some areas and the possibility of expression of the
population. The lack of dialogue with the government and the ban on most political protests,
the protest shifted from legally allowed towards radical one. Or the dissatisfied people are
easily influenced by Salafits that offer clear and simple recipes for guidance and social
justice. "
6.3. Cooperation between Kazakhstan and EU in the counter terrorism field: mission
possible
There is some differences in constructing terrorism threat and counter-terrorism
measures in EU and Kazakhstani discourse. In the first place, I would show the fact that the
EU documents are concerned primary of the characteristics of a given act as terrorist one; the
Карин,
Ерлан.
2014.
«В
террористы
идут
безработные».
http://news.headline.kz/mneniya_i_kommentarii/erlan_karin_v_terroristyi_idut_bezrabotnyie.html
122
Институт политических решении. 2012. Доклад Терроризм в Казахстане.
http://www.regnum.ru/news/1598478.html
121
1.04.
27.11.
46
Kazakhstani discourse are concerned above all with the reasons that give rise to terrorism. In
accordance with the main values of Kazakhstani security culture (stability, priority of
economy over politics) it accepts that the main causes are social and economic rather than
political.
However, unlike religious extremism, terrorism is unanimously designed by
Kazakhstan and EU as one of the main security threats. This makes the dialogue in the field
of counter-terrorism much more pragmatic. The cooperation is carried out under the existing
regional format, with special accent on the post-2014 when NATO troops are expected to
leave Afghanistan.
The last event in this sense was the visit group of experts, headed by Mr. Gilles de
Kerchove, EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator to Kazakhstan (24-25 April, 2014). The main
themes that were treated were: the preventing of radicalisation and terrorism, countering
terrorist financing and foreign fighters; possible consequences of the withdrawal of NATO
forces from Afghanistan and Kazakhstani combatants travelling to Syria and fighting on the
site of the opposition. However, unlike Central Asia representatives, the Counter-Terrorism
Coordinator stressed that with this capacity building effort special attention should also be
paid to further strengthening respect for human rights and the rule of law.
47
7.
COOPERATION IN COMBATING DRUG TRAFFICKING
In this chapter, I examine one of the clearest examples of existing cooperation
between European Union and Kazakhstan - the cooperation in the field of drug trafficking
and border control. I examine the common threat - the opium production in Afghanistan. I
explain the mutual interest for cooperation and finally present the two main frameworks in
which this cooperation is established - BOMCA and CADEP.
7.1. Opium in Afghanistan
Since the beginning of the 90s, Afghanistan is one of the major producers of opium in
the world. In 2009 Afghanistan covered approximately 90% of the world demand (6900 t.);123
in 2002 this present was 75-80.124
The beginning of the cultivation was marked by the Soviet invasion when the central
government started losing control over certain territories and when Pakistan put serious
efforts to eliminate the opium production its territory. After the Soviet withdrawal the
militant groups started fighting between each other, and with the halting of the American
support, they have found out that the drug production is a big source of money to finance
their military existence.
The central government, in the meantime, was completely unable to exercise control
on some parts of the country. From 1994 to 2000 the production kept rising, when in 1999 the
Taliban government engaged in extensive anti-drug campaigns aiming at eradicating the
poppies cultivation. Mullah Mohammed Omar declared the cultivation un-Islamic and the
ban was enforced by all possible means, including threats, public punishment and so on.
Although some critics claim125 126 that this campaign was made by the Taliban in order to
occupy themselves the market, as a result of it, the production of drugs in the country fell
with 99%. The declaration of war and the subsequent USA invasion in the country threw it
again in chaos and since then the cultivation per year has reached 2 times the cultivation
before that. Although the official position of the acting government in Afghanistan prohibits
the cultivation of poppy, the corruption and the impossibility to effectively enforce the ban,
do not limit significantly the spread. The fact that some of the suspected drug lords in
Afghanistan have become part of the Karzai's government certainly does not help dealing
with the problem.
As a result of the events, Afghanistan is number one drug supplier for Europe. Heroin
enters Europe primarily by two major land routes, one is the "Balkan route" through Turkey
and, the second one, since the mid-1990s, the "northern route", which leaves northern
Afghanistan through Central Asia and on to Russia (and is sometimes colloquially referred to
as the ‘silk route’).127 Afghanistan is part of the so called "Golden Crescent" - Afghanistan,
Pakistan and Iran. The other major suppliers are Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, known as
"Golden Triangle".
123
OLSCHNER, Johannes. The World Today, January 2011, http://www.questia.com/read/1P32248981421/deadly-addiction
124
SVANTE E. Cornell & Regine A. Spector (2002) Central Asia: More than Islamic extremists, The
Washington Quarterly, 25:1, 193-206, http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/016366002753358410 , p. 197
125
PETERS, Gretchen. Seeds of Terror, MacMillan
126
BYRD, William A. and Jonglez, Olivier. Prices And Market Interactions In The Opium Economy, World
127
"Monitoring the supply of heroin to Europe".
48
Although the country is partner to Europe in order to limit the spread of drugs, due to
the inability of the central government to establish effective control, Europe has focused its
efforts to prevent its traffic from the two possible routes. In Central Asia EU pushed forward
CADAP, BOMCA and other programs to strengthen the border control. All CA governments
put efforts and commitment, acknowledging the gravity of the problem, and in this aspect,
Kazakhstan is one of the most reliable partners to EU.
7.2. The mutual interest to cooperate
Why EU and Kazakhstan are interested to cooperate?
The interest of EU is determined by the next factors. First of all, because most Afghan
opiates traversing the border with Central Asia end up in Russia and Europe. These are the
two most profitable heroin markets in the world, valued at 13 billion dollars and twenty
billion dollars respectively. By the time heroin reaches both areas, its price is up to thirty
times greater than in Afghanistan.128 Second, drugs have provided a powerful inducement for
organised criminals in Russia and Europe. Their ability to effectively supply consumers has
in turn been accompanied by increased addiction and HIV infection rates. Third, together
with drugs, terrorist organizations and networks penetrate in Europe. Some authors, for
example, insist, that IMU (Islamic movement of Uzbekistan), has been involved in the direct
trafficking of opiates from Afghanistan through Central Asia to Europe.129 This makes EU
countries more vulnerable to the terrorist threat.
Why Kazakhstan is interested to cooperate? First of all, because 21% of the
trafficking is carried out by the "northern route", called also by some people “Silk road”. 130
Actually, the “Silk road” is a set of routes through Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan (alternatively –
through Fergana value), Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, or through Baltic countries to
East Europe, Germany and Netherlands.
Second, part of heroine, transported through Kazakhstan, rests in the country. In
personal communication with me Mr. Rafik Tairov, from the Centre of military-strategic
studies with the Ministry of Defence of Kazaknstan shared with me some data of his recent
research. According to him, in 1991, 10,5 thousand drug addicted were officially registered in
Kazakhstan. In 2013 this number is already 40 000. He supposed that this is only one third
party of the real number. In the same year, 3639 criminal acts related to drugs were
registered; 20% of the perpetrators were minor, and 27, 8 tonnes drugs (750 kg heroine out of
them) were confiscated.131
The next great challenge for Kazakhstan are the borders. The role of the borders for
national, regional and global security is unquestionable and has been pointed out by many
authors: “Corruption and a lack of concern for border security, Cory Welt says, not only
damage a state’s ability to collect revenue and establish the rule of law within its borders,
they also leave gaping holes in the transnational security regime, which can be exploited by,
128
OLSCHNER, Johannes. The World Today, January 2011, http://www.questia.com/read/1P32248981421/deadly-addiction
129
SVANTE E. Cornell & Regine A. Spector (2002) Central Asia: More than Islamic extremists, The
Washington Quarterly, 25:1, 193-206, http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/016366002753358410 , p. 197
130
PERSONAL COMMUNICATION with Mr. Таиров Р.А (Astana, September, 2013)
131
PERSONAL COMMUNICATION with Mr. Таиров Р.А (Astana, September, 2013)
49
at best, traffickers in conventional arms, drugs, and humans and, at worst, terrorists and those
trafficking or seeking to traffic in weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-related materials.”132
Kazakhstan is a huge country, 9th in the world with a total area of 2.7 million square
kilometres. Its specific geographical situation between Asia and Europe makes it attractive
for any kind of illegal trafficking.
Kazakhstan’s border extends almost 12.2 thousand km, including almost 600 km on
the Caspian Sea in the West. The border length with Russia (in the West and in the North of
the country) is 6,477 km (the longest in the world); with China (in the East) it is 1,782 km;
Kyrgyzstan = 1,050 km; Uzbekistan = 2,159 km; and Turkmenistan (with the latter three
states in the South) = 426 km… It should be also known that 73 per cent of its population
lives in these border regions, with 31 percent of its people inhabiting border districts.133
In a personal communication with me prof. Svetlana Kozhirova a local expert form
Eurasian National University L.M.Gumilev, expressed her opinion that the border between
Kazakhstan and Russia is one of the most problematic borders in the world. She considers the
main threat steams from the uncontrolled and unmanageable trans-border streams, including
drug trafficking. The great advantage of the Silk Road in comparison with the shorter Balkan
route is the permeability of the borders. She said that practically the drug trafficking takes
place all over the border.
As it can be seen, interests of Kazakhstan and of EU completely coincide, despite of
the differences in their security culture models. Their cooperation has been successfully
carried out through Central Asia Drug Action Programme (CADAP) and Border
Management Programme in Central Asia (BOMCA)
7.3. Central Asia Drug Action Programme (CADAP)
A short analysis of the program 134 shows that fighting against drug trafficking is set
as main priority by EU itself: “Considering the serious effect of the increase of transnational
drug trafficking, in particular of opium and heroin from the world's largest producer
Afghanistan, on the health situation of the peoples of Central Asia, it is a special concern of
the EU to support the fight against the drug trade and work towards a reduction of drug
demand.”
The main goals of CAPAD are as follows: to encourage a "sustainable commitment in
the field of drug addiction prevention and treatment as well as data collection on the drug
situation within the Central Asian governments of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan; and to reduce the risks associated with the above-described
drug related problems it aims at gradual reform of the system of drug addict prosecution,
moving away from punitive approaches inherited from the Soviet era towards using
knowledge-based international strategies and standards that support the implementation of
internationally recognised best practices of anti-drug policies."
The project activities are divided into four main components, which focus on national
and transregional increasing of the capacity in order to empower Central Asian countries to
deal with the problem by themselves.
DAMOS – Drug Epidemiology Data Base Collection and Development
132
CORY Welt. 2005. POLITICAL CHANGE AND BORDER SECURITY REFORM IN EURASIA: The
Case of Georgia, The Non-proliferation Review, 12:3, 503-537, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10736700600601541 ,
p. 503
133
Golunov, Sergey and McDermott, Roger. BORDER SECURITY IN KAZAKHSTAN: THREATS,
POLICIES AND FUTURE CHALLENGES. Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 18: 31–58, 2005, p. 32
134
http://www.cadap.eu/ - retrieved 29.04.2014
50
TREAT
Treatment
Methodologies
MEDISSA - Media and Dissemination Strategies
These three components will be supported by the overall coordination component OCAN.
According to the program, there are three actions that will help to improve drug policies
and reduce drug demand:
 Implement comprehensive and sustainable drug situation monitoring systems
designed for informing decision makers, experts and the general public
 Foster modern drug treatment methodologies in the community and in prisons
 Develop realistic, culturally appropriate methods of drug prevention, and establish
sustainable systems providing accessible, comprehensive and credible information on
legal and illegal drugs, their characteristics and the inherent risks they pose.
In Kazakhstan the program CADAP 5 was launched in 2010 and included
implementations of series of events, some of which were planned and others - already
conducted:
 Workshop on launching a publication in an international peer reviewed journal about
treatment results in Pavlodar







Seminar on evaluation techniques with a special focus on OST;
Booster rehabilitation in female prisons in Kazakhstan
Study tours to Germany on drug addiction treatment based on the needs of the
local community and specialists working on drug addiction treatment in
correctional institutions
High-level Dialogue meeting on the implementation of the EU and Central Asia
Drug Action Plan 2009-2013 under the Hungarian Presidency in Brussels
Study tour to the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction
(EMCDDA) in Lisbon; internship of national experts in EMCDDA
National workshop on study planning of HCV among the drug user
National workshop on best practices in withdrawal syndrome therapy and medical
rehabilitation of drug users.
Unlike in the case of the other program, BOMCA, in this one the accent falls on the
health, as a core of drug fighting policy and it hopes to reduce the drug demand thought
improved prevention and treatment mechanisms.
7.4. Border Management Programme in Central Asia (BOMCA)135
The other programme of European Union, aiming at limiting the drug trafficking is
BOMCA.
European Union puts the border management as a core element in combating "the
cross-border movement of illegal trafficking, drugs, militants, weapons and radioactive
materials, as well as to facilitate legitimate trade and transit.”
BOMCA appeared as a joint response of CA governments and EU to “the fragile
security situation in Afghanistan, potential regional instability arising from religious
extremism, terrorism, narcotics and weapons trafficking, other types of illegal trafficking and
smuggling"
The overall objectives of BOMCA 8 are:
To help increase security in Central Asia
135
http://www.bomca.eu/ - retrieved in 29.04.2014
51
To contribute toward the facilitation of legitimate trade and transit
To reduce the illicit movement of goods and people
BOMCA has started in 2003, when the European Commission signed an agreement
with UNDP on the coordination and implementation of the first phase of the programme.
Since then, BOMCA has become one of the biggest assistance programmes of the European
Union in Central Asia: BOMCA's accumulated budgets from 2003-2014 amount to €
33,555,405. UNDP, the implementing agency of BOMCA, has co-funded the programme
with € 2.74 million. BOMCA contracts for 2003–2014 amount to € 36,295,405.
The main strategy of the programme is to promote the stability and security of the
countries of Central Asia through Integrated Border Management (IBM) and Regional
Cooperation. BOMCA is also assisting Central Asia countries in their pursuit of regional
economic development and trade facilitation within the region, with the neighbouring
countries and between Central Asia and the EU member states.
The eighth phase of BOMCA focuses on the following four components:
- Component 1: Institutional Reform - Support the Central Asian countries to adopt and
implement the principles and practices of European IBM approach in their border
management, including their border strategies and implementation action plans.
BOMCA supports the legislative and regulatory changes required post-adoption, and
the process of Government coordination with the international community in regard to
donor support for implementation of the Action Plan. BOMCA continues to provide
legal advice and expertise on institutionalisation of inter-agency IBM working
between the Border Agencies, as well as specific support to the efforts of EurAsEC
and CAREC to promote introduction of the single window concept in all Central
Asian countries.
- Component 2: Enhancing Professional Skills - Consortia of training centres was
established under BOMCA 8, to include key training facilities in Central Asia – many
previously supported by the BOMCA Programme – and counterpart institutions in the
European Union. BOMCA facilitated the establishment of institutional partnerships
between consortia and the EU Border Management training institutions to enhance the
development of regional 'Centres of Excellence', capable of taking a lead role in
cascading down training to national trainers in border security, use of dog at borders,
document security, counternarcotics and anti-corruption.
- Component 3: Strengthening Counter Drugs Capacities in Agencies Working at
Borders - BOMCA-CADAP has supported all Central Asian countries to establish
Drug Profiling Units (DPUs) as a way to support multi-agency cooperation on
counter-narcotics (exchange of information, joint risk analysis, joint operations, etc.)
at national and regional levels.
- Component 4: Border Crossing Points and Border Outposts - Some financial
resources are allocated for small renovation of the previous construction work. In
total, it is envisaged to renovate 3 border outposts in Tajikistan. Additionally,
equipment will be provided to 17 border detachments and border outposts in
Kyrgyzstan and 4 border outposts - in Tajikistan.
In Kazakhstan the program is operative. Kazakhstan is challenged by one of the
longest land borders in Central Asia, but has demonstrated strong capacities in managing
them in a balanced way. Whilst the Border Guard Service is still using more limiting rules
and procedures, legacy from the soviet type of border management, Kazakhstan also
recognizes the obvious benefits of liberalizing trade and transit procedures.
52
Kazakhstan has taken an active role in regard to efforts to establish regional
cooperation and coordination on border management issues. Almaty hosts both the Eurasian
Economic Community (EurAsEC), with a dedicated secretariat for border management, and
the Central Asian Regional Information & Coordination Centre (CARICC) aimed at
curtailing drug trafficking.
The five controlling bodies involved in border management in the Republic of
Kazakhstan include the Customs Control Committee, National Security Committee (the
Border Guards are part of the National Security Committee), Ministry of Transport and
Communication, Ministry of Health and Ministry of Agriculture. The listed authorities are
responsible for close cooperation and interaction in customs control, border control, transport
control, sanitary and epidemiological control.
The programme's major beneficiaries in Kazakhstan include the Border Guards
Service, Customs Control Committee and the Border Academy of the National Security
Committee of the Republic of Kazakhstan. It is the duty of the Border Service, which
employs more than 20,000 servicemen, to apply the Law on the State Border and manage the
12,000 km long border of the republic. Customs services of Kazakhstan carry out control of
persons, vehicles, goods and freight crossing the state border in accordance with the
international law and national legislation of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Operational Centre
in the Customs Service in Astana has online access to 25 land Border Crossing Points (BCPs)
and to 11 BCPs at airports, which simplifies the approval of documents online and a
permanent surveillance of these crossings' status.
The cooperation between EU and Kazakhstan in the field of drug trafficking shows
that when relationships are interest based, and are not very concerned about values, they are
relatively “easy”. Does it mean that EU should “forget” its main values in order to establish
effective cooperation? The answer is, indeed, negative; EU should not compromise with
values which are at the core of its identity. But at the same time, EU should take into
consideration the local strategic, political and civic culture and not to try to construct
“another Europe” in the regions it cooperated with.
53
8.
INSTEAD OF CONCLUSION:
RECONSIDERING SECURITY, RELIGION AND POLITICS IN KAZAKHSTAN
AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR THE RELATIONSHIPS WITH EU (1999-2013)
Now, after answering the main research questions, I would like to return to my
research hypothesis and to reconsider the relation between security, religion and politics in
Kazakhstan and their implications for the relationships with EU.
For a new independent State, as Kazakhstan, which passes not only through process
of consolidation, but also of modernization and democratization, security is an issue of
crucial importance. Taking into consideration the predominant patriarchal culture of
Kazakhstani society, and strong support of voters to the regime of Nazarbayev, it’s not
difficult to understand why public opinion accepts the main values of ruling elite’s security
culture: priority of the economy over the politics; political stability; priority of the national
security concerns over human (individual) security concerns. However sometimes “priority
of economy over politics” means delayed process of democratization where only formal
features of democracy is presented (at least from European point of view). “Political
stability” is often identified with the stability of the ruling elite, and “priority of the national
security concerns over human (individual) security concerns”, according to human rights
activists is used as excuse for violation of human rights and restriction of citizens’ freedoms.
The strong acceptance of the ruling elites’ security culture values allows to the
government to securitize some aspects of religion. If religion, as one of the social
mechanisms, can impact political system; if it is part of a wider cultural system of the society
that impact public behaviour and political action of collective actors; if both, religion and
politics, are closely related to the exercise of power and decision making processes
concerning security, especially within a country with predominantly Muslim population, as
Kazakhstan is, it would be absolutely clear that a secular government, as this one of
Nazarbayev is, would strive to securitize those aspect of religion (non-traditional Islam) that
create to it political discomfort or competition - the capacity to become (hostile to the regime)
political ideology and means for (undesirable) social activism and mobilization.
Actually, this is what has been done in Kazakhstan, a country, when 70% of
population belongs to a tolerant and moderate version of Sunni Islam of the Hanafi school,
when Islam has become a part of Kazakh identity and when the manifestations of this religion
have been largely peaceful, non-militant and apolitical. Not by chance, the government
prefers to use the vague term “religious extremism” instead of other, much clearer terms as
“radicalization of religion”, “political Islam”, “militant Islam”, etc., transmitting the idea that
what is out of official Islam is unacceptable and damaging for people. The securitization,
understood as an “extreme version of politicization that enables the use of extraordinary
means in the name of security”, is carried out through legislation and programmes - The Law
of the Republic of Kazakhstan “On counteractive measures against extremism”, Programme
for Counteractive Measures Against Extremism and Terrorism in the Republic of Kazakhstan
2013-2017, other official documents – addresses of the President; media discourse.
On another hand, it can be reasonably supposed that in the specific regional context
(with the example of Russia and Uzbekistan), the ruling elites of Kazakhstan felt threatened
by the non-traditional forms of Islam which were penetrating since 1991 in Northern
54
Caucasus and Central Asia and caused so many troubles to the national governments. That’s
why they adopted another form of official discourse, which presented them as threat to the
security and the stability of the nation, managing successfully to securitize the issue. Finally,
the securitization of Islam enabled more drastic measures to be taken against the spread of the
radicalism, separatism and terrorism, thus objectively increasing the security.
Let me try to summarize all this in the answer to Buzan’s question: "who securitizes
(Securitizing actor), on what issues (threats), for whom (referent object), why, with what
results, and not least, under what conditions": The government and responsible for the
religion State bodies securitize new forms of religion, bringing them under the common
denominator of “religious extremism”, trying to convince public opinion they threat national
security. This is done because the government is upset of the events and processes in the
neighbor countries, cause by the new, uncontrollable (by the State) forms of Islam and by the
increasing impact of non-traditional Islam inside the country. Now for now the securitization
is successful as far as most part of voters support security culture of the ruling elites.
Hope this confirms my first hypothesis that “security, religion and politics are closely
related in Kazakhstan, if we understand the security in the broader sense established by B.
Buzan”.
As in most Western world, in EU security challenges on the national level are broadly
understood as serious, wide-ranging threats to the well-being of the citizenry that are best
countered by concerted government action. This definition presumes the existence of robust,
transparent institutions; elections in accord with international standards; and an elected
political leadership that is accountable to voters. As a result, it does not envision a
contradiction between the actions of government and the interests of citizens.
As it was seen, the main values of EU security culture: human dignity, freedom,
democracy, equality, the rule of law and the respect for human rights are quite different from
the values of Kazakhstani security culture. Sometimes they are seen as unacceptable, other
times – as direct threat to the power of the elites. For example, the accent on human rights
protection EU normally puts is treated as a hidden - and illegal – intervention in the home
affairs of an independent State; Kazakhstani public opinion is not sensitive to human rights
issues; and the concept of human security is much less present in public discourse than the
concept of national or regional and global security.
This explains why the Law of religion, for example, is widely criticized by EU and
why the cooperation in areas when values are strongly engaged – like fight against “religious
extremism” (I would call it radical interpretations of Islam) is relatively week. At the same
time cooperation in areas when interests, rather values are engaged, as for example,
prevention of drug trafficking and border control, goes in mutually satisfying way, under the
programmes CAPAD and BOMCA.
I hope, this confirms my second hypothesis, that “despite of the difference in values
of the strategic culture of the EU and Kazakhstan, the cooperation between two is possible,
even it meets some serious challenges”
Which are the implications for EU? The cooperation with Kazakhstan is a good test
for its ability to be a global security player and to act in security field out of its own territory.
My research shows that EU is not successful then and there, where it tries to construct
“another Europe” instead of take into consideration the specific characteristics of local
security culture. This does not mean that EU should cede form its core values, or compromise
with them but that it has no chance to implement in Central Asia conditionality, close to
55
accession-driven conditionality. The analysis shows also that the clearer interests are
designed, the better cooperation could be stated.
At the basis of the above mentioned, I would recommend the next to EU concerning
its future cooperation in security field with Kazakhstan:
Adopt more pragmatic approach in the relations with Kazakhstan
Recognize the differences and identify commonalities between the security culture
values shared by the two sides
Base its strategy not only on values, but on interests
Find the golden middle between values and interests in constructing its future
strategy for cooperation with Kazakhstan in security field
Recognize the differences between Kazakhstan and the other countries from Central
Asia in terms of stability, security, economic potential
Understand the political, geopolitical and economic importance of Kazakhstan and
take concrete measures to successfully retake its positions as core partner, despite
the aggressive presence of Russia and China and the influence of USA
Keep setting "good example" and norms, by transferring experience and good
practices and helping the enforcement of rule of law state
(24 648 words)
56
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122. UN concerned at disappearance in Kazakhstan. Scoop Independent News
123. United Nations Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism annex to UN General
Assembly resolution 49/60, "Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism", of December 9, 1994,
124. VELDE, Roel. 2013 'Inteligence and strteic culture. Inteligence and national security', Routledge
125. WÆVER, O., 1995. Securitization and Desecuritization. In: R. Lipschutz, ed. On security. New York:
Columbia University, 46–86.
126. WALT, S. M. 1991 'The Renaissance of Security Studies. International Studies Quarterly' in Buzan,
B., Weaver, O. and de Wilde, J. 1998 'Security – A New Framework for Analysis', Colorado: Lynne
Rinner Publishers, Inc., Boulder.
127. WELDES, J. (1999) Constructing National Interests: The United States and the Cuban Missile Crisis,
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press
128. WELT, Cory. 2005. POLITICAL CHANGE AND BORDER SECURITY REFORM IN EURASIA:
The
Case
of
Georgia,
The
Nonproliferation
Review,
12:3,
503-537,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10736700600601541 , p. 503
129. WINTROBE, Ron. Economics at Western
130. World Report 2014: Kazakhstan, 18.04.2014, Human Rights Watch
131. YEMELINOVA, G.M. 2013. Islam, national identity and politics in contemporary Kazakhstan
132. YINGER, J. Milton. 1970 'The Scientific Study of Religion. London' The Macmillan Company
60
133. АЗАРОВ, Алексей. 06.03.2013 'Дискуссии вокруг «Кок-Жайляу»: от экологии до идеологии',
Радио Азаттык, http://rus.azattyq.org/
134. Выступление Президента Республики Казахстан Н.А.Назарбаева на XX сессии Ассамблеи
народа Казахстана «Стратегия «Казахстан - 2050»: один народ – одна страна - одна судьба»,
24.04.2013,
http://www.akorda.kz/ru/page/page_213672_vystuplenie-prezidenta-respublikikazakhstan-n-a-nazarbaeva-na-xx-sessii-assamblei-naroda-kazakhstana
135. Доклад
Терроризм
в
Казахстане.
2012.
RRREGNUM,
27.11.,
http://www.regnum.ru/news/1598478.html
136. Закон
Республики
Казахстан
«О
противодействии
экстремизму».
http://stopsekta.kz/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=99:-l-r&catid=37:2010-05-03-09-1142&Itemid=60
137. Закон Республики Казахстан о «религиозной деятельности и религиозных объединениях»
138. Закон Республики Казахстан о национальной безопасности Республики Казахстан (с
изменениями по состоянию на 11.04.2014 г.)
139. Институт политических решении. 2012. Доклад Терроризм в Казахстане. 27.11.
http://www.regnum.ru/news/1598478.html
140. Казахстан: Угрозы национальной безопасности, 10.09.2013, Центрально азиатский портал
141. Казахстанский институт стратегических исследований при Президенте РК. 2010. УРОВЕНЬ
СОЦИАЛЬНОЙ КОНФЛИКТНОСТИ:ПОТЕНЦИАЛЬНЫЕ РИСКИ И УГРОЗЫ (по результатам
социологического исследования), Алмата, р. 20
142. Казахстанский институт стратегических исследований при Президенте РК. 2010. УРОВЕНЬ
СОЦИАЛЬНОЙ КОНФЛИКТНОСТИ:ПОТЕНЦИАЛЬНЫЕ РИСКИ И УГРОЗЫ (по результатам
социологического исследования), Алмата, р. 21
143. Казахстанский институт стратегических исследований при Президенте РК. 2010. УРОВЕНЬ
СОЦИАЛЬНОЙ КОНФЛИКТНОСТИ:ПОТЕНЦИАЛЬНЫЕ РИСКИ И УГРОЗЫ (по результатам
социологического исследования), Алмата, р. 19
144. КАРИН,
Ерлан.
2014.
«В
террористы
идут
безработные».
1.04.
http://news.headline.kz/mneniya_i_kommentarii/erlan_karin_v_terroristyi_idut_bezrabotnyie.html
145. КАШКЕЕВА, Жибек. 16.04.2005 'Судимых и иностранцев – вон из редакторов, предлагают
некоторые депутаты', Радио Азаттык, http://rus.azattyq.org/
146. KONDAKOV, Todor. 2009. The traditional against fundamentalist Islam – the example of Chechnia.
http://members.tripod.com/~konservativen_forum/doclad.htm (In Bulgarian)
147. МАВЛОНИЙ, Дильбегим. 30.10.2009 'Власть рассматривает религию как угрозу, так как
верующие – свободные люди, считают эксперты', Радио Азаттык, http://rus.azattyq.org/
148. Назарбаев поручил создать специальный штаб для обеспечения безопасности ЭКСПО-2017,
26.02.2014, http://today.kz
149. О Государственной программе по противодействию религиозному экстремизму и терроризму в
Республике Казахстан на 2013 - 2017 годы, Указ Президента Республики Казахстан от 24
сентября 2013 года № 648 http://adilet.zan.kz/rus/docs/U1300000648
150. Оценка населением эффективности деятельности органов государственного управления
(региональный социологический срез), 26.11.2012, Сауран Информационно-аналитический
центр
151. Послание Президента Республики Казахстан - Лидера нации Нурсултана Назарбаева народу
Казахстана «Стратегия «Казахстан-2050»: новый политический курс состоявшегося
государства» 14.12.2012,
http://www.akorda.kz/ru/page/page_poslanie-prezidenta-respublikikazakhstan-lidera-natsii-nursultana-nazarbaeva-narodu-kazakhstana152. Послание Президента страны народу Казахстана, 14.12.2012, http://www.akorda.kz
153. Приоритетность стабильности и нацбезопасности в РК не «подлежит никакой ревизии» Назарбаев, 30.01.2014, http://newskaz.ru/
154. Процветание, безопасность и улучшение благосостояния всех казахстанцев, Казахстан - 2030,
послание Президента страны народу Казахстана, http://www.akorda.kz
155. Современное состояние общественно-политической ситуации, глазами молодежи, 01.2014,
Научно-Исследовательский Центр «Молодёжь»Melvin, Neil J. 2008. "Engaging Central Asia: The
European Union's New Strategy in the Heart of Eurasia. CEPS Paperbacks. May 2008
156. Стратегия «Казахстан-2050»: культура мира, духовности и согласия. Выступление Президента
Казахстана Нурсултана Назарбаева на XXI сессии Ассамблеи народа Казахстана. Kaзахстанская
правда, 19.04.2014, http://www.kazpravda.kz/ida.php?ida=54848
157. ТОГУЗБАЕВ, Казис. 20.05.2011 'Идеи Сахарова, или Начало правозащитных движений в
Казахстане', Радио Азаттык, http://rus.azattyq.org/
61
10. LIST OF EXPERTS UNTERVIEWED FOR THEPROPOSES OF THIS RESERCH
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Dr. Botagoz Rakisheva (Kazakhstan), director of the Reserch institute of public opinion, Astana,
Kazakhstan
His excellency Kamen Velichkov (Bulgaria), Head of Political Press and Information section of the EU
Delegation in Kazakhstan
Mr. Murad Mohamedjan (Kazakhstan), imam, Akmola region
Mr. Rafik Tairov (Kazakhstan), Center for strategic studies with the Ministry of Defence of Kazakhstan
Prof. Svetlana Kozhirova (Kazakhstan), Eurasian National University
Prof. Tatyana Drozina (Bulgaria), director of the Institute of peace, conflicts and mediation, University
Kokshe, Kazakhstan
An expert of KNB (by his request I don’t publish his name)
11. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
APC - Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation
ARA - Agency of Religious Affair, known
BOMCA - Border Management Programme in Central Asia
CA - Central Asia
CADAP - Central Asia Drug Action Programme
CAREC - Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation Programme
CARICC - Central Asian Regional Information & Coordination Centre
CFSP - Common Foreign and Security Policy
CFSP - Common Foreign and Security Policy and the
CIS - Commonwealth of Independent States
CMSR - Center of Military and strategic studies
CMSR - Center of Military and strategic studies
CSDP - Common Security and Defence Policy
CSDP - Common Security and Defence Policy
CSTO - Collective Security Treaty Organization
DAMOS – Drug Epidemiology Data Base Collection and Development
DPUs - Drug Profiling Units
DUMK – Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of Kazakhstan
EMCDDA - European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction
ESS - European Security Strategy
ETA - Basque separatist organization
EU - European Union
EurAsEC - Eurasian Economic Community
GIZ - Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
HT - Hisb ut-Tahrir
IMU - Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
IRA - Irish Republican Army
MEDISSA - Media and Dissemination Strategies
NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OSCE - Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PCA - Partnership and Cooperation Agreement
RATS SCO - Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure of Shanghai Cooperation Organization
RK - Republic of Kazakhstan
SCO - Shanghai Cooperation Organization
SNP - The European Union and Central Asia: strategy for new partnership
TACIS - Technical Assistance to the CIS
TREAT - Treatment Methodologies
UNDP - United Nations Development Programme
URSS - Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
USA, US - United States (of America)
WMD - weapons of mass destruction
62
12. List of analyzed materials
12.1. Discourse analysis
12.1.1. Official EU documents
1. The European Union and Central Asia: strategy for new partnership (SNP) (2007)
2. A Secure Europe In A Better World, European Security Strategy, (December 2003)
3. Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) (1999)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
3.1.1. Laws and official documents
Law on Religion of RK, 11 October 2013 № 483-IV
Закон Республики Казахстан о национальной безопасности Республики Казахстан (с
изменениями по состоянию на 11.04.2014 г.)
Program for Counteractive Measures Against Extremism and Terrorism in the Republic of
Kazakhstan 2013-2017
Law of National Security of RK (6.01.2012, № 527-IV)
Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan “On counteractive measures against extremism”, accepted on
26 February 2005
Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated from 13 July 1999 № 416-I, On Countering Terrorism
Extremism law of Russia, 2005
7.1.1. Presidential addresses and speeches
Приоритетность стабильности и нацбезопасности в РК не «подлежит никакой ревизии» Назарбаев, 30.01.2014
Стратегия «Казахстан-2050»: культура мира, духовности и согласия. Выступление
Президента Казахстана Нурсултана Назарбаева на XXI сессии Ассамблеи народа
Казахстана. Kaзахстанская правда, 19 апреля 2014
Выступление Президента Республики Казахстан Н.А.Назарбаева на XX сессии Ассамблеи
народа Казахстана «Стратегия «Казахстан - 2050»: один народ – одна страна - одна судьба»,
24.04.2013
Выступление Президента Республики Казахстан Н.А.Назарбаева на XIX сессии Ассамблеи
народа Казахстана, 27.04.2012. КАЗАХСТАНСКИЙ ПУТЬ: СТАБИЛЬНОСТЬ, ЕДИНСТВО,
МОДЕРНИЗАЦИЯ
Послание Президента Республики Казахстан - Лидера нации Нурсултана Назарбаева народу
Казахстана «Стратегия «Казахстан-2050»: новый политический курс состоявшегося
государства» 14.12.2012
Послание Президента страны народу Казахстана „Процветание, безопасность и улучшение
благосостояния всех казахстанцев“, Казахстан - 2030, 28.02.2007
Назарбаев, Н. 2003. Критичное десятилетие. Астана, Казахстан (откъси)
7.1.1. Speeches of other official institutions and leaders
1. Карин, Ерлан. 2014. «В террористы идут безработные». 1.04. 2014 (Karin, Erlan.
"Unemployed people become terrorists")
2. Институт политических решении. 2012. Доклад Терроризм в Казахстане. (Institute for
political decisions. 2012. Report on the terrorism in Kazakhstan)
2.1. Content analysis
2.1.1. Radio Azattyq
1. АЗАРОВ, Алексей. 06.03.2013 'Дискуссии вокруг «Кок-Жайляу»: от экологии до
идеологии', Радио Азаттык, http://rus.azattyq.org/
2. ТОГУЗБАЕВ, Uазис. 20.05.2011 'Идеи Сахарова, или Начало правозащитных
движений в Казахстане', (The ideas of Saharov, or the Beginning of the Human Rights
movement, 20.05.2011) Радио Азаттык, http://rus.azattyq.org/ The ideas of Saharov, or
the Beginning of the Human Rights movement, 20.05.2011
3. МАВЛОНИЙ, Дильбегим. 30.10.2009 'Власть рассматривает религию как угрозу,
так как верующие – свободные люди, считают эксперты', (“The authorities consider
religion as threat, as believers - free people, believe experts") Радио Азаттык,
63
4.
http://rus.azattyq.org/ “The authorities consider religion as threat, as believers - free
people, believe experts" (30.10.2009)
КАШКЕЕВА, Жибек. 16.04.2005 'Судимых и иностранцев – вон из редакторов,
предлагают некоторые депутаты',(“Foreign people or people on trial should not be
editors” ) Радио Азаттык, http://rus.azattyq.org/ “Foreign people or people on trial
should not be editors” (12. 04. 2005)
64