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New Economics of Science, Economics of Scientific Knowledge and Sociology of
Science: the Case of Paul David.
“Definitions are the soul of law, but not, we venture, the gist of the economics of science”
(Mirowski 2011, 142);
“There are almost as many definitions of the ‘economics of science’ as there are practitioners”
(Tyfield, 2011 forthcoming).
_________________________
Introduction
The development of a social epistemology, controversies about recent scientific
advances (such as the human genome project) and the evolution of the
organizational structure of universities have generated a renewed interest for social
studies of science, among which the economics of science.
For a little more than twenty years, the terminology used in the economics of science
has changed significantly with the development of expressions such as "the new
economics of science" (NES) and "the economics of scientific knowledge" (ESK). This
article seeks to shed a light on the use of these different terminologies by taking
examples from Paul David’s work. We have chosen this author not only because he is
the co-author of the seminal article of the new economics of science (Dasgupta &
David 1994) but also because, a few years later (David 1998), he wrote an article
regarded as belonging to the field of the economics of scientific knowledge (Bonilla
2005). David is in our opinion the ideal candidate to show the definitional
ambiguities now going through the field of the economics of science, especially since
he considers his article written in 1998 as making part of the "new economics of
science”. Our study is further motivated by the fact that, to our knowledge, no other
articles have yet focused on the economic methodology of Paul David.
Due to the polysemous nature of the terminology used to describe Paul David’s
research, several interpretations can be made. One could consider that the
economics of scientific knowledge is the same field as the new economics of science
(Hands 2001) and in this case the problem is purely discharged; or one could instead
consider that the analysis provided by Bonilla is simply incorrect; or that it is David
himself who has failed to perceive the special characteristics of his 1998 article
compared to the one published in 1994. We reject each of these three solutions to
defend a more subtle thesis: if the object of study of David’s 1998 article corresponds
to that of ESK as interpreted, the sociological foundations of this paper are those of
the new economics of science, namely the Mertonian sociology of science. Hence,
whereas the object of David’s study changed between these two articles, from
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institutional questions to epistemic ones, his sociological background remained the
same. We show this in three main parts.
A first section focuses on NES with the study of the seminal paper by
Dasgupta and David (1994). This allows us to propose a definition of NES that will
be used to compare it with ESK in the next sections.
A second part studies and discusses the main definitions of ESK found in the
literature (Hands 1994, 1997, 2001; Shi 2001; Bonilla 2005). This enables us to propose
our own definition of ESK, and to take David’s 1998 paper as an example of it.
A third step is dedicated to examine the sociological background of the two
David’s papers (1994; 1998). We analyse David’s use of the Mertonian framework in
1994 and in 1998, and his rejection of the sociology of scientific knowledge in this
later article.
In conclusion, we show what could be the broader consequences for ESK.
New Economics of Science
We can nowadays identify three main ‘types’ of economics of science: the “old
economics of science” (ES), the “new economics of science” (NES), and the
“economics of scientific knowledge” (ESK). In this first part, we will briefly deal with
the old economics of science and focus deeper on NES. The study of the seminal
paper by Dasgupta and David (1994) will allow us to propose a definition of NES.
(Very) Short Indications on the Old Economics of Science.
The first type of economics of science appeared in the sixties with the publication of
the seminal articles of Arrow (1962) and Nelson (1959)1. Published during the Cold
War when scientific competition took the foreground (Leslie 1993), these papers tried
to measure the impact of scientific research on growth, and sought solutions to the
problem of production of scientific knowledge understood as a public good and thus
under-produced if only left to market forces (Stephan 1996). For Sent (1999, 101):
“This so-called old economics of science consisted of an institutional approach to
science, an argument that science is a market, a unity-of-science approach and a clear
definition of the organizational framework of scientific research”. Economic
representation of the process of scientific production is at this time the "linear model"
in which public funds are invested into basic research which leads to
commercializable goods and, in fine, to social benefits (Godin 2006; Mirowski 2011).
If the definition proposed by Sent is a good summary of the oldest approach, we can
discuss the claim that it was an “institutional” one. Indeed, it is important to note
that for this old type of economics study of science, norms and organizational forms
governing the activity of scientists (institutions) are regarded as exogenous and not
belonging to the scope of the economic analysis but to the sociological one. In the
next section, we will see that it is no longer the case in the new economics of science.
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We do not mean that there was not economics study of science before this time. Indeed, one of the precursors is
the American pragmatist philosopher C. S. Peirce with his “Note on the Theory of the Economy of Research”
(1879) (see Rescher 1976; Wible 1994a, 2008).
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The New Economics of Science by Dasgupta and David (1994).
The latest developments in the economics of science are most often attributed to the
new economics of science (NES) and its seminal paper "Toward a New Economics of
Science" by Dasgupta & David published in Research Policy in 19942. Before going
further in the characterization of the relationship between NES and ESK, we must
first provide a definition of NES. For Sent (1999, 102): « This so-called new economics
of science consists of a contextual approach to science, an argument that science
cannot be commodified, a disunity-of-science approach and a questioning of the
units of the organization in science ». If this definition allows us to take the measure
of the gap between the old economics of science and the new economics of science
broadly speaking, we will here provide a definition of NES as reflected by the
seminal paper of Dasgupta and David (1994). This will allow us to see what David
himself means by the expression of NES.
For Dasgupta and David, NES is a way to remedy the shortcomings of the old
economics of science by providing a useful analytical framework for empirical
research and public policy debates. The authors then identify three main areas
questionned by NES: those of the production, the dissemination and the use of
knowledge. Crucially, NES seeks to answer these questions by taking into account, at
the difference of the old economics of science, the uncertainty of the knowledge
production process, the incompleteness and asymmetric nature of information, and
the role of institutions:
« It makes use of insights from the theory of games of incomplete information to
synthesize the classic approach of Arrow and Nelson in examining the implications
of the characteristics of information for allocative efficiency in research activities,
on the one hand, with the functionalist analysis of institutional structures, reward
systems and behavioural norms of ‘open science’ communities-associates with the
sociology of science in the tradition of Merton-on the other ». (Dasgutpta & David
1994, 487).
A first distinction between NES and ESK appears: while NES gets an article that institutionalizes and
lays the groundwork for its research program, ESK does not. Some institutional elements are
important to understand why the term "new economics of science" is more widespread among the
economic profession than "economics of scientific knowledge". We can take the example of the
“Conference on the Need for a New Economics of Science”, hold at the University of Notre Dame in
1997 and note the ambiguous assimilation between NES and ESK in its call for papers
(http://www.mail-archive.com/pen-l@galaxy.csuchico.edu/msg11948.html - emphasis added):
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« The different perspectives on (quasi-)economics of science and/or scientific
knowledge can be organized in terms of old and new economics of science. Old
economics of science consists of an institutional approach to science, an
argument that science is a market, a unity-of science approach, and a
clear definition of the organizational framework of scientific research.
New economics of science consists of a contextual approach to science,
an argument that science cannot be commodified, a disunity-of science
approach, and a questioning of the units of organization in science ».
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« […] the new economics of science has the two-fold ambition of (1) exposing the
underlying logic of the salient institutions of science, and (2) examining
implications of those differentiating institutional features fro the efficiency of
economic resource allocation within this particular sphere of human action. » (ibid,
492).
To sum up, and following the seminal work of Dasgupta and David, we can say that
NES corresponds to:
The economic study of production, dissemination and use of
knowledge, using the tools of modern economic theory (asymmetric
information, game theory, dynamic processes etc.) and relying on the
results of the traditional economics of science and functionalist
sociology of science in the tradition of Merton.
In what follows, we will stick to this working definition of NES, in order to be able to
compare it with David’s 1998 paper. In the next section, we review the main
definitions of ESK found in the literature and propose our own. This will allow us to
argue that David’s 1998 work better fits ESK.
Economics of Scientific Knowledge
ESK has not yet been the object of a seminal article and thus does not possess a
stabilized definition. The difficulty to define ESK is such that Bonilla considers that
"it is very difficult, if not impossible, to give a comprehensive definition of the ESK”
(2005, 2). Moreover, the literature using this expression is thin, and the question of
his status is an open one (e.g. Is it a field? A research program? Is it still economics?). In
the two next sections, we first discuss and propose a working definition of ESK, and
we show why David’s 1998 work can enter this category.
Searching For a Definition
Before proposing a definition of ESK, we begin here by examining the different
definitions of ESK found in the literature in chronological order (Hands 1994, 1997,
2001; Shi 2001; Bonilla 2005). Wade Hands is the first one to have proposed an
analysis of what ESK could be. In 1994 he wrote:
« If we mirror the distinction between the sociology of science and the sociology of
scientific knowledge, then the economics of science would be the application of
economic theory, or ideas found in economic theory, to explaining the behaviour of
scientists and/or the intellectual output of the scientific community. That is, given
the goals of the individual scientists or those of the scientific community (for
example, the ‘pursuit of truth’) the economics of science might be used to explain
the behaviour of those in the scientific community or to make recommendations
about how those goals might be achieved in a more efficient manner. In this way
the economics of science would relate to science in precisely the way that
microeconomics has typically related to the firms in the market economy. […] On
the other hand, the economics of scientific knowledge (ESK) would involve
economics in a philosophically more fundamental way. The ESK would involve
economics, or at least metaphors derived from economics, in the actual
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characterization of scientific knowledge – that is, economics would be involved
fundamentally in the epistemological discourse regarding the nature of scientific
knowledge. Like the SSK argues that scientific knowledge comes to be constructed out of a
social process, the ESK would argue that scientific knowledge comes to be constructed out
of an economic process ». (Hands 1994, 87- last emphasis added).
The problem here is the distinction made between social and economic factors. What if
we reasonably assume that economic processes are a subset of social processes in the
broad sense?
In 1997, Hands proposes the same kind of definition:
« I will follow the earlier distinction between the sociology of science and the
sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) with the distinction between the economics
of science and the economics of scientific knowledge (ESK): where ESK concerns the
content of scientific knowledge as well as the social-economic factors affecting its growth
and development. The caveat in note 5 holds here as well (perhaps more so) » (Hands
1997, 725 f. n. 12 – emphasis added).
Note first that, this time, economic factors are no longer opposed to social ones but
are part of “social-economic factors”. Secondly, Hands adds the “growth and
development of scientific knowledge” to his definition, and that is why he is led to
implicitly mix ESK and NES. We consider below the caveat Hands refers to:
« While it is useful to maintain the distinction between sociology of science and
SSK (Hands 1994a), I must also admit that the distinction is very crisp and can be
difficult to apply in particular cases. One problem is that these attitudes fall along a
continuum and often do not fit into either one of these two distinct categories, and
an other problem is that there is frequently a lot of slippage within a particular text
or between an author’s works at two different points in time. As I think, it is a
useful but imperfect, conceptual tool ». (Hands ibid, f. n. 5).
Four remarks regarding the two above citations can be made.
First, Hands only refers to two types of economics of science and implicitly
considers here that NES is the same thing that ESK or the ES, since NES is not
mentioned.
Secondly, and this is an important point, saying that ESK is at the ES what SSK is at
the SS doesn’t say anything about the use of SSK and/or the SS made by ESK or the
ES.
Thirdly, we also have to point out that Hands considers that SS and SSK are not so
different. If true, the opposition between NES and ESK could not reflect the
opposition between the SS and SSK, since they are considered to be the same thing:
we would thus have only one type of economics of science and not even two. Not only is
NES implicitly thought to be the same as ESK but while examining the consistency of
Hand’s position we thus also have to say that ES equals NES equals ESK.
Finally, even if we could think that Hands actually considers ES to be different
from NES, his argument would be ambiguous. How could the difference between the
SS and SSK reflects the difference between the ES and NES (= ESK) (as it is said in the
above citation) whereas the sociological background of Dasgupta and David (NES) is
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the traditional sociology of science (SS) and that the traditional economics of science
doesn’t make any use of sociological analysis?
In Reflection Without Rules (2001), Hands is this time explicit about his assimilation of
ESK and NES:
« […] the economics profession is also engaged in in the production of its own
version(s) of the ESK: the so-called new economics of science. The economists actually
involved in the research employ the adjective “new” primarily to differentiate their
own theoretical approches – which involve game theory, bounded rationality,
transaction costs, and more attention to institutions – from the earlier economics of
science, but this literature is also “new” in another sens as well; it is much more
explicit about normative epistemology and the cognitive evauation of the various
sceintific institutions it considers. In other word, it is ESK and not just the (old)
economics of science». (Hands 2001, 373 – last emphasis added).
This definition, which equates NES and ESK is actually common in the literature. We
can take the example of Downes, whose paper title is "Agents and Norms in the New
Economics of Science", but whose first line is: "The Economics of science I talk about
in this article is an economics of scientific knowledge: the attempt to account for the
development of scientific knowledge by using economic models" (Downes 2001, 224 emphasis added). Still in Reflection, Hands completes this thesis by arguing that the ES
is to ESK what microeconomics is to welfare economics. The economics of scientific
knowledge would thus be a normative kind of economics of science:
« […] ESK, like SSK, would address the question of whether the epistemologically
right stuff is being produced in the economy of science; ESK mixes economics and
normative science theory. The distinction between the economics of science and ESK
mirrors not only the difference between sociology of science and SSK, but also the
traditional distinction between microeconomics and welfare economics. Microeconomics,
it is usually argued, predicts and/or explains the behavior of economic agents,
whereas welfare economics focuses on the question of whether the social
configuration produced as a result of the actions of these agents is “optimal” or
“efficient”. Now, the standards for efficiency in welfare economics have
traditionally been rooted in the utility of the agents themselves – and thus, is
grounded (at least at its core) in ethics, not epistemology – but it is a relatively
short jump to ESK, where the question is whether the behavior of the scientific
agents brings about a social configuration that is epistemically “optimal” or
“efficient”. The economics of science predicts and/or explains the behavior of
scientists and scientific institutions, whereas ESK adds the question of whether
those actions and institutions produce scientific products that are cognitively
efficient or optimal (or if they are not optimal, how the institutions might be
changed in order to improve epistemic efficiency). While the distinction between the
economics of science and ESK owes much to the distinction between the sociology of science
and SSK, the barrier separating the economics of science from ESK is even more permeable
than the one separating the sociology of science from SSK. This said, I still find the
distinction useful [...] » (Hands 2001, 360-1 – emphasis added).
This time, Hands emphasizes the normative side of ESK. If we keep in mind that
ESK seeks to study the content of scientific production from an economic
perspective, it does not follow that it has to be normative. SSK also deals with the
content of scientific production but, as a methodological principle, rejects any
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normative statement. We argue that if ESK can be normative (and indeed it
sometimes is) it can not be a necessary condition for its definition. Moreover, welfare
considerations are also present in the “old” economics of science, and thus can not
be used to define the originality of the economics of scientific knowledge. As
Mirowski puts it: “In attempting to frame an economics of science as a subset of
welfare economics, Arrow and Nelson repeatedly suggested that the greatest flaw in
market provision of research would be failure in arriving at Pareto optimality; that
was a static (and perhaps totally empirically inaccessible) notion of welfare that had
not been a pressing concern of writers on the subject since at least Bernal and
Polanyi” (Mirowski 2011, 59).
Another recent contribution in ESK is made by Shi (2001) with The Economics of
Scientific Knowledge - a Rational Choice Theory Neo-Instituionalist of Science. If Shi’s
project poses a number of theoretical issues (Wible 2004), we will focus here on his
definition of ESK. While Shi acknowledges his intellectual debt to Hands (Shi 2001,
vii), he nevertheless adopts a different definition by clearly distinguishing NES and
ESK:
« In economic studies of science, quasi-economic models of science or economics of
scientific knowledge have been advocated by philosophy-orientated economists
end economics-orientated philosophers over many years. Essentially, it focuses on
the issues about in what senses the processes of scientific knowledge production
are similar to those of economic exchange and market. Therefore, it must be
distinguished from the so-called ‘new economics of science’, which has recently been
developed by economists taking an interest in science policy issues, such as the relationship
between proprietary R&D and university-based research, research resource allocation
within the public sector and the role of intellectual property rights». (Shi 2001, xvi –
emphasis added).
For us, the most important problem with this definition is that it adopts a
controversial definition of NES. Remind the definition of NES that we provided
when studying Dasgupta and David’s seminal paper. In our opinion, Shi can not
distinguish NES from ESK since his definition of ESK is very close to the definition
of NES proposed by Dasgupta and David. The distinction between ESK and NES
made by Shi is thus hardly sustainable since it relies on a highly questionable
definition of NES and, thereby, of ESK.
We finally turn to Bonilla (2005), the most recent attempt to define ESK. For him, a «
working definition » of ESK consists of:
« […] the application of concepts and methods of economic analysis to the study of the
epistemic nature and value of scientific knowledge » (Zamora Bonilla 2005, 2 – original
emphasis).
For the author, the consequence of this definition is to take ESK out from economics
to make it a part of epistemology:
« […] it entails that ESK will be considered here more as a branch of epistemology than as
a branch of economics: economic concepts and methods are the tools, but scientific
knowledge is our object. » (ibid: 5 – original emphasis).
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This last quote is noteworthy regarding the definition of the boundaries between the
scientific fields. For Bonilla, it would be the object of study that determines the field
of study: as ESK deals with the epistemic nature of scientific knowledge, it is not
economics but epistemology. But, we could argue instead that it is the methods
which define a scientific discipline, as does the imperialistic movement in economics.
Our point is that this last citation does not logically derive (it does not “entails”) from
his definition of the field.
Finally, following Tyfield (forthcoming), the common problem with all theses
definitions is that they do not take into account economics conditions, but only the
analytical apparatus of economics as a discipline in dealing with the scientific
production. Hence, a more “complete” definition of the field would not only deal
with the economics but also with the economy. For us, then, a working definition of
ESK could be:
The study, thanks to the methods, tools, concepts of economics and
economic conditions of the epistemic value and nature of scientific
knowledge.
We will stick to this working definition of ESK when dealing with Paul David’s 1998
work in the next section, showing why it could fit this category.
David as an ESK Author
We now turn to the study of a later paper by David, « Communication Norms and
the Collective Cognitive Performance of ‘Invisible Colleges’ » (1998). For Bonilla
(2005, 28), « in some more recent papers […] David has articulated some ideas which
definitely belong into ESK field, particularly in David (1998), where he presents some
models about the behaviour of reputation seeking scientists when deciding what
opinion to express ». Indeed, as David deals with the nature (collective) and the value
(expressed in terms of performances) of scientific knowledge, we see that it fits the
definition of ESK provided above. Nevertheless, David himself thinks he is writing in
the field of the new economics of science:
“As transparent as are the purposes and the logic of this paper, some background
in the philosophy and sociology of science may be useful in order to situate it
within the broader context of studies that have concerned themselves with the
cognitive content of science and the intellectual and social organization of scientific
communities. […] I have tried to indicate how the present contribution to “the new
economics of science” fits within that larger enterprise” (David 1998, 116 – emphasis
added).
In order to show that the object of study better corresponds to ESK we study below
the object and results of this paper.
David assumes scientists to be rational agents whose beliefs evolve according to a
Bayesian process and who are influenced by the beliefs of other members within
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their network. Social interactions between researchers take place into ‘invisible
colleges’ defined as “informal structures of inter-personal knowledge-transactions”
(David 1998, 115)3. The question is how, from these individuals features and through
local network connections, a « collective cognitive performance » can be obtained.
The main result, found thanks to the use of Markov’s random field theory and the
percolation theory, is that a cognitive consensus is an emergent and path-dependent
feature of the network.
In the following, we sum up David’s demonstration (ibid, 138-9). The question is to
know if a scientist has to now be in conformity with the opinion of his peers,
assuming a subjective probability on the future state of the opinion. We note c for
being in conformity with the majority opinion of the network, and d for being in
disagreement. For the purpose of the example, David assumes that the current
opinion of the network is that the theory discussed is right, R. In the future, the
theory will be held either to be true (R’) or wrong (W). We note p the subjective
probability “assigned to the global consensus forming eventually” on R’. We thus
have four cases:
a: [c, R/R’]
b: [c, R/W]
c: [d, R/R’]
d:[d, R/W]
associated probability: p (since the consensus forms on R’)
associated probability: (1-p)
associated probability: p
associated probability: (1-p)
The expected utility of being in conformity is maximized when:
p.a + (1 - p).b > p.c + (1 - p).d
That is, when:
[(a – c) / (d – b)] > [(1 – p) /p]
A theory is then today adopted depending on the expected utility ratios and given
the subjective probability of this theory of being accepted in the future. This
probabilistic process is then represented by the Markovian graph theory. David
shows that global rejection or adoption of a theory are two “absorbing states” (i.e.
behaviours we can not escape once adopted) achieved in function of the number of
3 This concept is an old one. Indeed, it was used by Robert Boyle in the seventeenth century and more
recently popularized by Price (1963). For a discussion of this concept, see Collins (1974) and Crane
(1969). For David, rational agents maximizing utility are interested in joining these colleges for two
main reasons. The first is the "exchange value" of information. The simple idea is that, because of the
cognitive division of labour between researchers, participating in networks allows an individual
researcher to be able to resolve its potential problems much more effectively than in isolated
conditions. The second reason to join these networks is that they confer a status, and are a sign of
recognition from the scientific community (ibid, 127).
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agents accepting or rejecting T at the beginning of the process: that is why the
process is said to be path-dependent4.
We thus have an example of how economists can account for the content of the
scientific activity, namely the choice of a theory. It should also appear clearly that
the questions asked by David in this paper are very different from the ones he asked
in 1994. If institutional issues still remain important, he goes one step further in
asking how they impact the content of the scientific production.
In the first and second part, we focused on the economic side of David’s papers.
Nevertheless, he makes use of many sociological references in his two papers,
especially in the Mertonian tradition. In the next third part, we analyse the
sociological background of the two papers, showing David’s adherence to classical
sociology of science and rejection of the sociology of scientific knowledge.
Sociological Issues
Between the old and the new economics of science, the sociology of science has
known a great evolution with the development of the sociology of scientific
knowledge in the eighties. For the following, it is important to note here the
difference of questions asked by these two types of sociology of science. Whereas the
traditional sociology of science deals with the institutional structures of the scientific
production without talking about its content, SSK seeks to study the substantive
nature of the scientific production from a social point of view. As Collins (1983)
makes it clear:
“All the work coming under this heading [the sociology of science] could be said to turn on
the elucidation of the set of normative and other institutional arrangements that enable
science-the asking and answering of questions about Nature-to exist and function efficiently.
A crucial feature of this program of inquiry is the assumption that the ultimate
answers to the questions are Nature’s, mankind being only a mediator. Thus the
proper institutional prerequisites must obviate the effect of mundane disagreements
and biases. There must also be a reward system to encourage the vigorous pursuit of
the answers. It might be possible to say something about the direction of scientific
inquiry, but the answers become interesting to the sociologist only if they are wholly
men’s answers rather than Nature’s-that is to say, if they are not “properly” a part of
scientific knowledge. In the main, the content of scientific knowledge remained a closed
book within the enterprise. [See Merton (1945) for a programmatic discussion.] The
sociology of scientific knowledge, on the other hand, is concerned precisely with what comes to
count. The crucial phrase is “comes to count” since no knowledge of what lies hidden
beyond human scientific activity is claimed”. (Collins 1983, 266-7 – emphasis added).
In the following, we first study the Mertonian framework of NES, arguing that their
relationship is understandable since the two frameworks ask the same kind
(institutional) of questions. We then study the sociological framework of David’s
1998 paper, showing that he still relies on the Mertonian analysis, but that he goes
Indeed, formally, a process can not be said to be path-dependent if it has not at least two absorbing
states.
4
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one step further in rejecting SSK. We argue that this can be problematic because of
the difference of objects between the two papers.
New Economics of Science and Mertonian Framework
The link between the analysis of Dasgupta and David and the sociology of science in
the tradition of Merton is made through the integration of two of its most famous
themes in their paper, namely the analysis of the reward structures based on the
priority of discovery and the norm of information disclosure 5. References to classical
(Mertonian) sociology of science are indeed made explicit: “To carry out this
program [NES], we will be building upon the foundations laid down by the classic
contributions in the sociology of science […]” (Dasgupta & David 1994, 492). We
study here the way in which the two authors deal with these two main Mertonian
norms.
For the authors, a priority based reward system has two consequences: not only the
acceleration of the discoveries, but also that of their publication. This system is
rationally based becauce we can not judge the quality of a research before it is
published, and running priority is consistent with the incentives of individual
scientists. Moreover, and since there is no added value when a result is found twice,
a priority based reward system is also socially optimal. The problem is that, in a strict
system of priority, researchers from other ranks are not paid. However, Dasgupta
and David make the assumption that researchers are risk-adverse. Hence, a strict
system of remuneration based on priority could lead to the disappearance of
scientists, since they do not want to take the risk of not being the first to make a
discovery and not be paid for their research. Scientists must therefore have a fixed
salary plus bonuses which take into account criteria such as priority. Another defect
of such a priority based reward system would be that it could lead to a proliferation
of research programs. The time dimension becomes central to deal with this issue.
Instead of launching several projects at the same time, there may be significant
learning effects leading to the deepening of a particular research topic. A central
element for NES is therefore to escape the too static analysis framework of the old
economics of science to account for the historical effects of the interactions between
science and technology.
We now turn to the second main Mertonian concept used by the two authors, namely
the norm of public disclosure. Making public new discoveries has for the authors two
benefits: it serves to discover new knowledge and to get scientific judgment from
peers. But an aggregation problem arises. Indeed, the standard of published research
and cooperation among research teams is in tension with the wish of being the first
to publish results. At this stage of the analysis, (repeated) game theory is a tool used
for solving the problem of behavior among different rival researchers. The solution is
as follows: Dasgupta and David assume that two researchers are working on the
same problem composed of two sub-problems. Once a team has found out the result
These are the two main points treated by the authors, but they also cite, for example, the concept of
« multiple discoveries » (Dasgupta & David 1994, 506).
5
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of one of the two sub-problems, must it share (S) it with the other team or otherwise
keep such information (W)? If both teams share their results, they then publish
together. If the strategy followed by the researchers is (S, W) then it is the second
team who publishes since it has the two solutions, and vice versa in the case of (W, S).
If both play (W), each of them has to seek the solution of the second sub-problem.
The structure is typically that of the prisoner's dilemma, in which the outcome is
known to be socially suboptimal. Dasgupta and David escape this by using the
theory of repeated games with the possibility of punishment. In a game with more
than two agents, the advantage is given to small research networks who can more
easily detect the deviants and punish them more efficiently, because non-cooperative
agents will have more difficulty in finding other outsiders when they are members of
a small team.
The above show that Dasgupta & David import the concepts of the functionalist
Mertonian sociology of science, and inscribe them in an economic framework (using
game theory, risk aversion hypothesis etc.). This could have an important
consequence: removing the sociological substance of these concepts in order to make
them compatible with an economic rationale. We could thus think that social norms
studied by the sociologists and process of socialization of scientists have become
useless. But Dasgupta and David have anticipated this critique and answer as
follows concerning the norm of disclosure:
“Does this imply that the normative content of Merton’s communalistic norm of
disclosure is really redundant, and plays no role in fostering conditions of
cooperation among citizens of the Republic of Science? Not at all! For it can be
shown that networks of cooperative information-sharing will be more likely to form
spontaneously if the potential participants start by expecting others to cooperate
than if they expect ‘trust’ to be betrayed, and cooperative patterns of behavior will
be sustained longer if participants have reason to expect refusals to cooperate will
be encountered only in retaliation for transgressions on their part. […] It is evident
from this that even if the process of socialization among scientists were weak and imperfect,
the common ‘culture of Science’ makes it much more possible for the rule of priority to
engage the self-interest of researchers in reinforcing adherence to the norm of disclosure, at
least among a restricted circle of colleagues” (Dasgupta & David 1994, 504 – emphasis
added).
If NES makes use of the traditional sociology of science, the remaining question is
how it does so. The above citation shows that the economic rationale is more
sustainable when backed with social norms, but the later are not necessary
conditions to attain economic efficiency. The sentence “be more likely to form
spontaneously” quoted above is a typical way of David to make use of sociological
norms. Indeed, how could something formed spontaneously be at the same time ‘more
likely to be’?
In the next section, we study the way David deals with the sociology of science in his
1998 paper, showing that he still relies on the Mertonian framework, but adds a
rejection of the sociology of scientific knowledge that can be discussed.
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Mertonian Framework and Rejection of SSK in David’s 1998 Paper: “Plus ça change et plus
c’est la meme chose”6?
In his 1998 paper, David is much more explicit regarding his position about the
sociology of science: not only he still adopts the traditional Mertonian functionalist
sociology, but he also rejects the sociology of scientific knowledge:
« it is perhaps not surprising that the ‘new economics of science’ found it most
natural to start by reworking the area of organizational analysis originally
ploughed by Mertonian sociology of science, looking at the implications of certain
institutional arrangements for allocative efficiency in the production of generic
information that acquires a certain measure of reliability ; but not troubling itself over
the nature of reliability in this context, nor the details of the way that attribute of
information might be acquired, nor any of the other issues of socio-cognitive interaction
that have occupied the sociology of scientific knowledge” (David 1998, 120 – emphasis
added).
We study these two main points in the following.
First, David still relies on the functionalist sociology of science. His aim is to
reconcile the historically separate tradition of the study of the scientific institutions
and the study of the content of the production of scientific knowledge:
“[…] it is shown that the relationship between micro-levels behaviors of the
research units, on the one hand, and the macro-level cognitive performance of the
invisible college represented by the network of local networks, on the other hand,
have a quite direct correspondence with the functionalist sociology of science in the
tradition of Merton (1973)” (ibid, 117).
The way David deals with the Mertonian sociology of science is the same than in his
1994 paper, and indeed some passages about it are identical7. The point is still to
show that sociological norms can be grounded on an economic rationale.
Socialization is considered in a very specific way: it can help to reach the economic
efficiency more easily. From this point of view, “theses ‘norms’ of the Republic of
Science serve an important epistemological function” (155, original emphasis). This
also means that even if socialization eases the process, it can do without it:
“To restate the thrust of the foregoing discussion, it is possible that cooperative
behavior within a limited social sphere can emerge and be sustained without
requiring the prior perfect socialization of researchers to conform (altruistically) to
the norm of full disclosure and cooperation. This is a rather straightforward
instance in which insights from the theory of repeated games are applicable to
explaining cooperative behaviour among potentially rivalrous researchers” (ibid,
129).
By contrast with his paper about the new economics of science, David deals here
with the sociology of scientific knowledge. We have seen that one of the aims of
David’s paper is to reconcile the institutional analysis of the Mertonian tradition
6
7
David 1998, 119.
Indeed: “the following parallels material developed in Dasgupta and David [1994]” (ibid, 129 f. n. 22).
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with a study of the content of scientific production thanks to network analysis. For
him, if the traditional sociology of science can not deal with the content of scientific
production, the sociology of scientific knowledge can not deal with the
organizational structure of science8. These two types of sociological analyses would
thus be pretty much the same in that they could not cope with the interactions of
micro and macro levels:
“In the 1970’s a new generation of sociologists took up the sociology of scientific
knowledge – “SSK”, as it came to be styled. They insisted, with ample reason, that
the cognitive and the social dimensions of science should no longer remain
compartmentalized as distinct, specialized fields of inquiry [f. n. 5]. Instead, the
subject matter had to be seen in reality to be inseparable. This was held to be so,
because in “discourse” – within whose terms it was held possible to analyze
everything – social and cognitive contexts are thoroughly inter-penetrating and
mutually interactive. Left behind in the border-crossing rush of the SSK movement,
however, were the old sociology of science’s foci of attention, namely, the
institutionalized reward systems, the social norms and the relationship of these to
the organization of resource allocation within scientific communities. In the
evaluation of these academic transactions, as the case in other affairs, experience
sometimes seems to reaffirm the aphorism of the French: plus ça change, plus c’est la
même chose. The cognitive content of science and the macro-sociological,
organizational structures of scientific communities, once again, could not be held
simultaneously within the focus of scholarly attention” (ibid, 119).
However, this characterization of SSK seems at odds with some of the major work
done in the field. If SSK is different of the SS in its object, we agree with Hands
(1997- quoted above) when he says that we can find both in the same study. It is for
example the case of Schaffer and Shapin (1985) well known Leviathan and the Air
Pump: Hobbes, Boyle and the Experimental Life, in which (among other things) they
relate this controversy to a broader social philosophy.
David also considers the sociology of scientific knowledge when taking position in
the “culture wars” between realists and relativists. He wants to escape the battle by
advocating an evolutionary epistemology, which would represent a middle-ground.
For our purpose, it is worth noticing that, for David, the sociology of scientific
knowledge is on the side of the relativists (which here mean anti-realists):
“The Edinburgh “strong programme” for the sociology of scientific knowledge
proposed that the mechanism of consensus formation should be one that was
neutral with respect to eventual conclusion as to the validity or falsity of the
propositions. This was a useful departure, in asking sociologists of science to take
notice of what they had learned of a generic nature about belief-formation in
communities of specialized practitioners. It was a mistake, however, to suppose
that such a programme by it self would be sufficient to generate a useful sociology
of knowledge in modern scientific communities. This, surely is what Perutz (1996)
means when referring to the Second Law of Thermodynamics as not merely a
“social construction”, but something objectively real about the atomic makeup of
matter” (ibid, 144).
8
This also points out that, from an historical point of view, the sociology of science started from a macro
standpoint and has become more and more micro. This is typically the case with the French “actor network
theory”.
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The problem here is that sociologists of scientific knowledge are not the anti-realists
they are often depicted as. Regarding this issue, we can not talk of the sociology of
scientific knowledge, as Davis does, because there seems to be no consensus in the
field. For example, in Scientific Knowledge, a Sociological Analysis (1996), one of the
major books in SSK, B. Barnes, D. Bloor and J. Henry claim that they do not oppose
realism:
“Some sociologists see realism as a style or assumption that is to be opposed. Our
view is that it can be understood and illuminated by the finitist account already
developed” (ibid, x)
“Observation is rightly thought of as a channel or inlet through which the material
world around us makes its presence felt. To understand observation is therefore to
understand the role played by the reality of our environment in the formation of
beliefs about it. All too often the charge is made that sociologists of knowledge deny or
improperly minimize the role played this reality. Occasionally sociologists may have
given this impression, but by beginning with observation we want to emphasize
that this would be a misreading of the position developed here. The aim will be to show
how the sociological analysis of knowledge can and must proceed on the assumption that at
the basis of knowledge there lies a causal interaction between the knower and reality” (ibid,
1 – emphasis added).
It would also be relevant to note that accusations of relativism are not only made
against the “strong programme” but also against the entire field of the sociology of
science, including Mertonian theory. If David rejects SSK on the ground of its
supposed relativism, he should also ask this question regarding the traditional
sociology of science, and show why it would be less relativist (and then, for him,
more acceptable) than SSK.
It is also noteworthy that David seeks to reconcile SS and SSK with the use of
networks and an evolutionary epistemology. But why wanting to reconcile the two
approaches if SSK is thought as misleading? This ambiguity can also be seen when
David claims that NES can be a middle-ground between the traditional sociology of
science and SSK:
“[…] the extension of new economics of science in the indicate direction has something to
offer that has hitherto eluded studies in the SSK tradition. In those and other
explorations of the cognitive dimension of science, similarly based on networks
and inscriptions and the artifacts (to which those inscriptions refer and are referred
to in turn) there is general difficulty in knowing how to resolve a larger picture
from the microcosm of detailed filiations. One wants at the end of the day to know
how the workings of these micro-level networks are connected to the properties of
the macro-structure of scientific institutions; to the evolution of fields of scientific
endeavors that become organized through the extension of social networks and
their supporting apparatus of journals, conferences, professional societies, and
suchlike. What characterizes social networks in science? How do the behaviors of
the individual participants in scientific networks affect the ability of the collectivity
to do its work, and does a network’s cognitive-domain performance, that is to say,
in creating and validating knowledge, affect its opportunities for growth?
Questions of this sort crop up repeatedly on the critical “middle ground” between
the older and newer sociologies of science. The new economics of science should have
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something to offer by way of answers. So, it is precisely in that potentially hazardous noman’s-land that the present contribution is meant to stand” (David 1998, 123 –emphasis
added).
The problem here is that the imperialistic claim of David that NES can remedy the
supposed problems of SSK is based on the projection of David’s own concern on
SSK literature. David regrets here that the macro level of analysis would not be
studied by SSK authors. We have seen before that if it is true that compared to the
traditional sociology of science SSK focuses more on micro level, it does meant that
it rules out the macro level entirely. Furthermore, to criticise a field because it does
not ask the questions you would like it to ask seems to be a weak argument. The
claim that NES “has something to offer that has hitherto eluded studies in the SSK
tradition” is thus, for us, overstated.
Finally, even if David rejects SSK, it is ironical to see that some sociologists in the
field of SSK are interested in one of his most famous concept, namely the “path
dependency” (David 1988):
“An other area of mutual interest [between SSK and economics] is in the notions
like “path dependence” and the development of new markets. How a new
technology gets “locked in” to produce a “path dependence” is something quite
well understood in terms of the social construction of technology approach”
(Pinch, 1997: 749).
This shows that the relationship between SSK and ESK is somehow asymmetric:
whereas ESK is more often suspicious regarding SSK, the reverse is not true. This
can also be seen, for example, when sociologists such as Latour and Woolgar use
economic metaphors/concepts in their analysis (Hands 1994; Latour & Woolgar
1986; McClellan 1996).
Conclusion: Old Tools and New Objects.
Our aim, in this paper, was to try to provide some clarifications about the recent
development of expressions such as “new economics of science” and “economics of
scientific knowledge” in the field of the economics of science, taking the example of
one of its leading author, Paul David. The study of the seminal paper by Dasgupta
and David allowed us to define NES as the economic study of production,
dissemination and use of knowledge, using the tools of modern economic theory
(asymmetric information, game theory, dynamic processes etc.) and relying on the
results of the traditional economics of science and functionalist sociology of science
in the tradition of Merton. We then reviewed the main definitions of ESK and also
proposed a definition. A working definition of ESK could for us be the study, thanks
to the methods, tools, concepts of economics and the economic conditions of the
epistemic value and nature of scientific knowledge. We then took the example of a
later paper by David to show the difference between these two types of economics of
science. The second part of the paper was dedicated to the sociological background
of these two papers. We showed how David uses the Mertonian tradition in 1994
and in 1998 but, for this later article, also rejects SSK on disputable grounds.
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Our point is that, whereas one can understand why David relies on the Mertonian
framework in 1994, we could have expected that when he deals with the very
content of the scientific production in 1998, he would have rejected it in order to
make use of the insights provided by SSK. Instead, we have seen that he was still
relying on the classical sociology of science and was going further in rejecting SSK.
Thus, whereas the object of David’s study changed between these two articles, from
institutional questions to epistemic ones, his sociological background remained the
same.
For David, relying on Mertonian analysis while dealing with the content of scientific
production is not a problem when the link is made through network analysis. In
doing so, David makes, for us, a confusion between the distinction micro/macro and
the distinction institutions/content: “[…] it is shown that the relationship between
micro-level behaviors of the research unit, on the one hand, and the macro-level cognitive
performance of the invisible college represented by the network of local networks, on
the other hand, have a quite direct correspondence with the functionalist sociology
of science in the tradition of Merton (1973)” (David 1998, 117-emphasis added). First,
network analysis is most often represented as a way to escape the micro/macro
dichotomy in providing a meso analysis, which represents a level of analysis per se.
The claim that network analysis (only) provides a middle-ground between micro
and macro levels of analysis can thus be criticized in the first place. Secondly, David
seems to think that linking macro and micro levels is equal to linking epistemic to
institutional questions. One can hardly see why institutional questions are located at
the micro level and why epistemic one are located at the macro level9. These kinds of
issues are typically those pointed out by SSK, but since David rejects it, we could
understand why he does this kind of confusion.
What are the broader consequences?
The way ESK should rely on SSK has been recently debated. For Tyfield (2008), the
finitist account of meaning provided by SSK is a major philosophical issue, and for
this reason ESK could not be based on a SSK which would adopt this principle10. It is
worth noticing that the question raised by theses debates is: Can ESK be based on
SSK? Which is different from: How ESK can make use of SSK? For example,
Mirowski (2011) rejects the traditional sociology of science on the grounds that it is
too old fashioned to understand the actual current development of science
production, and makes use of insights coming from SSK literature. Even if ESK can
not be based on SSK, a crucial question is thus to know if it can still make use of it as a
sociological background and, if yes, in which way.
To be fair with David’s paper, we can find passages where he links macro level of analysis to
institutional questions. For example: “One wants at the end of the day to know how the workings of
these micro-level networks are connected to the properties of the macro-structure of scientific
institutions […]” (David 1998, 123). It only adds to the confusion.
10
See the critique of Giraud and Weintraub (2009) and the reply by Tyfield (2009).
9
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We thus can claim that ESK should also be very careful in making use of the
traditional sociology of science in order to avoid the epistemological dead-end of
their different objects of study and questions they ask.
But if ESK could not use the traditional sociology of science or the sociology of
scientific knowledge, the crucial point becomes: Is ESK condemned to have no
relations with the sociology of science just like the old economics of science? This
question opens the door to a history of the relationship between the economics of
science and the sociology of science, but that is an other story to be told.
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