200.
What are some of the recognized restrictions to the right of the people to information on matters
of public concern?
Held:
1)
National security matters and intelligence information. This jurisdiction recognizes the
common law holding that there is a governmental privilege against public disclosure with respect to state
secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other national security matters. Likewise, information on intergovernment exchanges prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive agreements may be subject to
reasonable safeguards for the sake of national interest;
2)
Trade or industrial secrets (pursuant to the Intellectual Property Code [R.A. No. 8293,
approved on June 6, 1997] and other related laws) and banking transactions (pursuant to the Secrecy of
Bank Deposits Act [R.A. No. 1405, as amended]);
3)
Criminal matters, such as those relating to the apprehension, the prosecution and the
detention of criminals, which courts may not inquire into prior to such arrest, detention and prosecution;
4)
Other confidential information. The Ethical Standards Act (R.A. No. 6713, enacted on
February 20, 1989) further prohibits public officials and employees from using or divulging “confidential
or classified information officially known to them by reason of their office and not made available to the
public.” (Sec. 7[c], ibid.) Other acknowledged limitations to information access include diplomatic
correspondence, closed door Cabinet meetings and executive sessions of either house of Congress, as
well as the internal deliberations of the Supreme Court.
(Chavez v. PCGG, 299 SCRA 744, Dec. 9, 1998 [Panganiban])
201.
Is the alleged ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses a matter of public concern subject to this right?
Held: With such pronouncements of our government, whose authority emanates from the people, there
is no doubt that the recovery of the Marcoses' alleged ill-gotten wealth is a matter of public concern and
imbued with public interest. We may also add that “ill-gotten wealth” refers to assets and properties
purportedly acquired, directly or indirectly, by former President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives
and close associates through or as a result of their improper or illegal use of government funds or
properties; or their having taken undue advantage of their public office; or their use of powers, influences
or relationships, “resulting in their unjust enrichment and causing grave damage and prejudice to the
Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.” Clearly, the assets and properties referred to
supposedly originated from the government itself. To all intents and purposes, therefore, they belong to
the people. As such, upon reconveyance they will be returned to the public treasury, subject only to the
satisfaction of positive claims of certain persons as may be adjudged by competent courts. Another
declared overriding consideration for the expeditious recovery of ill-gotten wealth is that it may be used
for national economic recovery.
We believe the foregoing disquisition settles the question of whether petitioner has a right to
respondents' disclosure of any agreement that may be arrived at concerning the Marcoses’ purported illgotten wealth. (Chavez v. PCGG, 299 SCRA 744, Dec. 9, 1998 [Panganiban])
Freedom of Association
202.
Does the right of civil servants to organize include their right to strike? Clarify.
Held:
Specifically, the right of civil servants to organize themselves was positively recognized in
Association of Court of Appeals Employees (ACAE) v. Ferrer-Calleja (203 SCRA 596, November 15, 1991).
But, as in the exercise of the rights of free expression and of assembly, there are standards for allowable
limitations such as the legitimacy of the purposes of the association , the overriding considerations of
national security and the preservation of democratic institutions (People v. Ferrer, 48 SCRA 382,
December 27, 1972, per Castro, J., where the Court, while upholding the validity of the Anti-Subversion
Act which outlawed the Communist Party of the Philippines and other "subversive" organizations,
clarified, "Whatever interest in freedom of speech and freedom of association is infringed by the
prohibition against knowing membership in the Communist Party of the Philippines, is so indirect and so
insubstantial as to be clearly and heavily outweighed by the overriding considerations of national security
and the preservation of democratic institutions in this country." It cautioned, though, that "the need for
prudence and circumspection [cannot be overemphasized] in [the law's] enforcement, operating as it
does in the sensitive area of freedom of expression and belief.")
As regards the right to strike, the Constitution itself qualifies its exercise with the proviso "in accordance
with law." This is a clear manifestation that the state may, by law, regulate the use of this right, or even
deny certain sectors such right. Executive Order No. 180 (Issued by former President Corazon C. Aquino
on June 1, 1987) which provides guidelines for the exercise of the right of government workers to
organize, for instance, implicitly endorsed an earlier CSC circular which "enjoins under pain of
administrative sanctions, all government officers and employees from staging strikes, demonstrations,
mass leaves, walkouts and other forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or
disruption of public service" (CSC Memorandum Circular No. 6, s. 1987, dated April 21, 1987) by stating
that the Civil Service law and rules governing concerted activities and strikes in the government service
shall be observed.
It is also settled in jurisprudence that, in general, workers in the public sector do not enjoy the right to
strike. Alliance of Concerned Government Workers v. Minister of Labor and Employment (124 SCRA 1,
August 3, 1983, also per Gutierrez, Jr., J.) rationalized the proscription thus:
"The general rule in the past and up to the present is that the 'terms and conditions of employment in
the Government, including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof are governed by law.' X x x.
Since the terms and conditions of government employment are fixed by law, government workers cannot
use the same weapons employed by the workers in the private sector to secure concessions from their
employers. The principle behind labor unionism in private industry is that industrial peace cannot be
secured through compulsion by law. Relations between private employers and their employees rest on
an essentially voluntary basis. Subject to the minimum requirements of wage laws and other labor and
welfare legislation, the terms and conditions of employment in the unionized private sector are settled
through the process of collective bargaining. In government employment, however, it is the legislature
and, where properly given delegated power, the administrative heads of government which fix the terms
and conditions of employment. And this is effected through statutes or administrative circulars, rules,
and regulations, not through collective bargaining agreements." (Ibid., p. 13)
After delving into the intent of the framers of the Constitution, the Court affirmed the above rule in Social
Security System Employees Association (SSSEA) v. Court of Appeals (175 SCRA 686, July 28, 1989) and
explained:
"Government employees may, therefore, through their unions or associations, either petition the
Congress for the betterment of the terms and conditions of employment which are within the ambit of
legislation or negotiate with the appropriate government agencies for the improvement of those which
are not fixed by law. If there be any unresolved grievances, the dispute may be referred to the Public
Sector Labor-Management Council for appropriate action. But employees in the civil service may not
resort to strikes, walkouts and other temporary work stoppages, like workers in the private sector, to
pressure the Government to accede to their demands. As now provided under Sec. 4, Rule III of the
Rules and Regulations to Govern the Exercise of the Right of Government Employees to SelfOrganization, which took effect after the instant dispute arose, '[t]he terms and conditions of
employment in the government, including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof and
government-owned and controlled corporations with original charters are governed by law and
employees therein shall not strike for the purpose of securing changes [thereto].'' (Ibid., p. 698)
(Jacinto v. Court of Appeals, 281 SCRA 657, Nov. 14, 1997, En Banc [Panganiban])
203.
Petitioners public school teachers walked out of their classes and engaged in mass actions during
certain dates in September 1990 protesting the alleged unlawful withholding of their salaries and other
economic benefits. They also raised national issues, such as the removal of US bases and the repudiation
of foreign debts, in their mass actions. They refused to return to work despite orders to do so and
subsequently were found guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interests of the service for having
absented themselves without proper authority, from their schools during regular school days, and
penalized. They denied that they engaged in “strike” but claimed that they merely exercised a
constitutionally guaranteed right – the right to peaceably assemble and petition the government for
redress of grievances - and, therefore, should not have been penalized. Should their contention be
upheld?
Held: Petitioners, who are public schoolteachers and thus government employees, do not seek to
establish that they have a right to strike. Rather, they tenaciously insist that their absences during
certain dates in September 1990 were a valid exercise of their constitutional right to engage in peaceful
assembly to petition the government for a redress of grievances. They claim that their gathering was not
a strike, therefore, their participation therein did not constitute any offense. MPSTA v. Laguio (Supra, per
Narvasa, J., now CJ.) and ACT v. Carino (Ibid.), in which this Court declared that "these 'mass actions'
were to all intents and purposes a strike; they constituted a concerted and unauthorized stoppage of, or
absence from, work which it was the teachers' duty to perform, undertaken for essentially economic
reasons," should not principally resolve the present case, as the underlying facts are allegedly not
identical.
Strike, as defined by law, means any temporary stoppage of work done by the concerted action of
employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute . A labor dispute includes any controversy or
matter concerning terms and conditions of employment; or the association or representation of persons
in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or arranging the terms and conditions of employment,
regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employers and employees . With
these premises, we now evaluate the circumstances of the instant petition.
It cannot be denied that the mass action or assembly staged by the petitioners resulted in the nonholding of classes in several public schools during the corresponding period. Petitioners do not dispute
that the grievances for which they sought redress concerned the alleged failure of public authorities essentially, their "employers" - to fully and justly implement certain laws and measures intended to
benefit them materially x x x. And probably to clothe their action with permissible character (In justifying
their mass actions, petitioners liken their activity to the pro-bases rally led by former President Corazon C.
Aquino on September 10, 1991, participated in, as well, by public school teachers who consequently
absented themselves from their classes. No administrative charges were allegedly instituted against any
of the participants.), they also raised national issues such as the removal of the U.S. bases and the
repudiation of foreign debt. In Balingasan v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 124678, July 31, 1997, per
Regalado, J.), however, this Court said that the fact that the conventional term "strike" was not used by
the participants to describe their common course of action was insignificant, since the substance of the
situation, and not its appearance, was deemed controlling.
Moreover, the petitioners here x x x were not penalized for the exercise of their right to assemble
peacefully and to petition the government for a redress of grievances. Rather, the Civil Service
Commission found them guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service for having
absented themselves without proper authority, from their schools during regular school days, in order to
participate in the mass protest, their absence ineluctably resulting in the non-holding of classes and in
the deprivation of students of education, for which they were responsible. Had petitioners availed
themselves of their free time - recess, after classes, weekends or holidays - to dramatize their grievances
and to dialogue with the proper authorities within the bounds of law, no one - not the DECS, the CSC or
even this Court - could have held them liable for the valid exercise of their constitutionally guaranteed
rights. As it was, the temporary stoppage of classes resulting from their activity necessarily disrupted
public services, the very evil sought to be forestalled by the prohibition against strikes by government
workers. Their act by their nature was enjoined by the Civil Service law, rules and regulations, for which
they must, therefore, be made answerable. (Jacinto v. CA, 281 SCRA 657, Nov. 14, 1997, En Banc
[Panganiban])
The Non-Impairment Clause
204.
Is the constitutional prohibition against impairing contractual obligations absolute?
Held: 1. Nor is there merit in the claim that the resolution and memorandum circular violate the
contract clause of the Bill of Rights.
The executive order creating the POEA was enacted to further implement the social justice provisions of
the 1973 Constitution, which have been greatly enhanced and expanded in the 1987 Constitution by
placing them under a separate Article (Article XIII). The Article on Social Justice was aptly described as
the "heart of the new Charter" by the President of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, retired Justice
Cecilia Munoz Palma. Social justice is identified with the broad scope of the police power of the state and
requires the extensive use of such power. X x x.
The constitutional prohibition against impairing contractual obligations is not absolute and is not to be
read with literal exactness. It is restricted to contracts with respect to property or some object of value
and which confer rights that may be asserted in a court of justice; it has no application to statutes
relating to public subjects within the domain of the general legislative powers of the State and involving
the public rights and public welfare of the entire community affected by it. It does not prevent a proper
exercise by the State of its police power by enacting regulations reasonably necessary to secure the
health, safety, morals, comfort, or general welfare of the community, even though contracts may thereby
be affected, for such matters cannot be placed by contract beyond the power of the State to regulate and
control them.
Verily, the freedom to contract is not absolute; all contracts and all rights are subject to the police power
of the State and not only may regulations which affect them be established by the State, but all such
regulations must be subject to change from time to time, as the general well-being of the community
may require, or as the circumstances may change, or as experience may demonstrate the necessity . And
under the Civil Code, contracts of labor are explicitly subject to the police power of the State because
they are not ordinary contracts but are impressed with public interest. Article 1700 thereof expressly
provides:
Art. 1700. The relations between capital and labor are not merely contractual. They are so impressed
with public interest that labor contracts must yield to the common good. Therefore, such contracts are
subject to the special laws on labor unions, collective bargaining, strikes and lockouts, closed shop,
wages, working conditions, hours of labor and similar subjects.
The challenged resolution and memorandum circular being valid implementations of E.O. No. 797
(Creating the POEA), which was enacted under the police power of the State, they cannot be struck down
on the ground that they violate the contract clause. To hold otherwise is to alter long-established
constitutional doctrine and to subordinate the police power to the contract clause. (The Conference of
Maritime Manning Agencies, Inc. v. POEA, 243 SCRA 666, April 21, 1995 [Davide, Jr.])
2. Petitioners pray that the present action should be barred, because private respondents have
voluntarily executed quitclaims and releases and received their separation pay. Petitioners claim that the
present suit is a "grave derogation of the fundamental principle that obligations arising from a valid
contract have the force of law between the parties and must be complied with in good faith."
The Court disagrees. Jurisprudence holds that the constitutional guarantee of non-impairment of
contract is subject to the police power of the state and to reasonable legislative regulations promoting
health, morals, safety and welfare. Not all quitclaims are per se invalid or against public policy, except
(1) where there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person, or
(2) where the terms of settlement are unconscionable on their face. In these cases, the law will step in
to annul the questionable transactions. Such quitclaim and release agreements are regarded as
ineffective to bar the workers from claiming the full measure of their legal rights.
In the case at bar, the private respondents agreed to the quitclaim and release in consideration of their
separation pay. Since they were dismissed allegedly for business losses, they are entitled to separation
pay under Article 283 of the Labor Code. And since there was thus no extra consideration for the private
respondents to give up their employment, such undertakings cannot be allowed to bar the action for
illegal dismissal. (Bogo-Medellin Sugarcane Planters Association, Inc. v. NLRC, 296 SCRA 108,
124, [Panganiban])
3. Only slightly less abstract but nonetheless hypothetical is the contention of CREBA that the imposition
of the VAT on the sales and leases of real estate by virtue of contracts entered prior to the effectivity of
the law would violate the constitutional provision that "No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall
be passed." It is enough to say that the parties to a contract cannot, through the exercise of prophetic
discernment, fetter the exercise of the taxing power of the State. For not only are existing laws read into
contracts in order to fix obligations as between parties, but the reservation of essential attributes of
sovereign power is also read into contracts as a basic postulate of the legal order. The policy of
protecting contracts against impairment presupposes the maintenance of a government which retains
adequate authority to secure the peace and good order of society.
In truth, the Contract Clause has never been thought as a limitation on the exercise of the State's power
of taxation save only where a tax exemption has been granted for a valid consideration. X x x.
(Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, 235 SCRA 630, 685-686, Aug. 25, 1994, En Banc
[Mendoza])
4. Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause x x x cannot be invoked.
X x x, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does not involve a law or
even an executive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of existing timber licenses. Hence,
the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting further that a law has
actually been passed mandating cancellations or modifications, the same cannot still be stigmatized as a
violation of the non-impairment clause. This is because by its very nature and purpose, such a law could
have only been passed in the exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose of advancing the
right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, promoting their health and enhancing their
general welfare. X x x.
In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state.
Finally, it is difficult to imagine x x x how the non-impairment clause could apply with respect to the
prayer to enjoin the respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving
new timber license for, save in cases of renewal, no contract would have as yet existed in the other
instances. Moreover, with respect to renewal, the holder is not entitled to it as a matter of right.
(Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., 224 SCRA 792 [1993])
5. Anent petitioners' contention that the forcible refund of incentive benefits is an unconstitutional
impairment of a contractual obligation, suffice it to state that "[n]ot all contracts entered into by the
government will operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must be made between its sovereign
and proprietary acts. The acts involved in this case are governmental. Besides, the Court is in
agreement with the Solicitor General that the incentive pay or benefit is in the nature of a bonus which is
not a demandable or enforceable obligation. (Blaquera v. Alcala, 295 SCRA 366, 446, Sept. 11,
1998, En Banc [Purisima])
The In-Custodial Investigation Rights of an Accused Person
205.
State the procedure, guidelines and duties which the arresting, detaining, inviting, or
investigating officer or his companions must do and observe at the time of making an arrest and again at
and during the time of the custodial interrogation.
Held: Lastly, considering the heavy penalty of death and in order to ensure that the evidence against
an accused were obtained through lawful means, the Court, as guardian of the rights of the people lays
down the procedure, guidelines and duties which the arresting, detaining, inviting, or investigating officer
or his companions must do and observe at the time of making an arrest and again at and during the time
of the custodial interrogation in accordance with the Constitution, jurisprudence and Republic Act No.
7438 (An Act Defining Certain Rights of Person Arrested, Detained or Under Custodial Investigation as
well as the Duties of the Arresting, Detaining, and Investigating Officers and Providing Penalties for
Violations Thereof). It is high-time to educate our law-enforcement agencies who neglect either by
ignorance or indifference the so-called Miranda rights which had become insufficient and which the Court
must update in the light of new legal developments:
1)
The person arrested, detained, invited or under custodial investigation must be informed in a
language known to and understood by him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the
warrant of arrest, if any. Every other warnings, information or communication must be in a language
known to and understood by said person;
2)
He must be warned that he has a right to remain silent and that any statement he makes
may be used as evidence against him;
3)
He must be informed that he has the right to be assisted at all times and have the presence
of an independent and competent lawyer, preferably of his own choice;
4)
He must be informed that if he has no lawyer or cannot afford the services of a lawyer, one
will be provided for him; and that a lawyer may also be engaged by any person in his behalf, or may be
appointed by the court upon petition of the person arrested or one acting on his behalf;
5)
That whether or not the person arrested has a lawyer, he must be informed that no custodial
investigation in any form shall be conducted except in the presence of his counsel of after a valid waiver
has been made;
6)
The person arrested must be informed that, at any time, he has the right to communicate or
confer by the most expedient means - telephone, radio, letter or messenger - with his lawyer (either
retained or appointed), any member of his immediate family, or any medical doctor, priest or minister
chosen by him or by any one from his immediate family or by his counsel, or be visited by/confer with
duly accredited national or international non-government organization. It shall be the responsibility of
the officer to ensure that this is accomplished;
7)
He must be informed that he has the right to waive any of said rights provided it is made
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently and ensure that he understood the same;
8)
In addition, if the person arrested waives his right to a lawyer, he must be informed that it
must be done in writing and in the presence of counsel, otherwise, he must be warned that the waiver is
void even if he insist on his waiver and chooses to speak;
9)
That the person arrested must be informed that he may indicate in any manner at any time
or stage of the process that he does not wish to be questioned with warning that once he makes such
indication, the police may not interrogate him if the same had not yet commenced, or the interrogation
must cease if it has already begun;
10)
The person arrested must be informed that his initial waiver of his right to remain silent, the
right to counsel or any of his rights does not bar him from invoking it at any time during the process,
regardless of whether he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements;
11)
He must also be informed that any statement or evidence, as the case may be, obtained in
violation of any of the foregoing, whether inculpatory or exculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be
admissible in evidence.
(People v. Mahinay, 302 SCRA 455, Feb. 1, 1999, En Banc [Per Curiam])
206.
Explain the kind of information that is required to be given by law enforcement officers to
suspect during custodial investigation.
Held: [I]t is settled that one’s right to be informed of the right to remain silent and to counsel
contemplates the transmission of meaningful information rather just the ceremonial and perfunctory
recitation of an abstract constitutional principle. It is not enough for the interrogator to merely repeat to
the person under investigation the provisions of Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution; the
former must also explain the effects of such provision in practical terms – e.g., what the person under
investigation may or may not do – and in a language the subject fairly understands. The right to be
informed carries with it a correlative obligation on the part of the police investigator to explain, and
contemplates effective communication which results in the subject’s understanding of what is conveyed.
Since it is comprehension that is sought to be attained, the degree of explanation required will
necessarily vary and depend on the education, intelligence, and other relevant personal circumstances of
the person undergoing investigation. In further ensuring the right to counsel, it is not enough that the
subject is informed of such right; he should also be asked if he wants to avail of the same and should be
told that he could ask for counsel if he so desired or that one could be provided him at his request. If he
decides not to retain a counsel of his choice or avail of one to be provided for him and, therefore,
chooses to waive his right to counsel, such waiver, to be valid and effective, must still be made with the
assistance of counsel, who, under prevailing jurisprudence, must be a lawyer. (People v. Canoy, 328
SCRA 385, March 17, 2000, 1st Div. [Davide, CJ])
207.
What is the meaning of “competent counsel” under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights?
Held: The meaning of “competent counsel” was explained in People v. Deniega (251 SCRA 626, 637) as
follows:
“x x x [T]he lawyer called to be present during such investigation should be as far as reasonably possible,
the choice of the individual undergoing questioning. If the lawyer were one furnished in the accused’s
behalf, it is important that he should be competent and independent, i.e., that he is willing to fully
safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused, as distinguished from one who would merely be giving
a routine, peremptory and meaningless recital of the individual’s rights. In People v. Basay (219 SCRA
404, 418), this Court stressed that an accused’s right to be informed of the right to remain silent and to
counsel ‘contemplates the transmission of meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and
perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle.’
“Ideally therefore, a lawyer engaged for an individual facing custodial investigation (if the latter could not
afford one) ‘should be engaged by the accused (himself), or by the latter’s relative or person authorized
by him to engage an attorney or by the court, upon proper petition of the accused or person authorized
by the accused to file such petition.’ Lawyers engaged by the police, whatever testimonials are given as
proof of their probity and supposed independence, are generally suspect, as in many areas, the
relationship between lawyers and law enforcement authorities can be symbiotic.
“x x x The competent or independent lawyer so engaged should be present from the beginning to end,
i.e., at all stages of the interview, counseling or advising caution reasonably at every turn of the
investigation, and stopping the interrogation once in a while either to give advice to the accused that he
may either continue, choose to remain silent or terminate the interview.”
(People v. Espiritu, 302 SCRA 533, Feb. 2, 1999, 3rd Div. [Panganiban])
208.
Can a PAO lawyer be considered an independent counsel within the contemplation of Section 12,
Article III, 1987 Constitution?
Held: In People v. Oracoy, 224 SCRA 759 [1993]; People v. Bandula, 232 SCRA 566 [1994], the SC has
held that a PAO lawyer can be considered an independent counsel within the contemplation of the
Constitution considering that he is not a special counsel, public or private prosecutor, counsel of the
police, or a municipal attorney whose interest is admittedly adverse to that of the accused-appellant.
Thus, the assistance of a PAO lawyer satisfies the constitutional requirement of a competent and
independent counsel for the accused. (People v. Bacor, 306 SCRA 522, April 30, 1999, 2nd Div.
[Mendoza])
209.
Is the confession of an accused given spontaneously, freely and voluntarily to the Mayor
admissible in evidence, considering that the Mayor has “operational supervision and control” over the
local police and may arguably be deemed a law enforcement officer?
Held: While it is true that a municipal mayor has “operational supervision and control” over the local
police and may arguably be deemed a law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Section 12(1) and
(3) of Article III of the Constitution, however, appellant’s confession to the mayor was not made in
response to any interrogation by the latter. In fact, the mayor did not question the appellant at all. No
police authority ordered appellant to talk to the mayor. It was appellant himself who spontaneously,
freely and voluntarily sought the mayor for a private meeting. The mayor did not know that appellant
was going to confess his guilt to him. When appellant talked with the mayor as a confidant and not as a
law enforcement officer, his uncounselled confession to him did not violate his constitutional rights.
Thus, it has been held that the constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a
spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary
manner whereby appellant orally admitted having committed the crime. What the Constitution bars is
the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. The rights under Section 12 are
guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the State as would lead the accused to admit
something false, not to prevent him from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. (People v. Andan,
269 SCRA 95, March 3, 1997)
210.
Are confessions made in response to questions by news reporters admissible in evidence?
Answer: Yes. Confessions made in response to questions by news reporters, not by the police or any
other investigating officer, are admissible. In People v. Vizcarra, 115 SCRA 743, 752 [1982], where the
accused, under custody, gave spontaneous answers to a televised interview by several press reporters in
the office of the chief of the CIS, it was held that statements spontaneously made by a suspect to news
reporters on a televised interview are deemed voluntary and are admissible in evidence. In People v.
Andan, 269 SCRA 95, March 3, 1997, it was held that appellant’s confessions to the news reporters
were given free from any undue influence from the police authorities. The news reporters acted as news
reporters when they interviewed appellant. They were not acting under the direction and control of the
police. They did not force appellant to grant them an interview and reenact the commission of the crime.
In fact, they asked his permission before interviewing him. The Supreme Court further ruled that
appellant’s verbal confessions to the newsmen are not covered by Section 12(1) and (3) of Article III of
the Constitution and, therefore, admissible in evidence.
211.
Discuss why lower court’s should act with extreme caution in admitting in evidence accused’s
videotaped media confessions.
Held: Apropos the court a quo’s admission of accused-appellant’s videotaped confession, we find such
admission proper. The interview was recorded on video and it showed accused-appellant unburdening
his guilt willingly, openly and publicly in the presence of newsmen. Such confession does not form part
of custodial investigation as it was not given to police officers but to media men in an attempt to elicit
sympathy and forgiveness from the public. Besides, if he had indeed been forced into confessing, he
could have easily sought succor from the newsmen who, in all likelihood, would have been sympathetic
with him. X x x
X x x However, because of the inherent danger in the use of television as a medium for
admitting one’s guilt, and the recurrence of this phenomenon in several cases (People v. Vizcarra, No. L38859, 30 July 1982, 115 SCRA 743; others omitted), it is prudent that trial courts are reminded that
extreme caution must be taken in further admitting similar confessions. For in all probability, the police,
with the connivance of unscrupulous media practitioners, may attempt to legitimize coerced extrajudicial
confessions and place them beyond the exclusionary rule by having an accused admit an offense on
television. Such a situation would be detrimental to the guaranteed rights of the accused and thus
imperil our criminal justice system.
We do not suggest that videotaped confessions given before media men by an accused with the
knowledge of and in the presence of police officers are impermissible. Indeed, the line between proper
and invalid police techniques and conduct is a difficult one to draw, particularly in cases such as this
where it is essential to make sharp judgments in determining whether a confession was given under
coercive physical or psychological atmosphere.
A word of caution then to lower courts: we should never presume that all media confessions described as
voluntary have been freely given. This type of confession always remains suspect and therefore should
be thoroughly examined and scrutinized. Detection of coerced confessions is admittedly a difficult and
arduous task for the courts to make. It requires persistence and determination in separating polluted
confessions from untainted ones. We have a sworn duty to be vigilant and protective of the rights
guaranteed by the Constitution. (People v. Endino, 353 SCRA 307, Feb. 20, 2001, 2nd Div.
[Bellosillo])
212.
Discuss the two kinds of involuntary or coerced confessions under Section 12, Article III of the
1987 Constitution. Illustrate how the Court should appreciate said involuntary or coerced confessions.
Held: There are two kinds of involuntary or coerced confessions treated in this constitutional provision:
(1) those which are the product of third degree methods such as torture, force, violence, threat,
intimidation, which are dealt with in paragraph 2 of Section 12, and (2) those which are given without the
benefit of Miranda warnings, which are the subject of paragraph 1 of the same Section 12.
Accused-appellant claims that his confession was obtained by force and threat. Aside from this bare
assertion, he has shown no proof of the use of force and violence on him. He did not seek medical
treatment nor even a physical examination. His allegation that the fact that he was made to sign the
confession five times is proof that he refused to sign it.
Xxx
We discern no sign that the confession was involuntarily executed from the fact that it was signed by
accused-appellant five times.
Xxx
Extrajudicial confessions are presumed voluntary, and, in the absence of conclusive evidence showing the
declarant’s consent in executing the same has been vitiated, such confession will be sustained.
Moreover, the confession contains details that only the perpetrator of the crime could have given. X x x.
It has been held that voluntariness of a confession may be inferred from its being replete with details
which could possibly be supplied only by the accused, reflecting spontaneity and coherence which cannot
be said of a mind on which violence and torture have been applied . When the details narrated in an
extrajudicial confession are such that they could not have been concocted by one who did not take part
in the acts narrated, where the claim of maltreatment in the extraction of the confession is
unsubstantiated and where abundant evidence exists showing that the statement was voluntarily
executed, the confession is admissible against the declarant. There is greater reason for finding a
confession to be voluntary where it is corroborated by evidence aliunde which dovetails with the essential
facts contained in such confession.
But what renders the confession of accused-appellant inadmissible is the fact that accused-appellant was
not given the Miranda warnings effectively. Under the Constitution, an uncounseled statement, such as it
is called in the United States from which Article III, Section 12(1) was derived, is presumed to be
psychologically coerced. Swept into an unfamiliar environment and surrounded by intimidating figures
typical of the atmosphere of police interrogation, the suspect really needs the guiding hand of counsel.
Now, under the first paragraph of this provision, it is required that the suspect in custodial interrogation
must be given the following warnings: (1) he must be informed of his right to remain silent; (2) he must
be warned that anything he says can and will be used against him; and (3) he must be told that he has a
right to counsel, and that if he is indigent, a lawyer will be appointed to represent him .
Xxx
There was thus only a perfunctory reading of the Miranda rights to accused-appellant without any effort
to find out from him whether he wanted to have counsel and, if so, whether he had his own counsel or
he wanted the police to appoint one for him. This kind of giving of warnings, in several decisions of this
Court, has been found to be merely ceremonial and inadequate to transmit meaningful information to the
suspect. Especially in this case, care should have been scrupulously observed by the police investigator
that accused-appellant was specifically asked these questions considering that he only finished the fourth
grade of the elementary school. X x x
Moreover, Article III, Section 12(1) requires that counsel assisting suspects in custodial interrogations be
competent and independent. Here, accused-appellant was assisted by Atty. De los Reyes, who, though
presumably competent, cannot be considered an “independent counsel” as contemplated by the law for
the reason that he was station commander of the WPD at the time he assisted accused-appellant. X x x.
This is error. As observed in People v. Bandula (232 SCRA 566 [1994]), the independent counsel
required by Article III, Section 12(1) cannot be special counsel, public or private prosecutor, municipal
attorney, or counsel of the police whose interest is admittedly adverse to the accused. In this case, Atty.
De los Reyes, as PC Captain and Station Commander of the WPD, was part of the police force who could
not be expected to have effectively and scrupulously assisted accused-appellant in the investigation. To
allow such a happenstance would render illusory the protection given to the suspect during custodial
investigation. (People v. Obrero, 332 SCRA 190, 220 – 208, May 17, 2000, 2nd Div. [Mendoza])
213.
What are the requirements for an extra-judicial confession of an accused to be admissible in
evidence?
Held: 1. In jurisprudence, no confession can be admitted in evidence unless it is given:
1)
Freely and voluntarily, without compulsion, inducement or trickery;
2)
Knowingly based on an effective communication to the individual under custodial
investigation of his constitutional rights; and
3)
Intelligently with full appreciation of its importance and comprehension of its consequences.
Once admitted, the confession must inspire credibility or be one which the normal experience of mankind
can accept as being within the realm of probability.
A confession meeting all the foregoing requisites constitutes evidence of a high order since it is supported
by the strong presumption that no person of normal mind will knowingly, freely and deliberately confess
that he is the perpetrator of a crime unless prompted by truth and conscience. When all these
requirements are met and the confession is admitted in evidence, the burden of proof that it was
obtained by undue pressure, threat or intimidation rests upon the accused. (People v. Fabro, 277
SCRA 19, Aug. 11, 1997 [Panganiban])
2. Numerous decisions of this Court rule that for an extrajudicial confession to be admissible, it must be:
1) voluntary; 2) made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; 3) express; and 4) in
writing.
The mantle of protection afforded by the above-quoted constitutional provision covers the period from
the time a person is taken into custody for the investigation of his possible participation in the
commission of a crime or from the time he is singled out as a suspect in the commission of the offense
although not yet in custody. The exclusionary rule is premised on the presumption that the defendant is
thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere running through menacing police interrogation procedures where
the potentiality for compulsion, physical or psychological is forcefully apparent.
However, the rule is not intended as a deterrent to the accused from confessing guilt if he voluntarily and
intelligently so desires but to protect the accused from admitting what he is coerced to admit although
untrue. (People v. Base, 329 SCRA 158, 169-171, March 30, 2000, 1st Div. [Ynares-Santiago])
214.
Is the choice of a lawyer by a person under custodial investigation who cannot afford the services
of a counsel exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and independent attorneys from handling
his defense?
Held: It must be remembered in this regard that while the right to counsel is immutable, the option to
secure the services of counsel de parte is not absolute. Indeed –
The phrase “competent and independent” and “preferably of his own choice” were explicit details which
were added upon the persistence of human rights lawyers in the 1986 Constitutional Commission who
pointed out cases where, during the martial law period, the lawyers made available to the detainee would
be one appointed by the military and therefore beholden to the military. (Citing I Record of the
Constitutional Commission 731-734; I Bernas, The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, 1987 1 st
ed., p. 347)
Xxx
xxx
xxx
Withal, the word “preferably” under Section 12(1), Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution does not convey the
message that the choice of a lawyer by a person under investigation is exclusive as to preclude other
equally competent and independent attorneys from handling his defense. If the rule were otherwise,
then, the tempo of a custodial investigation will be solely in the hands of the accused who can impede,
nay, obstruct the progress of the interrogation by simply selecting a lawyer who for one reason or
another, is not available to protect his interest. This absurd scenario could not have been contemplated
by the framers of the charter.
While the initial choice in cases where a person under custodial investigation cannot afford the services of
a lawyer is naturally lodged in the police investigators, the accused really has the final choice as he may
reject the counsel chosen for him and ask for another one. A lawyer provided by the investigators is
deemed engaged by the accused where he never raised any objection against the former’s appointment
during the course of the investigation and the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of his
statement before the swearing officer.
Verily, to be an effective counsel “[a] lawyer need not challenge all the questions being propounded to
his client. The presence of a lawyer is not intended to stop an accused from saying anything which might
incriminate him but, rather, it was adopted in our Constitution to preclude the slightest coercion as would
lead the accused to admit something false (People v. Layuso, 175 SCRA 47 [1989]). The counsel,
however, should never prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth.” (People v.
Base, 329 SCRA 158, 169-171, March 30, 2000, 1st Div. [Ynares-Santiago])
215.
Should courts be allowed to distinguish between preliminary questioning and custodial
investigation proper when applying the exclusionary rule?
Held: The exclusionary rule sprang from a recognition that police interrogatory procedures lay fertile
grounds for coercion, physical and psychological, of the suspect to admit responsibility for the crime
under investigation. It was not intended as a deterrent to the accused from confessing guilt, if he
voluntarily and intelligently so desires but to protect the accused from admitting what he is coerced to
admit although untrue. Law enforcement agencies are required to effectively communicate the rights of
a person under investigation and to insure that it is fully understood. Any measure short of this
requirement is considered a denial of such right . Courts are not allowed to distinguish between
preliminary questioning and custodial investigation proper when applying the exclusionary rule. Any
information or admission given by a person while in custody which may appear harmless or innocuous at
the time without the competent assistance of an independent counsel should be struck down as
inadmissible. It has been held, however, that an admission made to news reporters or to a confidant of
the accused is not covered by the exclusionary rule.
The admission allegedly made by the appellant is not in the form of a written extra-judicial confession;
the admission was allegedly made to the arresting officer during an “informal talk” at the police station
after his arrest as a prime suspect in the rape and killing of x x x. The arresting policeman testified that
the appellant admitted that he was with the victim on the evening of January 12, 1994, the probable time
of the commission of the crime and that he carried her on his shoulder but that he was too drunk to
remember what subsequently happened. The arresting policeman admitted that he did not inform the
appellant of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel. We note that the alleged admission
is incriminating because it places the accused in the company of the victim at the time the crime was
probably committed.
The exclusionary rule applies.
The accused was under arrest for the rape and killing of x x x and any statement allegedly made by him
pertaining to his possible complicity in the crime without prior notification of his constitutional rights is
inadmissible in evidence. The policeman’s apparent attempt to circumvent the rule by insisting that the
admission was made during an “informal talk” prior to custodial investigation prior is not tenable. The
appellant was not invited to the police station as part of a general inquiry for any possible lead to the
perpetrators of the crime under investigation. At the time the alleged admission was made the appellant
was in custody and had been arrested as the prime suspect in the rape and killing of x x x. The
exclusionary rule presumes that the alleged admission was coerced, the very evil the rule stands to avoid.
Supportive of such presumption is the absence of a written extra-judicial confession to that effect and the
appellant’s denial in court of the alleged oral admission. The alleged admission should be struck down as
inadmissible. (People v. Bravo, 318 SCRA 812, Nov. 22, 1999, En Banc [Gonzaga-Reyes])
216.
Explain the procedure for out-of-court identification of suspects and the test to determine the
admissibility of such identification.
Held: 1. In People v. Teehankee, Jr. (249 SCRA 54, October 6, 1995), the Court x x x explained the
procedure for out-of-court identification and the test to determine the admissibility of such identification.
It listed the following ways of identifying the suspects during custodial investigation: show-up, mug shots
and line-ups. The Court there ruled:
“x x x. Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done thru show-ups
where the suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness for identification. It is done thru mug
shots where photographs are shown to the witness to identify the suspect. It is also done thru line ups
where a witness identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined up for the purpose. Since corruption
of out-of-court identification contaminates the integrity of in court identification during the trial of the
case, courts have fashioned out rules to assure its fairness and its compliance with the requirements of
constitutional due process. In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of- court identification of
suspects, courts have adopted the totality of circumstances test where they consider the following
factors, viz: (1) the witness’ opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness’
degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the
level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between the
crime and the identification; and (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure.” (Ibid., p. 95)
(People v. Timon, 281 SCRA 577, Nov. 12, 1997 [Panganiban])
2. x x x. The totality test has been fashioned precisely to assure fairness as well as compliance with
constitutional requirements of due process in regard to out-of-court identification. These cited factors
must be considered to prevent contamination of the integrity of in-court identifications better. (People
v. Gamer, 326 SCRA 660, Feb. 29, 2000, 2nd Div. [Quisumbing])
217.
Does the prohibition for custodial investigation conducted without the assistance of counsel
extend to a person in a police line-up? Consequently, is the identification by private complainant of
accused who was not assisted by counsel during police line-up admissible in evidence?
Held: The prohibition x x x does not extend to a person in a police line-up because that stage of an
investigation is not yet a part of custodial investigation . It has been repeatedly held that custodial
investigation commences when a person is taken into custody and is singled out as a suspect in the
commission of the crime under investigation and the police officers begin to ask questions on the
suspect’s participation therein and which tend to elicit an admission . The stage of an investigation
wherein a person is asked to stand in a police line-up has been held to be outside the mantle of
protection of the right to counsel because it involves a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and is
purely investigatory in nature. It has also been held that an uncounseled identification at the police lineup does not preclude the admissibility of an in-court identification. The identification made by the private
complainant in the police line-up pointing to Pavillare as one of his abductors is admissible in evidence
although the accused-appellant was not assisted by counsel. X x x (People v. Pavillare, 329 SCRA
684, 694-695, April 5, 2000, En Banc [Per Curiam])
218.
Petitioner in a case “x x x posits the theory that since he had no counsel during the custodial
investigation when his urine sample was taken and chemically examined, Exhibits “L” and “M,” x x x are
also inadmissible in evidence since his urine sample was derived in effect from an uncounselled extrajudicial confession. Petitioner claims that the taking of his urine sample allegedly violates Article III,
Section 2 of the Constitution x x x.” Should his contentions be upheld?
Held: We are not persuaded. The right to counsel begins from the time a person is taken into custody
and placed under investigation for the commission of a crime, i.e., when the investigating officer starts to
ask questions to elicit information and/or confession or admissions from the accused. Such right is
guaranteed by the Constitution and cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
However, what the Constitution prohibits is the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort
communication from the accused, but not an inclusion of his body in evidence, when it may be material.
In fact, an accused may validly be compelled to be photographed or measured, or his garments or shoes
removed or replaced, or to move his body to enable the foregoing things to be done, without running
afoul of the proscription against testimonial compulsion. The situation in the case at bar falls within the
exemption under the freedom from testimonial compulsion since what was sought to be examined came
from the body of the accused. This was a mechanical act the accused was made to undergo which was
not meant to unearth undisclosed facts but to ascertain physical attributes determinable by simple
observation. In fact, the record shows that petitioner and his co-accused were not compelled to give
samples of their urine but they in fact voluntarily gave the same when they were requested to undergo a
drug test. (Gutang v. People, 335 SCRA 479, July 11, 2000, 2nd Div. [De Leon])
The Right to Bail
219.
In bail application where the accused is charged with a capital offense, will it be proper for the
judge to grant bail without conducting hearing if the prosecutor interposes no objection to such
application? Why?
Held: Jurisprudence is replete with decisions compelling judges to conduct the required hearings in bail
applications, in which the accused stands charged with a capital offense. The absence of objection from
the prosecution is never a basis for the grant of bail in such cases, for the judge has no right to presume
that the prosecutor knows what he is doing on account of familiarity with the case. "Said reasoning is
tantamount to ceding to the prosecutor the duty of exercising judicial discretion to determine whether the
guilt of the accused is strong. Judicial discretion is the domain of the judge before whom the petition for
provisional liberty will be decided. The mandated duty to exercise discretion has never been reposed
upon the prosecutor."
Imposed in Baylon v. Sison (243 SCRA 284, April 6, 1995) was this mandatory duty to conduct a hearing
despite the prosecution's refusal to adduce evidence in opposition to the application to grant and fix bail.
(Joselito V. Narciso v. Flor Marie Sta. Romana-Cruz, G.R. No. 134504, March 17, 2000, 3rd
Div. [Panganiban])
220.
What are the duties of the judge in cases of bail applications where the accused is charged with
capital offense?
Held: Basco v. Rapatalo (269 SCRA 220, March 5, 1997) enunciated the following duties of the trial
judge in such petition for bail:
1)
Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his
recommendation;
2)
Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution
refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling
the court to exercise its sound discretion;
3)
Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of
evidence of the prosecution;
4)
If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the
bailbond. Otherwise, petition should be denied.
The Court added: "The above-enumerated procedure should now leave no room for doubt as to the
duties of the trial judge in cases of bail applications. So basic and fundamental is it to conduct a hearing
in connection with the grant of bail in the proper cases that it would amount to judicial apostasy for any
member of the judiciary to disclaim knowledge or awareness thereof."
Additionally, the court's grant or refusal of bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the
prosecution, on the basis of which should be formulated the judge's own conclusion on whether such
evidence is strong enough to indicate the guilt of the accused. The summary thereof is considered an
aspect of procedural due process for both the prosecution and the defense; its absence will invalidate the
grant or the denial of the application for bail. (Joselito V. Narciso v. Flor Marie Sta. Romana-Cruz,
G.R. No. 134504, March 17, 2000, 3rd Div. [Panganiban])
221.
Should the accused who remained at large after their conviction be allowed provisional liberty?
Can the bail bond that the accused previously posted be used during the entire period of appeal?
Held: Despite an order of arrest from the trial court and two warnings from the Court of Appeals,
petitioners had remained at large. It is axiomatic that for one to be entitled to bail, he should be in the
custody of the law, or otherwise, deprived of liberty. The purpose of bail is to secure one’s release and it
would be incongruous to grant bail to one who is free . Petitioners’ Compliance and Motion x x x came
short of an unconditional submission to respondent court’s lawful order and to its jurisdiction.
The trial court correctly denied petitioners’ motion that they be allowed provisional liberty after their
conviction, under their respective bail bonds. Apart from the fact that they were at large, Section 5, Rule
114 of the Rules of Court, as amended by Supreme Court Administrative Circular 12-94, provides that:
Xxx
The Court, in its discretion, may allow the accused to continue on provisional liberty under the same bail
bond during the period to appeal subject to the consent of the bondsman.
The bail bond that the accused previously posted can only be used during the 15-day period to appeal
(Rule 122) and not during the entire period of appeal. This is consistent with Section 2(a) of Rule 114
which provides that the bail “shall be effective upon approval and remain in force at all stages of the
case, unless sooner cancelled, until the promulgation of the judgment of the Regional Trial Court,
irrespective of whether the case was originally filed in or appealed to it.” This amendment, introduced by
SC Administrative Circular 12-94 is a departure from the old rules which then provided that bail shall be
effective and remain in force at all stages of the case until its full determination, and thus even during the
period of appeal. Moreover, under the present rule, for the accused to continue his provisional liberty on
the same bail bond during the period to appeal, consent of the bondsman is necessary. From the record,
it appears that the bondsman x x x filed a motion in the trial court x x x for the cancellation of petitioners’
bail bond for the latter’s failure to renew the same upon its expiration. Obtaining the consent of the
bondsman was, thus, foreclosed. (Maguddatu v. Court of Appeals, 326 SCRA 362, Feb. 23, 2000,
1st Div. [Kapunan])
223.
Is a condition in an application for bail that accused be first arraigned before he could be granted
bail valid?
Held: In requiring that petitioner be first arraigned before he could be granted bail, the trial court
apprehended that if petitioner were released on bail he could, by being absent, prevent his early
arraignment and thereby delay his trial until the complainants got tired and lost interest in their cases.
Hence, to ensure his presence at the arraignment, approval of petitioner’s bail bonds should be deferred
until he could be arraigned. After that, even if petitioner does not appear, trial can proceed as long as he
is notified of the date of the hearing and his failure to appear is unjustified, since under Art. III, Sec.
14(2) of the Constitution, trial in absencia is authorized. This seems to be the theory of the trial court in
its x x x order conditioning the grant of bail to petitioner on his arraignment.
This theory is mistaken. In the first place x x x in cases where it is authorized, bail should be granted
before arraignment, otherwise the accused may be precluded from filing a motion to quash. For if the
information is quashed and the case is dismissed, there would then be no need for the arraignment of
the accused. In the second place, the trial court could ensure the presence of petitioner at the
arraignment precisely by granting bail and ordering his presence at any stage of the proceedings, such as
arraignment. Under Rule 114, Sec. 2(b) of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, one of the conditions of bail
is that “the accused shall appear before the proper court whenever so required by the court or these
Rules,” while under Rule 116, Sec. 1(b) the presence of the accused at the arraignment is required.
On the other hand, to condition the grant of bail to an accused on his arraignment would be to place him
in a position where he has to choose between (1) filing a motion to quash and thus delay his release on
bail because until his motion to quash can be resolved, his arraignment cannot be held, and (2) foregoing
the filing of a motion to quash so that he can be arraigned at once and thereafter be released on bail.
These scenarios certainly undermine the accused’s constitutional right not to be put on trial except upon
valid complaint or information sufficient to charge him with a crime and his right to bail. (Lavides v.
CA, 324 SCRA 321, Feb. 1, 2000, 2nd Div. [Mendoza])
The Right to be Informed of the Nature and Cause of Accusation against the Accused
224.
What are the objectives of the right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusations
against the accused?
Held: Instructive in this regard is Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court x x x.
The purpose of the above-quoted rule is to inform the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, a right guaranteed by no less than the fundamental law of the land (Article III, Section
14[2], 1987 Constitution). Elaborating on the defendant’s right to be informed, the Court held in Pecho
v. People (262 SCRA 518) that the objectives of this right are:
1)
To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will enable him
to make the defense;
2)
To avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for
the same cause; and
3)
To inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in
law to support a conviction, if one should be had.
It is thus imperative that the Information filed with the trial court be complete – to the end that the
accused may suitably prepare for his defense. Corollary to this, an indictment must fully state the
elements of the specific offense alleged to have been committed as it is the recital of the essentials of a
crime which delineates the nature and cause of accusation against the accused.
Xxx
In the case under scrutiny, the information does not allege the minority of the victim x x x although the
same was proven during the trial x x x. The omission is not merely formal in nature since doctrinally, an
accused cannot be held liable for more than what he is indicted for. It matters not how conclusive and
convincing the evidence of guilt may be, but an accused cannot be convicted of any offense, not charged
in the Complaint or Information on which he is tried or therein necessarily included. He has a right to be
informed of the nature of the offense with which he is charged before he is put on trial. To convict an
accused of an offense higher than that charged in the Complaint or Information on which he is tried
would constitute unauthorized denial of that right. (People v. Bayya, 327 SCRA 771, March 10,
2000, En Banc [Purisima])
The Right to a Fair Trial
225.
What is the purpose of the rule barring trial or sentence of an insane person? What are the
reasons underlying it?
Held: The rule barring trial or sentence of an insane person is for the protection of the accused, rather
than of the public. It has been held that it is inhuman to require an accused disabled by God to make a
just defense for his life or liberty. To put a legally incompetent person on trial or to convict and sentence
him is a violation of the constitutional rights to a fair trial; and this has several reasons underlying it. For
one, the accuracy of the proceedings may not be assured, as an incompetent defendant who cannot
comprehend the proceedings may not appreciate what information is relevant to the proof of his
innocence. Moreover, he is not in a position to exercise many of the rights afforded a defendant in a
criminal case, e.g., the right to effectively consult with counsel, the right to testify in his own behalf, and
the right to confront opposing witnesses, which rights are safeguards for the accuracy of the trial result.
Second, the fairness of the proceedings may be questioned, as there are certain basic decisions in the
course of a criminal proceeding which a defendant is expected to make for himself, and one of these is
his plea. Third, the dignity of the proceedings may be disrupted, for an incompetent defendant is likely
to conduct himself in the courtroom in a manner which may destroy the decorum of the court. Even if
the defendant remains passive, his lack of comprehension fundamentally impairs the functioning of the
trial process. A criminal proceeding is essentially an adversarial proceeding. If the defendant is not a
conscious and intelligent participant, the adjudication loses its character as a reasoned interaction
between an individual and his community and becomes and invective against an insensible object.
Fourth, it is important that the defendant knows why he is being punished, a comprehension which is
greatly dependent upon his understanding of what occurs at trial. An incompetent defendant may not
realize the moral reprehensibility of his conduct. The societal goal of institutionalized retribution may be
frustrated when the force of the state is brought to bear against one who cannot comprehend its
significance. (People v. Estrada, 333 SCRA 699, 718-719, June 19, 2000, En Banc [Puno])
The Right to an Impartial Trial
226.
What are the two principal legal and philosophical schools of thought on how to deal with the
rain of unrestrained publicity during the investigation and trial of high profile cases?
Held: There are two (2) principal legal and philosophical schools of thought on how to deal with the rain
of unrestrained publicity during the investigation and trial of high profile cases . The British approach the
problem with the presumption that publicity will prejudice a jury. Thus, English courts readily stay and
stop criminal trials when the right of an accused to fair trial suffers a threat . The American approach is
different. US courts assume a skeptical approach about the potential effect of pervasive publicity on the
right of an accused to a fair trial. They have developed different strains of tests to resolve this issue, i.e.,
substantial probability of irreparable harm, strong likelihood, clear and present danger, etc. (Estrada v.
Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001, En Banc [Puno])
227.
Should the Ombudsman be stopped from conducting the investigation of the cases filed against
petitioner (former President) Estrada due to the barrage of prejudicial publicity on his guilt?
Held: Petitioner x x x contends that the respondent Ombudsman should be stopped from conducting the
investigation of the cases filed against him due to the barrage of prejudicial publicity on his guilt. He
submits that the respondent Ombudsman has developed bias and is all set to file the criminal cases in
violation of his right to due process.
Xxx
This is not the first time the issue of trial by publicity has been raised in this Court to stop the
trials or annul convictions in high profile criminal cases. In People v. Teehankee, Jr. (249 SCRA 54
[1995]), later reiterated in the case of Larranaga v. Court of Appeals, et al. (287 SCRA 581 at pp. 596597 [1998]), we laid down the doctrine that:
“We cannot sustain appellant’s claim that he was denied the right to impartial trial due to prejudicial
publicity. It is true that the print and broadcast media gave the case at bar pervasive publicity, just like
all high profile and high stake criminal trials. Then and now, we rule that the right of an accused to a fair
trial is not incompatible to a free press. To be sure, responsible reporting enhances an accused’s right to
a fair trial for, as well pointed out, a responsible press has always been regarded as the handmaiden of
effective judicial administration, especially in the criminal field x x x. The press does not simply publish
information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police,
prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism.
Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact that the
trial of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that the
publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality. For one, it is impossible
to seal the minds of members of the bench from pre-trial and other off-court publicity of sensational
criminal cases. The state of the art of our communication system brings news as they happen straight to
our breakfast tables and right to our bedrooms. These news form part of our everyday menu of the facts
and fictions of life. For another, our idea of a fair and impartial judge is not that of a hermit who is out
of touch with the world. We have not installed the jury system whose members are overly protected
from publicity lest they lose their impartiality. x x x. Our judges are learned in the law and trained to
disregard off-court evidence and on-camera performances of parties to a litigation. Their mere exposure
to publications and publicity stunts does not per se fatally infect their impartiality.
At best, appellant can only conjure possibility of prejudice on the part of the trial judge due to the
barrage of publicity that characterized the investigation and trial of the case. In Martelino, et al. v.
Alejandro, et al., we rejected this standard of possibility of prejudice and adopted the test of actual
prejudice as we ruled that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof
that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity.
In the case at bar, the records do not show that the trial judge developed actual bias against appellant as
a consequence of the extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality of
circumstances of the case does not prove that the trial judge acquired a fixed opinion as a result of
prejudicial publicity which is incapable of change even by evidence presented during the trial. Appellant
has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has not discharged the burden.”
We expounded further on this doctrine in the subsequent case of Webb v. Hon. Raul de Leon,
etc. (247 SCRA 652 [1995]) and its companion cases, viz.:
“Again, petitioners raise the effect of prejudicial publicity on their right to due process while undergoing
preliminary investigation. We find no procedural impediment to its early invocation considering the
substantial risk to their liberty whole undergoing a preliminary investigation.
Xxx
The democratic settings, media coverage of trials of sensational cases cannot be avoided and oftentimes,
its excessiveness has been aggravated by kinetic developments in the telecommunications industry. For
sure, few cases can match the high volume and high velocity of publicity that attended the preliminary
investigation of the case at bar. Our daily diet of facts and fiction about the case continues unabated
even today. Commentators still bombard the public with views not too many of which are sober and
sublime. Indeed, even the principal actors in the case – the NBI, the respondents, their lawyers and their
sympathizers – have participated in this media blitz. The possibility of media abuses and their threat to a
fair trial notwithstanding, criminal trials cannot be completely closed to the press and public. In the
seminal case of Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, it was wisely held:
‘x x x
(a) The historical evidence of the evolution of the criminal trial in Anglo-American justice demonstrates
conclusively that at the time this Nation’s organic laws were adopted, criminal trials both here and in
England had long been presumptively open, thus giving assurance that the proceedings were conducted
fairly to all concerned and discouraging perjury, the misconduct of participants, or decisions based on
secret bias or partiality. In addition, the significant community therapeutic value of public trials was
recognized: when a shocking crime occurs, a community reaction of outrage and public protest often
follows, and thereafter the open processes of justice serve an important prophylactic purpose, providing
an outlet for community concern, hostility, and emotion. To work effectively, it is important that society’s
criminal process ‘satisfy the appearance of justice,’ Offutt v. United States, 348 US 11, 14, 99 L Ed 11, 75
S Ct 11, which can best be provided by allowing people to observe such process. From this unbroken,
uncontradicted history, supported by reasons as valid today as in centuries past, it must be concluded
that a presumption of openness inheres in the very nature of a criminal trial under this Nation’s system of
justice, Cf., e.g., Levine v. United States, 362 US 610, 4 L Ed 2d 989, 80 S Ct 1038.
(b) The freedoms of speech, press, and assembly, expressly guaranteed by the First Amendment, share a
common core purpose of assuring freedom of communication on matters relating to the functioning of
government. In guaranteeing freedoms such as those of speech and press, the First Amendment can be
read as protecting the right of everyone to attend trials so as give meaning to those explicit guarantees;
the First Amendment right to receive information and ideas means, in the context of trials, that the
guarantees of speech and press, standing alone, prohibit government from summarily closing courtroom
doors which had long been open to the public at the time the First Amendment was adopted. Moreover,
the right of assembly is also relevant, having been regarded not only as an independent right but also as
a catalyst to augment the free exercise of the other First Amendment rights with which it was deliberately
linked by the draftsmen. A trial courtroom is a public place where the people generally – and
representatives of the media – have a right to be present, and where their presence historically has been
thought to enhance the integrity and quality of what takes place.
(c) Even though the Constitution contains no provision which by its terms guarantees to the public the
right to attend criminal trials, various fundamental rights, not expressly guaranteed, have been
recognized as indispensable to the enjoyment of enumerated rights. The right to attend criminal trial is
implicit in the guarantees of the First Amendment: without the freedom to attend such trials, which
people have exercised for centuries, important aspects of freedom of speech and of the press could be
eviscerated.’
Be that as it may, we recognize that pervasive and prejudicial publicity under certain circumstances can
deprive an accused of his due process right to fair trial. Thus, in Martelino, et al. v. Alejandro, et al., we
held that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity there must be allegation and proof that the judges
have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at
bar, we find nothing in the records that will prove that the tone and content of the publicity that attended
the investigation of petitioners fatally infected the fairness and impartiality of the DOJ Panel. Petitioners
cannot just rely on the subliminal effects of publicity on the sense of fairness of the DOJ Panel, for these
are basically unbeknown and beyond knowing. To be sure, the DOJ Panel is composed of an Assistant
Chief State Prosecutor and Senior State Prosecutors. Their long experience in criminal investigation is a
factor to consider in determining whether they can easily be blinded by the klieg lights of publicity.
Indeed, their 26-page Resolution carries no indubitable indicia of bias for it does not appear that they
considered any extra-record evidence except evidence properly adduced by the parties. The length of
time the investigation was conducted despite it summary nature and the generosity with which they
accommodated the discovery motions of petitioners speak well of their fairness. At no instance, we note,
did petitioners seek the disqualification of any member of the DOJ Panel on the ground of bias resulting
from their bombardment of prejudicial publicity.”
Applying the above ruling, we hold that there is not enough evidence to warrant this Court to enjoin the
preliminary investigation of the petitioner by the respondent Ombudsman. Petitioner needs to offer more
than hostile headlines to discharge his burden of proof. He needs to show more than weighty social
science evidence to successfully prove the impaired capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision.
Well to note, the cases against the petitioner are still undergoing preliminary investigation by a special
panel of prosecutors in the office of the respondent Ombudsman. No allegation whatsoever has been
made by the petitioner that the minds of the members of this special panel have already been infected by
bias because of the pervasive prejudicial publicity against him. Indeed, the special panel has yet to come
out with its findings and the Court cannot second guess whether its recommendation will be unfavorable
to the petitioner. (Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001, En Banc [Puno])
The Right against Self-Incrimination
228.
Discuss the types of immunity statutes. Which has broader scope of protection?
Held: Our immunity statutes are of American origin. In the United States, there are two types of
statutory immunity granted to a witness. They are the transactional immunity and the use-andderivative-use immunity. Transactional immunity is broader in the scope of its protection. By its grant, a
witness can no longer be prosecuted for any offense whatsoever arising out of the act or transaction. In
contrast, by the grant of use-and-derivative-use immunity, a witness is only assured that his or her
particular testimony and evidence derived from it will not be used against him or her in a subsequent
prosecution. (Mapa, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 231 SCRA 783, 797-798, April 26, 1994, En Banc
[Puno])
229.
Is the grant of immunity to an accused willing to testify for the government a special privilege
and therefore must be strictly construed against the accused?
Held: [W]e reject respondent court’s ruling that the grant of section 5 immunity must be strictly
construed against the petitioners. It simplistically characterized the grant as a special privilege, as if it
was gifted by the government, ex gratia. In taking this posture, it misread the raison d’ etre and the long
pedigree of the right against self-incrimination vis-à-vis immunity statutes.
The days of inquisition brought about the most despicable abuses against human rights. Not the least of
these abuses is the expert use of coerced confessions to send to the guillotine even the guiltless. To
guard against the recurrence of this totalitarian method, the right against self-incrimination was
ensconced in the fundamental laws of all civilized countries. Over the years, however, came the need to
assist government in its task of containing crime for peace and order is a necessary matrix of public
welfare. To accommodate the need, the right against self-incrimination was stripped of its absoluteness.
Immunity statutes in varying shapes were enacted which would allow government to compel a witness to
testify despite his plea of the right against self-incrimination. To insulate these statutes from the virus of
unconstitutionality, a witness is given what has come to be known as transactional or a use-derivativeuse immunity x x x. Quite clearly, these immunity statutes are not a bonanza from government. Those
given the privilege of immunity paid a high price for it – the surrender of their precious right to be silent.
Our hierarchy of values demands that the right against self-incrimination and the right to be silent should
be accorded greater respect and protection. Laws that tend to erode the force of these preeminent
rights must necessarily be given a liberal interpretation in favor of the individual. The government has a
right to solve crimes but it must do it, rightly. (Mapa, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 231 SCRA 783, 805-
806, April 26, 1994, En Banc [Puno])
230.
May the right against self-incrimination be validly invoked during inquiry in aid of legislation?
Held: Now to another matter. It has been held that “a congressional committee’s right to
inquire is ‘subject to all relevant limitations placed by the Constitution on governmental action,’ including
‘the relevant limitations of the Bill of Rights’.” (Maurice A. Hutcheson v. U.S., 369 US 599)
In another case –
“x x x the mere semblance of legislative purpose would not justify an inquiry in the face of the Bill of
Rights. The critical element is the existence of, and the weight to be ascribed to, the interest of the
Congress in demanding disclosures from an unwilling witness. We cannot simply assume, however, that
every congressional investigation is justified by a public need that over-balances any private rights
affected. To do so would be to abdicate the responsibility placed by the Constitution upon the judiciary
to insure that the Congress does not unjustifiably encroach upon an individual’s right to privacy nor
abridge his liberty of speech, press, religion or assembly.” (Watkins v. US, 354 USS 178 citing US v.
Rumely, 345 US 41)
One of the basic rights guaranteed by the Constitution to an individual is the right against selfincrimination (Sec. 17, Art. III of the Constitution). This right construed as the right to remain
completely silent may be availed of by the accused in a criminal case; but it may be invoked by other
witnesses only as questions are asked of them.
This distinction is enunciated by the Court in Romeo Chavez v. The Honorable Court of Appeals,
et al. (G.R. No. L-29169, August 19, 1968, 24 SCRA 663) thus –
“Petitioner, as accused, occupies a different tier of protection from an ordinary witness. Whereas an
ordinary witness may be compelled to take the witness stand and claim the privilege as each question
requiring an incriminating answer is shot at him, an accused may altogether refuse to take the witness
stand and refuse to answer any and all questions.”
Moreover, this right of the accused is extended to respondents in administrative investigations
but only if they partake of the nature of a criminal proceeding or analogous to a criminal proceeding. In
Galman v. Pamaran (G.R. Nos. 71208-09, August 30, 1985, 138 SCRA 294), the Court reiterated the
doctrine in Cabal v. Kapunan (6 SCRA 1059) to illustrate the right of witnesses to invoke the right against
self-incrimination not only in criminal proceedings but also in all other types of suit.
It was held that:
“We did not therein state that since he is not an accused and the case is not a criminal case, Cabal
cannot refuse to take the witness stand and testify, and that he can invoke his right against selfincrimination only when a question which tends to elicit an answer that will incriminate him is
propounded to him. Clearly then, it is not the character of the suit involved but the nature of the
proceedings that controls. The privilege has consistently been held to extend to all proceedings
sanctioned by law and to all cases in which punishment is sought to be visited upon a witness, whether a
party or not.”
We do not here modify these doctrines. If we presently rule that petitioners may not be
compelled by the respondent Committee to appear, testify and produce evidence before it, it is only
because we hold that the questioned inquiry is not in aid of legislation and, if pursued, would be violative
of the principle of separation of powers between the legislative and the judicial departments of
government, ordained by the Constitution. (Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, 203
SCRA 767, Nov. 20, 1991, En Banc [Padilla])
The Right against Double Jeopardy
231.
Discuss the two kinds of double jeopardy.
Held: Our Bill of Rights deals with two (2) kinds of double jeopardy. The first sentence of Clause 20,
Section 1, Article III of the Constitution ordains that “no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense.” The second sentence of said clause provides that “if an act is
punishable by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to
another prosecution for the same act.” Thus, the first sentence prohibits double jeopardy of punishment
for the same offense whereas, the second contemplates double jeopardy of punishment for the same act.
Under the first sentence, one may be twice put in jeopardy of punishment of the same act, provided that
he is charged with different offenses, or the offense charged in one case is not included in, or does not
include, the crime charged in the other case. The second sentence applies, even if the offense charged
are not the same, owing to the fact that one constitutes a violation of an ordinance and the other a
violation of statute. If the two charges are based on one and the same act, conviction or acquittal under
either the law or the ordinance shall bar a prosecution under the other. Incidentally, such conviction or
acquittal is not indispensable to sustain the plea of double jeopardy of punishment or the same offense.
So long as jeopardy has been attached under one of the informations charging said offense, the defense
may be availed of in the other case involving the same offense, even if there has been neither conviction
nor acquittal in either case.
Elsewhere stated, where the offense charged are penalized either by different sections of the same
statute or by different statutes, the important inquiry relates to the identity of offenses charged. The
constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available only where an identity is shown to exist
between the earlier and the subsequent offenses charged. The question of identity or lack of identity of
offenses is addressed by examining the essential elements of each of the two offenses charged, as such
elements are set out in the respective legislative definitions of the offenses involved. (People v.
Quijada, 259 SCRA 191, July 24, 1996)
232.
What must be proved to substantiate a claim of double jeopardy? When may legal jeopardy
attach?
Held: To substantiate a claim of double jeopardy, the following must be proven:
(1) A first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly
terminated; (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense, or the second offense includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt to commit the same
or is a frustration thereof.
Legal jeopardy attaches only: (1) upon a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after
arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without the express consent of the accused. (Cuison v. CA, 289 SCRA 159, April 15,
1998 [Panganiban])
233.
In its decision in a criminal case, the Judge promulgated only the civil aspect of the case, but not
the criminal. Will the promulgation of the criminal aspect later constitute double jeopardy?
Held: Petitioner contends that "the promulgation by Judge Ramos on April 4, 1995 of the Respondent
Court's decision of June 30, 1991 by reading its dispositive portion has effectively terminated the criminal
cases against the petitioner x x x." In other words, petitioner claims that the first jeopardy attached at
that point.
The Court is not persuaded. As a rule, a criminal prosecution includes a civil action for the recovery of
indemnity. Hence, a decision in such case disposes of both the criminal as well as the civil liabilities of an
accused. Here, trial court promulgated only the civil aspect of the case, but not the criminal.
[T]he promulgation of the CA Decision was not complete. In fact and in truth, the promulgation was not
merely incomplete; it was also void. In excess of its jurisdiction, the trial judge rendered a substantially
incomplete promulgation on April 4, 1995, and he repeated his mistake in his April 12, 1996 Order. We
emphasize that grave abuse of discretion rendered the aforementioned act of the trial court void. Since
the criminal cases have not yet been terminated, the first jeopardy has not yet attached. Hence, double
jeopardy cannot prosper as a defense.
We must stress that Respondent Court's questioned Decision did not modify or amend its July 30, 1991
Decision. It merely ordered the promulgation of the judgment of conviction and the full execution of the
penalty it had earlier imposed on petitioner. (Cuison v. CA, 289 SCRA 159, April 15, 1998
[Panganiban])
234.
What are the exceptions to the rule that the dismissal of a criminal case resulting in acquittal
made with the express consent of the accused or upon his own motion will not place the accused in
double jeopardy?
Held: In the cases at bar, the order of dismissal based on a violation of the right to speedy trial
was made upon motion by counsel for petitioner before the trial court. It was made at the instance of
the accused before the trial court, and with his express consent. Generally, the dismissal of a criminal
case resulting in acquittal made with the express consent of the accused or upon his own motion will not
place the accused in double jeopardy. However, this rule admits of two exceptions, namely: insufficiency
of evidence and denial of the right to speedy trial (People v. Bans, 239 SCRA 48, 55 [1994]). Double
jeopardy may attach when the proceedings have been prolonged unreasonably, in violation of the
accused’s right to speedy trial (Commission on Elections v. Court of Appeals, 229 SCRA 501, 507 [1994]).
(Almario v. Court of Appeals, 355 SCRA 1, Mar. 22, 2001, 2nd Div. [Quisumbing]
235.
If the criminal case was dismissed predicated on the right of the accused to speedy trial, but later
the trial court reconsidered its decision and allowed the case to be reinstated as it noted that the delay in
the trial was due to circumstances beyond the control of the parties and of the trial court, i.e., the
presiding judge was promoted to the Court of Appeals, and his successor as trial judge was not
immediately appointed, nor another judge detailed to his sala, is there violation of the accused’s right
against double jeopardy?
Held: Here we must inquire whether there was unreasonable delay in the conduct of the trial so
that violation of the right to speedy trial of the accused x x x resulted. For it must be recalled that in the
application of the constitutional guaranty of the right to speedy disposition of cases, particular regard
must also be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case (Socrates v. Sandiganbayan, 253
SCRA 773, 788 [1996]). Both the trial court and the appellate court noted that after pre-trial of
petitioner’s case was terminated x x x continuous trial was set x x x. The scheduled hearings, however,
were cancelled when the presiding judge was promoted to the Court of Appeals, and his successor as
trial judge was not immediately appointed, nor another judge detailed to his sala.
Xxx
As observed by respondent appellate court, delay in the trial was due to circumstances beyond
the control of the parties and of the trial court. X x x. Thus, after a closer analysis of these successive
events, the trial court realized that the dates of the hearings were transferred for valid grounds. Hence,
the trial court set aside its initial order and reinstated the cases against petitioner, which order the
appellate court later sustained.
That there was no unreasonable delay of the proceedings is apparent from the chronology of the
hearings with the reasons for their postponements or transfers. X x x
There being no oppressive delay in the proceedings, and no postponements unjustifiably sought,
we concur with the conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals that petitioner’s right to speedy trial had
not been infringed. Where the right of the accused to speedy trial had not been violated, there was no
reason to support the initial order of dismissal.
It follows that petitioner cannot invoke the constitutional right against double jeopardy when that
order was reconsidered seasonably (People v. Leviste, 255 SCRA 238, 249 [1996]). For as petitioner’s
right to speedy trial was not transgressed, this exception to the fifth element of double jeopardy – that
the defendant was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the
express consent of the accused – was not met. The trial court’s initial order of dismissal was upon
motion of petitioner’s counsel, hence made with the express consent of petitioner. That being the case,
despite the reconsideration of said order, double jeopardy did not attach. As this Court had occasion to
rule in People v. Tampal (244 SCRA 202), reiterated in People v. Leviste (Ibid.), where we overturned an
order of dismissal by the trial court predicated on the right to speedy trial –
It is true that in an unbroken line of cases, we have held that the dismissal of cases on the ground of
failure to prosecute is equivalent to an acquittal that would bar further prosecution of the accused for the
same offense. It must be stressed, however, that these dismissals were predicated on the clear right of
the accused to speedy trial. These cases are not applicable to the petition at bench considering that the
right of the private respondents to speedy trial has not been violated by the State. For this reason,
private respondents cannot invoke their right against double jeopardy.
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals were thus not in error when they allowed
reinstatement of the cases against petitioner. (Almario v. Court of Appeals, 355 SCRA 1, Mar. 22,
2001, 2nd Div. [Quisumbing]
236.
Is there double jeopardy when an accused was acquitted in a criminal case for reckless
imprudence but the civil aspect of the case was elevated to the Court of Appeals and the latter found him
liable for indemnity and damages?
Held: Petitioner opines that the Court of Appeals should not have disturbed the findings of the trial court
on the lack of negligence or reckless imprudence under the guise of determining his civil liability. He
argues that the trial court’s finding that he was neither imprudent nor negligent was the basis for his
acquittal, and not reasonable doubt. He submits that in finding him liable for indemnity and damages,
the appellate court not only placed his acquittal in suspicion, but also put him in “double jeopardy.”
Private respondents contend that while the trial court found that petitioner’s guilt had not been proven
beyond reasonable doubt, it did not state in clear and unequivocal terms that petitioner was not
recklessly imprudent or negligent. Hence, impliedly the trial court acquitted him on reasonable doubt.
Since civil liability is not extinguished in criminal cases, if the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt, the
Court of Appeals had to review the findings of the trial court to determine if there was a basis for
awarding indemnity and damages.
Preliminarily, petitioner’s claim that the decision of the appellate court awarding indemnity placed him in
double jeopardy is misplaced. X x x. When a person is charged with an offense and the case is
terminated either by acquittal or conviction or in any manner without the consent of the accused, the
latter cannot again be charged with the same or identical offense (Melo v. People, 85 Phil. 766, 768
[1950]). This is double jeopardy. For double jeopardy to exist, the following elements must be
established: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have
terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as the first (People v. Bocar, 138
SCRA 166, 171 [1985]). In the instant case, petitioner had once been placed in jeopardy by the filing of
Criminal Case No. 066 and the jeopardy was terminated by his discharge. The judgment of acquittal
became immediately final. Note, however, that what was elevated to the Court of Appeals by private
respondents was the civil aspect of Criminal Case No. 066. Petitioner was not charged anew in CA-G.R.
CV No. 19240 with a second criminal offense identical to the first offense. The records clearly show that
no second criminal offense was being imputed to petitioner on appeal. In modifying the lower court’s
judgment, the appellate court did not modify the judgment of acquittal. Nor did it order the filing of a
second criminal cases against petitioner for the same offense. Obviously, therefore, there was no second
jeopardy to speak of. Petitioner’s claim of having been placed in double jeopardy is incorrect.
Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of the accused. First
is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the act or omission complained of.
This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person who has been found to be not the perpetrator
of any act or omission cannot and can never be held liable for such or omission (Almeida, et al. v.
Abaroa, 8 Phil. 178, 181 [1907]; other citations omitted.) There being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is
out of the question, and the civil action, if any, which may be instituted must be based on grounds other
than the delict complained of. This is the situation contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. The
second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even
if the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil liability
which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only (Manahan, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 255 SCRA
202, 214 [1996], citing Padilla v. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 558 [1984]). This is the situation
contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil Code, where the civil action for damages is “for the same act or
omission.” Although the two actions have different purposes, the matters discussed in the civil case are
similar to those discussed in the criminal case. However, the judgment in the criminal proceeding cannot
be read in evidence in the civil action to establish any fact there determined, even though both actions
involve the same act or omission (Almeida Chantangco and Lete v. Abaroa, supra note 13, at 1061). The
reason for this rule is that the parties are not the same and secondarily, different rules of evidence are
applicable. Hence, notwithstanding herein petitioner’s acquittal, the Court of Appeals in determining
whether Article 29 applied, was not precluded from looking into the question of petitioner’s negligence or
reckless imprudence. (Manantan v. Court of Appeals, 350 SCRA 387, Jan. 29, 2001, 2 nd Div.
[Quisumbing])
The Right against Ex Post Facto Laws and Bills of Attainder
237.
What is a bill of attainder? Is P.D. 1866 a bill of attainder?
Held: [T]he Court, in People v. Ferrer (G.R. Nos. L-32613-14, December 27, 1972, 48 SCRA 382),
defined a bill of attainder as a legislative act which inflicts punishment on individuals or members of a
particular group without a judicial trial. Essential to a bill of attainder are a specification of certain
individuals or a group of individuals, the imposition of a punishment, penal or otherwise, and the lack of
judicial trial. This last element, the total lack of court intervention in the finding of guilt and the
determination of the actual penalty to be imposed, is the most essential . P.D. No. 1866 does not possess
the elements of a bill of attainder. It does not seek to inflict punishment without a judicial trial. Nowhere
in the measure is there a finding of guilt and an imposition of a corresponding punishment. What the
decree does is to define the offense and provide for the penalty that may be imposed, specifying the
qualifying circumstances that would aggravate the offense. There is no encroachment on the power of
the court to determine after due hearing whether the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that the offense of illegal possession of firearms has been committed and that the qualifying
circumstances attached to it has been established also beyond reasonable doubt as the Constitution and
judicial precedents require. (Misolas v. Panga, 181 SCRA 648, 659-660, Jan. 30, 1990, En Banc
[Cortes])
238.
What is an ex post facto law? Is R.A. No. 8249 an ex post facto law?
Held: Ex post facto law, generally, prohibits retrospectivity of penal laws. R.A. 8249 is not a penal law.
It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in character. Penal laws are those acts of the
Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violations; or those that define
crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for their punishment. R.A. 7975, which amended P.D. 1606 as
regards the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other procedural matters, has been
declared by the Court as not a penal law, but clearly a procedural statute, i.e., one which prescribes rules
of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice. Not being a penal
law, the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as unconstitutional.
Petitioner’s and intervenors’ contention that their right to a two-tiered appeal which they acquired under
R.A. 7975 has been diluted by the enactment of R.A. 8249, is incorrect. The same contention has
already been rejected by the court several times considering that the right to appeal is not a natural right
but statutory in nature that can be regulated by law. The mode of procedure provided for in the
statutory right of appeal is not included in the prohibition against ex post facto laws. R.A. 8249 pertains
only to matters of procedure, and being merely an amendatory statute it does not partake the nature of
an ex post facto law. It does not mete out a penalty and, therefore, does not come within the
prohibition. Moreover, the law did not alter the rules of evidence or the mode of trial. It has been ruled
that adjective statutes may be made applicable to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their
passage.
At any rate, R.A. 8249 has preserved the accused’s right to appeal to the Supreme Court to review
questions of law. On the removal of the intermediate review of facts, the Supreme Court still has the
power of review to determine if the presumption of innocence has been convincingly overcome.
(Panfilo M. Lacson v. The Executive Secretary, et. al., G.R. No. 128096, Jan. 20, 1999
[Martinez])
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
239.
Describe the Administrative Code of 1987
Held: The Code is a general law and “incorporates in a unified document the major structural, functional
and procedural principles of governance (Third Whereas Clause, Administrative Code of 1987) and
“embodies changes in administrative structures and procedures designed to serve the people.” (Fourth
Whereas Clause, Administrative Code of 1987) The Code is divided into seven (7) books. These books
contain provisions on the organization, powers and general administration of departments, bureaus and
offices under the executive branch, the organization and functions of the Constitutional Commissions and
other constitutional bodies, the rules on the national government budget, as well as guidelines for the
exercise by administrative agencies of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers. The Code covers both
the internal administration, i.e., internal organization, personnel and recruitment, supervision and
discipline, and the effects of the functions performed by administrative officials on private individuals or
parties outside government. (Ople v. Torres, G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998 [Puno])
240.
What is administrative power?
Held: Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as
determined by proper governmental organs. It enables the President to fix a uniform standard of
administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of his agents. To this end, he can issue
administrative orders, rules and regulations. (Ople v. Torres, G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998
[Puno])
241.
What is an administrative order?
Held: An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific aspects in
the administrative operation of government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the
sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy. (Ople v. Torres, G.R. No.
127685, July 23, 1998 [Puno])
242.
What is the Government of the Republic of the Philippines?
Answer: The Government of the Republic of the Philippines refers to the corporate governmental entity
through which the functions of the government are exercised throughout the Philippines, including, save
as the contrary appears from the context, the various arms through which political authority is made
effective in the Philippines, whether pertaining to the autonomous regions, the provincial, city, municipal
or barangay subdivisions or other forms of local government. (Sec. 2[1], Introductory Provisions,
Executive Order No. 292)
243.
What is a government instrumentality?
instrumentality?
What are included in the term government
Answer: A government instrumentality refers to any agency of the national government, not integrated
within the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with
some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, enjoying operational autonomy, usually
through a charter. The term includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions and government-owned
or controlled corporations. (Sec. 2[10], Introductory Provisions, Executive Order No. 292)
244.
What is a regulatory agency?
Answer: A regulatory agency refers to any agency expressly vested with jurisdiction to regulate,
administer or adjudicate matters affecting substantial rights and interest of private persons, the principal
powers of which are exercised by a collective body, such as a commission, board or council. (Sec.
2[11], Introductory Provisions, Executive Order No. 292)
245.
What is a chartered institution?
Answer: A chartered institution refers to any agency organized or operating under a special charter,
and vested by law with functions relating to specific constitutional policies or objectives. This term
includes state universities and colleges and the monetary authority of the State. (Section 2[12],
Introductory Provisions, Executive Order No. 292)
246.
When is a government-owned or controlled corporation deemed to be performing proprietary
function? When is it deemed to be performing governmental function?
Held: Government-owned or controlled corporations may perform governmental or proprietary functions
or both, depending on the purpose for which they have been created. If the purpose is to obtain special
corporate benefits or earn pecuniary profit, the function is proprietary. If it is in the interest of health,
safety and for the advancement of public good and welfare, affecting the public in general, the function is
governmental. Powers classified as “proprietary” are those intended for private advantage and benefit.
(Blaquera v. Alcala, 295 SCRA 366, 425, Sept. 11, 1998, En Banc [Purisima])
247.
Does the petition for annulment of proclamation of a candidate merely involve the exercise by
the COMELEC of its administrative power to review, revise and reverse the actions of the board of
canvassers and, therefore, justifies non-observance of procedural due process, or does it involve the
exercise of the COMELEC's quasi-judicial function?
Held: Taking cognizance of private respondent's petitions for annulment of petitioner's proclamation,
COMELEC was not merely performing an administrative function. The administrative powers of the
COMELEC include the power to determine the number and location of polling places, appoint election
officials and inspectors, conduct registration of voters, deputize law enforcement agencies and
governmental instrumentalities to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections, register
political parties, organizations or coalition, accredit citizen's arms of the Commission, prosecute election
offenses, and recommend to the President the removal of or imposition of any other disciplinary action
upon any officer or employee it has deputized for violation or disregard of its directive, order or decision.
In addition, the Commission also has direct control and supervision over all personnel involved in the
conduct of election. However, the resolution of the adverse claims of private respondent and petitioner
as regards the existence of a manifest error in the questioned certificate of canvass requires the
COMELEC to act as an arbiter. It behooves the Commission to hear both parties to determine the
veracity of their allegations and to decide whether the alleged error is a manifest error. Hence, the
resolution of this issue calls for the exercise by the COMELEC of its quasi-judicial power. It has been said
that where a power rests in judgment or discretion, so that it is of judicial nature or character, but does
not involve the exercise of functions of a judge, or is conferred upon an officer other than a judicial
officer, it is deemed quasi-judicial. The COMELEC therefore, acting as quasi-judicial tribunal, cannot
ignore the requirements of procedural due process in resolving the petitions filed by private respondent.
(Federico S. Sandoval v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 133842, Jan. 26, 2000 [Puno])
248.
Discuss the Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction (or Prior Resort).
Held: Courts cannot and will not resolve a controversy involving a question which is within the
jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, especially where the question demands the exercise of sound
administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative
tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.
In recent years, it has been the jurisprudential trend to apply this doctrine to cases involving matters that
demand the special competence of administrative agencies even if the question involved is also judicial in
character. It applies “where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever
enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been
placed within the special competence of an administrative body; in such case, the judicial process is
suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view.”
In cases where the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is clearly applicable, the court cannot arrogate unto
itself the authority to resolve a controversy, the jurisdiction over which is lodged with an administrative
body of special competence. (Villaflor v. CA, 280 SCRA 287)
249.
Discuss the Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies. Enumerate exceptions thereto.
Held: 1. Before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he
should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within
the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every
opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be
exhausted first before the court’s judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of court’s
jurisdiction is fatal to one’s cause of action. Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel the
case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause of action. This doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies was not without its practical and legal reasons, for one thing, availment of administrative
remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. It is no less true
to state that the courts of justice for reasons of comity and convenience will shy away from a dispute
until the system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with so as to give the
administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and to dispose of the case.
This doctrine is disregarded:
1)
when there is a violation of due process;
2)
when the issue involved is purely a legal question;
3)
when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction;
4)
when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned;
5)
when there is irreparable injury;
6)
when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President
bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter;
7)
when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable;
8)
when it would amount to a nullification of a claim;
9)
when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceeding;
10)
when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and
11)
when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.
(Paat v. CA, 266 SCRA 167 [1997])
2. Non-exhaustion of administrative remedies is not jurisdictional. It only renders the action premature,
i.e., claimed cause of action is not ripe for judicial determination and for that reason a party has no cause
of action to ventilate in court. (Carale v. Abarintos, 269 SCRA 132)
250.
When may the Government not validly invoke the rule that prescription does not run against the
State?
Held: While it is true that prescription does not run against the State, the same may not be invoked by
the government in this case since it is no longer interested in the subject matter. While Camp Wallace
may have belonged to the government at the time Rafael Galvez’s title was ordered cancelled in Land
Registration Case No. N-361, the same no longer holds true today.
Republic Act No. 7227, otherwise known as the Base Conversion and Development Act of 1992, created
the Bases Conversion and Development Authority. X x x
Xxx
With the transfer of Camp Wallace to the BCDA, the government no longer has a right or interest to
protect. Consequently, the Republic is not a real party in interest and it may not institute the instant
action. Nor may it raise the defense of imprescriptibility, the same being applicable only in cases where
the government is a party in interest. X x x. Being the owner of the areas covered by Camp Wallace, it
is the Bases Conversion and Development Authority, not the Government, which stands to be benefited if
the land covered by TCT No. T-5710 issued in the name of petitioner is cancelled.
Nonetheless, it has been posited that the transfer of military reservations and their extensions to the
BCDA is basically for the purpose of accelerating the sound and balanced conversion of these military
reservations into alternative productive uses and to enhance the benefits to be derived from such
property as a measure of promoting the economic and social development, particularly of Central Luzon
and, in general, the country’s goal for enhancement (Section 2, Republic Act No. 7227). It is contended
that the transfer of these military reservations to the Conversion Authority does not amount to an
abdication on the part of the Republic of its interests, but simply a recognition of the need to create a
body corporate which will act as its agent for the realization of its program. It is consequently asserted
that the Republic remains to be the real party in interest and the Conversion Authority merely its agent.
We, however, must not lose sight of the fact that the BCDA is an entity invested with a personality
separate and distinct from the government. X x x
It may not be amiss to state at this point that the functions of government have been classified into
governmental or constituent and proprietary or ministrant. While public benefit and public welfare,
particularly, the promotion of the economic and social development of Central Luzon, may be attributable
to the operation of the BCDA, yet it is certain that the functions performed by the BCDA are basically
proprietary in nature. The promotion of economic and social development of Central Luzon, in particular,
and the country’s goal for enhancement, in general, do not make the BCDA equivalent to the
Government. Other corporations have been created by government to act as its agents for the
realization of its programs, the SSS, GSIS, NAWASA and the NIA, to count a few, and yet, the Court has
ruled that these entities, although performing functions aimed at promoting public interest and public
welfare, are not government-function corporations invested with governmental attributes. It may thus be
said that the BCDA is not a mere agency of the Government but a corporate body performing proprietary
functions.
Xxx
Having the capacity to sue or be sued, it should thus be the BCDA which may file an action to cancel
petitioner’s title, not the Republic, the former being the real party in interest. One having no right or
interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as a party plaintiff in an action (Ralla v.
Ralla, 199 SCRA 495 [1991]). A suit may be dismissed if the plaintiff or the defendant is not a real party
in interest. X x x.
However, E.B. Marcha Transport Co., Inc. v. IAC (147 SCRA 276 [1987]) is cited as authority that the
Republic is the proper party to sue for the recovery of possession of property which at the time of the
installation of the suit was no longer held by the national government body but by the Philippine Ports
Authrotiy. In E.B. Marcha, the Court ruled:
It can be said that in suing for the recovery of the rentals, the Republic of the Philippines, acted as
principal of the Philippine Ports Authority, directly exercising the commission it had earlier conferred on
the latter as its agent. We may presume that, by doing so, the Republic of the Philippines did not intend
to retain the said rentals for its own use, considering that by its voluntary act it had transferred the land
in question to the Philippine Ports Authority effective July 11, 1974. The Republic of the Philippines had
simply sought to assist, not supplant, the Philippine Ports Authority, whose title to the disputed property
it continues to recognize. We may expect the that the said rentals, once collected by the Republic of the
Philippines, shall be turned over by it to the Philippine Ports Authority conformably to the purposes of
P.D. No. 857.
E.B. Marcha is, however, not on all fours with the case at bar. In the former, the Court considered the
Republic a proper party to sue since the claims of the Republic and the Philippine Ports Authority against
the petitioner therein were the same. To dismiss the complaint in E.B. Marcha would have brought
needless delay in the settlement of the matter since the PPA would have to refile the case on the same
claim already litigated upon. Such is not the case here since to allow the government to sue herein
enables it to raise the issue of imprescriptibility, a claim which is not available to the BCDA. The rule that
prescription does not run against the State does not apply to corporations or artificial bodies created by
the State for special purposes, it being said that when the title of the Republic has been divested, its
grantees, although artificial bodies of its own creation, are in the same category as ordinary persons
(Kingston v. LeHigh Valley Coal Co., 241 Pa 469). By raising the claim of imprescriptibility, a claim which
cannot be raised by the BCDA, the Government not only assists the BCDA, as it did in E.B. Marcha, it
even supplants the latter, a course of action proscribed by said case.
Moreover, to recognize the Government as a proper party to sue in this case would set a bad precedent
as it would allow the Republic to prosecute, on behalf of government-owned or controlled corporations,
causes of action which have already prescribed, on the pretext that the Government is the real party in
interest against whom prescription does not run, said corporations having been created merely as agents
for the realization of government programs.
It should also be noted that petitioner is unquestionably a buyer in good faith and for value, having
acquired the property in 1963, or 5 years after the issuance of the original certificate of title, as a third
transferee. If only not to do violence and to give some measure of respect to the Torrens System,
petitioner must be afforded some measure of protection. (Shipside Incorporated v. Court of
Appeals, 352 SCRA 334, Feb. 20, 2001, 3rd Div. [Melo])
251.
Discuss the nature and functions of the NTC, and analyze its powers and authority as well as the
laws, rules and regulations that govern its existence and operations.
Held: The NTC was created pursuant to Executive Order No. 546, promulgated on July 23,
1979. It assumed the functions formerly assigned to the Board of Communications and the
Communications Control Bureau, which were both abolished under the said Executive Order. Previously,
the NTC’s function were merely those of the defunct Public Service Commission (PSC), created under
Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended, otherwise known as the Public Service Act, considering that
the Board of Communications was the successor-in-interest of the PSC. Under Executive Order No. 125A, issued in April 1987, the NTC became an attached agency of the Department of Transportation and
Communications.
In the regulatory communications industry, the NTC has the sole authority to issue Certificates of
Public Convenience and Necessity (CPCN) for the installation, operation, and maintenance of
communications facilities and services, radio communications systems, telephone and telegraph systems.
Such power includes the authority to determine the areas of operations of applicants for
telecommunications services. Specifically, Section 16 of the Public Service Act authorizes the then PSC,
upon notice and hearing, to issue Certificates of Public Convenience for the operation of public services
within the Philippines “whenever the Commission finds that the operation of the public service proposed
and the authorization to do business will promote the public interests in a proper and suitable manner.”
(Commonwealth Act No. 146, Section 16[a]) The procedure governing the issuance of such
authorizations is set forth in Section 29 of the said Act x x x. (Republic v. Express
Telecommunication Co., Inc., 373 SCRA 316, Jan. 15, 2002, 1st Div. [Ynares-Santiago])
252.
Is the filing of the administrative rules and regulations with the UP Law Center the operative act
that gives the rules force and effect?
Held: In granting Bayantel the provisional authority to operate a CMTS, the NTC applied Rule
15, Section 3 of its 1978 Rules of Practice and Procedure, which provides:
Sec. 3. Provisional Relief. – Upon the filing of an application, complaint or petition or at any stage
thereafter, the Board may grant on motion of the pleader or on its own initiative, the relief prayed for,
based on the pleading, together with the affidavits and supporting documents attached thereto, without
prejudice to a final decision after completion of the hearing which shall be called within thirty (30) days
from grant of authority asked for. (italics ours)
Respondent Extelcom, however, contends that the NTC should have applied the Revised Rules
which were filed with the Office of the National Administrative Register on February 3, 1993. These
Revised Rules deleted the phrase “on its own initiative”; accordingly, a provisional authority may be
issued only upon filing of the proper motion before the Commission.
In answer to this argument, the NTC, through the Secretary of the Commission, issued a
certification to the effect that inasmuch as the 1993 Revised Rules have not been published in a
newspaper of general circulation, the NTC has been applying the 1978 Rules.
The absence of publication, coupled with the certification by the Commissioner of the NTC stating
that the NTC was still governed by the 1987 Rules, clearly indicate that the 1993 Revised Rules have not
taken effect at the time of the grant of the provisional authority to Bayantel. The fact that the 1993
Revised Rules were filed with the UP Law Center on February 3, 1993 is of no moment. There is nothing
in the Administrative Code of 1987 which implies that the filing of the rules with the UP Law Center is the
operative act that gives the rules force and effect. Book VII, Chapter 2, Section 3 thereof merely states:
Filing. – (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center three (3) certified
copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not
filed within three (3) months from the date shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any
party or persons.
(2) The records officer of the agency, or his equivalent functionary, shall carry out the requirements of
this section under pain of disciplinary action.
(3) A permanent register of all rules shall be kept by the issuing agency and shall be open to public
inspection.
The National Administrative Register is merely a bulletin of codified rules and it is furnished only
to the Office of the President, Congress, all appellate courts, the National Library, other public offices or
agencies as the Congress may select, and to other persons at a price sufficient to cover publication and
mailing or distribution costs (Administrative Code of 1987, Book VII, Chapter 2, Section 7). In a similar
case, we held:
This does not imply, however, that the subject Administrative Order is a valid exercise of such quasilegislative power. The original Administrative Order issued on August 30, 1989, under which the
respondents filed their applications for importations, was not published in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation. The questioned Administrative Order, legally, until it is published, is
invalid within the context of Article 2 of Civil Code, which reads:
“Article 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette (or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines), unless it is otherwise
provided. X x x”
The fact that the amendments to Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 were filed with, and
published by the UP Law Center in the National Administrative Register, does not cure the defect related
to the effectivity of the Administrative Order.
This Court, in Tanada v. Tuvera (G.R. No. L-63915, December 29, 1986, 146 SCRA 446) stated, thus:
“We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be
published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a
different effectivity is fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the
exercise of legislative power or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative Rules
and Regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant
also to a valid delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of
the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of
the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines
to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.
Xxx
We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the
public of the contents of the laws.”
The Administrative Order under consideration is one of those issuances which should be published for its
effectivity, since its purpose is to enforce and implement an existing law pursuant to a valid delegation,
i.e., P.D. 1071, in relation to LOI 444 and EO 133 (Philippine International Trading Corp. v. Angeles, 263
SCRA 421, 446-447 [1996]).
Thus, publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation is a condition sine
qua non before statutes, rules or regulations can take effect. This is explicit from Executive Order No.
200, which repealed Article 2 of the Civil Code, and which states that:
Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication either in the Official
Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided (E.O.
200, Section 1).
The Rules of Practice and Procedure of the NTC, which implements Section 29 of the Public
Service Act (C.A. 146, as amended), fall squarely within the scope of these laws, as explicitly mentioned
in the case of Tanada v. Tuvera (146 SCRA 446 [1986]).
Our pronouncement in Tanada v. Tuvera is clear and categorical. Administrative rules and regulations
must be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation.
The only exception are interpretative regulations, those merely internal in nature, or those so-called
letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules and guidelines to be
followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties (PHILSA International Placement &
Services Corp. v. Secretary of Labor, G.R. No. 103144, April 4, 2001, 356 SCRA 174).
Hence, the 1993 Revised Rules should be published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of
general circulation before it can take effect. Even the 1993 Revised Rules itself mandates that said Rules
shall take effect only after their publication in a newspaper of general circulation (Section 20 thereof). In
the absence of such publication, therefore, it is the 1978 Rules that governs. (Republic v. Express
Telecommunication Co., Inc., 373 SCRA 316, Jan. 15, 2002, 1st Div. [Ynares-Santiago])
253.
May a person be held liable for violation of an administrative regulation which was not published?
Held: Petitioner insists, however, that it cannot be held liable for illegal exaction as POEA
Memorandum Circular No. II, Series of 1983, which enumerated the allowable fees which may be
collected from applicants, is void for lack of publication.
There is merit in the argument.
In Tanada v. Tuvera (136 SCRA 27 [1985]), the Court held, as follows:
“We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be
published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a
different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the
exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present,
directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their
purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of
the administrative agency and the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the
so-called letter of instructions issued by the administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to
be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.”
Applying this doctrine, we have previously declared as having no force and effect the following
administrative issuances: a) Rules and Regulations issued by the Joint Ministry of Health-Ministry of Labor
and Employment Accreditation Committee regarding the accreditation of hospitals, medical clinics and
laboratories (Joint Ministry of Health-Ministry of Labor and Employment Accreditation Committee v. Court
of Appeals, 196 SCRA 263 [1991]); b) Letter of Instruction No. 416 ordering the suspension of payments
due and payable by distressed copper mining companies to the national government (Caltex Philippines,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 208 SCRA 726 [1992]); c) Memorandum Circulars issued by the POEA regulating
the recruitment of domestic helpers to Hong Kong (Phil. Association of Service Exporters v. Torres, 212
SCRA 298 [1992]); d) Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 issued by the Philippine International
Trading Corporation regulating applications for importation from the People’s Republic of China
(Philippine International Trading Corporation v. Angeles, 263 SCRA 421 [1996]) ; and e) Corporate
Compensation Circular No. 10 issued by the Department of Budget and Management discontinuing the
payment of other allowances and fringe benefits to government officials and employees (De Jesus v.
Commission on Audit, 294 SCRA 152 [1998). In all these cited cases, the administrative issuances
questioned therein were uniformly struck down as they were not published or filed with the National
Administrative Register as required by the Administrative Code of 1987 (Administrative Code of 1987,
Book VII, chapter 2, Section 3).
POEA memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 must likewise be declared ineffective as the
same was never published or filed with the National Administrative Register.
POEA Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 provides for the applicable schedule of
placement and documentation fees for private employment agencies or authority holders. Under the said
Order, the maximum amount which may be collected from prospective Filipino overseas workers is
P2,500.00. The said circular was apparently issued in compliance with the provisions of Article 32 of the
Labor Code x x x.
It is thus clear that the administrative circular under consideration is one of those issuances
which should be published for its effectivity, since its purpose is to enforce and implement an existing law
pursuant to a valid delegation (Philippine International Trading Corporation v. Angeles, supra.).
Considering that POEA Administrative Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 has not as yet been published or filed
with the National Administrative Register, the same is ineffective and may not be enforced. (Philsa
International Placement and Services Corporation v. Secretary of Labor and Employment,
356 SCRA 174, April 4, 2001, 3rd Div., [Gonzaga-Reyes])
254.
Does the publication requirement apply as well to administrative regulations addressed only to a
specific group and not to the general public?
Held: The Office of the Solicitor General likewise argues that the questioned administrative
circular is not among those requiring publication contemplated by Tanada v. Tuvera as it is addressed
only to a specific group of persons and not to the general public.
Again, there is no merit in this argument.
The fact that the said circular is addressed only to a specified group, namely private employment
agencies or authority holders, does not take it away from the ambit of our ruling in Tanada v. Tuvera. In
the case of Phil. Association of Service Exporters v. Torres ((212 SCRA 298 [1992]), the administrative
circulars questioned therein were addressed to an even smaller group, namely Philippine and Hong Kong
agencies engaged in the recruitment of workers for Hong Kong, and still the Court ruled therein that, for
lack of proper publication, the said circulars may not be enforced or implemented.
Our pronouncement in Tanada v. Tuvera is clear and categorical. Administrative rules and
regulations must be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid
delegation. The only exceptions are interpretative regulations, those merely internal in nature, or those
so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules and guidelines to
be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties. Administrative Circular No. 2, Series
of 1983 has not been shown to fall under any of these exceptions.
In this regard, the Solicitor General’s reliance on the case of Yaokasin v. Commissioner of Customs (180
SCRA 599 [1989]) is misplaced. In the said case, the validity of certain Customs Memorandum Orders
were upheld despite their lack of publication as they were addressed to a particular class of persons, the
customs collectors, who were also the subordinates of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs. As
such, the said Memorandum Orders clearly fall under one of the exceptions to the publication
requirement, namely those dealing with instructions from an administrative superior to a subordinate
regarding the performance of their duties, a circumstance which does not obtain in the case at bench.
Xxx
To summarize, petitioner should be absolved from the three (3) counts of exaction as POEA
Administrative Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 could not be the basis of administrative sanctions against
petitioner for lack of publication. (Philsa International Placement and Services Corporation v.
Secretary of Labor and Employment, 356 SCRA 174, April 4, 2001, 3 rd Div., [Gonzaga-Reyes])
255.
May a successful bidder compel a government agency to formalize a contract with it
notwithstanding that its bid exceeds the amount appropriated by Congress for the project?
Held: Enshrined in the 1987 Philippine Constitution is the mandate that “no money shall be paid out of
the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.” (Sec. 29[1], Article VI of the 1987
Constitution) Thus, in the execution of government contracts, the precise import of this constitutional
restriction is to require the various agencies to limit their expenditures within the appropriations made by
law for each fiscal year.
Xxx
It is quite evident from the tenor of the language of the law that the existence of appropriations
and the availability of funds are indispensable pre-requisites to or conditions sine qua non for the
execution of government contracts. The obvious intent is to impose such conditions as a priori requisites
to the validity of the proposed contract (Fernandez, A Treatise on Government Contracts Under Philippine
Law, 2001, pp. 40-41). Using this as our premise, we cannot accede to PHOTOKINA’s contention that
there is already a perfected contract. While we held in Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v.
Jancom Environmental Corporation (Supra) that “the effect of an unqualified acceptance of the offer or
proposal of the bidder is to perfect a contract, upon notice of the award to the bidder,” however, such
statement would be inconsequential in a government where the acceptance referred to is yet to meet
certain conditions. To hold otherwise is to allow a public officer to execute a binding contract that would
obligate the government in an amount in excess of the appropriations for the purpose for which the
contract was attempted to be made (64 Am Jur 2d Sec. 11). This is a dangerous precedent.
In the case at bar, there seems to be an oversight of the legal requirements as early as the
bidding stage. The first step of a Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) is to determine whether the bids
comply with the requirements. The BAC shall rate a bid “passed” only if it complies with all the
requirements and the submitted price does not exceed the approved budget for the contract.”
(Implementing Rules and Regulations [IRR] for Executive Order No. 262, supra.)
Extant on the record is the fact that the VRIS Project was awarded to PHOTOKINA on account of
its bid in the amount of P6.588 Billion Pesos. However, under Republic Act No. 8760 (General
Appropriations Act, FY 2000, p. 1018, supra.), the only fund appropriated for the project was P1 Billion
Pesos and under the Certification of Available Funds (CAF) only P1.2 Billion Pesos was available. Clearly,
the amount appropriated is insufficient to cover the cost of the entire VRIS Project. There is no way that
the COMELEC could enter into a contract with PHOTOKINA whose accepted bid was way beyond the
amount appropriated by law for the project. This being the case, the BAC should have rejected the bid
for being excessive or should have withdrawn the Notice of Award on the ground that in the eyes of the
law, the same is null and void.
Xxx
Even the draft contract submitted by Commissioner Sadain, that provides for a contract price in
the amount of P1.2 Billion Pesos is unacceptable. X x x While the contract price under the draft contract
is only P1.2 Billion and, thus, within the certified available funds, the same covers only Phase I of the
VRIS Project, i.e., the issuance of identification cards for only 1,000,000 voters in specified areas (Ibid.,
p. 382). In effect, the implementation of the VRIS Project will be “segmented” or “chopped” into several
phases. Not only is such arrangement disallowed by our budgetary laws and practices, it is also
disadvantageous to the COMELEC because of the uncertainty that will loom over its modernization project
for an indefinite period of time. Should Congress fail to appropriate the amount necessary for the
completion of the entire project, what good will the accomplished Phase I serve? As expected, the
project failed “to sell” with the Department of Budget and Management. Thus, Secretary Benjamin
Diokno, per his letter of December 1, 2000, declined the COMELEC’s request for the issuance of the
Notice of Cash Availability (NCA) and a multi-year obligatory authority to assume payment of the total
VRIS Project for lack of legal basis. Corollarily, under Section 33 of R.A. No. 8760, no agency shall enter
into a multi-year contract without a multi-year obligational authority, thus:
“SECTION 33. Contracting Multi-Year Projects. - In the implementation of multi-year projects, no agency
shall enter into a multi-year contract without a multi-year Obligational Authority issued by the
Department of Budget and Management for the purpose. Notwithstanding the issuance of the multi-year
Obligational Authority, the obligation to be incurred in any given calendar year, shall in no case exceed
the amount programmed for implementation during said calendar year.”
Petitioners are justified in refusing to formalize the contract with PHOTOKINA. Prudence dictated them
not to enter into a contract not backed up by sufficient appropriation and available funds. Definitely, to
act otherwise would be a futile exercise for the contract would inevitably suffer the vice of nullity. X x x
Xxx
Verily, the contract, as expressly declared by law, is inexistent and void ab initio (Article 1409 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines). This is to say that the proposed contract is without force and effect
from the very beginning or from its incipiency, as if it had never been entered into, and hence, cannot be
validated either by lapse of time or ratification (Manila Lodge v. Court of Appeals, 73 SCRA 162 [1976];
See also Tongoy v. Court of Appeals, 123 SCRA 99 [1983]).
Xxx
In fine, we rule that PHOTOKINA, though the winning bidder, cannot compel the COMELEC to formalize
the contract. Since PHOTOKINA’s bid is beyond the amount appropriated by Congress for the VRIS
Project, the proposed contract is not binding upon the COMELEC and is considered void x x x.
(Commission on Elections v. Judge Ma. Luisa Quijano-Padilla, G.R. No. 151992, Sept. 18,
2002, En Banc [Sandoval-Gutierrez])
256.
What is the remedy available to a party who contracts with the government contrary to the
requirements of the law and, therefore, void ab initio?
Held: Of course, we are not saying that the party who contracts with the government has no other
recourse in law. The law itself affords him the remedy. Section 48 of E.O. No. 292 explicitly provides
that any contract entered into contrary to the above-mentioned requirements shall be void, and “the
officers entering into the contract shall be liable to the Government or other contracting party for any
consequent damage to the same as if the transaction had been wholly between private parties.” So
when the contracting officer transcends his lawful and legitimate powers by acting in excess of or beyond
the limits of his contracting authority, the Government is not bound under the contract. It would be as if
the contract in such case were a private one, whereupon, he binds himself, and thus, assumes personal
liability thereunder. (Fernandez, a Treatise on Government Contracts Under Philippine Law, 2001, supra.,
pp. 22-23). Otherwise stated, the proposed contract is unenforceable as to the Government.
While this is not the proceeding to determine where the culpability lies, however, the
constitutional mandate cited above constrains us to remind all public officers that public office is a public
trust and all public officers must at all times be accountable to the people. The authority of public
officers to enter into government contracts is circumscribed with a heavy burden of responsibility. In the
exercise of their contracting prerogative, they should be the first judges of the legality, propriety and
wisdom of the contract they entered into. They must exercise a high degree of caution so that the
Government may not be the victim of ill-advised or improvident action (Rivera v. Maclang, 7 SCRA 57
[1963]). (Commission on Elections v. Judge Ma. Luisa Quijano-Padilla, G.R. No. 151992, Sept.
18, 2002, En Banc [Sandoval-Gutierrez])
257.
Does the Commission on Human Rights have the power to adjudicate?
Held: In its Order x x x denying petitioners’ motion to dismiss, the CHR theorizes that the
intention of the members of the Constitutional Commission is to make CHR a quasi-judicial body. This
view, however, has not heretofore been shared by this Court. In Carino v. Commission on Human Rights
(204 SCRA 483, 492), the Court x x x has observed that it is “only the first of the enumerated powers and
functions that bears any resemblance to adjudication of adjudgment,” but that resemblance can in no
way be synonymous to the adjudicatory power itself. The Court explained:
“x x x [T]he Commission on Human Rights x x x was not meant by the fundamental law to be another
court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.
“The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may
investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations
involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the
judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving
evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly
speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a
controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the
end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to
such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission
does not have. (Simon, Jr. v. Commission on Human Rights, 229 SCRA 117, 125, Jan. 5, 1994,
En Banc [Vitug, J.])
258.
Does the Commission on Human Rights have jurisdiction to issue TRO or writ of preliminary
injunction?
Held: In Export Processing Zone Authority v. Commission on Human rights (208 SCRA 125,
131), the Court x x x explained:
“The constitutional provision directing the CHR to ‘provide for preventive measures and legal aid services
to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection’ may not be construed
to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a restraining order or writ of injunction for, if that were
the intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so. ‘Jurisdiction is conferred only by the
Constitution or by law.’ It is never derived by implication.”
“Evidently, the ‘preventive measures and legal aid services’ mentioned in the Constitution refer to
extrajudicial and judicial remedies (including a writ of preliminary injunction) which the CHR may seek
from the proper courts on behalf of the victims of human rights violations. Not being a court of justice,
the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued
‘by the judge of any court in which the action is pending [within his district], or by a Justice of the Court
of Appeals, or of the Supreme Court. x x x. A writ of preliminary injunction is an ancillary remedy. It is
available only in a pending principal action, for the preservation or protection of the rights and interest of
a party thereto, and for no other purpose.”
The Commission does have legal standing to indorse, for appropriate action, its findings and
recommendations to any appropriate agency of government (See Export Processing Zone Authority v.
Commission on Human Rights, 208 SCRA 125). (Simon, Jr. v. Commission on Human Rights, 229
SCRA 117, 134-135, Jan. 5, 1994, En Banc [Vitug, J.])
259.
Discuss the contempt power of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR). When may it be validly
exercised?
Held: On its contempt powers, the CHR is constitutionally authorized to “adopt its operational
guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the
Rules of Court.” Accordingly, the CHR acted within its authority in providing in its revised rules, its power
“to cite or hold any person in direct or indirect contempt, and to impose the appropriate penalties in
accordance with the procedure and sanctions provided for in the Rules of Court.” That power to cite for
contempt, however, should be understood to apply only to violations of its adopted operational guidelines
and rules of procedure essential to carry out its investigatorial powers. To exemplify, the power to cite
for contempt could be exercised against persons who refuse to cooperate with the said body, or who
unduly withhold relevant information, or who decline to honor summons, and the like, in pursuing its
investigative work. The “order to desist” (a semantic interplay for a restraining order) in the instance
before us, however, is not investigatorial in character but prescinds from an adjudicative power that it
does not possess. x x x (Simon, Jr. v. Commission on Human Rights, 229 SCRA 117, 134, Jan.
5, 1994, En Banc [Vitug, J.])
THE LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
260.
How are positions in the Civil Service classified? Discuss the characteristics of each.
Ans.: Positions in the Civil Service may be classified into: 1) Career Positions, and 2) Non-Career
Positions.
Career Positions are characterized by (1) entrance based on merit and fitness to be determined as far as
practicable by competitive examination, or based on highly technical qualifications; (2) opportunity for
advancement to higher career positions; and (3) security of tenure (Sec. 7, Chap. 2, Subtitle A, Title
I, Bk. V, E.O. No. 292).
The Non-Career Service shall be characterized by (1) entrance on bases other than of the usual tests of
merit or fitness utilized for the career service; and (2) tenure which is limited to a period specified by law,
or which is coterminous with that of the appointing authority or subject to his pleasure, or which is
limited to the duration of a particular project for which purpose employment was made (Sec. 9, Chap.
2, Subtitle A, Title I, Bk. V, E.O. No. 292).
261.
Define Appointment. Discuss its nature.
Held: An “appointment” to a public office is the unequivocal act of designating or selecting by one
having the authority therefor of an individual to discharge and perform the duties and functions of an
office or trust. The appointment is deemed complete once the last act required of the appointing
authority has been complied with and its acceptance thereafter by the appointee in order to render it
effective. Appointment necessarily calls for an exercise of discretion on the part of the appointing
authority. In Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila v. Intermediate Appellate Court (140 SCRA 22),
reiterated in Flores v. Drilon (223 SCRA 568), this Court has held:
“The power to appoint is, in essence, discretionary. The appointing power has the right of choice which
he may exercise freely according to his judgment, deciding for himself who is best qualified among those
who have the necessary qualifications and eligibilities. It is a prerogative of the appointing power x x x.”
(At p. 579)
Indeed, it may rightly be said that the right of choice is the heart of the power to appoint. In the
exercise of the power of appointment, discretion is an integral thereof. (Bermudez v. Torres, 311
SCRA 733, Aug. 4, 1999, 3rd Div. [Vitug])
262.
May the Civil Service Commission, or the Supreme Court, validly nullify an appointment on the
ground that somebody else is better qualified?
Held: The head of an agency who is the appointing power is the one most knowledgeable to decide who
can best perform the functions of the office. Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must
be performed by the officer vested with such power according to his best lights, the only condition being
that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment
cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who should have been preferred.
Indeed, this is a prerogative of the appointing authority which he alone can decide. The choice of an
appointee from among those who possess the required qualifications is a political and administrative
decision calling for considerations of wisdom, convenience, utility and the interests of the service which
can best be made by the head of the office concerned, the person most familiar with the organizational
structure and environmental circumstances within which the appointee must function.
As long as the appointee is qualified the Civil Service Commission has no choice but to attest to and
respect the appointment even if it be proved that there are others with superior credentials. The law
limits the Commission’s authority only to whether or not the appointees possess the legal qualifications
and the appropriate civil service eligibility, nothing else. If they do then the appointments are approved
because the Commission cannot exceed its power by substituting its will for that of the appointing
authority. Neither can we. (Rimonte v. CSC, 244 SCRA 504-505, May 29, 1995, En Banc
[Bellosillo, J.])
263.
Does the “next-in-rank” rule import any mandatory or peremptory requirement that the person
next-in-rank must be appointed to the vacancy?
Held: The “next-in-rank rule is not absolute; it only applies in cases of promotion, a process which
denotes a scalar ascent of an officer to another position higher either in rank or salary. And even in
promotions, it can be disregarded for sound reasons made known to the next-in-rank, as the concept
does not import any mandatory or peremptory requirement that the person next-in-rank must be
appointed to the vacancy. The appointing authority, under the Civil Service Law, is allowed to fill
vacancies by promotion, transfer of present employees, reinstatement, reemployment, and appointment
of outsiders who have appropriate civil service eligibility, not necessarily in that order. There is no legal
fiat that a vacancy must be filled only by promotion; the appointing authority is given wide discretion to
fill a vacancy from among the several alternatives provided by law.
What the Civil Service Law provides is that if a vacancy is filled by promotion, the person holding the
position next in rank thereto “shall be considered for promotion.”
In Taduran v. Civil Service Commission (131 SCRA 66 [1984]) , the Court construed that phrase to mean
that the person next-in-rank “would be among the first to be considered for the vacancy, if qualified.” In
Santiago, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission (178 SCRA 733 [1989]), the Court elaborated the import of the
rule in the following manner:
“One who is next-in-rank is entitled to preferential consideration for promotion to the higher vacancy but
it does not necessarily follow that he and no one else can be appointed. The rule neither grants a vested
right to the holder nor imposes a ministerial duty on the appointing authority to promote such person to
the next higher position x x x”
(Abila v. CSC, 198 SCRA 102, June 3, 1991, En Banc [Feliciano])
263.
Can a person who lacks the necessary qualifications for a public position be appointed to it in a
permanent capacity? Illustrative case.
Held: At the outset, it must be stressed that the position of Ministry Legal Counsel-CESO IV is
embraced in the Career Executive Service. X x x
In the case at bar, there is no question that private respondent does not have the required CES
eligibility. As admitted by private respondent in his Comment, he is “not a CESO or a member of the
Career Executive Service.”
In the case of Achacoso v. Macaraig, et al. (195 SCRA 235, 239-240 [1991]), the Court held:
It is settled that a permanent appointment can be issued only “to a person who meets all the
requirements for the position to which he s being appointed, including the appropriate eligibility
prescribed.” Achacoso did not. At best, therefore, his appointment could be regarded only as temporary.
And being so, it could be withdrawn at will by the appointing authority and “at a moment’s notice,”
conformably to established jurisprudence.
The Court, having considered these submissions and the additional arguments of the parties in the
petitioner’s Reply and of the Solicitor-General’s Rejoinder, must find for the respondents.
The mere fact that a position belongs to the Career Service does not automatically confer security of
tenure in its occupant even if he does not possess the required qualifications. Such right will have to
depend on the nature of his appointment, which in turn depends on his eligibility or lack of it. A person
who does not have the requisite qualifications for the position cannot be appointed to it in the first place
or, only as an exception to the rule, may be appointed to it merely in an acting capacity in the absence of
appropriate eligibles. The appointment extended to him cannot be regarded as permanent even if it may
be so designated.
Evidently, private respondent’s appointment did not attain permanency. Not having taken the
necessary Career Executive Service examination to obtain the requisite eligibility, he did not at the time
of his appointment and up to the present, possess the needed eligibility for a position in the Career
Executive Service. Consequently, his appointment as Ministry Legal Counsel-CESO IV/Department Legal
Counsel and/or Director III, was merely temporary. Such being the case, he could be transferred or
reassigned without violating the constitutionally guaranteed right to security of tenure.
Private respondent capitalizes on his lack of CES eligibility by adamantly contending that the
mobility and flexibility concepts in the assignment of personnels under the Career Executive Service do
not apply to him because he s not a Career Executive Service Officer. Obviously, the contention is
without merit. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, non-eligibles holding permanent
appointments to CES positions were never meant to remain immobile in their status. Otherwise, their
lack of eligibility would be a premium vesting them with permanency in the CES positions, a privilege
even their eligible counterparts do not enjoy.
Then too, the cases on unconsented transfer invoked by private respondent find no application in
the present case. To reiterate, private respondent’s appointment is merely temporary; hence, he could
be transferred or reassigned to other positions without violating his right to security of tenure. (De Leon
v. Court of Appeals, 350 SCRA 1, Jan. 22, 2001, En Banc [Ynares-Santiago])
264.
In the career executive service, is a career executive service (CES) eligibility all that an employee
needs to acquire security of tenure? Is appointment to a CES rank necessary for the acquisition of such
security of tenure?
Held: The petitions are impressed with merit.
In the career executive service, the acquisition of security of tenure which presupposes a
permanent appointment is governed by the rules and regulations promulgated by the CES Board x x x.
As clearly set forth in the foregoing provisions, two requisites must concur in order that an employee in
the career executive service may attain security of tenure, to wit:
a)
b)
CES eligibility; and
Appointment to the appropriate CES rank.
In addition, it must be stressed that the security of tenure of employees in the career executive service
(except first and second level employees in the civil service), pertains only to rank and not to the office or
to the position to which they may be appointed. Thus, a career executive service officer may be
transferred or reassigned from one position to another without losing his rank which follows him
wherever he is transferred or reassigned. In fact, a CESO suffers no diminution of salary even if assigned
to a CES position with lower salary grade, as he is compensated according to his CES rank and not on the
basis of the position or office he occupies.
In the case at bar, there is no question that respondent Ramon S. Roco, though a CES eligible, does not
possess the appropriate CES rank, which is – CES rank level V, for the position of Regional Director of the
LTO (Region V). Falling short of one of the qualifications that would complete his membership in the
CES, respondent cannot successfully interpose violation of security of tenure. Accordingly, he could be
validly reassigned to other positions in the career executive service. X x x
Moreover, under the mobility and flexibility principles of the Integrated Reorganization Plan, CES
personnel may be reassigned or transferred from one position to another x x x.
One last point. Respondent capitalizes on the fact that petitioner Luis Mario M. General is not a CES
eligible. The absence, however, of such CES eligibility is of no moment. As stated in Part III, Chapter I,
Article IV, paragraph 5(c), of the Integrated Reorganization Plan –
“x x x the President may, in exceptional cases, appoint any person who is not a Career Executive Service
eligible; provided that such appointee shall subsequently take the required Career Executive Service
examination and that he shall not be promoted to a higher class until he qualified in such examination.”
Evidently, the law allows appointment of those who are not CES eligible, subject to the obtention of said
eligibility, in the same manner that the appointment of respondent who does not possess the required
CES rank (CES rank level V) for the position of Regional Director of the LTO, is permitted in a temporary
capacity. (General v. Roco, 350 SCRA 528, Jan. 29, 2001, 1st Div. [Ynares-Santiago])
265.
May an elective public official be validly appointed or designated to any public office or position
during his tenure?
Ans.: No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any
public office or position during his tenure. (Sec. 7, 1st par., Art. IX-B, 1987 Constitution)
266.
May an appointive public official hold any other office or employment?
Ans.: Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive
official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporation. (Sec. 7, 2nd par., Art.
IX-B, 1987 Constitution)
267.
May the President, Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants hold any
other office or employment?
Ans.: The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or
assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment
during their tenure. (Sec. 13, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution)
268.
Does the prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution insofar as Cabinet
members, their deputies or assistants are concerned admit of the broad exceptions made for appointive
officials in general under Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B?
Held: The threshold question therefore is: does the prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution insofar as Cabinet members, their deputies or assistants are concerned admit of the
broad exceptions made for appointive officials in general under Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B which, for
easy reference is quoted anew, thus: “Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his
position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the government or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporation or
their subsidiaries.”
We rule in the negative.
Xxx
The practice of designating members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants as members of
the governing bodies or boards of various government agencies and instrumentalities, including
government-owned and controlled corporations, became prevalent during the time legislative powers in
this country were exercised by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos pursuant to his martial law
authority. There was a proliferation of newly-created agencies, instrumentalities and government-owned
and controlled corporations created by presidential decrees and other modes of presidential issuances
where Cabinet members, their deputies or assistants were designated to head or sit as members of the
board with the corresponding salaries, emoluments, per diems, allowances and other perquisites of
office. X x x
This practice of holding multiple offices or positions in the government soon led to abuses by
unscrupulous public officials who took advantage of this scheme for purposes of self-enrichment. X x x
Particularly odious and revolting to the people’s sense of propriety and morality in government
service were the data contained therein that Roberto v. Ongpin was a member of the governing boards
of twenty-nine (29) governmental agencies, instrumentalities and corporations; Imelda R. Marcos of
twenty-three (23); Cesar E.A. Virata of twenty-two (22); Arturo R. Tanco, Jr. of fifteen (15); Jesus S.
Hipolito and Geronimo Z. Velasco, of fourteen each (14); Cesar C. Zalamea of thirteen (13); Ruben B.
Ancheta and Jose A. Rono of twelve (12) each; Manuel P. Alba, Gilberto O. Teodoro, and Edgardo
Tordesillas of eleven (11) each; and Lilia Bautista and Teodoro Q. Pena of ten (10) each.
The blatant betrayal of public trust evolved into one of the serious causes of discontent with the
Marcos regime. It was therefore quite inevitable and in consonance with the overwhelming sentiment of
the people that the 1986 Constitutional Commission, convened as it was after the people successfully
unseated former President Marcos, should draft into its proposed Constitution the provisions under
consideration which are envisioned to remedy, if not correct, the evils that flow from the holding of
multiple governmental offices and employment. X x x
But what is indeed significant is the fact that although Section 7, Article IX-B already contains a
blanket prohibition against the holding of multiple offices or employment in the government subsuming
both elective and appointive public officials, the Constitutional Commission should see it fit to formulate
another provision, Sec. 13, Article VII, specifically prohibiting the President, Vice-President, members of
the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants from holding any other office or employment during their
tenure, unless otherwise provided in the Constitution itself.
Evidently, from this move as well as in the different phraseologies of the constitutional provisions
in question, the intent of the framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on the
President and his official family in so far as holding other offices or employment in the government or
elsewhere is concerned.
Moreover, such intent is underscored by a comparison of Section 13, Article VII with other
provisions of the Constitution on the disqualifications of certain public officials or employees from holding
other offices or employment. Under Section 13, Article VI, “[N]o Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives may hold any other office or employment in the Government x x x.” Under section 5(4),
Article XVI, “[N]o member of the armed forces in the active service shall, at any time, be appointed in
any capacity to a civilian position in the Government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or any of their subsidiaries.” Even Section 7(2), Article IX-B, relied upon by respondents
provides “[U]nless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive
official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government.”
It is quite notable that in all these provisions on disqualifications to hold other office or
employment, the prohibition pertains to an office or employment in the government and governmentowned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. In striking contrast is the wording of Section 13,
Article VII which states that “[T]he President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their
deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or
employment during their tenure.” In the latter provision, the disqualification is absolute, not being
qualified by the phrase “in the Government.” The prohibition imposed on the President and his official
family is therefore all-embracing and covers both public and private office or employment.
Going further into Section 13, Article VII, the second sentence provides: “They shall not, during
said tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be
financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the
Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.” These sweeping, all-embracing prohibitions imposed on the
President and his official family, which prohibitions are not similarly imposed on other public officials or
employees such as the Members of Congress, members of the civil service in general and members of the
armed forces, are proof of the intent of the 1987 Constitution to treat the President and his official family
as a class by itself and to impose upon said class stricter prohibitions.
Xxx
Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or
employment in the government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary
functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only when
expressly authorized by the Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to lay
down the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and employees, while
Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the President, the Vice-President,
Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.
This being the case, the qualifying phrase “unless otherwise provided in this Constitution” in
Section 13, Article VII cannot possibly refer to the broad exceptions provided under Section 7, Article IXB of the 1987 Constitution. To construe said qualifying phrase as respondents would have us to do,
would render nugatory and meaningless the manifest intent and purpose of the framers of the
Constitution to impose a stricter prohibition on the President, Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet,
their deputies and assistants with respect to holding other offices or employment in the government
during their tenure. Respondents’ interpretation that Section 13 of Article VII admits of the exceptions
found in Section 7, par. (2) of Article IX-B would obliterate the distinction so carefully set by the framers
of the Constitution as to when the high-ranking officials of the Executive Branch from the President to
assistant Secretary, on the one hand, and the generality of civil servants from the rank immediately
below Assistant Secretary downwards, on the other, may hold any other office or position in the
government during their tenure.
Moreover, respondents’ reading of the provisions in question would render certain parts of the
Constitution inoperative. This observation applies particularly to the Vice-President who, under Section
13 of Article VII is allowed to hold other office or employment when so authorized by the Constitution,
but who as an elective public official under Sec. 7, par. (1) of Article IX-B is absolutely ineligible “for
appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure.” Surely, to
say that the phrase “unless otherwise provided in this Constitution” found in Section 13, Article VII has
reference to Section 7, par. (1) of Article IX-B would render meaningless the specific provisions of the
Constitution authorizing the Vice-President to become a member of the Cabinet (Sec. 3, Ibid.), and to act
as President without relinquishing the Vice-Presidency where the President shall not have been chosen or
fails to qualify (Sec. 7, Article VII). Such absurd consequence can be avoided only by interpreting the
two provisions under consideration as one, i.e., Section 7, par. (1) of Article IX-B providing the general
rule and the other, i.e., Section 13, Article VII as constituting the exception thereto. In the same manner
must Section 7, par. (2) of Article IX-B be construed vis-à-vis Section 13, Article VII.
Xxx
Since the evident purpose of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to impose a stricter
prohibition on the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants with
respect to holding multiple offices or employment in the government during their tenure, the exception to
this prohibition must be read with equal severity. On its face, the language of Section 13, Article VII is
prohibitory so that it must be understood as intended to be a positive and unequivocal negation of the
privilege of holding multiple government offices and employment. Verily, wherever the language used in
the constitution is prohibitory, it is to be understood as intended to be a positive and unequivocal
negation (Varney v. Justice, 86 Ky 596; 6 S.W. 457; Hunt v. State, 22 Tex. App. 396, 3 S.W. 233). The
phrase “unless otherwise provided in this Constitution” must be given a literal interpretation to refer only
to those particular instances cited in the Constitution itself, to wit: the Vice-President being appointed as
a member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2), Article VII; or acting as President in those instances
provided under Section 7, pars. (2) and (3), Article VII; and, the Secretary of Justice being ex-officio
member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII.
Xxx
It being clear x x x that the 1987 Constitution seeks to prohibit the President, Vice-President,
members of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants from holding during their tenure multiple offices or
employment in the government, except in those cases specified in the Constitution itself and as above
clarified with respect to posts held without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided
by law and as required by the primary functions of their office, the citation of Cabinet members (then
called Ministers) as examples during the debate and deliberation on the general rule laid down for all
appointive officials should be considered as mere personal opinions which cannot override the
constitution’s manifest intent and the people’s understanding thereof.
In the light of the construction given to Section 13, Article VII in relation to Section 7, par. (2),
Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, Executive Order No. 284 dated July 23, 1987 is unconstitutional.
Ostensibly restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant
secretaries may hold in addition to their primary position to not more than two (2) positions in the
government and government corporations, Executive Order No. 284 actually allows them to hold multiple
offices or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Section 13, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution
itself.
The Court is alerted by respondents to the impractical consequences that will result from a strict
application of the prohibition mandated under Section 13, Article VII on the operations of the
Government, considering that Cabinet members would be stripped of their offices held in an ex-officio
capacity, by reason of their primary positions or by virtue of legislation. As earlier clarified in this
decision, ex-officio posts held by the executive official concerned without additional compensation as
provided by law and as required by the primary functions of his office do not fall under the definition of
“any other office” within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition. With respect to other offices
or employment held by virtue of legislation, including chairmanships or directorships in governmentowned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, suffice it to say that the feared impractical
consequences are more apparent than real. Being head of an executive department is no mean job. It is
more than a full-time job, requiring full attention, specialized knowledge, skills and expertise. If
maximum benefits are to be derived from a department head’s ability and expertise, he should be
allowed to attend to his duties and responsibilities without the distraction of other governmental offices
or employment. He should be precluded from dissipating his efforts, attention and energy among too
many positions and responsibility, which may result in haphazardness and inefficiency. Surely the
advantages to be derived from this concentration of attention, knowledge and expertise, particularly at
this stage of our national and economic development, far outweigh the benefits, if any, that may be
gained from a department head spreading himself too thin and taking in more than what he can handle.
Finding Executive Order No. 284 to be constitutionally infirm, the Court hereby orders
respondents x x x to immediately relinquish their other offices or employment, as herein defined, in the
government, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries. (Civil
Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317, Feb. 22, 1991, En Banc [Fernan, CJ])
269.
Does the prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under Section 13,
Article VII of the Constitution apply to posts occupied by the Executive officials specified therein without
additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary
functions of said officials’ office?
Held: The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under Section 13,
Article VII of the Constitution must not, however, be construed as applying to posts occupied by the
Executive officials specified therein without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided
by law and as required (As opposed to the term “allowed” used in Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B of the
Constitution, which is permissive. “Required” suggests an imposition, and therefore, obligatory in nature)
by the primary functions of said officials’ office. The reason is that these posts do not comprise “any
other office” within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are properly an imposition of
additional duties and functions on said officials (Martin v. Smith, 140 A.L.R. 1073; Ashmore v. Greater
Greenville Sewer District, 173 A.L.R. 407). To characterize these posts otherwise would lead to absurd
consequences, among which are: The President of the Philippines cannot chair the National Security
Council reorganized under Executive Order No. 115 (December 24, 1986). Neither can the VicePresident, the Executive Secretary, and the Secretaries of National Defense, Justice, Labor and
Employment and Local Government sit in this Council, which would then have no reason to exist for lack
of a chairperson and members. The respective undersecretaries and assistant secretaries, would also be
prohibited.
Xxx
Indeed, the framers of our Constitution could not have intended such absurd consequences. A
Constitution, viewed as a continuously operative charter of government, is not to be interpreted as
demanding the impossible or the impracticable; and unreasonable or absurd consequences, if possible,
should be avoided (Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 87 L. Ed. 1774, 63 S. Ct. 1375; others
omitted).
To reiterate, the prohibition under Section 13, Article VII is not to be interpreted as covering
positions held without additional compensation in ex-officio capacities as provided by law and as required
by the primary functions of the concerned official’s office. The term ex-officio means “from office; by
virtue of office.” It refers to an “authority derived from official character merely, not expressly conferred
upon the individual character, but rather annexed to the official position.” Ex officio likewise denotes an
“act done in an official character, or as a consequence of office, and without any other appointment or
authority than that conferred by the office.” (Black’s Law Dictionary, p. 516; 15A Words and Phrases, p.
392) An ex-officio member of a board is one who is a member by virtue of his title to a certain office,
and without further warrant or appointment (15A Words and Phrases, p. 392). To illustrate, by express
provision of law, the Secretary of Transportation and Communications is the ex-officio Chairman of the
Board of the Philippine Ports Authority (Sec. 7, E.O. 778), and the Light Rail Transit Authority (Sec. 1,
E.O. 210).
The Court had occasion to explain the meaning of an ex-officio position in Rafael v. Embroidery
and Apparel Control and Inspection Board (21 SCRA 336 [1967]) , thus: “An examination of Section 2 of
the questioned statute (R.A. 3137) reveals that for the chairman and members of the Board to qualify
they need only be designated by the respective department heads. With the exception of the
representative from the private sector, they sit ex-officio. I order to be designated they must already be
holding positions in the offices mentioned in the law. Thus, for instance, one who does not hold a
previous appointment in the Bureau of Customs, cannot, under the act, be designated a representative
from that office. The same is true with respect to the representatives from the other offices. No new
appointments are necessary. This is as it should be, because the representatives so designated merely
perform duties in the Board in addition to those already performed under their original appointments.”
(Italics supplied)
The term “primary” used to describe “functions” refers to the order of importance and thus
means chief or principal function. The term is not restricted to the singular but may refer to the plural
(33A Words and Phrases, p. 210, citing Collector of Revenue v. Louisiana Ready Mix Co., La. App., 197 S.
2d 141, 145). The additional duties must not only be closely related to, but must be required by the
official’s primary functions. Examples of designations to positions by virtue of one’s primary functions are
the Secretaries of Finance and Budget sitting as members of the Monetary Board, and the Secretary of
Transportation and Communications acting as Chairman of the Maritime Industry Authority (Sec. 7, P.D.
No. 474) and the Civil Aeronautics Board.
If the functions to be performed are merely incidental, remotely related, inconsistent,
incompatible, or otherwise alien to the primary function of a cabinet official, such additional functions
would fall under the purview of “any other office” prohibited by the Constitution. An example would be
the Press Undersecretary sitting as a member of the Board of the Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation. The same rule applies to such positions which confer on the cabinet official management
functions and/or monetary compensation, such as but not limited to chairmanships or directorships in
government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.
Mandating additional duties and functions to the President, Vice-President, Cabinet Members,
their deputies or assistants which are not inconsistent with those already prescribed by their offices or
appointments by virtue of their special knowledge, expertise and skill in their respective executive offices
is a practice long-recognized in many jurisdictions. It is a practice justified by the demands of efficiency,
policy direction, continuity and coordination among the different offices in the Executive Branch in the
discharge of its multifarious tasks of executing and implementing laws affecting national interest and
general welfare and delivering basic services to the people. It is consistent with the power vested on the
President and his alter egos, the Cabinet members, to have control of all the executive departments,
bureaus and offices and to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed (Section 17, Article VII). Without
these additional duties and functions being assigned to the President and his official family to sit in the
governing bodies or boards of governmental agencies or instrumentalities in an ex-officio capacity as
provided by law and as required by their primary functions, they would be deprived of the means for
control and supervision, thereby resulting in an unwieldy and confused bureaucracy.
It bears repeating though that in order that such additional duties or functions may not
transgress the prohibition embodied in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, such additional
duties or functions must be required by the primary functions of the official concerned, who is to perform
the same in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law, without receiving any additional compensation
therefor.
The ex-officio position being actually and in legal contemplation part of the principal office, it
follows that the official concerned has no right to receive additional compensation for his services in the
said position. The reason is that these services are already paid for and covered by the compensation
attached to his principal office. It should be obvious that if, say, the Secretary of Finance attends a
meeting of the Monetary Board as an ex-officio member thereof, he is actually and in legal contemplation
performing the primary function of his principal office in defining policy in monetary and banking matters,
which come under the jurisdiction of his department. For such attendance, therefore, he is not entitled
to collect any extra compensation, whether it be in the form of a per diem or an honorarium or an
allowance, or some other such euphemism. By whatever name it is designated, such additional
compensation is prohibited by the Constitution. (Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, 194
SCRA 317, Feb. 22, 1991, En Banc [Fernan, CJ])
270.
Should members of the Cabinet appointed to other positions in the government pursuant to
Executive Order No. 284 which later was declared unconstitutional by the SC for being violative of Section
13, Article VII of the Constitution be made to reimburse the government for whatever pay and
emoluments they received from holding such other positions?
Held: During their tenure in the questioned positions, respondents may be considered de facto
officers and as such entitled to emoluments for actual services rendered (Castillo v. Arrieta, G.R. No. L31444, November 13, 1974, 61 SCRA 55). It has been held that “in cases where there is no de jure
officer, a de facto officer, who, in good faith has had possession of the office and has discharged the
duties pertaining thereto, is legally entitled to the emoluments of the office, and may in an appropriate
action recover the salary, fees and other compensations attached to the office. This doctrine is,
undoubtedly, supported on equitable grounds since it seems unjust that the public should benefit by the
services of an officer de facto and then be freed from all liability to pay any one for such services
(Patterson v. Benson, 112 Pac. 801, 32 L.R.A. [NS] 949). Any per diem, allowances or other emoluments
received by the respondents by virtue of actual services rendered in the questioned positions may
therefore be retained by them. (Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317, Feb.
22, 1991, En Banc [Fernan, CJ])
271.
May a Senator or Congressman hold any other office or employment?
Ans.: No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or
employment in the government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his
seat. Neither shall he be appointed to any office which may have been created or the emoluments
thereof increased during the term for which he was elected (Sec. 13, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution). The
first sentence is referred to as an incompatible office; the second is a forbidden office.
272.
Petitioner claims that Benipayo has no authority to remove her as Director IV of the EID and
reassign her to the Law Department. Petitioner further argues that only the COMELEC, acting as a
collegial body, can authorize such reappointment. Moreover, petitioner maintains that a reassignment
without her consent amounts to removal from office without due process and therefore illegal.
Held: Petitioner’s posturing will hold water if Benipayo does not possess any color of title to the
office of Chairman of the COMELEC. We have ruled, however, that Benipayo is the de jure COMELEC
Chairman, and consequently he has full authority to exercise all the powers of that office for so long as
his ad interim appointment remains effective. X x x. The Chairman, as the Chief Executive of the
COMELEC, is expressly empowered on his own authority to transfer or reassign COMELEC personnel in
accordance with the Civil Service Law. In the exercise of this power, the Chairman is not required by law
to secure the approval of the COMELEC en banc.
Petitioner’s appointment papers x x x indisputably show that she held her Director IV position in
the EID only in an acting or temporary capacity. Petitioner is not a Career Executive Service (CES), and
neither does she hold Career Executive Service Eligibility, which are necessary qualifications for holding
the position of Director IV as prescribed in the Qualifications Standards (Revised 1987) issued by the Civil
Service Commission. Obviously, petitioner does not enjoy security of tenure as Director IV. X x x
Xxx
Having been appointed merely in a temporary or acting capacity, and not possessed of the
necessary qualifications to hold the position of Director IV, petitioner has no legal basis in claiming that
her reassignment was contrary to the Civil Service Law. X x x
Still, petitioner assails her reassignment, carried out during the election period, as a prohibited act under
Section 261 (h) of the Omnibus Election Code x x x.
Xxx
Petitioner claims that Benipayo failed to secure the approval of the COMELEC en banc to effect transfers
or reassignments of COMELEC personnel during the election period. Moreover, petitioner insists that the
COMELEC en banc must concur to every transfer or reassignment of COMELEC personnel during the
election period.
Contrary to petitioner’s allegation, the COMELEC did in fact issue COMELEC Resolution No. 3300 dated
November 6, 2000, exempting the COMELEC from Section 261 (h) of the Omnibus Election Code. X x x
Xxx
The proviso in COMELEC Resolution No. 3300, requiring due notice and hearing before any transfer or
reassignment can be made within thirty days prior to election day, refers only to COMELEC field
personnel and not to head office personnel like the petitioner. Under the Revised Administrative Code
(see Section 7 [4], Chapter 2, Subtitle C, Book V of the Revised Administrative Code), the COMELEC
Chairman is the sole officer specifically vested with the power to transfer or reassign COMELEC
personnel. The COMELEC Chairman will logically exercise the authority to transfer or reassign COMELEC
personnel pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 3300. The COMELEC en banc cannot arrogate unto itself
this power because that will mean amending the Revised Administrative Code, an act the COMELEC en
banc cannot legally do.
COMELEC Resolution No. 3300 does not require that every transfer or reassignment of COMELEC
personnel should carry the concurrence of the COMELEC as a collegial body. Interpreting Resolution No.
3300 to require such concurrence will render the resolution meaningless since the COMELEC en banc will
have to approve every personnel transfer or reassignment, making the resolution utterly useless.
Resolution No. 3300 should be interpreted for what it is, an approval to effect transfers and
reassignments of personnel, without need of securing a second approval from the COMELEC en banc to
actually implement such transfer or reassignment.
The COMELEC Chairman is the official expressly authorized by law to transfer or reassign COMELEC
personnel. The person holding that office, in a de jure capacity, is Benipayo. The COMELEC en banc, in
COMELEC Resolution No. 3300, approved the transfer or reassignment of COMELEC personnel during the
election period. Thus, Benipayo’s order reassigning petitioner from the EID to the Law Department does
not violate Section 261 (h) of the Omnibus Election Code. For the same reason, Benipayo’s order
designating Cinco Officer-in-Charge of the EID is legally unassailable. (Matibag v. Benipayo, 380
SCRA 49, April 2, 2002, En Banc [Carpio])
273.
May the appointment of a person assuming a position in the civil service under a completed
appointment be validly recalled or revoked?
Held: It has been held that upon the issuance of an appointment and the appointee’s assumption of the
position in the civil service, “he acquires a legal right which cannot be taken away either by revocation of
the appointment or by removal except for cause and with previous notice and hearing.” (Mauna v. Civil
Service Commission, 232 SCRA 388, 398 [1994]) Moreover, it is well-settled that the person assuming a
position in the civil service under a completed appointment acquires a legal, not just an equitable, right to
the position. This right is protected not only by statute, but by the Constitution as well, which right
cannot be taken away by either revocation of the appointment, or by removal, unless there is valid cause
to do so, provided that there is previous notice and hearing. (Aquino v. Civil Service Commission,
208 SCRA 240, 248 [1992])
Petitioner admits that his very first official act upon assuming the position of town mayor was to issue
Office Order No. 95-01 which recalled the appointments of the private respondents. There was no
previous notice, much less a hearing accorded to the latter. Clearly, it was petitioner who acted in undue
haste to remove the private respondents without regard for the simple requirements of due process of
law. While he argues that the appointing power has the sole authority to revoke said appointments,
there is no debate that he does not have blanket authority to do so. Neither can he question the CSC’s
jurisdiction to affirm or revoke the recall.
Rule V, Section 9 of the Omnibus Implementing Regulations of the Revised Administrative Code
specifically provides that “an appointment accepted by the appointee cannot be withdrawn or revoked by
the appointing authority and shall remain in force and in effect until disapproved by the Commission.”
Thus, it is the CSC that is authorized to recall an appointment initially approved, but only when such
appointment and approval are proven to be in disregard of applicable provisions of the civil service law
and regulations (Debulgado v. Civil Service Commission, 237 SCRA 184, 200 [1994]).
Moreover, Section 10 of the same rule provides:
Sec. 10. An appointment issued in accordance with pertinent laws and rules shall take effect
immediately upon its issuance by the appointing authority, and if the appointee has assumed the duties
of the position, he shall be entitled to receive his salary at once without awaiting the approval of his
appointment by the Commission. The appointment shall remain effective until disapproved by the
Commission. In no case shall an appointment take effect earlier than the date of its issuance.
Section 20 of Rule VI also provides:
Sec. 20. Notwithstanding the initial approval of an appointment, the same may be recalled on any of
the following grounds:
(a)
Promotion Plan;
(b)
Non-compliance with the procedures/criteria provided in the agency’s Merit
Failure to pass through the agency’s Selection/Promotion Board;
(c)
Violation of the existing collective agreement between management and employees
relative to promotion; or
(d)
Violation of other existing civil service law, rules and regulations.
Accordingly, the appointments of the private respondents may only be recalled on the above-cited
grounds. And yet, the only reason advanced by the petitioner to justify the recall was that these were
“midnight appointments.” The CSC correctly ruled, however, that the constitutional prohibition on socalled “midnight appointments,” specifically those made within two (2) months immediately prior to the
next presidential elections, applies only to the President or Acting President. (De Rama v. Court of
Appeals, 353 SCRA 94, Feb. 28, 2001, En Banc [Ynares-Santiago])
274.
The Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) is a government-owned and controlled corporation with
an original charter under R.A. No. 95, as amended. Its charter, however, was amended to vest in it the
authority to secure loans, be exempted from payment of all duties, taxes, fees and other charges, etc.
With the amendment of its charter, has it been “impliedly converted to a private corporation”?
Held: The test to determine whether a corporation is government owned or controlled, or private in
nature is simple. Is it created by its own charter for the exercise of a public function, or by incorporation
under the general corporation law? Those with special charters are government corporations subject to
its provisions, and its employees are under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. The PNRC
was not “impliedly converted to a private corporation” simply because its charter was amended to vest in
it the authority to secure loans, be exempted from payment of all duties, taxes, fees and other charges,
etc. (Camporedondo v. NLRC, G.R. No. 129049, Aug. 6, 1999, 1st Div. [Pardo])
275.
What is a primarily confidential position? What is the test to determine whether a position is
primarily confidential or not?
Held: A primarily confidential position is one which denotes not only confidence in the aptitude of the
appointee for the duties of the office but primarily close intimacy which ensures freedom from intercourse
without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings or betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters
of state. (De los Santos v. Mallare, 87 Phil. 289 [1950])
Under the proximity rule, the occupant of a particular position could be considered a confidential
employee if the predominant reason why he was chosen by the appointing authority was the latter’s
belief that he can share a close intimate relationship with the occupant which ensures freedom of
discussion without fear or embarrassment or misgivings of possible betrayal of personal trust or
confidential matters of state. Withal, where the position occupied is more remote from that of the
appointing authority, the element of trust between them is no longer predominant. (CSC v. Salas, 274
SCRA 414, June 19, 1997)
276.
Does the Civil Service Law contemplate a review of decisions exonerating officers or employees
from administrative charges?
Held: By this ruling, we now expressly abandon and overrule extant jurisprudence that “the phrase
‘party adversely affected by the decision’ refers to the government employee against whom the
administrative case is filed for the purpose of disciplinary action which may take the form of suspension,
demotion in rank or salary, transfer, removal or dismissal from office” and not included are “cases where
the penalty imposed is suspension for not more than thirty (30) days or fine in an amount not exceeding
thirty days salary” (Paredes v. Civil Service Commission, 192 SCRA 84, 85) or “when respondent is
exonerated of the charges, there is no occasion for appeal.” (Mendez v. Civil Service Commission, 204
SCRA 965, 968) In other words, we overrule prior decisions holding that the Civil Service Law “does not
contemplate a review of decisions exonerating officers or employees from administrative charges”
enunciated in Paredes v. Civil Service Commission (192 SCRA 84); Mendez v. Civil Service Commission
(204 SCRA 965); Magpale v. Civil Service Commission (215 SCRA 398); Navarro v. Civil Service
Commission and Export Processing Zone Authority (226 SCRA 207) and more recently Del Castillo v. Civil
Service Commission (237 SCRA 184). (CSC v. Pedro O. Dacoycoy, G.R. No. 135805, April 29,
1999, En Banc [Pardo])
277.
What is preventive suspension? Discuss its nature.
Held: Imposed during the pendency of an administrative investigation, preventive suspension is not a
penalty in itself. It is merely a measure of precaution so that the employee who is charged may be
separated, for obvious reasons, from the scene of his alleged misfeasance while the same is being
investigated. Thus preventive suspension is distinct from the administrative penalty of removal from
office such as the one mentioned in Sec. 8(d) of P.D. No. 807. While the former may be imposed on a
respondent during the investigation of the charges against him, the latter is the penalty which may only
be meted upon him at the termination of the investigation or the final disposition of the case. (Beja, Sr.
v. CA, 207 SCRA 689, March 31, 1992 [Romero])
278.
Discuss the kinds of preventive suspension under the Civil Service Law. When may a civil service
employee placed under preventive suspension be entitled to compensation?
Held: There are two kinds of preventive suspension of civil service employees who are charged with
offenses punishable by removal or suspension: (1) preventive suspension pending investigation (Sec. 51,
Civil Service Law, EO No. 292) and (2) preventive suspension pending appeal if the penalty imposed by
the disciplining authority is suspension or dismissal and, after review, the respondent is exonerated
(Section 47, par. 4, Civil Service Law, EO No. 292).
Preventive suspension pending investigation is not a penalty. It is a measure intended to enable the
disciplining authority to investigate charges against respondent by preventing the latter from intimidating
or in any way influencing witnesses against him. If the investigation is not finished and a decision is not
rendered within that period, the suspension will be lifted and the respondent will automatically be
reinstated. If after investigation respondent is found innocent of the charges and is exonerated, he
should be reinstated. However, no compensation was due for the period of preventive suspension
pending investigation. The Civil Service Act of 1959 (R.A. No. 2260) providing for compensation in such a
case once the respondent was exonerated was revised in 1975 and the provision on the payment of
salaries during suspension was deleted.
But although it is held that employees who are preventively suspended pending investigation are not
entitled to the payment of their salaries even if they are exonerated, they are entitled to compensation
for the period of their suspension pending appeal if eventually they are found innocent.
Preventive suspension pending investigation x x x is not a penalty but only a means of enabling the
disciplining authority to conduct an unhampered investigation. On the other hand, preventive suspension
pending appeal is actually punitive although it is in effect subsequently considered illegal if respondent is
exonerated and the administrative decision finding him guilty is reversed. Hence, he should be reinstated
with full pay for the period of the suspension. (Gloria v. CA, G.R. No. 131012, April 21, 1999, En
Banc [Mendoza])
279.
Discuss the power of Ombudsman to conduct administrative investigations, and to impose
preventive suspension.
Held: Worth stressing, to resolve the present controversy, we must recall that the authority of the
Ombudsman to conduct administrative investigations is mandated by no less than the Constitution. x x x
R.A. 6770, the Ombudsman Law, further grants the Office of the Ombudsman the statutory power to
conduct administrative investigations. X x x
Section 21 of R.A. 6770 names the officials subject to the Ombudsman’s disciplinary authority x x x.
Petitioner is an elective local official accused of grave misconduct and dishonesty. That the Office of the
Ombudsman may conduct an administrative investigation into the acts complained of, appears clear from
the foregoing provisions of R.A. 6770.
However, the question of whether or not the Ombudsman may conduct an investigation over a particular
act or omission, is different from the question of whether or not petitioner, after investigation, may be
held administratively liable. This distinction ought here to be kept in mind, even as we must also take
note that the power to investigate is distinct from the power to suspend preventively an erring public
officer.
Likewise worthy of note, the power of the Office of the Ombudsman to preventively suspend an official
subject to its administrative investigation is provided by specific provision of law. X x x
We have previously interpreted the phrase “under his authority” to mean that the Ombudsman can
preventively suspend all officials under investigation by his office, regardless of the branch of government
in which they are employed (Buenaseda v. Flavier, 226 SCRA 645, 654 [1993]), excepting of course those
removable by impeachment, members of Congress and the Judiciary.
The power to preventively suspend is available not only to the Ombudsman but also to the Deputy
Ombudsman. This is the clear import of Section 24 of R.A. 6770 abovecited.
There can be no question in this case as to the power and authority of respondent Deputy Ombudsman
to issue an order of preventive suspension against an official like the petitioner, to prevent that official
from using his office to intimidate or influence witnesses (Gloria v. CA, et al., G.R. No. 131012, April 21,
1999, p. 7, 306 SCRA 287) or to tamper with records that might be vital to the prosecution of the case
against him (Yasay, Jr. v. Desierto, et al., G.R. No. 134495, December 28, 1998, p. 9, 300 SCRA 494). In
our view, the present controversy simply boils down to this pivotal question: Given the purpose of
preventive suspension and the circumstances of this case, did respondent Deputy Ombudsman commit a
grave abuse of discretion when he set the period of preventive suspension at six months?
Preventive suspension under Sec. 24, R.A. 6770 x x x may be imposed when, among other factors, the
evidence of guilt is strong. The period for which an official may be preventively suspended must not
exceed six months. In this case, petitioner was preventively suspended and ordered to cease and desist
from holding office for the entire period of six months, which is the maximum provided by law.
The determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong as to warrant preventive suspension
rests with the Ombudsman (Nera v. Garcia, 106 Phil. 1031 [1960]; others omitted.). The discretion as
regards the period of such suspension also necessarily belongs to the Ombudsman, except that he cannot
extend the period of suspension beyond that provided by law (Castillo-Co v. Barbers, supra.). But, in our
view, both the strength of the evidence to warrant said suspension and the propriety of the length or
period of suspension imposed on petitioner are properly raised in this petition for certiorari and
prohibition. X x x
Xxx
Given these findings, we cannot say now that there is no evidence sufficiently strong to justify the
imposition of preventive suspension against petitioner.
But considering its purpose and the
circumstances in the case brought before us, it does appear to us that the imposition of the maximum
period of six months is unwarranted.
X x x [G]ranting that now the evidence against petitioner is already strong, even without conceding that
initially it was weak, it is clear to us that the maximum six-month period is excessive and definitely longer
than necessary for the Ombudsman to make its legitimate case against petitioner. We must conclude
that the period during which petitioner was already preventively suspended, has been sufficient for the
lawful purpose of preventing petitioner from hiding and destroying needed documents, or harassing and
preventing witnesses who wish to appear against him. (Garcia v. Mojica, 314 SCRA 207, Sept. 10,
1999, 2nd Div. [Quisumbing])
280.
Distinguish preventive suspension under the Local Government Code from preventive suspension
under the Ombudsman Act.
Held: We reach the foregoing conclusion, however, without necessarily subscribing to petitioner’s claim
that the Local Government Code, which he averred should apply to this case of an elective local official,
has been violated. True, under said Code, preventive suspension may only be imposed after the issues
are joined, and only for a maximum period of sixty days. Here, petitioner was suspended without having
had the chance to refute first the charges against him, and for the maximum period of six months
provided by the Ombudsman Law. But as respondents argue, administrative complaints commenced
under the Ombudsman Law are distinct from those initiated under the Local Government Code.
Respondents point out that the shorter period of suspension under the Local Government Code is
intended to limit the period of suspension that may be imposed by a mayor, a governor, or the President,
who may be motivated by partisan political considerations. In contrast the Ombudsman, who can impose
a longer period of preventive suspension, is not likely to be similarly motivated because it is a
constitutional body. The distinction is valid but not decisive, in our view, of whether there has been
grave abuse of discretion in a specific case of preventive suspension.
Xxx
Respondents may be correct in pointing out the reason for the shorter period of preventive
suspension imposable under the Local Government Code. Political color could taint the exercise of the
power to suspend local officials by the mayor, governor, or President’s office. In contrast the
Ombudsman, considering the constitutional origin of his Office, always ought to be insulated from the
vagaries of politics, as respondents would have us believe.
In Hagad v. Gozo-Dadole (251 SCRA 242 [1995]), on the matter of whether or not the
Ombudsman has been stripped of his power to investigate local elective officials by virtue of the Local
Government Code, we said:
“Indeed, there is nothing in the Local Government Code to indicate that it has repealed, whether
expressly or impliedly, the pertinent provisions of the Ombudsman Act. The two statutes on the specific
matter in question are not so inconsistent, let alone irreconcilable, as to compel us to only uphold one
and strike down the other.” (Hagad v. Gozo-Dadole, supra, 251-252)
It was also argued in Hagad, that the six-month preventive suspension under the Ombudsman
Law is “much too repugnant” to the 60-day period that may be imposed under the Local Government
Code. But per J. Vitug, “the two provisions govern differently.” (Id., at 253-254)
However, petitioner now contends that Hagad did not settle the question of whether a local
elective official may be preventively suspended even before the issues could be joined. Indeed it did not,
but we have held in other cases that there could be preventive suspension even before the charges
against the official are heard, or before the official is given an opportunity to prove his innocence (supra
at note 14, excluding the case of Buenaseda v. Flavier).
Preventive suspension is merely a
preliminary step in an administrative investigation and is not in any way the final determination of the
guilt of the official concerned.
Petitioner also avers that the suspension order against him was issued in violation of Section
26[2] of the Ombudsman Law x x x.
Petitioner argues that before an inquiry may be converted into a full-blown administrative
investigation, the official concerned must be given 72 hours to answer the charges against him. In his
case, petitioner says the inquiry was converted into an administrative investigation without him being
given the required number of hours to answer.
Indeed, it does not appear that petitioner was given the requisite 72 hours to submit a written
answer to the complaint against him. This, however, does not make invalid the preventive suspension
order issued against him. As we have earlier stated, a preventive suspension order may be issued even
before the charges against the official concerned is heard.
Moreover, respondents state that petitioner was given 10 days to submit his counter-affidavit to the
complaint filed by respondent Tagaan. We find this 10-day period is in keeping with Section 5[a] of the
Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman x x x. (Garcia v. Mojica, 314 SCRA 207, Sept.
10, 1999, 2nd Div. [Quisumbing])
281.
Does Section 13, Republic Act No. 3019 exclude from its coverage the members of Congress and,
therefore, the Sandiganbayan erred in decreeing the preventive suspension order against Senator Miriam
Defensor-Santiago? Will the order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019 not encroach on
the power of Congress to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution?
Held: The petition assails the authority of the Sandiganbayan to decree a ninety-day preventive
suspension of Mme. Miriam Defensor-Santiago, a Senator of the Republic of the Philippines, from any
government position, and furnishing a copy thereof to the Senate of the Philippines for the
implementation of the suspension order.
The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive suspension of an incumbent public
official charged with violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 has both legal and
jurisprudential support. X x x
In the relatively recent case of Segovia v. Sandiganbayan (288 SCRA 328 [1998]), the Court
reiterated:
“The validity of Section 13, R.A. 3019, as amended – treating of the suspension pendente lite of an
accused public officer – may no longer be put at issue, having been repeatedly upheld by this Court.
“X x x
“The provision of suspension pendente lite applies to all persons indicted upon a valid information under
the Act, whether they be appointive or elective officials; or permanent or temporary employees, or
pertaining to the career or non-career service.” (At pp. 336-337)
It would appear, indeed, to be a ministerial duty of the court to issue an order of suspension
upon determination of the validity of the information filed before it. Once the information is found to be
sufficient in form and substance, the court is bound to issue an order of suspension as a matter of
course, and there seems to be “no ifs and buts about it.” (Libanan v. Sandiganbayan, 163 SCRA 163
[1988]) Explaining the nature of the preventive suspension, the Court in the case of Bayot v.
Sandiganbayan (128 SCRA 383 [1984]) observed:
“x x x It is not a penalty because it is not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings. In fact, if
acquitted, the official concerned shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which
he failed to receive during suspension.” (At p. 386)
In issuing the preventive suspension of petitioner, the Sandiganbayan merely adhered to the
clear and unequivocal mandate of the law, as well as the jurisprudence in which the Court has, more
than once, upheld Sandiganbayan’s authority to decree the suspension of public officials and employees
indicted before it.
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that the public officer concerned must be
suspended only in the office where he is alleged to have committed the acts with which he has been
charged. Thus, it has been held that the use of the word “office” would indicate that it applies to any
office which the officer charged may be holding, and not only the particular office under which he stands
accused. (Bayot v. Sandiganbayan, supra; Segovia v. Sandiganbayan, supra.)
En passant, while the imposition of suspension is not automatic or self-operative as the validity of
the information must be determined in a pre-suspension hearing, there is no hard and fast rule as to the
conduct thereof. It has been said that –
“ ‘x x x No specific rules need be laid down for such pre-suspension hearing. Suffice it to state that the
accused should be given a fair and adequate opportunity to challenge the VALIDITY OF THE CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS against him, e.g., that he has not been afforded the right of due preliminary investigation;
that the acts for which he stands charged do not constitute a violation of the provisions of Republic Act
3019 or the bribery provisions of the Revised Penal Code which would warrant his mandatory suspension
from office under Section 13 of the Act; or he may present a motion to quash the information on any of
the grounds provided for in Rule 117 of the Rules of Court x x x.’
“x x x
“Likewise, he is accorded the right to challenge the propriety of his prosecution on the ground that the
acts for which he is charged do not constitute a violation of Rep. Act 3019, or of the provisions on bribery
of the Revised Penal Code, and the right to present a motion to quash the information on any other
grounds provided in Rule 117 of the Rules of Court.
“However, a challenge to the validity of the criminal proceedings on the ground that the acts for which
the accused is charged do not constitute a violation of the provisions of Rep. Act No. 3019, or of the
provisions on bribery of the Revised Penal Code, should be treated only in the same manner as a
challenge to the criminal proceeding by way of a motion to quash on the ground provided in Paragraph
(a), Section 2 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, i.e., that the facts charged do not constitute an offense.
In other words, a resolution of the challenge to the validity of the criminal proceeding, on such ground,
should be limited to an inquiry whether the facts alleged in the information, if hypothetically admitted,
constitute the elements of an offense punishable under Rep. Act 3019 or the provisions on bribery of the
Revised Penal Code.” (Luciano v. Mariano, 40 SCRA 187 [1971]; People v. Albano, 163 SCRA 511, 517-
519 [1988])
The law does not require that the guilt of the accused must be established in a pre-suspension
proceeding before trial on the merits proceeds. Neither does it contemplate a proceeding to determine
(1) the strength of the evidence of culpability against him, (2) the gravity of the offense charged, or (3)
whether or not his continuance in office could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and
integrity of the records and other evidence before the court could have a valid basis in decreeing
preventive suspension pending the trial of the case. All it secures to the accused is adequate opportunity
to challenge the validity or regularity of the proceedings against him, such as, that he has not been
afforded the right to due preliminary investigation, that the acts imputed to him do not constitute a
specific crime warranting his mandatory suspension from office under Section 13 of Republic Act No.
3019, or that the information is subject to quashal on any of the grounds set out in Section 3, Rule 117,
of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure (Segovia v. Sandiganbayan, supra; Resolution of the Supreme
Court in A.M. No. 00-05-03-SC, dated 03 October 2000, which became effective on 01 December 2000)
Xxx
The pronouncement, upholding the validity of the information filed against petitioner, behooved
Sandiganbayan to discharge its mandated duty to forthwith issue the order of preventive suspension.
The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019 is distinct from the power of
Congress to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution which provides that each –
“x x x house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and,
with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of
suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.” (Section 16[3], Article VI, 1987 Constitution)
The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is
imposed upon determination by the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, upon
an erring member. Thus, in its resolution in the case of Ceferino Paredes, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, et al.
(G.R. No. 118364, 08 August 1995), the Court affirmed the order of suspension of Congressman Paredes
by the Sandiganbayan, despite his protestations on the encroachment by the court on the prerogatives of
Congress. The Court ruled:
“x x x. Petitioner’s invocation of Section 16 (3), Article VI of the Constitution – which deals with the
power of each House of Congress inter alia to ‘punish its Members for disorderly behavior,’ and ‘suspend
or expel a Member’ by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members subject to the qualification that the penalty
of suspension, when imposed, should not exceed sixty days – in unavailing, as it appears to be quite
distinct from the suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not a penalty but a preliminary,
preventive measure, prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being imposed on petitioner for
misbehavior as a Member of the House of Representatives.”
The doctrine of separation of powers by itself may not be deemed to have effectively excluded Members
of Congress from Republic Act No. 3019 nor from its sanctions. The maxim simply recognizes each of the
three co-equal and independent, albeit coordinate, branches of the government – the Legislative, the
Executive and the Judiciary – has exclusive prerogatives and cognizance within its own sphere of
influence and effectively prevents one branch from unduly intruding into the internal affairs of either
branch.
Parenthetically, it might be well to elaborate a bit. Section 1, Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution,
empowers the Court to act not only in the settlement of “actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable,” but also in the determination of “whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government.” The provision allowing the Court to look into any possible grave
abuse of discretion committed by any government instrumentality has evidently been couched in general
terms in order to make it malleable to judicial interpretation in the light of any emerging milieu. In its
normal concept, the term has been said to imply an arbitrary, despotic, capricious or whimsical exercise
of judgment amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. When the question, however, pertains to an
affair internal to either of Congress or the Executive, the Court subscribes to the view that unless an
infringement of any specific Constitutional proscription thereby inheres the Court should not deign
substitute its own judgment over that of any of the other two branches of government. It is an
impairment or a clear disregard of a specific constitutional precept or provision that can unbolt the steel
door for judicial intervention. If any part of the Constitution is not, or ceases to be, responsive to
contemporary needs, it is the people, not the Court, who must promptly react in the manner prescribed
by the Charter itself.
Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress and that, therefore,
the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension order.
Attention might be called to the fact that Criminal Case No. 16698 has been decided by the First Division
of the Sandiganbayan on 06 December 1999, acquitting herein petitioner. The Court, nevertheless,
deems it appropriate to render this decision for future guidance on the significant issue raised by
petitioner. (Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, 356 SCRA 636, April 18, 2001, En Banc [Vitug])
282.
What is the doctrine of forgiveness or condonation? Does it apply to pending criminal cases?
Held: 1. A public official cannot be removed for administrative misconduct committed during a prior
term, since his re-election to office operates as a condonation of the officer’s previous misconduct to the
extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. The foregoing rule, however, finds no application
to criminal cases pending against petitioner. (Aguinaldo v. Santos, 212 SCRA 768, 773 [1992])
2. A reelected local official may not be held administratively accountable for misconduct committed
during his prior term of office. The rationale for this holding is that when the electorate put him back
into office, it is presumed that it did so with full knowledge of his life and character, including his past
misconduct. If, armed with such knowledge, it still reelects him, then such reelection is considered a
condonation of his past misdeeds. (Mayor Alvin B. Garcia v. Hon. Arturo C. Mojica, et al., G.R.
No. 139043, Sept. 10, 1999 [Quisumbing])
283.
What is the Doctrine of Condonation? Illustrative case.
Held: Petitioner contends that, per our ruling in Aguinaldo v. Santos (212 SCRA 768 [1992]), his
reelection has rendered the administrative case filed against him moot and academic. This is because his
reelection operates as a condonation by the electorate of the misconduct committed by an elective official
during his previous term. Petitioner further cites the ruling of this Court in Pascual v. Hon. Provincial
Board of Nueva Ecija (106 Phil. 466, 472 [1959], citing Conant v. Brogan, 6 N.Y.S.R. 332 [1887], cited in
17 A.L.R. 281, 63, So. 559, 50 LRA [NS] 553), that
“x x x When the people have elected a man to office, it must be assumed that they did this with
knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he
had been guilty of any. It is not for the court, by reason of such faults or misconduct to practically
overrule the will of the people.”
Respondents, on the other hand, contend that while the contract in question was signed during the
previous term of petitioner, it was to commence or be effective only on September 1998 or during his
current term. It is the respondents’ submission that petitioner “went beyond the protective confines” of
jurisprudence when he “agreed to extend his act to his current term of office.” Aguinaldo cannot apply,
according to respondents, because what is involved in this case is a misconduct committed during a
previous term but to be effective during the current term.
Respondents maintain that,
“x x x petitioner performed two acts with respect to the contract: he provided for a suspensive period
making the supply contract commence or be effective during his succeeding or current term and during
his current term of office he acceded to the suspensive period making the contract effective during his
current term by causing the implementation of the contract.”
Hence, petitioner cannot take refuge in the fact of his reelection, according to respondents.
Further, respondents point out that the contract in question was signed just four days before the
date of the 1998 election and so it could not be presumed that when the people of Cebu City voted
petitioner to office, they did so with full knowledge of petitioner’s character.
On this point, petitioner responds that knowledge of an official’s previous acts is presumed and
the court need not inquire whether, in reelecting him, the electorate was actually aware of his prior
misdeeds.
Petitioner cites our ruling in Salalima v. Guingona (257 SCRA 55 [1996]), wherein we absolved
Albay governor Ramon R. Salalima of his administrative liability as regards a retainer agreement he
signed in favor of a law firm during his previous term, although disbursements of public funds to cover
payments under the agreement were still being done during his subsequent term. Petitioner argues that,
following Salalima, the doctrine of Aguinaldo applies even where the effects of the acts complained of are
still evident during the subsequent term of the reelected official. The implementation of the contract is a
mere incident of its execution. Besides, according to petitioner, the “sole act” for which he has been
administratively charged is the signing of the contract with F.E. Zuellig. The charge, in his view, excludes
the contract’s execution or implementation, or any act subsequent to the perfection of the contract.
In Salalima, we recall that the Solicitor General maintained that Aguinaldo did not apply to that
case because the administrative case against Governor Rodolfo Aguinaldo of Cagayan was already
pending when he filed his certificate of candidacy for his reelection bid. Nevertheless, in Salalima, the
Court applied the Aguinaldo doctrine, even if the administrative case against Governor Salalima was filed
after his reelection.
Xxx
We now come to the concluding inquiry. Granting that the Office of the Ombudsman may
investigate, for purposes provided for by law, the acts of petitioner committed prior to his present term of
office; and that it may preventively suspend him for a reasonable period, can that office hold him
administratively liable for said acts?
In a number of cases, we have repeatedly held that a reelected local official may not be held
administratively accountable for misconduct committed during his prior term of office (Pascual v. Hon.
Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, 106 Phil. 466 [1959]; others omitted). The rationale for this holding is
that when the electorate put him back into office, it is resumed that it did so with full knowledge of his
life and character, including his past misconduct. If, armed with such knowledge, it still reelects him,
then such reelection is considered a condonation of his past misdeeds.
However, in the present case, respondents point out that the contract entered into by petitioner
with F.E. Zuellig was signed just four days before the date of the elections. It was not made an issue
during the election, and so the electorate could not be said to have voted for petitioner with knowledge
of this particular aspect of his life and character.
For his part, petitioner contends that “the only conclusive determining factor” as regards the
people’s thinking on the matter is an election. On this point we agree with petitioner. That the people
voted for an official with knowledge of his character is presumed, precisely to eliminate the need to
determine, in factual terms, the extent of this knowledge. Such an undertaking will obviously be
impossible. Our rulings on the matter do not distinguish the precise timing or period when the
misconduct was committed, reckoned from the date of the official’s reelection, except that it must be
prior to said date.
As held in Salalima,
“The rule adopted in Pascual, qualified in Aguinaldo insofar as criminal cases are concerned, is still a good
law. Such a rule is not only founded on the theory that an official’s reelection expresses the sovereign
will of the electorate to forgive or condone any act or omission constituting a ground for administrative
discipline which was committed during his previous term. We may add that sound policy dictates it. To
rule otherwise would open the floodgates to exacerbating endless partisan contests between the
reelected official and his political enemies, who may not stop to hound the former during his new term
with administrative cases for acts alleged to have been committed during his previous term. His second
term may thus be devoted to defending himself in the said cases to the detriment of public service x x x.”
(Emphasis added.) (Salalima v. Guingona, supra at 115)
The above ruling in Salalima applies to this case. Petitioner cannot anymore be held
administratively liable for an act done during his previous term, that is, his signing of the contract with
F.E. Zuellig.
The assailed retainer agreement in Salalima was executed sometime in 1990. Governor Salalima
was reelected in 1992 and payments for the retainer continued to be made during his succeeding term.
This situation is no different from the one in the present case, wherein deliveries of the asphalt under the
contract with F.E. Zuellig and the payments therefor were supposed to have commenced on September
1998, during petitioner’s second term.
However, respondents argue that the contract, although signed on May 7, 1998, during
petitioner’s prior term, is to be made effective only during his present term.
We fail to see any difference to justify a valid distinction in the result. The agreement between
petitioner (representing Cebu City) and F.E. Zuellig was perfected on the date the contract was signed,
during petitioner’s prior term. At that moment, petitioner already acceded to the terms of the contract,
including stipulations now alleged to be prejudicial to the city government. Thus, any culpability
petitioner may have in signing the contract already became extant on the day the contract was signed. It
hardly matters that the deliveries under the contract are supposed to have been made months later.
While petitioner can no longer be held administratively liable for signing the contract with F.E.
Zuellig, however, this should not prejudice the filing of any case other than administrative against
petitioner. Our ruling in this case, may not be taken to mean the total exoneration of petitioner for
whatever wrongdoing, if any, might have been committed in signing the subject contract. The ruling
now is limited to the question of whether or not he may be held administratively liable therefor, and it is
our considered view that he may not. (Garcia v. Mojica, 314 SCRA 207, Sept. 10, 1999, 2nd Div.
[Quisumbing])
284.
What are the situations covered by the law on nepotism?
Held: Under the definition of nepotism, one is guilty of nepotism if an appointment is issued in favor of
a relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of any of the following:
a)
b)
c)
appointing authority;
recommending authority;
chief of the bureau or office; and
d)
person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee.
Clearly, there are four situations covered. In the last two mentioned situations, it is immaterial who the
appointing or recommending authority is. To constitute a violation of the law, it suffices that an
appointment is extended or issued in favor of a relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity or
affinity of the chief of the bureau or office, or the person exercising immediate supervision over the
appointee. (CSC v. Pedro O. Dacoycoy, G.R. No. 135805, April 29, 1999, En Banc [Pardo])
285.
What are the exemptions from the operation of the rules on nepotism?
Ans.: The following are exempted from the operation of the rules on nepotism: (a) persons employed in
a confidential capacity, (b) teachers, (c) physicians, and (d) members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines.
The rules on nepotism shall likewise not be applicable to the case of a member of any family
who, after his or her appointment to any position in an office or bureau, contracts marriage with
someone in the same office or bureau, in which event the employment or retention therein of both
husband and wife may be allowed. (Sec. 59, Chap. 7, Subtitle A, Title I, Bk. V, E.O. No. 292)
286.
Distinguish “term” of office from “tenure” of the incumbent.
Held: In the law of public officers, there is a settled distinction between “term” and “tenure.” “[T]he
term of an office must be distinguished from the tenure of the incumbent. The term means the time
during which the officer may claim to hold office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several
incumbents shall succeed one another. The tenure represents the term during which the incumbent
actually holds the office. The term of office is not affected by the hold-over. The tenure may be shorter
than the term for reasons within or beyond the power of the incumbent.” (Thelma P. Gaminde v.
COA, G.R. No. 140335, Dec. 13, 2000, En Banc [Pardo])
287.
Discuss the operation of the rotational plan insofar as the term of office of the Chairman and
Members of the Constitutional Commissions is concerned.
Held: In Republic v. Imperial (96 Phil. 770 [1955]), we said that “the operation of the rotational plan
requires two conditions, both indispensable to its workability: (1) that the terms of the first three (3)
Commissioners should start on a common date, and (2) that any vacancy due to death, resignation or
disability before the expiration of the term should only be filled only for the unexpired balance of the
term.”
Consequently, the terms of the first Chairmen and Commissioners of the Constitutional Commissions
under the 1987 Constitution must start on a common date, irrespective of the variations in the dates of
appointments and qualifications of the appointees, in order that the expiration of the first terms of seven,
five and three years should lead to the regular recurrence of the two-year interval between the expiration
of the terms.
Applying the foregoing conditions x x x, we rule that the appropriate starting point of the terms of office
of the first appointees to the Constitutional Commissions under the 1987 Constitution must be on
February 2, 1987, the date of the adoption of the 1987 Constitution. In case of a belated appointment or
qualification, the interval between the start of the term and the actual qualification of the appointee must
be counted against the latter. (Thelma P. Gaminde v. COA, G.R. No. 140335, Dec. 13, 2000, En
Banc [Pardo])
288.
What is the hold-over doctrine? What is its purpose?
Held: 1. The concept of holdover when applied to a public officer implies that the office has a fixed
term and the incumbent is holding onto the succeeding term. It is usually provided by law that officers
elected or appointed for a fixed term shall remain in office not only for that term but until their
successors have been elected and qualified. Where this provision is found, the office does not become
vacant upon the expiration of the term if there is no successor elected and qualified to assume it, but the
present incumbent will carry over until his successor is elected and qualified, even though it be beyond
the term fixed by law.
Absent an express or implied constitutional or statutory provision to the contrary, an officer is entitled to
stay in office until his successor is appointed or chosen and has qualified. The legislative intent of not
allowing holdover must be clearly expressed or at least implied in the legislative enactment, otherwise it
is reasonable to assume that the law-making body favors the same.
Indeed, the law abhors a vacuum in public offices, and courts generally indulge in the strong
presumption against a legislative intent to create, by statute, a condition which may result in an
executive or administrative office becoming, for any period of time, wholly vacant or unoccupied by one
lawfully authorized to exercise its functions. This is founded on obvious considerations of public policy,
for the principle of holdover is specifically intended to prevent public convenience from suffering because
of a vacancy and to avoid a hiatus in the performance of government functions. (Lecaroz v.
Sandiganbayan, 305 SCRA 397, March 25, 1999, 2nd Div. [Bellosillo])
2. The rule is settled that unless “holding over be expressly or impliedly prohibited, the incumbent may
continue to hold over until someone else is elected and qualified to assume the office.” This rule is
demanded by the “most obvious requirements of public policy, for without it there must frequently be
cases where, from a failure to elect or a refusal or neglect to qualify, the office would be vacant and the
public service entirely suspended.” Otherwise stated, the purpose is to prevent a hiatus in the
government pending the time when the successor may be chosen and inducted into office. (Galarosa v.
Valencia, 227 SCRA 728, Nov. 11, 1993, En Banc [Davide, Jr.])
289.
What is resignation? What are the requisites of a valid resignation?
Held: 1. It is the act of giving up or the act of an officer by which he declines his office and renounces
the further right to use it. It is an expression of the incumbent in some form, express or implied, of the
intention to surrender, renounce, and relinquish the office and the acceptance by competent and lawful
authority. To constitute a complete and operative resignation from public office, there must be: (a) an
intention to relinquish a part of the term; (b) an act of relinquishment; and (c) an acceptance by the
proper authority. The last one is required by reason of Article 238 of the Revised Penal Code.
(Sangguniang Bayan of San Andres, Catanduanes v. CA, 284 SCRA 276, Jan. 16, 1998)
2. Resignation x x x is a factual question and its elements are beyond quibble: there must be an intent
to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment (Gonzales v. Hernandez, 2 SCRA 228
[1961]). The validity of a resignation is not governed by any formal requirement as to form. It can be
oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can be implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must
be given legal effect. (Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001, en Banc
[Puno])
290.
What is abandonment of an office?
resignation?
What are its requisites?
How is it distinguished from
Held: Abandonment of an office has been defined as the voluntary relinquishment of an office by the
holder, with the intention of terminating his possession and control thereof. Indeed, abandonment of
office is a species of resignation; while resignation in general is a formal relinquishment, abandonment is
a voluntary relinquishment through nonuser.
Abandonment springs from and is accompanied by deliberation and freedom of choice. Its concomitant
effect is that the former holder of an office can no longer legally repossess it even by forcible
reoccupancy.
Clear intention to abandon should be manifested by the officer concerned. Such intention may be
express or inferred from his own conduct. Thus, the failure to perform the duties pertaining to the office
must be with the officer’s actual or imputed intention to abandon and relinquish the office. Abandonment
of an office is not wholly a matter of intention; it results from a complete abandonment of duties of such
continuance that the law will infer a relinquishment. Therefore, there are two essential elements of
abandonment; first, an intention to abandon and, second, an overt or “external” act by which the
intention is carried into effect. (Sangguniang Bayan of San Andres, Catanduanes v. CA, 284
SCRA 276, Jan. 16, 1998)
291.
Petitioner claims that Benipayo has no authority to remove her as Director IV of the EID and
reassign her to the Law Department. Petitioner further argues that only the COMELEC, acting as a
collegial body, can authorize such reappointment. Moreover, petitioner maintains that a reassignment
without her consent amounts to removal from office without due process and therefore illegal.
Held: Petitioner’s posturing will hold water if Benipayo does not possess any color of title to the
office of Chairman of the COMELEC. We have ruled, however, that Benipayo is the de jure COMELEC
Chairman, and consequently he has full authority to exercise all the powers of that office for so long as
his ad interim appointment remains effective. X x x. The Chairman, as the Chief Executive of the
COMELEC, is expressly empowered on his own authority to transfer or reassign COMELEC personnel in
accordance with the Civil Service Law. In the exercise of this power, the Chairman is not required by law
to secure the approval of the COMELEC en banc.
Petitioner’s appointment papers x x x indisputably show that she held her Director IV position in
the EID only in an acting or temporary capacity. Petitioner is not a Career Executive Service (CES), and
neither does she hold Career Executive Service Eligibility, which are necessary qualifications for holding
the position of Director IV as prescribed in the Qualifications Standards (Revised 1987) issued by the Civil
Service Commission. Obviously, petitioner does not enjoy security of tenure as Director IV. X x x
Xxx
Having been appointed merely in a temporary or acting capacity, and not possessed of the
necessary qualifications to hold the position of Director IV, petitioner has no legal basis in claiming that
her reassignment was contrary to the Civil Service Law. X x x
Still, petitioner assails her reassignment, carried out during the election period, as a prohibited act under
Section 261 (h) of the Omnibus Election Code x x x.
Xxx
Petitioner claims that Benipayo failed to secure the approval of the COMELEC en banc to effect transfers
or reassignments of COMELEC personnel during the election period. Moreover, petitioner insists that the
COMELEC en banc must concur to every transfer or reassignment of COMELEC personnel during the
election period.
Contrary to petitioner’s allegation, the COMELEC did in fact issue COMELEC Resolution No. 3300 dated
November 6, 2000, exempting the COMELEC from Section 261 (h) of the Omnibus Election Code. X x x
Xxx
The proviso in COMELEC Resolution No. 3300, requiring due notice and hearing before any transfer or
reassignment can be made within thirty days prior to election day, refers only to COMELEC field
personnel and not to head office personnel like the petitioner. Under the Revised Administrative Code
(see Section 7 [4], Chapter 2, Subtitle C, Book V of the Revised Administrative Code) , the COMELEC
Chairman is the sole officer specifically vested with the power to transfer or reassign COMELEC
personnel. The COMELEC Chairman will logically exercise the authority to transfer or reassign COMELEC
personnel pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 3300. The COMELEC en banc cannot arrogate unto itself
this power because that will mean amending the Revised Administrative Code, an act the COMELEC en
banc cannot legally do.
COMELEC Resolution No. 3300 does not require that every transfer or reassignment of COMELEC
personnel should carry the concurrence of the COMELEC as a collegial body. Interpreting Resolution No.
3300 to require such concurrence will render the resolution meaningless since the COMELEC en banc will
have to approve every personnel transfer or reassignment, making the resolution utterly useless.
Resolution No. 3300 should be interpreted for what it is, an approval to effect transfers and
reassignments of personnel, without need of securing a second approval from the COMELEC en banc to
actually implement such transfer or reassignment.
The COMELEC Chairman is the official expressly authorized by law to transfer or reassign COMELEC
personnel. The person holding that office, in a de jure capacity, is Benipayo. The COMELEC en banc, in
COMELEC Resolution No. 3300, approved the transfer or reassignment of COMELEC personnel during the
election period. Thus, Benipayo’s order reassigning petitioner from the EID to the Law Department does
not violate Section 261 (h) of the Omnibus Election Code. For the same reason, Benipayo’s order
designating Cinco Officer-in-Charge of the EID is legally unassailable. (Matibag v. Benipayo, 380
SCRA 49, April 2, 2002, En Banc [Carpio])
292.
Is a government employee who has been ordered arrested and detained for a non-bailable
offense and for which he was suspended for his inability to report for work until the termination of his
case, still required to file a formal application for leave of absence to ensure his reinstatement upon his
acquittal and thus protect his security of tenure? Concomitantly, will his prolonged absence from office
for more than one (1) year automatically justify his being dropped from the rolls without prior notice
despite his being allegedly placed under suspension by his employer until the termination of his case,
which finally resulted in his acquittal for lack of evidence?
EUSEBIA R. GALZOTE was employed as a lowly clerk in the service of the City Government of
Makati City. With her meager income she was the lone provider for her children. But her simple life was
disrupted abruptly when she was arrested without warrant and detained for more than three (3) years for
a crime she did not commit. Throughout her ordeal she trusted the city government that the suspension
imposed on her was only until the final disposition of her case. As she drew near her vindication she
never did expect the worst to come to her. On the third year of her detention the city government lifted
her suspension, dropped her from the rolls without prior notice and without her knowledge, much less
gave her an opportunity to forthwith correct the omission of an application for leave of absence belatedly
laid on her.
Upon her acquittal for lack of evidence and her release from detention she was denied
reinstatement to her position. She was forced to seek recourse in the Civil Service Commission which
ordered her immediate reinstatement with back wages from 19 October 1994, the date when she
presented herself for reassumption of duties but was turned back by the city government, up to the time
of her actual reinstatement.
Xxx
Plainly, the case of petitioner City Government of Makati City revolves around a rotunda of doubt,
a dilemma concerning the legal status and implications of its suspension of private respondent Eusebia R.
Galzote and the automatic leave of absence espoused by the Civil Service Commission. Against this
concern is the punctilious adherence to technicality, the requirement that private respondent should have
filed an application for leave of absence in proper form. The instant case is therefore a dispute between,
at its worst, private respondent’s substantial compliance with the standing rules, and the City
Government’s insistence that the lowly clerk should have still gone through the formalities of applying for
leave despite her detention, of which petitioner had actual notice, and the suspension order couched in
simple language that she was being suspended until the final disposition of her criminal case.
The meaning of suspension until the final disposition of her case is that should her case be
dismissed she should be reinstated to her position with payment of back wages. She did not have to
apply for leave of absence since she was already suspended by her employer until her case would be
terminated. We have done justice to the workingman in the past; today we will do no less by resolving
all doubts in favor of the humble employee in faithful obeisance to the constitutional mandate to afford
full protection to labor (Const., Art. XIII, Sec. 3, par. 1; Art. II, Sec. 18)
Xxx
As may be gleaned from the pleadings of the parties, the issues are: (1) whether private
respondent Eusebia R. Galzote may be considered absent without leave; (b) whether due process had
been observed before she was dropped from the rolls; and, (3) whether she may be deemed to have
abandoned her position, hence, not entitled to reinstatement with back salaries for not having filed a
formal application for leave. Encapsulated, the issues may be reduced to whether private respondent
may be considered absent without leave or whether she abandoned her job as to justify being dropped
from the service for not filing a formal application for leave.
Petitioner would have private respondent declared on AWOL and faults her for failing to file an
application for leave of absence under Secs. 20 (Now Sec. 52 of Rule XVI, Leave of Absence, of Res. No.
91-1631 dated 27 December 1991, as amended by CSC MC No. 41, s. 1998) and 35 (Now Sec. 63 of Rule
XVI, Leave of Absence, of Res. No. 91-1631 dated 27 December 1991, as amended by CSC MC Nos. 41,
s. 1998 and 14, s. 1999) of the CSC Rules and rejects the CSC’s ruling of an “automatic leave of absence
for the period of her detention” since the “current Civil Service Law and Rules do not contain any specific
provision on automatic leave of absence.”
The Court believes that private respondent cannot be faulted for failing to file prior to her
detention an application for leave and obtain approval thereof. The records clearly show that she had
been advised three (3) days after her arrest, or on 9 September 1991, that petitioner City government of
Makati City had placed her under suspension until the final disposition of her criminal case. This act of
petitioner indubitably recognized private respondent’s predicament and thus allowed her to forego
reporting for work during the pendency of her criminal case without the needless exercise of strict
formalities. At the very least, this official communication should be taken as an equivalent of a prior
approved leave of absence since it was her employer itself which placed her under suspension and thus
excused her from further formalities in applying for such leave. Moreover, the arrangement bound the
City Government to allow private respondent to return to her work after the termination of her case, i.e.,
if acquitted of the criminal charge. This pledge sufficiently served as legitimate reason for her to
altogether dispense with the formal application for leave; there was no reason to, as in fact it was not
required, since she was for all practical purposes incapacitated or disabled to do so.
Indeed, private respondent did not have the least intention to go on AWOL from her post as Clerk III of
petitioner, for AWOL means the employee leaving or abandoning his post without justifiable reason and
without notifying his employer. In the instant case, private respondent had a valid reason for failing to
report for work as she was detained without bail. Hence, right after her release from detention, and
when finally able to do so, she presented herself to the Municipal Personnel Officer of petitioner City
Government to report for work. Certainly, had she been told that it was still necessary for her to file an
application for leave despite the 9 September 1991 assurance from petitioner, private respondent would
have lost no time in filing such piece of document. But the situation momentarily suspending her from
work persisted: petitioner City Government did not alter the modus vivendi with private respondent and
lulled her into believing that its commitment that her suspension was only until the termination of her
case was true and reliable. Under the circumstances private respondent was in, prudence would have
dictated petitioner, more particularly the incumbent city executive, in patria potestas, to advise her that it
was still necessary – although indeed unnecessary and a useless ceremony – to file such application
despite the suspension order, before depriving her of her legitimate right to return to her position. Patria
potestas in piatate debet, non in atrocitate, consistere. Paternal power should consist or be exercised in
affection, not in atrocity.
It is clear from the records that private respondent Galzote was arrested and detained without a warrant
on 6 September 1991 for which reason she and her co-accused were subjected immediately to inquest
proceedings. This fact is evident from the instant petition itself and its attachments x x x. Hence, her
ordeal in jail began on 6 September 1991 and ended only after her acquittal, thus leaving her no time to
attend to the formality of filing a leave of absence.
But petitioner City Government would unceremoniously set aside its 9 September 1991
suspension order claiming that it was superseded three (3) years later by a memorandum dropping her
from the rolls effective 21 January 1993 for absence “for more than one (1) year without official leave.”
Hence, the suspension order was void since there was no pending administrative charge against private
respondent so that she was not excused from filing an application for leave.
We do not agree. In placing private respondent under suspension until the final disposition of
her criminal case, the Municipal Personnel Officer acted with competence, so he presumably knew that
his order of suspension was not akin to either suspension as penalty or preventive suspension since there
was no administrative case against private respondent. As competence on the part of the MPO is
presumed, any error on his part should not prejudice private respondent, and that what he had in mind
was to consider her as being on leave of absence without pay and their employer-employee relationship
being merely suspended, not severed, in the meantime. This construction of the order of suspension is
actually more consistent with logic as well as fairness and kindness to its author, the MPO. Significantly,
the idea of a suspended employer-employee relationship is widely accepted in labor law to account for
situations wherein laborers would have no work to perform for causes not attributable to them (see e.g.,
Visayan Stevedore Transportation Company v. Court of Industrial Relations, No. L-21696, 25 February
1967, 19 SCRA 426; Tomas Lao Construction v. NLRC, G.R. No. 116781, 5 September 1997, 278 SCRA
716). We find no basis for denying the application of this principle to the instant case which also involves
a lowly worker in the public service.
Moreover, we certainly cannot nullify the City Government’s order of suspension, as we have no
reason to do so, much less retroactively apply such nullification to deprive private respondent of a
compelling and valid reason for not filing the leave application. For as we have held, a void act though in
law a mere scrap of paper nonetheless confers legitimacy upon past acts or omissions done in reliance
thereof (De Agbayani v. Philippine National Bank, G.R. No. 231127, 29 April 1971, 38 SCRA 429;
Municipality of Malabang v. Benito, G.R No. 28113, 28 March 1969, 27 SCRA 545). Consequently, the
existence of a statute or executive order prior to its being adjudged void is an operative fact to which
legal consequences are attached (De Agbayani, supra, p. 435). It would indeed be ghastly unfair to
prevent private respondent from relying upon the order of suspension in lieu of a formal leave
application.
At any rate, statements are, or should be, construed against the one responsible for the
confusion; otherwise stated, petitioner must assume full responsibility for the consequences of its own
act, hence, he should be made to answer for the mix-up of private respondent as regards the leave
application. At the very least, it should be considered estopped from claiming that its order of suspension
is void or that it did not excuse private respondent from filing an application for leave on account of her
incarceration. It is a fact that she relied upon this order, issued barely three (3) days from the date of
her arrest, and assumed that when the criminal case would be settled she could return to work without
need of any prior act. X x x
Xxx
The holding of the Civil Service Commission that private respondent was on automatic leave of
absence during the period of her detention must be sustained. The CSC is the constitutionally mandated
central personnel agency of the Government tasked to “establish a career service and adopt measures to
promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness and courtesy in the civil service”
(Const., Art. IX-B, Sec. 3) and “strengthen the merit and rewards system, integrate all human resources
development programs for all levels and ranks, and institutionalize a management climate conducive to
public accountability.” (Ibid.) Besides, the Administrative Code of 1987 further empowers the CSC to
“prescribe, amend, and enforce rules and regulations for carrying into effect the provisions of the Civil
Service Law and other pertinent laws,” (Bk. V, I (A), Ch. 3, Sec. 12) and for matters concerning leaves of
absence, the Code specifically vests the CSC to ordain –
Sec. 60. Leave of absence. – Officers and employees in the Civil Service shall be entitled to leave of
absence, with or without pay, as may be provided by law and the rules and regulations of the Civil
Service Commission in the interest of the service.
Pursuant thereto the CSC promulgated Resolution No. 91-1631 dated 27 December 1991 entitled
Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and Other Pertinent Civil Service Laws which it
has several times amended through memorandum circulars. It devotes Rule XVI to leaves of absence.
Petitioner City Government relies upon Secs. 20 and 35 to debunk the CSC ruling of an automatic leave of
absence. Significantly, these provisions have been amended so that Sec. 20 of the Civil Service Rules is
now Sec. 52 of Rule XVI, on Leave of Absence, of Resolution No. 91-1631 dated 27 December 1991 as
amended by CSC MC No. 41, s. 1998, and Sec. 35 is now Sec. 63 as amended by CSC MC Nos. 41, s.
1998 and 14, s. 1999.
Xxx
As a general rule, Secs. 20 and 52, as well as Secs. 35 and 63, require an approved leave of
absence to avoid being an AWOL. However, these provisions cannot be interpreted as exclusive and
referring only to one mode of securing the approval of a leave of absence which would require an
employee to apply for it, formalities and all, before exceeding thirty (30) days of absence in order to
avoid from being dropped from the rolls. There are, after all, other means of seeking and granting an
approved leave of absence, one of which is the CSC recognized rule of automatic leave of absence under
specified circumstances. X x x
Xxx
As properly noted, the CSC was only interpreting its own rules on leave of absence and not a
statutory provision (As a matter of fact, Sec. 60 of the Administrative Code does not provide for any rule
on leave of absence other than that civil servants are entitled to leave of absence) in coming up with this
uniform rule. Undoubtedly, the CSC like any other agency has the power to interpret its own rules and
any phrase contained in them (Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States of America, 288 SCRA
294, 325, 77 Led. 796, 812 [1933]) with its interpretation significantly becoming part of the rules
themselves. X x x
Xxx
Under RA 6656 (An Act to Protect the Security of Tenure of Civil Service Officers and Employees
in the Implementation of Government Reorganization) and RA 7160 (The Local Government Code of
1991), civil servants who are found illegally dismissed or retrenched are entitled to full pay for the period
of their separation.
Our final point. An efficient and honest bureaucracy is never inconsistent with the emphasis on
and the recognition of the basic rights and privileges of our civil servants or, for that matter, the
constitutional mandates of the Civil Service Commission. In fact only from an enlightened corps of
government workers and an effective CSC grows the professionalization of the bureaucracy. Indeed the
government cannot be left in the lurch; but neither could we decree that government personnel be
separated from their jobs indiscriminately regardless of fault. The fine line between these concerns may
be difficult to clearly draw but if we only exerted extra effort to rebel against the allure of legal oversimplification, justice would have been done where it is truly due. (City Government of Makati City
v. Civil Service Commission, 376 SCRA 248, Feb. 6, 2002, En Banc [Bellosillo])
293.
What is abandonment of office? What are its essential elements?
Held: Abandonment of an office is the voluntary relinquishment of an office by the holder, with the
intention of terminating his possession and control thereof (Sangguniang Bayan of San Andres,
Catanduanes v. Court of Appeals, 284 SCRA 276 [1998]). In order to constitute abandonment of an
office, it must be total and under such circumstances as clearly to indicate an absolute relinquishment
(Airoso v. De Guzman, 49 Phil. 371 [1926]). There must be a complete abandonment of duties of such
continuance that the law will infer a relinquishment (67 C.J.S. Officers Sec. 100, citing Cosby v. Moore, 65
So.2d 178, 259 Ala. 41). Abandonment of duties is a voluntary act (Ibid., citing Steingruber v. San
Antonio, Comm. App., 220 S.W. 77, 78); it springs from and is accompanied by deliberation and freedom
of choice (Jorge v. Mayor, 10 SCRA 331 [1964], citing Teves v. Sindiong, 81 Ohil. 658 [1948]). There
are, therefore, two essential elements of abandonment: first, an intention to abandon and second, an
overt or “external” act by which the intention is carried into effect (67 C.J.S. Officers Sec. 100, citing
Rainwater v. State ex rel. Strickland, 178 So. 484, 237 Ala. 482, 121 A.L.R. 981)
Generally speaking, a person holding a public office may abandon such office by nonuser or acquiescence
(Ibid., citing Herbert v. State Oil and Gas Bd., 250 So.2d 597, 287 Ala. 221). Non-user refers to a neglect
to use a right or privilege or to exercise an office (Sangguniang Bayan of San Andres, Catanduanes v.
Court of Appeals, supra). However, nonperformance of the duties of an office does not constitute
abandonment where such nonperformance results from temporary disability or from involuntary failure to
perform (67 C.J.S. Sec. 100, citing Doris v. Heroux, 47 A.2d 633, 71 R.I. 491). Abandonment may also
result from an acquiescence by the officer in his wrongful removal or discharge, for instance, after a
summary removal, an unreasonable delay by an officer illegally removed in taking steps to vindicate his
rights may constitute an abandonment of the office (Ibid., citing Nicholas v. U.S., Ct. Cl., 42 S.Ct. 7, 257
U.S. 71, 66 L. Ed. 133). Where, while desiring and intending to hold the office, and with no willful desire
or intention to abandon it, the public officer vacates it in deference to the requirements of a statute
which is afterwards declared unconstitutional, such a surrender will not be deemed an abandonment and
the officer may recover the effect. (Mechem, A Treatise on the Law of Public Offices and Officers, 1890
edition, p. 279, citing Turnipseed v. Hudson, 50 Miss. 429, 19 Am. Rep. 15) (Canonizado v. Aguirre,
351 SCRA 659, 665-668, Feb. 15, 2001, En Banc [Gonzaga-Reyes])
294.
By accepting another position in the government during the pendency of a case – brought
precisely to assail the constitutionality of his removal - may a person be deemed to have abandoned his
claim for reinstatement?
Held: Although petitioners do not deny the appointment of Canonizado as Inspector General, they
maintain that Canonizado’s initiation and tenacious pursuance of the present case would belie any
intention to abandon his former office. Petitioners assert that Canonizado should not be faulted for
seeking gainful employment during the pendency of this case. Furthermore, petitioners point out that
from the time Canonizado assumed office as Inspector General he never received the salary pertaining to
such position x x x.
Xxx
By accepting the position of Inspector General during the pendency of the present case –
brought precisely to assail the constitutionality of his removal from the NAPOLCOM – Canonizado cannot
be deemed to have abandoned his claim for reinstatement to the latter position. First of all, Canonizado
did not voluntarily leave his post as Commissioner, but was compelled to do so on the strength of Section
8 of RA 8551 x x x
In our decision of 25 January 2000, we struck down the abovequoted provision for being violative
of petitioner’s constitutionally guaranteed right to security of tenure. Thus, Canonizado harbored no
willful desire or intention to abandon his official duties. In fact, Canonizado, together with petitioners x x
x lost no time disputing what they perceived to be an illegal removal; a few weeks after RA 8551 took
effect x x x petitioners instituted the current action x x x assailing the constitutionality of certain
provisions of said law. The removal of petitioners from their positions by virtue of a constitutionally
infirm act necessarily negates a finding of voluntary relinquishment. (Canonizado v. Aguirre, 351
SCRA 659, 665-668, Feb. 15, 2001, En Banc [Gonzaga-Reyes])
295.
What is the effect of acceptance of an incompatible office to a claim for reinstatement?
Held: The next issue is whether Canonizado’s appointment to and acceptance of the position of
Inspector General should result in an abandonment of his claim for reinstatement to the NAPOLCOM. It
is a well-settled rule that he who, while occupying one office, accepts another incompatible with the first,
ipso facto vacates the first office and his title is thereby terminated without any other act or proceeding
(Mechem, A Treatise on the Law of Public Offices and Officers, 1890 edition, p. 267). Public policy
considerations dictate against allowing the same individual to perform inconsistent and incompatible
duties (Ibid.). The incompatibility contemplated is not the mere physical impossibility of one person’s
performing the duties of the two offices due to a lack of time or the inability to be in two places at the
same moment, but that which proceeds from the nature and relations of the two positions to each other
as to give rise to contrariety and antagonism should one person attempt to faithfully and impartially
discharge the duties of one toward the incumbent of the other. (Ibid.)
There is no question that the positions of NAPOLCOM Commissioner and Inspector General of the
IAS are incompatible with each other. As pointed out by respondents, RA 8551 prohibits any personnel
of the IAS from sitting in a committee charged with the task of deliberating on the appointment,
promotion, or assignment of any PNP personnel, whereas the NAPOLCOM has the power of control and
supervision over the PNP. However, the rule on incompatibility of duties will not apply to the case at bar
because at no point did Canonizado discharge the functions of the two offices simultaneously.
Canonizado was forced out of his first office by the enactment of Section 8 of RA 8551. Thus, when
Canonizado was appointed as Inspector General x x x he had ceased to discharge his official functions as
NAPOLCOM Commissioner. X x x. Thus, to reiterate, the incompatibility of duties rule never had a
chance to come into play for petitioner never occupied the two positions, of Commissioner and Inspector
General, nor discharged their respective functions, concurrently.
Xxx
As in the Tan (Tan v. Gimenez, 107 Phil. 17 [1960]) and Gonzales (Gonzales v. Hernandez, 2 SCRA 228
[1961]) cases, Canonizado was compelled to leave his position as Commissioner, not by an erroneous
decision, but by an unconstitutional provision of law. Canonizado, like the petitioners in the above
mentioned cases, held a second office during the period that his appeal was pending. As stated in the
Comment filed by petitioners, Canonizado was impelled to accept this subsequent position by a desire to
continue serving the country, in whatever capacity. Surely, this selfless and noble aspiration deserves to
be placed on at least equal footing with the worthy goal of providing for oneself and one’s family, either
of which are sufficient to justify Canonizado’s acceptance of the position of Inspector General. A
Contrary ruling would deprive petitioner of his right to live, which contemplates not only a right to earn a
living, as held in previous cases, but also a right to lead a useful and productive life. Furthermore,
prohibiting Canonizado from accepting a second position during the pendency of his petition would be to
unjustly compel him to bear the consequences of an unconstitutional act which under no circumstance
can be attributed to him. However, before Canonizado can re-assume his post as Commissioner, he
should first resign as Inspector General of the IAS-PNP. (Canonizado v. Aguirre, 351 SCRA 659, Feb.
15, 2001, En Banc [Gonzaga-Reyes])
296.
May the appointment of a person assuming a position in the civil service under a completed
appointment be validly recalled or revoked?
Held: It has been held that upon the issuance of an appointment and the appointee’s assumption of the
position in the civil service, “he acquires a legal right which cannot be taken away either by revocation of
the appointment or by removal except for cause and with previous notice and hearing.” (Mauna v. Civil
Service Commission, 232 SCRA 388, 398 [1994]) Moreover, it is well-settled that the person
assuming a position in the civil service under a completed appointment acquires a legal, not just an
equitable, right to the position. This right is protected not only by statute, but by the Constitution as
well, which right cannot be taken away by either revocation of the appointment, or by removal, unless
there is valid cause to do so, provided that there is previous notice and hearing. (Aquino v. Civil
Service Commission, 208 SCRA 240, 248 [1992])
Petitioner admits that his very first official act upon assuming the position of town mayor was to issue
Office Order No. 95-01 which recalled the appointments of the private respondents. There was no
previous notice, much less a hearing accorded to the latter. Clearly, it was petitioner who acted in undue
haste to remove the private respondents without regard for the simple requirements of due process of
law. While he argues that the appointing power has the sole authority to revoke said appointments,
there is no debate that he does not have blanket authority to do so. Neither can he question the CSC’s
jurisdiction to affirm or revoke the recall.
Rule V, Section 9 of the Omnibus Implementing Regulations of the Revised Administrative Code
specifically provides that “an appointment accepted by the appointee cannot be withdrawn or revoked by
the appointing authority and shall remain in force and in effect until disapproved by the Commission.”
Thus, it is the CSC that is authorized to recall an appointment initially approved, but only when such
appointment and approval are proven to be in disregard of applicable provisions of the civil service law
and regulations (Debulgado v. Civil Service Commission, 237 SCRA 184, 200 [1994]).
Moreover, Section 10 of the same rule provides:
Sec. 10. An appointment issued in accordance with pertinent laws and rules shall take effect
immediately upon its issuance by the appointing authority, and if the appointee has assumed the duties
of the position, he shall be entitled to receive his salary at once without awaiting the approval of his
appointment by the Commission. The appointment shall remain effective until disapproved by the
Commission. In no case shall an appointment take effect earlier than the date of its issuance.
Section 20 of Rule VI also provides:
Sec. 20. Notwithstanding the initial approval of an appointment, the same may be recalled on any of
the following grounds:
(e)
Non-compliance with the procedures/criteria provided in the agency’s Merit
Promotion Plan;
(f)
Failure to pass through the agency’s Selection/Promotion Board;
(g)
Violation of the existing collective agreement between management and employees
relative to promotion; or
(h)
Violation of other existing civil service law, rules and regulations.
Accordingly, the appointments of the private respondents may only be recalled on the above-cited
grounds. And yet, the only reason advanced by the petitioner to justify the recall was that these were
“midnight appointments.” The CSC correctly ruled, however, that the constitutional prohibition on socalled “midnight appointments,” specifically those made within two (2) months immediately prior to the
next presidential elections, applies only to the President or Acting President. (De Rama v. Court of
Appeals, 353 SCRA 94, Feb. 28, 2001, En Banc [Ynares-Santiago])
297.
When may unconsented transfers be considered anathema to security of tenure?
Held: As held in Sta. Maria v. Lopez (31 SCRA 637, 653 citing Ibanez v. Commission on Elections, L-
26558, April 27, 1967, 19 SCRA 1002, 1012 and Section 12 of the Tax Code).
"x x x the rule that outlaws unconsented transfers as anathema to security of tenure applies only to an
officer who is appointed - not merely assigned - to a particular station. Such a rule does not pr[o]scribe
a transfer carried out under a specific statute that empowers the head of an agency to periodically
reassign the employees and officers in order to improve the service of the agency. x x x"
The guarantee of security of tenure under the Constitution is not a guarantee of perpetual employment.
It only means that an employee cannot be dismissed (or transferred) from the service for causes other
than those provided by law and after due process is accorded the employee. What it seeks to prevent is
capricious exercise of the power to dismiss. But where it is the law-making authority itself which
furnishes the ground for the transfer of a class of employees, no such capriciousness can be raised for so
long as the remedy proposed to cure a perceived evil is germane to the purposes of the law. (Agripino
A. De Guzman, Jr., et al. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 129118, July 19, 2000, En Banc [Purisima])
298.
Discuss Abolition of Office?
Held: The creation and abolition of public offices is primarily a legislative function . It is acknowledged
that Congress may abolish any office it creates without impairing the officer's right to continue in the
position held and that such power may be exercised for various reasons, such as the lack of funds or in
the interest of economy. However, in order for the abolition to be valid, it must be made in good faith,
not for political or personal reasons, or in order to circumvent the constitutional security of tenure of civil
service employees.
An abolition of office connotes an intention to do away with such office wholly and permanently, as the
word "abolished" denotes. Where one office is abolished and replaced with another office vested with
similar functions, the abolition is a legal nullity. Thus, in U.P. Board of Regents v. Rasul (200 SCRA 685
[1991]) we said:
It is true that a valid and bona fide abolition of an office denies to the incumbent the right to security of
tenure (De la Llana v. Alba, 112 SCRA 294 [1982]). However, in this case, the renaming and
restructuring of the PGH and its component units cannot give rise to a valid and bona fide abolition of the
position of PGH Director. This is because where the abolished office and the offices created in its place
have similar functions, the abolition lacks good faith (Jose L. Guerrero v. Hon. Antonio V. Arizabal, G.R.
No. 81928, June 4, 1990, 186 SCRA 108 [1990]). We hereby apply the principle enunciated in Cezar Z.
Dario v. Hon. Salvador M. Mison (176 SCRA 84 [1989]) that abolition which merely changes the
nomenclature of positions is invalid and does not result in the removal of the incumbent.
The above notwithstanding, and assuming that the abolition of the position of the PGH Director and the
creation of a UP-PGH Medical Center Director are valid, the removal of the incumbent is still not justified
for the reason that the duties and functions of the two positions are basically the same.
This was also our ruling in Guerrero v. Arizabal (186 SCRA 108 [1990]), wherein we declared that the
substantial identity in the functions between the two offices was indicia of bad faith in the removal of
petitioner pursuant to a reorganization. (Alexis C. Canonizado, et al. v. Hon. Alexander P. Aguirre,
et al., G.R. No. 133132, Jan. 25, 2000, En Banc [Gonzaga-Reyes])
299.
What is reorganization? When is it valid? When is it invalid?
Held: 1. Reorganization takes place when there is an alteration of the existing structure of government
offices or units therein, including the lines of control, authority and responsibility between them . It
involves a reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or
redundancy of functions. Naturally, it may result in the loss of one's position through removal or
abolition of an office. However, for a reorganization to be valid, it must also pass the test of good faith,
laid down in Dario v. Mison (176 SCRA 84 [1989]):
x x x As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in "good faith" if it is for the purpose of economy
or to make bureaucracy more efficient. In that event, no dismissal (in case of dismissal) or separation
actually occurs because the position itself ceases to exist. And in that case, security of tenure would not
be a Chinese wall. Be that as it may, if the "abolition" which is nothing else but a separation or removal,
is done for political reasons or purposely to defeat security of tenure, or otherwise not in good faith, no
valid "abolition" takes place and whatever "abolition" is done, is void ab initio. There is an invalid
"abolition" as where there is merely a change of nomenclature of positions, or where claims of economy
are belied by the existence of ample funds.
(Alexis C. Canonizado, et al. v. Hon. Alexander P. Aguirre, et al., G.R. No. 133132,
2000, En Banc [Gonzaga-Reyes])
Jan. 25,
2. While the President’s power to reorganize can not be denied, this does not mean however
that the reorganization itself is properly made in accordance with law. Well-settled is the rule that
reorganization is regarded as valid provided it is pursued in good faith. Thus, in Dario v. Mison, this
Court has had the occasion to clarify that:
“As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in ‘good faith’ if it is for the purpose of economy or to
make the bureaucracy more efficient. In that event no dismissal or separation actually occurs because
the position itself ceases to exist. And in that case the security of tenure would not be a Chinese wall.
Be that as it may, if the abolition which is nothing else but a separation or removal, is done for political
reasons or purposely to defeat security of tenure, or otherwise not in good faith, no valid abolition takes
place and whatever abolition done is void ab initio. There is an invalid abolition as where there is merely
a change of nomenclature of positions or where claims of economy are belied by the existence of ample
funds.” (176 SCRA 84)
(Larin v. Executive Secretary, 280 SCRA 713, Oct. 16, 1997)
300.
What are the circumstances evidencing bad faith in the removal of employees as a result of
reorganization and which may give rise to a claim for reinstatement or reappointment)?
Held:
1)
Where there is a significant increase in the number of positions in the new staffing pattern of
the department or agency concerned;
2)
Where an office is abolished and another performing substantially the same functions is
created;
3)
Where incumbents are replaced by those less qualified in terms of status of appointment,
performance and merit;
4)
Where there is a reclassification of offices in the department or agency concerned and the
reclassified offices perform substantially the same functions as the original offices;
5)
Where the removal violates the order of separation provided in Section 3 hereof .
(Sec. 2, R.A. No. 6656; Larin v. Executive Secretary, 280 SCRA 713, Oct. 16, 1997)
ELECTION LAWS
301.
Discuss the Right of Suffrage, and its substantive and procedural requirements.
Held: In a representative democracy such as ours, the right of suffrage, although accorded a
prime niche in the hierarchy of rights embodied in the fundamental law, ought to be exercised within the
proper bounds and framework of the Constitution and must properly yield to pertinent laws skillfully
enacted by the Legislature, which statutes for all intents and purposes, are crafted to effectively insulate
such so cherished right from ravishment and preserve the democratic institutions our people have, for so
long, guarded against the spoils of opportunism, debauchery and abuse.
To be sure, the right of suffrage x x x is not at all absolute. Needless to say, the exercise of the
right of suffrage, as in the enjoyment of all other rights, is subject to existing substantive and procedural
requirements embodied in our Constitution, statute books and other repositories of law. Thus, as to the
substantive aspect, Section 1, Article V of the Constitution provides:
“SECTION 1. SUFFRAGE MAY BE EXERCISED BY ALL CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES NOT
OTHERWISE DISQUALIFIED BY LAW, WHO ARE AT LEAST EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE, AND WHO SHALL
HAVE RESIDED IN THE PHILIPPINES FOR AT LEAST ONE YEAR AND IN THE PLACE WHEREIN THEY
PROPOSE TO VOTE FOR AT LAST SIX MONTHS IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION. NO
LITERACY, PROPERTY, OR OTHER SUBSTANTIVE REQUIREMENT SHALL BE IMPOSED ON THE EXERCISE
OF SUFFRAGE.”
As to the procedural limitation, the right of a citizen to vote is necessarily conditioned upon
certain procedural requirements he must undergo: among others, the process of registration.
Specifically, a citizen in order to be qualified to exercise his right to vote, in addition to the minimum
requirements set by the fundamental charter, is obliged by law to register, at present, under the
provisions of Republic Act No. 8189, otherwise known as the “Voter’s Registration Act of 1996.”
(Akbayan-Youth v. COMELEC, 355 SCRA 318, Mar. 26, 2001, En Banc [Buena])
Discuss the reason behind the principle of ballot secrecy. May the conduct of exit polls
transgress the sanctity and the secrecy of the ballot to justify its prohibition?
302.
Held: The reason behind the principle of ballot secrecy is to avoid vote buying through voter
identification. Thus, voters are prohibited from exhibiting the contents of their official ballots to other
persons, from making copies thereof, or from putting distinguishing marks thereon so as to be identified.
Also proscribed is finding out the contents of the ballots cast by particular voters or disclosing those of
disabled or illiterate voters who have been assisted. Clearly, what is forbidden is the association of voters
with their respective votes, for the purpose of assuring that the votes have been cast in accordance with
the instructions of a third party. This result cannot, however, be achieved merely through the voters’
verbal and confidential disclosure to a pollster of whom they have voted for.
In exit polls, the contents of the official ballot are not actually exposed. Furthermore, the revelation of
whom an elector has voted for is not compulsory, but voluntary. Voters may also choose not to reveal
their identities. Indeed, narrowly tailored countermeasures may be prescribed by the Comelec, so as to
minimize or suppress incidental problems in the conduct of exit polls, without transgressing the
fundamental rights of our people. (ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
133486, Jan. 28, 2000, En Banc [Panganiban])
303.
Discuss the meaning and purpose of residency requirement in Election Law.
Held: 1. The meaning and purpose of the residency requirement were explained recently in our
decision in Aquino v. Comelec (248 SCRA 400, 420-421 [1995]), as follows:
X x x [T]he place “where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home,” where he, no
matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his
domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election
law. The manifest purpose of this deviation from the usual conceptions of residency in law as explained
in Gallego v. Vera is “to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and needs of the
community” from taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that community for electoral
gain. While there is nothing wrong with the practice of establishing residence in a given area for meeting
election law requirements, this nonetheless defeats the essence of representation, which is to place
through the assent of voters those most cognizant and sensitive to the needs of a particular district, if a
candidate falls short of the period of residency mandated by law for him to qualify. That purpose could
be obviously best met by individuals who have either had actual residence in the area for a given period
or who have been domiciled in the same area either by origin or by choice.
(Marcita Mamba Perez v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 133944, Oct. 28, 1999, En Banc [Mendoza])
2. The Constitution and the law requires residence as a qualification for seeking and holding
elective public office, in order to give candidates the opportunity to be familiar with the needs, difficulties,
aspirations, potentials for growth and all matters vital to the welfare of their constituencies; likewise, it
enables the electorate to evaluate the office seekers’ qualifications and fitness for the job they aspire for.
Inasmuch as Vicente Y. Emano has proven that he, together with his family, (1) had actually resided in a
house he bought in 1973 in Cagayan de Oro City; (2) had actually held office there during his three terms
as provincial governor of Misamis Oriental, the provincial capitol being located therein; and (3) has
registered as voter in the city during the period required by law, he could not be deemed “a stranger or
newcomer” when he ran for and was overwhelmingly voted as city mayor. Election laws must be liberally
construed to give effect to the popular mandate. (Torayno, Sr. v. COMELEC, 337 SCRA 574, Aug. 9,
2000, En Banc [Panganiban])
3. Generally, in requiring candidates to have a minimum period of residence in the area in which they
seek to be elected, the Constitution or the law intends to prevent the possibility of a “stranger or
newcomer unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the latter
from [seeking] an elective office to serve that community.” Such provision is aimed at excluding
outsiders “from taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that community for electoral
gain.” Establishing residence in a community merely to meet an election law requirement defeats the
purpose of representation: to elect through the assent of voters those most cognizant and sensitive to
the needs of the community. This purpose is “best met by individuals who have either had actual
residence in the area for a given period or who have been domiciled in the same area either by origin or
by choice.” (Torayno, Sr. v. COMELEC, 337 SCRA 574, Aug. 9, 2000, En Banc [Panganiban])
304.
Does the fact that a person is registered as a voter in one district proof that he is not domiciled in
another district?
Held: The fact that a person is registered as a voter in one district is not proof that he is not domiciled
in another district. Thus, in Faypon v. Quirino (96 Phil. 294 [1954]), this Court held that the registration
of a voter in a place other than his residence of origin is not sufficient to consider him to have abandoned
or lost his residence. (Marcita Mamba Perez v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 133944, Oct. 28, 1999, En
Banc [Mendoza])
305.
Discuss the nature of Voter’s Registration.
Held: Stated differently, the act of registration is an indispensable precondition to the right of
suffrage. For registration is part and parcel of the right to vote and an indispensable element in the
election process. Thus, x x x registration cannot and should not be denigrated to the lowly stature of a
mere statutory requirement. Proceeding from the significance of registration as a necessary requisite to
the right to vote, the State undoubtedly, in the exercise of its inherent police power, may then enact laws
to safeguard and regulate the act of voter’s registration for the ultimate purpose of conducting honest,
orderly and peaceful election, to the incidental yet generally important end, that even pre-election
activities could be performed by the duly constituted authorities in a realistic and orderly manner – one
which is not indifferent and so far removed from the pressing order of the day and the prevalent
circumstances of the times. (Akbayan-Youth v. COMELEC, 355 SCRA 318, Mar. 26, 2001, En
Banc [Buena])
306.
What is the Lone Candidate Law? What are its salient provisions?
Answer: The Lone Candidate Law is Republic Act No. 8295, enacted on June 6, 1997. Section 2
thereof provides that “Upon the expiration of the deadline for the filing of the certificate of candidacy in a
special election called to fill a vacancy in an elective position other than for President and Vice-President,
when there is only one (1) qualified candidate for such position, the lone candidate shall be proclaimed
elected to the position by proper proclaiming body of the Commission on Elections without holding the
special election upon certification by the Commission on Elections that he is the only candidate for the
office and is thereby deemed elected.”
Section 3 thereof provides that “the lone candidate so proclaimed shall assume office not earlier than the
scheduled election day, in the absence of any lawful ground to deny due course or cancel the certificate
of candidacy in order to prevent such proclamation, as provided for under Sections 69 and 78 of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 881 also known as the Omnibus Election Code.”
307.
Who are disqualified to run in a special election under the Lone Candidate Law?
Answer: Section 4 of the Lone Candidate Law provides that “In addition to the disqualifications
mentioned in Sections 12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 40 of Republic Act No. 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code, whenever the evidence of guilt is strong, the following
persons are disqualified to run in a special election called to fill the vacancy in an elective office, to wit:
a)
Any elective official who has resigned from his office by accepting an appointive office or for
whatever reason which he previously occupied but has caused to become vacant due to his resignation;
and
b)
Any person who, directly or indirectly, coerces, bribes, threatens, harasses, intimidates or
actually causes, inflicts or produces any violence, injury, punishment, torture, damage, loss or
disadvantage to any person or persons aspiring to become a candidate or that of the immediate member
of his family, his honor or property that is meant to eliminate all other potential candidate.”
308.
What is the purpose of the law in requiring the filing of certificate of candidacy and in fixing the
time limit therefor?
Held: The evident purpose of the law in requiring the filing of certificate of candidacy and in fixing the
time limit therefor are: (a) to enable the voters to know, at least sixty days before the regular election,
the candidates among whom they are to make the choice, and (b) to avoid confusion and inconvenience
in the tabulation of the votes cast. For if the law did not confine the choice or election by the voters to
the duly registered candidates, there might be as many persons voted for as there are voters, and votes
might be cast even for unknown or fictitious persons as a mark to identify the votes in favor of a
candidate for another office in the same election. (Miranda v. Abaya, G.R. No. 136351, July 28,
1999)
309.
May a disqualified candidate and whose certificate of candidacy was denied due course and/or
canceled by the Comelec be validly substituted?
Held: Even on the most basic and fundamental principles, it is readily understood that the concept of a
substitute presupposes the existence of the person to be substituted, for how can a person take the place
of somebody who does not exist or who never was. The Court has no other choice but to rule that in all
instances enumerated in Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code, the existence of a valid certificate of
candidacy seasonably filed is a requisite sine qua non.
All told, a disqualified candidate may only be substituted if he had a valid certificate of candidacy in the
first place because, if the disqualified candidate did not have a valid and seasonably filed certificate of
candidacy, he is and was not a candidate at all. If a person was not a candidate, he cannot be
substituted under Section 77 of the Code. (Miranda v. Abaya, G.R. No. 136351, July 28, 1999, en
Banc [Melo])
310.
Should the votes cast for the substituted candidate be considered votes for the substitute
candidate?
Answer: Republic Act No. 9006, otherwise known as the Fair Election Act, provides in Section 12
thereof: “In case of valid substitutions after the official ballots have been printed, the votes cast for the
substituted candidates shall be considered as stray votes but shall not invalidate the whole ballot. For
this purpose, the official ballots shall provide spaces where the voters may write the name of the
substitute candidates if they are voting for the latter: Provided, however, That if the substitute candidate
is of the same family name, this provision shall not apply.”
311.
What is the effect of the filing of certificate of candidacy by elective officials?
COMELEC Resolution No. 3636, promulgated March 1, 2001, implementing the Fair
Election Act (R.A. No. 9006) provides in Section 26 thereof: “any elective official, whether national or
Answer:
local, who has filed a certificate of candidacy for the same or any other office shall not be considered
resigned from his office.”
Note that Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code and the first proviso in the third paragraph of Section
11 of Republic Act No. 8436 which modified said Section 67, were expressly repealed and rendered
ineffective, respectively, by Section 14 (Repealing Clause) of The Fair Election Act (R.A. No. 9006).
312.
What kind of “material misrepresentation” is contemplated by Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code as a ground for disqualification of a candidate? Does it include the use of surname?
Held: Therefore, it may be concluded that the material misrepresentation contemplated by Section 78 of
the (Omnibus Election) Code refers to qualifications for elective office. This conclusion is strengthened by
the fact that the consequences imposed upon a candidate guilty of having made a false representation in
his certificate of candidacy are grave – to prevent the candidate from running or, if elected, from serving,
or to prosecute him for violation of the election laws. It could not have been the intention of the law to
deprive a person of such a basic and substantial political right to be voted for a public office upon just
any innocuous mistake.
[A]side from the requirement of materiality, a false representation under Section 78 must consist of a
“deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate
ineligible.” In other words, it must be made with an intention to deceive the electorate as to one’s
qualifications for public office. The use of a surname, when not intended to mislead or deceive the public
as to one’s identity, is not within the scope of the provision. (Victorino Salcedo II v. COMELEC, G.R.
No. 135886, Aug. 16, 1999, En Banc [Gonzaga-Reyes])
313.
Who has authority to declare failure of elections and the calling of special election? What are the
three instances where a failure of election may be declared?
Held: The COMELEC’s authority to declare failure of elections is provided in our election laws. Section 4
of RA 7166 provides that the Comelec sitting en banc by a majority vote of its members may decide,
among others, the declaration of failure of election and the calling of special election as provided in
Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code. X x x
There are three instances where a failure of election may be declared, namely, (a) the election in any
polling place has not been held on the date fixed on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud
or other analogous causes; (b) the election in any polling place has been suspended before the hour
fixed by law for the closing of the voting on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other
analogous causes; or (c) after the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election
returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect on account of force
majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes. In these instances, there is a resulting
failure to elect. This is obvious in the first two scenarios, where the election was not held and where the
election was suspended. As to the third scenario, where the preparation and the transmission of the
election returns give rise to the consequence of failure to elect, it must x x x, be interpreted to mean that
nobody emerged as a winner. (Banaga, Jr. v. COMELEC, 336 SCRA 701, July 31, 2000, En Banc
[Quisumbing])
314.
What are the two conditions that must concur before the COMELEC can act on a verified petition
seeking to declare a afailure of election?
Held: Before the COMELEC can act on a verified petition seeking to declare a failure of election two
conditions must concur, namely: (1) no voting took place in the precinct or precincts on the date fixed by
law, or even if there was voting, the election resulted in a failure to elect; and (2) the votes not cast
would have affected the result of the election. Note that the cause of such failure of election could only
be any of the following: force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes.
Thus, in Banaga, Jr. v. COMELEC (336 SCRA 701, July 31, 2000, En Banc [Quisumbing]), the SC held:
“We have painstakingly examined the petition filed by petitioner Banaga before the Comelec. But we
found that petitioner did not allege at all that elections were either not held or suspended. Neither did he
aver that although there was voting, nobody was elected. On the contrary, he conceded that an election
took place for the office of vice-mayor of Paranaque City, and that private respondent was, in fact,
proclaimed elected to that post. While petitioner contends that the election was tainted with widespread
anomalies, it must be noted that to warrant a declaration of failure of election the commission of fraud
must be such that it prevented or suspended the holding of an election, or marred fatally the preparation
and transmission, custody and canvass of the election returns. These essential facts ought to have been
alleged clearly by the petitioner below, but he did not.”
315.
Cite instances when Comelec may or may not validly declare failure of elections.
Held: In Mitmug v. COMELEC (230 SCRA 54 [1994]), petitioner instituted with the COMELEC an action
to declare failure of election in forty-nine precincts where less than a quarter of the electorate were able
to cast their votes. He also lodged an election protest with the Regional Trial Court disputing the result
of the election in all precincts in his municipality. The Comelec denied motu proprio and without due
notice and hearing the petition to declare failure of election despite petitioner’s argument that he has
meritorious grounds in support thereto, that is, massive disenfranchisement of voters due to terrorism.
On review, we ruled that the Comelec did not gravely abuse its discretion in denying the petition. It was
not proven that no actual voting took place. Neither was it shown that even if there was voting, the
results thereon would be tantamount to failure to elect. Considering that there is no concurrence of the
conditions seeking to declare failure of election, there is no longer need to receive evidence on alleged
election irregularities.
In Sardea v. COMELEC (225 SCRA 374 [1993]), all election materials and paraphernalia with the
municipal board of canvassers were destroyed by the sympathizers of the losing mayoralty candidate.
The board then decided to use the copies of election returns furnished to the municipal trial court.
Petitioner therein filed a petition to stop the proceedings of the board of canvassers on the ground that it
had no authority to use said election returns obtained from the municipal trial court. The petition was
denied. Next, he filed a petition assailing the composition of the board of canvassers. Despite that
petition, the board of canvassers proclaimed the winning candidates. Later on, petitioner filed a petition
to declare a failure of election alleging that the attendant facts would justify declaration of such failure.
On review, we ruled that petitioner’s first two actions involved pre-proclamation controversies which can
no longer be entertained after the winning candidates have been proclaimed. Regarding the petition to
declare a failure of election, we held that the destruction and loss of copies of election returns intended
for the municipal board of canvassers on account of violence is not one of the causes that would warrant
the declaration of failure of election. The reason is that voting actually took place as scheduled and other
valid election returns still existed. Moreover, the destruction or loss did not affect the result of the
election. We also declared that there is failure of elections only when the will of the electorate has been
muted and cannot be ascertained. If the will of the people is determinable, the same must as far as
possible be respected.
Xxx
In Loong v. COMELEC (257 SCRA 1 [1996]), the petition for annulment of election results or to declare
failure of elections in Parang, Sulu, on the ground of statistical improbability and massive fraud was
granted by the COMELEC. Even before the technical examination of election documents was conducted,
the Comelec already observed badges of fraud just by looking at the election results in Parang.
Nevertheless, the Comelec dismissed the petition for annulment of election results or to declare failure of
elections in the municipalities of Tapul, Panglima Estino, Pata, Siasi and Kalinggalang Calauag. The
COMELEC dismissed the latter action on ground of untimeliness of the petition, despite a finding that the
same badges of fraud evident from the results of the election based on the certificates of canvass of
votes in Parang, are also evident in the election results of the five mentioned municipalities. We ruled
that Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition as there is no law which
provides for a reglementary period to file annulment of elections when there is yet no proclamation. The
election resulted in a failure to elect on account of fraud. Accordingly, we ordered the Comelec to
reinstate the aforesaid petition. Those circumstances, however, are not present in this case, so that
reliance on Loong by petitioner Banaga is misplaced. (Banaga, Jr. v. COMELEC, 336 SCRA 701, July
31, 2000, En Banc [Quisumbing])
316.
What acts of a Division of the COMELEC may be subject of a motion for reconsideration of the
COMELEC en banc?
Held: Section 5, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, provides:
“SEC. 5. How Motion for Reconsideration Disposed of. - Upon the filing of a motion to reconsider a
decision, resolution, order or ruling of a Division, the Clerk of Court concerned shall, within twenty-four
(24) hours from the filing thereof, notify the presiding Commissioner. The latter shall within two (2) days
thereafter certify the case to the Commission en banc.”
Under the above-quoted rule, the acts of a Division that are subject of a motion for
reconsideration must have a character of finality before the same can be elevated to the COMELEC en
banc. The elementary rule is that an order is final in nature if it completely disposes of the entire case.
But if there is something more to be done in the case after its issuance, that order is interlocutory.
As correctly pointed out by public respondent in its assailed order of November 29, 1999, the
October 11, 1999 did not dispose of the case completely as there is something more to be done which is
to decide the election protest. As such, it is the herein public respondent (Second Division of the
COMELEC) which issued the interlocutory order of October 11, 1999 that should resolve petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration, not the COMELEC en banc (Bulaong v. COMELEC, First Division, 220 SCRA
745, 749 [1993]). Accordingly, the applicable rule on the subject is Section 5(c), Rule 3 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure, which states:
“Rule 3, Section 5(c). Any motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a Division shall
be resolved by the Commission en banc except motions on interlocutory orders of the division, which
shall be resolved by the divisions which issued the order.”
That only final orders of a Division may be raised before the COMELEC en banc is in accordance
with Article IX-C, Section 3 of the Constitution which mandates that only motions for reconsideration of
final decisions shall be decided by the Commission on Elections en banc, thus:
“Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of
procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such
election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be
decided by the Commission en banc.”
It bears stressing that under this constitutional provision, the COMELEC en banc shall decide
motions for reconsideration only of “decisions” of a Division, meaning those acts of final character.
Clearly, the assailed order denying petitioner's demurrer to evidence, being interlocutory, may not, be
resolved by the COMELEC en banc (Ambil, Jr. v. Commission on elections, G.R. No. 143398, Oct. 25,
2000, 344 SCRA 358). (Gementiza v. Commission on Elections, 353 SCRA 724, March 6, 2001,
En Banc [Sandoval-Gutierrez])
317.
Is a petition to declare failure of election different from a petition to annul the election results?
Held: A prayer to declare failure of elections and a prayer to annul the election results x x x are actually
of the same nature. Whether an action is for declaration of failure of elections or for annulment of
election results, based on allegations of fraud, terrorism, violence or analogous, the Omnibus Election
Code denominates them similarly. (Banaga, Jr. v. COMELEC, 336 SCRA 701, July 31, 2000, En
Banc [Quisumbing])
318.
What conditions must concur before the Comelec can act on a verified petition seeking to declare
a failure of election? Is low turn-out of voters enough basis to grant the petition?
Held: Before COMELEC can act on a verified petition seeking to declare a failure of election, two (2)
conditions must concur: first, no voting has taken place in the precinct or precincts on the date fixed by
law or, even if there was voting, the election nevertheless results in failure to elect; and, second, the
votes not cast would affect the result of the election.
There can be failure of election in a political unit only if the will of the majority has been defiled and
cannot be ascertained. But, if it can be determined, it must be accorded respect. After all, there is no
provision in our election laws which requires that a majority of registered voters must cast their votes.
All the law requires is that a winning candidate must be elected by a plurality of valid votes, regardless of
the actual number of ballots cast. Thus, even if less than 25% of the electorate in the questioned
precincts cast their votes, the same must still be respected. (Mitmug v. COMELEC, 230 SCRA 54,
Feb. 10, 1994, En Banc [Bellosillo])
319.
Distinguish a petition to declare failure of elections from an election protest.
Held: While petitioner may have intended to institute an election protest by praying that said action may
also be considered an election protest, in our view, petitioner’s action is a petition to declare a failure of
elections or annul election results. It is not an election protest.
First, his petition before the Comelec was instituted pursuant to Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7166 in
relation to Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code. Section 4 of RA 7166 refers to “postponement,
failure of election and special elections” while Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code relates to “failure
of election.” It is simply captioned as “Petition to Declare Failure of Elections and/or For Annulment of
Elections.”
Second, an election protest is an ordinary action while a petition to declare a failure of elections is a
special action under the 1993 Comelec Rules of Procedure as amended. An election protest is governed
by Rule 20 on ordinary actions, while a petition to declare failure of elections is covered by Rule 26 under
special actions.
In this case, petitioner filed his petition as a special action and paid the corresponding fee therefor.
Thus, the petition was docketed as SPA-98-383. This conforms to petitioner’s categorization of his
petition as one to declare a failure of elections or annul election results. In contrast, an election protest
is assigned a docket number starting with “EPC,” meaning election protest case.
Third, petitioner did not comply with the requirements for filing an election protest. He failed to pay the
required filing fee and cash deposits for an election protest. Failure to pay filing fees will not vest the
election tribunal jurisdiction over the case. Such procedural lapse on the part of a petitioner would
clearly warrant the outright dismissal of his action.
Fourth, an en banc decision of Comelec in an ordinary action becomes final and executory after thirty
(30) days from its promulgation, while an en banc decision in a special action becomes final and
executory after five (5) days from promulgation, unless restrained by the Supreme Court (Comelec Rules
of Procedure, Rule 18, Section 13 [a], [b]). For that reason, a petition cannot be treated as both an
election protest and a petition to declare failure of elections.
Fifth, the allegations in the petition decisively determine its nature. Petitioner alleged that the local
elections for the office of vice-mayor in Paranaque City held on May 11, 1998, denigrates the true will of
the people as it was marred with widespread anomalies on account of vote buying, flying voters and
glaring discrepancies in the election returns. He averred that those incidents warrant the declaration of a
failure of elections.
Given these circumstances, public respondent cannot be said to have gravely erred in treating petitioner’s
action as a petition to declare failure of elections or to annul election results. (Banaga, Jr. v. COMELEC,
336 SCRA 701, July 31, 2000, En Banc [Quisumbing])
320.
What are pre-proclamation cases, and exceptions thereto? What Court has jurisdiction over preproclamation cases?
Held: As a general rule, candidates and registered political parties involved in an election are allowed to
file pre-proclamation cases before the Comelec. Pre-proclamation cases refer to any question pertaining
to or affecting the proceedings of the board of canvassers which may be raised by any candidate or by
any registered political party or coalition of political parties before the board or directly with the
Commission, or any matter raised under Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 in relation to the preparation,
transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of election returns (Section 241, Omnibus Election Code).
The Comelec has exclusive jurisdiction over all pre-proclamation controversies (Section 242, supra). As
an exception, however, to the general rule, Section 15 of Republic Act 7166 prohibits candidates in the
presidential, vice-presidential, senatorial and congressional elections from filing pre-proclamation cases.
It states:
“Sec. 15. Pre-Proclamation Cases Not Allowed in Elections for President, Vice-President, Senator, and
Members of the House of Representatives. - For purposes of the elections for President, Vice-President,
Senator and Member of the House of Representatives, no pre-proclamation cases shall be allowed on
matters relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of election returns or
the certificates of canvass, as the case may be. However, this does not preclude the authority of the
appropriate canvassing body motu proprio or upon written complaint of an interested person to correct
manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or election returns before it.”
The prohibition aims to avoid delay in the proclamation of the winner in the election, which delay might
result in a vacuum in these sensitive posts . The law, nonetheless, provides an exception to the
exception. The second sentence of Section 15 allows the filing of petitions for correction of manifest
errors in the certificate of canvass or election returns even in elections for president, vice-president and
members of the House of Representatives for the simple reason that the correction of manifest error will
not prolong the process of canvassing nor delay the proclamation of the winner in the election. The rule
is consistent with and complements the authority of the Comelec under the Constitution to "enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum
and recall" (Section 2[1], Article IX-C, 1987 Constitution) and its power to "decide, except those involving
the right to vote, all questions affecting elections." (Section 2[3], Article IX-C, supra) (Federico S.
Sandoval v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 133842, Jan. 26, 2000 [Puno])
321.
Who has authority to rule on petitions for correction of manifest error in the certificate of canvass
or election returns?
Held: The authority to rule on petitions for correction of manifest error is vested in the Comelec en
banc. Section 7 of Rule 27 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure (took effect on February 15, 1993)
provides that if the error is discovered before proclamation, the board of canvassers may motu proprio,
or upon verified petition by any candidate, political party, organization or coalition of political parties,
after due notice and hearing, correct the errors committed. The aggrieved party may appeal the decision
of the board to the Commission and said appeal shall be heard and decided by the Commission en banc.
Section 5, however, of the same rule states that a petition for correction of manifest error may be filed
directly with the Commission en banc provided that such errors could not have been discovered during
the canvassing despite the exercise of due diligence and proclamation of the winning candidate had
already been made. (Federico S. Sandoval v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 133842, Jan. 26, 2000 [Puno])
322.
Distinguish Election Protest from Petition for Quo Warranto.
Held: In Samad v. COMELEC, we explained that a petition for quo warranto under the Omnibus Election
Code raises in issue the disloyalty or ineligibility of the winning candidate. It is a proceeding to unseat
the respondent from office but not necessarily to install the petitioner in his place. An election protest is
a contest between the defeated and winning candidates on the ground of frauds or irregularities in the
casting and counting of the ballots, or in the preparation of the returns. It raises the question of who
actually obtained the plurality of the legal votes and therefore is entitled to hold the office. (Dumayas,
Jr. v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 141952-53, April 20, 2001, En Banc [Quisumbing])
323.
What is a counter-protest? When should it be filed?
Held: Under the Comelec Rules of Procedure, the protestee may incorporate in his answer a counterprotest. It has been said that a counter-protest is tantamount to a counterclaim in a civil action and may
be presented as a part of the answer within the time he is required to answer the protest, i.e., within five
(5) days upon receipt of the protest, unless a motion for extension is granted, in which case it must be
filed before the expiration of the extended time.
As early as in the case of Arrieta v. Rodriguez (57 Phil. 717), the SC had firmly settled the rule that the
counter-protest must be filed within the period provided by law, otherwise, the forum loses its jurisdiction
to entertain the belatedly filed counter-protest. (Kho v. COMELEC, 279 SCRA 463, Sept. 25, 1997,
En Banc [Torres])
324.
What is the effect of death of a party in an election protest? Should it warrant the dismissal of
the protest?
Held: An election protest involves both the private interests of the rival candidates and the public
interest in the final determination of the real choice of the electorate, and for this reason, an election
contest necessarily survives the death of the protestant or the protestee. It is true that a public office is
personal to the public officer and is not a property transmissible to his heirs upon death, thus, upon the
death of the incumbent, no heir of his may be allowed to continue holding his office in his place. But
while the right to a public office is personal and exclusive to the public officer, an election protest is not
purely personal and exclusive to the protestant or to the protestee such that after the death of either
would oust the court of all authority to continue the protest proceedings. An election contest, after all,
involves not merely conflicting private aspirations but is imbued with paramount public interests. The
death of the protestant neither constitutes a ground for the dismissal of the contest nor ousts the trial
court of its jurisdiction to decide the election contest. (De Castro v. COMELEC, 267 SCRA 806, Feb.
7, 1997)
325.
Does the fact that one or a few candidates in an election got zero votes in one or a few precincts
adequately support a finding that the election returns are statistically improbable?
Held: From experiences in past elections, it is possible for one candidate or even a few candidates to
get zero votes in one or a few precincts.
Standing alone and without more, the bare fact that a candidate for public office received zero votes in
one or two precincts can not adequately support a finding that the subject election returns are
statistically improbable. A no-vote for a particular candidate in election returns is but one strand in the
web of circumstantial evidence that those election returns were prepared under “duress, force and
intimidation.” In the case of Una Kibad v. Comelec (23 SCRA 588 [1968]), the SC warned that the
doctrine of statistical improbability must be viewed restrictively, the utmost care being taken lest in
penalizing the fraudulent and corrupt practices, innocent voters become disenfranchised, a result which
hardly commends itself. Moreover, the doctrine of statistical improbability involves a question of fact and
a more prudential approach prohibits its determination ex parte. (Arthur V. Velayo v. COMELEC, G.R.
No. 135613, March 9, 2000, En Banc [Puno])
326.
What Court has jurisdiction over election protests and quo warranto proceedings involving
Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) elections?
Held: Any contest relating to the election of members of the Sangguniang Kabataan (including the
chairman) – whether pertaining to their eligibility or the manner of their election – is cognizable by MTCs,
MCTCs, and MeTCs. Section 6 of Comelec Resolution No. 2824 which provides that cases involving the
eligibility or qualification of SK candidates shall be decided by the City/Municipal Election Officer whose
decision shall be final, applies only to proceedings before the election. Before proclamation, cases
concerning eligibility of SK officers and members are cognizable by the Election Officer. But after the
election and proclamation, the same cases become quo warranto cases cognizable by MTCs, MCTCs, and
MeTCs. The distinction is based on the principle that it is the proclamation which marks off the
jurisdiction of the courts from the jurisdiction of election officials.
The case of Jose M. Mercado v. Board of Election Supervisors (243 SCRA 423, G.R. No. 109713, April 6,
1995), in which this Court ruled that election protests involving SK elections are to be determined by the
Board of Election Supervisors was decided under the aegis of Comelec Resolution No. 2499, which took
effect on August 27, 1992. However, Comelec Resolution No. 2824, which took effect on February 6,
1996 and was passed pursuant to R.A. 7808, in relation to Arts. 252-253 of the Omnibus Election Code,
has since transferred the cognizance of such cases from the Board of Election Supervisors to the MTCs,
MCTCs and MeTCs. Thus, the doctrine of Mercado is no longer controlling. (Francis King L. Marquez
v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 127318, Aug. 25, 1999, En Banc [Purisima])
327.
What acts of a Division of the COMELEC may be subject of a motion for reconsideration of the
COMELEC en banc?
Held: Section 5, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, provides:
“SEC. 5. How Motion for Reconsideration Disposed of. - Upon the filing of a motion to reconsider a
decision, resolution, order or ruling of a Division, the Clerk of Court concerned shall, within twenty-four
(24) hours from the filing thereof, notify the presiding Commissioner. The latter shall within two (2) days
thereafter certify the case to the Commission en banc.”
Under the above-quoted rule, the acts of a Division that are subject of a motion for
reconsideration must have a character of finality before the same can be elevated to the COMELEC en
banc. The elementary rule is that an order is final in nature if it completely disposes of the entire case.
But if there is something more to be done in the case after its issuance, that order is interlocutory.
As correctly pointed out by public respondent in its assailed order of November 29, 1999, the
October 11, 1999 did not dispose of the case completely as there is something more to be done which is
to decide the election protest. As such, it is the herein public respondent (Second Division of the
COMELEC) which issued the interlocutory order of October 11, 1999 that should resolve petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration, not the COMELEC en banc (Bulaong v. COMELEC, First Division, 220 SCRA
745, 749 [1993]). Accordingly, the applicable rule on the subject is Section 5(c), Rule 3 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure, which states:
“Rule 3, Section 5(c). Any motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a Division shall
be resolved by the Commission en banc except motions on interlocutory orders of the division, which
shall be resolved by the divisions which issued the order.”
That only final orders of a Division may be raised before the COMELEC en banc is in accordance
with Article IX-C, Section 3 of the Constitution which mandates that only motions for reconsideration of
final decisions shall be decided by the Commission on Elections en banc, thus:
“Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of
procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such
election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be
decided by the Commission en banc.”
It bears stressing that under this constitutional provision, the COMELEC en banc shall decide
motions for reconsideration only of “decisions” of a Division, meaning those acts of final character.
Clearly, the assailed order denying petitioner's demurrer to evidence, being interlocutory, may not, be
resolved by the COMELEC en banc (Ambil, Jr. v. Commission on elections, G.R. No. 143398, Oct. 25,
2000, 344 SCRA 358). (Gementiza v. Commission on Elections, 353 SCRA 724, March 6, 2001,
En Banc [Sandoval-Gutierrez])
THE LAW OF PUBLIC CORPORATIONS
328.
What is an autonomous region?
Answer: An autonomous region consists of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas
sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other
relevant characteristics within the framework of the Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as
the territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines. (Sec. 15, Art. X, 1987 Constitution)
329.
What are administrative regions? Are they considered territorial and political subdivisions of the
State? Who has the power to create administrative regions?
Held: Administrative regions are mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes.
They are not territorial and political subdivisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays .
While the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly provided for in the Constitution, it is a
power which has traditionally been lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of the power of
general supervision over local governments . (Abbas v. COMELEC, 179 SCRA 287, Nov. 10, 1989, En
Banc [Cortes])
329.
Is there a conflict between the power of the President to merge administrative regions with the
constitutional provision requiring a plebiscite in the merger of local government units?
Held: There is no conflict between the power of the President to merge administrative regions with the
constitutional provision requiring a plebiscite in the merger of local government units because the
requirement of a plebiscite in a merger expressly applies only to provinces, cities, municipalities or
barangays, not to administrative regions. (Abbas v. COMELEC, 179 SCRA 287, Nov. 10, 1989, En
Banc [Cortes])
330.
What is the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA)? Is it a local government unit or
public corporation endowed with legislative power? May it validly exercise police power? How is it
distinguished from the former Metro Manila Council (MMC) created under PD No. 824?
Held: Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body composed of several local government units – i.e., twelve
(12) cities and five (5) municipalities x x x. With the passage of Republic Act No. 7924 in 1995,
Metropolitan Manila was declared as a “special development and administrative region” and the
Administration of “metrowide” basic services affecting the region placed under “a development authority”
referred to as the MMDA.
The governing board of the MMDA is the Metro Manila Council. The Council is composed of the mayors
of the component 12 cities and 5 municipalities, the president of the Metro Manila Vice-Mayors’ League
and the president of the Metro Manila Councilors’ League. The Council is headed by a Chairman who is
appointed by the President and vested with the rank of cabinet member. As the policy-making body of
the MMDA, the Metro Manila Council approves metro-wide plans, programs and projects, and issues the
necessary rules and regulations for the implementation of said plans; it approves the annual budget of
the MMDA and promulgates the rules and regulations for the delivery of basic services, collection of
service and regulatory fees, fines and penalties. X x x
Clearly, the scope of the MMDA’s function is limited to the delivery of the seven (7) basic services. One
of these is transport and traffic management x x x.
It will be noted that the powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation, coordination,
regulation, implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a
system and administration. There is no syllable in R.A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let
alone legislative power. Even the Metro Manila Council has not been delegated any legislative power.
Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government units, there is no provision in R.A. No. 7924 that
empowers the MMDA or its Council “to enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for
the general welfare” of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is x x x a “development authority.”
It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various national
government agencies, people’s organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector for
the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area. All its functions are
administrative in nature and these are actually summed up in the charter itself x x x.
Secondly, the MMDA is not the same entity as the MMC in Sangalang. Although the MMC is the
forerunner of the present MMDA, an examination of Presidential Decree No. 824, the charter of the MMC,
shows that the latter possessed greater powers which were not bestowed on the present MMDA.
Metropolitan Manila was first created in 1975 by Presidential Decree No. 824. It comprised the Greater
Manila Area composed of the contiguous four (4) cities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay and Caloocan, and the
thirteen (13) municipalities x x x. Metropolitan Manila was created as a response to the finding that the
rapid growth of population and the increase of social and economic requirements in these areas demand
a call for simultaneous and unified development; that the public services rendered by the respective local
governments could be administered more efficiently and economically if integrated under a system of
central planning; and this coordination, “especially in the maintenance of peace and order and the
eradication of social and economic ills that fanned the flames of rebellion and discontent [were] part of
the reform measures under Martial Law essential to the safety and security of the State.”
Metropolitan Manila was established as a “public corporation” x x x.
The administration of Metropolitan Manila was placed under the Metro Manila Commission (MMC) x x x.
The MMC was the “central government” of Metro Manila for the purpose of establishing and administering
programs providing services common to the area. As a “central government” it had the power to levy
and collect taxes and special assessments, the power to charge and collect fees; the power to
appropriate money for its operation, and at the same time, review appropriations for the city and
municipal units within its jurisdiction. It was bestowed the power to enact or approve ordinances,
resolutions and fix penalties for violation of such ordinances and resolutions. It also had the power to
review, amend, revise or repeal all ordinances, resolutions and acts of any of the x x x cities and x x x
municipalities comprising Metro Manila.
Xxx
The creation of the MMC also carried with it the creation of the Sangguniang Bayan. This was composed
of the members of the component city and municipal councils, barangay captains chosen by the MMC and
sectoral representatives appointed by the President. The Sangguniang Bayan had the power to
recommend to the MMC the adoption of ordinances, resolutions or measures. It was the MMC itself,
however, that possessed legislative powers. All ordinances, resolutions and measures recommended by
the Sangguniang Bayan were subject to the MMC’s approval. Moreover, the power to impose taxes and
other levies, the power to appropriate money, and the power to pass ordinances or resolutions with penal
sanctions were vested exclusively in the MMC.
Thus, Metropolitan Manila had a “central government,” i.e., the MMC which fully possessed legislative and
police powers. Whatever legislative powers the component cities and municipalities had were all subject
to review and approval by the MMC.
After President Corazon Aquino assumed power, there was a clamor to restore the autonomy of the local
government units in Metro Manila. Hence, Sections 1 and 2 of Article X of the 1987 Constitution x x x.
The Constitution, however, recognized the necessity of creating metropolitan regions not only in the
existing National Capital Region but also in potential equivalents in the Visayas and Mindanao . X x x
The Constitution itself expressly provides that Congress may, by law, create “special metropolitan political
subdivisions” which shall be subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected; the jurisdiction of this subdivision shall be limited to basic services
requiring coordination; and the cities and municipalities comprising this subdivision shall retain their basic
autonomy and their own local executive and legislative assemblies (Section 11, Article X, 1987
Constitution). Pending enactment of this law, the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution gave the
President of the Philippines the power to constitute the Metropolitan Authority x x x.
In 1990, President Aquino issued Executive Order No. 392 and constituted the Metropolitan Manila
Authority (MMA). The powers and functions of the MMC were devolved to the MMA. It ought to be
stressed, however, that not all powers and functions of the MMC were passed to the MMA. The MMA’s
power was limited to the “delivery of basic urban services requiring coordination in Metropolitan Manila.”
The MMA’s governing body, the Metropolitan Manila Council, although composed of the mayors of the
component cities and municipalities, was merely given the power of: (1) formulation of policies on the
delivery of basic services requiring coordination and consolidation; and (2) promulgation of resolutions
and other issuances, approval of a code of basic services and the exercise of its rule-making power.”
Under the 1987 Constitution, the local government units became primarily responsible for the governance
of their respective political subdivisions. The MMA’s jurisdiction was limited to addressing common
problems involving basic services that transcended local boundaries. It did not have legislative power.
Its power was merely to provide the local government units technical assistance in the preparation of
local development plans. Any semblance of legislative power it had was confined to a “review [of]
legislation proposed by the local legislative assemblies to ensure consistency among local governments
and with the comprehensive development plan of Metro Manila,” and to “advise the local governments
accordingly.”
When R.A. No. 7924 took effect, Metropolitan Manila became a “special development and administrative
region” and the MMDA a “special development authority” whose functions were “without prejudice to the
autonomy of the affected local government units.” The character of the MMDA was clearly defined in the
legislative debates enacting its charter.
Xxx
Clearly, the MMDA is not a political unit of government. The power delegated to the MMDA is that given
to the Metro Manila Council to promulgate administrative rules and regulations in the implementation of
the MMDA’s functions. There is no grant of authority to enact ordinances and regulations for the general
welfare of the inhabitants of the metropolis. This was explicitly stated in the last Committee deliberations
prior to the bill’s presentation to Congress. X x x
It is thus beyond doubt that the MMDA is not a local government unit or a public corporation endowed
with legislative power. It is not even a “special metropolitan political subdivision” as contemplated in
Section 11, Article X of the Constitution. The creation of a “special metropolitan political subdivision”
requires the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
R.A. No. 7924 was not submitted to the inhabitants of Metro Manila in a plebiscite. The Chairman of the
MMDA is not an official elected by the people, but appointed by the President with the rank and privileges
of a cabinet member. In fact, part of his function is to perform such other duties as may be assigned to
him by the President, whereas in local government units, the President merely exercises supervisory
authority. This emphasizes the administrative character of the MMDA.
Clearly then, the MMC under P.D. No. 824 is not the same entity as the MMDA under R.A. No. 7924.
Unlike the MMC, the MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. It is the
local government units, acting through their respective legislative councils, that possess legislative power
and police power. In the case at bar, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any
ordinance or resolution ordering the opening of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening by
petitioner MMDA is illegal x x x. (MMDA v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc., 328 SCRA 836, March
27, 2000, 1st Div. [Puno])
331.
Discuss the concept of local autonomy.
Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is
decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to
Held:
political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government and in the process to make local
governments more responsive and accountable, and ensure their fullest development as self-reliant
communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social
progress. At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs
and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises general supervision over
them, but only to ensure that local affairs are administered according to law. He has no control over
their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own.
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in favor of local
government units declared autonomous. In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its
own destiny and shape its own future with minimum intervention from central authorities. According to a
constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to “self-immolation,” since in that event, the
autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its constituency.
(Limbona v. Mangelin, 170 SCRA 786, Feb. 28, 1989, En Banc [Sarmiento])
332.
What kind of local autonomy is contemplated by the Constitution? What about the kind of
autonomy contemplated insofar as the autonomous regions are concerned?
Held: 1. The principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means “decentralization.”
It does not make local governments sovereign within the state or an “imperium in imperio.” Remaining
to be an intra sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation, but not intended, however, to be an
imperium in imperio,” the local government unit is autonomous in the sense that it is given more powers,
authority, responsibilities and resources. Power which used to be highly centralized in Manila, is thereby
deconcentrated, enabling especially the peripheral local government units to develop not only at their
own pace and discretion but also with their own resources and assets. (Alvarez v. Guingona, Jr., 252
SCRA 695, Jan. 31, 1996, En Banc [Hermosisima])
2. The constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the Constitution refers to the administrative
autonomy of local government units or, cast in more technical language, the decentralization of
government authority.
On the other hand, the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras, which is
peculiar to the 1987 Constitution, contemplates the grant of political autonomy and not just
administrative autonomy to these regions. Thus, the provision in the Constitution for an autonomous
regional government with a basic structure consisting of an executive department and a legislative
assembly and special courts with personal, family and property law jurisdiction in each of the
autonomous regions. (Cordillera Broad Coalition v. COA, 181 SCRA 495, Jan. 29, 1990, En Banc
[Cortes])
333.
Whether or not the Internal Revenue allotments (IRAs) are to be included in the computation of
the average annual income of a municipality for purposes of its conversion into an independent
component city?
Held: Yes. The IRAs are items of income because they form part of the gross accretion of the funds of
the local government unit. The IRAs regularly and automatically accrue to the local treasury without
need of any further action on the part of the local government unit. They thus constitute income which
the local government can invariably rely upon as the source of much needed funds.
Xxx
[T]o reiterate, IRAs are a regular, recurring item of income; nil is there a basis, too, to classify the same
as a special fund or transfer, since IRAs have a technical definition and meaning all its own as used in the
Local Government Code that unequivocally makes it distinct from special funds or transfers referred to
when the Code speaks of “funding support from the national government, its instrumentalities and
government-owned or controlled corporations.”
Thus, Department of Finance Order No. 35-93 correctly encapsulizes the full import of the above
disquisition when it defined ANNUAL INCOME to be “revenues and receipts realized by provinces, cities
and municipalities from regular sources of the Local General Fund including the internal revenue
allotment and other shares provided for in Sections 284, 290 and 291 of the Code, but exclusive of nonrecurring receipts, such as other national aids, grants, financial assistance, loan proceeds, sales of fixed
assets, and similar others”. Such order, constituting executive or contemporaneous construction of a
statute by an administrative agency charged with the task of interpreting and applying the same, is
entitled to full respect and should be accorded great weight by the courts, unless such construction is
clearly shown to be in sharp conflict with the Constitution, the governing statute, or other laws . (Alvarez
v. Guingona, Jr., 252 SCRA 695, Jan. 31, 1996, En Banc [Hermosisima, Jr., J.])
334.
State the importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial boundaries of a local
government unit.
Held: The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial boundaries of a local unit of
government cannot be overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for they define the limits of the
territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can legitimately exercise powers of government only
within the limits of its territorial jurisdiction. Beyond these limits, its acts are ultra vires. Needless to
state, any uncertainty in the boundaries of local government units will sow costly conflicts in the exercise
of governmental powers which ultimately will prejudice the people’s welfare. This is the evil sought to
be avoided by the Local Government Code in requiring that the land area of a local government unit must
be spelled out in metes and bounds, with technical descriptions. (Mariano, Jr. v. COMELEC, 242 SCRA
211, 217-219, Mar. 7, 1995, En Banc [Puno])
335.
R.A. 7854 was enacted converting the Municipality of Makati into a highly urbanized city. Section
2 thereof did not provide for a cadastral type of description of its boundary but merely provided that the
boundary of the new city of Makati shall be the boundary of the present municipality of Makati.
Petitioners contended in a petition brought the SC that R.A. 7854 was defective because it did not comply
with the requirement in the Local Government Code that “the territorial jurisdiction of newly created or
converted cities should be described by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions.” Note that at the
time the law was enacted, there was a pending boundary dispute between Makati and one of its
neighbors, Taguig, before the regular court. Should the contention be upheld?
Held: Given the facts of the cases at bench, we cannot perceive how this evil (uncertainty in the
boundaries of local government units will sow costly conflicts in the exercise of government powers which
ultimately will prejudice the people’s welfare) can be brought about by the description made in Section 2
of R.A. No. 7854. Petitioners have not demonstrated that the delineation of the land area of the
proposed City of Makati will cause confusion as to its boundaries. We note that said delineation did not
change even by an inch the land area previously covered by Makati as a municipality. Section 2 did not
add, subtract, divide, or multiply the established land area of Makati. In language that cannot be any
clearer, Section 2 stated that the city’s land area “shall comprise the present territory of the municipality.”
The deliberations of Congress will reveal that there is a legitimate reason why the land area of the
proposed City of Makati was not defined by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions. At the time
of the consideration of R.A. No. 7854, the territorial dispute between the municipalities of Makati and
Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was under court litigation. Out of a becoming sense of respect to a co-equal
department of government, the legislators felt that the dispute should be left to the courts to decide.
They did not want to foreclose the dispute by making a legislative finding of fact which could decide the
issue. This would have ensued if they defined the land area of the proposed city by its exact metes and
bounds, with technical descriptions . We take judicial notice of the fact that Congress has also refrained
from using the metes and bounds description of the land area of other local government units with
unsettled boundary disputes.
We hold that the existence of a boundary dispute does not per se present an insurmountable difficulty
which will prevent Congress from defining with reasonable certitude the territorial jurisdiction of a local
government unit. In the cases at bench, Congress maintained the existing boundaries of the proposed
City of Makati but as an act of fairness, made them subject to the ultimate resolution by the courts.
Considering these peculiar circumstances, we are not prepared to hold that Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 is
unconstitutional. We sustain the submission of the Solicitor General in this regard, viz:
“Going now to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code, it is beyond cavil that the requirement
started therein, viz: ‘the territorial jurisdiction of newly created or converted cities should be described by
metes and bounds, with technical descriptions” – was made in order to provide a means by which the
area of said cities may be reasonably ascertained. In other words, the requirement on metes and bounds
was meant merely as a tool in the establishment of local government units. It is not an end in itself.
Ergo, so long as the territorial jurisdiction of a city may be reasonably ascertained, i.e., by referring to
common boundaries with neighboring municipalities, as in this case, then, it may be concluded that the
legislative intent behind the law has been sufficiently served.
Certainly, Congress did not intend that laws creating new cities must contain therein detailed technical
descriptions similar to those appearing in Torrens titles, as petitioners seem to imply. To require such
description in the law as a condition sine qua non for its validity would be to defeat the very purpose
which the Local Government Code seeks to serve. The manifest intent of the Code is to empower local
government units and to give them their rightful due. It seeks to make local governments more
responsive to the needs of their constituents while at the same time serving as a vital cog in national
development. To invalidate R.A. No. 7854 on the mere ground that no cadastral type of description was
used in the law would serve the letter but defeat the spirit of the Code. It then becomes a case of the
master serving the slave, instead of the other way around. This could not be the intendment of the law.”
Xxx
(Mariano, Jr. v. COMELEC, 242 SCRA 211, 217-219, Mar. 7, 1995, En Banc [Puno])
336.
What is the meaning of "devolution"?
Answer: The term "devolution" refers to the act by which the National government confers power and
authority upon the various local government units to perform specific functions and responsibilities.
(Sec. 17[e], 2nd par., Local Government Code)
337.
Have the powers of the Land Transportation Office (LTO) to register, tricycles in particular, as
well as to issue licenses for the driving thereof, been devolved likewise to local government units?
Held: Only the powers of the Land Transportation Franchising Regulatory Board (LTFRB) to regulate the
operation of tricycles-for-hire and to grant franchises for the operation thereof have been devolved to
local governments under the Local Government Code. Clearly unaffected by the Local Government Code
are the powers of the LTO under R.A. No. 4136 requiring the registration of all kinds of motor vehicles
“used or operated on or upon any public highway” in the country. This can be gleaned from the explicit
language of the statute itself, as well as the corresponding guidelines issued by the DOTC. In fact, even
the power of LGUs to regulate the operation of tricycles and to grant franchises for the operation thereof
is still subject to the guidelines prescribed by the DOTC. (LTO v. City of Butuan, G.R. No. 131512,
Jan. 20, 2000, 3rd Div. [Vitug])
338.
Distinguish the power to grant a license or permit to do business and the power to issue a license
to engage in the practice of a particular profession.
Held: Distinction must be made between the grant of a license or permit to do business and the
issuance of a license to engage in the practice of a particular profession. The first is usually granted by
the local authorities and the second is issued by the Board or Commission tasked to regulate the
particular profession. A business permit authorizes the person, natural or otherwise, to engage in
business or some form of commercial activity. A professional license, on the other hand, is the grant of
authority to a natural person to engage in the practice or exercise of his or her profession.
In the case at bar, what is sought by petitioner (Acebedo Optical Company, Inc.) from respondent City
Mayor is a permit to engage in the business of running an optical shop. It does not purport to seek a
license to engage in the practice of optometry as a corporate body or entity, although it does have in its
employ, persons who are duly licensed to practice optometry by the Board of Examiners in Optometry.
Xxx
In the present case, the objective of the imposition of subject conditions on petitioner’s business permit
could be attained by requiring the optometrists in petitioner’s employ to produce a valid certificate of
registration as optometrists, from the Board of Examiners in Optometry. A business permit is issued
primarily to regulate the conduct of business and the City Mayor cannot, through the issuance of such
permit, regulate the practice of a profession, like that of optometry. Such a function is within the
exclusive domain of the administrative agency specifically empowered by law to supervise the profession,
in this case the Professional Regulations Commission and the Board of Examiners in Optometry.
(Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. v. CA, 329 SCRA 314, March 31, 2000, En Banc [Purisima])
339.
May a local government unit validly authorize an expropriation of private property through a
mere resolution of its lawmaking body?
Held: The Local Government Code expressly and clearly requires an ordinance or a local law for that
purpose. A resolution that merely expresses the sentiment or opinion of the Municipal Council will not
suffice. The case of Province of Camarines Sur v. Court of Appeals which held that a mere resolution
may suffice to support the exercise of eminent domain by a local government unit is not in point because
the applicable law at that time was B.P. 337, the previous Local Government Code, which had provided
that a mere resolution would enable an LGU to exercise eminent domain. In contrast, R.A. 7160, the
present Local Government Code, explicitly required an ordinance for this purpose. (Municipality of
Paranaque v. V.M. Realty Corp., 292 SCRA 678, July 20, 1998 [Panganiban])
340.
What are the requisites before a Local Government Unit can validly exercise the power of
eminent domain?
Held:
1)
An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive,
in behalf of the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over
a particular private property;
2)
The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the
benefit of the poor and the landless;
3)
There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the
Constitution, and other pertinent laws;
4)
A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to
be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.
(Municipality of Paranaque v. V.M. Realty Corp., 292 SCRA 678, July 20, 1998 [Panganiban])
341.
May the Sangguniang Panlalawigan validly disapprove a resolution or ordinance of a municipality
calling for the expropriation of private property to be made site of a Farmers Center and Other
Government Sports Facilities on the ground that said “expropriation is unnecessary considering that there
are still available lots of the municipality for the establishment of a government center”?
Held: Under the Local Government Code, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is granted the power to declare
a municipal resolution invalid on the sole ground that it is beyond the power of the Sangguniang Bayan
or Mayor to issue. As held in Velazco v. Blas (G.R. No. L-30456, July 30, 1982, 115 SCRA 540, 544-545),
“The only ground upon which a provincial board may declare any municipal resolution, ordinance or order
invalid is when such resolution, ordinance, or order is ‘beyond the powers conferred upon the council or
president making the same.’ A strictly legal question is before the provincial board in its consideration of
a municipal resolution, ordinance, or order. The provincial board’s disapproval of any resolution,
ordinance, or order must be premised specifically upon the fact that such resolution, ordinance, or order
is outside the scope of the legal powers conferred by law. If a provincial board passes these limits, it
usurps the legislative functions of the municipal council or president. Such has been the consistent
course of executive authority.” (Moday v. CA, 268 SCRA 586, Feb. 20, 1997)
342.
Under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution, "[T]he term of office of elective local officials x x x
shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms." How is this
term limit for elective local officials to be interpreted?
Held: The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as
the right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has
served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same
position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply. (Borja, Jr. v. COMELEC
and Capco, Jr., G.R. No. 133495, Sept. 3, 1998, 295 SCRA 157, En Banc [Mendoza])
Case No. 1. Suppose A is a vice-mayor who becomes mayor by reason of the death of the incumbent.
Six months before the next election, he resigns and is twice elected thereafter. Can he run again for
mayor in the next election?
Answer: Yes, because although he has already first served as mayor by succession and subsequently
resigned from office before the full term expired, he has not actually served three full terms in all for the
purpose of applying the term limit. Under Art. X, Sec. 8, voluntary renunciation of the office is not
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term only if the term is one “for
which he was elected.” Since A is only completing the service of the term for which the deceased and
not he was elected, A cannot be considered to have completed one term. His resignation constitutes an
interruption of the full term.
Case No. 2. Suppose B is elected Mayor and, during his first term, he is twice suspended for misconduct
for a total of 1 year. If he is twice reelected after that, can he run for one more term in the next
election?
Answer: Yes, because he has served only two full terms successively.
In both cases, the mayor is entitled to run for reelection because the two conditions for the application of
the disqualification provisions have not concurred, namely, that the local official concerned has been
elected three consecutive times and that he has fully served three consecutive terms. In the first case,
even if the local official is considered to have served three full terms notwithstanding his resignation
before the end of the first term, the fact remains that he has not been elected three times. In the
second case, the local official has been elected three consecutive times, but he has not fully served three
consecutive terms.
Case No. 3. The case of vice-mayor C who becomes mayor by succession involves a total failure of the
two conditions to concur for the purpose of applying Art. X, Sec. 8. Suppose he is twice elected after
that term, is he qualified to run again in the next election?
Answer: Yes, because he was not elected to the office of mayor in the first term but simply found
himself thrust into it by operation of law. Neither had he served the full term because he only continued
the service, interrupted by the death, of the deceased mayor. (Borja, Jr. v. COMELEC and Capco, Jr.,
G.R. No. 133495, Sept. 3, 1998, 295 SCRA 157, En Banc [Mendoza])
343.
What are the policies embodied in the constitutional provision barring elective local officials, with
the exception of barangay officials, from serving more than three consecutive terms?
Held: To prevent the establishment of political dynasties is not the only policy embodied in the
constitutional provision in question (barring elective local officials, with the exception of barangay
officials, from serving more than three consecutive terms). The other policy is that of enhancing the
freedom of choice of the people. To consider, therefore, only stay in office regardless of how the official
concerned came to that office – whether by election or by succession by operation of law – would be to
disregard one of the purposes of the constitutional provision in question. (Borja, Jr. v. COMELEC and
Capco, Jr., G.R. No. 133495, Sept. 3, 1998, 295 SCRA 157, En Banc [Mendoza])
344.
Lonzanida was previously elected and served two consecutive terms as mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales prior to the May 1995 mayoral elections. In the May 1995 elections he again ran for mayor of
San Antonio, Zambales and was proclaimed winner. He assumed office and discharged the rights and
duties of mayor until March 1998 when he was ordered to vacate the post by reason of the COMELEC
decision on the election protest against him which declared his opponent Juan Alvez the duly elected
mayor. Alvez served the remaining portion of the 1995-1998 mayoral term. Is Lonzanida still qualified to
run for mayor of San Antonio, Zambales in the May 1998 local elections?
Held: The two requisites for the application of the three term rule was absent. First, Lonzanida cannot
be considered as having been duly elected to the post in the May 1995 elections, and second, he did not
fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term by reason of involuntary relinquishment of office. After a reappreciation and revision of the contested ballots the COMELEC itself declared by final judgment that
Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral elections and his previous proclamation as winner was declared
null and void. His assumption of office as mayor cannot be deemed to have been by reason of a valid
election but by reason of a void proclamation. It has been repeatedly held by the SC that a proclamation
subsequently declared void is no proclamation at all and while a proclaimed candidate may assume office
on the strength of the proclamation of the Board of Canvassers he is only a presumptive winner who
assumes office subject to the final outcome of the election protest. Lonzanida did not serve a term as
mayor of San Antonio, Zambales from May 1995 to March 1998 because he was not duly elected to the
post; he merely assumed office as presumptive winner, which presumption was later overturned by the
COMELEC when it decided with finality that Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral elections.
Second, Lonzanida cannot be deemed to have served the May 1995 to 1998 term because he was
ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of the term. His opponents' contention that Lonzanida
should be deemed to have served one full term from May 1995-1998 because he served the greater
portion of that term has no legal basis to support it; it disregards the second requisite for the application
of the disqualification, i.e., that he has fully served three consecutive terms. The second sentence of the
constitutional provision under scrutiny states, "Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall
not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which he was
elected." The clear intent of the framers of the Constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the threeterm limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time respect the people's choice and
grant their elected official full service of a term is evident in this provision. Voluntary renunciation of a
term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term limit; conversely,
involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to
an interruption of continuity of service. Lonzanida vacated his post a few months before the next
mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal process of writ of
execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary severance from office is an
interruption of continuity of service and thus, Lonzanida did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term.
In sum, Lonzanida was not the duly elected mayor and that he did not hold office for the full term;
hence, his assumption of office from May 1995 to March 1998 cannot be counted as a term for purposes
of computing the three term limit. (Lonzanida v. COMELEC, 311 SCRA 602, July 28, 1999, En
Banc [Gonzaga-Reyes])
345.
May the President validly withhold a portion of the internal revenue allotments of Local
Government Units legally due them by administrative fiat?
Held: The Constitution vests the President with the power of supervision, not control, over local
government units (LGUs). Such power enables him to see to it that LGUs and their officials execute their
tasks in accordance with law. While he may issue advisories and seek their cooperation in solving
economic difficulties, he cannot prevent them from performing their tasks and using available resources
to achieve their goals. He may not withhold or alter any authority or power given them by the law.
Thus, the withholding of a portion of internal revenue allotments legally due them cannot be directed by
administrative fiat.
Xxx
Section 4 of AO 372 cannot x x x be upheld. A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the automatic
release of the shares of LGUs in the National internal revenue. This is mandated by no less than the
Constitution. The Local Government Code (Sec. 286[a]) specifies further that the release shall be made
directly to the LGU concerned within five (5) days after every quarter of the year and “shall not be
subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by the national government for whatever purpose.”
As a rule, the term “shall” is a word of command that must be given a compulsory meaning.” The
provision is, therefore, imperative.
Section 4 of AO 372, however, orders the withholding, effective January 1, 1998, of 10 percent of the
LGUs’ IRA “pending the assessment and evaluation by the Development Budget Coordinating Committee
of the emerging fiscal situation” in the country. Such withholding clearly contravenes the Constitution
and the law. Although, temporary, it is equivalent to a holdback, which means “something held back or
withheld. Often temporarily.” Hence, the “temporary” nature of the retention by the national government
does not matter. Any retention is prohibited.
In sum, while Section 1 of AO 372 may be upheld as an advisory effected in times of national crisis,
Section 4 thereof has no color of validity at all. The latter provision effectively encroaches on the fiscal
autonomy of local governments. Concededly, the President was well-intentioned in issuing his Order to
withhold the LGUs’ IRA, but the rule of law requires that even the best intentions must be carried out
within the parameters of the Constitution and the law. Verily, laudable purposes must be carried out by
legal methods. (Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre, G.R. No. 132988, 336 SCRA 201, July 19, 2000, En
Banc [Panganiban])
346.
What is meant by fiscal autonomy of Local Governments? Does it rule out in any manner
national government intervention by way of supervision in order to ensure that local programs are
consistent with national goals?
Held: Under existing law, local government units, in addition to having administrative autonomy in the
exercise of their functions, enjoy fiscal autonomy as well. Fiscal autonomy means that local governments
have the power to create their own sources of revenue in addition to their equitable share in the national
taxes released by the national government, as well as the power to allocate their resources in accordance
with their own priorities. It extends to the preparation of their budgets, and local officials in turn have to
work within the constraints thereof. They are not formulated at the national level and imposed on local
governments, whether they are relevant to local needs and resources or not. Hence, the necessity of a
balancing of viewpoints and the harmonization of proposals from both local and national officials , who in
any case are partners in the attainment of national goals.
Local fiscal autonomy does not, however, rule out any manner of national government intervention by
way of supervision, in order to ensure that local programs, fiscal and otherwise, are consistent with
national goals. Significantly, the President, by constitutional fiat, is the head of the economic and
planning agency of the government (Section 9, Article XII of the Constitution), primarily responsible for
formulating and implementing continuing, coordinated and integrated social and economic policies, plans
and programs (Section 3, Chapter 1, Subtitle C, Title II, Book V, EO 292 [Administrative Code of 1987])
for the entire country. However, under the Constitution, the formulation and the implementation of such
policies and programs are subject to “consultations with the appropriate public agencies, various private
sectors, and local government units.”
The President cannot do so unilaterally. (Pimentel, Jr. v.
Aguirre, 336 SCRA 201, July 19, 2000, En Banc [Panganiban])
347.
What are the requisites before the President may interfere in local fiscal matters?
Held: x x x [T]he Local Government Code provides (Sec. 284. See also Art. 379 of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991) :
“x x x [I]n the event the national government incurs an unmanaged public sector deficit, the President of
the Philippines is hereby authorized, upon the recommendation of [the] Secretary of Finance, Secretary
of the Interior and Local Government and Secretary of Budget and Management, and subject to
consultation with the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress and the presidents of the liga, to
make the necessary adjustments in the internal revenue allotment of local government units but in no
case shall the allotment be less than thirty percent (30%) of the collection of national internal revenue
taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the current fiscal year x x x”
There are therefore several requisites before the President may interfere in local fiscal matters: (1) an
unmanaged public sector deficit of the national government; (2) consultations with the presiding officers
of the Senate and the House of Representatives and the presidents of the various local leagues; and (3)
the corresponding recommendation of the secretaries of the Department of Finance, Interior and Local
Government, and Budget and Management. Furthermore, any adjustment in the allotment shall in no
case be less than thirty percent (30%) of the collection of national internal revenue taxes of the third
fiscal year preceding the current one. (Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre, 336 SCRA 201, July 19, 2000, En
Banc [Panganiban])
348.
Distinguish an ordinance from a mere resolution.
Held: A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is
merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. An ordinance
possesses a general and permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in nature. Additionally, the
two are enacted differently – a third reading is necessary for an ordinance, but not for a resolution,
unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the Sanggunian members . (Municipality of Paranaque v.
V.M. Realty Corporation, 292 SCRA 678, July 20, 1998 [Panganiban])
349.
On its first regular session, may the Sanggunian transact business other than the matter of
adopting or updating its existing rules or procedure?
Held: We cannot infer the mandate of the (Local Government) Code that no other business may be
transacted on the first regular session except to take up the matter of adopting or updating rules. All
that the law requires is that “on the first regular session x x x the sanggunian concerned shall adopt or
update its existing rules or procedures.” There is nothing in the language thereof that restricts the
matters to be taken up during the first regular session merely to the adoption or updating of the house
rules. If it were the intent of Congress to limit the business of the local council to such matters, then it
would have done so in clear and unequivocal terms. But as it is, there is no such intent.
Moreover, adopting or updating of house rules would necessarily entail work beyond the day of the first
regular session. Does this mean that prior thereto, the local council's hands were tied and could not act
on any other matter? That would certainly be absurd for it would result in a hiatus and a paralysis in the
local legislature's work which could not have been intended by the law. (Malonzo v. Zamora, 311
SCRA 224, July 27, 1999, En Banc [Romero])
350.
May an incumbent Vice-Governor, while concurrently the Acting Governor, continue to preside
over the sessions of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP)? If no, who may preside in the meantime?
Held: Being the acting governor, the Vice-governor cannot continue to simultaneously exercise the
duties of the latter office, since the nature of the duties of the Provincial Governor calls for a full-time
occupant to discharge them. Such is not only consistent with but also appears to be the clear rationale of
the new (Local Government) Code wherein the policy of performing dual functions in both offices has
already been abandoned. To repeat, the creation of a temporary vacancy in the office of the Governor
creates a corresponding vacancy in the office of the Vice-Governor whenever the latter acts as Governor
by virtue of such temporary vacancy. This event constitutes an “inability” on the part of the regular
presiding officer (Vice-Governor) to preside during the SP sessions, which thus calls for the operation of
the remedy set in Article 49(b) of the Local Government Code – concerning the election of a temporary
presiding officer. The continuity of the Acting Governor’s (Vice-Governor) powers as presiding officer of
the SP is suspended so long as he is in such capacity. Under Section 49(b), “in the event of the inability
of the regular presiding officer to preside at the sanggunian session, the members present and
constituting a quorum shall elect from among themselves a temporary presiding officer.” (Gamboa, Jr.
v. Aguirre, Jr., G.R. No. 134213, July 20, 1999, En Banc [Ynares-Santiago])
351.
What is recall?
Held: Recall is a mode of removal of a public officer by the people before the end of his term of office.
The people's prerogative to remove a public officer is an incident of their sovereign power and in the
absence of constitutional restraint, the power is implied in all governmental operations. Such power has
been held to be indispensable for the proper administration of public affairs. Not undeservedly, it is
frequently described as a fundamental right of the people in a representative democracy . (Garcia v.
COMELEC, 227 SCRA 108, Oct. 5, 1993, En Banc [Puno])
352.
What is the ground for recall? Is this subject to judicial inquiry?
Held: Former Senator Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., a major author of the subject law in his book The Local
Government Code of 1991: The Key to National Development , stressed the same reason why the
substantive content of a vote of lack of confidence is beyond any inquiry, thus:
“There is only one ground for recall of local government officials: loss of confidence. This means that the
people may petition or the Preparatory Recall Assembly may resolve to recall any local elective official
without specifying any particular ground except loss of confidence. There is no need for them to bring
up any charge of abuse or corruption against the local elective officials who are subject of any recall
petition.
In the case of Evardone v. Commission on Elections, et al., 204 SCRA 464, 472 (1991) , the Court ruled
that ‘loss of confidence’ as a ground for recall is a political question. In the words of the Court, 'whether
or not the electorate of the municipality of Sulat has lost confidence in the incumbent mayor is a political
question.’”
(Garcia v. COMELEC, 227 SCRA 108, Oct. 5, 1993, En Banc [Puno])
353.
The members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly (PRA) of the province of Bataan adopted a
resolution calling for the recall of Governor Garcia. It was admitted, however, by the proponents of the
recall resolution that only those members of the assembly inclined to agree were notified of the meeting
where said resolution was adopted “as a matter of strategy and security.” They justified these selective
notices on the ground that the law (Local Government Code) does not specifically mandate the giving of
notice. Should this submission be sustained?
Held: We reject this submission of the respondents. The due process clause of the Constitution
requiring notice as an element of fairness is inviolable and should always be considered part and parcel of
every law in case of its silence. The need for notice to all the members of the assembly is also
imperative for these members represent the different sectors of the electorate of Bataan. To the extent
that they are not notified of the meeting of the assembly, to that extent is the sovereign voice of the
people they represent nullified. The resolution to recall should articulate the majority will of the members
of the assembly but the majority will can be genuinely determined only after all the members of the
assembly have been given a fair opportunity to express the will of their constituents. Needless to stress,
the requirement of notice is mandatory for it is indispensable in determining the collective wisdom of the
members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly. Its non-observance is fatal to the validity of the resolution
to recall petitioner Garcia as Governor of the province of Bataan. (Garcia v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
111511, Sept. 21, 1993; 227 SCRA 100, Oct. 5, 1993, En Banc [Puno]
354.
The members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly (PRA) of Puerto Princesa City met and adopted
a resolution calling for the recall of incumbent Mayor Dennis Victorino M. Socrates on the ground of loss
of confidence on July 2, 2002. Mayor Socrates argued that they have no authority to adopt said Recall
Resolution because a majority of PRA members were seeking a new electoral mandate in the barangay
elections scheduled on July 15, 2002. Should his contention be sustained?
Held: This argument deserves scant consideration considering that when the PRA members adopted
the Recall Resolution their terms of office had not yet expired. They were all de jure sangguniang
barangay members with no legal disqualification to participate in the recall assembly under Section 70 of
the Local Government Code. (Victorino Dennis M. Socrates v. The Commission on Elections, G.R.
No. 154512, Nov. 12, 2002, En Banc [Carpio])
355.
Whether or not an elective official who became City Mayor by legal succession can be the subject
of a recall election by virtue of a Preparatory Recall Assembly Resolution which was passed or adopted
when the said elective official was still the Vice-Mayor.
Held: The specific purpose of the Preparatory Recall Assembly was to remove Amelita S.
Navarro as the elected Vice-Mayor of Santiago City since PRA Resolution No. 1 dated July 12, 1999
expressly states that “ x x x it is hereby resolved to invoke the rescission of the electoral mandate of the
incumbent City Vice-Mayor Amelita S. Navarro for loss of confidence through a recall election to be set by
the Commission on Election as provided for under Section 71 of the Local Government Code of 1991.”
However, the said PRA Resolution No. 1 is no longer applicable to her inasmuch as she had already
vacated the office of Vice-Mayor on October 11, 1999 when she assumed the position of City Mayor of
Santiago City.
Even if the Preparatory Recall Assembly were to reconvene to adopt another resolution for the
recall of Amelita Navarro, this time as Mayor of Santiago City, the same would still not prosper in view of
Section 74 (b) of the Local Government Code of 1991 which provides that “No recall shall take place
within one (1) year from the date of the official’s assumption of office or one (1) year immediately
preceding a regular election.” There is no more allowable time in the light of that law within which to
hold recall elections for that purpose. The then Vice-Mayor Amelita S. Navarro assumed office as Mayor
of Santiago City on October 11, 1999. One year after her assumption of office as Mayor will be October
11, 2000 which is already within the one (1) year prohibited period immediately preceding the next
regular election in May 2001. (Afiado v. Commission on Elections, 340 SCRA 600, Sept. 18,
2000, En Banc [De Leon]
356.
Mayor Edward S. Hagedorn of Puerto Princesa City was elected for three consecutive times in the
1992, 1995 and 1998 elections and served in full his three consecutive terms as Mayor. In the 2001
elections, he ran for Governor of the Province of Palawan and lost. Socrates ran and won as Mayor of
Puerto Princesa in that election. On July 2, 2002, the Preparatory Recall Assembly (PRA) of Puerto
Princesa City adopted a Resolution calling for the recall of incumbent Mayor Socrates. The COMELEC
scheduled a Special Recall Election for Mayor of that City on September 24, 2002. Is Mayor Hagedorn
qualified to run again for Mayor in that Special Recall Election considering the circumstances?
Held: The three-term limit rule for elective local officials is found in Section 8,
Article X of the Constitution x x x.
This three-term limit rule is reiterated in Section 43 (b) of RA No. 7160, otherwise known as the
Local Government Code x x x.
These constitutional and statutory provisions have two parts. The first part provides that an
elective local official cannot serve for more than three consecutive terms. The clear intent is that only
consecutive terms count in determining the three-term limit rule. The second part states that voluntary
renunciation of office for any length of time does not interrupt the continuity of service. The clear intent
is that involuntary severance from office for any length of time interrupts continuity of service and
prevents the service before and after the interruption from being joined together to form a continuous
service or consecutive terms.
After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection for a
fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same office following the
end of the third consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by
the prohibition for two reasons. First, a subsequent election like a recall election is no longer an
immediate reelection after three consecutive terms. Second, the intervening period constitutes an
involuntary interruption in the continuity of service.
Xxx
Clearly, what the Constitution prohibits is an immediate reelection for a fourth term following
three consecutive terms. The Constitution, however, does not prohibit a subsequent reelection for a
fourth term as long as the reelection is not immediately after the end of the third consecutive term. A
recall election mid-way in the term following the third consecutive term is a subsequent election but not
an immediate reelection after the third term.
Neither does the Constitution prohibit one barred from seeking immediate reelection to run in
any other subsequent election involving the same term of office. What the Constitution prohibits is a
consecutive fourth term. The debates in the Constitutional Commission evidently show that the
prohibited election referred to by the framers of the Constitution is the immediate reelection after the
third term, not any other subsequent election.
Xxx
In the case of Hagedorn, his candidacy in the recall election on September 24, 2002 is not an
immediate reelection after his third consecutive term which ended on June 30, 2001. The immediate
reelection that the Constitution barred Hagedorn from seeking referred to the regular elections in 2001.
Hagedorn did not seek reelection in the 2001 elections.
Xxx
From June 30, 2001 until the recall election on September 24, 2002, the mayor of Puerto
Princesa was Socrates. This period is clearly an interruption in the continuity of Hagedorn’s service as
mayor, not because of his voluntary renunciation, but because of a legal prohibition. Hagedorn’s three
consecutive terms ended on June 30, 2001. Hagedorn’s new recall term from September 24, 2002 to
June 30, 2004 is not a seamless continuation of his previous three consecutive terms as mayor. One
cannot stitch together Hagedorn’s previous three-terms with his new recall term to make the recall term
a fourth consecutive term because factually it is not. An involuntary interruption occurred from June 30,
2001 to September 24, 2002 which broke the continuity or consecutive character of Hagedorn’s service
as mayor.
X x x In Hagedorn’s case, the nearly 15-month period he was out of office, although short of a full term
of three years, constituted an interruption in the continuity of his service as mayor. The Constitution
does not require the interruption or hiatus to be a full term of three years. The clear intent is that
interruption “for any length of time,” as long as the cause is involuntary, is sufficient to break an elective
local official’s continuity of service. (Victorino Dennis M. Socrates v. The Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 154512, Nov. 12, 2002, En Banc [Carpio])
357.
What acts of a Division of the COMELEC may be subject of a motion for reconsideration of the
COMELEC en banc?
Held: Section 5, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, provides:
“SEC. 5. How Motion for Reconsideration Disposed of. - Upon the filing of a motion to reconsider a
decision, resolution, order or ruling of a Division, the Clerk of Court concerned shall, within twenty-four
(24) hours from the filing thereof, notify the presiding Commissioner. The latter shall within two (2) days
thereafter certify the case to the Commission en banc.”
Under the above-quoted rule, the acts of a Division that are subject of a motion for
reconsideration must have a character of finality before the same can be elevated to the COMELEC en
banc. The elementary rule is that an order is final in nature if it completely disposes of the entire case.
But if there is something more to be done in the case after its issuance, that order is interlocutory.
As correctly pointed out by public respondent in its assailed order of November 29, 1999, the
October 11, 1999 did not dispose of the case completely as there is something more to be done which is
to decide the election protest. As such, it is the herein public respondent (Second Division of the
COMELEC) which issued the interlocutory order of October 11, 1999 that should resolve petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration, not the COMELEC en banc (Bulaong v. COMELEC, First Division, 220 SCRA
745, 749 [1993]). Accordingly, the applicable rule on the subject is Section 5(c), Rule 3 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure, which states:
“Rule 3, Section 5(c). Any motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a Division shall
be resolved by the Commission en banc except motions on interlocutory orders of the division, which
shall be resolved by the divisions which issued the order.”
That only final orders of a Division may be raised before the COMELEC en banc is in accordance
with Article IX-C, Section 3 of the Constitution which mandates that only motions for reconsideration of
final decisions shall be decided by the Commission on Elections en banc, thus:
“Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of
procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such
election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be
decided by the Commission en banc.”
It bears stressing that under this constitutional provision, the COMELEC en banc shall decide
motions for reconsideration only of “decisions” of a Division, meaning those acts of final character.
Clearly, the assailed order denying petitioner's demurrer to evidence, being interlocutory, may not, be
resolved by the COMELEC en banc (Ambil, Jr. v. Commission on elections, G.R. No. 143398, Oct. 25,
2000, 344 SCRA 358). (Gementiza v. Commission on Elections, 353 SCRA 724, March 6, 2001,
En Banc [Sandoval-Gutierrez])
358.
Will it be proper for the Commission on Elections to act on a petition for recall signed by just one
person?
Held: A petition for recall signed by just one person is in violation of the statutory 25% minimum
requirement as to the number of signatures supporting any petition for recall. Sec. 69(d) of the Local
Government Code of 1991 expressly provides that 'recall of any elective x x x municipal x x x official may
also be validly initiated upon petition of at least twenty-five percent (25%) of the total number of
registered voters in the local government unit concerned during the election in which the local official
sought to be recalled was elected.' The law is plain and unequivocal as to what constitutes recall
proceedings: only a petition of at least 25% of the total number of registered voters may validly initiate
recall proceedings. (Angobung v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 126576, March 5, 1997)
359.
Section 74 of the Local Government Code provides that “no recall shall take place within one year
x x x immediately preceding a regular local election.” What does the term “regular local election,” as
used in this section, mean?
Held: The term “regular local election” under Sec. 74 of the Local Government Code of 1991 which
provides that “no recall shall take place within one (1) year x x x immediately preceding a regular local
election” refers to one where the position of the official sought to be recalled is to be actually contested
and filled by the electorate (Paras v. Comelec, G.R. No. 123169, Nov. 4, 1996). The one-year time bar
will not apply where the local official sought to be recalled is a Mayor and the approaching election is a
barangay election. (Angobung v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 126576, March 5, 1997)
360.
Does the word “Recall” in paragraph (b) of Section 74 of the Local Government Code include the
convening of the Preparatory Recall Assembly and the filing by it of a recall resolution? Discuss.
Held: Petitioner contends that the term “recall” in Sec. 74 (b) refers to a process, in contrast to the term
“recall election” found in Sec. 74 (a), which obviously refers to an election. He claims that “when several
barangay chairmen met and convened on May 19, 1999 and unanimously resolved to initiate the recall,
followed by the taking of votes by the PRA on May 29, 1999 for the purpose of adopting a resolution ‘to
initiate the recall of Jovito Claudio as Mayor of Pasay City for loss of confidence,’ the process of recall
began” and, since May 29, 1999 was less than a year after he had assumed office, the PRA was illegally
convened and all proceedings held thereafter, including the filing of the recall petition on July 2, 1999,
were null and void.
The COMELEC, on the other hand, maintains that the process of recall starts with the filing of the petition
for recall and ends with the conduct of the recall election, and that, since the petition for recall in this
case was filed on July 2, 1999, exactly one year and a day after petitioner’s assumption of office, the
recall was validly initiated outside the one-year prohibited period.
Both petitioner Claudio and the COMELEC thus agree that the term “recall” as used in Sec. 74 refers to a
process. They disagree only as to when the process starts for purpose of the one-year limitation in
paragraph (b) of Sec. 74.
We can agree that recall is a process which begins with the convening of the preparatory recall assembly
or the gathering of the signatures at least 25% of the registered voters of a local government unit, and
then proceeds to the filing of a recall resolution or petition with the COMELEC, the verification of such
resolution or petition, the fixing of the date of the recall election, and the holding of the election on the
scheduled date. However, as used in paragraph (b) of Sec. 74, “recall” refers to the election itself by
means of which voters decide whether they should retain their local official or elect his replacement.
Xxx
To sum up, the term “recall” in paragraph (b) refers to the recall election and not to the preliminary
proceedings to initiate recall –
1)
Because Sec. 74 speaks of limitations on “recall” which, according to Sec. 69, is a power
which shall be exercised by the registered voters of a local government unit. Since the voters do not
exercise such right except in an election, it is clear that the initiation of recall proceedings is not
prohibited within the one-year period provided in paragraph (b);
2)
Because the purpose of the first limitation in paragraph (b) is to provide voters a sufficient
basis for judging an elective local official, and final judging is not done until the day of the election; and
3)
Because to construe the limitation in paragraph (b) as including the initiation of recall
proceedings would unduly curtail freedom of speech and of assembly guaranteed in the Constitution.
(Jovito O. Claudio v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 140560, May 4, 2000, En Banc [Mendoza])
361.
Who has the legal authority to represent a municipality in lawsuits?
Held: Only the provincial fiscal, provincial attorney, and municipal attorney should represent a
municipality in its lawsuits. Only in exceptional instances may a private attorney be hired by a
municipality to represent it in lawsuits. (Ramos v. CA, 269 SCRA 34, March 3, 1997)
362.
What are the exceptional instances when a private attorney may be validly hired by a
municipality in its lawsuits?
Held: In Alinsug v. RTC Br. 58, San Carlos City, Negros Occidental (225 SCRA 553, Aug. 23, 1993), it
was held that “the law allows a private counsel to be hired by a municipality only when the municipality is
an adverse party in a case involving the provincial government or another municipality or city within the
province. This provision has its apparent origin in De Guia v. The Auditor General (44 SCRA 169, March
29, 1979) where the Court held that the municipality’s authority to employ a private attorney is expressly
limited only to situations where the provincial fiscal would be disqualified to serve and represent it.”
(Ramos v. CA, 269 SCRA 34, March 3, 1997)
363.
Cite instances when the provincial fiscal may be disqualified to represent in court a particular
municipality.
Held: As held in Enriquez, Sr. v. Gimenez (107 Phil. 932 [1960]), the provincial fiscal may be disqualified
to represent in court a particular municipality in the following instances:
1)
If and when original jurisdiction of case involving the municipality is vested in the Supreme
Court;
2)
When the municipality is a party adverse to the provincial government or to some other
municipality in the same province; and
3)
When, in a case involving the municipality, he, or his wife, or child, is pecuniarily involved, as
heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise.
(Ramos v. CA, 269 SCRA 34, March 3, 1997)
364.
May a municipality be represented by a private law firm which had volunteered its services gratis,
in collaboration with the municipal attorney and the fiscal?
Held: No. Such representation will be violative of Section 1983 of the old Administrative Code. This
strict coherence to the letter of the law appears to have been dictated by the fact that “the municipality
should not be burdened with expenses of hiring a private lawyer” and that “the interests of the
municipality would be best protected if a government lawyer handles its litigations.”
Private lawyers may not represent municipalities on their own. Neither may they do so even in
collaboration with authorized government lawyers. This is anchored on the principle that only
accountable public officers may act for and in behalf of public entities and that public funds should not be
expended to hire private lawyers. (Ramos v. CA, 269 SCRA 34, March 3, 1997)
365.
May a municipality adopt the work already performed in good faith by a private lawyer, which
work proved beneficial to it?
Held: Although a municipality may not hire a private lawyer to represent it in litigations, in the interest
of substantial justice, however, it was held that a municipality may adopt the work already performed in
good faith by such private lawyer, which work is beneficial to it (1) provided that no injustice is thereby
heaped on the adverse party and (2) provided further that no compensation in any guise is paid therefor
by said municipality to the private lawyer. Unless so expressly adopted, the private lawyer’s work cannot
bind the municipality. (Ramos v. CA, 269 SCRA 34, March 3, 1997)
366.
May the Punong Barangay validly appoint or remove the barangay treasurer, the barangay
secretary, and other appointive barangay officials without the concurrence of the majority of all the
members of the Sangguniang Barangay?
Held: The Local Government Code explicitly vests on the punong barangay, upon approval by a majority
of all the members of the sangguniang barangay, the power to appoint or replace the barangay
treasurer, the barangay secretary, and other appointive barangay officials. Verily, the power of
appointment is to be exercised conjointly by the punong barangay and a majority of all the members of
the sangguniang barangay. Without such conjoint action, neither an appointment nor a replacement can
be effectual.
Applying the rule that the power to appoint includes the power to remove, the questioned dismissal from
office of the barangay officials by the punong barangay without the concurrence of the majority of all the
members of the Sangguniang Barangay cannot be legally justified. To rule otherwise could also create
an absurd situation of the Sangguniang Barangay members refusing to give their approval to the
replacements selected by the punong barangay who has unilaterally terminated the services of the
incumbents. It is likely that the legislature did not intend this absurdity to follow from its enactment of
the law. (Ramon Alquizola, Sr. v. Gallardo Ocol, G.R. No. 132413, Aug. 27, 1999, 3 rd Div.
[Vitug])
367.
What acts of a Division of the COMELEC may be subject of a motion for reconsideration of the
COMELEC en banc?
Held: Section 5, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, provides:
“SEC. 5. How Motion for Reconsideration Disposed of. - Upon the filing of a motion to reconsider a
decision, resolution, order or ruling of a Division, the Clerk of Court concerned shall, within twenty-four
(24) hours from the filing thereof, notify the presiding Commissioner. The latter shall within two (2) days
thereafter certify the case to the Commission en banc.”
Under the above-quoted rule, the acts of a Division that are subject of a motion for
reconsideration must have a character of finality before the same can be elevated to the COMELEC en
banc. The elementary rule is that an order is final in nature if it completely disposes of the entire case.
But if there is something more to be done in the case after its issuance, that order is interlocutory.
As correctly pointed out by public respondent in its assailed order of November 29, 1999, the
October 11, 1999 did not dispose of the case completely as there is something more to be done which is
to decide the election protest. As such, it is the herein public respondent (Second Division of the
COMELEC) which issued the interlocutory order of October 11, 1999 that should resolve petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration, not the COMELEC en banc (Bulaong v. COMELEC, First Division, 220 SCRA
745, 749 [1993]). Accordingly, the applicable rule on the subject is Section 5(c), Rule 3 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure, which states:
“Rule 3, Section 5(c). Any motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a Division shall
be resolved by the Commission en banc except motions on interlocutory orders of the division, which
shall be resolved by the divisions which issued the order.”
That only final orders of a Division may be raised before the COMELEC en banc is in accordance
with Article IX-C, Section 3 of the Constitution which mandates that only motions for reconsideration of
final decisions shall be decided by the Commission on Elections en banc, thus:
“Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of
procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such
election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be
decided by the Commission en banc.”
It bears stressing that under this constitutional provision, the COMELEC en banc shall decide
motions for reconsideration only of “decisions” of a Division, meaning those acts of final character.
Clearly, the assailed order denying petitioner's demurrer to evidence, being interlocutory, may not, be
resolved by the COMELEC en banc (Ambil, Jr. v. Commission on elections, G.R. No. 143398, Oct. 25,
2000, 344 SCRA 358). (Gementiza v. Commission on Elections, 353 SCRA 724, March 6, 2001,
En Banc [Sandoval-Gutierrez])
368.
Is a contract entered into by the city mayor involving the expenditure of public funds by the local
government without prior appropriation by the city council valid and binding?
Held: If we are to limit our disquisition to the cited provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1445, or the
Auditing Code of the Philippines, in conjunction with Section 177 (b) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, or the
Local Government Code of 1983, which empowered the Sangguniang Panlungsod to “appropriate funds
for expenses of the city government, and fix the salaries of its officers and employees according to law,”
there would be no debate that prior appropriation by the city council and a certification that funds are
available therefore is indeed mandatorily required.
Xxx
However, the very same Presidential Decree No. 1445, which is the cornerstone of petitioner’s
arguments, does not provide that the absence of an appropriation law ipso facto makes a contract
entered into by a local government unit null and void. Section 84 of the statute specifically provides:
Revenue funds shall not be paid out of any public treasury or depository except in pursuance of an
appropriation law or other specific statutory authority.
Consequently, public funds may be disbursed not only pursuant to an appropriation law, but also
in pursuance of other specific statutory authority, i.e., Section 84 of PD 1445. Thus, when a contract is
entered into by a city mayor pursuant to specific statutory authority, the law, i.e., PD 1445 allows the
disbursement of funds from any public treasury or depository therefor. It can thus be plainly seen that
the law invoked by petitioner Quezon City itself provides that an appropriation law is not the only
authority upon which public funds shall be disbursed.
Furthermore, then Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr. did not enter into the subject contract without legal
authority. The Local Government Code of 1983, or B.P. Blg. 337, which was then in force, specifically
and exclusively empowered the city mayor to “represent the city in its business transactions, and sign all
warrants drawn on the city treasury and all bonds, contracts and obligations of the city.” Such power
granted to the city mayor by B.P. Blg. 337 was not qualified nor restricted by any prior action or authority
of the city council. We note that while the subsequent Local Government Code of 1991, which took
effect after the execution of the subject contracts, provides that the mayor’s representation must be
“upon authority of the sangguniang panlungsod or pursuant to law or ordinance,” there was no such
qualification under the old code. (Citations omitted)
We must differentiate the provisions of the old Local Government Code of 1983, B.P. Blg. 337,
which was then in force, from that of the Local Government Code of 1991, R.A. No. 7160, which now
requires that the mayor’s representation of the city in its business transactions must be “upon authority
of the sangguniang panlungsod or pursuant to law or ordinance” (Section 455 [vi]. No such prior
authority was required under B.P. Blg. 337. This restriction, therefore, cannot be imposed on the city
mayor then since the two contracts were entered into before R.A. No. 7160 was even enacted.
Under B.P. Blg. 337, while the city mayor has no power to appropriate funds to support the
contracts, neither does said law prohibit him from entering into contracts unless and until funds are
appropriated therefor. In fact, it is his bounden duty to so represent the city in all its business
transactions. On the other hand, the city council must provide for the “depositing, leaving or throwing of
garbage” and to appropriate funds for such expenses. (Section 177 [b]). It cannot refuse to so provide
and appropriate public funds for such services which are very vital to the maintenance of cleanliness of
the city and the good health of its inhabitants.
By entering into the two contracts, Mayor Simon did not usurp the city council’s power to provide
for the proper disposal of garbage and to appropriate funds therefor. The execution of contracts to
address such a need is his statutory duty, just as it is the city council’s duty to provide for said services.
There is no provision in B.P. Blg. 337, however, that prohibits the city mayor from entering into contracts
for the public welfare, unless and until there is prior authority from the city council. This requirement
was imposed much later by R.A. No. 7160, long after the contracts had already been executed and
implemented.
Even the very Charter of Quezon City, more particularly Section 9(f), Section 12(a)and Section
12(m) thereof, simply provide that the mayor shall exercise general powers and duties, such as signing
“all warrants drawn on the city treasurer and all bonds, contracts, and obligations of the city,” even as it
grants the City Council the power, by ordinance or resolution, “to make all appropriations for the
expenses of the government of the city,” as well as “to prohibit the throwing or depositing of offal,
garbage, refuse, or other offensive matter in the same, and to provide for its collection and disposition x
x x.” (Citations omitted)
While the powers and duties of the Mayor and the City Council are clearly delineated, there is
nothing in the cited provisions, nor even in the statute itself, that requires “prior authorization by the city
council by proper enactment of an ordinance” before the City Mayor can enter into contracts.
Private respondent Lexber asserts that the subject contract was entered into by Mayor Simon in
behalf of the Quezon City government pursuant to specific statutory authority, more particularly the
provisions of Executive Order No. 392 (Constituting the Metro Manila Authority [MMA]). x x x (City of
Quezon v. Lexber Incorporated, 354 SCRA 493, Mar. 15, 2001, 1st Div. [Ynares-Santiago])
369.
Does the President’s power of general supervision extend to the liga ng mga barangay, which is
not a local government unit?
Held: We rule in the affirmative. In Opinion No. 41, Series of 1995, the Department of Justice
ruled that the liga ng mga barangay is a government organization, being an association, federation,
league or union created by law or by authority of law, whose members are either appointed or elected
government officials. The Local Government Code defines the liga ng mga barangay as an organization
of all barangays for the primary purpose of determining the representation of the liga in the sanggunians,
and for ventilating, articulating and crystallizing issues affecting barangay government administration and
securing, through proper and legal means, solutions thereto (Sec. 491, Local Government Code). X x x
Xxx
The ligas are primarily governed by the provisions of the Local Government Code (Book III, Title
VI, Local Government Code). However, their respective constitution and by-laws shall govern other
matters affecting internal organization of the liga not otherwise provided for in the Local Government
Code provided that the constitution and by-laws shall be suppletory to the provisions of Book III, Title VI
of the Local Government Code and shall always conform to the provisions of the Constitution and existing
laws (Sec. 507, Local Government Code).
Having in mind the foregoing principles, we rule that Memorandum Circular No. 97-193 of the
DILG insofar as it authorizes the filing a Petition for Review of the BES with the regular courts in a post
proclamation electoral protest is of doubtful constitutionality. We agree with both the petitioner and the
Solicitor General that in authorizing the filing of the petition for review of the decision of the BES with the
regular courts, the DILG Secretary in effect amended and modified the GUIDELINES promulgated by the
National Liga Board and adopted by the LIGA which provides that the decision of the BES shall be subject
to review by the National Liga Board. The amendment of the GUIDELINES is more than an exercise of
the power of supervision but is an exercise of the power of control, which the President does not have
over the LIGA. Although the DILG is given the power to prescribe rules, regulations and other issuances,
the Administrative Code limits its authority to merely “monitoring compliance” by local government units
of such issuances (Taule v. Santos, 200 SCRA 512, 523 [1991]). To monitor means “to watch, observe or
check” and is compatible with the power of supervision of the DILG Secretary over local governments,
which is limited to checking whether the local government unit concerned or the officers thereof perform
their duties as per statutory enactments (Ibid.). Besides, any doubt as to the power of the DILG
Secretary to interfere with local affairs should be resolved in favor of the greater autonomy of the local
government (Ibid.)
The public respondent judge therefore committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in not dismissing the respondent’s Petition for Review for failure to exhaust all
administrative remedies and for lack of jurisdiction. (Bito-Onon v. Fernandez, 350 SCRA 732, Jan.
31, 2001, 3rd Div. [Gonzaga-Reyes])
370.
Petitioners would seek the disqualification of respondent Leonardo B. Roman on the ground of
his having transgressed the three-term limit under Section 8, Article X, of the 1987 Constitution and
Section 43 of Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code). The focal issue presented before the
Court x x x would revolve on the question of whether or not private respondent Roman exceeded the
three-term limit for elective local officials, expressed in the Constitution and the Local Government Code,
when he again ran for the position of Governor in the 14th of May 2001 elections, having occupied and
served in that position following the 1993 recall elections, as well as the 1995 and 1998 regular elections,
immediately prior to the 2001 elections. In fine, should respondent’s incumbency to the post of Governor
following the recall elections be included in determining the three-consecutive term limit fixed by law?
Held: After due deliberation, the Court voted 8 to 7 to DISMISS the petition.
VITUG, J., joined by YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., voted to dismiss the petition. He contended that as revealed
by the records of the Constitutional Commission, the Constitution envisions a continuous and an
uninterrupted service for three full terms before the proscription applies. Therefore, not being a full
term, a recall term should not be counted or used as a basis for the disqualification whether served prior
(as in this case) or subsequent (as in the Socrates case) to the nine-year, full three-term limit.
MENDOZA, J., in whose opinion QUISUMBING, J., joined, voted to dismiss the petition on the ground
that, in accordance with the ruling in Borja, Jr. v. COMELEC, 295 SCRA 157 [1998]; Arcos v. COMELEC,
G.R. No. 133639, Oct. 6, 1998 (res.); Lonzanida v. COMELEC, 311 SCRA 602 [1999]; and Adormeo v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 147927, Feb. 4, 2002, a term during which succession to a local elective office takes
place or a recall election is held should not be counted in determining whether an elective local official
has served more than three consecutive terms. He argued that the Constitution does not prohibit
elective local officials from serving for more than three consecutive terms because, in fact, it excludes
from the three-term limit interruptions in the continuity of service, so long as such interruptions are not
due to the voluntary renunciation of the office by the incumbent. Hence, the period from June 28, 1994
to June 30, 1995, during which respondent Leonardo B. Roman served as governor of Bataan by virtue of
a recall election held in 1993, should not be counted. Since on May 14, 2001 respondent had previously
served as governor of Bataan for only two consecutive terms (1995-1998 and 1998-2001), his election on
that day was actually only his third term for the same position.
PANGANIBAN, J., joined by PUNO, J., also voted to dismiss the petition. He argued that a recall term
should not be considered as one full term, because a contrary interpretation would in effect cut short the
elected official’s service to less than nine years and shortchange his constituents. The desire to prevent
monopoly of political power should be balanced against the need to uphold the voters’ obvious
preference who, in the present case, is Roman who received 97 percent of the votes cast. He explained
that, in Socrates, he also voted to affirm the clear choice of the electorate, because in a democracy the
people should, as much as legally possible, be governed by leaders freely chosen by them in credible
elections. He concluded that, in election cases, when two conflicting legal positions are of almost equal
weight, the scales of justice should be tilted in favor of the people’s overwhelming choice.
AZCUNA, J., joined by BELLOSILLO, J., also voted to dismiss, arguing that it is clear from the
constitutional provision that the disqualification applies only if the terms are consecutive and the service
is full and continuous. Hence, service for less than a term, except only in case of voluntary renunciation,
should not count to disqualify an elective local official from running for the same position. This case is
different from Socrates, where the full three consecutive terms had been continuously served so that
disqualification had clearly attached.
On the other hand, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J., with whom DAVIDE, C.J., and AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA, and CALLEJO, SR., JJ., concurred, holds the view that the recall term served by respondent
Roman, comprising the period June 28, 1994 to June 30, 1995, should be considered as one term. Since
he thereafter served for two consecutive terms from 1995 to 1998 and from 1998 to 2001, his election on
May 14, 2001 was actually his fourth term and contravenes Art. X, Sec. 8 of the Constitution. For this
reason, she voted to grant the petition and to declare respondent’s election on May 14, 2002 as null and
void.
CARPIO, J., joined by CARPI0-MORALES, J., also dissented and voted to grant the petition. He held that
a recall term constitutes one term and that to totally ignore a recall term in determining the three-term
limit would allow local officials to serve for more than nine consecutive years contrary to the manifest
intent of the framers of the Constitution. He contended that respondent Roman’s election in 2001 cannot
exempt him from the three-term limit imposed by the Constitution.
In his Separate Opinion, Justice Vitug voted to dismiss the petition on the following considerations:
In order that the three-consecutive term limit can apply, two conditions must concur, i.e., (1)
that the elective local official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms to the same local
government position, and (2) that he has served three consecutive full terms, albeit a voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be deemed to be an interruption in the
continuity of the service for the full term for which he is elected. The constitutional provision does not
appear to be all that imprecise for and in its application. Section 8, Article X, of the Constitution is
explicit that the “term of office of elective local officials x x x shall be three years” which phrase is
forthwith followed by its mandate that “no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive
terms,” and that “[v]oluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as
an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he [is] elected.” The law
evidently contemplates a continuous full three-year term before the proscription can apply.
The Constitutional Commission, in its deliberations, referred to a full nine (9) years of service for
each elective local government official in the application of the prohibition, envisioning at the same time a
continuous and uninterrupted period of nine years by providing for only one exception, i.e., when an
incumbent voluntarily gives up the office.
Xxx
A winner who dislodges in a recall election an incumbent elective local official merely serves the
balance of the latter’s term of office; it is not a full three-year term. It also goes without saying that an
incumbent elective local official against whom a recall election is initiated and who nevertheless wins in a
recall election must be viewed as being a continuing term of office and not as a break in reckoning his
three consecutive terms. X x x
If involuntary severance from the service which results in the incumbent’s being unable to
finish his term of office because of his ouster through valid recall proceedings negates “one term” for
purposes of applying the three-term limit, as so intimated in Lonzanida, it stands to reason that the
balance of the term assumed by the newly elected local official in a recall election should not also be held
to be one term in reckoning the three-term limit. In both situations, neither the elective local official who
is unable to finish his term nor the elected local official who only assumes the balance of the term of the
ousted local official following the recall election could be considered to have served a full three-year term
set by the Constitution.
This view is not inconsistent, but indeed in line, with the conclusion ultimately reached in
Socrates v. Commission on Elections, where the Court has considered Hagedorn, following his three
full terms of nine years, still qualified to run in a recall election conducted about a year and a half after
the most recent regular local elections. A recall term then, not being a full three-year term, is not to be
counted or used as a basis for disqualification whether it is held prior or subsequent to the nine year full
three-term limit.
This same issue has been passed and ruled upon by the Commission on Elections no less than
five times. Consistently, it has held that the term of a newcomer in recall elections cannot be counted as
a full term and may not thus be included in counting the three-term limit prescribed under the law. The
Commission on Elections, with its fact-finding facilities, its familiarity with political realities, and its
peculiar expertise in dealing with election controversies, should be in a good vantage point to resolve
issues of this nature. Concededly, no ready made formulae are always extant to address occasional
complex issues, allowing time and experience to merely evolve and ultimately provide acceptable
solutions. In the administration of election laws, it would be unsound by an excessive zeal to remove
from the Commission on Elections the initiative it takes on such questions which, in fact, by legal
mandate properly belong to it (See Loong v. COMELEC, 305 SCRA 832, Pangandaman v. COMELEC, 319
SCRA 283).
Nor should it be ignored that the law here involved is a limitation on the right of suffrage not only
on the candidate for office but also, and most importantly, on the electorate. Respondent Roman has
won the election to the post of Governor of Bataan with a comfortable margin against his closest
opponent. Where a candidate appears to be the clear choice of the people, doubts on the candidate’s
eligibility, even only as a practical matter, must be so resolved as to respect and carry out, not defeat,
the paramount will of the electorate. While the Constitution would attempt to prevent the monopolization
of political power, indeed a wise rule, the precept of preserving the freedom of choice of the people on
who shall rightfully hold the reins of government for them is no less than fundamental in looking at its
overriding intent. (Melanio L. Mendoza and Mario E. Ibarra v. Commission on Elections and
Leonardo B. Roman, G.R. No. 149736, Dec. 17, 2002, En Banc)
371.
On May 3, 2001, petitioner filed with the Provincial Election Supervisor in Pagadian City a petition
for the disqualification of respondent Sulong, pursuant to Sec. 40[b] of Republic Act No. 7160 (Local
Government Code), which disqualifies from running for any elective local position “those removed from
office as a result of an administrative case.” It appears that respondent Sulong had previously won as
mayor of Lapuyan on January 18, 1988. In the May 11, 1992, and again in the May 8, 1995 elections, he
was reelected. In a petition for disqualification, petitioner alleged that in 1991, during his first term as
mayor of Lapuyan, respondent Sulong, along with a municipal councilor of Lapuyan and several other
individuals, was administratively charged (AC No. 12-91) with various offenses, and that, on February 4,
1992, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Zamboanga del Sur found him guilty of the charges and ordered
his removal from office. Petitioner claimed that this decision had become final and executory, and
consequently the then vice-mayor of Lapuyan, Vicente Imbing, took his oath as mayor vice respondent
Sulong on March 3, 1992.
Respondent Sulong denied that the decision in AC No. 12-91 had become final and executory. He
averred that after receiving a copy of the decision on February 17, 1992, he filed a motion for
reconsideration and/or notice of appeal thereof on February 18, 1992; that on February 27, 1992, the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan required Jim Lingating, the complainant in AC No. 12-91, to comment on
respondent Sulong’s motion for reconsideration and/or notice of appeal; that the said complainant had
not yet complied therewith and his (respondent Sulong’s) motion had consequently remained pending.
Respondent Sulong denied he had been removed from office by virtue of the decision in AC No. 12-91.
Held: Petitioner contends that the COMELEC en banc erred in applying the ruling in Aguinaldo v.
Commission on Elections (212 SCRA 768 [1992]) in holding that the reelection of respondent Sulong in
1992 and 1995 as mayor of Lapuyan had the effect of condoning the misconduct for which he was
ordered dismissed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Zamboanga del Sur. Petitioner cites Reyes v.
Commission on Elections (254 SCRA 514, 525-526 [1996]) in which we held that an elective local
executive officer, who is removed before the expiration of the term for which he was elected, is
disqualified from being a candidate for a local elective position under Section 40[b] of the Local
Government Code.
Xxx
However, Reyes cannot be applied to this case because it appears that the 1992 decision of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan, finding respondent Sulong guilty of dishonesty, falsification and malversation
of public funds, has not until now become final. X x x The filing of his motion for reconsideration
prevented the decision of Sangguniang Panlalawigan from becoming final.
While R.A. No. 7160 on disciplinary actions is silent on the filing of a motion for reconsideration,
the same cannot be interpreted as a prohibition against the filing of a motion for reconsideration. x x x.
There is thus no decision finding respondent guilty to speak of. As Provincial Secretary of
Zamboanga del Sur Wilfredo Cimafranca attested, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan simply considered the
matter as having become moot and academic because it was “overtaken by the local elections of May
[11], 1992.”
Neither can the succession of the then vice-mayor of Lapuyan x x x and the highest ranking
municipal councilor of Lapuyan x x x to the offices of mayor and vice-mayor, respectively, be considered
proof that the decision in AC No. 12-91 had become final because it appears to have been made pursuant
to Sec. 68 of the Local Government Code, which makes decisions in administrative cases immediately
executory.
Indeed, considering the failure of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to resolve respondent’s motion,
it is unfair to the electorate to be told after they have voted for respondent Sulong that after all he is
disqualified, especially since at the time of the elections on May 14, 2001, the decision of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan had been rendered nearly ten years ago. (Atty. Miguel M. Lingating v.
Commission on Elections and Cesar B. Sulong, G.R. No. 153475, Nov. 13, 2002, En Banc
[Mendoza])
372.
When may a permanent vacancy arise under Section 44 of the Local Government Code?
Held: Under Section 44, a permanent vacancy arises when an elective official fills a higher
vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office, voluntarily resigns, or
is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office. (Navarro v. Court of
Appeals, 355 SCRA 672, Mar. 28, 2001, 1st Div. [Kapunan])
373.
How is Section 45(b) of the Local Government Code to be interpreted? What is the reason
behind the right given to a political party to nominate a replacement where a permanent vacancy occurs
in the Sanggunian?
Held: What is crucial is the interpretation of Section 45(b) providing that “x x x only the
nominee of the political party under which the Sanggunian member concerned has been elected and
whose elevation to the position next higher in rank created the last vacancy in the Sanggunian shall be
appointed in the manner hereinabove provided. The appointee shall come from the political party as that
of the Sanggunian member who caused the vacancy x x x.”
The reason behind the right given to a political party to nominate a replacement where a
permanent vacancy occurs in the Sanggunian is to maintain the party representation as willed by the
people in the election (Aquilino Pimentel, the Local Government Code of 1991, The Key to National
Development, p. 150).
With the elevation of petitioner Tamayo, who belonged to REFORMA-LM, to the position of ViceMayor, a vacancy occurred in the Sanggunian that should be filled up with someone who should belong
to the political party of petitioner Tamayo. Otherwise, REFORMA-LM’s representation in the Sanggunian
would be diminished. To argue that the vacancy created was that formerly held by Rolando Lalas, a
LAKAS-NUCD-Kampi member, would result in the increase of that party’s representation in the
Sanggunian at the expense of the REFORMA-LM. This interpretation is contrary to the letter and spirit of
the law and thus violative of a fundamental rule in statutory construction which is to ascertain and give
effect to the intent and purpose of the law (Manila Lodge No. 761 v. Court of Appeals, 73 SCRA 12
[1976]). As earlier pointed out, the reason behind par. (b), section 44 of the Local Government Code is
the maintenance of party representation in the Sanggunian in accordance with the will of the electorate.
The “last vacancy” in the Sanggunian refers to that created by the elevation of the member
formerly occupying the next higher in rank which in turn also had become vacant by any of the causes
already enumerated. The term “last vacancy” is thus used in Sec. 45 (b) to differentiate it from the other
vacancy previously created. The term by no means refers to the vacancy in the No. 8 position which
occurred with the elevation of Rolando Lalas to the seventh position in the Sanggunian. Such
construction will result in absurdity. (Navarro v. Court of Appeals, 355 SCRA 672, Mar. 28, 2001,
1st Div. [Kapunan])
374.
May local elective officials practice their profession or engage in any occupation?
Ans.: All governors, city and municipal mayors are prohibited from practicing their profession
or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their functions as local chief executives. (Sec.
90[a], LGC)
Sanggunian members may practice their profession, engage in any occupation, or teach in
schools except during session hours. (Sec. 90[b], LGC)
Sanggunian members who are also members of the Bar shall not:
(a)
Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local government unit or any
office, agency, or instrumentality of the government is the adverse party;
(b)
Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the national or local
government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office;
(c)
Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings involving the local
government unit of which he is an official; and
(d)
Use property and personnel of the government except when the sanggunian member
concerned is defending the interest of the Government. (Sec. 90[b], LGC)
375.
Whether or not the plebiscites scheduled for the creation of Barangays Karangalan and Napico
should be suspended or cancelled in view of the pending boundary dispute between the two local
governments.
Held: To begin with, we agree with the position of the COMELEC that Civil Case No. 94-3006 involving
the boundary dispute between the Municipality of Cainta and the City of Pasig presents a prejudicial
question which must first be decided before the plebiscites for the creation of the proposed barangays
may be held.
Xxx
In the case at bar, while the City of Pasig vigorously claims that the areas covered by the proposed
Barangays Karangalan and Napico are within its territory, it can not deny that portions of the same area
are included in the boundary dispute case pending before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo. Surely,
whether the areas in controversy shall be decided as within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality
of Cainta or the City of Pasig has material bearing to the creation of the proposed Barangays Karangalan
and Napico. Indeed, a requisite for the creation of a barangay is for its territorial jurisdiction to be
properly identified by metes and bounds or by more or less permanent natural boundaries (Sec. 386[b],
R.A. No. 7160). Precisely because territorial jurisdiction is an issue raised in the pending civil case, until
and unless such issue is resolved with finality, to define the territorial jurisdiction of the proposed
barangays would only be an exercise in futility. Not only that, we would be paving the way for potentially
ultra vires acts of such barangays. X x x
Moreover, considering the expenses entailed in the holding of plebiscites, it is far more prudent to hold in
abeyance the conduct of the same, pending final determination of whether or not the entire area of the
proposed barangays are truly within the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Pasig.
Neither do we agree that merely because a plebiscite had already been held in the case of the proposed
Barangay Napico, the petition of the Municipality of Cainta has already been rendered moot and
academic. The issue raised by the Municipality of Cainta in its petition before the COMELEC against the
holding of the plebiscite for the creation of Barangay Napico are still pending determination before the
Antipolo Regional Trial Court.
Xxx
Therefore, the plebiscite on the creation of Barangay Karangalan should be held in abeyance pending
final resolution of the boundary dispute between the City of Pasig and the Municipality of Cainta by the
Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City. In the same vein, the plebiscite held on March 15, 1997 to ratify
the creation of Barangay Napico, Pasig City, should be annulled and set aside. (City of Pasig v.
COMELEC, 314 SCRA 179, Sept. 10, 1999, En Banc [Ynares-Santiago])
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
376.
Discuss the contemporary view on the rightful place of an Individual in International Law? Does
he remain a mere “object” of International Law, or is he now a proper “subject” of International Law?
Held: Then came the long and still ongoing debate on what should be the subject of
international law. The 20th century saw the dramatic rise and fall of different types and hues of
authoritarianism – the fascism of Italy’s Mussolini and Germany’s Hitler, the militarism of Japan’s Hirohito
and the communism of Russia’s Stalin, etc. The sinking of these isms led to the elevation of the rights of
the individual against the state. Indeed, some species of human rights have already been accorded
universal recognition (See Universal Declaration of Human Rights [1948], The International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights [1966] and The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
[1966]). Today, the drive to internationalize rights of women and children is also on high gear (The
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women [CEDAW] otherwise known
as
“The
Bill
of
Rights
for
Women” was adopted by the UN General Assembly in December 1979. As of November 1999, one
hundred sixty seven [167] states including the Philippines have ratified or acceded to it. See Statement
of Angela King, Special Adviser to the Secretary General of the UN on Gender Issues and Advancement of
Women, Judicial Colloquium on the Application of International Human Rights Law at the Domestic Level,
Vienna, Austria, October 27, 1999). The higher rating given to human rights on the hierarchy of values
necessarily led to the re-examination of the rightful place of the individual in international law. Given the
harshest eye is the moss-covered doctrine that international law deals only with States and that
individuals are not its subject. For its undesirable corollary is that sub-doctrine that an individual’s right
in international law is a near cipher. Translated in extradition law, the view that once commanded a
consensus is that since a fugitive is a mere object and not a subject of international law, he is bereft of
rights. An extraditee, so it was held, is a mere “object transported from one state to the other as an
exercise of the sovereign will of the two states involved.” (Blakesley and Lagodny, Finding Harmony
Amidst Disagreement Over Extradition, Jurisdiction, The Role of Human Rights and Issues of
Extraterritoriality Under International Criminal Law, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 24, No.
1, p. 44 [1991]) The re-examination consigned this pernicious doctrine to the museum of ideas (See
generally Kelsen, Principles of International Law, 2nd ed. [1966]; Korowicz, The Problem of the
International Personality of Individuals, 50 Am. J., Int’l. Law 553 [1966]).
The new thinkers of
international law then gave a significant shape to the role and rights of the individual in state-concluded
treaties and other international agreements. X x x (Concurring Opinion, Puno J., in Jeffrey Liang
[Huefeng] v. People, G.R. No. 125865, Mar. 26, 2001, 1st Div. [Motion for Reconsideration])
377.
What is the doctrine of incorporation? How is it applied by local courts?
Held: Under the doctrine of incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law of the land and
no further legislative action is needed to make such rules applicable in the domestic sphere.
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals (or local courts) are confronted with
situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of
the Constitution or statute of the local state. Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to
give effect to both since it is to be presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the
generally accepted principles of international law in observance of the Incorporation Clause in Section 2,
Article II of the Constitution. In a situation however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has
to be made between a rule of international law and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal
law should be upheld by the municipal courts for the reason that such courts are organs of municipal law
and are accordingly bound by it in all circumstances. The fact that international law has been made part
of the law of the land does not pertain to or imply the primacy of international law over national or
municipal law in the municipal sphere. The doctrine of incorporation, as applied in most countries,
decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing with, but are not superior to, national
legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle of lex posterior derogat priori takes effect – a treaty
may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. In states where the Constitution is the highest
law of the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if
they are in conflict with the Constitution. (Secretary of Justice v. Hon. Ralph C. Lantion, G.R. No.
139465, Jan. 18, 2000, En Banc [Melo])
378.
Is sovereignty really absolute and all-encompassing?
limitations?
If not, what are its restrictions and
Held: While sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and all-encompassing on the domestic
level, it is however subject to restrictions and limitations voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines,
expressly or impliedly, as a member of the family of nations. By the doctrine of incorporation, the
country is bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered to be
automatically part of our own laws. One of the oldest and most fundamental rules in international law is
pacta sunt servanda – international agreements must be performed in good faith. A state which has
contracted valid international obligations is bound to make in its legislations such modifications as may be
necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations.
By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of sovereignty. By their
voluntary act, nations may surrender some aspects of their state power in exchange for greater benefits
granted by or derived from a convention or pact. After all, states, like individuals, live with coequals, and
in pursuit of mutually covenanted objectives and benefits, they also commonly agree to limit the exercise
of their otherwise absolute rights. Thus, treaties have been used to record agreements between States
concerning such widely diverse matters as, for example, the lease of naval bases, the sale or cession of
territory, the termination of war, the regulation of conduct of hostilities, the formation of alliances, the
regulation of commercial relations, the settling of claims, the laying down of rules governing conduct in
peace and the establishment of international organizations. The sovereignty of a state therefore cannot
in fact and in reality be considered absolute. Certain restrictions enter into the picture: (1) limitations
imposed by the very nature of membership in the family of nations and (2) limitations imposed by treaty
stipulations. (Tanada v. Angara, 272 SCRA 18, May 2, 1997 [Panganiban])
379.
What must a person who feels aggrieved by the acts of a foreign sovereign do to espouse his
cause?
Held: Private respondent is not left without any legal remedy for the redress of its grievances.
Under both Public International Law and Transnational Law, a person who feels aggrieved by the acts of
a foreign sovereign can ask his own government to espouse his cause through diplomatic channels.
Private respondent can ask the Philippine government, through the Foreign Office, to espouse its
claims against the Holy See. Its first task is to persuade the Philippine government to take up with the
Holy See the validity of its claim. Of course, the Foreign Office shall first make a determination of the
impact of its espousal on the relations between the Philippine government and the Holy See (Young,
Remedies of Private Claimants Against Foreign States, Selected Readings on Protection by Law of Private
Foreign Investments 905, 919 [1964]). Once the Philippine government decides to espouse the claim,
the latter ceases to be a private cause.
According to the Permanent Court of International Justice, the forerunner of the International
Court of Justice:
“By taking up the case of one of its subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or international judicial
proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own rights - its right to ensure, in the person
of its subjects, respect for the rules of international law” (The Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, 1
Hudson, World Court Reports 293, 302 [1924]).
(Holy See, The v. Rosario, Jr., 238 SCRA 524, 538-539, Dec. 1, 1994, En Banc [Quiason])
380.
Discuss the Status of the Vatican and the Holy See in International Law.
Held: Before the annexation of the Papal States by Italy in 1870, the Pope was the monarch and he, as
the Holy See, was considered a subject of International Law. With the loss of the Papal States and the
limitation of the territory under the Holy See to an area of 108.7 acres, the position of the Holy See in
International Law became controversial.
In 1929, Italy and the Holy See entered into the Lateran Treaty, where Italy recognized the exclusive
dominion and sovereign jurisdiction of the Holy See over the Vatican City. It also recognized the right of
the Holy See to receive foreign diplomats, to send its own diplomats to foreign countries, and to enter
into treaties according to International Law.
The Lateran Treaty established the statehood of the Vatican City “for the purpose of assuring to the Holy
See absolute and visible independence and of guaranteeing to it indisputable sovereignty also in the field
of international relations.”
In view of the wordings of the Lateran Treaty, it is difficult to determine whether the statehood is vested
in the Holy See or in the Vatican City. Some writers even suggested that the treaty created two
international persons - the Holy See and Vatican City.
The Vatican City fits into none of the established categories of states, and the attribution to it of
“sovereignty” must be made in a sense different from that in which it is applied to other states . In a
community of national states, the Vatican City represents an entity organized not for political but for
ecclesiastical purposes and international objects. Despite its size and object, the Vatican City has an
independent government of its own, with the Pope, who is also head of the Roman Catholic Church, as
the Holy See or Head of State, in conformity with its traditions, and the demands of its mission in the
world. Indeed, the world-wide interests and activities of the Vatican City are such as to make it in a
sense an “international state.”
One authority wrote that the recognition of the Vatican City as a state has significant implication - that it
is possible for any entity pursuing objects essentially different from those pursued by states to be
invested with international personality.
Inasmuch as the Pope prefers to conduct foreign relations and enter into transactions as the Holy See
and not in the name of the Vatican City, one can conclude that in the Pope's own view, it is the Holy See
that is the international person.
The Republic of the Philippines has accorded the Holy See the status of a foreign sovereign. The Holy
See, through its Ambassador, the Papal Nuncio, has had diplomatic representations with the Philippine
government since 1957. This appears to be the universal practice in international relations. (Holy See,
The v. Rosario, Jr., 238 SCRA 524, 533-534, Dec. 1, 1994, En Banc [Quiason])
381.
What are international organizations? Discuss their nature.
Held: International organizations are institutions constituted by international agreement between two or
more States to accomplish common goals. The legal personality of these international organizations has
been recognized not only in municipal law, but in international law as well.
Permanent international commissions and administrative bodies have been created by the agreement of a
considerable number of States for a variety of international purposes, economic or social and mainly nonpolitical. In so far as they are autonomous and beyond the control of any one State, they have distinct
juridical personality independent of the municipal law of the State where they are situated. As such, they
are deemed to possess a species of international personality of their own. (SEAFDEC-AQD v. NLRC,
206 SCRA 283, Feb. 14, 1992)
382.
Discuss the basic immunities of international organizations and the reason for affording them
such immunities.
Held: One of the basic immunities of an international organization is immunity from local jurisdiction,
i.e., that it is immune from legal writs and processes issued by the tribunals of the country where it is
found. The obvious reason for this is that the subjection of such an organization to the authority of the
local courts would afford a convenient medium through which the host government may interfere in their
operations or even influence or control its policies and decisions; besides, such subjection to local
jurisdiction would impair the capacity of such body to discharge its responsibilities impartially on behalf of
its member-states. (SEAFDEC-AQD v. NLRC, 206 SCRA 283, Feb. 4, 1992)
383.
Discuss the two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity from suit.
Held: There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly established.
According to the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a
respondent in the courts of another sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive theory, the
immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but
not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis.
Some states passed legislation to serve as guidelines for the executive or judicial determination when an
act may be considered as jure gestionis. The United States passed the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
of 1976, which defines a commercial activity as “either a regular course of commercial conduct or a
particular commercial transaction or act.” Furthermore, the law declared that the “commercial character
of the activity shall be determined by reference to the nature of the course of conduct or particular
transaction or act, rather than by reference to its purpose.” The Canadian Parliament enacted in 1982 an
Act to Provide For State Immunity in Canadian Courts. The Act defines a “commercial activity” as any
particular transaction, act or conduct or any regular course of conduct that by reason of its nature, is of a
“commercial character.”
The restrictive theory, which is intended to be a solution to the host of problems involving the issue of
sovereign immunity, has created problems of its own. Legal treatises and the decisions in countries
which follow the restrictive theory have difficulty in characterizing whether a contract of a sovereign state
with a private party is an act jure gestionis or an act jure imperii.
The restrictive theory came about because of the entry of sovereign states into purely commercial
activities remotely connected with the discharge of governmental functions. This is particularly true with
respect to the Communist states which took control of nationalized business activities and international
trading. (Holy See, The v. Rosario, Jr., 238 SCRA 524, Dec. 1, 1994, En Banc [Quiason])
384.
Cite some transactions by a foreign state with private parties that were considered by the
Supreme Court as acts “jure imperii” and acts “jure gestionis.”
Held: This Court has considered the following transactions by a foreign state with private parties as acts
jure imperii: (1) the lease by a foreign government of apartment buildings for use of its military officers
(Syquia v. Lopez, 84 Phil. 312 [1949]); (2) the conduct of public bidding for the repair of a wharf at a
United States Naval Station (United States of America v. Ruiz, supra.); and (3) the change of employment
status of base employees (Sanders v. Veridiano, 162 SCRA 88 [1988]).
On the other hand, this Court has considered the following transactions by a foreign state with private
parties as acts jure gestionis: (1) the hiring of a cook in the recreation center, consisting of three
restaurants, a cafeteria, a bakery, a store, and a coffee and pastry shop at the John Hay Air Station in
Baguio City, to cater to American servicemen and the general public (United States of America v. Rodrigo,
182 SCRA 644 [1990]; and (2) the bidding for the operation of barber shops in Clark Air Base in Angeles
City (United States of America v. Guinto, 182 SCRA 644 [1990]). The operation of the restaurants and
other facilities open to the general public is undoubtedly for profit as a commercial and not a
governmental activity. By entering into the employment contract with the cook in the discharge of its
proprietary function, the United States government impliedly divested itself of it sovereign immunity from
suit. (Holy See, The v. Rosario, Jr., 238 SCRA 524, Dec. 1, 1994, En Banc [Quiason])
385.
What should be the guidelines to determine what activities and transactions shall be considered
“commercial” and as constituting acts “jure gestionis” by a foreign state?
Held: In the absence of legislation defining what activities and transactions shall be considered
“commercial” and as constituting acts jure gestionis, we have to come out with our own guidelines,
tentative they may be.
Certainly, the mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party cannot be the ultimate
test. Such an act can only be the start of the inquiry. The logical question is whether the foreign state is
engaged in the activity in the regular course of business. If the foreign state is not engaged regularly in
a business or trade, the particular act or transaction must then be tested by its nature. If the act is in
pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii, especially when it is
not undertaken for gain or profit.
As held in United States of America v. Guinto (supra.) :
“There is no question that the United States of America, like any other state, will be deemed to have
impliedly waived its non-suability if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or private capacity. It
is only when the contract involves its sovereign or governmental capacity that no such waiver may be
implied.”
(Holy See, The v. Rosario, Jr., 238 SCRA 524, Dec. 1, 1994, En Banc [Quiason])
386.
May the Holy See be sued for selling the land it acquired by donation from the Archdiocese of
Manila to be made site of its mission or the Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippines but which purpose
cannot be accomplished as the land was occupied by squatters who refused to vacate the area?
Held: In the case at bench, if petitioner (Holy See) has bought and sold lands in the ordinary course of
a real estate business, surely the said transaction can be categorized as an act jure gestionis. However,
petitioner has denied that the acquisition and subsequent disposal of Lot 5-A were made for profit but
claimed that it acquired said property for the site of its mission or the Apostolic Nunciature in the
Philippines. X x x
Lot 5-A was acquired by petitioner as a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila. The donation was
made not for commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to construct thereon the official place of
residence of the Papal Nuncio. The right of a foreign sovereign to acquire property, real or personal, in a
receiving state, necessary for the creation and maintenance of its diplomatic mission, is recognized in the
1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations . This treaty was concurred in by the Philippine Senate
and entered into force in the Philippines on November 15, 1965.
In Article 31(a) of the Convention, a diplomatic envoy is granted immunity from the civil and
administrative jurisdiction of the receiving state over any real action relating to private immovable
property situated in the territory of the receiving state which the envoy holds on behalf of the sending
state for the purposes of the mission. If this immunity is provided for a diplomatic envoy, with all the
more reason should immunity be recognized as regards the sovereign itself, which in this case is the Holy
See.
The decision to transfer the property and the subsequent disposal thereof are likewise clothed with a
governmental character. Petitioner did not sell Lot 5-A for profit or gain. It merely wanted to dispose off
the same because the squatters living thereon made it almost impossible for petitioner to use it for the
purpose of the donation. (Holy See, The v. Rosario, Jr., 238 SCRA 524, Dec. 1, 1994, En Banc
[Quiason])
387.
How is sovereign or diplomatic immunity pleaded in a foreign court?
Held: In Public International Law, when a state or international agency wishes to plead sovereign or
diplomatic immunity in a foreign court, it requests the Foreign Office of the state where it is sued to
convey to the court that said defendant is entitled to immunity.
In the United States, the procedure followed is the process of “suggestion,” where the foreign state or
the international organization sued in an American court requests the Secretary of State to make a
determination as to whether it is entitled to immunity. If the Secretary of State finds that the defendant
is immune from suit, he, in turn, asks the Attorney General to submit to the court a “suggestion” that the
defendant is entitled to immunity. In England, a similar procedure is followed, only the Foreign Office
issues a certification to that effect instead of submitting a “suggestion”.
In the Philippines, the practice is for the foreign government or the international organization to first
secure an executive endorsement of its claim of sovereign or diplomatic immunity. But how the
Philippine Foreign Office conveys its endorsement to the courts varies. In International Catholic Migration
Commission v. Calleja, 190 SCRA 130 (1990), the Secretary of Foreign Affairs just sent a letter directly to
the Secretary of Labor and Employment, informing the latter that the respondent-employer could not be
sued because it enjoyed diplomatic immunity. In World Health Organization v. Aquino, 48 SCRA 242
(1972), the Secretary of Foreign Affairs sent the trial court a telegram to that effect. In Baer v. Tizon, 57
SCRA 1 (1974), the U.S. Embassy asked the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to request the Solicitor General
to make, in behalf of the commander of the United States Naval Base at Olongapo City, Zambales, a
“suggestion” to respondent Judge. The Solicitor General embodied the “suggestion” in a Manifestation
and Memorandum as amicus curiae.
In the case at bench, the Department of Foreign Affairs, through the Office of Legal Affairs moved with
this Court to be allowed to intervene on the side of petitioner. The Court allowed the said Department to
file its memorandum in support of petitioner’s claim of sovereign immunity.
In some cases, the defense of sovereign immunity was submitted directly to the local courts by the
respondents through their private counsels. In cases where the foreign states bypass the Foreign Office,
the courts can inquire into the facts and make their own determination as to the nature of the acts and
transactions involved. (Holy See, The v. Rosario, Jr., 238 SCRA 524, Dec. 1, 1994, En Banc
[Quiason])
388.
Is the determination of the executive branch of the government that a state or instrumentality is
entitled to sovereign or diplomatic immunity subject to judicial review, or is it a political question and
therefore, conclusive upon the courts?
Held: The issue of petitioner’s (The Holy See) non-suability can be determined by the trial court without
going to trial in light of the pleadings x x x. Besides, the privilege of sovereign immunity in this case was
sufficiently established by the Memorandum and Certification of the Department of Foreign Affairs. As
the department tasked with the conduct of the Philippines’ foreign relations, the Department of Foreign
Affairs has formally intervened in this case and officially certified that the Embassy of the Holy See is a
duly accredited diplomatic mission to the Republic of the Philippines exempt from local jurisdiction and
entitled to all the rights, privileges and immunities of a diplomatic mission or embassy in this country.
The determination of the executive arm of government that a state or instrumentality is entitled to
sovereign or diplomatic immunity is a political question that is conclusive upon the courts . Where the
plea of immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch, it is the duty of the courts to accept
this claim so as not to embarrass the executive arm of the government in conducting the country’s
foreign relations. As in International Catholic Migration Commission and in World Health Organization,
we abide by the certification of the Department of Foreign Affairs. (Holy See, The v. Rosario, Jr., 238
SCRA 524, Dec. 1, 1994, En Banc [Quiason])
389.
Discuss the Status of the Vatican and the Holy See in International Law.
Held: Before the annexation of the Papal States by Italy in 1870, the Pope was the monarch
and he, as the Holy See, was considered a subject of International Law. With the loss of the Papal States
and the limitation of the territory under the Holy See to an area of 108.7 acres, the position of the Holy
See in International Law became controversial (Salonga and Yap, Public International Law 36-37 [1992]).
In 1929, Italy and the Holy See entered into the Lateran Treaty, where Italy recognized the
exclusive dominion and sovereign jurisdiction of the Holy See over the Vatican City. It also recognized
the right of the Holy See to receive foreign diplomats, to send its own diplomats to foreign countries, and
to enter into treaties according to International Law (Garcia, Questions and Problems in International
Law, Public and Private 81 [1948]).
The Lateran Treaty established the statehood of the Vatican City "for the purpose of assuring to
the Holy See absolute and visible independence and of guaranteeing to it indisputable sovereignty also in
the field of international relations" (O'Connell, I International Law 311 [1965]).
In view of the wordings of the Lateran Treaty, it is difficult to determine whether the statehood is
vested in the Holy See or in the Vatican City. Some writers even suggested that the treaty created two
international persons - the Holy See and Vatican City (Salonga and Yap, supra, 37).
The Vatican City fits into none of the established categories of states, and the attribution to it of
“sovereignty” must be made in a sense different from that in which it is applied to other states (Fenwick,
International Law 124-125 [1948]; Cruz, International Law 37 [1991]). In a community of national
states, the Vatican City represents an entity organized not for political but for ecclesiastical purposes and
international objects. Despite its size and object, the Vatican City has an independent government of its
own, with the Pope, who is also head of the Roman Catholic Church, as the Holy See or Head of State, in
conformity with its traditions, and the demands of its mission in the world. Indeed, the world-wide
interests and activities of the Vatican City are such as to make it in a sense an “international state”
(Fenwick, supra, 125; Kelsen, Principles of International Law 160 [1956]).
One authority wrote that the recognition of the Vatican City as a state has significant implication that it is possible for any entity pursuing objects essentially different from those pursued by states to be
invested with international personality (Kunz, The Status of the Holy See in International Law, 46 The
American Journal of International Law 308 [1952]).
Inasmuch as the Pope prefers to conduct foreign relations and enter into transactions as the Holy
See and not in the name of the Vatican City, one can conclude that in the Pope's own view, it is the Holy
See that is the international person.
The Republic of the Philippines has accorded the Holy See the status of a foreign sovereign. The
Holy See, through its Ambassador, the Papal Nuncio, has had diplomatic representations with the
Philippine government since 1957. This appears to be the universal practice in international relations.
(Holy See, The v. Rosario, Jr., 238 SCRA 524, 533-534, Dec. 1, 1994, En Banc [Quiason])
390.
What is extradition? To whom does it apply?
Held: It is the “process by which persons charged with or convicted of crime against the law of a State
and found in a foreign State are returned by the latter to the former for trial or punishment. It applies to
those who are merely charged with an offense but have not been brought to trial; to those who have
been tried and convicted and have subsequently escaped from custody; and those who have been
convicted in absentia. It does not apply to persons merely suspected of having committed an offense but
against whom no charge has been laid or to a person whose presence is desired as a witness or for
obtaining or enforcing a civil judgment.” (Weston, Falk, D' Amato, International Law and Order,
2nd ed., p. 630 [1990], cited in Dissenting Opinion, Puno, J., in Secretary of Justice v. Hon.
Ralph C. Lantion, G.R. No. 139465, Jan. 18, 2000, En Banc)
391.
Discuss the basis for allowing extradition.
Held: Extradition was first practiced by the Egyptians, Chinese, Chaldeans and Assyro-Babylonians but
their basis for allowing extradition was unclear. Sometimes, it was granted due to pacts; at other times,
due to plain good will. The classical commentators on international law thus focused their early views on
the nature of the duty to surrender an extraditee --- whether the duty is legal or moral in character.
Grotius and Vattel led the school of thought that international law imposed a legal duty called civitas
maxima to extradite criminals. In sharp contrast, Puffendorf and Billot led the school of thought that the
so-called duty was but an "imperfect obligation which could become enforceable only by a contract or
agreement between states.
Modern nations tilted towards the view of Puffendorf and Billot that under international law there is no
duty to extradite in the absence of treaty, whether bilateral or multilateral. Thus, the US Supreme Court
in US v. Rauscher (119 US 407, 411, 7 S Ct. 234, 236, 30 L. ed. 425 [1886]), held: “x x x it is only in
modern times that the nations of the earth have imposed upon themselves the obligation of delivering up
these fugitives from justice to the states where their crimes were committed, for trial and punishment.
This has been done generally by treaties x x x Prior to these treaties, and apart from them there was no
well-defined obligation on one country to deliver up such fugitives to another; and though such delivery
was often made it was upon the principle of comity x x x.” (Dissenting Opinion, Puno, J., in
Secretary of Justice v. Hon. Ralph C. Lantion, G.R. No. 139465, Jan. 18, 2000, En Banc)
392.
What is the nature of an extradition proceeding? Is it akin to a criminal proceeding?
Held: [A]n extradition proceeding is sui generis. It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into
operation all the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. To begin with, the process of
extradition does not involve the determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused. His guilt or
innocence will be adjudged in the court of the state where he will be extradited. Hence, as a rule,
constitutional rights that are only relevant to determine the guilt or innocence of an accused cannot be
invoked by an extraditee especially by one whose extradition papers are still undergoing evaluation . As
held by the US Supreme Court in United States v. Galanis:
“An extradition proceeding is not a criminal prosecution, and the constitutional safeguards that
accompany a criminal trial in this country do not shield an accused from extradition pursuant to a valid
treaty.” (Wiehl, Extradition Law at the Crossroads: The Trend Toward Extending Greater Constitutional
Procedural Protections To Fugitives Fighting Extradition from the United States, 19 Michigan Journal of
International Law 729, 741 [1998], citing United States v. Galanis, 429 F. Supp. 1215 [D. Conn. 1977])
There are other differences between an extradition proceeding and a criminal proceeding. An extradition
proceeding is summary in natural while criminal proceedings involve a full-blown trial.
In
contradistinction to a criminal proceeding, the rules of evidence in an extradition proceeding allow
admission of evidence under less stringent standards. In terms of the quantum of evidence to be
satisfied, a criminal case requires proof beyond reasonable doubt for conviction while a fugitive may be
ordered extradited “upon showing of the existence of a prima facie case.” Finally, unlike in a criminal
case where judgment becomes executory upon being rendered final, in an extradition proceeding, our
courts may adjudge an individual extraditable but the President has the final discretion to extradite him .
The United States adheres to a similar practice whereby the Secretary of State exercises wide discretion
in balancing the equities of the case and the demands of the nation's foreign relations before making the
ultimate decision to extradite.
As an extradition proceeding is not criminal in character and the evaluation stage in an extradition
proceeding is not akin to a preliminary investigation, the due process safeguards in the latter do not
necessarily apply to the former. This we hold for the procedural due process required by a given set of
circumstances “must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the government function
involved as well as the private interest that has been affected by governmental action.” The concept of
due process is flexible for “not all situations calling for procedural safeguards call for the same kind of
procedure.” (Secretary of Justice v. Hon. Ralph C. Lantion, G.R. No. 139465, Oct. 17, 2000, En
Banc [Puno])
393.
Will the retroactive application of an extradition treaty violate the constitutional prohibition
against "ex post facto" laws?
Held: The prohibition against ex post facto law applies only to criminal legislation which affects the
substantial rights of the accused. This being so, there is no merit in the contention that the ruling
sustaining an extradition treaty’s retroactive application violates the constitutional prohibition against ex
post facto laws. The treaty is neither a piece of criminal legislation nor a criminal procedural statute.
(Wright v. CA, 235 SCRA 341, Aug. 15, 1994 [Kapunan])
394.
Discuss the rules in the interpretation of extradition treaties.
Held: [A]ll treaties, including the RP-US Extradition Treaty, should be interpreted in light of their intent.
Nothing less than the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties to which the Philippines is a signatory
provides that “a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose.” X x x. It cannot
be gainsaid that today, countries like the Philippines forge extradition treaties to arrest the dramatic rise
of international and transnational crimes like terrorism and drug trafficking. Extradition treaties provide
the assurance that the punishment of these crimes will not be frustrated by the frontiers of territorial
sovereignty. Implicit in the treaties should be the unbending commitment that the perpetrators of these
crimes will not be coddled by any signatory state.
It ought to follow that the RP-US Extradition Treaty calls for an interpretation that will minimize if not
prevent the escape of extraditees from the long arm of the law and expedite their trial. X x x
[A]n equally compelling factor to consider is the understanding of the parties themselves to the RP-US
Extradition Treaty as well as the general interpretation of the issue in question by other countries with
similar treaties with the Philippines. The rule is recognized that while courts have the power to interpret
treaties, the meaning given them by the departments of government particularly charged with their
negotiation and enforcement is accorded great weight. The reason for the rule is laid down in Santos III
v. Northwest Orient Airlines, et al. (210 SCRA 256, 261 [1992]) , where we stressed that a treaty is a joint
executive-legislative act which enjoys the presumption that “it was first carefully studied and determined
to be constitutional before it was adopted and given the force of law in the country.” (Secretary of
Justice v. Hon. Ralph C. Lantion, G.R. No. 139465, Oct. 17, 2000, En Banc [Puno])
395.
Is respondent Mark Jimenez entitled to bail during the pendency of the Extradition Proceeding?
Held: We agree with petitioner. As suggested by the use of the word “conviction,” the constitutional
provision on bail x x x, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person
has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition
proceedings, because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail “flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of
every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to
acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt.” (De la Camara v. Enage, 41 SCRA 1, 6,
September 17, 1971, per Fernando, Jr. [later CJ]) It follows that the constitutional provision on bail will
not apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not an issue.
The provision in the Constitution stating that the right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended” does not detract from the rule that the constitutional
right to bail is available only in criminal proceedings. It must be noted that the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus finds application “only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or
offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.” (Sec. 18, Article VII, Constitution) Hence, the
second sentence in the constitutional provision on bail merely emphasizes the right to bail in criminal
proceedings for the aforementioned offenses. It cannot be taken to mean that the right is available even
in extradition proceedings that are not criminal in nature.
That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are bailable in the United States is not an argument to
grant him one in the present case. To stress, extradition proceedings are separate and distinct from the trial for the
offenses for which he is charged. He should apply for bail before the courts trying the criminal cases against him,
not before the extradition court. (Government of the United States of America v. Hon. Guillermo Purganan, G.R.
No. 148571, Sept. 24, 2002, En Banc [Panganiban])
396.
What is the exception to the “No Bail” Rule in Extradition Proceedings?
Held: The rule x x x is that bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases. However, the judiciary has
the constitutional duty to curb grave abuse of discretion and tyranny, as well as the power to promulgate
rules to protect and enforce constitutional rights. Furthermore, we believe that the right to due process
is broad enough to include the grant of basic fairness to extraditees. Indeed, the right to due process
extends to the “life, liberty or property” of every person. It is “dynamic and resilient, adaptable to every
situation calling for its application.” (I.A. Cruz, Constitutional Law, 1998 ed., p. 98)
Accordingly and to best serve the ends of justice, we believe and so hold that, after a potential extraditee
has been arrested or placed under the custody of the law, bail may be applied for and granted as an exception, only
upon a clear and convincing showing (1) that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to
the community; and (2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances including, as a matter of
reciprocity, those cited by the highest court in the requesting state when it grants provisional liberty in extradition
cases therein.
Since this exception has no express or specific statutory basis, and since it is derived essentially from
general principles of justice and fairness, the applicant bears the burden of proving the above two-tiered requirement
with clarity, precision and emphatic forcefulness. The Court realizes that extradition is basically an executive, not a
judicial, responsibility arising from the presidential power to conduct foreign relations. In its barest concept, it
partakes of the nature of police assistance amongst states, which is not normally a judicial prerogative. Hence, any
intrusion by the courts into the exercise of this power should be characterized by caution, so that the vital
international and bilateral interests of our country will not be unreasonably impeded or compromised. In short,
while this Court is ever protective of “the sporting idea of fair play,” it also recognizes the limits of its own
prerogatives and the need to fulfill international obligations. (Government of the United States of America v. Hon.
Guillermo Purganan, G.R. No. 148571, Sept. 24, 2002, En Banc [Panganiban])
397.
Are there special circumstances compelling enough for the Court to grant Mark Jimenez’s request
for provisional release on bail?
Held: Along this line, Jimenez contends that there are special circumstances that are compelling enough
for the Court to grant his request for provisional release on bail. We have carefully examined these
circumstances and shall now discuss them.
1. Alleged Disenfranchisement
While his extradition was pending, Respondent Jimenez was elected as a member of the House
of Representatives. On that basis, he claims that his detention will disenfranchise his Manila district of
600,000 residents. We are not persuaded. In People v. Jalosjos (324 SCRA 689, February 3, 2000, per
Ynares-Santiago, J.), the Court has already debunked the disenfranchisement argument x x x.
It must be noted that even before private respondent ran for and won a congressional seat in
Manila, it was already of public knowledge that the United States was requesting his extradition. Hence,
his constituents were or should have been prepared for the consequences of the extradition case against
their representative, including his detention pending the final resolution of the case. Premises considered
and in line with Jalosjos, we are constrained to rule against his claim that his election to public office is by
itself a compelling reason to grant him bail.
2. Anticipated Delay
Respondent Jimenez further contends that because the extradition proceedings are lengthy, it
would be unfair to confine him during the pendency of the case. Again we are not convinced. We must
emphasize that extradition cases are summary in nature. They are resorted to merely to determine
whether the extradition petition and its annexes conform to the Extradition Treaty, not to determine his
guilt or innocence. Neither is it, as a rule, intended to address issues relevant to the constitutional rights
available to the accused in a criminal action.
We are not overruling the possibility that petitioner may, in bad faith, unduly delay the
proceedings. This is quite another matter that is not at issue here. Thus, any further discussion of this
point would be merely anticipatory and academic.
However, if the delay is due to maneuverings of respondent, with all the more reason would the
grant of bail not be justified. Giving premium to delay by considering it as a special circumstance for the
grant of bail would be tantamount to giving him the power to grant bail to himself. It would also
encourage him to stretch out and unreasonably delay the extradition proceedings even more. This we
cannot allow.
3. Not a Flight Risk?
Jimenez further claims that he is not a flight risk. To support this claim, he stresses that he
learned of the extradition request in June 1999; yet, he has not fled the country. True, he has not
actually fled during the preliminary stages of the request for his extradition. Yet, this fact cannot be
taken to mean that he will not flee as the process moves forward to its conclusion, as he hears the
footsteps of the requesting government inching closer and closer. That he has not yet fled from the
Philippines cannot be taken to mean that he will stand his ground and still be within reach of our
government if and when it matters; that is, upon the resolution of the Petition for Extradition.
In any event, it is settled that bail may be applied for and granted by the trial court at anytime
after the applicant has been taken into custody and prior to judgment, even after bail has been
previously denied. In the present case, the extradition court may continue hearing evidence on the
application for bail, which may be granted in accordance with the guidelines in this Decision.
(Government of the United States of America v. Hon. Guillermo Purganan, G.R. No. 148571,
Sept. 24, 2002, En Banc [Panganiban])
398.
Discuss the Five Postulates of Extradition.
Held:
1. Extradition Is a Major Instrument for the Suppression of Crime.
First, extradition treaties are entered into for the purpose of suppressing crime by facilitating the
arrest and custodial transfer (Bassiouni, International Extradition, 1987 ed., p. 68) of a fugitive from one
state to the other.
With the advent of easier and faster means of international travel, the flight of affluent criminals
from one country to another for the purpose of committing crime and evading prosecution has become
more frequent. Accordingly, governments are adjusting their methods of dealing with criminals and
crimes that transcend international boundaries.
Today, “a majority of nations in the world community have come to look upon extradition as the
major effective instrument of international co-operation in the suppression of crime.” (Bassiouni, supra,
p. 21) It is the only regular system that has been devised to return fugitives to the jurisdiction of a court
competent to try them in accordance with municipal and international law (Id., p. 67).
Xxx
Indeed, in this era of globalization, easier and faster international travel, and an expanding ring
of international crimes and criminals, we cannot afford to be an isolationist state. We need to cooperate
with other states in order to improve our chances of suppressing crime in our country.
2. The Requesting State Will Accord Due Process to the Accused.
Second, an extradition treaty presupposes that both parties thereto have examined, and that
both accept and trust, each other’s legal system and judicial process (Coquia, “On Implementation of the
RP-US Extradition Treaty,” The Lawyers Review, August 31, 2000, p. 4). More pointedly, our duly
authorized representative’s signature on an extradition treaty signifies our confidence in the capacity and
willingness of the other state to protect the basic rights of the person sought to be extradited (See
Bassiouni, p. 546; citing 221 US 508, 512 [1910]). That signature signifies our full faith that the accused
will be given, upon extradition to the requesting state, all relevant and basic rights in the criminal
proceedings that will take place therein; otherwise, the treaty would not have been signed, or would
have been directly attacked for its unconstitutionality.
3. The Proceedings Are Sui Generis.
Third, as pointed out in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion (Supra), extradition proceedings are not
criminal in nature. In criminal proceedings, the constitutional rights of the accused are at fore; in
extradition which is sui generis – in a class by itself – they are not.
Xxx
Given the foregoing, it is evident that the extradition court is not called upon to ascertain the
guilt or the innocence of the person sought to be extradited (Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, supra.).
Such determination during the extradition proceedings will only result in needless duplication and delay.
Extradition is merely a measure of international judicial assistance through which a person charged with
or convicted of a crime is restored to a jurisdiction with the best claim to try that person. It is not part of
the function of the assisting authorities to enter into questions that are the prerogative of that jurisdiction
(Shearer, Extradition in International Law, 1971 ed., p. 157). The ultimate purpose of extradition
proceedings in court is only to determine whether the extradition request complies with the Extradition
Treaty, and whether the person sought is extraditable (Id., p. 545).
4.
Compliance Shall Be in Good Faith.
Fourth, our executive branch of government voluntarily entered into the Extradition Treaty, and our
legislative branch ratified it. Hence, the Treaty carries the presumption that its implementation will serve
the national interest.
Fulfilling our obligations under the Extradition Treaty promotes comity (In line with the Philippine policy of
cooperation and amity with all nations set forth in Article II, Section 2, Constitution). On the other hand, failure to
fulfill our obligations thereunder paints at bad image of our country before the world community. Such failure
would discourage other states from entering into treaties with us, particularly an extradition treaty that hinges on
reciprocity.
Verily, we are bound by pacta sunt servanda to comply in good faith with our obligations under the
Treaty (Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, supra.). This principle requires that we deliver the accused to the
requesting country if the conditions precedent to extradition, as set forth in the Treaty, are satisfied. In
other words, “[t]he demanding government, when it has done all that the treaty and the law require it to
do, is entitled to the delivery of the accused on the issue of the proper warrant, and the other
government is under obligation to make the surrender.” (Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 62, March 23,
1903) Accordingly, the Philippines must be ready and in a position to deliver the accused, should it be
found proper.
5.
There Is an Underlying Risk of Flight.
Fifth, persons to be extradited are presumed to be flight risks.
This prima facie presumption finds
reinforcement in the experience of the executive branch: nothing short of confinement can ensure that
the accused will not flee the jurisdiction of the requested state in order to thwart their extradition to the
requesting state.
The present extradition case further validates the premise that persons sought to be extradited have a
propensity to flee. Indeed, extradition hearings would not even begin, if only the accused were willing to
submit to trial in the requesting country (Persily, “International Extradition and the Right to Bail,” 34
Stan. J. Int’l L. 407 [Summer 1988]). Prior acts of herein respondent – (1) leaving the requesting state
right before the conclusion of his indictment proceedings there; and (2) remaining in the requested state
despite learning that the requesting state is seeking his return and that the crimes he is charged with are
bailable – eloquently speak of his aversion to the processes in the requesting state, as well as his
predisposition to avoid them at all cost. These circumstances point to an ever-present, underlying high
risk of flight. He has demonstrated that he has the capacity and the will to flee. Having fled once, what
is there to stop him, given sufficient opportunity, from fleeing a second time? (Government of the
United States of America v. Hon. Guillermo Purganan, G.R. No. 148571, Sept. 24, 2002, En
Banc [Panganiban])
399.
Discuss the Ten Points to consider in Extradition Proceedings?
Held: 1. The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings is to determine whether the request
expressed in the petition, supported by its annexes and the evidence that may be adduced during the
hearing of the petition, complies with the Extradition Treaty and Law; and whether the person sought is
extraditable. The proceedings are intended merely to assist the requesting state in bringing the accused
– or the fugitive who has illegally escaped – back to its territory, so that the criminal process may
proceed therein.
2. By entering into an extradition treaty, the Philippines is deemed to have reposed its trust in the
reliability or soundness of the legal and judicial system of its treaty partner; as well as in the ability and
the willingness of the latter to grant basic rights to the accused in the pending criminal case therein.
3. By nature then, extradition proceedings are not equivalent to a criminal case in which guilt or
innocence is determined. Consequently, an extradition case is not one in which the constitutional rights
of the accused are necessarily available. It is more akin, if at all, to a court’s request to police authorities
for the arrest of the accused who is at large or has escaped detention or jumped bail. Having once
escaped the jurisdiction of the requesting state, the reasonable prima facie presumption is that the
person would escape again if given the opportunity.
4. Immediately upon receipt of the petition for extradition and its supporting documents, the judge shall
make a prima facie finding whether the petition is sufficient in form and substance, whether it complies
with the Extradition Treaty and Law, and whether the person sought is extraditable. The magistrate has
discretion to require the petitioner to submit further documentation, or to personally examine the affiants
or witnesses. If convinced that a prima facie case exists, the judge immediately issues a warrant for the
arrest of the potential extraditee and summons him or her to answer and to appear at scheduled
hearings on the petition.
5. After being taken into custody, potential extraditees may apply for bail. Since the applicants have a
history of absconding, they have the burden of showing that (a) there is no flight risk and no danger to
the community; and (b) there exist special, humanitarian or compelling circumstances. The grounds
used by the highest court in the requesting state for the grant of bail therein may be considered, under
the principle of reciprocity as a special circumstance. In extradition cases, bail is not a matter of right; it
is subject to judicial discretion in the context of the peculiar facts of each case.
6. Potential extraditees are entitled to the rights to due process and to fundamental fairness. Due
process does not always call for a prior opportunity to be heard. A subsequent opportunity is sufficient
due to the flight risk involved. Indeed, available during the hearings on the petition and the answer is
the full chance to be heard and to enjoy fundamental fairness that is compatible with the summary
nature of extradition.
7. This Court will always remain a protector of human rights, a bastion of liberty, a bulwark of
democracy and the conscience of society. But it is also well aware of the limitations of its authority and
of the need for respect for the prerogatives of the other co-equal and co-independent organs of
government.
8. We realize that extradition is essentially an executive, not a judicial, responsibility arising out of the
presidential power to conduct foreign relations and to implement treaties. Thus, the Executive
Department of government has broad discretion in its duty and power of implementation.
9. On the other hand, courts merely perform oversight functions and exercise review authority to
prevent or excise grave abuse and tyranny. They should not allow contortions, delays and “over-due
process” every little step of the way, lest these summary extradition proceedings become not only inutile
but also sources of international embarrassment due to our inability to comply in good faith with a treaty
partner’s simple request to return a fugitive. Worse, our country should not be converted into a dubious
haven where fugitives and escapees can unreasonably delay, mummify, mock, frustrate, checkmate and
defeat the quest for bilateral justice and international cooperation.
10. At bottom, extradition proceedings should be conducted with all deliberate speed to determine
compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law; and, while safeguarding basic individual rights, to avoid
the legalistic contortions, delays and technicalities that may negate that purpose. (Government of the
United States of America v. Hon. Guillermo Purganan, G.R. No. 148571, Sept. 24, 2002, En
Banc [Panganiban])
400.
What is a Treaty? Discuss.
Held: A treaty, as defined by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties , is “an international
instrument concluded between States in written form and governed by international law, whether
embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments, and whatever its particular
designation.” There are many other terms used for a treaty or international agreement, some of which
are: act, protocol, agreement, compromis d' arbitrage, concordat, convention, declaration, exchange of
notes, pact, statute, charter and modus vivendi. All writers, from Hugo Grotius onward, have pointed out
that the names or titles of international agreements included under the general term treaty have little or
no significance. Certain terms are useful, but they furnish little more than mere description
Article 2(2) of the Vienna Convention provides that “the provisions of paragraph 1 regarding the use of
terms in the present Convention are without prejudice to the use of those terms, or to the meanings
which may be given to them in the internal law of the State.” (BAYAN [Bagong Alyansang
Makabayan] v. Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, G.R. No. 138570, Oct. 10, 2000, En
Banc [Buena])
401.
Discuss the binding effect of treaties and executive agreements in international law.
Held: [I]n international law, there is no difference between treaties and executive agreements in their
binding effect upon states concerned, as long as the functionaries have remained within their powers .
International law continues to make no distinction between treaties and executive agreements: they are
equally binding obligations upon nations. (BAYAN [Bagong Alyansang Makabayan] v. Executive
Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, G.R. No. 138570, Oct. 10, 2000, En Banc [Buena])
402.
Does the Philippines recognize the binding effect of executive agreements even without the
concurrence of the Senate or Congress?
Held: In our jurisdiction, we have recognized the binding effect of executive agreements even without
the concurrence of the Senate or Congress. In Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading (3 SCRA
351, 356-357 [1961]), we had occasion to pronounce:
“x x x the right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements without the necessity of subsequent
Congressional approval has been confirmed by long usage. From the earliest days of our history we have
entered into executive agreements covering such subjects as commercial and consular relations, mostfavored-nation rights, patent rights, trademark and copyright protection, postal and navigation
arrangements and the settlement of claims. The validity of these has never been seriously questioned
by our courts. "
(BAYAN [Bagong Alyansang Makabayan] v. Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, G.R. No.
138570, Oct. 10, 2000, En Banc [Buena])
403.
What is a "protocol de cloture"? Will it require concurrence by the Senate?
Held: A final act, sometimes called protocol de cloture, is an instrument which records the winding up of
the proceedings of a diplomatic conference and usually includes a reproduction of the texts of treaties,
conventions, recommendations and other acts agreed upon and signed by the plenipotentiaries attending
the conference. It is not the treaty itself. It is rather a summary of the proceedings of a protracted
conference which may have taken place over several years. It will not require the concurrence of the
Senate. The documents contained therein are deemed adopted without need for ratification. (Tanada
v. Angara, 272 SCRA 18, May 2, 1997 [Panganiban])
404.
What is the “most-favored-nation” clause? What is its purpose?
Answer: 1. The most-favored-nation clause may be defined, in general, as a pledge by a contracting
party to a treaty to grant to the other party treatment not less favorable than that which has been or
may be granted to the “most favored” among other countries. The clause has been commonly included
in treaties of commercial nature.
There are generally two types of most-favored-nation clause, namely, conditional and unconditional.
According to the clause in its unconditional form, any advantage of whatever kind which has been or may
in future be granted by either of the contracting parties to a third State shall simultaneously and
unconditionally be extended to the other under the same or equivalent conditions as those under which it
has been granted to the third State. (Salonga & Yap, Public International Law, 5th Edition, 1992,
pp. 141-142)
2. The purpose of a most favored nation clause is to grant to the contracting party treatment not less
favorable than that which has been or may be granted to the "most favored" among other countries.
The most favored nation clause is intended to establish the principle of equality of international treatment
by providing that the citizens or subjects of the contracting nations may enjoy the privileges accorded by
either party to those of the most favored nation (Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. S.C.
Johnson and Son, Inc., 309 SCRA 87, 107-108, June 25, 1999, 3rd Div. [Gonzaga-Reyes])
405.
What is the essence of the principle behind the "most-favored-nation" clause as applied to tax
treaties?
Held: The essence of the principle is to allow the taxpayer in one state to avail of more liberal provisions
granted in another tax treaty to which the country of residence of such taxpayer is also a party provided
that the subject matter of taxation x x x is the same as that in the tax treaty under which the taxpayer is
liable.
In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. S.C. Johnson and Son, Inc., 309 SCRA 87, June 25,
1999, the SC did not grant the claim filed by S.C. Johnson and Son, Inc., a non-resident foreign
corporation based in the USA, with the BIR for refund of overpaid withholding tax on royalties pursuant
to the most-favored-nation clause of the RP-US Tax Treaty in relation to the RP-West Germany Tax
Treaty. It held:
Given the purpose underlying tax treaties and the rationale for the most favored nation clause, the
concessional tax rate of 10 percent provided for in the RP-Germany Tax Treaty should apply only if the
taxes imposed upon royalties in the RP-US Tax Treaty and in the RP-Germany Tax Treaty are paid under
similar circumstances. This would mean that private respondent (S.C. Johnson and Son, Inc.) must prove
that the RP-US Tax Treaty grants similar tax reliefs to residents of the United States in respect of the
taxes imposable upon royalties earned from sources within the Philippines as those allowed to their
German counterparts under the RP-Germany Tax Treaty.
The RP-US and the RP-West Germany Tax Treaties do not contain similar provisions on tax crediting.
Article 24 of the RP-Germany Tax Treaty x x x expressly allows crediting against German income and
corporation tax of 20% of the gross amount of royalties paid under the law of the Philippines. On the
other hand, Article 23 of the RP-US Tax Treaty, which is the counterpart provision with respect to relief
for double taxation, does not provide for similar crediting of 20% of the gross amount of royalties paid.
Xxx
X x x The entitlement of the 10% rate by U.S. firms despite the absence of matching credit (20% for
royalties) would derogate from the design behind the most favored nation clause to grant equality of
international treatment since the tax burden laid upon the income of the investor is not the same in the
two countries. The similarity in the circumstances of payment of taxes is a condition for the enjoyment
of most favored nation treatment precisely to underscore the need for equality of treatment.
406.
What is ratification? Discuss its function in the treaty-making process.
Held: Ratification is generally held to be an executive act, undertaken by the head of state or of the
government, as the case may be, through which the formal acceptance of the treaty is proclaimed. A
State may provide in its domestic legislation the process of ratification of a treaty. The consent of the
State to be bound by a treaty is expressed by ratification when: (a) the treaty provides for such
ratification, (b) it is otherwise established that the negotiating States agreed that ratification should be
required, (c) the representative of the State has signed the treaty subject to ratification, or (d) the
intention of the State to sign the treaty subject to ratification appears from the full powers of its
representative, or was expressed during the negotiation. (BAYAN [Bagong Alyansang Makabayan]
v. Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, G.R. No. 138570, Oct. 10, 2000, En Banc [Buena])
407.
Explain the “pacta sunt servanda” rule.
Held: One of the oldest and most fundamental rules in international law is pacta sunt servanda –
international agreements must be performed in good faith. “A treaty engagement is not a mere moral
obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties x x x. A state which has contracted valid
international obligations is bound to make in its legislations such modifications as may be necessary to
ensure the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken.” (Tanada v. Angara, 272 SCRA 18, May 2,
1997 [Panganiban])
408.
Explain the "rebus sic stantibus" rule (i.e., things remaining as they are).
automatically to render a treaty inoperative?
Does it operate
Held: According to Jessup, the doctrine constitutes an attempt to formulate a legal principle which
would justify non-performance of a treaty obligation if the conditions with relation to which the parties
contracted have changed so materially and so unexpectedly as to create a situation in which the exaction
of performance would be unreasonable. The key element of this doctrine is the vital change in the
condition of the contracting parties that they could not have foreseen at the time the treaty was
concluded.
The doctrine of rebus sic stantibus does not operate automatically to render the treaty inoperative.
There is a necessity for a formal act of rejection, usually made by the head of state, with a statement of
the reasons why compliance with the treaty is no longer required. (Santos III v. Northwest Orient
Airlines, 210 SCRA 256, June 23, 1992)
409.
What is the “doctrine of effective nationality” (genuine link doctrine)?
Held:
This principle is expressed in Article 5 of the Hague Convention of 1930 on the Conflict of
Nationality Laws as follows:
Art. 5. Within a third State a person having more than one nationality shall be treated as if he had only
one. Without prejudice to the application of its law in matters of personal status and of any convention
in force, a third State shall, of the nationalities which any such person possesses, recognize exclusively in
its territory either the nationality of the country in which he is habitually and principally resident or the
nationality of the country with which in the circumstances he appears to be in fact most closely
connected. (Frivaldo v. COMELEC, 174 SCRA 245, June 23, 1989)
What are the conditions before foreign military bases, troops, or facilities may be allowed in the
Philippines?
410.
Ans.: After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and
the United States of America concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall
not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the
Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held
for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State. (Sec. 25, Art. XVIII, 1987
Constitution)
411.
Which provision of the Constitution applies with regard to the exercise by the Senate of its
constitutional power to concur with the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA)?
Held: One focal point of inquiry in this controversy is the determination of which provision of the
Constitution applies, with regard to the exercise by the Senate of its constitutional power to concur with
the VFA. Petitioners argue that Section 25, Article XVIII is applicable considering that the VFA has for its
subject the presence of foreign military troops in the Philippines. Respondents, on the contrary, maintain
that Section 21, Article VII should apply inasmuch as the VFA is not a basing arrangement but an
agreement which involves merely the temporary visits of United States personnel engaged in joint
military exercises.
The 1987 Philippine contains two provisions requiring the concurrence of the Senate on treaties
or international agreements. Section 21, Article VII x x x reads:
"No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least twothirds of all the Members of the Senate."
Section 25, Article XVIII, provides:
"After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the United
States of America concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be
allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress
so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that
purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State."
Section 21, Article VII deals with treaties or international agreements in general, in which case,
the concurrence of at least two-thirds (2/3) of all the Members of the Senate is required to make the
subject treaty, or international agreement, valid and binding on the part of the Philippines. This provision
lays down the general rule on treaties or international agreements and applies to any form of treaty with
a wide variety of subject matter, such as, but not limited to, extradition or tax treaties or those economic
in nature. All treaties or international agreements entered into by the Philippines, regardless of subject
matter, coverage, or particular designation or appellation, requires the concurrence of the Senate to be
valid and effective.
In contrast, Section 25, Article XVIII is a special provision that applies to treaties which involve
the presence of foreign military bases, troops or facilities in the Philippines. Under this provision, the
concurrence of the Senate is only one of the requisites to render compliance with the constitutional
requirements and to consider the agreement binding on the Philippines. Section 25, Article XVIII further
requires that "foreign military bases, troops, or facilities" may be allowed in the Philippines only by virtue
of a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate, ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a national
referendum held for that purpose if so required by Congress, and recognized as such by the other
contracting State.
It is our considered view that both constitutional provisions, far from contradicting each other,
actually share some common ground. These constitutional provisions both embody phrases in the
negative and thus, are deemed prohibitory in mandate and character. In particular, Section 21 opens
with the clause "No treaty x x x," and Section 25 contains the phrase "shall not be allowed." Additionally,
in both instances, the concurrence of the Senate is indispensable to render the treaty or international
agreement valid and effective.
To our mind, the fact that the President referred the VFA to the Senate under Section 21, Article
VII, and that the Senate extended its concurrence under the same provision, is immaterial. For in either
case, whether under Section 21, Article VII or Section 25, Article XVIII, the fundamental law is crystalline
that the concurrence of the Senate is mandatory to comply with the strict constitutional requirements.
On the whole, the VFA is an agreement which defines the treatment of United States troops and
personnel visiting the Philippines. It provides for the guidelines to govern such visits of military
personnel, and further defines the rights of the United States and the Philippine government in the
matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessels and aircraft, importation and exportation of
equipment, materials and supplies.
Undoubtedly, Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with treaties involving foreign
military bases, troops, or facilities, should apply in the instant case. To a certain extent and in a limited
sense, however, the provisions of Section 21, Article VII will find applicability with regard to the issue and
for the sole purpose of determining the number of votes required to obtain the valid concurrence of the
Senate x x x.
It is a finely-imbedded principle in statutory construction that a special provision or law prevails
over a general one. Lex specialis derogat generali. Thus, where there is in the same statute a particular
enactment and also a general one which, in its most comprehensive sense, would include what is
embraced in the former, the particular enactment must be operative, and the general enactment must be
taken to affect only such cases within its general language which are not within the provision of the
particular enactment (Manila Railroad Co. v. Collector of Customs, 52 Phil. 950). (BAYAN [Bagong
Alyansang Makabayan] v. Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, G.R. No. 138570 and
Companion Cases, Oct. 10, 2000, 342 SCRA 449, 481-492, En Banc [Buena])
412.
Should the contention that since the VFA merely involved the temporary visits of United States
personnel engaged in joint military exercises and not a basing agreement, therefore, Sec. 21, Art. VII of
the 1987 Constitution, and not Sec. 25, Art. XVIII, should apply to the VFA, be upheld?
Held: It is specious to argue that Section 25, Article XVIII is inapplicable to mere transient
agreements for the reason that there is no permanent placing of structure for the establishment of a
military base. On this score, the Constitution makes no distinction between "transient" and "permanent".
Certainly, we find nothing in Section 25, Article XVIII that requires foreign troops or facilities to be
stationed or placed permanently in the Philippines.
It is a rudiment in legal hermeneutics that when no distinction is made by law, the Court should
not distinguish - Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire debemos.
In like manner, we do not subscribe to the argument that Section 25, Article XVIII is not
controlling since no foreign military bases, but merely foreign troops and facilities, are involved in the
VFA. Notably, a perusal of said constitutional provision revels that the proscription covers "foreign
military bases, troops, or facilities." Stated differently, this prohibition is not limited to the entry of troops
and facilities without any foreign bases being established. The clause does not refer to foreign military
bases, troops, or facilities" collectively but treats them as separate and independent subjects. The use of
comma and disjunctive word "or" clearly signifies disassociation and independence of one thing from the
others included in the enumeration (Castillo-Co v. Barbers, 290 SCRA 717, 723 [1998]), such that, the
provision contemplates three different situations - a military treaty the subject of which could be either
(a) foreign bases (b) foreign troops, or (c) foreign facilities - any of the three standing alone places it
under the coverage of Section 25, Article XVIII.
To this end, the intention of the framers of the Charter, as manifested during the deliberations of
the 1986 Constitutional Commission, is consistent with this interpretation x x x.
Moreover, military bases established within the territory of another state is no longer viable
because of the alternatives offered by new means and weapons of warfare such as nuclear weapons,
guided missiles as well as huge sea vessels that can stay afloat in the sea even for months and years
without returning to their home country. These military warships are actually used as substitutes for a
land-home base not only of military aircraft but also of military personnel and facilities. Besides, vessels
are mobile as compared to a land-based military headquarters. (BAYAN [Bagong Alyansang
Makabayan] v. Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, G.R. No. 138570 and Companion Cases,
Oct. 10, 2000, 342 SCRA 449, 481-492, En Banc [Buena])
413.
Were the requirements of Sec. 25, Art. XVIII of the 1987 Constitution complied with when the
Senate gave its concurrence to the VFA?
Held: Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the country, unless
the following conditions are sufficiently met, viz: (a) it must be under a treaty; (b) the treaty must be
duly concurred in by the Senate and, when so required by Congress, ratified by a majority of the votes
cast by the people in a national referendum; and (c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting
state.
There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the case of the VFA. The concurrence
handed by the Senate through Resolution No. 18 is in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution,
whether under the general requirement in Section 21, Article VII, or the specific mandate mentioned in
Section 25, Article XVIII, the provision in the latter article requiring ratification by a majority of the votes
cast in a national referendum being unnecessary since Congress has not required it.
As to the matter of voting, Section 21, Article VII particularly requires that a treaty or international
agreement, to be valid and effective, must be concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the members of
the Senate. On the other hand, Section 25, Article XVIII simply provides that the treaty be "duly
concurred in by the Senate."
Applying the foregoing constitutional provisions, a two-thirds vote of all the members of the Senate is
clearly required so that the concurrence contemplated by law may be validly obtained and deemed
present. While it is true that Section 25, Article XVIII requires, among other things, that the treaty - the
VFA, in the instant case - be "duly concurred in by the Senate," it is very true however that said provision
must be related and viewed in light of the clear mandate embodied in Section 21, Article VII, which in
more specific terms, requires that the concurrence of a treaty, or international agreement, be made by a
two-thirds vote of all the members of the Senate. Indeed, Section 25, Article XVIII must not be treated
in isolation to Section 21, Article VII.
As noted, the "concurrence requirement" under Section 25, Article XVIII must be construed in relation to
the provisions of Section 21, Article VII. In a more particular language, the concurrence of the Senate
contemplated under Section 25, Article XVIII means that at least two-thirds of all the members of the
Senate favorably vote to concur with the treaty - the VFA in the instant case.
xxx
Having resolved that the first two requisites prescribed in Section 25, Article XVIII are present, we shall now pass
upon and delve on the requirement that the VFA should be recognized as a treaty by the United States of America.
xxx
This Court is of the firm view that the phrase "recognized as a treaty" means that the other contracting
party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty (Ballantine's Legal Dictionary, 1995). To
require the other contracting state, The United States of America in this case, to submit the VFA to the
United States Senate for concurrence pursuant to its Constitution, is to accord strict meaning to the
phrase.
Well-entrenched is the principle that the words used in the Constitution are to be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed, in which case the significance thus attached to
them prevails. Its language should be understood in the sense they have in common use (J.M. Tuason &
Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Association, 31 SCRA 413 [1970])
Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive agreement
because, under international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty (Altman Co. v. United
States, 224 US 263 [1942], cited in Coquia and Defensor-Santiago, International Law, 1998 Ed. P. 497).
To be sure, as long as the VFA possesses the elements of an agreement under international law, the said
agreement is to be taken equally as a treaty.
xxx
The records reveal that the United States Government, through Ambassador Thomas C. Hubbard, has
stated that the United States government has fully committed to living up to the terms of the VFA. For
as long as the United States of America accepts or acknowledges the VFA as a treaty, and binds itself
further to comply with its obligations under the treaty, there is indeed marked compliance with the
mandate of the Constitution.
Worth stressing too, is that the ratification, by the President, of the VFA and the concurrence of the
Senate should be taken as a clear and unequivocal expression of our nation's consent to be bound by
said treaty, with the concomitant duty to uphold the obligations and responsibilities embodied
thereunder.
xxx
With the ratification of the VFA, which is equivalent to final acceptance, and with the exchange of notes
between the Philippines and the United States of America, it now becomes obligatory and incumbent on
our part, under the principles of international law, to be bound by the terms of the agreement. Thus, no
less than Section 2, Article II of the Constitution, declares that the Philippines adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace,
equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations. (BAYAN [Bagong Alyansang
Makabayan] v. Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, G.R. No. 138570 and Companion Cases,
Oct. 10, 2000, 342 SCRA 449, 481-492, En Banc [Buena])
414.
Are the “Balikatan” exercises covered by the Visiting Forces Agreement?
Held: The holding of “Balikatan 02-1” must be studied in the framework of the treaty
antecedents to which the Philippines bound itself. The first of these is the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT,
for brevity). The MDT has been described as the “core” of the defense relationship between the
Philippines and its traditional ally, the United States. Its aim is to enhance the strategic and technological
capabilities of our armed forces through joint training with its American counterparts; the “Balikatan” is
the largest such training exercise directly supporting the MDT’s objectives. It is this treaty to which the
VFA adverts and the obligations thereunder which it seeks to reaffirm.
The lapse of the US-Philippine Bases Agreement in 1992 and the decision not to renew it created a
vacuum in US-Philippine defense relations, that is, until it was replaced by the Visiting Forces Agreement.
It should be recalled that on October 10, 2000, by a vote of eleven to three, this Court upheld the validity
of the VFA (BAYAN, et. Al. v. Zamora, et. al., 342 SCRA 449 [2000]). The VFA provides the “regulatory
mechanism” by which “United States military and civilian personnel [may visit] temporarily in the
Philippines in connection with activities approved by the Philippine Government.” It contains provisions
relative to entry and departure of American personnel, driving and vehicle registration, criminal
jurisdiction, claims, importation and exportation, movement of vessels and aircraft, as well as the
duration of the agreement and its termination. It is the VFA which gives continued relevance to the MDT
despite the passage of years. Its primary goal is to facilitate the promotion of optimal cooperation
between American and Philippine military forces in the event of an attack by a common foe.
The first question that should be addressed is whether “Balikatan 02-1” is covered by the Visiting Forces
Agreement. To resolve this, it is necessary to refer to the VFA itself. Not much help can be had
therefrom, unfortunately, since the terminology employed is itself the source of the problem. The VFA
permits United States personnel to engage, on an impermanent basis, in “activities,” the exact meaning
of which was left undefined. The expression is ambiguous, permitting a wide scope of undertakings
subject only to the approval of the Philippine government. The sole encumbrance placed on its definition
is couched in the negative, in that United States personnel must “abstain from any activity inconsistent
with the spirit of this agreement, and in particular, from any political activity.” All other activities, in other
words, are fair game.
We are not completely unaided, however. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which contains
provisos governing interpretations of international agreements, state x x x.
It is clear from the foregoing that the cardinal rule of interpretation must involve an examination of the
text, which is presumed to verbalize the parties’ intentions. The Convention likewise dictates what may
be used as aids to deduce the meaning of terms, which it refers to as the context of the treaty, as well as
other elements may be taken into account alongside the aforesaid context. X x x
The Terms of Reference rightly fall within the context of the VFA.
After studied reflection, it appeared farfetched that the ambiguity surrounding the meaning of the word
“activities” arose from accident. In our view, it was deliberately made that way to give both parties a
certain leeway in negotiation. In this manner, visiting US forces may sojourn in Philippine territory for
purposes other than military. As conceived, the joint exercises may include training on new techniques of
patrol and surveillance to protect the nation’s marine resources, sea search-and-destroy operations to
assist vessels in distress, disaster relief operations, civic action projects such as the building of school
houses, medical and humanitarian missions, and the like.
Under these auspices, the VFA gives legitimacy to the current Balikatan exercises. It is only logical to
assume that “Balikatan 02-1,” a “mutual anti-terrorism advising, assisting and training exercise,” falls
under the umbrella of sanctioned or allowable activities in the context of the agreement. Both the history
and intent of the Mutual Defense Treaty and the VFA support the conclusion that combat-related
activities – as opposed to combat itself – such as the one subject of the instant petition, are indeed
authorized. (Arthur D. Lim and Paulino R. Ersando v. Honorable Executive Secretary, G.R. No.
151445, April 11, 2002, En Banc [De Leon])
415.
With the ratification of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA), has it now become obligatory and
incumbent on our part to be bound by its terms even if it is asserted that said agreement contravenes the
Constitution?
Held: With the ratification of the VFA, which is equivalent to final acceptance, and with the exchange of
notes between the Philippines and the United States of America, it now becomes obligatory and
incumbent on our part, under the principles of international law, to be bound by the terms of the
agreement. Thus, no less than Section 2, Article II of the Constitution, declares that the Philippines
adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to
the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations.
As a member of the family of nations, the Philippines agrees to be bound by generally accepted rules for
the conduct of its international relations. While the international obligation devolves upon the state and
not upon any particular branch, institution, or individual member of its government, the Philippines is
nonetheless responsible for violations committed by any branch or subdivision of its government or any
official thereof. As an integral part of the community of nations, we are responsible to assure that our
government, Constitution and laws will carry out our international obligation (Louis Henkin, Richard C.
Pugh, Oscar Schachter, Hans Smit, International Law, Cases and Materials, 2n d Ed., American Casebook
Series, p. 136). Hence, we cannot readily plead the Constitution as a convenient excuse for noncompliance with our obligations, duties and responsibilities under international law.
Beyond this, Article 13 of the Declaration of Rights and Duties of States adopted by the International Law
Commission in 1949 provides: Every State has the duty to carry out in good faith its obligations arising
from treaties and other sources of international law, and it may not invoke provisions in its constitution or
its laws as an excuse for failure to perform this duty. (Gerhard von Glahn, supra, p. 487)
Equally important is Article 26 of the Convention which provides that “Every treaty in force is binding
upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.” This is known as the principle of
pacta sunt servanda which preserves the sanctity of treaties and have been one of the most fundamental
principles of positive international law, supported by the jurisprudence of international tribunals (Harris,
p. 634 cited in Coquia, International Law, supra, p. 512). (BAYAN [Bagong Alyansang Makabayan]
v. Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, G.R. No. 138570, Oct. 10, 2000, 342 SCRA 449, 492493, En Banc [Buena])
416.
What must a person who feels aggrieved by the acts of a foreign sovereign do to espouse his
cause?
Held: Private respondent is not left without any legal remedy for the redress of its grievances.
Under both Public International Law and Transnational Law, a person who feels aggrieved by the acts of
a foreign sovereign can ask his own government to espouse his cause through diplomatic channels.
Private respondent can ask the Philippine government, through the Foreign Office, to espouse its
claims against the Holy See. Its first task is to persuade the Philippine government to take up with the
Holy See the validity of its claim. Of course, the Foreign Office shall first make a determination of the
impact of its espousal on the relations between the Philippine government and the Holy See (Young,
Remedies of Private Claimants Against Foreign States, Selected Readings on Protection by Law of Private
Foreign Investments 905, 919 [1964]). Once the Philippine government decides to espouse the claim,
the latter ceases to be a private cause.
According to the Permanent Court of International Justice, the forerunner of the International
Court of Justice:
“By taking up the case of one of its subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or international judicial
proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own rights - its right to ensure, in the person
of its subjects, respect for the rules of international law” (The Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, 1
Hudson, World Court Reports 293, 302 [1924]).
(Holy See, The v. Rosario, Jr., 238 SCRA 524, 538-539, Dec. 1, 1994, En Banc [Quiason])
417.
What are the conditions before the rights of belligerency may be accorded the rebels?
Ans.: As a matter of legal theory, the rebels have to fulfill certain conditions before the rights of
belligerency are accorded them, namely:
1)
An organized civil government that has control and direction over the armed struggle
launched by the rebels;
2)
Occupation of a substantial portion of the national territory;
3)
Seriousness of the struggle, which must be so widespread thereby leaving no doubt as to the
outcome;
4)
Willingness on the part of the rebels to observe the rules and customs of war.
418.
Discuss the legal consequences that follow recognition of belligerency.
Ans.:
1)
Before recognition as such, it is the legitimate government that is responsible for the acts of the rebels
affecting foreign nationals and their properties. Once recognition is given, the legitimate government may no longer
be held responsible for their acts; responsibility is shifted to the rebel government;
2)
The legitimate government, once it recognizes the rebels as belligerents, is bound to observe the laws
and customs of war in conducting the hostilities;
3)
From the point of view of third States, the effect of recognition of belligerency is to put them under
obligation to observe strict neutrality and abide by the consequences arising from that position;
4)
On the side of the rebels, recognition of belligerency puts them under responsibility to third States and
to the legitimate government for all their acts which do not conform to the laws and customs of war. (Salonga &
Yap, Public International Law, 5th Ed. [1992], p. 33)
419.
Should Courts blindly adhere and take on its face the communication from the Department of
Foreign Affairs (DFA) that a person is covered by any immunity?
Held: Courts cannot blindly adhere and take on its face the communication from the DFA that
petitioner is covered by any immunity. The DFA’s determination that a certain person is covered by
immunity is only preliminary which has no binding effect in courts. In receiving ex parte the DFA’s advice
and in motu proprio dismissing the two criminal cases without notice to the prosecution, the latter’s right
to due process was violated. It should be noted that due process is a right of the accused as much as it
is of the prosecution. The needed inquiry in what capacity petitioner was acting at the time of the
alleged utterances requires for its resolution evidentiary basis that has yet to be presented at the proper
time (See United States v. Guinto, 182 SCRA 644 [1990]). At any rate, it has been ruled that the mere
invocation of the immunity clause does not ipso facto result in the dropping of the charges (Chavez v.
Sandiganbayan, 193 SCRA 282 [1991]). (Liang v. People, 323 SCRA 692, Jan. 28, 2000, 1st Div.
[Ynares-Santiago])
420.
Discuss the basis of the argument that a determination by the DFA that a person is entitled to
diplomatic immunity is a political question binding on the courts.
Held: Petitioner’s argument that a determination by the Department of Foreign Affairs that he is
entitled to diplomatic immunity is a political question binding on the courts, is anchored on the ruling
enunciated in the case of WHO, et al. v. Aquino, et al. (48 SCRA 242 [1972]), viz :
“It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers that
diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a
determination by the executive branch of the government, and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is
recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is then the
duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law
officer of the government, the Solicitor General in this case, or other officer acting under his direction.
Hence, in adherence to the settled principle that courts may not so exercise their jurisdiction by seizure
and detention of property, as to embarrass the executive arm of the government in conducting foreign
relations, it is accepted doctrine that in such cases the judicial department of the government follows the
action of the political branch and will not embarrass the latter by assuming an antagonistic jurisdiction.”
This ruling was reiterated in the subsequent cases of International Catholic Migration Commission
v. Calleja (190 SCRA 130 [1990]); The Holy See v. Rosario, Jr. (238 SCRA 524 [1994]); Lasco v. United
Nations (241 SCRA 681 [1995]); and DFA v. NLRC (262 SCRA 38 [1996]).
The case of WHO v. Aquino involved the search and seizure of personal effects of petitioner
Leonce Verstuyft, an official of the WHO. Verstuyft was certified to be entitled to diplomatic immunity
pursuant to the Host Agreement executed between the Philippines and the WHO.
ICMC v. Calleja concerned a petition for certification election filed against ICMC and IRRI. As
international organizations, ICMC and IRRI were declared to possess diplomatic immunity. It was held
that they are not subject to local jurisdictions. It was ruled that the exercise of jurisdiction by the
Department of Labor over the case would defeat the very purpose of immunity, which is to shield the
affairs of international organizations from political pressure or control by the host country and to ensure
the unhampered performance of their functions.
Holy See v. Rosario, Jr. involved an action for annulment of sale of land against the Holy See, as
represented by the Papal Nuncio. The Court upheld the petitioner’s defense of sovereign immunity. It
ruled that where a diplomatic envoy is granted immunity from the civil and administrative jurisdiction of
the receiving state over any real action relating to private immovable property situated in the territory of
the receiving state, which the envoy holds on behalf of the sending state for the purposes of the mission,
with all the more reason should immunity be recognized as regards the sovereign itself, which in that
case is the Holy See.
In Lasco v. United Nations, the United Nations Revolving Fund for Natural Resources Exploration
was sued before the NLRC for illegal dismissal. The Court again upheld the doctrine of diplomatic
immunity invoked by the Fund.
Finally, DFA v. NLRC involved an illegal dismissal case filed against the Asian Development Bank.
Pursuant to its Charter and the Headquarters Agreement, the diplomatic immunity of the Asian
Development Bank was recognized by the Court.
It bears to stress that all of these cases pertain to the diplomatic immunity enjoyed by
international organizations. Petitioner asserts that he is entitled to the same diplomatic immunity and he
cannot be prosecuted for acts allegedly done in the exercise of his official functions.
The term “international organizations” –
“is generally used to describe an organization set up by agreement between two or more states. Under
contemporary international law, such organizations are endowed with some degree of international legal
personality such that they are capable of exercising specific rights, duties and powers. They are
organized mainly as a means for conducting general international business in which the member states
have an interest.” (ICMC v. Calleja, supra note 2)
International public officials have been defined as:
“x x x persons who, on the basis of an international treaty constituting a particular international
community, are appointed by this international community, or by an organ of it, and are under its control
to exercise, in a continuous way, functions in the interest of this particular international community, and
who are subject to a particular personal status.” (John Kerry King, The Privileges and Immunities of the
Personnel of International Organizations xiii [1949], citing: Suzanne Basdevant, Les Functionnaires
Internationaux [Paris: 1931], Chapter I)
“Specialized agencies” are international organizations having functions in particular fields, such as
posts, telecommunications, railways, canals, rivers, sea transport, civil aviation, meteorology, atomic
energy, finance, trade, education and culture, health and refugees (ICMC v. Calleja, et al., citing Articles
57 and 63 of the United Nations Charter). (Concurring Opinion, Puno J., in Jeffrey Liang
[Huefeng] v. People, G.R. No. 125865, Mar. 26, 2001, 1st Div. [Motion for Reconsideration])
421.
What are the differences between Diplomatic and International Immunities? Discuss.
Held: There are three major differences between diplomatic and international immunities.
Firstly, one of the recognized limitations of diplomatic immunity is that members of the diplomatic staff of
a mission may be appointed from among the nationals of the receiving State only with the express
consent of that State; apart from inviolability and immunity from jurisdiction in respect of official acts
performed in the exercise of their functions, nationals enjoy only such privileges and immunities as may
be granted by the receiving State. International immunities may be specially important in relation to the
State of which the official is a national. Secondly, the immunity of a diplomatic agent from the
jurisdiction of the receiving State does not exempt him from the jurisdiction of the sending State; in the
case of international immunities there is no sending State and an equivalent for the jurisdiction of the
Sending State therefore has to be found either in waiver of immunity or in some international disciplinary
or judicial procedure. Thirdly, the effective sanctions which secure respect for diplomatic immunity are
the principle of reciprocity and the danger of retaliation by the aggrieved State; international immunities
enjoy no similar protection (C. Wilfred Jenks, Contemporary Development in International Immunities
xxxvii [1961]) (Concurring Opinion, Puno J., in Jeffrey Liang [Huefeng] v. People, G.R. No.
125865, Mar. 26, 2001, 1st Div. [Motion for Reconsideration])
422.
Discuss the immunity of International Officials.
Held: The generally accepted principles which are now regarded as the foundation of international
immunities are contained in the ILO Memorandum, which reduced them in three basic propositions,
namely: (1) that international institutions should have a status which protects them against control or
interference by any one government in the performance of functions for the effective discharge of which
they are responsible to democratically constituted international bodies in which all the nations concerned
are represented; (2) that no country should derive any financial advantage by levying fiscal charges on
common international funds; and (3) that the international organization should, as a collectivity of States
Members, be accorded the facilities for the conduct of its official business customarily extended to each
other by its individual member States. The thinking underlying these propositions is essentially
institutional in character. It is not concerned with the status, dignity or privileges of individuals, but with
the elements of functional independence necessary to free international institutions from national control
and to enable them to discharge their responsibilities impartially on behalf of all their members (Id. at
17). (Concurring Opinion, Puno J., in Jeffrey Liang [Huefeng] v. People, G.R. No. 125865,
Mar. 26, 2001, 1st Div. [Motion for Reconsideration])
423.
What are the three methods of granting privileges and immunities to the personnel of
international organizations? Under what category does the Asian Development Bank and its Personnel
fall?
Held: Positive international law has devised three methods of granting privileges and immunities to the
personnel of international organizations. The first is by simple conventional stipulation, as was the case
in the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907. The second is by internal legislation whereby the
government of a state, upon whose territory the international organization is to carry out its functions,
recognizes the international character of the organization and grants, by unilateral measures, certain
privileges and immunities to better assure the successful functioning of the organization and its
personnel. In this situation, treaty obligation for the state in question to grant concessions is lacking.
Such was the case with the Central Commission of the Rhine at Strasbourg and the International Institute
of Agriculture at Rome. The third is a combination of the first two. In this third method, one finds a
conventional obligation to recognize a certain status of an international organization and its personnel,
but the status is described in broad and general terms. The specific definition and application of those
general terms are determined by an accord between the organization itself and the state wherein it is
located. This is the case with the League of Nations, the Permanent Court of Justice, and the United
Nations (J.K. King, supra note 12, at 81).
The Asian Development Bank and its Personnel fall under this third category .
There is a connection between diplomatic privileges and immunities and those extended to
international officials. The connection consists in the granting, by contractual provisions, of the relatively
well-established body of diplomatic privileges and immunities to international functionaries. This
connection is purely historical. Both types of officials find the basis of their special status in the necessity
of retaining functional independence and freedom from interference by the state of residence. However,
the legal relationship between an ambassador and the state to which he is accredited is entirely different
from the relationship between the international official and those states upon whose territory he might
carry out its functions (See Id. at 255).
The privileges and immunities of diplomats and those of international officials rest upon different legal
foundations. Whereas those immunities awarded to diplomatic agents are a right of the sending state
based on customary international law, those granted to international officials are based on treaty or
conventional law. Customary international law places no obligation on a state to recognize a special
status of an international official or to grant him jurisdictional immunities. Such an obligation can only
result from specific treaty provisions (Id. at 25-26).
The special status of the diplomatic envoy is regulated by the principle of reciprocity by which a state is
free to treat the envoy of another state as its envoys are treated by that state. The juridical basis of the
diplomat’s position is firmly established in customary international law. The diplomatic envoy is
appointed by the sending State but it has to make certain that the agreement of the receiving State has
been given for the person it proposes to accredit as head of the mission to that State (Article 4, Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations).
The staff personnel of an international organization – the international officials – assume a different
position as regards their special status. They are appointed or elected to their position by the
organization itself, or by a competent organ of it; they are responsible to the organization and their
official acts are imputed to it. The juridical basis of their special position is found in conventional law
(J.K. King, supra note 12, at xiii), since there is no established basis of usage or custom in the case of the
international official. Moreover, the relationship between an international organization and a memberstate does not admit of the principle of reciprocity (Id. at 27), for it is contradictory to the basic principle
of equality of states. An international organization carries out functions in the interest of every member
state equally. The international official does not carry out his functions in the interest of any state, but in
serving the organization he serves, indirectly, each state equally. He cannot be, legally, the object of the
operation of the principle of reciprocity between states under such circumstances. It is contrary to the
principle of equality of states for one state member of an international organization to assert a capacity
to extract special privileges for its nationals from other member states on the basis of a status awarded
by it to an international organization. It is upon this principle of sovereign equality that international
organizations are built.
It follows from this same legal circumstance that a state called upon to admit an official of an
international organization does not have a capacity to declare him persona non grata.
The functions of the diplomat and those of the international official are quite different. Those of the
diplomat are functions in the national interest. The task of the ambassador is to represent his state, and
its specific interest, at the capital of another state. The functions of the international official are carried
out in the international interest. He does not represent a state or the interest of any specific state. He
does not usually “represent” the organization in the true sense of that term. His functions normally are
administrative, although they may be judicial or executive, but they are rarely political or functions of
representation, such as those of the diplomat.
There is a difference of degree as well as of kind. The interruption of the activities of a diplomatic agent
is likely to produce serious harm to the purposes for which his immunities were granted. But the
interruption of the activities of the international official does not, usually, cause serious dislocation of the
functions of an international secretariat (id. at 254-257).
On the other hand, they are similar in the sense that acts performed in an official capacity by either a
diplomatic envoy or an international official are not attributable to him as an individual but are imputed to
the entity he represents, the state in the case of the diplomat, and the organization in the case of the
international official (Id. at 103). ). (Concurring Opinion, Puno J., in Jeffrey Liang [Huefeng] v.
People, G.R. No. 125865, Mar. 26, 2001, 1st Div. [Motion for Reconsideration])
424.
What is the reason behind the current tendency of reducing privileges and immunities of
personnel of international organizations to a minimum?
Held: Looking back over 150 years of privileges and immunities granted to the personnel of
international organizations, it is clear that they were accorded a wide scope of protection in the exercise
of their functions – The Rhine Treaty of 1804 between the German Empire and France which provided
“all the rights of neutrality” to persons employed in regulating navigation in the international interest; The
Treaty of Berlin of 1878 which granted the European Commission of the Danube “complete independence
of territorial authorities” in the exercise of its functions; The Convention of the League which granted
“diplomatic immunities and privileges.” Today, the age of the United Nations finds the scope of
protection narrowed. The current tendency is to reduce privileges and immunities of personnel of
international organizations to a minimum. The tendency cannot be considered as a lowering of the
standard but rather as a recognition that the problem on the privileges and immunities of international
officials is new. The solution to the problem presented by the extension of diplomatic prerogatives to
international functionaries lies in the general reduction of the special position of both types of agents in
that the special status of each agent is granted in the interest of function. The wide grant of diplomatic
prerogatives was curtailed because of practical necessity and because the proper functioning of the
organization did not require such extensive immunity for its officials. While the current direction of the
law seems to be to narrow the prerogatives of the personnel of international organizations, the reverse is
true with respect to the prerogatives of the organizations themselves, considered as legal entities.
Historically, states have been more generous in granting privileges and immunities to organizations than
they have to the personnel of these organizations (J.K. King, supra note 12, at 253-268).
Thus, Section 2 of the General Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations states
that the UN shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process except insofar as in any particular case
it has expressly waived its immunity. Section 4 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the
Specialized Agencies likewise provides that the specialized agencies shall enjoy immunity from every form
of legal process subject to the same exception. Finally, Article 50[1] of the ADB Charter and Section 5 of
the Headquarters Agreement similarly provide that the bank shall enjoy immunity from every form of
legal process, except in cases arising out of or in connection with the exercise of its powers to borrow
money, to guarantee obligations, or to buy and sell or underwrite the sale of securities.
The phrase “immunity from every form of legal process” as used in the UN General Convention has been
interpreted to mean absolute immunity from a state’s jurisdiction to adjudicate or enforce its law by legal
process, and it is said that states have not sought to restrict that immunity of the United Nations by
interpretation or amendment. Similar provisions are contained in the Special Agencies Convention as well
as in the ADB Charter and Headquarters Agreement. These organizations were accorded privileges and
immunities in their charters by language similar to that applicable to the United Nations. It is clear
therefore that these organizations were intended to have similar privileges and immunities (1
Restatement of the Law Third 498-501). From this, it can be easily deduced that international
organizations enjoy absolute immunity similar to the diplomatic prerogatives granted to diplomatic
envoys.
Even in the United States this seems to be the prevailing rule x x x.
On the other hand, international officials are governed by a different rule. Section 18[a] of the General
Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations states that officials of the United Nations
shall be immune from legal process in respect of words spoken or written and all acts performed by them
in their official capacity. The Convention on Specialized Agencies carries exactly the same provision. The
Charter of the ADB provides under Article 55[i] that officers and employees of the bank shall be immune
from legal process with respect to acts performed by them in their official capacity except when the Bank
waives immunity. Section 45 [a] of the ADB Headquarters Agreement accords the same immunity to the
officers and staff of the bank. There can be no dispute that international officials are entitled to
immunity only with respect to acts performed in their official capacity, unlike international organizations
which enjoy absolute immunity.
Clearly, the most important immunity to an international official, in the discharge of his international
functions, is immunity from local jurisdiction. There is no argument in doctrine or practice with the
principle that an international official is independent of the jurisdiction of the local authorities for his
official acts. Those acts are not his, but are imputed to the organization, and without waiver the local
courts cannot hold him liable for them. In strict law, it would seem that even the organization itself could
have no right to waive an official’s immunity for his official acts. This permits local authorities to assume
jurisdiction over an individual for an act which is not, in the wider sense of the term, his act al all. It is
the organization itself, as a juristic person, which should waive its own immunity and appear in court, not
the individual, except insofar as he appears in the name of the organization. Provisions for immunity
from jurisdiction for official acts appear, aside from the aforementioned treatises, in the constitution of
most modern international organizations. The acceptance of the principle is sufficiently widespread to
be regarded as declaratory of international law (J.K. King, supra note 12, at 258-259) (Concurring
Opinion, Puno J., in Jeffrey Liang [Huefeng] v. People, G.R. No. 125865, Mar. 26, 2001, 1 st
Div. [Motion for Reconsideration])
425.
What is the status of the international official with respect to his private acts?
Held: Section 18 [a] of the General Convention has been interpreted to mean that officials of
the specified categories are denied immunity from local jurisdiction for acts of their private life and
empowers local courts to assume jurisdiction in such cases without the necessity of waiver (Id. at 186).
It has earlier been mentioned that historically, international officials were granted diplomatic privileges
and immunities and were thus considered immune for both private and official acts. In practice, this
wide grant of diplomatic prerogatives was curtailed because of practical necessity and because the proper
functioning of the organization did not require such exclusive immunity for its officials. Thus, the current
status of the law does not maintain that states grant jurisdictional immunity to international officials for
acts of their private lives (But see id. at 259. It is important to note that the submission of international
officials to local jurisdiction for private acts is not completely accepted in doctrine and theory. Jenks, in
particular, has argued for complete jurisdictional immunity, as has Hammarskjold.). This much is explicit
from the charter and Headquarters Agreement of the ADB which contain substantially similar provisions
to that of the General convention. (Concurring Opinion, Puno J., in Jeffrey Liang [Huefeng] v.
People, G.R. No. 125865, Mar. 26, 2001, 1st Div. [Motion for Reconsideration])
426.
Who is competent to determine whether a given act of international officials and representatives
is private or official?
Held: In connection with this question, the current tendency to narrow the scope of privileges
ad immunities of international officials and representatives is most apparent. Prior to the regime of the
United Nations, the determination of this question rested with the organization and its decision was final.
By the new formula, the state itself tends to assume this competence. If the organization is dissatisfied
with the decision, under the provisions of the General Convention of the United Nations, or the Special
Convention for Specialized Agencies, the Swiss Arrangement, and other current dominant instruments, it
may appeal to an international tribunal by procedures outlined in these instruments. Thus, the state
assumes this competence in the first instance. It means that, if a local court assumes jurisdiction over an
act without the necessity of waiver from the organization, the determination of the nature of the act is
made at the national level (Id. at 260-261).
It appears that the inclination is to place the competence to determine the nature of an act as
private or official in the courts of the state concerned. That the practical notion seems to be to leave to
the local courts determination of whether or not a given act is official or private does not necessarily
mean that such determination is final. If the United Nations questions the decision of the Court, it may
invoke proceedings for settlement of disputes between the organization and the member states as
provided in Section 30 of the General Convention. Thus, the decision as to whether a given act is official
or private is made by the national courts in the first instance, but it may be subjected to review in the
international level if questioned by the United Nations (Id. at 189).
xxx
Under the Third Restatement of the Law, it is suggested that since an international official does not enjoy
personal inviolability from arrest or detention and has immunity only with respect to official acts, he is
subject to judicial or administrative process and must claim his immunity in the proceedings by showing
that the act in question was an official act. Whether an act was performed in the individual’s official
capacity is a question for the court in which a proceeding is brought, but if the international organization
disputes the court’s finding, the dispute between that organization and the state of the forum is to be
resolved by negotiation, by an agreed mode of settlement or by advisory opinion of the International
Court of Justice (Restatement of the Law Third 512).
Recognizing the difficulty that by reason of the right of a national court to assume jurisdiction over
private acts without a waiver of immunity, the determination of the official or private character of a
particular act may pass from international to national, Jenks proposes three ways of avoiding difficulty in
the matter. The first would be for a municipal court before which a question of the official or private
character of a particular act arose to accept as conclusive in the matter any claim by the international
organization that the act was official in character, such a claim being regarded as equivalent to a
governmental claim that a particular act is an act of State. Such a claim would be in effect a claim by the
organization that the proceedings against the official were a violation of the jurisdictional immunity of the
organization itself which is unqualified and therefore not subject to delimitation in the discretion of the
municipal court. The second would be for a court to accept as conclusive in the matter a statement by
the executive government of the country where the matter arises certifying the official character of the
act. The third would be to have recourse to the procedure of international arbitration. Jenks opines that
it is possible that none of these three solutions would be applicable in all cases; the first might be readily
acceptable only in the clearest cases and the second is available only if the executive government of the
country where the matter arises concurs in the view of the international organization concerning the
official character of the act. However, he surmises that taken in combination, these various possibilities
may afford the elements of a solution to the problem (Jenks, supra note 14, at 117-118). (Concurring
Opinion, Puno J., in Jeffrey Liang [Huefeng] v. People, G.R. No. 125865, Mar. 26, 2001, 1 st
Div. [Motion for Reconsideration])
427.
Discuss the extent of the international official’s immunity for official acts.
Held: One final point. The international official’s immunity for official acts may be likened to a
consular official’s immunity from arrest, detention, and criminal or civil process which is not absolute but
applies only to acts or omissions in the performance of his official functions, in the absence of special
agreement. Since a consular officer is not immune from all legal processes, he must respond to any
process and plead and prove immunity on the ground that the act or omission underlying the process
was in the performance of his official functions. The issue has not been authoritatively determined, but
apparently the burden is on the consular official to prove his status as well as his exemption in the
circumstances. In the United States, the US Department of State generally has left it to the courts to
determine whether a particular act was within a consular officer’s official duties (1 Restatement of the
Law Third 475-477). (Concurring Opinion, Puno J., in Jeffrey Liang [Huefeng] v. People, G.R.
No. 125865, Mar. 26, 2001, 1st Div. [Motion for Reconsideration])
428.
State the occasions when the use of force may be allowed under the UN Charter.
Ans.: There are only two occasions when the use of force is allowed under the UN Charter. The first is
when it is authorized in pursuance of the enforcement action that may be decreed by the Security Council
under Art. 42. The second is when it is employed in the exercise of the inherent right of self-defense
under conditions prescribed in Art. 51. (Justice Isagani A. Cruz, in an article entitled “A New
World Order” written in his column “Separate Opinion” published in the March 30, 2003
issue of the Philippines Daily Inquirer)
429.
Is the United States justified in invading Iraq invoking its right to defend itself against an
expected attack by Iraq with the use of its biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction?
Ans.: The United States is invoking its right to defend itself against an expected attack by Iraq with the
use of its biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction. There is no evidence of such a threat,
but Bush is probably invoking the modern view that a state does not have to wait until the potential
enemy fires first. The cowboy from Texas says that outdrawing the foe who is about to shoot is an act of
self-defense.
Art. 51 says, however, that there must first be an “armed attack” before a state can exercise its inherent
right of self-defense, and only until the Security Council, to which the aggression should be reported,
shall have taken the necessary measures to maintain international peace and security. It was the United
States that made the “armed attack” first, thus becoming the aggressor, not Iraq. Iraq is now not only
exercising its inherent right of self-defense as recognized by the UN Charter. (Justice Isagani A. Cruz,
in an article entitled “A New World Order” written in his column “Separate Opinion”
published in the March 30, 2003 issue of the Philippines Daily Inquirer)
430.
Will the subsequent discovery of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq after its invasion by the US
justify the attack initiated by the latter?
Ans.: Even if Iraq’s hidden arsenal is discovered – or actually used – and the United States is justified in
its suspicions, that circumstance will not validate the procedure taken against Iraq. It is like searching a
person without warrant and curing the irregularity with the discovery of prohibited drugs in his
possession. The process cannot be reversed. The warrant must first be issued before the search and
seizure can be made.
The American invasion was made without permission from the Security Council as required by the UN
Charter. Any subsequent discovery of the prohibited biological and chemical weapons will not
retroactively legalize that invasion, which was, legally speaking, null and void ab initio. (Justice Isagani
A. Cruz, in an article entitled “A New World Order” written in his column “Separate Opinion”
published in the March 30, 2003 issue of the Philippines Daily Inquirer)