Moral Enhancement and the Family
Assume that by using chemical, electric or surgical means, it is possible to affect the way human
beings engage in moral decision making. This possibility, which is termed 'moral enhancement',
has attracted a great deal of attention in the last few years. Given the progress in
understanding the neural mechanisms which are involved in moral decision making, questions
which were no more than science fiction just a short time ago are becoming practical. Thus, for
example, neural modeling of moral decision making paves the way to understanding both the
way moral decisions are taken and the way in which those mechanisms fail or malfunction.
Other studies point to the possibility of "curing" of psychopaths' brains through surgical
procedures. Similarly, progress in the understanding of the chemical aspects of brain activity
might enable the cultivation of tendencies such as trust or empathy through pharmacological
means.
The possibility of moral enhancement has been discussed mainly in the context of adjusting the
moral decision making mechanism to the nature of modern moral dilemmas. Intuitive moral
judgment faces difficulties in such contexts? As human moral psychology is the result of
evolutionary processes, it enables cooperation only within close-knit societies, where interdependence is limited to direct interactions between close parties. In the modern world it is
possible, in addition, to cause widespread harm or to provide aid to distant populations. In
these modern conditions, intuitive moral judgments lead to disturbing results. Common moral
judgments are sensitive to features like geographical proximity or physical contact between
people, a fact which is seen as a shortcoming of the decision mechanism. Similarly, such
judgments tend to be insensitive to differences in big numbers (such as the difference between
hurting 1 or 1.2 million people); or to give exaggerated weight to the distinction between
causing harm and allowing it to happen. Advocates of moral enhancement identify these
tendencies as cognitive defects of the human reasoning, which should be fixed in order to face
modern challenges such as global warming (which involves causing harm to future and
unidentified victims through a complex causal mechanism); the modern battlefield (which
raises concerns of mass destruction); or the technological ability to provide famine relief to
distant unidentified strangers.1 Due to scientific progress, "fixing" these tendencies might be
practical in the near future. It is worthwhile, then, to lay the theoretic foundation before the
technological possibility.
1
See, for example, Ruud ter Meulen et al. (eds.), Enhancing Human Capacities (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), ch.
34; Ingmar Persson & Julian Savulescu, Unfit for the Future: The Need for Moral Enhancement (Oxford: OUP,
2012); Ingmar Persson & Julian Savulescu, "The perils of cognitive enhancement and the urgent imperative to
enhance the moral character of humanity" 25 J Appl. Phil. 162 (2008).
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Is moral enhancement morally permitted? Is it advisable? Discussions of these questions tend
to focus on concerns about the loss of authenticity which emerges from artificial interference
with the mechanism of reasoning. Yet it is necessary to expand the discussion from the
legitimacy of the means of moral enhancement to include the desired end of such
enhancement. In contrast to other projects of enhancement (like making human beings
healthier, smarter or more able to concentrate) where the direction of enhancement is clear,
moral enhancement involves another difficulty. Enhancing sensitivity to strangers might come
on the expense of the consolidation of communities and impair the empathy to the neighbor;
furthermore, abolishing the distinctions regarding causality might radically change our
conception of personal responsibility. In sum, the debate about authenticity in moral
enhancement overlooks an equally important issue brought up by such potential: moral
enhancement to what end?
Thus, any discussion of moral enhancement must also include a theory about the proper way to
decide such questions in a society which is deeply divided by moral disputes. The problem
worsens when the functioning of democratic institutions depends to agreat extent on the
outcome of the enhancement project, whether in the degree and quality of interconnectedness
of citizens or the manner in which it spurs people to political action. Can a democratic state
require its citizens to undergo moral enhancement, or is this something which lies in the heart
of the private autonomic sphere?
Although the discussions on this topic are relatively new, the debate over it seems to have
come to a dead end. In the proposed research I wish to shed light on the issue by utilizing an
analogy from the realm of family law theory. The limits of legitimacy in shaping the moral
character of people and the relations between the state and the individual are constantly
discussed with respect to the parental versus state right to control the content of children’s
education. Questions about the proper power allocated to political institutions in determining
the content of education, or the state's right to promote moral and political views against the
values of the parents' community, gained substantial scholarly attention and a stable normative
and conceptual framework. A special discussion was devoted to the possibility of "democratic
education" namely to the existence of content that should serve as a basis for education in any
democratic society.
The parallel between the questions of state mandated education and the shaping of children’s
attitudes at a young age and those surrounding moral enhancement provides an initial
Archimedean point for this project. Yet one must also note the limits of this parallel and the
contexts in which it is inadequate. In what way does the scientific-technological nature of moral
enhancement affect the relevant considerations? Does it hint to a deeper threat to the
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autonomy and responsibility of the enhanced individual? Could familial education, state
education and state technological intervention all be seen as parts of the same spectrum
between autonomy and intervention? And in what way are those questions related to the
nature of democracy and the arguments in favor of such regime? This research aims to provide
an original and fruitful perspective on the important contemporary discussion of moral
enhancement, while at the same time providing new insights for the legitimacy of state
education.