What is Behind the ti esti Question?
Vasilis Politis
‘You must not suppose, Protagoras, that I engage in conversation with you
with any other desire than to examine (διασκέψασθαι) those very things
that I am myself in each case puzzling over (ἃ αὐτὸς ἀπορῶ ἑκάστοτε).’
Protagoras 348c5-7, Socrates to Protagoras
We all know that, in a number of apparently early dialogues, Plato has Socrates demand a
definition of some concept or other, Φ, typically a moral concept: a definition in the
broad sense of a correct answer to the question ti esti Φ; (henceforth τί ἐστι). This
demand is so familiar and seemingly well-understood that it has come to appear a basic
trade-mark of these dialogues, an essential part of the gestalt that we associate with the
philosopher; so much so that it may seem that to ask for Plato’s rationale for making this
demand – for raising the τί ἐστι question in the way in which he does raise it and for
placing the weight on it that he does – is a little bizarre in the way in which it would be
bizarre to ask for the reason why Schubert sounds Schubertian or Beethoven
Beethovenian: it wouldn’t be Plato if he didn’t sound like that, the impression appears to
be. There is, however, an assumption behind this impression, and this is that the demand
for definitions is, in the order of inquiry, primary and basic: the assumption is that there
is nothing in these dialogues that serves to motivate and justify the demand for
definitions and the inquiries modelled on this demand.
This assumption, however, it seems to me, is not beyond question, in fact it is
problematic. The reason is that that the demand for definitions, as Plato articulates it, is
very strong indeed and, therefore, seriously in need of justification; and the implication is
that, unless these dialogues provide at least for the attempt to justify it, the demand for
definitions and thus an undoubtedly central element in the philosophy of these dialogues
will be problematic if not flawed. The reason why the demand for definitions is so strong
is that in these dialogues Plato associates the question τί ἐστι Φ; – and this question is
not Platonic property but is, in Greek as in English, a request for a standard for a thing’s
being Φ, i.e. a request for something by reference to which (ἀποβλέπων πρός / εἰς τι, as
Plato often says) we can determine of a thing whether it is such as to be Φ – with a series
of requirements, in particular the requirements of: generality, unity, and explanatoriness.
I shall formulate these requirements presently, but the generality requirement, which
shall particularly occupy us in this paper, can be formulated as follows: the answer to the
question τί ἐστι Φ; may not consist in pointing to an exemplar (παράδειγμα) of a
particular thing that is Φ, ‘exemplar’ in the sense of an instance of a thing that is Φ that is
suitable for providing a standard for a thing’s being Φ – it is this requirement that directly
rules out Hippias’ desire to define beauty by pointing to some particular maiden of
exemplary beauty, whichever one Socrates or we the readers may care to call to mind. The
problem, and the reason why the demand for definitions stands in need of justification, is
that it is not part of the basic meaning of the τί ἐστι question, in Greek or in English,
that it should be associated with any of these requirements. The basic meaning of the τί
ἐστι question is provided by the fact that it is a request for a standard for a thing’s being
Φ, ‘standard’ in the sense of something by reference to which we can determine of a thing
whether it is such as to be Φ (I shall refer to this as ‘the standard requirement’, pun
intended); but it is not the case that the standard requirement directly implies any of the
generality, unity, or explanatoriness requirements. We ought, therefore, to ask why – with
what motivation and justification – Plato associates the τί ἐστι question with these
requirements.
My aim in this paper is threefold. First (section 1) I want to articulate what I
shall call the problem regarding the demand for definitions: the problem is that, for
reasons just indicated, this central element in these dialogues stands in need of
justification; but it is not clear what in the dialogues, if anything, is supposed to justify it.
Second (section 2), I want to consider whether this problem has been properly
recognized in the critical literature, whether there have been attempts to resolve it and to
locate in the dialogues the needed justification, and whether the problem has been
resolved. My impression is that, in spite of Peter Geach’s provocation1 – we may recall his
charge that Plato’s association of the τί ἐστι question with the generality requirement
1
Geach 1966.
amounts to ‘a fallacy’ – and the extended responses that this charge has provoked in the
scholarly community over the past forty years, the nature or extent of the problem has not
been properly recognized much less has the problem been resolved.
Third (section 3), I want to sketch (for present purposes this is no more than a
sketch) a proposal for how the problem can be resolved, that is, a proposal for what in
these dialogues is supposed to provide the motivation and justification for, first, raising
the τί ἐστι question and placing on it such weight, and, second, for associating the τί ἐστι
question with the generality requirement (leaving aside for another occasion the
requirements of unity and explanatoriness).
1. THE PROBLEM REGARDING THE DEMAND FOR DEFINITIONS
We may formulate the problem as follows, the problem of why, with what motivation and
justification, Plato associates the τί ἐστι question with certain stringent requirement of
definition:
(1) The τί ἐστι question, as raised and addressed in these dialogues, is associated
with certain stringent requirements for how it must be answered, requirements that
help determine the nature of the particular searches for an answer to it – they
include the requirements of: generality, unity, and explanatoriness (more on these
below);
(2) (a) These requirements, and the generality requirement in the first instance, are
substantive; i.e. it is not part of the basic meaning of the τί ἐστι question that it
must be answered in conformity with them; therefore, (b) this association and these
requirements stand in need of justification;
(3) It is not at all clear from the dialogues what, if anything, serves to motivate and
justify this association and these requirements, and the generality requirement in
particular.
Let me first offer a brief comment on this statement of the problem. 1 ought to be
uncontroversial. It is remarkable that the particular searches in these dialogues for the τί
ἐστι of a certain concept Φ are considerably shaped by these requirements: it is in large
part because of these requirements that the searches take the form they do and, especially,
that they go beyond answering the question τί ἐστι Φ; simply by appeal to a suitable
example of a particular thing that is Φ, i.e. (as we shall see) an example that can function
as a standard for a particular thing’s being Φ – go beyond the kind of undemanding
answer favoured by Hippias (in the Hippias Major). 2 is crucial for deciding whether there
really is a problem, and I shall consider it in due course (see section 2, under the heading
On the no-problem response). 3 ought to be uncontroversial. The point is not, of course, that
it is clear from the dialogues that there is nothing that serves to motivate and justify the
association of the τί ἐστι question with these requirements; only that it is not at all clear
what, if anything, serves to accomplish this, or how it is meant to accomplish it. I note
that some critics, in particular Russell Dancy, while rightly demanding that we look for
such justification in Plato, appear to despair of the prospect of our finding any2 – but I
am more optimistic.
THE REQUIREMENTS OF DEFINITION
Properly to articulate the problem, we need first of all to attend to the requirements that
Socrates appears to introduce as a way of indicating how the τί ἐστι question may not be
answered and how it must be answered – we may call them the requirements of
definition. It is generally recognized that Socrates will often react to the interlocutor’s
ready response to his τί ἐστι question by insisting that the question, or the question as he
intends it, may not be answered in the way in which the interlocutor wants to answer it,
and by in various ways indicating how it must be answered. Textually to trace the variety
of ways in which Socrates indicates this is not our present task; this has been well
undertaken by many critics (most recently and systematically, Russell Dancy, note one
above), part of whose aim has also, and I think rightly, been to formulate Socrates’ variety
of proscriptions and prescriptions in terms of a set of general requirements. In what
follows I offer my own set and formulations, followed by some comments.
2
Dancy 2004.
R1 The standard requirement
The answer to the question τί ἐστι Φ; must appeal to something that can function as a
standard for a thing’s being Φ, i.e. something by reference to which it is possible to
determine of a thing whether it is such as to be Φ.
R2 The generality requirement
The question τί ἐστι Φ; may not be answered by pointing to a particular that is Φ – may
not be answered ‘by example’ or ‘ostensively’.
R2a The strong generality requirement
The answer to the question τί ἐστι Φ; may not contain ineliminable reference to
particulars and must refer only to properties.
RX The co-extensivity requirement
The answer to the question τί ἐστι Φ; must refer to a property or a set of properties that is
true of all and only the things that are Φ.
R3 The unity requirement
The answer to the question τί ἐστι Φ; must be in terms of a single property by reference
to which it is possible, in each and every case (i.e. each and every case in which the question
of determining of a thing whether it is such as to be Φ is raised), to determine whether a
thing is such as to be Φ.
R4 The explanatoriness requirement
The answer to the question τί ἐστι Φ; must be in terms of that because of which a thing
that is Φ is, precisely, Φ.
As set out above, these requirements (with the exception of the co-extensivity
requirement, more on whose status below) are meant to be serially ordered, in an order
from weaker and less demanding to stronger and more demanding; and I think there is
evidence that Plato intends some such ordering. We shall consider the logical relations
among the requirements in due course, but first let us attend to these requirements
individually.
On the standard requirement
This, apparently, is the basic requirement, which indicates the basic sense of the τί ἐστι
question and the basic intention in raising it: the question τί ἐστι Φ; is a request for a
standard for a thing’s being Φ, i.e. something by reference to which – by looking to which
– it is possible to determine of a thing whether it is such as to be Φ. While with regard to
the other requirements it is a genuine issue whether it is part of the meaning of the τί
ἐστι question that it must be answered in conformity with them, there can be no doubt
that it is part of its meaning that it must be answered in conformity with the standard
requirement; and to fail to recognize this (as, according to some critics, some
interlocutors fail to do) is to be guilty of misunderstanding the τί ἐστι question and, in all
likelihood, confusing it with the request for what things are Φ. The standard requirement
also indicates that the τί ἐστι question, as intended by Socrates and as understood by (at
least most of) the interlocutors, though it may sound and look deceptively similar to the
request for what things are Φ, is clearly distinct and very different from that request.
Clearly the request for what things are Φ (or what things are Φ within a circumscribed
area, e.g. what rivers there are, say, in Ireland or in Greece) is not a request for a standard
for a thing’s being Φ, indeed it makes no mention of the notion of a standard. And even
if that request is thought to contain implicit reference to the notion of a standard, or to
use that notion, what it is a request for is the application of a particular standard in a
particular case, whereas the τί ἐστι question is the request for the standard itself.
I add one comment on this requirement.
Why ‘a standard for a thing’s being Φ’ and not ‘a standard for any thing’s being Φ’? It is
certainly true that Socrates appears to prefer, indeed to require the latter formulation. For
he demands that they search not only for a standard for a thing’s being Φ, but for one
single standard by reference to which it is possible, in each and every case (i.e. each and
every case in which the question of determining of a thing whether it is such as to be Φ is
raised), to determine whether a thing is such as to be Φ. The principle to which he
commits himself here, we may say, is not simply a one-over-many principle, but a one-
over-all principle. However, it appears that this requirement (we shall refer it under R3,
the unity requirement) is a substantial one, and that it is not part of the basic meaning of
the τί ἐστι question, a meaning which is largely specified by the standard requirement,
that it must be answered in conformity with this requirement. The standard requirement,
at least to the extent that it is constitutive of the basic meaning of the τί ἐστι question as
this meaning is understood by both Socrates and his interlocutors (or at least those
interlocutors who do not totally misunderstand the question and confuse it with the
request for what things are Φ), is compatible with thinking that there may be, indeed
typically will be, more than one standard for a thing’s being Φ, one being appropriate for
determining some cases, another appropriate for determining other cases.
Plato, it appears, is not committed to the view that the one-over-all requirement is
part of, or directly follows from the standard requirement; on the contrary, he appears to
think that this view is substantive and questionable. In the Hippias Major, where Socrates
asks τί ἐστι τὸ καλόν; (‘What is beauty?’, ‘What is a beautiful thing?’, ‘What is it for a
thing to be beautiful?’), he has Hippias’ first response be: ‘a beautiful maiden is a
beautiful thing’ (παρθένος καλὴ καλόν) and by ‘a beautiful maiden’ he apparently means
some particular maiden of exemplary beauty, whichever one Socrates (or we the reader)
desire to invoke. And while some critics take this response to be evidence that Hippias
confuses this τί ἐστι question with the request for what things are beautiful, the right way
to understand the response, it seems to me, is as demonstrating that Hippias has perfectly
understood that this τί ἐστι question is a request for a standard of a thing’s being
beautiful, and he thinks, rightly or wrongly but clearly not confusedly, that a beautiful
maiden may function as an exemplar, and therefore standard, of a beautiful thing. What
Socrates then goes on to do, in effect, is ask Hippias whether a beautiful maiden is also a
standard and exemplar of, say, a beautiful horse. The force of this query, it appears, is
that even if a beautiful maiden is a standard and exemplar of some beautiful things (such
as, for instance, beautiful humans), is it also a standard and exemplar of other beautiful
things, such as, for instance, beautiful horses? And, by extension, is it a standard of all
beautiful things? It is less clear, however, whether Socrates’ query is by way of objection or
by way of clarification. Remarkably, Hippias does not take it to be an objection, for he
appears happy to concede that a beautiful maiden may not be an appropriate standard
and exemplar of a beautiful horse. And he clarifies that if Socrates wonders how this
concession can accord with his, Hippias’, answer that a beautiful maiden is a standard
and exemplar of a beautiful thing, it is enough to point out that he could equally well
have answered that a particular horse of exemplary beauty, whichever one Socrates desires
to call to mind, may function as a standard and exemplar of a beautiful thing; and, he
goes on to add, he could equally well have answered that a particular pot of exemplary
beauty may likewise so function. Hippias’ line of response here appears clearly to
exemplify and illustrate the view that the standard requirement is part of the basic
intention in raising the τί ἐστι question but that this does not contain or directly imply
the one-over-all requirement. Plato apparently wants to point out that it is at least
questionable whether the standard requirement contains, or directly implies the one-overall requirement.
On the generality requirement
This is the requirement that caused Geach such offence that he labelled it ‘a fallacy’ and,
even more notoriously, ‘the Socratic fallacy’; on the grounds that, as he insisted, ‘we know
heaps of things without being able to define the terms in which we express our
knowledge’ and, more soberly and carefully, that ‘formal definitions are only one way of
elucidating terms; a set of examples may in a given case be more useful than a formal
definition’.3 Now, setting entirely to one side the provocative connotations attached to
Geach’s choice of the term ‘fallacy’, a provocation that, remarkably, has recurrently been
stinging critics for the last three or four decades, and freely admitting that he went too far
not only in his choice of tone but also in his claim that this requirement is manifestly
mistaken, I think that Geach raised a challenge to Plato’s demand for definitions that is
fair, appropriate, and, if suitably taken up, thoroughly constructive. The challenge is,
simply: What, in Plato, motivates and justifies the generality requirement? Why does
Plato think answering the τί ἐστι question by example is not licit or adequate? And what
does he think is illicit or inadequate about answering the τί ἐστι question by example?
Unless this challenge can be met and these questions answered, Plato’s method of inquiry
in these dialogues, which is crucially associated not only with the request for answers to τί
3
Geach 1966: 371.
ἐστι questions but with the demand that such answers be general definitions, will be
flawed or certainly problematical at its root. Moreover, far from this challenge being
indicative of our importing into the study of these dialogues critical or philosophical
assumptions (some said against Geach: Wittgensteinian assumptions) 4 that may or may
not be appropriate, it would be more correct to say that Plato is directly responsible for
and practically invites the challenge. At its core, the request for answers to the question τί
ἐστι Φ; is a request for a standard for a thing’s being Φ. But, it readily ought to be
admitted, it is entirely natural to think that this request can, at least generally and in the
absence of particular reasons to the contrary, be answered by pointing to an example of a
thing that is Φ; an example not simply in the sense of an instance, but in the sense of an
exemplar. And it is far from clear that there is anything objectionable in this view.
Moreover, Plato appears deliberately and pointedly to illustrate the intuitiveness of this
view by having interlocutors regularly respond to Socrates’ request by appealing to what
they consider familiar and readily acknowledged exemplars of things that are Φ. It ought,
therefore, to come as some surprise that Socrates rules out this response, indeed there
appears to be some tension between the standard requirement, which seems basic and
indicative of the core meaning of the τί ἐστι question, and the generality requirement.
On the co-extensivity requirement
This requirement does not call for much comment, though it is worth pointing out its
peculiar status. For it appears (I cannot argue the point here) that it is not an
independent requirement but follows directly from the generality requirement. It is also
worth obviating a certain mistake about the implications of this requirement. For it may
be tempting to think – and a number of critics appear to have thought – that an
implication of the co-extensivity requirement is that it must be possible to appeal to
apparent instances of things that are Φ for the purpose of testing or at least providing a
check on a proposed answer to the question τί ἐστι Φ; But there is no such implication;
the co-extensivity requirement does not imply that what appears to one to be and what
one believes are instances of things that are Φ can provide a condition, whether sufficient
or only necessary, for the correctness of a proposed answer to the question τί ἐστι Φ;
4
E.g. W. Prior 1998: 102-3.
What it implies is something much weaker and neutral with regard to the issue of the
status of examples and instances; namely, that the set of beliefs comprising one’s
proposed answer to the question τί ἐστι Φ;, on the one hand, and the particular things
that one believes are Φ, on the other, must be consistent. But this implication leaves it
quite open how, in the case in which this set is not consistent, it can and ought to be
made consistent: whether by revising the proposed account of the τί ἐστι of Φ, or by
revising one’s beliefs about what particular things are Φ, or in some other way. It follows
that although it is clearly true that, in response to an answer proposed by the interlocutor
to the question τί ἐστι Φ;, Socrates in these dialogues often appeals to what the
interlocutor and perhaps he too believes are instances and examples of things that are or
are not Φ, and does so clearly by way of objection to the proposed answer, this in no way
shows that he, or Plato, is committed to the view that the appeal to apparent instances of
things that are Φ can provide a test or even a check on a proposed answer to the question
τί ἐστι Φ;
On the unity requirement
This requirement is most memorably exemplified and illustrated in a famous and often
commented upon passage from the Meno (71d-73a). In response to Socrates’ question
‘What is virtue?’ Meno offers an account remarkable precisely for its apparent lack of
unity – a feature Meno appears deliberately to intend, for he points it out and welcomes
it when he says, using a memorable phrase which is difficult to translate both
idiomatically and so as to preserve the term ἀπορία in it, that virtue is so various and
manifold ‘that there is no difficulty in saying with regard to it what it is’ (ὥστε οὐκ
ἀπορία εἰπεῖν ἀρετῆς πέρι ὅτι ἐστίν, 72a1-2). And Socrates goes on to demand that he
must, on the contrary, give a unified account; and he spells out at some length and with
some care – and famously by invoking the bee analogy – how he is to do this and how the
required unity is to be understood. Socrates’ demand is summed up in a succinct
statement which looks distinctively like a distillation of the unity requirement: ‘even if the
virtues are various and manifold, for sure they have all one and the same identical pattern
because of which they are virtues (ἕν γέ τι εἶδος ταὐτὸν ἅπασαι ἔχουσιν δι’ ὃ εἰσὶν
ἀρεταί), which pattern one surely would do well to look to (ἀποβλέπειν εἰς) if one
intends to answer the questioner and point out to him that which virtue is’ (72c6-d1).
On the explanatoriness requirement
The locus classicus for this requirement of definition is Euthyphro 9e-11b, the passage in
which the so-called Euthyphro-dilemma is famously stated when Socrates asks Euthyphro:
‘Is what is pious loved by the gods because it is pious or is it pious because it is loved by
the gods?’ (10a2-3). The immediate aim of the passage, and of raising this dilemmatic
question, is to argue against (some would say ‘refute’) Euthyphro’s proposed definition of
what is pious as ‘what all the gods love’ (9e1-3). And this argument proceeds along what
are commonly thought to be standard lines of Socratic elenchus (‘testing’, ‘refutation’), in
that Socrates elicits from Euthyphro an answer in favour of the one side and against the
other of this dilemma, namely, that what is pious ‘is loved [by the gods] because it is
pious, and it is not the case that it is pious because it is loved [by the gods]’ (10d6-8); and
he goes on to show without much difficulty that this answer is inconsistent with his
proposed definition – on the supposition, notably (which Socrates has not omitted to
make explicit), that that definition may naturally be understood in such a way as to imply
that what is pious is pious because it is loved by all the gods. Euthyphro, having yet again
failed to answer the question ‘What is piety?’ and to make plain in words what he is
convinced that he has clearly in mind, ends up declaring that he has been reduced to
speechlessness, inarticulateness and general confusion – reduced to the kind of ἀπορία
that Meno famously associates with one’s having become paralysed in mind and tongue at
the hands of Socrates’ questioning.
If this were the only aim of the passage, the thrust and conclusion of
Socrates’ argument would at best be evidence of Plato’s wanting to defend a certain view
about the relation between a property such as piety, or in general goodness, on the one
hand, and the desires and attitudes of gods, or in general divine or perfect beings, on the
other; namely, the view that piety or goodness does not, essentially and for being the
thing it is, depend on the desires or attitudes of gods or perfect beings. This of course is a
highly interesting and important view, and one we may perhaps expect Plato to have held.
But if the aim of the passage is to defend this view, it attempts its aim very poorly. For the
success of Socrates’ argument depends crucially on his eliciting from Euthyphro the
answer in favour of the one side of the dilemma, and it is remarkable that for the
correctness of this answer Euthyphro offers no more support than saying that ‘this seems
so’ to him (ἔοικεν, 10d8) and does not so much as consider whether there is anything to
be said in favour of the other side, namely, that what is pious is pious because it is loved
by the gods – which would have been perfectly consistent and indeed practically identical
with the supposed implication of his proposed definition. If this were the only aim of the
passage, therefore, the best we can say in favour of Socrates’ argument is that it illustrates
his method of elenchus when this method is used in distinctively ad hominem fashion, its
success depending decisively on what the interlocutor happens, apparently for no
particular reason and without much critical reflection, to believe.
The passage, however, appears to have a further aim, and one that it
accomplishes very well, and this is to exemplify, illustrate and articulate the
explanatoriness requirement of definition. Euthyphro’s proposed definition, that what is
pious is what all the gods love, whether or not it is plausible as a definition of piety, at
least it appears to be an adequate attempt at answering the τί ἐστι question, an adequate
attempt at a definition. Certainly it appears to satisfy the basic requirement of definition,
the standard requirement, for it provides a procedure for determining of a thing whether
it is such as to be pious: ask the gods. It also appears to satisfy the generality requirement,
since it does not refer to exemplars of pious things (not even implicitly, for gods are not
supposed to be pious). And it appears to satisfy the unity requirement, at least on the
arguable supposition that the love exhibited by such perfect beings as the gods is a single
kind of desire and attitude and that, therefore, being loved by the gods is a single
property, the same in all cases in which something is loved by the gods. But does it satisfy
the explanatoriness requirement? It is striking that, as it stands and as stated by
Euthyphro (‘what is pious is what all the gods love’, 9e1-2), it evidently does not; for it
contains no ‘because’ (διότι) or equivalent expression (such as the appropriate dative), the
expressions that Socrates goes on to supply and underline. As we may say, as it stands it is
of the form of a bi-implication, perhaps even a necessary bi-implication (supposing that
the gods are so perfect that they cannot possibly not love what is pious); for it is of the
form: ‘x is Φ (pious) if, and only if, x is Ψ (loved by the gods)’ or perhaps ‘necessarily: x is
Φ if, and only if, x is Ψ’. But such bi-implications evidently do not state that x is Φ because
it is Ψ, and they do not, apparently, directly imply this. We may even say that such biimplications clearly do not imply this; for a bi-implication of either of these forms is
compatible with both ‘x is Φ because it is Ψ’ and ‘x is Ψ because it is Φ’; but, due to the
asymmetry of the X because Y relation, only one of these two propositions can be true. We
may say, in other words, that such bi-implications, even the necessary ones, leave open
whether there is an explanatory or causal relation between a thing’s being Φ and its being
Ψ and, if there is, which way this relation is directed.
The logical order of the requirements of definition
It can be argued that the standard requirement is the weakest and that, arguably with the
exception of the co-extensivity requirement which appears to be rather a consequence of
the generality requirement, each of the following requirements is progressively stronger: a
prior requirement is implied by but does not imply a posterior requirement.
That the requirements are supposed to progress from weaker to stronger is
especially important because it suggests that there is supposed to be a basic and original
sense of the τί ἐστι question, a sense that is determined by the standard requirement, and
that adding each of the following requirements one by one, as Plato appears to do, may
be understood as amounting to making answering the τί ἐστι question progressively more
demanding. Or, if one prefers, it amounts to progressively narrowing the sense of the τί
ἐστι question in such a way as to make answering the question progressively more
demanding.
(1) That the generality, unity and explanatoriness requirements all imply the
standard requirement is because they each determine a different way in which one may
provide a standard for a thing’s being Φ: a general way; a general and unitary way; a
general, unitary, and explanatory way. Or, if one prefers, they determine different kinds
of standards for a thing’s being Φ: a general standard; a general and unitary standard; a
general, unitary, and explanatory standard. Or even, if one must, they each imply a
different sense of ‘a standard for a thing’s being Φ’.
(2) That the standard requirement does not imply the generality
requirement is evident, for by itself it allows for and even invites answering the question
τί ἐστι Φ; by pointing to an exemplar of a thing that is Φ.
(3) That the standard requirement does not imply the unity requirement is
evident, for Hippias’ answer to the question τί ἐστι τὸ καλόν; (‘What is beauty?’), namely
by pointing to exemplars of beautiful things but to different exemplars in different cases,
satisfies the standard requirement but not the unity requirement (of course, it does not
satisfy the generality requirement either).
(4) That the standard requirement does not imply the explanatoriness
requirement is not, however, evident. On the contrary, one may think that any answer to
the question τί ἐστι Φ; that appeals to a standard for a thing’s being Φ can be an
adequately explanatory answer, the explanation being simply: that a thing that is Φ is,
precisely, Φ because it conforms to the standard for a thing’s being Φ. There is no doubt,
however, that Plato does not intend the standard requirement to imply the
explanatoriness requirement; for he thinks that the explanatoriness requirement implies
the unity and generality requirements, and that the standard requirement does not imply
either of these.
(5) That the generality requirement does not imply the unity requirement is
evident, for Meno’s answer to the question τί ἐστι ἡ ἀρετή; (‘What is virtue?’), namely by
stating simply what the virtue of man is, and woman, and child, etc., satisfies the
generality requirement but not the unity requirement.
(6) That the generality requirement, and likewise (7) the unity requirement,
do not imply the explanatoriness requirement is evident, for they contain no ‘because’
(διότι) or equivalent expression (such as the appropriate dative); also, Euthyphro’s answer
to the question τί ἐστι τὸ ὅσιον; (‘What is piety?’), namely that what is pious is what all
the gods love, satisfies the generality and unity requirements but not the explanatoriness
requirement.
(8) Whether the unity requirement implies the generality requirement is
not immediately evident; for it is not evident that it is not possible to satisfy the unity
requirement by answering the τί ἐστι question simply by example and exemplar and
hence without satisfying the generality requirement. There is no doubt, however, that
Plato intends the unity requirement to imply the generality requirement; for that which
he demands must be unified in an answer to a τί ἐστι question is not exemplars, but
general accounts. It is, however, arguable that the unity requirement does indeed imply
the generality requirement. For it is plausible to think that if a τί ἐστι question is
answered by example and exemplar, then there will not be a single exemplar identical in
all cases, but different exemplars each appropriate for a different set of cases. And one
may think that this is one of the general points that Plato wants to illustrate and articulate
by having Hippias, who apparently wants to answer the question ‘What is beauty?’ by
pointing to exemplars of beautiful things, practically immediately have recourse to
different exemplars for different cases: a beautiful maiden in some cases, a beautiful horse
in other cases, a beautiful pot in yet other cases.
(9) Whether the explanatoriness requirement implies the unity requirement
is not in fact evident, for it is not evident that, say, Meno’s account of virtue, which states
simply what the virtue of man is, and woman, and child, etc., and which satisfies the
generality requirement but not the unity requirement, cannot be thought of as stating
that (i.e. those things) because of which a thing that is Φ is, precisely, Φ. There is no
doubt, however, that Plato intends the explanatoriness requirement to imply the unity
requirement; for what he demands must be explanatory of why a thing that is Φ is,
precisely Φ, is not simply a conjunction of a set of distinct and independent properties,
but a single property or a properly unified set of properties. We may also note that in the
Meno passage he runs the unity and the explanatoriness requirements into one: ‘even if
the virtues are various and manifold, for sure they have all one and the same identical
pattern (ἕν γέ τι εἶδος ταὐτὸν ἅπασαι ἔχουσιν) because of which they are virtues (δι’ ὃ
εἰσὶν ἀρεταί)’ (72c6-8). It is not immediately clear why Plato thinks that the
explanatoriness requirement implies the unity requirement. Presumably, however, the
reason is to be sought in his views about explanation in general (i.e. not simply the
explanation peculiar to an explanatory definition), and in particular his view that same
things (i.e. things to be explained, explananda) must have same explanations.
(10) Whether the explanatoriness requirement implies the generality
requirement is not in fact evident, for it is not evident that, say, Hippias’ answer to the
question ‘What is beauty?’, which is simply in terms of pointing to exemplars of beautiful
things, and so satisfies the standard requirement but not the generality requirement,
cannot be thought of as stating that (or those things) because of which a thing that is Φ is,
precisely, Φ. Each thing that is beautiful, one may think on Hippias’ behalf, is, precisely,
beautiful because it conforms to an exemplar of a beautiful thing, or to the standard that
is constituted by an exemplar of a beautiful thing. There is no doubt, however, that Plato
intends the explanatoriness requirement to imply the generality requirement and that he
does not think answering the τί ἐστι question by example and exemplar can really
amount to answering it in an explanatory way and with an explanatory standard. It is not
immediately clear why he thinks that this is so, but we may suppose that the reason is to
be sought in his views, first, that same things must have same explanations, and, second,
that if a τί ἐστι question is answered by example and exemplar, then there will not be a
single exemplar identical in all cases, but different exemplars for different cases.
Is there in general reason to think that Plato intends the requirements of
definition to be serially ordered in this manner: from weaker and less demanding to
stronger and more demanding? Certainly passages such a those we have been considering
suggest that he intends something like this. There is, however, general reason for thinking
that this is what he intends. First, Plato has the interlocutors find some of these
requirements more familiar and less perplexing and less difficult to comply with than
others; and it is the weaker and less demanding that they find more familiar and less
perplexing and less difficult to comply with. Indeed they find the standard requirement,
which is the weakest, readily familiar, unproblematic, and perfectly easy to comply with.
Second, he has the interlocutors first offer answers in apparently adequate conformity
with a weaker of these requirements before he has Socrates request answers in conformity
with a progressively stronger requirement. I shall not further document these two general
points, they can readily be confirmed on reading such dialogues as: the Meno (Meno’s first
answer conforms to the generality requirement but not, Socrates’ argues, to the generality,
unity, or explanatoriness requirements); or the Hippias Major (Hippias’ first answer is by
exemplar and conforms to the standard requirement, but not, Socrates argues, to the
unity or the explanatoriness requirements); and, especially, the Euthyphro (Euthyphro’s
first answer is by exemplar, treating his own action as such, Socrates then requests a
general and apparently also unitary answer, and when Euthyphro complies and states that
‘what is pious is what all the gods love’, he finally requests an explanatory answer – at
which point Euthyphro is unable to comply and indeed pronounces himself reduced to
perplexity and confusion).
2. HAS THIS PROBLEM BEEN PROPERLY RECOGNIZED, OR ANSWERED?
On the critics’ responses to Geach
My impression is that, with notable exceptions such as Dancy (cf. note Two above), this
problem has not been properly recognized – though I readily grant that this verdict may
be ungenerous and that it may be preferable to say that, even if and to the extent that the
problem has been properly recognized, it has not been satisfactorily answered. One reason
for thinking that it has not been properly recognized becomes apparent if one considers a
common and recurrent way in which critics have responded to Geach’s charge that the
association of the τί ἐστι question with the generality requirement is obviously mistaken
and amounts to ‘a fallacy’: critics of Geach have commonly responded with the expressly
narrow aim of showing that this association is not obviously mistaken and that Geach did
not succeed in showing that it is obviously mistaken.5 One may be forgiven, however, for
thinking that, especially more than forty years since Geach’s article (or at least more than
thirty, when such a narrowly conceived account was last defended: by William Prior), the
question that needs to be addressed is not whether this association is obviously mistaken,
much less whether, for all that Geach has shown, it is obviously mistaken, but whether or
not it is mistaken; which in effect means: whether or not it is properly and adequately
motivated and justified in these dialogues.
On the no-problem response to the alleged problem
The view (which I am defending in this paper) that Plato’s association of the τί ἐστι
question with the stringent requirements of definition constitutes a problem depends on
the view that this association stands in need of justification. In response to this claim of a
problem, however, it may be said that the view that this association stands in need of
justification depends on the supposition that it is not part of the meaning of the τί ἐστι
question, as Plato intends this question to be understood, that it must be answered in
conformity with these requirements; and, it may be objected, this supposition is mistaken.
For, it may be argued, the question of this verbal form – τί ἐστι Ψ; – has not one, but
5
See esp. W. Prior 1998.
several meanings or senses; and on one of these senses, and the one that Plato intends, it
is part of its meaning that it must be answered in conformity with these requirements. If
we recognize in what sense Plato intends the τί ἐστι question we shall, therefore,
recognize that the supposed problem is spurious – there really is no such problem. This
line of response (we may call it the ‘no-problem’ response) can be found in a tradition of
distinguished critics, which began perhaps with Richard Robinson’s classic Plato’s Earlier
Dialectic (see esp. chapter Five); which, among many other examples, includes Richard
Allen’s fine Plato’s ‘Euthyphro’ and the Earlier Theory of Forms; and whose latest exponents
include Russell Dancy’s Plato’s Introduction of Forms and David Charles.6
My main difficulty with the ‘no-problem’ response is that the reasoning
behind it appears to be fallacious. For, let it be granted that (1) the τί ἐστι question has
several senses, and (2) Plato intends it in one of these, and (3) his associating it with
certain general assumptions, and in particular with the assumption that it must be
answered in conformity with the stringent requirements of definition, is based and
depends on his so intending it. How is it supposed to follow from this that Plato’s
associating the τί ἐστι question with such assumptions does not stand in need of
justification? Perhaps this follows, if the multivocity of the τί ἐστι question is thought to
be a matter of mere ambiguity – as in the multivocity of ‘bank’. For then one may argue:
if you suppose that associating the τί ἐστι question with these assumptions stands in need
of justification, then this must be because you are confusing a sense of this question that
is not determined by any such association with a different and unrelated sense of it that is
so determined. But take away the ‘and unrelated’ and this reasoning is clearly fallacious.
For suppose that: (i) there is a basic sense of the question τί ἐστι Φ; and let this be the
sense according to which this question is a request for a standard – one kind of standard
or another – for a thing’s being Φ; and (ii) it is not part of its basic sense that the
question must be answered in conformity with the stringent requirements of definition,
rather, according to its basic sense it may be answered in more than one way, one way
being either more or less demanding than another, and each such way determining a
certain kind of standard (or even sense of ‘standard’); and (iii) someone, N.N., intends
the τί ἐστι question not simply in its basic sense, but in a different and apparently more
6
Robinson 1953; Allen 1970; Dancy 2004; Charles 2000, 2006, 2010.
restricted sense, such that this question is not simply a request for a standard for a thing’s
being Φ, but for a certain kind of standard for a thing’s being Φ, this kind of standard (or
even sense of ‘standard’) being determined by certain stringent requirements of definition
that N.N. associates with the τί ἐστι question in the sense in which he intends it. May
one still argue that if it is supposed that N.N.’s association of the τί ἐστι question (or the
sense in which N.N. intends it) with these requirements stands in need of justification,
then this must be because one is confusing different senses of this question – and in
general because of a confusion? Clearly not. Whether it is we or N.N. that are reflecting
on and making explicit assumptions i-iii, clearly one need not respond by crying ‘foul!’ if
one is requested to justify one’s association of the τί ἐστι question (or the sense in which
one intends it) with certain stringent requirements for how it must be answered. On the
contrary, one may respond to this as to a rightful and appropriate request, and look for a
‘straight’ answer to it. And one may defend this ‘straight’ line of response by calling
attention to the fact that in general restricting the meaning of words is something that
requires reasons, especially if the restriction is supposed to be rigorous and systematic.
On epistemological answers to the problem
There is a variety of such answers, epistemological answers, in the critical literature, and
they seem to me both to recognize the problem and to make a credible attempt at
answering it – though I have some doubts about whether the attempt succeeds. By an
‘epistemological’ answer I mean the view which says, first, that in these dialogues Plato
defends a theory of knowledge which includes, crucially, the distinction between
knowledge proper and a less demanding cognitive state; and second, that it is because of
this theory of knowledge that Plato associates the τί ἐστι question with the requirements of
definition (generality, unity, explanatoriness). The distinction between knowledge proper
and the less demanding cognitive state may be understood in either of two ways: it is either
(1) the distinction between knowledge and belief (this variety has been defended by Terry
Irwin)7 or (2) the distinction between explanation-involving, or scientific, knowledge and
non-explanation-involving, or non-scientific, knowledge (see William Prior, note Three
above, for a defence of this variety). According to an epistemological answer, Plato in
these dialogues holds a certain conception or account of knowledge such that this most
7
Irwin 1985.
demanding cognitive state (be it understood as knowledge as opposed to belief or as
scientific knowledge as opposed to non-scientific knowledge) must be based on knowing
the τί ἐστι of the things cognized by one when in this state, and knowing the τί ἐστι in a
general, unitary, and explanatory way. We may call this the ‘knowledge-depends-ondefinitions’ conception or account of knowledge, or KDD. And according to the
epistemological response, this shows, practically directly, why and with what justification
Plato in these dialogues associates the τί ἐστι question with the requirements of
definition.
The epistemological answer (in both its varieties) deserves careful consideration,
but for present purposes let me only state why I am inclined to think that it does not
succeed. Let me clarify that I am not denying that Plato is committed to something like
this conception of knowledge, KDD; I am denying that this commitment is what serves to
motivate and justify his association of the τί ἐστι question with the stringent
requirements of definition. My objection is that the supposed justificans is too close to
the justificandum, and so this justification is in effect circular. Bluntly stated, the
objection is: we cannot locate in Plato’s conception of knowledge the justification of the
association of the τί ἐστι question with the stringent requirements of definition; for this
association is, if anything, precisely what constitutes (at least a good part of) Plato’s
conception of knowledge. This objection, it is true, depends on the assumption that there
is nothing in these dialogues, or indeed the Platonic corpus, that would enable us to
formulate Plato’s core conception of knowledge without reference to the view that
knowledge requires definitions and definitions in conformity with the stringent
requirements. This is a large assumption, but, alas!, not one I can begin to defend here.
3. THE RELATION BETWEEN ΑΠΟΡΙΑ AND THE DEMAND FOR DEFINITIONS
Here, then, is my positive proposal – the intention being to do no more than table it and
add one or two points of clarification – for what in these dialogues is supposed to provide
the motivation and justification for, first, raising the τί ἐστι question and placing on it
such weight; and, second, for associating the τί ἐστι question with the generality
requirement (leaving aside for another occasion the requirements of unity and
explanatoriness). Basically, the proposal consists of two claims.
THE FIRST CLAIM is that a central element in the
method of inquiry in these dialogues is the concept of
ἀπορία; ἀπορία not, or not only or primarily, in the sense
of the mental state of puzzlement resulting from the
breakdown of a particular inquiry, but in the sense, first,
of the grasp of a particular problem of a certain kind, and,
second, of such a problem itself; namely, a problem that
can be articulated in a two-sided question of the form
whether or not p or whether p or q (where p and q are
incompatible propositions) such that there appear, to one
and the same person, to be good reasons of both sides.
For example, the question whether or not virtue can be taught is described by Plato as an
ἀπορία in this sense (in the Protagoras); and so too is (in the Charmides) the question
whether or not reflexive knowledge is, first, possible, and, second, beneficial. This is
basically the concept of ἀπορία that Aristotle articulates when, in the Topics, he refers to
certain philosophers, whom unfortunately he does not name, as defining ἀπορία as an
equality of opposite reasonings (Top. 6.6.145b1-2); and it is of course the concept of
ἀπορία that became such a prominent tool in the hands of the sceptics and their
arguments from ἰσοσθένεια – though it is remarkable that this tool was apparently put to
opposite use and effect by the sceptics than it was by Aristotle and Plato.
THE SECOND CLAIM depends on the first, and it says
that if there is an ἀπορία regarding Φ (e.g. the ἀπορία,
regarding virtue, whether or not virtue can be taught), and
if this ἀπορία is in a peculiar sense radical, then the
attempt to resolve this ἀπορία requires raising the
question τί ἐστι Φ; (e.g. the question ‘What is virtue?’)
and it requires trying to answer this question in
conformity with the generality requirement.
By a ‘radical’ ἀπορία I shall mean an ἀπορία (in the above sense of the term) that renders
questionable whether an everyday acknowledged exemplar (παράδειγμα) of a thing that is
Φ really is an exemplar of a thing that is Φ. (By ‘rendering questionable’ I mean not
‘undermining’, but ‘calling into question’ or ‘rendering doubtful’.) For example, suppose
there is a particular ἀπορία whether or not virtue can be taught. This ἀπορία, evidently, is
radical with regard to the concept teacher of virtue, i.e. it renders questionable what, if
anything, is an instance, and in particular an exemplary instance, of this concept. Even
Protagoras’ status as teacher of virtue, so exemplary in the eyes of those fortunate enough
to have witnessed him, will be called into question by this ἀπορία. It is even arguable that
it is radical with regard to the concept virtue, or at least that Plato thinks so (this is not the
place to argue this point). Or, suppose that there is a particular ἀπορία regarding whether
the just person is happy. This ἀπορία, it is plausible to think, is radical with regard to the
concepts justice, excellence, and happiness.
For the purposes of this paper I shall assume rather than argue for THE FIRST CLAIM,
which I have defended it elsewhere.8
Linking up the presence of an ἀπορία to the demand for a definition – via the radicality of the
ἀπορία
How, then, does the presence of a radical ἀπορία regarding Φ (e.g. the ἀπορία whether or
not virtue can be taught) motivate and justify raising the question τί ἐστι Φ;? Here is my
answer. If a particular ἀπορία regarding Φ is radical, it renders questionable what
particular things are examples, including exemplary instances, of things that are Φ. But an
exemplary instance of a thing that is Φ is, precisely, something that (other things being
equal and unless there is particular reason to think otherwise) can serve as a standard for
a particular thing’s being Φ. Therefore, the appeal to an exemplary instance of a thing
that is Φ is, precisely, something that can serve as an answer to the question τί ἐστι Φ; –
indeed an answer to this question in accordance with its basic meaning. It follows that a
radical ἀπορία regarding Φ renders questionable how the question τί ἐστι Φ; is basically
to be answered – renders questionable what Φ (even most basically) is. But if this is
questionable, then it is questionable what the meaning of ‘Φ’, or the concept Φ (even
most basically) is. In this case, therefore, we have the strongest possible motivation and
justification to try to render this no longer questionable. And evidently this will, first and
8
Politis 2006, 2007, 2008.
foremost, involve searching for a resolution of the ἀπορία that rendered this questionable
in the first place. But evidently, to render no longer questionable what Φ (even most
basically) is, we must properly raise the question: τί ἐστι Φ;
Let me make one or two of comments on this argument. First, the
argument does not assume that all ἀπορίαι are radical; indeed it seems to me that to
assume this would be mistaken. Second, and most important, it does not assume that an
ἀπορία regarding Φ (e.g. the ἀπορία whether or not virtue can be taught) is or implies an
ἀπορία about what Φ is (τὸ τί εστι Φ). The ἀπορία whether or not virtue can be taught
uses the concept of virtue, it does not mention it; it does not, implicitly or explicitly raise
the question τί ἐστι Φ;; and it does not directly imply this question. An ἀπορία regarding
Φ (unless it is expressly about the τί ἐστι or essence of Φ) implies the question τί ἐστι Φ;
only on the supposition that it is radical; and, in that case, the implication is not direct or
immediately obvious but, I submit, based on the above argument for it.
The justification of the generality requirement
So far, so good. We must next consider: what is involved in properly raising the question
τί ἐστι Φ; in this context (i.e. the context in which there is a particular and radical ἀπορία
regarding Φ)? And, are the stringent requirements for answering the τί ἐστι question
involved? For the purpose of this paper, I shall concentrate on the generality requirement,
leaving the unity and explanatoriness requirements for another occasion. This
requirement already goes decisively beyond what is basically required to answer the τί ἐστι
question, or what is required to answer this question in its basic sense, namely, appealing
to something that can serve as a standard for a thing’s being Φ. For, according to the
basic sense of the τί ἐστι question, there is no apparent reason to deny that a particular
thing that is an exemplary instance of a thing that is Φ, rather than an abstract general
account, can serve as such a standard.
We have just seen that if there is a particular radical ἀπορία regarding Φ, then
this motivates and justifies raising and trying to answer the question τί ἐστι Φ; But it is
relatively easy to see that the answer to the question τί ἐστι Φ;, if the raising of this
question is motivated and justified by the presence of a particular radical ἀπορία
regarding Φ, must conform to the generality requirement. For suppose it did not need to
do so. In that case, the answer could be by exemplar, i.e. by appeal to a particular thing that
is an exemplary instance of a thing that is Φ. However, if the ἀπορία that motivated the τί
ἐστι question is radical, then it is questionable what things are exemplary instances of
things that are Φ. The answer to the question τί ἐστι Φ; cannot, therefore, be by exemplar;
and the weakest alternative to its being by exemplar is its being general and conforming to
the generality requirement.
This is the core-argument for an ἀπορία-based account of Plato’s motivation and
justification of the generality requirement – and clearly a great deal more will have to be
said about it. Suffice it for present purposes to point to a particular objection to the
argument. For one may object that the argument presupposes that a radical ἀπορία
renders questionable all supposed exemplary instances of things that are Φ, but that this
supposition is unwarranted, all that is warranted being the supposition that a radical
ἀπορία renders questionable at least some supposed exemplary instances of things that are
Φ. Here is an initial attempt at a response. It is perhaps plausible to think that, in the first
instance, a radical ἀπορία will render questionable certain supposed exemplary instances
of things that are Φ. For example, it will render questionable the status of Protagoras as
an exemplary instance of a teacher of virtue (from the Protagoras), or the status of Helen of
Troy – or one’s favourite super-model – as an exemplary instance of a beautiful thing
(from the Hippias Major). However, at least if these exemplary instances are sufficiently
central and well-entrenched, it is also plausible to think that such a radical ἀπορία will
also, by implication, render questionable what in general is an exemplary instance of a
thing that is Φ. It will do so by rationally motivating the following thought: ‘If this
(Protagoras, Helen of Troy) is not an exemplary instance of a teacher of virtue, or of a
beautiful thing, then I don’t know what is?’
A final comment. It is a consequence of this ἀπορία-based account of Plato’s
motivation and justification behind the demand for definitions (i.e. the account in terms
of THE FIRST and THE SECOND CLAIM) that, in these dialogues, ἀπορία enjoys
priority over the demand for definition, indeed that ἀπορία rather than the demand for
definition is methodologically primary. For, according to this ἀπορία-based account of the
rationale for the demand for definitions, it is the presence of such ἀπορίαι as whether or
not virtue can be taught that, in the process of one’s addressing them and searching for
an answer to them, generates the need to raise the question ‘What is virtue?’ and to
answer it in a general way rather than simply by example and exemplar. Of course,
however, and as Aristotle reminds us (Met. 5.11), priority is said in many ways, so even if
ἀπορία is prior in one way, that is, methodologically and in the order of inquiry, the
demand for definitions may still be prior in a different way. For we know from these
dialogues that Plato thinks that a particular ἀπορία regarding Φ (e.g. the ἀπορία whether
or not virtue can be taught) can be resolved only be raising and correctly answering the
question τί ἐστι Φ; (e.g. ‘What is virtue?’), and in this sense, it may be argued, the
demand for definitions is prior to ἀπορία.
The question of relative priority between ἀπορία and the demand for definitions
in these dialogues is, however, highly complex and difficult, and substantially pursuing it
further lies beyond the scope of this paper. Let me only alert the reader to what I consider
to be a relatively superficial objection against my claim that, in the order of inquiry, the
question τί ἐστι Φ; is not primary in these dialogues, and that particular questions, of the
form whether or not Φ is Ψ, and questions that Plato thinks of as articulating particular
ἀπορίαι, are prior to it. The objection is that, as we all know, there are several among
these dialogues in which the question τί ἐστι Φ; is raised first, and a particular ἀπορία
regarding Φ is articulated, if at all, only later. This objection is less devastating than may
at first appear. First, let it be supposed (for the purpose of providing the strongest possible
case in favour of the objection) that in all the apparently early dialogues in which the τί
ἐστι question is raised, it is indeed the first major question to be raised. Still, this is
compatible with thinking that, in the order of inquiry, the question τί ἐστι Φ; is not
primary in these dialogues and that particular questions of the form whether or not Φ is Ψ
are prior to it. For we ought to observe, especially if we take seriously these dialogues as
dramatic representations of live discussions and debates among particular people, that in
everyday discussions and debates it is perfectly possible, indeed all too common, that one
question should be raised first and the rationale for raising it should emerge, if at all, only
later – perhaps in the form of a different question. It is, therefore, mistaken and confused
to run together ‘priority in the order of inquiry, which inquiry is conducted through
dialogue’ and ‘priority in the course of that concrete dialogue’. Second, it is in any case
not true that in all the apparently early dialogues in which the τί ἐστι question is raised, it
is the first major question to be raised. Perhaps this is true of the following set of such
dialogues: Laches, Euthyphro, Charmides. Let this be granted. It is not, however, true of the
following set of other such dialogues: Protagoras, Meno, Republic 1 (supposing that book 1
of the Republic can be read as a complete dialogue proceeding along similar lines to, say,
the Protagoras). On the contrary, in each of the dialogues of this latter set, the first major
question raised is of the form whether or not Φ is Ψ (whether or not virtue can be taught, in
Protagoras and Meno; whether justice is only ‘another’s good’ [ἀλλότριον ἀγαθόν] in Republic 1);
and it is, expressly, for the purpose of answering this whether or not question that either the
τί ἐστι question is raised and actually taken up (in the Meno) or the need to raise and take
up the τί ἐστι question is postulated and highlighted but this question is not in fact taken
up before the dialogue comes to an end (as in the ending of the Protagoras and of Republic
1). We are, therefore, invited to ask which of these two sets of dialogues is more
important, and better suited, for the purpose of considering the critical issue of the
primacy or otherwise of the τί ἐστι question in Plato’s apparently early dialogues
generally.
CONCLUSION
The title of this paper – What is behind the τί ἐστι question? – was, of course,
tendentious. For it is not obvious that there is anything, much less a single thing, behind
the τί ἐστι question in those of Plato’s apparently early dialogues in which this question is
raised. Indeed, on a very common view in the vast literature on these dialogues, it is
supposed to be obvious that the τί ἐστι question is primary, and certainly that it is the
primary question; and hence that there is nothing, and certainly no other question,
behind it and prior to it. This view, however, it seems to me, is both objectionable and
mistaken. It is objectionable because, as I have argued, the τί ἐστι question, as Plato
intends it in these dialogues, stands in serious need of justification; and, therefore, we
must look for something behind it that serves to motivate and justify, first, Plato’s raising
of it, and second, his apparent view that it must be answered in certain highly demanding
ways rather than simply by example and everyday exemplar. It is mistaken because, if my
optimism is not misplaced, such a prior element, prior, that is, to the τί ἐστι question,
can be found in these dialogues. For, as I have submitted and at least begun to articulate
and defend, what is behind the question τί ἐστι Φ; in these dialogues (e.g. the question
‘What is virtue?’) is a particular and radical ἀπορία regarding Φ (e.g. the ἀπορία whether
or not virtue can be taught). In short, the thesis that I have defended in this paper is
made up of the following three claims: first, there is indeed something behind the
question ‘What is Φ?’ in these dialogues; second, this is a particular ἀπορία, and a
particular ἀπορία of a certain kind, regarding Φ, of the form whether or not Φ is Ψ; and
third, this is a thoroughly good state of affairs regarding these dialogues, since otherwise,
if, that is, the τί ἐστι question was primary and basic in them, the τί ἐστι question as
Plato raises it, and so the inquiries that are addressed to it, would be fundamentally
flawed.
This concludes, for present purposes, my proposal for an ἀπορία-based account of
why and with what justification Plato raises the τί ἐστι question in these dialogues; and of
why he demands that an answer to this question must be general and may not be simply
by example and everyday exemplar. The account requires, I recognize, a great deal of
further work. For one thing, the notion of ‘a reason’ (λόγος), which is central to the
notion of an ἀπορία here (i.e. an ἀπορία in the sense of what is articulable in a two-sided
question with what appears to one and the same person to be good reasons on both sides)
calls for close attention. It does so especially by inviting us to consider whether Plato
conceives of reasons as objective or subjective (the issue here being whether or not there
is more to there being a reason R for p than someone’s thinking that there is a reason R
for p); and whether he thinks that there are some ἀπορίαι that are generated by reasons
all of which are objective – these would then be what we may call objective ἀπορίαι. But
this and much else is another day’s work.