Scott Sullivan’s An Introduction to Traditional Logic Chapter 3 Substance - Primary substance is an individual existent, e.g., Socrates Primary substance is not a category Primary substance does not exist in something Secondary substance is universal or nature, e.g., human being Secondary substance is a category Secondary substance is predicated of a primary substance Accident - Modify the way a primary substance exists Exist only in primary substances Categories - Ten categories = secondary substance + nine accidents Is a secondary substance an accident, i.e., does a secondary substance modify the way something exists? o o No, because an individual existent (a primary substance) has the kind of existence which it has as a specific kind of existing being only through a secondary substance. This is perhaps the sense in which we should take Sullivan’s assertion that the secondary substance is the main category (existing as a universal predicate) Predicables - If categories are the predicates of a subject, then the predicables are the ways in which the predicates are related to a subject Genus + specific difference = species Is every species a secondary substance? Is a genus ever a secondary substance? o o o o o Sullivan characterizes both species and secondary substance as the “nature” of a thing Sullivan also characterizes “living” as a species (of corporeal things) But “human being” and “living” are not species in the same sense or to the same degree “living” doesn’t get as close as “human being” to revealing the reality of Socrates Is Sullivan using species in an equivocal way? To refer to the nature of an existent (i.e., a primary substance) AND To refer to a subclass of a larger class? Property - Characteristic that always accompanies a particular nature Distinguished from accident, which is a characteristic that can be said of things with different natures