***China CP***
Neg
Shells
1NC Solves the Aff
China engagement solves the aff – and Latin American countries prefer it to US
engagement
WorldCrunch 5/6 (2013, Wang xiaoxia, staffwriter, economic observer, “In America’s Backyard: Chinas Rising Influence in Latin
America” http://worldcrunch.com/china-2.0/in-america-039-s-backyard-china-039-s-rising-influence-in-latin-america/foreign-policy-tradeeconomy-investments-energy/c9s11647/)
In their book America's Blind Spot: Chavez, Oil, and U.S. Security, Andres Cala and Michael J. Economides avoid the usual patter of linking South America’s "China
factor" with some sordid conspiracy theory. Instead, they
investigate Latin America’s subtle choice between China and the
United States, attributing Washington's weakened influence in the region to its failure in foreign policy and
economic development -- while China rises on the back of globalization. Since 1823, when America put forward the Monroe Doctrine and declared its
sphere of influence to Europeans, it has maintained the unique position of the United States in the Americas. Military intervention has always served as the most
important tool for the United States. Especially after the start of the Cold War, in order to curb Communism from taking root in Latin America, the U.S. used military
means largely without restraint. After
the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States faced new external
challenges such as the threat of global terrorism. Latin America’s strategic significance has quickly slipped to a
secondary and more local ranking. The United States has shifted its focus in Latin America to specific issues such as illegal immigration
and drug smuggling. The “realism” that ran through America’s foreign policy during the Cold War has gradually transformed towards “idealism,” which in
consequence weakens its influence in Latin America. Under the doctrine of realism, America broke any illusion of moral constraint in its foreign interventions; the
protection of American interests was its pragmatic principle. Washington didn’t care that some Latin American countries were dictatorial or that they violated human
rights, as long as their leaders firmly stood on the side of the anti-Communist camp. Since adopting idealism, America considers that whatever is best for itself is also
best for the rest of the world. Its foreign policy is aimed at maintaining democracy, human rights and a free market economy around the world. America began to
demand that its former dictatorial allies quit their attachment to power and carry out a transition to democracy. Since 1989, the U.S. has pushed Latin American
countries -- many facing a severe debt crisis -- to accept the “Washington Consensus” oriented by market economy theory. The ultimate goal set by this theory may
not be a problem. However, it did not pull Latin America out of the quagmire of its “lost decade” of the 1980s. In the 1990s, Latin America suffered another severe
economic downturn, which exacerbated the division between the rich and the poor -- leading to serious social problems. The idealism exported by the United States
intensified the existing contradictions in Latin American society, and eventually led to the downfall of most of the brutal totalitarian military governments. China as a
new favorite Initially, China’s activities in Latin America were limited to the diplomatic level. By providing funds and assisting in infrastructure constructions, China
with China's economic boom, the supply of
energy and resources has gradually become a problem that plagues China -- and its exchanges with Latin
America thus are endowed with real substantive purpose. Among the numerous needs of China, the demand for oil has always been
managed to interrupt diplomatic ties between poor Latin countries and Taiwan. Since then,
the most powerful driving force. In the past 30 years, China has consumed one-third of the world's new oil production and become the world's second-largest oil
importer. More than half of China's oil demand depends on imports, which increases the instability of its energy security. Diversification is inevitable. In this context,
Latin America and its huge reserves and production capacity naturally became a destination for China. China must better protect its energy supply, and can't just play
the simple role of consumer. It must also help solidify the important links of the petroleum industry supply chain. Indeed, the China National Petroleum Corporation
frequently appears in Latin American countries, and China’s investment and trade in the Latin American countries are also focused on its energy sector. In the opinion
of many European and American scholars, China's current practice isn’t much different from that of Western colonizers of the last century. These scholars believe that
China doesn’t care about local human rights or the state of democracy when dealing with countries. All
China is interested in is establishing
long-term, stable economic relations. This realistic path is exactly opposite to that of America's newfound idealism.
Thus China has become a close collaborator of certain Latin American countries, such as Venezuela, that
are in sharp conflict with the United States. The global financial crisis of 2008 was a chance for China to become an increasingly important
player in Latin American. As Europe and the United States were caught in a financial quagmire, China, with nearly $3 trillion of foreign exchange reserves as
backing, embarked on "funds-for-assets" transactions with Latin American countries. So what does China want exactly in entering Latin American? Is it to obtain a
stable supply of energy and resources, and thus inadvertently acquire political influence? Or the other way round? Presumably most U.S. foreign policy-makers are
well aware of the answer. China's
involvement in the Latin American continent doesn’t constitute a threat to the
United States, but brings benefits. It is precisely because China has reached "loans-for-oil" swap agreements with Venezuela, Brazil, Ecuador and
other countries that it brings much-needed funds to these oil-producing countries in South America. Not only have these funds been
used in the field of oil production, but they have also safeguarded the energy supply of the United States, as well as stabilized these countries'
livelihood -- and to a certain extent reduced the impact of illegal immigration and the drug trade on the U.S.
1NC Solves China Influence NB (GDI China DA)
CP solves the aff and Chinese soft power in Latin America – avoids Western constraints
Nye 4/29 (2013, Joseph S. Nye is an American political scientist and former Dean of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at
Harvard University. He currently holds the position of University Distinguished Service Professor at Harvard University[1] where he has been a
member of the faculty since 1964. He is also the co-founder, along with Robert Keohane, of the international relations theory neoliberalism,
developed in their 1977 book Power and Interdependence. The 2011 TRIP survey of over 1700 international relations scholars ranks Joe Nye as
the sixth most influential scholar in the field of international relations in the past twenty years. ForeignPolicy.Com, “What China and Russia
Don’t Get About Soft Power”
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/29/what_china_and_russia_don_t_get_about_soft_power?wp_login_redirect=0)
In his new book, China Goes Global, George Washington University's David Shambaugh shows how China has spent billions of
dollars on a charm offensive to increase its soft power. Chinese aid programs to Africa and Latin America are not
limited by the institutional or human rights concerns that constrain Western aid. The Chinese style emphasizes
high-profile gestures. But for all its efforts, China has earned a limited return on its investment. Polls show that opinions of
China's influence are positive in much of Africa and Latin America, but predominantly negative in the United
States, Europe, as well as India, Japan and South Korea.
Solvency
Latin America General
Economic engagement with individual countries
Bethel 1/18 (2013, Erik Bethel, Managing partner of SinoLatin capital, “How 'Strategically Important' Is Latin America for China?”
Originally published in the Dialogue's daily Latin America Advisor http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=3210)
China's ambassador to Chile, Yang Wanming, told newspaper China Daily that the Asian nation should look to Latin
for declining demand from developed markets. Chinese exports to the region grew 12 to 15 percent last year, and it "is
America to make up
now a strategically
important market," he said. How significant is Latin America as an export destination for China? Are business and government leaders
actively looking to the region to expand trade? Where is the Chinese economy headed next year and in the mid-term, and how will that affect
Latin America? A: Erik Bethel, managing partner of SinoLatin Capital: "Latin America's 19 countries, 575 million people and $6.8 trillion GDP
offer a tantalizing opportunity for Chinese exports. China is already a major exporter in Latin America, but there is a lot
of room for further growth. In order for this to happen, Chinese firms need to view the market not on a regional basis, but
rather country-by-country. There is no question that Sino-Latin relations have been strengthening at a rapid pace, as
demonstrated by China's direct investment in the region ($175 billion in cumulative FDI as of September), membership in the Inter-American
Development Bank and the many bilateral visits that have taken place. However, Chinese firms need to approach the region with the
understanding that Latin American countries have uneven levels of development, varying political models, alliances and outlooks. All of this
requires deft political engagement in developing the relationships, trust and public support in order to
open markets further. There is no question that while China's appreciation for Latin America and its opportunities has significantly
increased in the last decade, there is still work to be done in deepening its understanding of the region's differing
customs, histories, nuances and subtleties. Achieving this heightened awareness and understanding will be critical. Conversely, Latin Americans
need to better understand China and define a fair and constructive relationship. It is clear that while Latin American consumers could greatly
benefit from China's wide range of inexpensive imports, concerns remain over the effects of increased Chinese competition on domestic Latin
American industries. Herein lays Latin America's conundrum. Latin America greatly benefits by selling raw materials to China and by purchasing
inexpensive Chinese electronic goods, textiles, furniture and other goods. But the concern is that the region will remain trapped as a low valueadded raw material supplier with a struggling manufacturing sector and limited employment opportunities. Without a doubt, a great
foundation for expanded trade is in place. However, seeing it grow over the coming years will require a sustained
educational and outreach effort on both sides."
Chinese economic engagement solves trade relations and Latin American political and
economic stability
Hungbo 1/18 (2013, Sun Hungbo, associate professor at the Institute of Latin American Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences in Beijing, “How 'Strategically Important' Is Latin America for China?” Originally published in the Dialogue's daily Latin America
Advisor http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=3210)
"China regards Latin America as a promising strategic trade partner not only for diversifying export destinations, but also for safeguarding
commodity import security. According to official statistics, Chinese exports to Latin America represented 6.74 percent of its total exports for the
first nine months of 2012. Compared to the United States, European Union and Asia, Latin America has absorbed a marginal
share of China's fast export expansion. From 2003 to 2011, the region's share of China's export volume only rose from 2.71 percent
to 6.41 percent. Chinese policymakers expect to build a more sustainable and balanced trade relationship with
Latin America. This issue has been widely negotiated both in political and commercial circles from the two sides. However, the
bilateral effort still needs to find an efficient way to achieve satisfactory results, particularly for those countries that
have a trade deficit with China. China continues to increase its imports from Latin America-with the region supplying 3.62 percent of China's
total imports in 2003 to 7.13 percent in 2012. China's slowdown in 2012 caused serious concern in commodity-exporting countries in South
America. Nonetheless, Chinese trade with Latin America in 2012 is estimated at more than $250 billion, higher than the year prior. Chinese
business groups will attach great importance to the market volume in Latin America, but the export opportunities will also depend on strong
economic growth in this region. In 2013, China's highlighted macroeconomic policy device for sustaining stable
growth is to accelerate the pace of high-quality urbanization, which will necessitate increasing imports of
mineral, agricultural and energy products from Latin America."
Cuba
Sino-Cuban relations are the strongest they have ever been – now is the time for Chinese
involvement
Xinhuanet 12 (9/27, "Cuba, China to strengthen economic, trade ties” http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/201209/27/c_131876461.htm”)
Top officials from Cuba
and China reaffirmed here Wednesday their commitment to strengthening bilateral economic
and trade ties. At the 25th Session of the China-Cuba Intergovernmental Commission, Chinese Minister of Commerce Chen Deming stressed
the importance of developing and improving bilateral cooperation and promoting business ties between the two sides as some European countries
are struggling with their debt crises. Chen said that during the meeting co-chaired by him and Ricardo Cabrisas, vice president of Cuba's Council
of Ministers, the two sides "discussed and reached broad consensus on issues of mutual concern." He believed the
meeting "will perfect bilateral cooperation of mutual benefit and deepen our economic and trade relations." Chen added that the Sino-Cuban
ties and friendship are at their best time in history. For his part, Cabrisas said the year 2012 has seen significant advances in
bilateral ties especially in the field of economy and trade. Cuban leader Raul Castro visited China in July, during which the two countries
signed several important agreements on health care, computer technology, banking, agriculture and trade tariffs. He also praised the
efforts made by related government agencies of both countries to formulate a basic strategy for
consolidating and developing bilateral ties in the medium and long term.
The groundwork has been laid for Cuban engagement
Ellis 5 (June 2005, R. Evan Ellis, professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the Center for Hemispheric
Defense Studies at the National Defense University, with a research focus on Latin America’s relationships with external actors, including China,
Russia, and Iran. Author of “China in Latin America: The Whats and Wherefores” and more than 20 articles in this research area. Strategic
Studies Institute. “U.S. National Security Implications of Chinese Involvement in Latin America”
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=606)
Whether or not Chinese interest in Cuba is driven by the shared ideological roots of the two political systems, Chinese
trade and investment in
Cuba is growing significantly. Over the past year, bilateral Chinese-Cuban trade expanded 36 percent to
$401 million.106 Following the November 2004 APEC conference and associated state visits to Brazil, Argentina, and Chile, President Hu Jintao also visited
Cuba, where he signed 16 bilateral commercial accords, committing to more than $500 million in Chinese investment in Cuba.107 As part of the state visit, the two
countries also conducted the first annual “Forum of Chinese-Cuban Investment,” with 400 businessmen from both nations in attendance.108
US engagement that ignores China inevitably fails in Cuba – they accept Chinese action
because of no preconditions
Hearn 9 (Dr. Adrian H., research fellow at the School of Social and Political
Sciences, the University of Sydney. He has conducted research in Cuba (three years)
and China (ten months), and is currently undertaking a study of Chinese engagement
with Latin America. Author of multiple books on Cuba, China, and Latin America. “Cuba and China:
Lessons and Opportunities for the United States” Commissioned report for the Cuba Info Series The
Cuban Research Institute Florida International University June 2009
http://cri.fiu.edu/research/commissioned-reports/cuba-china-hearn.pdf)
As U.S. firms weather the recession and adapt to a global economic environment skeptical of short-term investments, partnerships with Cuba
could offer some stable and constructive solutions. In March 2009 the Obama administration approved wider legal channels for U.S. agricultural
and medical exports to Cuba under the Omnibus Appropriations Measure (P.L. 111-8), providing a foundation for future industrial engagement.
Likely next steps could include the authorization of trade in farm equipment, medical apparatus, and telecommunications products, niches that
have already benefited from Chinese trade credits. Such steps would permit U.S. firms to compete and collaborate with Chinese counterparts in
Cuba, and as indicated by several recent legislative proposals in Congress, would advance U.S. strategic interests if extended to the oil sector. It is
generally acknowledged that the U.S. embargo on Cuba has not achieved its economic or political goals. Even
Cuban dissidents received the 2006 report of the Commission for a Free Cuba with skepticism, criticizing
it for “presuming what a Cuban transition must be”, and affirming that “only we Cubans, of our own
volition...can decide issues of such singular importance” (quoted in Sullivan 2009:20). A greater awareness of local sociopolitical dynamics in Cuba is sorely needed, and would be achieved by closer contact both at the interpersonal level, a prospect favored by 55.2
percent of Cuban Americans (FIU 2007), and through more interactive and coordinated commercial relations. Since 2002 the Unites States has
been Cuba’s largest food supplier, and in the wake of hurricanes Gustav and Ike in September 2008, the Cuban government expressed its
readiness for deeper trade relations (Sullivan 2009:24). Rather than dismiss this prospect on political grounds, economic
openings and industrial coordination could be used to promote democratic outcomes. As the InterAmerican Dialogue has concluded, “a democratic society in Cuba should be the objective of U.S.
engagement, not a precondition” (IAD 2009:10).
China solves Cuba Affs
Hearn 9 (Dr. Adrian H., research fellow at the School of Social and Political Sciences, the University of Sydney. He has conducted research
in Cuba (three years) and China (ten months), and is currently undertaking a study of Chinese engagement with Latin America. Author of
multiple books on Cuba, China, and Latin America. Pacific Rim Report No. 52, January 2009 “China’s Relations with Mexico and Cuba: A
Study of Contrasts” http://usf.usfca.edu/pac_rim/new/research/pacrimreport/pacrimreport52.html)
China is Cuba’s second largest trading partner after Venezuela, with 2.7 billion dollars in bilateral trade reported for 2007
(Cubaencuentro 2008). This trade is more valuable to Cuba than to China, though this could change if Chinese oil, nickel, and
electronics manufacturing operations in Cuba expand. Furthermore, for the eight resource-rich countries that comprise Latin America’s “New
Left”, Cuba is a unique ideological symbol of resistance to U.S. hegemony. For China, whose pursuit of
Latin American natural resources is at least as voracious as that of the United States, cooperation with
Cuba, strongly supported by Raúl Castro, decreases the danger of being perceived in the region as an external—
potentially imperialistic—threat to economic sovereignty. In the wake of the Soviet collapse, China has become an
important commercial and political partner for Cuba, though as Mao Xianglin of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences notes, Chinese officials
are not interested in replicating the Soviet experience: I think we have to recognize that although bartering with Venezuela and other
countries—for example doctors for oil—is
of great value to Cuba, it is not enough. There will never be a return to the
Soviet model, and nor would this be a good idea. The Soviets essentially gave resources to Cuba for political reasons, but this
is not sustainable and it creates a dependency. Using Chinese expertise Cuba could come to produce electronic goods
for sale to Latin America, but at the same time could also open its domestic market very gradually. I think both
will happen (interview, December 14, 2007). When Hu Jintao visited Cuba in November 2008, he donated $8 million to assist Cuba’s
hurricane relief efforts, offered a $70 million credit for modernizing Cuba’s hospitals, and proposed 37 new projects for Chinese investment on
the island. He also extended the deadline for the repayment of a $7 million credit granted in 1998 and deferred until 2018 the payment of Cuba’s
trade imbalance with China accumulated prior to 1995. In the area of education, Hu affirmed that between 2006 and 2011, Cuba will have trained
5,000 Chinese students in medicine, tourism, and Spanish. Among Chinese economic activities in Cuba are sales to state-run transport sector,
nickel extraction, oil exploration, and industrial manufacturing. Local sources report that Chinese electronics manufacturers have built a threestory production facility in Havana to compile small appliances for sale to the Cuban and Latin American markets, an objective supported by
Chinese investment in Cuba’s transport and telecommunications infrastructure. This initiative is also supported by Raúl Castro’s April 2008
lifting of restrictions on the domestic sale of televisions, VCRs, mobile phones, computers, and electronic appliances. This has legalized the sale
of products that were already widely in circulation through informal channels, effectively formalizing, expanding, and regulating a commercial
sector with enormous growth potential between Cuba and China, where most of these products originate. Limited informal trade flows both ways
between Cuba and China. Cigars, for instance, are popular among China’s emerging wealthy class and resident foreign executives, who pay
upwards of 250 yuan ($40) for Don Diegos from the Dominican Republic, Flors from Honduras, and more recently Cohibas from the Cuban state
tobacco company Habanos. At this price cigars are beyond the reach of most Chinese people, but in a country of 350 million smokers, where
conspicuous consumption is increasingly pervasive, there is growing demand. Altadis, the fifth largest tobacco company in the world, has
developed a strategy for meeting this demand: a less expensive, synthetic line of cigars, artificially flavored with vanilla and cognac.
Unconvinced, many aspiring aficionados opt to buy genuine Cuban ‘puros’ under the table in trendy cigar bars for the standard price of 100 yuan
($17), or on the streets of districts frequented by tourists, like Beijing’s Sanlitun. Owing to a combination of high import duties and a shortage of
official retail licenses, contraband is cited in one report to represent approximately 90% of total cigar sales in Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen,
Guangzhou and Zhuhai (Hua 2005:37). As discussed below, illicit merchandise also enters Cuba from China, but in contrast to their Mexican
counterparts, Cuban authorities carefully monitor—and have effectively contained—the emergence of
unregistered commercial linkages between local entrepreneurs and Chinese business partners.
Legalization and regulation of informal practices has in fact been one of the Cuban government’s key
mechanisms for overcoming the political and economic difficulties of the Special Period. This is evident in the
growth of neighborhood development projects that incorporate—and often rely on—the participation of unregistered religious communities,
women’s groups, and community associations that were previously excluded from official state activities. As I have argued elsewhere, since 1990
such projects have drawn together a diverse array of state and non-state actors, whose combined social capital is at the core of Cuba’s emerging
civil society (Hearn 2008). The Havana-based Group for the Integrated Development of the Capital has argued that to conserve societal stability
through Cuba’s current phase of socio-economic transformation, it will be increasingly necessary to “bridge the widening gap between state
structures and community life”, or put another way, to “formalize the informal” (Coyula, Coyula, and Oliveras 2001:12, GDIC 2001:1). As
engagement with China stimulates a new variety of transformations on the island, it is no coincidence that
this is precisely what the state has set out to accomplish in Havana’s Chinatown, Barrio Chino.
Chinese aid is uniquely tailored to benefit Cuba
Hearn 9 (Dr. Adrian H., research fellow at the School of Social and Political Sciences, the University of Sydney. He has conducted research
in Cuba (three years) and China (ten months), and is currently undertaking a study of Chinese engagement with Latin America. Author of
multiple books on Cuba, China, and Latin America. Pacific Rim Report No. 52, January 2009 “China’s Relations with Mexico and Cuba: A
Study of Contrasts” http://usf.usfca.edu/pac_rim/new/research/pacrimreport/pacrimreport52.html)
Except for the notable exception of the oil sector, Mexico
generally operates according to free market principles; by
contrast, despite the gradual broadening of spaces for private entrepreneurship under Raúl Castro, Cuba remains a state-run
economy. These distinct approaches to economic governance have produced different strategies for
engaging with China, which for its part, has demonstrated an unorthodox capacity to engage with both
state-managed and market-oriented systems. Perceptions of China in both countries range from concern about
potential threats to national interests to optimism about emerging opportunities for market expansion and industrial
collaboration. Mexican economic trepidation is based primarily on the country’s inundation with Chinese imports, which, together with
illicit trade, has produced devastating competition for Mexican manufacturers both domestically and in their primary export market, the United
States. The political fallout for the Mexican government is twofold: first, it faces the dissatisfaction of Mexican industry leaders about inadequate
protective measures, and second, its efforts to meet Chinese demand for energy resources by opening the oil sector to foreign investment has
provoked a hostile public response. Nevertheless, opportunities for deeper collaboration exist in the development of manufacturing chains, the
refinement of educational exchange programs, and the placement of Mexican products in the booming Chinese consumer market. For Cuba,
a historically accrued wariness of excessive foreign influence has colored the character of engagement
with China. Suspicions have been largely overcome through state supervision of economic collaboration,
for instance, through joint ventures in oil and nickel extraction, biomedicine, tourism, and light industrial manufacturing. Developed through
direct bilateral governmental channels rather than in the private sector, these ventures are carefully monitored and contained within the policy
objectives of the Cuban state. Aware of the politically and economically debilitating consequences of black market commerce, the Cuban
government has preempted the formation of unofficial lines of illicit cooperation like those that exist between China and Mexico. This is evident
in the assimilation of Barrio Chino, a historically notorious center of black market activity, into the administrative control of the Office of the
Historian at a time when Sino-Cuban engagement is deeper than it has ever been. Furthermore, Raúl Castro’s legalization of trade in appliances,
TVs, VCRs, and other electronics further reduces the impact of Cuba’s already extensive informal sector while simultaneously opening the way
for expanded official trade with China. Chinese officials interviewed in Beijing argue that their country’s
collaborative projects in Latin America endeavor to learn from the successes and failures of the United
States in the region in order to provide alternative, more locally beneficial programs of economic
cooperation and development. The existing evidence from Latin America does not permit a conclusive assessment of the local costs
and benefits implicit in this agenda. What is evident is that China’s ability to simultaneously engage in free market
commerce with countries like Mexico and state-to-state exchange with countries like Cuba has framed its
collaborative projects in an unusually broad, coordinated, and long term set of social, political, and
economic objectives.
Chinese engagement causes Mexican backlash
Hearn 9 (Dr. Adrian H., research fellow at the School of Social and Political Sciences, the University of Sydney. He has conducted research
in Cuba (three years) and China (ten months), and is currently undertaking a study of Chinese engagement with Latin America. Author of
multiple books on Cuba, China, and Latin America. Pacific Rim Report No. 52, January 2009 “China’s Relations with Mexico and Cuba: A
Study of Contrasts” http://usf.usfca.edu/pac_rim/new/research/pacrimreport/pacrimreport52.html)
Perceptions of China in both countries range from concern about potential threats to national interests to
optimism about emerging opportunities for market expansion and industrial collaboration . Mexican economic trepidation is based
primarily on the country’s inundation with Chinese imports, which, together with illicit trade, has produced
devastating competition for Mexican manufacturers both domestically and in their primary export market, the United
States. The political fallout for the Mexican government is twofold: first, it faces the dissatisfaction of
Mexican industry leaders about inadequate protective measures, and second, its efforts to meet Chinese
demand for energy resources by opening the oil sector to foreign investment has provoked a hostile public
response. Nevertheless, opportunities for deeper collaboration exist in the development of manufacturing chains, the refinement of educational
exchange programs, and the placement of Mexican products in the booming Chinese consumer market
Venezuela
Venezuela values engagement from China
Xinhuanet 5/10 (2013, “Future China-Venezuelan cooperation looks optimistic,”
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-05/12/c_132376693.htm)
Officials from Venezuela and China have voiced confidence in bilateral relations since President Nicolas
Maduro took office in April, saying the two countries' cooperation prospects look great. China and Venezuela established diplomatic
relations in 1974. In recent years, the two countries have expanded their cooperation in energy, finance, infrastructure,
technology and production. During his 14-year mandate, the late Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez visited China six times and
boosted bilateral relations. After Maduro was sworn in last month, he said his government will continue to attach great
importance to its strategic partnership with China and will further deepen and promote their cooperative
relations in various fields. "The best way to pay tribute to Chavez is to continue to deepen Venezuela and China's strategic relationship,"
he said. The China-Venezuela High Level Joint Commission was established in 2001 as a high-level decision-making center of the cooperation
between the two countries. A joint development fund between the two nations was created in 2007. Han Deping, regional chief of China
Development Bank's American division, told Xinhua that the joint development fund and the long-term financing loans
are cornerstones of cooperation between the two countries. They not only help undertaking the financial risks for the
Chinese enterprises, but also solve the budget restriction for the Venezuelan government, Han said. Wang Yong, China's economic and
commercial counselor to Venezuela, said trade volume between China and Venezuela amounted to over 23 billion dollars
in
2012. Venezuela has become China's fourth largest trading partner in Latin America. China has provided more than 30 billion dollars to
Venezuela in financing nearly 300 bilateral cooperation projects in energy, agriculture, industry, technology and infrastructure, he added.
Maduro loves china but bodes ill for US-Venezuela relations
Fillingham 3/10 (2013, Zachary, BA in IR from York University, MA in Chinese Studies from School of Oriental and African Studies in
London, analytical area of expertise in Chinese foreign policy, particularly in regards to how nationalist issues affect Chinese policy,
GeopoliticalMonitor.com, “Post-Chavez US-Venezuelan Relations: Headed for a Thaw?” http://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/post-chavez-usvenezuelan-relations-headed-for-a-thaw-4790/)
Current polls indicate that Maduro would triumph in the coming election, a scenario that does
not bode well for a thaw in USVenezuelan relations. Maduro has dropped several indications that he plans to carry on his predecessor’s
anti-American tone, notably by suggesting that the U.S. might be behind Chavez’s illness and by kicking
out two U.S. military attaches under the accusation of “trying to destabilize Venezuelan politics.”
CP solves Venezuela
Aljazeera 3/12 (2013, Chris Arsenault, Phil Lind Fellow (University of British Columbia) and Wolfson Press Fellow (Cambridge),
Venezuela looks to China for economic boost, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/03/201331271053389351.html)
China is the Future for Venezuela President of OrOctrading, a consulting firm, Sanchez - sporting thick cufflinks with the red Chinese flag and a
dark blazer - has been teaching Venezuelan companies about doing business with the world’s second-largest economy. “Usually,
manufactured goods from China are coming into Latin America and raw materials are going out,” Sanchez
told Al Jazeera. “Venezuela has posted a positive trade balance with China, because of oil exports, but without
those we would have a major deficit.” Trade between Venezuela, holder of the world’s largest oil reserves, and China grew to $18bn in 2011,
a 24-fold increase from 2003, reported China Daily, a government-backed newspaper. Venezuela exports more than 500,000
barrels of oil to the Asian giant daily, according to government figures, and plans to increase that to one million by 2015. The
two countries had signed 300 bilateral agreements, including 80 major projects, according to a University of Miami study in
2010. Looking east As relations between Venezuela and the US soured in recent years, Venezuela looked away
from its traditional trading partner towards the east. China could soon surpass the US as Venezuela’s largest trading
partner. Venezuela's interim President Nicolas Maduro, who took the job following the death of President Hugo Chavez on March 5, held talks
with Chinese officials over the weekend. "The best tribute that we could give to our comandante Chavez is to deepen our strategic relationship
with our beloved China," said Maduro, who once served as Venezuela’s foreign minister. In a televised meeting with Maduro, Zhang Ping,
chairman of China’s National Development and Reform Commission, said “deepening relations between China and Venezuela” are “the only
way to comfort the soul of President Hugo Chavez”. If elected president on April 14, Maduro has said his first trip abroad will be
to China. Henrique Capriles, leader of Venezuela’s opposition, criticises most government policies but generally supports expanding trade
with China. The countries have launched two satellites together in recent years, and China
is negotiating a free trade deal with
Mercosur, a South American trading zone.
No offense – china already gave massive amounts of aid to Venezuela for petroleum and
coal extraction
Ellis 5 (June 2005, R. Evan Ellis, professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the Center for Hemispheric
Defense Studies at the National Defense University, with a research focus on Latin America’s relationships with external actors, including China,
Russia, and Iran. Author of “China in Latin America: The Whats and Wherefores” and more than 20 articles in this research area. Strategic
Studies Institute. “U.S. National Security Implications of Chinese Involvement in Latin America”
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=606)
It can be argued that Venezuela
is currently China’s principal strategic partner in Latin America, both in terms
of the volume of investment, as well as in the nature of the relationship between the two countries .29
China currently has over $1.5 billion invested in Venezuela―prior to the recently announced $100 million in investment
commitments, the largest investment position of any country in the region.30 Bilateral trade between China and Venezuela increased from $150
million in 2003 to $1.2 billion in 2004,31 and is anticipated to reach $3 billion in 2005, based on agreements signed during the state visit of
Venezuela’s populist president Hugo Chávez Frias to China during the 2004 Christmas holiday,32 as well as a series of 19 cooperation accords
signed between Venezuela and China in January 2005.33 These figures reflect growth in both imports and exports. Venezuelan imports from
China grew by 120 percent over 2004 to reach $560 million, while similarly growing oil exports have allowed Venezuela to maintain a net trade
surplus.34 The Chinese relationship with Venezuela reflects not only Chinese interest in Venezuelan resources, but also the receptivity of
President Chávez. His interest in developing alternative markets for Venezuelan petroleum, and developing a hedge against U.S. influence in the
region, make him a strong potential Chinese ally.35 In his highprofile state visit to China, Chávez signed a number of accords in which he
committed Venezuela to put its petroleum production “at the disposition of the great Chinese fatherland.”36 On the other hand, he is also a
potential threat to Chinese interests, insofar as his Bolivarian revolution and support for indigenous populism and antiglobalist causes could
foment instability in China’s trading partners in Latin America, and undermine Chinese access to the resources of the region. China’s
principal interest in Venezuela, based on trade and investment patterns, is petroleum products. Exports of Venezuelan
petroleum products to China registered a 75 percent increase in 2003,37 and a 25 percent increase in 2004, reaching a level of $640 million.38
Although the volume of petroleum shipments from Venezuela to China is limited and there are restrictions on the size of tankers and cargo ships
which can be sent through the Panama Canal, infrastructure projects are under consideration which could sidestep these constraints by using
pipelines to carry the oil overland to Pacific ports―either across Colombia or Panama. As part of a series of accords signed during the state visit
of Chávez to China in December 2004, and leveraging the close working relationship with the Chinese developed over recent years,39 Venezuela
will give China access to 15 mature oil fields, with proven reserves of up to a billion barrels of oil, for Chinese firms to develop and exploit.40 As
part of the accord, China will invest $350 million toward bringing these fields on line,41 and in exchange will be allowed to build refineries on
Venezuelan territory to process the oil.42 The agreement will help the Venezuelan government to overcome the shortfalls in technical
management that it created when it fired half of all workers in its state oil firm, Petroleos de Venezuela (PdVSA), following the December 2002March 2003 national strike. By allowing the Chinese to directly develop these fields, Venezuela will be able to
almost double its production despite a lack of internal technical capacity to do so, selling significant
quantities of oil to China while still serving its traditional markets. As a compliment to its assistance to Venezuela in
extracting its oil, China is also investing $60 million in a number of projects to help Venezuela extract its natural gas. 43 During a scheduled state
visit at the end of January 2005, Chinese Vice-President Zeng Quinghong and senior directors of China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC)
will analyze the viability of even greater Chinese investment in the development of Venezuelan natural gas reserves.44 A third significant
element of Chinese engagement with Venezuela in the petroleum sector involves the Chinese purchase of
Venezuelan ormulsión, and conversion of Chinese facilities to use it for the generation of electricity.
Ormulsión is a low-grade, high-pollution content fuel oil traditionally given little or no value because of
the lack of a global market for its use. In December 2001, CNPC and PdVSA established the joint venture Orifuels Sinoven, S.A
(Sinovensa) and invested $330 million to develop a capability to produce 6.5 million metric tons of ormulsión per year by the end of 2004. In
conjunction with this effort, in November 2003 CNPC began constructing a special new type of power plant capable of burning ormulsión in the
Guangdong province of China.45 Through a deal finalized in 2004, China’s commercial agent, Petrochina, a subsidiary of CNPC, is currently
purchasing 1.5 millions of tons of orimulsión annually from Venezuela.46 By building the new power plant, China is able to make use of the
Venezuelan ormulsión, which it is able to 8 purchase at relatively low cost because of the lack of a global market. Moreover, Venezuela is
China’s natural partner for the ormulsión deal, in that the Latin American country currently possesses the
world’s largest proven ormulsión reserves―almost double those of Saudi Arabia, the next largest source.
China is also helping Venezuela to extract its coal. At the end of 2004, China announced that it will invest in the development
of mines in the Orinoco River Basin area in the south of the country.47 China Minmetal and the Venezuelan firm, Corpozulia, are slated to sign
an agreement during the scheduled state visit of Chinese Vice President Zeng Quinghong at the end of January 2005 that would use Chinese
investment to increase Venezuelan carbon production.48 Beyond the domain of extractive industries, the ChineseVenezuelan partnership has
extended to the agricultural sector, where Venezuelan interests in improving agricultural productivity coincide with Chinese interests in
developing reliable, friendly suppliers of foodstuffs. As part of the accords reached between the two nations during the Christmas 2004 visit of
Chávez to China, the Asian giant has agreed to provide Venezuela with agricultural machinery and credits for the nation to increase its food
production.49 In keeping with the vertically integrated strategy that China has pursued in other Latin American countries to secure access to
sources of supply for strategic materials, China announced in December 2005 that it will invest in the construction of a national railway line,
helping Venezuela to transport raw materials and foodstuffs to market.50 Finally, China is also helping Venezuela to develop its
telecommunications industry, including assistance to Venezuela in access to space. As part of the series of accords reached during the Christmas
2004 visit of Hugo Chávez to China, the two nations announced that China will launch a telecommunications satellite for Venezuela, helping the
nation become less dependent on U.S. telecommunications networks.51 The initiative built on broader discussions of how China could help
Venezuela to develop and modernize its telecommunications infrastructure more broadly, including a December 2004 visit to Venezuela by Vice
minister of the Chinese information ministry Lou Kinjian to discuss possible collaboration on telecommunication projects with the Venezuelan
telecommunications firm, CVG Telecom.52
Mexico 1NC – Trade Agreements
Expanded Economic Aid to Mexico from China could be mutually beneficial and
underscore better market access with the proper framework
Hearn 9 (Dr. Adrian H., research fellow at the School of Social and Political Sciences, the University of Sydney. He has conducted research
in Cuba (three years) and China (ten months), and is currently undertaking a study of Chinese engagement with Latin America. Author of
multiple books on Cuba, China, and Latin America. Pacific Rim Report No. 52, January 2009 “China’s Relations with Mexico and Cuba: A
Study of Contrasts” http://usf.usfca.edu/pac_rim/new/research/pacrimreport/pacrimreport52.html)
Mexico’s trade imbalance with China is deep, but it is confined to a relatively narrow cross-section of manufactured products. Chief among these
are electronics, autoparts, and optical photographic equipment. The Mexican government, particularly since China’s 2001 accession to
the WTO, has advised
manufacturers to divert production away from these and other competing sectors, and focus
instead on sectors that either draw on Mexico’s inherent competitive advantages, particularly its geographic
proximity to the United States, or that show potential for expansion in the Chinese market. The burgeoning Chinese middle class that is
propelling (and to an extent is propelled by) its country’s emerging market has begun to show the depth of its influence on domestic economic
restructuring, institutional transformation, and political leadership (Goodman 2008, Mulvenon 2004). Attuned to this development, global
manufacturers have demonstrated their awareness of rising purchasing power in the Chinese population through product lines and advertising
campaigns tailored to the desires of domestic consumers. Indeed, as Enrique Dussel Peters (2007:14) notes, although China out-
competes Mexico in the U.S. market, particularly in electronics and auto parts, some Mexican corporations have
begun to establish themselves in China as vendors of high-end electronics and specialized auto parts, synthetic fibers, steel and
plastic products, and beer. The Mexican cement company CEMEX, which has traditionally focused its operations in the United States, has also
made inroads into China both to source cement for its U.S. projects and to capitalize on the intense pace of construction in urban China.
Emerging Chinese tastes have also begun to provoke action from certain Mexican specialty food companies, such as Gruma S.A.B. de C.V.,
which recently opened a $20 million tortilla plant in Shanghai (Business Wire 2006). The growth of China’s domestic market is a positive
development for Mexico, both because of the new opportunities it creates for Mexican retailers, and because it will likely ease competition
through trade diversion as Chinese manufacturers increasingly target customers closer to home than Mexico and North America. Geographic
proximity to the United States is a key competitive advantage for Mexico because it opens opportunities to expand
trade in products that are not cost-effective or feasible for China to ship across the Pacific Ocean. New and used cars, buses, trucks, motors, auto
parts and accessories are all cases in point, as are farm products and other perishables that benefit from existing commercial arrangements under
NAFTA. More problematic for Mexico are products that are easier to transport, such as recording instruments, telecommunications equipment,
televisions, VCRs, small generators, textiles, and cotton goods. Nevertheless, owing to a combination of technical expertise and an advanced
logistical infrastructure of railways, highways, air and water supply, and communications, it is often less expensive to produce specialized
electronic equipment in Mexico despite the difference in labor costs ($1 at Chinese factories for every $3.5 dollars paid in Mexico) (Rovelo
2005). The relative value of Mexico’s competitive advantages may grow as production costs rise in China .
Although the coastal region stretching from Hong Kong northward through the Pearl River delta has become known as the ‘factory of the world’,
its appeal as a manufacturing base may be declining. Companies such as Adidas have closed down their factories in the region and are relocating
to the lower-wage—though logistically challenging—inland provinces (Garnaut 2008:43). Other manufacturers are exploring the potential of
countries like Vietnam, Thailand, and India as alternative homes for their factories. Rising production costs in China increase the likelihood that
Mexico, with its combination of advanced transport infrastructure, geographic proximity to the United States, and membership in NAFTA, may
gradually reclaim the ground lost to China as a manufacturing source for the U.S. market. Electronics manufacturers Eaton, IBM, and HE
Sanmina-SCI have plants in China but utilize their Mexican facilities to produce high-end equipment for markets throughout North and South
America. The Chinese electronics firm Lenovo has also shown an interest in Mexico, recently announcing that it will build a $20 million plant in
Apodaca, a town in the northern Mexican state of Nuevo Leon. This, it says, will create 1,400 jobs, of which 20 percent will be for highly skilled
workers designing new technology and logistics (Yao 2007). Other Chinese companies operating in Mexico include the textile manufacturer
Sinatex, which has established a $9.6 million plant in Sonora to target the U.S. cotton market; Huawei Technologies, which has spent over
$200,000 to develop communications, computers, and fiber optic cables; Xin Tian, which operates a 1,000-hectare rice plantation in Campeche
and a $10 million commercial center in Mexico City; and TTE, which since 2004 has employed over 2,000 Mexicans to manufacture color
televisions in its factory in Juárez (Jia 2005). Some analysts suggest that Sino-Latin American collaborations of this sort
would be facilitated by bilateral trade agreements, noting Chile’s Free Trade Agreement with China, signed in 2005, as an
example to be emulated (ECLAC 2006). It is true that comprehensive trade agreements support bilateral integration, but it
should be remembered that the way Chile and Mexico relate economically to China are fundamentally different. The China-Chile FTA removed
Chinese duties on 2,834 Chilean exports to China (chief among which is copper) but also removed tariffs on 5,891 Chinese consumer goods
exported to Chile. In 2004 Argentina rejected Beijing’s proposal for an FTA over concerns about the damage that such an influx of imports could
do to its already fragile economy. For Mexico, whose present commercial relations with China consist primarily of trade in manufactured
products, an
FTA would create collaborative opportunities, but would require precisely defined exclusion
clauses in order to avoid augmenting the already chronic competitive imbalance facing Mexican
manufacturers. Expanded cooperative ventures with Chinese enterprises, supported or not by an FTA,
could enable Mexico to develop mutually beneficial production chains capable of penetrating global
markets. Increased intra-industry trade could open access routes to Asian markets and foster the integration of new technologies, thereby
reducing face-to-face competition in third markets like the United States (ECLAC 2006). As Mexican Foreign Minister Luis Ernesto Derbez
recently put it, The question is not whether Mexico is losing the U.S. market, but rather how we can establish
a strategic relationship with China to penetrate that market together.[...] Many Mexican business executives already
understand that they must invest in China with Chinese partners and invest in Mexico with those same partners. Then they can go after the U.S.
market together...We are developing three-way businesses between Mexico, China and the United States, and the participants have begun to
understand what globalization of trade means and how to establish a structure that benefits everyone (IADB 2004). Such a strategy would
require careful legal planning in order to avoid infringement of U.S. antitrust laws, but in principle it is a reasonable
solution that resembles the existing practice of shipping components into the NAFTA zone and the special economic areas of Panama (such as
the Howard Farfan facility) for assembly and tax-free entry into the United States. Considering the rapid growth of the domestic Chinese market,
Mexican manufacturers should keep abreast of emerging trends and opportunities there, with a view to commercial expansion into niche areas.
Costa Rica has shown what can be achieved, exporting locally manufactured Intel computer chips around the world, including to China
(Oppenheimer 2008). As discussed below, some important initial steps toward greater Mexican knowledge of the
Chinese market have been advanced through educational exchange and research scholarships.
Mexico 1NC – Educational Deals
China should engage in greater educational exchange in Mexico – solves the aff and SinoMexican relations
Hearn 9 (Dr. Adrian H., research fellow at the School of Social and Political Sciences, the University of Sydney. He has conducted research
in Cuba (three years) and China (ten months), and is currently undertaking a study of Chinese engagement with Latin America. Author of
multiple books on Cuba, China, and Latin America. Pacific Rim Report No. 52, January 2009 “China’s Relations with Mexico and Cuba: A
Study of Contrasts” http://usf.usfca.edu/pac_rim/new/research/pacrimreport/pacrimreport52.html)
Considering the rapid growth of the domestic Chinese market, Mexican manufacturers should keep abreast of emerging trends and opportunities
there, with a view to commercial expansion into niche areas. Costa Rica has shown what can be achieved, exporting locally manufactured Intel
computer chips around the world, including to China (Oppenheimer 2008). As discussed below, some important initial steps toward
greater Mexican knowledge of the Chinese market have been advanced through educational exchange and
research scholarships. Educational Exchange: The Value of Culture To promote mutually beneficial cooperation, the
Chinese and Mexican governments have stepped up their commitments to bilateral education exchange
programs. Educational exchange is a central component of the Chinese government’s ambitious program
of institutional capacity building, Project 211, and as such has emerged as a key strategic branch of China’s
foreign policy. According to Edgardo Bermejo Mora, Cultural Attaché at the Mexican Embassy in Beijing, contemporary exchange
programs with Mexico draw on over three decades of bilateral collaboration: The Chinese have always sent their technicians, students, and
diplomats to a specific country to learn Spanish language and Hispanic culture. In the 1960s it was Cuba, from 1973 until about 1984 it was
Mexico, and since then Spain has become more important. During the eleven years in which Mexico was the focus, the Mexican government
gave scholarships to Chinese technicians to come and learn our ways, habits, and practices. Therefore, in the 1980s and 1990s, the Chinese had a
strong link to Mexico, which gave them a lot of political and socio-economic advantages. By 2000, in the wake of our financial
crisis, the number of Chinese coming to Mexico diminished, but now the number of incoming and
outgoing students is growing again. Educational cooperation is fundamental in the formation of bilateral
relations. Without educational cooperation we would be really limiting the scope and opportunities of
collaboration (interview, December 13, 2007). Mexican universities such as the Tecnológico de Monterrey attract a significant number of
Chinese students, many of whom are sent by their employers or through Chinese government scholarships to learn Spanish and Latin American
business cultures. China’s three Petroleum Universities, funded largely by the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and the China
National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), send students to Mexico for this kind of training before dispatching them to Venezuela, Peru, and
Ecuador. To expand such programs and create new ones, Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao recently signed a bilateral ‘Cultural Development
Agreement’ with Mexico, which resulted in the 2006 inauguration of Latin America’s first Confucius Institute in Mexico City. At present there
are 210 Confucius Institutes operating in over 60 countries. Although they harbor no specific political objective, the official Chinese news service
People’s Daily acknowledges that they and their associated programs serve to minimize “the misconception of [China’s] development as the
‘China threat’ by making its traditional value systems known to the world” (People’s Daily 2006). The hope seems to be that greater cultural
familiarity will offset local misunderstandings, suspicions, and fears associated with China’s growing influence. This is a timely objective in
Mexico, but the extent to which such programs will ease apprehensions and stimulate creative thinking about new forms of official commercial
cooperation remains to be seen. In 2005 China began to offer 300 scholarships per year for Mexican students to study in China, and Mexico
reciprocated in kind (Domínguez et al. 2006:40). Led by the Secretariat of Economic Development (SEDEC) of the state of Michoacán, nine
Mexican state governments now offer scholarships for students to live in China and study its business practices. Eloy Vargas Arreola, Secretary
of the Michoacán SEDEC, has argued that educational exchange is a critical factor in overcoming the existing commercial imbalance, stating
that, “China, a friend and ally of Mexico, poses no threat” (Kai 2006). The growing number of Mexicans studying in China is
reflected in the diversity of the programs that host them. The Asia Pacific Institute of the Tecnológico de Monterrey has
developed a pioneering strategic plan for China, working with its permanent staff in Beijing and Shanghai to coordinate activities with the
Mexican embassy in Beijing. With over 500 students in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Harbin, the Tecnológico offers long-term programs
in engineering, international relations, business, and language, as well as short-term visits to embassies, factories, and work centers. Other
programs have been less creative in their design, sending students in large groups to Chinese universities and providing only minimal guidance
when they arrive. According to an anonymous local source, one program in Hangzhou hosts 80 Mexican government-funded students annually in
an on-campus residence hall, where their level of interaction with Chinese society—even academic society—is very low. Familiarity with
Chinese culture is apparently not an objective of the local program director, who has set up a Mexican restaurant at the gates of the university.
Two interviewees reported that such programs, ostensibly focused on language and business training, function largely as propaganda for Mexican
politicians eager to convince their electorates that they are actively dealing with the ‘China threat’. As one interviewee put it, “I think it’s good
that the Mexican government is trying to do something about China, but I feel very angry that the money is so often misused” (interview,
November 3, 2007). Educational exchange programs are inherently complicated initiatives, which tend to
become more effective and tailored to local conditions over time. Such programs should ideally maximize student contact
with the foreign environment through domestic home-stays, placement with local roommates, strategically focused independent research projects,
and where possible, internships with local businesses and community organizations. It is too early to assess the effectiveness of
Mexican exchange programs in China, but their growing appeal to Mexican policymakers and students
signals an important opportunity for expansion and refinement. A committed pursuit of this opportunity at
the undergraduate, postgraduate, and professional levels would expand Mexican knowledge of Chinese
business practices, cultural values, and potentials for collaboration.
Mexico
Global downturn means now is the time for Sino-Mexican ties – improving relations and
Mexican interest
WSJ 4/28 (2013, WSJ Market Watch, Zhang Tao, “Mexico building bridges with China”
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/mexico-building-bridges-with-china-2013-04-28)
In a trip to the southern province of Hainan in early April, four months after he took office, the 47-year-old Pena Nieto met with the head of
China’s new leadership, Xi Jinping; announced the establishment of a government agency to handle trade with China; and repeatedly sent the
message that the two economies can complement each other, rather than compete. “I’ve come to reaffirm, and to also
confirm very clearly, the interest Mexico has to expand its relationship with China,” Pena Nieto said in an exclusive interview with Caixin on
April 6. Sino-Mexican economic relations have long been tense. Both are major suppliers of manufactured goods, especially
to the United States. Mexico
was the last country to sign a bilateral deal with China in 2001 to pave the latter’s way
trade deficit with
China is the largest among its trade partners. “China has set up strategic relationship with many Latin American countries, but
economic ties with Mexico have long been one of the worst because both are competing for the North
American market,” said Dong Jingsheng, deputy professor of history at Peking University. “(Pena Nieto) choosing to
emphasize Sino-Mexican relations at this particular moment might be triggered by sluggish U.S. growth
in recent years, and China’s robust development means Mexico can benefit from a strong bilateral ties.”
into the World Trade Organization, and it has launched several WTO complaints against Chinese exports. Mexico’s
Economic engagement is key to Sino-Mexican relations
WSJ 4/28 (2013, WSJ Market Watch, Zhang Tao, “Mexico building bridges with China”
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/mexico-building-bridges-with-china-2013-04-28)
“(Pena Nieto) choosing to emphasize Sino-Mexican relations at this particular moment might be triggered by sluggish U.S. growth in recent
years, and China’s robust development means Mexico can benefit from a strong bilateral ties.” Pena Nieto’s
formula to beef up relations is to let Mexico learn from China’s experience in economic growth, and to have
the two countries’ products integrate in a global, value-added chain. Time might be on Mexico’s side. While China’s labor costs are rising
rapidly, Mexico still enjoys low labor costs and advantages in transport, taxes and access to raw materials. In addition, Pena Nieto’s reform
blueprint, if implemented, could be the start of economic and social strength. But as is the case with the country’s new
friend, China, “the largest obstacle for Mexico’s reform is the resistance from vested interests,” said Jiang Shixue,
deputy head of Chinese Association of Latin America Studies.
Economic engagement with China is uniquely key to Mexico’s economy
WSJ 4/28 (2013, WSJ Market Watch, Zhang Tao, “Mexico building bridges with China”
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/mexico-building-bridges-with-china-2013-04-28)
Caixin: Mr. President, what brings you to China? Enrique Pena Nieto: We are just beginning a new administration in Mexico, and our
main
interest here is in establishing a new relationship with China. We have to recognize the very important
role of China as an engine of the world economy. Our relationship should be closer, more trade and more
integration to complement our economies. Caixin: Mexico is troubled with a large trade deficit with China. How do you plan to
tackle the deficit? Pena Nieto: Mexico is now working to promote its economic growth, more infrastructure and more opportunity for investment.
Yes, the trade flow is in deficit for Mexico. First of all we should be bringing Mexico to the attention of China, so that
we have more productive investment from China, which is only about $300 million today, and more productive
investment also from Mexico to China, which is just over $90 million. What I’d try to discuss with president Xi is that in this relaunch of the
relationship we may find institutional mechanisms with more capacity to resolve any obstacle we might have had in the past, so that we may
facilitate trade exchange. This is a general interest of Mexico to boost the relationship with China, and for China to find
in Mexico an opportunity of growth with the very broad market that Mexico has been able to build through free trade agreements with 44 nations.
We can complement each other.
China could be an engine of growth for mexico
WSJ 4/28 (2013, WSJ Market Watch, Zhang Tao, “Mexico building bridges with China”
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/mexico-building-bridges-with-china-2013-04-28)
Caixin: In recent years, China has increased its involvement in Latin America via investment and infrastructure
projects. In your view, what has China brought to this region? Pena Nieto: Asia today is a region with important economic
growth in a sustaining manner. It is also generating wealth for the world. China is the great engine of the
economic growth in this region and of the rebalancing throughout the world. Mexico is now working on structural
reforms that will allow us to take advantage of having a stable macro-economic condition, low inflation and low
level of public debt. It allows us to speed up the pace of economic growth. Latin America is a region which is also growing, and Mexico is part of
the region as a major gateway of access to two important marketplaces: the Latin American marketplace, which is the region that we are a part of,
and also the North America market, with which we have a free trade agreement.
China seeks Meixcan engagement now
Ellis 5 (June 2005, R. Evan Ellis, professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the Center for Hemispheric
Defense Studies at the National Defense University, with a research focus on Latin America’s relationships with external actors, including China,
Russia, and Iran. Author of “China in Latin America: The Whats and Wherefores” and more than 20 articles in this research area. Strategic
Studies Institute. “U.S. National Security Implications of Chinese Involvement in Latin America”
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=606)
Chinese trade with Mexico is significant and has been expanding at the same rapid rate as with other parts of Latin America. Between 1998 and
2003, Mexican exports to China increased by 337 percent, while corresponding imports from China increased by 476 percent.109 In 2004,
bilateral trade between China and Mexico was more than $7 billion, representing a 44 percent increase over 2003.110 By contrast to other Latin
American countries, however, Mexico has a trade deficit with China that is significant and growing. Mexican imports
from China in 2003 were $9,298 million, compared to exports of $463 million.111 Indeed, if the Mexican trade deficit with China was only half
of this level, Latin America as a whole would register a positive balance of trade with the Asian giant. A study by BBVA suggests that, by
contrast to other nations in Latin America, the structure of Mexican exports resemble that of China.112 Thus while the
economies of many other nations in Latin America may be regarded as complimenting those of China, Mexico more of a direct
competitor―particularly in labor-intensive, lowvalue added manufacturing sectors. Perhaps reflecting the less complimentary nature of the
economic relationship between the two countries, Chinese investment in Mexico has been relatively modest relative to
other Latin American countries―$200 million in 2004, for example. Despite the current nature of the relationship in the short term,
Mexico offers a number of attractions for China, including significant quantities of oil and other strategic
materials, and a number of commercially developed Pacific ports. On the other hand, Mexico currently uses almost all of
the oil that it produces, leaving little available for export. Moreover, Mexico’s proximity to the United States may make China wary of too
aggressively pursuing investment there in the near term. Nonetheless, China has indicated interest in pursuing a relationship
with Mexico in a number of important arenas, as reflected by inclusion of Mexico as the first stop in a
high-profile five-nation Latin American and Caribbean tour made by Chinese Vice-President Zeng Quinghong in JanuaryFebruary 2005.113
Mexico will accept Chinese aid because it views china as a competitor
CFR 8 (Congressional Committee on Foreign Relations, 110th Congress, April, “CHINA’S FOREIGN POLICY AND ‘‘SOFT POWER’’ IN
SOUTH AMERICA, ASIA, AND AFRICA” http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2008_rpt/crs-china.pdf)
While many press accounts focus on Latin American countries welcoming Chinese trade and investment, this view is not shared by all countries
in the region. Mexico and many Central American countries view China as a competitor, in terms of supplying assembled goods to
the U.S. market. They fear losing their U.S. market share to China. Fear of competition from Chinese apparel and textile
exports was a major factor for Central American nations and the Dominican Republic in negotiating the DR-CAFTA agreement with the United
States. There has also been fear in other Latin American countries about the impact of Chinese competition on domestic manufacturing sectors.
For example, Brazilian manufacturers of footwear, toys, textiles, and consumer electronics have suffered from competition with China.46
Because of the large increase in Chinese imports, Brazil is poised to run a trade deficit with China in 2007, the first since 2000, which has raised
considerable concern among Brazilian manufacturers. The specter of a flood of Chinese manufactured exports to Latin
America has led some economists to question the future viability for manufacturing in Latin America.47
Other economists and observers contend, however, that increased Chinese trade and investment can act as an engine of
growth for Latin American economies and could serve as an impetus for reform in the region in order to
increase the ability to compete with Chinese imports.48
Chinese aid is uniquely tailored to benefit Mexico
Hearn 9 (Dr. Adrian H., research fellow at the School of Social and Political Sciences, the University of Sydney. He has conducted research
in Cuba (three years) and China (ten months), and is currently undertaking a study of Chinese engagement with Latin America. Author of
multiple books on Cuba, China, and Latin America. Pacific Rim Report No. 52, January 2009 “China’s Relations with Mexico and Cuba: A
Study of Contrasts” http://usf.usfca.edu/pac_rim/new/research/pacrimreport/pacrimreport52.html)
Except for the notable exception of the oil sector, Mexico
generally operates according to free market principles; by
contrast, despite the gradual broadening of spaces for private entrepreneurship under Raúl Castro, Cuba remains a state-run
economy. These distinct approaches to economic governance have produced different strategies for
engaging with China, which for its part, has demonstrated an unorthodox capacity to engage with both
state-managed and market-oriented systems. Perceptions of China in both countries range from concern about
potential threats to national interests to optimism about emerging opportunities for market expansion and industrial
collaboration. Mexican economic trepidation is based primarily on the country’s inundation with Chinese imports, which, together with
illicit trade, has produced devastating competition for Mexican manufacturers both domestically and in their primary export market, the United
States. The political fallout for the Mexican government is twofold: first, it faces the dissatisfaction of Mexican industry leaders about inadequate
protective measures, and second, its efforts to meet Chinese demand for energy resources by opening the oil sector to foreign investment has
provoked a hostile public response. Nevertheless, opportunities for deeper collaboration exist in the development of manufacturing chains, the
refinement of educational exchange programs, and the placement of Mexican products in the booming Chinese consumer market. For Cuba,
a historically accrued wariness of excessive foreign influence has colored the character of engagement
with China. Suspicions have been largely overcome through state supervision of economic collaboration,
for instance, through joint ventures in oil and nickel extraction, biomedicine, tourism, and light industrial manufacturing. Developed through
direct bilateral governmental channels rather than in the private sector, these ventures are carefully monitored and contained within the policy
objectives of the Cuban state. Aware of the politically and economically debilitating consequences of black market commerce, the Cuban
government has preempted the formation of unofficial lines of illicit cooperation like those that exist between China and Mexico. This is evident
in the assimilation of Barrio Chino, a historically notorious center of black market activity, into the administrative control of the Office of the
Historian at a time when Sino-Cuban engagement is deeper than it has ever been. Furthermore, Raúl Castro’s legalization of trade in appliances,
TVs, VCRs, and other electronics further reduces the impact of Cuba’s already extensive informal sector while simultaneously opening the way
for expanded official trade with China. Chinese officials interviewed in Beijing argue that their country’s
collaborative projects in Latin America endeavor to learn from the successes and failures of the United
States in the region in order to provide alternative, more locally beneficial programs of economic
cooperation and development. The existing evidence from Latin America does not permit a conclusive assessment of the local costs
and benefits implicit in this agenda. What is evident is that China’s ability to simultaneously engage in free market
commerce with countries like Mexico and state-to-state exchange with countries like Cuba has framed its
collaborative projects in an unusually broad, coordinated, and long term set of social, political, and
economic objectives.
Solves Econ Advs
Only China solves Latin American economies – empirically proven
Caixin 11 (11/9 Nailene Chou West, “Soft Power and China's Story in Latin America”
http://english.caixin.com/2011-11-09/100324170.html)
Yes, the story is important. Now, China needs a convincing narrative. The China-Latin America attraction is easy to understand.
China provides a growth model as a counterweight to the United States. Latin American countries have tried one failed
development model after another only to find themselves, unlike the dynamic economies of East Asia stuck in a slow-growth rut. State-led import
substitution policies mired these countries in self-imposed isolation and inefficiencies. Neoliberal policies in line with the Washington Consensus
led to dependency on fickle capital inflow. China's economic success, achieved via controlled economic liberalization and by expanding technical
capacities in order to attract foreign investment, offers a viable alternative. In the second half of the 20th century, Mao Zedong's doctrine of
guerrilla warfare – which once shone like a beacon guiding fervent revolutionaries in South America – faded into the Andean jungles. But since
launching its capitalist transformation, China has avoided ideological exports. It carefully keeps a safe distance from leftist politics
in Venezuela and Bolivia, while adhering to mercantilist policies: Doing
business for business' sake. Latin American
countries that today count China as their No. 1 trading partner, such as Brazil, Chile and Peru, have benefited
enormously as Chinese commodity purchases boosted export revenues and helped them weather the 2008 financial crisis. In contrast,
countries overly dependent on the United States, such as Mexico, were hurt more than others during that
recent downturn. With the U.S. economy in recession, cash-rich China is now in a unique position to invest in capital-intensive projects.
"Cuento chino" is more relevant than ever this year amid buzz over an US$ 8 billion railroad project scheduled to link two Colombian cities: the
port of Cartagena on the Caribbean Sea, and Buenaventura on the Pacific Ocean. This would be an engineering feat that arguably only the
Chinese could accomplish: A 220-kilometer railway across floodplains and three mountain ranges, and through a region marred by drugtrafficking violence. The rail project's plans sparked wild speculation about China's intent and what some said was an unabashed incursion into
America's backyard. The story got more intriguing when the railway started being called a "canal seco," or "dry canal," by those who guessed
ships would be ferried on railroad cars from sea to sea.
Zero-Suminess
Chinese engagement trades off
WorldCrunch 5/6 (2013, Wang xiaoxia, staffwriter, economic observer, “In America’s Backyard: Chinas Rising Influence in Latin
America” http://worldcrunch.com/china-2.0/in-america-039-s-backyard-china-039-s-rising-influence-in-latin-america/foreign-policy-tradeeconomy-investments-energy/c9s11647/)
China is busy in America's backyard. Over the past five years, Chinese businesses have been expanding their footprint in
Latin America in a number of ways, beginning with enhanced trade to ensure a steady supply of bulk commodities such as oil,
copper and soybeans. At this year's Boao Forum for Asia, for the first time a Latin American sub-forum was created that included the
participation of several heads of state from the region. Since 2011, China has overtaken the Netherlands to become Latin
America’s second biggest investor behind the United States. China has signed a series of large cooperation
agreements with Latin American countries in such fields as finance, resources and energy. According to the latest statistics of the General
Administration of Customs of China, Sino-Latin American trade grew in 2012 to a total of $261.2 billion, a year-on-year increase of
8.18%. This trend risks undermining the position of the United States as Latin America’s single dominant
trading partner. In 2011, the U.S.-Latin American trade volume was $351 billion.
Power is zero sum – even a peaceful china rise erodes US power
Ellis 11 (NDU Press, 1st Quarter 2011, Issue 60, R. Evan Ellis, professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with
the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies at the National Defense University, with a research focus on Latin America’s relationships with
external actors, including China, Russia, and Iran. Author of “China in Latin America: The Whats and Wherefores” and more than 20 articles in
this research area. Strategic Studies Institute. “Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study” http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq60/JFQ60_85-91_Ellis.pdf)
The reemergence of China as a dominant global actor highlights longstanding ambiguities in U.S. thinking regarding what constitutes national
security. People’s Republic of China (PRC) policymakers have emphasized the “peaceful” nature of China’s rise and
have generally avoided military or political actions that could be seen by the United States as “threatening.” Nonetheless, the economic,
institutional, and cultural battles through which the PRC has advanced its
position have both leveraged and contributed to an
erosion of the U.S. strategic position globally. The advance of China and the multidimensional strategic challenge that it poses
are most effectively characterized by one of the most loosely defined and misunderstood buzzwords in the modern parlance: soft power.
Chinese access to Latin America trades off with US interests
Ellis 11 (NDU Press, 1st Quarter 2011, Issue 60, R. Evan Ellis, professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with
the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies at the National Defense University, with a research focus on Latin America’s relationships with
external actors, including China, Russia, and Iran. Author of “China in Latin America: The Whats and Wherefores” and more than 20 articles in
this research area. Strategic Studies Institute. “Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study” http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq60/JFQ60_85-91_Ellis.pdf)
Use of Chinese Soft Power One of the most important questions associated with the rise of China is how it is likely to use its growing soft power.
Although such an endeavor is, by nature, speculative, Chinese interests and patterns of behavior to date suggest the
continued use of that influence in at least the following areas: ■■ diplomatic recognition of Taiwan ■■
access to Latin American markets ■■ protection of Chinese investments in and trade flows from the
region ■■ protection of Chinese nationals ■■ working against the consolidation of U.S. influence in the
region and its institutions. Although the Chinese government repeatedly states its commitment to noninterference in the internal affairs
of partner nations, in reality the PRC is as interested in such issues as any other outside country. Only the issues that the PRC focuses on, and the
ways in which China applies pressure, differ. Diplomatic Recognition of Taiwan. For the PRC, the government of Taiwan represents an important
issue of political legitimacy and internal security. Currently, 12 of the 23 nations in the world that diplomatically recognize the government of
Taiwan are found in Latin America and the Caribbean. Although the People’s Republic of China does not publicly threaten to block investment in
or loans to countries that do not recognize the PRC, China repeatedly emphasizes the issue in its public diplomacy in the region, and makes such
investments and market access difficult for those countries that do not recognize it, while simultaneously nurturing expectations regarding the
opportunities that diplomatically recognizing the PRC could bring. When Costa Rica changed its diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to the PRC
in May 2007, for example, it received an aid package that included an $83 million soccer stadium, the purchase of $300 million in government
bonds, various highway, public works, and aid projects, and a $1 billion joint venture to expand the country’s petroleum refinery, as well as PRC
aid in facilitating access to Chinese markets by traditional Costa Rican products such as coffee. In part, such Chinese generosity was directed
toward the other countries in the region that still recognized Taiwan in order to demonstrate the types of benefits that could be made available if
they too were to change their diplomatic posture.13 Although the PRC and Taiwan have informally agreed to refrain from the use of economic
incentives to competitively “bid” for diplomatic recognition, since Costa Rica’s switch, the allure of the PRC has prompted declarations of
interest in changing diplomatic posture by Panamanian president Richard Martenelli, Paraguayan president Fernando Lugo, and Salvadoran
president Maricio Fuenes—although all did so prior to assuming office. Access to Latin American Markets. Latin American markets
are becoming increasingly valuable for Chinese companies because they allow the PRC to expand and
diversify its export base at a time when economic growth is slowing in traditional markets such as the
United States and Europe. The region has also proven an effective market for Chinese efforts to sell more
sophisticated, higher value added products in sectors seen as strategic, such as automobiles, appliances,
computers and telecommunication equipment, and aircraft. In expanding access for its products through free trade accords
with countries such as Chile, Peru, and Costa Rica, and penetrating markets in Latin American countries with existing manufacturing sectors such
as Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina, the PRC has often had to overcome resistance by organized and often politically well-connected established
interests in those nations. In doing so, the hopes of access to Chinese markets and investments among key groups of businesspeople and
government officials in those nations have played a key role in the political will to overcome the resistance. In Venezuela, it was said that the
prior Chinese ambassador to Venezuela, Zheng Tuo, was one of the few people in the country who could call President Chávez on the telephone
and get an instant response if an issue arose regarding a Chinese company. Protection of Chinese Investments in and Trade Flows from the
Region. At times, China has applied more explicit pressures to induce Latin America to keep its markets open to Chinese goods. It has
specifically protested measures by the Argentine and Mexican governments that it has seen as protectionist: and, in the case of Argentina, as
informal retaliation, China began enforcing a longstanding phytosanitary regulation, causing almost $2 billion in lost soy exports and other
damages for Argentina.14 China has also used its economic weight to help secure major projects on preferential terms. In the course of
negotiating a $1.7 billion loan deal for the Coco Coda Sinclair Hydroelectric plant in Ecuador, the ability of the Chinese bidder SinoHidro to selffinance 85 percent of the projects through Chinese banks helped it to work around the traditional Ecuadorian requirement that the project have a
local partner. Later, the Ecuadorian government publicly and bitterly broke off negotiations with the Chinese, only to return to the bargaining
table 2 months later after failing to find satisfactory alternatives. In Venezuela, the Chávez government agreed, for example, to accept half of the
$20 billion loaned to it by the PRC in Chinese currency, and to use part of that currency to buy 229,000 consumer appliances from the Chinese
manufacturer Haier for resale to the Venezuelan people. In another deal, the PRC loaned Venezuela $300 million to start a regional airline, but as
part of the deal, required Venezuela to purchase the planes from a Chinese company.15 Protection of Chinese Nationals. As with the United
States and other Western countries, as China becomes more involved in business and other operations in Latin America, an increasing number of
its nationals will be vulnerable to hazards common to the region, such as kidnapping, crime, protests, and related problems. The heightened
presence of Chinese petroleum companies in the northern jungle region of Ecuador, for example, has been associated with a series of problems,
including the takeover of an oilfield operated by the Andes petroleum consortium in Tarapoa in November 2006, and protests in Orellana related
to a labor dispute with the Chinese company Petroriental in 2007 that resulted in the death of more than 35 police officers and forced the
declaration of a national state of emergency. In 2004, ethnic Chinese shopkeepers in Valencia and Maracay, Venezuela, became the focus of
violent protests associated with the Venezuelan recall referendum. As such incidents increase, the PRC will need to rely increasingly on a
combination of goodwill and fear to deter action against its personnel, as well as its influence with governments of the region, to resolve such
problems when they occur. Blocking the Consolidation of U.S. Influence in the Region and Its Institutions. The rise of China is intimately tied to
the global economy through trade, financial, and information flows, each of which is highly dependent on global institutions and cooperation.
Because of this, some within the PRC leadership see the country’s sustained growth and development, and thus the stability of the
regime, threatened
if an actor such as the United States is able to limit that cooperation or block global institutions
from supporting Chinese interests. In Latin America, China’s attainment of observer status in the OAS in 2004 and its acceptance
into the IADB in 2009 were efforts to obtain a seat at the table in key regional institutions, and to keep them from being used “against” Chinese
interests. In addition, the PRC has leveraged hopes of access to Chinese markets by Chile, Peru, and Costa Rica to secure
bilateral free trade agreements, whose
practical effect is to move Latin America away from a U.S.-dominated
trading block (the Free Trade Area of the Americas) in which the PRC would have been disadvantaged. Finally, the PRC benefits
from the challenges posed to the dominance of the United States in the region by regimes such as
Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia, and its trade and investment with those regimes help to keep them
economically viable. Nonetheless, as mentioned above, the PRC is careful to avoid association with the anti-U.S. rhetoric and projects of
those regimes, which could damage its more strategically important relationship with the United States.
China’s presence destabilizes US security interests
Ellis 5 (June 2005, R. Evan Ellis, professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the Center for Hemispheric
Defense Studies at the National Defense University, with a research focus on Latin America’s relationships with external actors, including China,
Russia, and Iran. Author of “China in Latin America: The Whats and Wherefores” and more than 20 articles in this research area. Strategic
Studies Institute. “U.S. National Security Implications of Chinese Involvement in Latin America” Executive Summary
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/summary.cfm?q=606)
In this monograph, the author argues that China?s pursuit of longterm strategic objectives is leading the country to increase its
presence in Latin
America, with serious national security implications for the United States. Sustained Chinese economic growth requires ever greater
quantities of basic commodities such as petroleum products, coal, iron and steel, and strategic minerals. As the new generation of Chinese leadership under Hu Jintao
has moved away from the more cautious approach of his predecessor, Jiang Zemin, China has begun to aggressively court Latin America as its principal source of
supply outside Asia. Figures from the Chinese National Statistics Office show that, for example, 77 percent of all Chinese foreign investment outside Asia in 2003
went to Latin America. The pattern of Chinese investment in countries such as Argentina, Brazil, and Chile suggests that the Asian giant is seeking to assure access to
critical commodities by constructing vertically integrated supply networks over which it has leverage. China is purchasing interest in key Latin American suppliers
such as the Canadian minerals firm Noranda, or the Argentine oil subsidiary PlusPetrol Norte. It is also building cooperative relationships with supplier governments
such as the joint oil exploration and refinery construction deals signed with Venezuela and Brazil in 2004. Where necessary, China is also investing in the
infrastructure of Latin American countries to help them more effectively bring their products to market. In addition to documenting China?s aggressive new posture in
specific Latin American countries, this monograph argues that the expanded Chinese trade and investment presence in the region ultimately will give China a stake in
the politics of the region and may tempt it to become involved in the region?s security affairs. Expanded Chinese trade and investment in Latin America, for example,
will expand greatly the community of Chinese nationals in the region. The broadened community of Chinese nationals multiplies opportunities for incidents involving
significant Chinese investments in
Latin American extractive industries and increasing dependence on its production will cause the Chinese
government to seek to deflect political movements in Latin American countries that could expropriate
these investments or disrupt these resource flows. Ultimately, this monograph argues that Chinese engagement with
Latin America will make the nation both a powerful competitor and a potential partner for the United States in the
region. On one hand, China, with major investments in Latin America and dependence on its material flows, is likely to be a nation interested in reducing political
instability, armed groups, and criminal activity in the region, rather than fueling radical populism and insurgency. On the other hand, the United States
needs to consider to what degree it is willing to accept a China that has increasing leverage in Latin
America through its investment and trade presence?and a growing interest in the political course of the
region. Now, rather than later, is the time for the United States to begin seriously considering how to most constructively engage the Chinese in the Western
those nationals, while also expanding the community in China with an interest in the region. At the same time,
Hemisphere.
Even if power isn’t zero-sum, China will act as though it is
Economist 7(3/31“Here comes trouble,” p. lexis)
And what if North Korea dismantles its nuclear programmes, exchanging weapons for American friendship, rather as Libya has done? Or if it
keeps its nuclear weapons and thus provokes America into toppling the regime? For China, many strategists think, this would be disastrous,
putting Japan, South Korea, North Korea and Taiwan—"a part of China", after all—all firmly in the American camp. "In this case, China's
security pressure regarding Taiwanese independence would be far more severe a burden, [one] that would be hard to bear." It's a hard life
being a Chinese strategist, obliged to look at the world in zero-sum terms.
2NC Blocks
Solvency 2NC – Generic
Counterplan solves best – China is most willing to tailor aid, provide it no strings attached,
and is the preferred choice of _____. That’s 1NC WorldBank.
Chinese trade agreements would solve each of the topic countries
Hearn 9 (Dr. Adrian H., research fellow at the School of Social and Political Sciences, the University of Sydney. He has conducted research
in Cuba (three years) and China (ten months), and is currently undertaking a study of Chinese engagement with Latin America. Author of
multiple books on Cuba, China, and Latin America. Pacific Rim Report No. 52, January 2009 “China’s Relations with Mexico and Cuba: A
Study of Contrasts” http://usf.usfca.edu/pac_rim/new/research/pacrimreport/pacrimreport52.html)
Some scholars
believe that a coordinated multilateral approach to China will improve outcomes for Latin
American countries. As Enrique Dussel Peters and Jorge Katz (2006) have argued, a region-based bilateral dialogue with
China could integrate the booming resource industry into a broader, more sustainable development plan.
The foundations for such a process already exist in common markets such as MERCOSUR, in which China
holds consultant status. Its members (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, Venezuela) have demonstrated a commitment to defending the
integrity of MERCOSUR, and although Paraguay’s continuing support for Taiwan has been an obstacle, Chinese investments in Argentina,
Brazil, and Venezuela have created favorable conditions for a MERCOSUR-China FTA. The prospect for greater
bilateral cooperation is strengthened by the fact that all three of these countries have used support from China to increase their bargaining power
with the United States and to oppose the U.S.-backed Free Trade Area of the Americas. Indeed, Venezuela’s 2005 accession to MERCOSUR
may further this objective as Hugo Chávez builds linkages with the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA) network (Antigua, Bolivia,
Cuba, Dominica, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Saint Vincent and Venezuela) and its associated ‘People’s Trade Agreement’ (TCP). Mexico is well
positioned to engage Central and South American countries to stimulate dialogue about the capacity of
multilateral collaboration to promote regional interests vis-à-vis China. Membership in NAFTA should
not stand in Mexico’s path toward simultaneously developing alternative economic partnerships. As Chile
has shown through the concurrent development of FTAs with Canada, China, Mexico, Korea, the United States, MERCOSUR, and the European
Union, multiple agreements can consolidate overseas business networks and secure broader access to foreign markets. The emergence of
China represents more than a temporary problem for Mexico; rather, it raises the historically enduring challenge of
developing balanced and sustainable international economic relations. The threats associated with this challenge
include, but extend beyond, specific cases of ineffective enforcement of customs regulations, unscrupulous profiteering from tariff loopholes, and
even the encompassing problem of competition for a place in the consumer markets of the Americas. Indeed, the threats extend to the global scale
in the form of economically and environmentally unsustainable development strategies based on natural resource exports. To overcome the most
impending of these threats Mexico could tighten domestic policing of illicit commerce and build knowledge of the emerging Chinese market in
order to identify niche areas and develop appropriate strategies for filling them. Tortillas and cement are a good start, but there are significant
opportunities to expand existing sales of specialized electronics and auto parts, synthetic fibers, steel and plastic products, beer, and a range of
other items. Opportunities also exist to develop production chains based on assembly of Chinese manufactured components in Mexico, and
subsequent export throughout the NAFTA zone, though this would require careful legal preparation. Expanded production of automobiles, heavy
industrial equipment, and computing equipment would benefit from Mexico’s geographic proximity to the United States, sophisticated logistical
infrastructure, high levels of human capital in technological development, and access to U.S. and Canadian markets. Refined educational
exchange programs that more strongly encourage face-to-face dialogue with Chinese counterparts and industry professionals would deepen
opportunities for collaboration. Indeed, Venezuelan scholarship programs in China (mainly in the oil and space satellite industries) demonstrate
that the prospects for long-term professional partnerships are enhanced when students are exposed to—and tested on—a broad base of technical,
linguistic, and cultural experience. Mexican educational initiatives in China such as those of the Tecnológico de Monterrey have shown that
strategic industrial targeting and flexibility in program design have produced positive outcomes. At the most encompassing level, the emergence
of China raises questions about the long-term viability of development models based on bilateral free trade, particularly in natural resources.
Multilateral blocs such as ASEAN, the EU, and MERCOSUR, have shown a historical capacity to represent the interests of member countries
through improved harmonization of trade policies. These organizations have historically structured themselves to leverage benefits from trade
with the United States, providing them with a solid basis for adaptation to the emergence of China. The 21st century may turn out to be the
century of regional trade accords, and a vigorous exploration of new partnerships will only benefit Mexico. Regional integration has
also become more important for Cuba, which together with Venezuela and Bolivia, has advanced the
People’s Trade Agreement (TCP) under the auspices of ALBA. It is worth noting that ALBA’s preference for exchange
and bartering of resources (material and human) through state-administrated programs rather than free market commerce is an approach
accommodated by China’s economic policy. Indeed, even as it pursues integration into the capitalist world market as a WTO member, China
often pays for Latin American natural resources with trade credits, construction equipment, infrastructure upgrading, and technical training rather
than hard currency (Robles 2005). China has not openly endorsed ALBA, but its willingness to develop
commercial relations within the framework of state-to-state cooperation is an important dimension of its
engagement with Latin America. For Cuba this has meant the consolidation of ‘South-South cooperation’ through collaboration in
education, food security, biomedicine (particularly cancer and blood pressure research), solar energy, light industry, and tourism. Intensifying
engagement with China has also produced challenges for Cuba, where prior experience with the United States and the Soviet Union has generated
acute political sensitivity about excessive foreign influence. Elsewhere I have discussed the key political and economic factors shaping
contemporary Sino-Cuban relations (Hearn forthcoming); rather than repeat this discussion, the next section draws primarily on ethnographic data
gathered in Beijing and Havana to discuss how the Cuban state has incorporated China into its administrative priorities.
A2: Perm Do Both [Generic]
Chinese influence depends on U.S. desertion- plan reverses that
Johnson 5 (Stephen, Senior Policy Analyst for Latin America in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center
for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International
Studies, at The Heritage Foundation. Balancing China's Growing Influence in Latin America, 10/24/05,
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2005/10/balancing-chinas-growing-influence-in-latin-america)
China's main rival for global preeminence is the United States. China sees the United States as preventing Tai-wan's
reunification with the mainland and thwarting Beijing's rise as a power. Previously, China was isolated, but now
plays key roles in Asian geopolitics and aspires to do so elsewhere. Besides status as a nuclear nation, it is a member of the U.N. Security Council, the
World Trade Organization, the Group of 77 developing nations, and the Asia Pacific Economic Coopera-tion group. It also holds observer status in the Organization of American States. While
China has become the second-largest U.S. trade partner after Canada, it challenges U.S. influence wherever it can. In fact, it will soon have more
attack submarines than the United States, with the addition of four Russian Kilo-class subs and new diesel-electric vessels equipped with technology that will allow them to run quieter than
nuclear submarines.[1] According to former U.S. Ambassador to Beijing James Lilly, "[T]he facts are that [the Chinese] run massive intelligence operations against us, they make open
statements against us, their high-level documents show that they are not friendly to us." Chinese military white papers promote power pro-jection and describe U.S. policies as "hegemonism and
, the Chinese are taking advantage of failures of half-hearted mar-ket
reforms and Washington's unwillingness to pursue neighborhood relations with much enthu-siasm.
National Defense University professor Cyn-thia A. Watson notes, "[T]he 1990s turned into a period of severe disappointment as free markets led to
rampant corruption and unfulfilled expec-tations in Latin America while Washington became the world's
superpower rather than a part-ner for the region."[3]
power politics."[2] In the Western Hemisphere
Perm doesn’t solve soft power—U.S. action will drag China down
Kurlantzick 7 (4/9, Joshua, visiting scholar at the China Program of the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, “Beijing's Big Push,” Newsweek, p. lexis)
Putin's bear hug was no anomaly, and though done for good strategic reasons, also reflects Russian public opinion. Even as relations between
Moscow and Washington continue to sour, China is growing more popular than ever; a major public-opinion poll last year found that most
ordinary Russians now think China has "a positive impact on the world" and that the United States has a negative one. And Russians are far from
alone in these sentiments. Over the last five years, while anti-Americanism has surged around the globe, Beijing
has worked hard to ingratiate itself in Asia, Latin America and Africa. The name of this game is soft power:
making China and its culture as attractive as possible to foreign publics, not just their leaders. For years, Washington has dominated the field. But
Beijing's new outreach--through foreign aid, investment, deft diplomacy, tourism and education--is starting to best
American efforts. Ordinary people across the planet now view China more warmly than they do the United States. Polls taken by the
Program on International Policy Attitudes and the BBC show that majorities of people in most countries
today consider China to be a more positive influence and less of a threat to international peace than the
United States is. Such sentiments are particularly strong in the developing world; China is rated far more favorably
than the United States is in places ranging from Saudi Arabia (54 percent to 38 percent) to Turkey (27 percent to 15 percent) to Indonesia (60
percent to 40 percent) to Brazil (53 percent to 42 percent). Even in Australia, one of Washington's closest allies, polls by the Lowy Institute now
show that average citizens feel as good about China as they do about the United States.
A2: Perm Do Both [Venezuela]
Chinese influence depends on U.S. desertion- plan reverses that
Johnson 5 (Stephen, Senior Policy Analyst for Latin America in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center
for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International
Studies, at The Heritage Foundation. Balancing China's Growing Influence in Latin America, 10/24/05,
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2005/10/balancing-chinas-growing-influence-in-latin-america)
China's main rival for global preeminence is the United States. China sees the United States as preventing Tai-wan's
reunification with the mainland and thwarting Beijing's rise as a power. Previously, China was isolated, but now
plays key roles in Asian geopolitics and aspires to do so elsewhere. Besides status as a nuclear nation, it is a member of the U.N. Security Council, the
World Trade Organization, the Group of 77 developing nations, and the Asia Pacific Economic Coopera-tion group. It also holds observer status in the Organization of American States. While
China has become the second-largest U.S. trade partner after Canada, it challenges U.S. influence wherever it can. In fact, it will soon have more
attack submarines than the United States, with the addition of four Russian Kilo-class subs and new diesel-electric vessels equipped with technology that will allow them to run quieter than
nuclear submarines.[1] According to former U.S. Ambassador to Beijing James Lilly, "[T]he facts are that [the Chinese] run massive intelligence operations against us, they make open
statements against us, their high-level documents show that they are not friendly to us." Chinese military white papers promote power pro-jection and describe U.S. policies as "hegemonism and
, the Chinese are taking advantage of failures of half-hearted mar-ket
reforms and Washington's unwillingness to pursue neighborhood relations with much enthu-siasm.
National Defense University professor Cyn-thia A. Watson notes, "[T]he 1990s turned into a period of severe disappointment as free markets led to
rampant corruption and unfulfilled expec-tations in Latin America while Washington became the world's
superpower rather than a part-ner for the region."[3]
power politics."[2] In the Western Hemisphere
Maduro loves china but doesn’t want the US involved
Fillingham 3/10 (2013, Zachary, BA in IR from York University, MA in Chinese Studies from School of Oriental and African Studies in
London, analytical area of expertise in Chinese foreign policy, particularly in regards to how nationalist issues affect Chinese policy,
GeopoliticalMonitor.com, “Post-Chavez US-Venezuelan Relations: Headed for a Thaw?” http://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/post-chavez-usvenezuelan-relations-headed-for-a-thaw-4790/)
Current polls indicate that Maduro would triumph in the coming election, a scenario that does
not bode well for a thaw in USVenezuelan relations. Maduro has dropped several indications that he plans to carry on his predecessor’s
anti-American tone, notably by suggesting that the U.S. might be behind Chavez’s illness and by kicking
out two U.S. military attaches under the accusation of “trying to destabilize Venezuelan politics.”
Perm doesn’t solve soft power—U.S. action will drag China down
Kurlantzick 7 (4/9, Joshua, visiting scholar at the China Program of the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, “Beijing's Big Push,” Newsweek, p. lexis)
Putin's bear hug was no anomaly, and though done for good strategic reasons, also reflects Russian public opinion. Even as relations between
Moscow and Washington continue to sour, China is growing more popular than ever; a major public-opinion poll last year found that most
ordinary Russians now think China has "a positive impact on the world" and that the United States has a negative one. And Russians are far from
alone in these sentiments. Over the last five years, while anti-Americanism has surged around the globe, Beijing
has worked hard to ingratiate itself in Asia, Latin America and Africa. The name of this game is soft power:
making China and its culture as attractive as possible to foreign publics, not just their leaders. For years, Washington has dominated the field. But
Beijing's new outreach--through foreign aid, investment, deft diplomacy, tourism and education--is starting to best
American efforts. Ordinary people across the planet now view China more warmly than they do the United States. Polls taken by the
Program on International Policy Attitudes and the BBC show that majorities of people in most countries
today consider China to be a more positive influence and less of a threat to international peace than the
United States is. Such sentiments are particularly strong in the developing world; China is rated far more favorably
than the United States is in places ranging from Saudi Arabia (54 percent to 38 percent) to Turkey (27 percent to 15 percent) to Indonesia (60
percent to 40 percent) to Brazil (53 percent to 42 percent). Even in Australia, one of Washington's closest allies, polls by the Lowy Institute now
show that average citizens feel as good about China as they do about the United States.
Misc
CP S China Growth
China’s growth is tied to its access to Latin American resources
Business Wire 3/6 (2013, Erik Bethel, “SinoLatin Capital Explains Why China Needs Latin America”
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20130306005786/en/SinoLatin-Capital-Explains-China-LatinAmerica)
This rapid urbanization, coupled with China’s limited natural resources has lead it to expand its trade
relationship with Latin America, which has an abundance of natural resources that China needs and
whose growth is inexorably tied to the sale of those resources. Highlighting the growing symbiotic relationship, trade
between China and Latin America increased 30% per year for the last decade to reach US$240 billion last year. China is the
#1 trading partner of Brazil, Peru, Chile, Venezuela, and #2 in most of the rest. In terms of investing in the region,
China has provided US$85 billion of debt financing to Latin America between 2005 and 2012 – surpassing the World Bank (US$53 million) and
the IDB (US$67 million).
Aff
No Solvency
Generic
Balancing is false – Chinese engagement is bad for Latin American nations
Myers 12 (Margaret, program director of the Inter-American dialogue, written for the Inter-American
dialogue, April 10, “China's engagement with Latin America: More of the same?”
http://www.opeal.net/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=10729:chinas-engagement-with-latinamerica-more-of-the-same?&Itemid=123)
For more than a decade, China has maintained the upper hand in its burgeoning relationship with Latin America. As the engager, the investor, and
the lender, China has had a transformative effect on certain economies in the region. Latin America countries, on the other hand,
have assumed a more passive -- or even reactionary -- role in their relations with China. There is a
tendency now to view increasing cooperation and exchanges between China and certain Latin American
countries as a “balancing” of these lop-sided bilateral relationships. Cooperation between China and Latin America –
and especially that of the high-tech and/or scientifically-focused variety -- has expanded considerably in recent years. Costa Rica and China are
preparing to work together on the installation of new carbon emissions technologies, for example. Argentina has worked with China on
developing innovative agricultural methods. Scientific, social, and educational cooperation are all major features of ongoing Brazil-China High
Level Coordination and Cooperation Commission (COSBAN) meetings. I would argue, however, that deepening cooperation between
China and Latin America is not indicative of a balancing of relations or of genuinely horizontal
engagement. In many cases, the cooperation itself is limited, or is merely a short-term effort to secure access to
new technologies or scientific methods. In other cases, cooperative engagement should be thought of not as a leveling of the
playing field, but as an element of China’s ever-evolving economic statecraft. China’s cooperative endeavors in Latin America and elsewhere are
often seen as intervention in the affairs of China’s commercial actors to ensure a degree of “mutual benefit” in overseas dealings. Mutual benefit,
a guiding principle of China’s external engagement philosophy, is thought to secure access to and postive relationships with countries and
markets in the region.
Relations are one-sided and serve to benefit only China
Myers 12 (Margaret, program director of the Inter-American dialogue, written for the Inter-American
dialogue, April 10, “China's engagement with Latin America: More of the same?”
http://www.opeal.net/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=10729:chinas-engagement-with-latinamerica-more-of-the-same?&Itemid=123)
More of the Same? China’s Ya-Fei-La or “Asia-Africa-Latin America” construct was conceived during the Mao-era in a movement to
promote developing country solidarity. At that time, China saw itself as a “spokesperson” for what it termed the
“struggle of third world countries.” Thirty years after implementing its policy of “reform and opening-up,” China sees its role
among developing nations in much the same way. Though always willing to study other countries -- their economic and
political systems, development challenges, social policy, etc. --, its leaders still operate under the
assumption that China has more to offer developing nations than the other way around -- especially in terms of
development assistance and a as model for economic growth. Once more, China is establishing its role as a leader among developing nations -formal references to aid and developing country assistance have increased significantly over the course of the 11th Five Year and 12th Five Year
periods. China’s academic literature on Latin America further illuminates its dominant view toward Latin
America. Of the existing Chinese-language literature on the China-Latin America relationship, the vast
majority seeks to derive jiaoxun or “lessons” from Latin America’s failed experiments in economic and
social development. These “lessons” frequently are taught in China’s top universities, where students encounter numerous charts
documenting China’s and Latin America’s divergent paths toward economic development. The economic demise of Latin America – often linked
to import substitution and/or failed neo-liberal policy -- is explained alongside China’s post-1979 growth miracle. Only one widely-published
Chinese-language article looks to Latin America (and Brazil, in particular) for a viable development model. The article,lingyizhongjueqi, or
“Another kind of rise,” considers Brazil’s approaches to dealing with rampant inflation and social inequality over the past three decades,
suggesting that China might benefit from similar reforms. Although China goes to some effort to promote mutually beneficial and win-win
arrangments, China’s motivations for engaging the region remain firmly linked to its domestic interests. The premise of China’s
“going-out” strategy, as described during the 17th Party Congress is to “realize China’s long-term
economic and social development.” China’s global engagement remains driven by its leaders’ plans for
domestic development as prescribed in 12th Five-Year Plan and, more recently, in Wen Jiabao’s 2012
Government Work Report -- albeit with consideration for the “common development” of other nations.
Assuming the leadership makes incremental progress toward the objectives highlighted in its 12th Five-Year Plan, China is very likely to
continue engaging Latin America as it has over the past decade. Latin America should anticipate relations with China
that
are still dominated by trade, as well as by an overwhelming interest in natural resources and agricultural
commodities. This dynamic will produce ongoing challenges for Latin American policy-makers in terms
of export primarization, extractive sector-related environmental degradation, competitiveness, intraindustry trade, and other issues stemming from China’s engagement with the region over the past decade.
Cuba
Mexico
Mexican engagement is bad for China
Ellis 5 (June 2005, R. Evan Ellis, professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the Center for Hemispheric
Defense Studies at the National Defense University, with a research focus on Latin America’s relationships with external actors, including China,
Russia, and Iran. Author of “China in Latin America: The Whats and Wherefores” and more than 20 articles in this research area. Strategic
Studies Institute. “U.S. National Security Implications of Chinese Involvement in Latin America”
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=606)
Chinese trade with Mexico is significant and has been expanding at the same rapid rate as with other parts of Latin America. Between 1998 and
2003, Mexican exports to China increased by 337 percent, while corresponding imports from China increased by 476 percent.109 In 2004,
bilateral trade between China and Mexico was more than $7 billion, representing a 44 percent increase over 2003.110 By contrast to other Latin
American countries, however, Mexico has a trade deficit with China that is significant and growing. Mexican imports
from China in 2003 were $9,298 million, compared to exports of $463 million.111 Indeed, if the Mexican trade deficit with China was only half
of this level, Latin America as a whole would register a positive balance of trade with the Asian giant. A study by BBVA suggests that, by
contrast to other nations in Latin America, the structure of Mexican exports resemble that of China.112 Thus while the
economies of many other nations in Latin America may be regarded as complimenting those of China,
Mexico more of a direct competitor―particularly in labor-intensive, lowvalue added manufacturing
sectors. Perhaps reflecting the less complimentary nature of the economic relationship between the two countries, Chinese investment
in Mexico has been relatively modest relative to other Latin American countries―$200 million in 2004, for
example. Despite the current nature of the relationship in the short term, Mexico offers a number of attractions for China, including significant
quantities of oil and other strategic materials, and a number of commercially developed Pacific ports. On the other hand, Mexico currently uses
almost all of the oil that it produces, leaving little available for export. Moreover, Mexico’s proximity to the United States may
make China wary of too aggressively pursuing investment there in the near term. Nonetheless, China has indicated
interest in pursuing a relationship with Mexico in a number of important arenas, as reflected by inclusion of Mexico as the first stop in a highprofile five-nation Latin American and Caribbean tour made by Chinese Vice-President Zeng Quinghong in January-February 2005.113
Mexico views China as a competitor
CFR 8 (Congressional Committee on Foreign Relations, 110th Congress, April, “CHINA’S FOREIGN POLICY AND ‘‘SOFT POWER’’ IN
SOUTH AMERICA, ASIA, AND AFRICA” http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2008_rpt/crs-china.pdf)
While many press accounts focus on Latin American countries welcoming Chinese trade and investment, this view is not shared by all countries
in the region. Mexico and many Central American countries view China as a competitor, in terms of supplying assembled goods to
the U.S. market. They fear losing their U.S. market share to China. Fear of competition from Chinese apparel and textile
exports was a major factor for Central American nations and the Dominican Republic in negotiating the DR-CAFTA agreement with the United
States. There has also been fear in other Latin American countries about the impact of Chinese competition on domestic manufacturing sectors.
For example, Brazilian manufacturers of footwear, toys, textiles, and consumer electronics have suffered from competition with China.46
Because of the large increase in Chinese imports, Brazil is poised to run a trade deficit with China in 2007, the first since 2000, which has raised
considerable concern among Brazilian manufacturers. The specter of a flood of Chinese manufactured exports to Latin
America has led some economists to question the future viability for manufacturing in Latin America.47
Other economists and observers contend, however, that increased Chinese trade and investment can act as an engine of growth for Latin
American economies and could serve as an impetus for reform in the region in order to increase the ability to compete with Chinese imports.48
Mexico sees Chinese aid as a threat to its economic future
Hearn 9 (Dr. Adrian H., research fellow at the School of Social and Political Sciences, the University of Sydney. He has conducted research
in Cuba (three years) and China (ten months), and is currently undertaking a study of Chinese engagement with Latin America. Author of
multiple books on Cuba, China, and Latin America. Pacific Rim Report No. 52, January 2009 “China’s Relations with Mexico and Cuba: A
Study of Contrasts” http://usf.usfca.edu/pac_rim/new/research/pacrimreport/pacrimreport52.html)
Over the past decade the
threats posed to Mexico’s economy by China have become well known, owing
primarily to intensifying competition from legal and illicit Chinese imports both domestically and into Mexico’s primary
export market, the United States. Chinese demand for energy resources has simultaneously forced the Mexican government to confront the
socially unpopular and strategically uncertain prospect of privatizing the oil industry. The economic impasse produced by this
combination of pressures has provoked fears of an impending ‘China threat’ across Mexico’s industrial landscape.
Mexican apprehensions of an emerging ‘China threat’ find historical precedence in the observations of Vladimir Lenin in the early 20th century,
Raúl Prebisch in the 1950s, and Noam Chomsky since the 1980s: that Latin America’s prospects for moving inwards from
the periphery of the global market lie in less dependence on resource exports and more in attention to
educational and technical advancement. Mexican leaders have been aware of this at least since the 1930s. In 1938, for instance,
Lázaro Cárdenas nationalized the oil industry under the PEMEX Corporation with the aim of boosting the state’s budget for social programs,
technical training, and industrial upgrading. Successive governments deepened this model of development, gradually moving Mexico toward
import substitution and industrialization. The collapse of global commodity markets in the late 1970s and a
chronically overvalued peso, however, led to a reconsideration of trade policies and the initiation of
measures to privatize the economy.
Unbalance tanks the CP
Hearn 9 (Dr. Adrian H., research fellow at the School of Social and Political Sciences, the University of Sydney. He has conducted research
in Cuba (three years) and China (ten months), and is currently undertaking a study of Chinese engagement with Latin America. Author of
multiple books on Cuba, China, and Latin America. Pacific Rim Report No. 52, January 2009 “China’s Relations with Mexico and Cuba: A
Study of Contrasts” http://usf.usfca.edu/pac_rim/new/research/pacrimreport/pacrimreport52.html)
surpassed Mexico’s position in the U.S. market, causing the loss of over 672,000 Mexican
jobs across 12 industrial sectors. CEPAL (2004) reports that 2,500 of these jobs were lost from the maquiladora or export-processing
In 2002 China
sector alone as a result of the relocation of manufacturing operations to China. By 2003, Sony, NEC, VTech, and Kodak, together with 85 percent
of shoe manufacturers in Mexico, closed their Mexican operations and moved to China (Domínguez et al. 2007:38-9). Further losses will likely
result from the December 2007 expiration of Mexico’s ‘peace clause’ tariffs on imported Chinese shoes, textiles, and toys under World Trade
Organization (WTO) guidelines. Mexico’s inability to compete with China in industrial manufacturing has driven
it to begin emulating the resource intensive strategies of other Latin American countries, increasing oil
production to roughly 15 percent of total exports in 2005 (Dussel Peters 2007:19). Industry watchers claim that Mexican oil output could
rival that of Saudi Arabia, but stress the need for investment to the tune of $20 billion per year to exploit existing fields and explore new
discoveries such as the deepwater Noxal field in the Gulf of Mexico (Reuters 2004, Rueda 2005). Companies from China, the United States, and
elsewhere are lining up to provide this investment, intensifying the debate over whether the oil and electricity sectors should be privatized in
order to boost productivity (Hogenboom 2007:11). Adding to the bilateral tension, Mexico is China’s largest Latin
American export market: of the $15 billion of Sino-Mexican bilateral trade reported for 2007, $11.7 billion was made up of Chinese
imports to Mexico (Oppenheimer 2008). One report calculates that for every dollar worth of goods Mexico exports to China
it imports $31 worth of Chinese goods (McKinley 2005). Furthermore, illegal Chinese imports (particularly apparel) are thought to account
for close to 60 percent of the Mexican retail market, driving industry workers to mount periodic street protests outside the Chinese embassy and
the national Economics Secretariat in Mexico City (CANAINTEX 2006, Sourcemex 2003). According to a 2005 national poll, 52 percent of
Mexicans identify China as a “source of unfair competition” (cited in Domínguez et al. 2006:12), and in the words of Irma Gómez Cavazos,
Assistant Minister for Economic Relations and International Co-operation in the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “the vision of China as a
threat to the Mexican economy is getting stronger every day” (Gómez Cavazos 2005). Mexican suspicions of Chinese imports are
compounded by concerns about their safety. In 2007 Chinese-manufactured toothpaste containing potentially lethal diethylene
glycol, a cheap substitute for glycerine, was recalled from shelves worldwide. The same ingredient was included in Chinese-made cough
medicine, which killed 100 people in Panama (French 2007). Other defective Chinese products to reach Latin America include disintegrating
automobile tires, contaminated pet food, and seafood containing high levels of antibiotics to prevent infections from the industrial waste of
China’s Eastern shores.
Chinese aid is detrimental to the long-term health of Mexico’s economy
Hearn 9 (Dr. Adrian H., research fellow at the School of Social and Political Sciences, the University of Sydney. He has conducted research
in Cuba (three years) and China (ten months), and is currently undertaking a study of Chinese engagement with Latin America. Author of
multiple books on Cuba, China, and Latin America. Pacific Rim Report No. 52, January 2009 “China’s Relations with Mexico and Cuba: A
Study of Contrasts” http://usf.usfca.edu/pac_rim/new/research/pacrimreport/pacrimreport52.html)
One negative, though hardly unexpected, consequence of Mexico’s continuing regulatory codes is that suppliers and retailers have found creative
ways to circumvent them. According to the 2007 Inquiry into Antidumping Quotas Against Imports of Chinese Origin, undertaken by the
Mexican consultant IQOM Trade Intelligence, some Mexican firms have arranged legal loopholes and exceptions to antidumping quotas for their
Chinese counterparts (Garc’a 2007). A related problem is the growth of the informal economy, which, as noted above, has seen illegal imports
from China claim some 60 percent of the Mexican apparel retail market, drawing attention to local corruption in the customs system as a factor
contributing to the trade imbalance. Ultimately some responsibility for China’s negative economic impact on Mexico lies with both countries, but
it also lies with the larger global trade regime that encompasses them. While it is true that Mexican regulation of the energy sector is preventing
the inflow of FDI, it is also true that free trade will not provide a miracle solution to Mexico’s problems . Conservatives
within the Mexican Ministry of Economy argue that
open markets in shoes and other products will eventually benefit
Mexican consumers by lowering prices, but their critics point out that multinational companies such as
Wal-Mart, now Mexico’s largest private-sector employer, will reap most of the profits (Tingting 2003). Most
Latin American countries (particularly those in South America) have derived short-term economic gains
from natural resource exports to China. Just as they found in dealing with the United States, though, unregulated enclave
developments locked up in industrial parks and resource extraction projects not only create dependency
on external enterprises, but do little to strengthen local human capacities or to create opportunities for
local business (Pritchard and Hearn 2005, also see Angeles 2003). Regional dissatisfaction with this predicament is
reflected in a 2006 poll conducted by the Chilean organization Latinobarometro, which calculates that 63 percent of
Latin Americans have come to oppose unregulated foreign management and investment in gas, oil, and
other mineral extraction initiatives (Economist 2006:42). These lessons should be born in mind as Mexico
reflects on the prospect of opening its oil industry to private investment, whether from China, the United
States, or elsewhere.
Venezuela
China doesn’t solve Venezuela crisis
Fillingham 3/10 (2013, Zachary, BA in IR from York University, MA in Chinese Studies from School of Oriental and African Studies in
London, analytical area of expertise in Chinese foreign policy, particularly in regards to how nationalist issues affect Chinese policy,
GeopoliticalMonitor.com, “Post-Chavez US-Venezuelan Relations: Headed for a Thaw?” http://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/post-chavez-usvenezuelan-relations-headed-for-a-thaw-4790/)
Just to recap: what we are likely to see is a Maduro win, followed by a politico-economic crisis that ushers in either a return to credible multi-party democracy or a
Venezuela will
need outside assistance in the near future. And while some would say that China is best suited to step up and bail out
Caracas, there are a few reasons to question whether this will actually come to pass. First of all, The Chinese
Development Bank has already provided a huge amount of money to the Chavez government, about $40 billion
between 2008 and 2012 alone. Thus, if Venezuela were to be faced with a default, it would be Chinese investors with their
money on the line. Any debt renegotiations would surely include provisions that didn’t sit well with the
Venezuelan public. After all, there have already been agreements reached between Venezuela and the Chinese state-owned company Citic Group that have raised
descent into conspicuous authoritarianism. But how will this impact US-Venezuelan relations? Given its precarious economic situation,
populist alarm bells regarding the signing of mineral rights over to foreign companies. In this context, a limited rapprochement makes sense from a Venezuelan point
of view, as it would balance against a preponderance of Chinese economic influence. Now
that the “Bolivarian Revolution” is all but
discredited, and countries like Brazil have proven that it’s possible to alleviate poverty through trade and
keep US influence at arm’s length, a US-Venezuelan thaw is theoretically possible. However, authorities in Washington
will likely have to endure another round of vitriol and wait until the dust settles in Venezuelan domestic politics before their window of opportunity presents itself.
The US is best for aid to Venezuela
Fillingham 3/10 (2013, Zachary, BA in IR from York University, MA in Chinese Studies from School of Oriental and African Studies in
London, analytical area of expertise in Chinese foreign policy, particularly in regards to how nationalist issues affect Chinese policy,
GeopoliticalMonitor.com, “Post-Chavez US-Venezuelan Relations: Headed for a Thaw?” http://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/post-chavez-usvenezuelan-relations-headed-for-a-thaw-4790/)
And by all indications, Venezuela’s finances aren’t going to hold out for very long. The country is currently running a deficit of over
20 percent, and its national inflation rate fluctuates between 20 and 30 percent. Though it presides over one of the world’s largest oil reserves and is a card-carrying
member of OPEC, Venezuela’s
oil yields have been dropping throughout the Chavez era due to a lack of foreign investment. The same
is true of Venezuela’s food industry. A lack of foreign investment, inefficiency, and costly subsidies have stunted overall output, resulting in food shortages
that are now showing themselves in the huge lineups spilling out of government food depots nationwide. A reoccurring theme of Chavez’s economic policy was a willful
Given the structural
challenges that the Venezuelan economy now faces, challenges that will preclude the government’s ability to continue Chavez-era patronage ad infinitum, a Maduro
government will inevitably be faced with an economic reckoning of sorts. In the aftermath of this economic reckoning,
there will be an opportunity for both domestic opposition forces within Venezuela, and American foreign policy to make inroads.
ignorance regarding the creation of infrastructure and social capital that could drive economic growth beyond the era of direct government handouts.
CP Not Solve Econ Advantages
Doesn’t solve the US econ
Ellis 5 (June 2005, R. Evan Ellis, professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the Center for Hemispheric
Defense Studies at the National Defense University, with a research focus on Latin America’s relationships with external actors, including China,
Russia, and Iran. Author of “China in Latin America: The Whats and Wherefores” and more than 20 articles in this research area. Strategic
Studies Institute. “U.S. National Security Implications of Chinese Involvement in Latin America”
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=606)
Some of the
most immediate consequences of the current Chinese engagement in Latin America involve the
economic security of the United States and the livelihood of U.S. citizens. To the extent that Latin American countries sign free
trade agreements both with China and with the United States, American markets will become increasingly open to duty free Chinese
products―something that China has never been able to obtain through direct negotiations with the United States.129 The free trade
accord
that Chile has negotiated with the United States, for example, in combination with the one that Chile is currently negotiating with China, raises
the possibility that Chile (or other Latin American nations pursuing similar agreements) could be used as a “pass
through,” country, by which Chinese goods were sold without tariffs to U.S. markets. Although the U.S.-led initiative for a Free Trade Area of
the Americas (FTAA) is currently experiencing difficulties, its achievement would compound U.S. vulnerability to this
Chinese competition.
2AC Arguments
Perm
Perm do both – the US and China aren’t competing for spheres in Latin America –
relations aren’t zero-sum
Global Times 5/31 (2013, “China, US not competing over Latin America: expert”
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/785721.shtml#.Uaqh_kCkqUI)
Chinese President Xi Jinping heads to Latin America and the Caribbean on Friday, in a state visit aiming
at promoting China's cooperation with the region.
Xi's visit to Trinidad and Tobago, Costa Rica and Mexico follows his first foreign trip to Russia and three countries in Africa, Tanzania, South
Africa and Republic of Congo, shortly after taking office in March. While Xi kicks off his visit, US Vice President Joe Biden is concluding his
Latin America visit on the same day, as he leaves Brazil Friday. Some media reports described "dueling visits" by Chinese and
Both
the US and China deny they are competing with each other. Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson
Hong Lei said last week that the two countries can "carry out cooperation in Latin America by giving play
to their respective advantages." Tao Wenzhao, a fellow of the Institute of American Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social
US leaders, and said that the "competition between the world's two biggest economies for influence in Latin America is on display."
Sciences, told the Global Times that it is a coincidence that the two leaders chose to visit Latin America at a similar time, and that China has no
intention to challenge US influence in the area. "It's not like in the 19th century when countries divided their sphere of
influence in a certain area. China and the US' involvement in Latin America is not a zero-sum game ,"
Tao said, explaining that it is a good thing for Latin America. Chinese and US leaders visit Latin America out of their respective strategic needs,
Tao said. All countries need to interact and cooperate with other countries, and visits of such high-level are usually arranged long time before
they starts, Tao said. China has embarked on a diplomatic drive since completing its once-in-a-decade leadership transition with Chinese Premier
Li Keqiang also visiting India, Pakistan, Switzerland and Germany, and several high-level visitors to Beijing. After visiting Mexico, Xi travels to
the US for his first summit with President Barack Obama on June 7 to 8 in California.
Uniqueness Tricks
Economic cooperation is increasing now – double bind – either squo solves the impact or
the CP is insufficient
People’s Daily Online 5/31 (2013, “China-Latin America economic cooperation gains momentum: MOC”
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90883/8265408.html)
BEIJING, May 30 (Xinhua) -- Economic
and trade cooperation between China and Latin America has gained
momentum and been applied to more sectors, a spokesman for China's Ministry of Commerce (MOC) said on Thursday. Shen
Danyang said the rapid trade growth has benefited the economic development of both sides, and interdependent trade relations between China
and Latin America has been developed. China is the third-largest trade partner for Latin America after the United States and the European Union.
The two-way trade's volume reached 261.2 billion U.S. dollars in 2012, up 8.2 percent year on year, according to China's General Administration
of Customs. With huge market potential and highly complementary trading between both sides, there remains huge opportunities for joint work
between China and Latin America in the future, Shen added. The trade volume between China and Trinidad and Tobago increased 33 percent
annually from 2002 to 2011, China's official data showed. The free trade agreement between China and Costa Rica was
the first of its kind between China and Central American countries. The bilateral trade volume hit 6.17
billion U.S. dollars in 2012, a year-on-year growth of 30.5 percent. China is Mexico's second-largest
trading partner, while Mexico is China's second-largest trading partner in Latin America, official data
showed
^You need to win a “not zero sum” claim to win the first half of this.
Not-zero-suminess
Engagement isn’t zero sum – Chinese investment won’t challenge US interests
WorldCrunch 5/6 (2013, Wang xiaoxia, staffwriter, economic observer, “In America’s Backyard: Chinas Rising Influence in Latin
America” http://worldcrunch.com/china-2.0/in-america-039-s-backyard-china-039-s-rising-influence-in-latin-america/foreign-policy-tradeeconomy-investments-energy/c9s11647/)
China's involvement in the Latin American continent doesn’t constitute a threat to the United States, but
brings benefits. It is precisely because China has reached "loans-for-oil" swap agreements with Venezuela, Brazil, Ecuador and other countries that it brings muchneeded funds to these oil-producing countries in South America. Not only have these funds been used in the field of oil production,
but they have also safeguarded the energy supply of the United States, as well as stabilized these countries'
livelihood -- and to a certain extent reduced the impact of illegal immigration and the drug trade on the
U.S. For South America, China and the United States, this is not a zero-sum game , but a multiple choice of mutual benefits and
synergies. Even if China has become the Latin American economy’s new upstart , it is still not in a
position to challenge the strong and diverse influence that the United States has accumulated over two
centuries in the region.
US and Chinese influence are not zero-sum
Washington Observer 6 (1/11
http://www.washingtonobserver.org/en/document.cfm?documentid=31&charid=3)
"In regions such as Latin America, Middle East and Africa, the U.S. is simply watching to see how China's
economic and political relations with these regions will develop," said Evan Medeiros, a China expert at the RAND
Corporation, U.S.-based think-tank. "It is inevitable that China will become involved in more regions around the
world and the U.S. welcomes this change," he said. According to Medeiros, China is an "engine for global
prosperity" and that there isn't a zero-sum global competition between the U.S. and China in which
Chinese activities in Latin America, Middle East or Africa are seen as undermining U.S. influence. Instead, the
question for many American strategists is how China will use its new-found influence in these regions.
Latin American Influence isn’t zero-sum
Global Times 5/31 (2013, “China, US not competing over Latin America: expert”
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/785721.shtml#.Uaqh_kCkqUI)
Chinese President Xi Jinping heads to Latin America and the Caribbean on Friday, in a state visit aiming
at promoting China's cooperation with the region.
Xi's visit to Trinidad and Tobago, Costa Rica and Mexico follows his first foreign trip to Russia and three countries in Africa, Tanzania, South
Africa and Republic of Congo, shortly after taking office in March. While Xi kicks off his visit, US Vice President Joe Biden is concluding his
Latin America visit on the same day, as he leaves Brazil Friday. Some media reports described "dueling visits" by Chinese and
US leaders, and said that the "competition between the world's two biggest economies for influence in Latin America is on display." Both
the
US and China deny they are competing with each other. Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Hong Lei
said last week that the two countries can "carry out cooperation in Latin America by giving play to their
respective advantages." Tao Wenzhao, a fellow of the Institute of American Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, told the
Global Times that it is a coincidence that the two leaders chose to visit Latin America at a similar time, and that China has no intention to
challenge US influence in the area. "It's not like in the 19th century when countries divided their sphere of
influence in a certain area. China and the US' involvement in Latin America is not a zero-sum game," Tao
said, explaining that it is a good thing for Latin America. Chinese and US leaders visit Latin America out of their respective strategic needs, Tao
said. All countries need to interact and cooperate with other countries, and visits of such high-level are usually arranged long time before they
starts, Tao said. China has embarked on a diplomatic drive since completing its once-in-a-decade leadership transition with Chinese Premier Li
Keqiang also visiting India, Pakistan, Switzerland and Germany, and several high-level visitors to Beijing. After visiting Mexico, Xi travels to the
US for his first summit with President Barack Obama on June 7 to 8 in California.
***Chinese Soft Power NB***
Chinese Soft Power NB
Soft Power 1NC
CP solves the aff and Chinese soft power in Latin America – avoids Western constraints
Nye 4/29 (2013, Joseph S. Nye is an American political scientist and former Dean of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at
Harvard University. He currently holds the position of University Distinguished Service Professor at Harvard University[1] where he has been a
member of the faculty since 1964. He is also the co-founder, along with Robert Keohane, of the international relations theory neoliberalism,
developed in their 1977 book Power and Interdependence. The 2011 TRIP survey of over 1700 international relations scholars ranks Joe Nye as
the sixth most influential scholar in the field of international relations in the past twenty years. ForeignPolicy.Com, “What China and Russia
Don’t Get About Soft Power”
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/29/what_china_and_russia_don_t_get_about_soft_power?wp_login_redirect=0)
In his new book, China Goes Global, George Washington University's David Shambaugh shows how China has spent billions of
dollars on a charm offensive to increase its soft power. Chinese aid programs to Africa and Latin America are not
limited by the institutional or human rights concerns that constrain Western aid. The Chinese style emphasizes
high-profile gestures. But for all its efforts, China has earned a limited return on its investment. Polls show that opinions of
China's influence are positive in much of Africa and Latin America, but predominantly negative in the United
States, Europe, as well as India, Japan and South Korea.
Chinese influence depends on U.S. desertion- plan reverses that
Johnson 5
[Stephen Johnson is Senior Policy Analyst for Latin America in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for
Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International
Stud-ies, at The Heritage Foundation.Balancing China's Growing Influence in Latin America, 10/24/05,
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2005/10/balancing-chinas-growing-influence-in-latin-america]
China's main rival for global preeminence is the United States. China sees the United States as preventing Tai-wan's
reunification with the mainland and thwarting Beijing's rise as a power. Previously, China was isolated, but now
plays key roles in Asian geopolitics and aspires to do so elsewhere. Besides status as a nuclear nation, it is a member of the U.N. Security Council, the
World Trade Organization, the Group of 77 developing nations, and the Asia Pacific Economic Coopera-tion group. It also holds observer status in the Organization of American States. While
China has become the second-largest U.S. trade partner after Canada, it challenges U.S. influence wherever it can. In fact, it will soon have more
attack submarines than the United States, with the addition of four Russian Kilo-class subs and new diesel-electric vessels equipped with technology that will allow them to run quieter than
nuclear submarines.[1] According to former U.S. Ambassador to Beijing James Lilly, "[T]he facts are that [the Chinese] run massive intelligence operations against us, they make open
statements against us, their high-level documents show that they are not friendly to us." Chinese military white papers promote power pro-jection and describe U.S. policies as "hegemonism and
, the Chinese are taking advantage of failures of half-hearted mar-ket
reforms and Washington's unwillingness to pursue neighborhood relations with much enthu-siasm.
National Defense University professor Cyn-thia A. Watson notes, "[T]he 1990s turned into a period of severe disappointment as free markets led to
rampant corruption and unfulfilled expec-tations in Latin America while Washington became the world's
superpower rather than a part-ner for the region."[3]
power politics."[2] In the Western Hemisphere
Chinese soft power is key to solve global climate change – it’s key to getting other nations
on board
CSIS 9 (March, Jesse Kaplan and Julianne Smith, “Chinese Soft Power and its Implications for the
United States: competition and cooperation in the developing world”
http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/090305_mcgiffert_chinesesoftpower_web.pdf)
When it comes to China and combating climate change, everyone, from Al Gore to T. Boone Pickens, recites a common yet troubling narrative: with global temperatures rising, the need for a
peak in global greenhouse gas emissions is incompatible with continued Chinese economic growth. The People’s Republic of China, which recently became the world leader in carbon emissions,
has completely ignored environmental considerations. Kinder critics explain that renewable energy is hopelessly expensive for developing countries. Conspiracy theorists grumble that China is
Chinese obstructionism is a
primary obstacle to global efforts to combat climate change. If only the Chinese would do something, the
thinking goes, perhaps the United States would have an incentive to act as well. This narrative is familiar. It is also almost entirely wrong.
determined to destroy the Pax Americana with emissions, if not with military and economic might. All, or at least most, agree that
the climate picture is alarming
To be sure,
. Experts agree that to limit global warming to a moderately safe level of two degrees Celsius above the preindustrial norm,
global carbon emissions will need to peak in the next decade and then be more than halved by 2050. Practically, this means that developed countries must have zero-carbon economies by midcentury and developing countries must followe suit a few decades later. In quantifiable terms, the avoidable costs of climate change inaction range between 5 and 20 percent of global gross
domestic product (GDP) – approximately the cost of both world wars and the Great Depression combined. The environmental, human development, and quality-of-life costs are far greater. Even
before it passed the United States as the world’s largest emitter of carbon dioxide, China figured prominently in climate change discussions. The International Energy Agency has projected that
if China were to do nothing to curb emissions, it would emit more carbon dioxide during the next 25
years than the worlds 26 richest counties combined. Almost every week a coal-fired and highly polluting power plant large enough to service all of San
Diego or Dallas opens somewhere in China, and the Chinese build enough such plants annually to light the entire United Kingdom. The Chinese coal sector alone produces upward of 16 percent
The Chinese widely
recognize that the threat of climate change is real, and they have taken significant steps in recent years to
counter that threat. To start, China has a National Climate Change Plan, something about which U.S. environmentalists can only dream, and
China has mustered a wide array of legislative, economic, and governmental instruments to foster shifts to
more sustainable industrial activity. China has invested heavily in renewable energy and has more stringent efficiency standards for its automobiles than does the
of global carbon emissions. These numbers are sobering. In contrast with the common narrative, however, they are not sobering only to Western eyes.
United States. In his annual address in 2007, Premier Wen Jiabao made 48 references to “environment,” “pollution” or “environmental protection,” and party leadership has pursued efforts at
However, significant gaps between well-intentioned rhetoric and
concrete action remain. In addition, Chinese efforts to stem emissions are sometimes contradictory and not always effective. The country is nevertheless of the correct path,
structural reform to ensure compliance with environmental regulations.
and its recalcitrance about addressing climate change is, if not a complete myth, not an obstacle to engagement either. Villainizing China, while convenient, distorts reality and distracts from U.S.
inaction.
Extinction
Deibel 7 [Terry L. Professor of IR at National War College, 2007 “Foreign Affairs Strategy: Logic for
American Statecraft”, Conclusion: American Foreign Affairs Strategy Today]
Finally, there is one major existential threat to American security (as well as prosperity) of a nonviolent nature, which, though
far in the future, demands urgent action. It is the threat of global warming to the stability of the climate
upon which all earthly life depends. Scientists worldwide have been observing the gathering of this threat for
three decades now, and what was once a mere possibility has passed through probability to near
certainty. Indeed not one of more than 900 articles on climate change published in refereed scientific
journals from 1993 to 2003 doubted that anthropogenic warming is occurring. “In legitimate
scientific circles,” writes Elizabeth Kolbert, “it is virtually impossible to find evidence of disagreement over
the fun damentals of global warming.” Evidence from a vast international scientific monitoring effort accumulates almost
weekly, as this sample of newspaper reports shows: an international panel predicts “brutal droughts, floods and violent storms across the planet
over the next century”; climate change could “literally alter ocean currents, wipe away huge portions of Alpine Snowcaps and aid the spread of
cholera and malaria”; “glaciers in the Antarctic and in Greenland are melting much faster than expected, and…worldwide, plants are blooming
several days earlier than a decade ago”; “rising sea temperatures have been accompanied by a significant global increase in the most destructive
hurricanes”; “NASA scientists have concluded from direct temperature measurements that 2005 was the hottest year on record, with 1998 a close
second”;“Earth’s
warming climate is estimated to contribute to more than 150,000 deaths and 5
million illnesses each year” as disease spreads; “widespread bleaching from Texas to Trinidad…killed broad swaths of
corals” due to a 2-degree rise in sea temperatures. “The world is slowly disintegrating,” concluded Inuit hunter Noah Metuq, who
lives 30 miles from the Arctic Circle. “They call it climate change…but we just call it breaking up.” From the founding of the first cities some
6,000 years ago until the beginning of the industrial revolution, carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere remained relatively constant at about 280
parts per million (ppm). At present they are accelerating toward 400 ppm, and by 2050 they will reach 500 ppm, about double pre-industrial
levels. Unfortunately,
atmospheric CO2 lasts about a century, so there is no way immediately to
reduce levels, only to slow their increase, we are thus in for significant global warming; the only
debate is how much and how serous the effects will be. As the newspaper stories quoted above show, we are
already experiencing the effects of 1-2 degree warming in more violent storms, spread of disease, mass die offs of
plants and animals, species extinction, and threatened inundation of low-lying countries like the Pacific nation
of Kiribati and the Netherlands at a warming of 5 degrees or less the Greenland and West Antarctic ice sheets could
disintegrate, leading to a sea level of rise of 20 feet that would cover North Carolina’s outer banks, swamp the southern
third of Florida, and inundate Manhattan up to the middle of Greenwich Village. Another catastrophic effect would be the
collapse of the Atlantic thermohaline circulation that keeps the winter weather in Europe far
warmer than its latitude would otherwise allow. Economist William Cline once estimated the damage to the United States
alone from moderate levels of warming at 1-6 percent of GDP annually; severe warming could cost 13-26 percent of GDP. But the most
frightening scenario is runaway greenhouse warming, based on positive feedback from the buildup
of water vapor in the atmosphere that is both caused by and causes hotter surface temperatures. Past
ice age transitions, associated with only 5-10 degree changes in average global temperatures, took place in just decades, even though no one was
then pouring ever-increasing amounts of carbon into the atmosphere. Faced with this specter, the best one can conclude is that “humankind’s
continuing enhancement of the natural greenhouse effect is akin to playing Russian roulette with
the earth’s climate and humanity’s life support system. At worst, says physics professor Marty Hoffert of New York
University, “we’re just going to burn everything up; we’re going to heat the atmosphere to the
temperature it was in the Cretaceous when there were crocodiles at the poles, and then everything
will collapse.” During the Cold War, astronomer Carl Sagan popularized a theory of nuclear winter to describe how a thermonuclear war
between the Untied States and the Soviet Union would not only destroy both countries but possibly end life on this planet. Global
warming is the post-Cold War era’s equivalent of nuclear winter at least as serious and considerably better
supported scientifically. Over the long run it puts dangers form terrorism and traditional military challenges to
shame. It is a threat not only to the security and prosperity to the United States, but potentially to the continued existence of
life on this planet.
Sphere of Influence 1NC
CP solves the aff and Chinese soft power in Latin America – avoids Western constraints
Nye 4/29 (2013, Joseph S. Nye is an American political scientist and former Dean of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at
Harvard University. He currently holds the position of University Distinguished Service Professor at Harvard University[1] where he has been a
member of the faculty since 1964. He is also the co-founder, along with Robert Keohane, of the international relations theory neoliberalism,
developed in their 1977 book Power and Interdependence. The 2011 TRIP survey of over 1700 international relations scholars ranks Joe Nye as
the sixth most influential scholar in the field of international relations in the past twenty years. ForeignPolicy.Com, “What China and Russia
Don’t Get About Soft Power”
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/29/what_china_and_russia_don_t_get_about_soft_power?wp_login_redirect=0)
In his new book, China Goes Global, George Washington University's David Shambaugh shows how China has spent billions of
dollars on a charm offensive to increase its soft power. Chinese aid programs to Africa and Latin America are not
limited by the institutional or human rights concerns that constrain Western aid. The Chinese style emphasizes
high-profile gestures. But for all its efforts, China has earned a limited return on its investment. Polls show that opinions of
China's influence are positive in much of Africa and Latin America, but predominantly negative in the United
States, Europe, as well as India, Japan and South Korea.
Even if power isn’t zero-sum, China will act as though it is
Economist 7(3/31“Here comes trouble,” p. lexis)
And what if North Korea dismantles its nuclear programmes, exchanging weapons for American friendship, rather as Libya has done? Or if it
keeps its nuclear weapons and thus provokes America into toppling the regime? For China, many strategists think, this would be
disastrous, putting Japan, South Korea, North Korea and Taiwan—"a part of China", after all—all firmly in the American
camp. "In this case, China's security pressure regarding Taiwanese independence would be far more severe a burden, [one] that would be hard
to bear." It's a hard life being a Chinese strategist, obliged to look at the world in zero-sum terms.
Competing with China for influence causes nuclear war
Eland 5 (Director of the Center on Peace & Liberty at The Independent Institute, Former Director of
Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute Ivan Eland - - 4/11/05 “Coexisting with a Rising China,”
http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=1494)
Although China is an autocratic state, it still has legitimate security interests. The United States would be
smart to show some empathy with those concerns. In recent years, as the United States has become
alarmed at China’s expanded military spending, the Chinese have also become alarmed at large increases
in the U.S. defense budget and U.S. attacks on the sovereign nations of Serbia and Iraq. Many Chinese
see the threat of an expanding U.S. empire that aims at encircling China and preventing its legitimate rise
to great power status. To lessen such perceptions and reduce the chance of conflict between the two
nuclear-armed nations, the United States should retract its forward military and alliance posture in Asia,
including repudiating any implied commitment to defend Taiwan. With large bodies of water as moats
and the most formidable nuclear arsenal in the world, the United States hardly needs a security perimeter
that stretches across the entire Pacific Ocean to protect it from China. If the United States continues to
maintain an outdated Cold War-style empire, it is bound to come into needless conflict with other powers,
especially China. Instead of emulating the policies of pre-World War I Britain toward Germany, the
United States should take a page from another chapter in British history. In the late 1800s, although not
without tension, the British peacefully allowed the fledging United States to rise as a great power,
knowing both countries were protected by the expanse of the Atlantic Ocean that separated them. Taking
advantage of that same kind separation by a major ocean, the United States could also safely allow China
to obtain respect as a great power, with a sphere of influence to match. If China went beyond obtaining a
reasonable sphere of influence into an Imperial Japanese-style expansion, the United States could very
well need to mount a challenge. However, at present, little evidence exists of Chinese intent for such
expansion, which would run counter to recent Chinese history. Therefore, a U.S. policy of coexistence,
rather than neo-containment, might avoid a future catastrophic war or even a nuclear conflagration.
Cards
CP solves the aff and Chinese soft power in Latin America – avoids Western constraints
Nye 4/29 (2013, Joseph S. Nye is an American political scientist and former Dean of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at
Harvard University. He currently holds the position of University Distinguished Service Professor at Harvard University[1] where he has been a
member of the faculty since 1964. He is also the co-founder, along with Robert Keohane, of the international relations theory neoliberalism,
developed in their 1977 book Power and Interdependence. The 2011 TRIP survey of over 1700 international relations scholars ranks Joe Nye as
the sixth most influential scholar in the field of international relations in the past twenty years. ForeignPolicy.Com, “What China and Russia
Don’t Get About Soft Power”
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/29/what_china_and_russia_don_t_get_about_soft_power?wp_login_redirect=0)
In his new book, China Goes Global, George Washington University's David Shambaugh shows how China has spent billions of
dollars on a charm offensive to increase its soft power. Chinese aid programs to Africa and Latin America are not
limited by the institutional or human rights concerns that constrain Western aid. The Chinese style emphasizes
high-profile gestures. But for all its efforts, China has earned a limited return on its investment. Polls show that opinions of
China's influence are positive in much of Africa and Latin America, but predominantly negative in the United
States, Europe, as well as India, Japan and South Korea.
Your Authors underestimate Chinese Soft Power because they compare it to US-style soft
power – china cultivates power differently – seven reasons
*This explicitly answers Nye’s reasoning in his 2013 article on why china doesn’t have soft power
Ellis 11 (NDU Press, 1st Quarter 2011, Issue 60, R. Evan Ellis, professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with
the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies at the National Defense University, with a research focus on Latin America’s relationships with
external actors, including China, Russia, and Iran. Author of “China in Latin America: The Whats and Wherefores” and more than 20 articles in
this research area. Strategic Studies Institute. “Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study” http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq60/JFQ60_85-91_Ellis.pdf)
In general, the
bases of Chinese soft power differ from those of the United States, leading analysts to
underestimate that power when they compare the PRC to the United States on those factors that are the sources of
U.S. influence, such as the affinity of the world’s youth for American music, media, and lifestyle, the
widespread use of the English language in business and technology, or the number of elites who have learned their
professions in U.S. institutions. It is also important to clarify that soft power is based on perceptions and emotion (that is, inferences), and not
necessarily on objective reality. Although China’s current trade with and investment position in Latin America are
still limited compared to those of the United States,3 its influence in the region is based not so much on the current
size of those activities, but rather on hopes or fears in the region of what it could be in the future. Because perception
drives soft power, the nature of the PRC impact on each country in Latin America is shaped by its particular situation, hopes, fears, and
prevailing ideology. The “Bolivarian socialist” regime of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela sees China as a powerful ally in its
crusade against Western “imperialism,” while countries such as Peru, Chile, and Colombia view the PRC in more traditional terms
as an important investor and trading partner within the context of global free market capitalism. The core of Chinese soft power in
Latin America, as in the rest of the world, is the widespread perception that the PRC, because of its sustained high rates of
economic growth and technology development, will present tremendous business opportunities in the future, and will
be a power to be reckoned with globally. In general, this perception can be divided into seven areas: ■■ hopes for
future access to Chinese markets ■■ hopes for future Chinese investment ■■ influence of Chinese entities and
infrastructure in Latin America ■■ hopes for the PRC to serve as a counterweight to the United States and Western institutions
■■ China as a development model ■■ affinity for Chinese culture and work ethic ■■ China as “the wave of the
future.” In each of these cases, the soft power of the PRC can be identified as operating through distinct sets of actors:
the political leadership of countries, the business community, students and youth, and the general population.
Soft power from policy successes in Latin America is key to consolidating the CCP’s power
base
Lam 7 ( Feb 7, 2007, Willy, Senior Fellow at The Jamestown Foundation, “Beijing’s Great Leap Outward: Power
Projection with Chinese Characteristics,” http://jamestown.org/china_brief/article.php?articleid=2373266)
There are also benefits, both tangible and intangible, that may accrue with China’s achievement of quasi-superpower status. Given the United
States’ difficulties in Iraq and the perceived shrinkage of America’s moral high ground in international affairs, countries in regions such
as Africa, Southeast Asia and Latin America may have pragmatic reasons to tilt toward a seemingly benign, foreignaid dispensing China. This goodwill may translate into more favorable terms when Chinese state firms
negotiate for oil contracts in Africa and Latin America. Moreover, thanks to the backing from large numbers of
Third World countries, Beijing may be able to vote down motions at the UN and other world bodies that
are deemed detrimental to the interests of Beijing and close allies, such as Burma and Iran. There may also be
overwhelming domestic calculations behind Hu’s policies. With Chinese society becoming more fragmented due to the growing disparities
between the haves and the have-nots, Beijing increasingly relies upon overarching ideals, such as patriotism and nationalism, to bind the disparate
nation together. Spectacular demonstrations of the country’s own military capabilities and diplomatic triumphs in Africa and Latin
America make it easier for Hu and his PLA colleagues to justify even greater increases in the army’s
budget. And in the months leading up to the 17th Party Congress, Hu needs the support of the PLA
generals in order to fully consolidate his stature in the CCP political hierarchy and legacy. All of these factors
seem to impel the Fourth Generation leadership toward a much bolder—if not riskier—approach to the Middle Kingdom’s centuries-old quest for
fuguo qiangbing or “wealthy country, strong army.”
Other nations find it easier to get PRC aid
CFR 8 (Congressional Committee on Foreign Relations, 110th Congress, April, “CHINA’S FOREIGN POLICY AND ‘‘SOFT POWER’’ IN
SOUTH AMERICA, ASIA, AND AFRICA” http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2008_rpt/crs-china.pdf)
COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGES OF PRC ‘‘SOFT POWER’’
Whether one is reading press accounts and scholarly treatises or traveling through the regions under discussion, the PRC seems to be everywhere.
It is tempting to begin to think in alarmist terms, thereby magnifying presumed PRC strengths as well as perceived U.S. weaknesses. Many
concerned observers focus on the competitive strengths that PRC soft power has in relation to the United States, pointing out that the PRC
international approach is particularly strong in areas where the U.S. political system and U.S. values make
it less competitive. Some suggest that these PRC strengths have a brighter future in today’s global economy, meaning that China will
have increasing economic and political soft power clout internationally at the expense of the United
States. Still, a closer look at some of the PRC’s presumed assets suggests that they may have downsides as well. No Strings The recipient
governments of PRC trade and investment are particularly attracted to the fact that Chinese money generally comes with none of
the pesky human rights conditions, good governance requirements, approved-project restrictions, and
environmental quality regulations that characterize U.S. and other Western government investments. With an
authoritarian government that has few if any democratic imperatives, China has capitalized on its willingness to make such ‘‘unrestricted’’
international investments as part of its ‘‘win-win’’ international strategy. In response to the December 2006 military coup in Fiji, for instance,
Beijing promised to continue its aid programs on the grounds that the coup was Fiji’s ‘‘internal’’ affair. (PRC leaders do not appear to define the
recipient country’s adoption of the ‘‘one- China’’ policy as such a restriction.) China markets this capacity internationally as a key competitive
advantage to Western capital—one that is both more efficient and less intrusive for the recipients. And the unrestricted nature of PRC investments
resonates with many foreign governments. According to one African leader, for instance: . . . I have found that a contract that would take five
years to discuss, negotiate and sign with the World Bank takes three months when we have dealt with Chinese authorities. I am a firm believer in
good governance and the rule of law. But when bureaucracy and senseless red tape impede our ability to act—and when poverty persists while
international functionaries drag their feet—African leaders have an obligation to opt for swifter solutions.20 The World Bank and the U.S. and
other Western governments may be able to increase the efficiency of their international investment processes and reduce attending red tape to
compete with these PRC advantages. But Beijing’s willingness to make unrestricted investments while holding the recipients to no standards
implicitly validates the policies of the recipient (and often authoritarian governments. Such a ‘‘hands-off’’ approach could have negative longerterm implications for how the PRC is viewed within the countries in which it is investing. Over the longer term, then, China’s approach has
potential negative consequences that could counterbalance any soft power advantages. The Advantage of State-Owned Assets The PRC also
is thought to reap soft-power advantages by having much of its foreign investment carried out by its
strong state- owned sector. These state corporations lack transparency, have deep pockets backed by
government assets, and operate without the constraints that come with having to issue a corporate annual
report. Unlike U.S. corporations investing overseas, who lack this close government patronage and in addition must answer to their
shareholders, PRC state-owned companies have the luxury of being able to take a longer-term, strategic view—one more closely integrated with
national priorities—without having to demonstrate immediate profits. But again, there are negative consequences; there is a certain discipline in
having to adhere to the bottom line. PRC state-owned companies, lacking this built-in discipline, sometimes are seen to have paid above-market
prices for their oil and gas contracts and to have entered into unprofitable initial arrangements in order to improve bilateral relations and facilitate
future contracts.
China’s image is most favorable in Latin America – but it’s on the decline
The Atlantic 4/11 (2013, China File, “Can China Do Softpower” http://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/04/can-china-do-softpower/274916/)
David Shambaugh:
Since 2008 the Chinese government increasingly has recognized the importance of its international image
and building 'soft power' as part of the nation's "comprehensive power" (综合国力, zònghé guólì). Since then, the
various government and Communist Party agencies have been prioritizing this effort and pouring billions into various activities abroad -- ramping
up Chinese media presence overseas, cultural exhibitions, student exchanges, Confucius Institutes, corporate branding, and public diplomacy.
This has been a global effort. In a short time, China has managed significantly to increase its "cultural footprint"
overseas. But, the question remains: is all the investment producing dividends? Thus far, the the answer must be "no." China's global
public image is mixed at best, although there do exist "pockets of favorability" in Africa and Latin America -but even on these two continents, polling and anecdotal evidence indicates growing suspicions about
China's presence (mainly commercial and in the realm of energy and resource extraction) during the last 18 months. Elsewhere in the
world, China's image generally is mixed to poor and declining. This is probably a natural part of becoming a global power (critical views), but the
czars of China's "external propaganda" (对外宣传, duìwài xuānchuán) would be better served reflecting on the kinds of activities that give China
a negative image abroad than simply investing in programs for cultural exchange. At the end of the day, if the "message" isn't sellable, no wellresourced "messenger" can sell it.
Aff Answers
CP insufficient
CP doesn’t solve Chinese soft power – [limited scope, hypocritical stance and strategic
flaws]
Nye 4/29 (2013, Joseph S. Nye is an American political scientist and former Dean of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at
Harvard University. He currently holds the position of University Distinguished Service Professor at Harvard University[1] where he has been a
member of the faculty since 1964. He is also the co-founder, along with Robert Keohane, of the international relations theory neoliberalism,
developed in their 1977 book Power and Interdependence. The 2011 TRIP survey of over 1700 international relations scholars ranks Joe Nye as
the sixth most influential scholar in the field of international relations in the past twenty years. ForeignPolicy.Com, “What China and Russia
Don’t Get About Soft Power”
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/29/what_china_and_russia_don_t_get_about_soft_power?wp_login_redirect=0)
Power is the ability to affect others to get the outcomes one wants, and that can be accomplished in three main ways -- by coercion, payment, or
attraction. If you can add the soft power of attraction to your toolkit, you can economize on carrots and sticks. For a rising power like China
whose growing economic and military might frightens its neighbors into counter-balancing coalitions, a
smart strategy includes soft
power to make China look less frightening and the balancing coalitions less effective. For a declining power like
Russia (or Britain before it), a residual soft power helps to cushion the fall. The soft power of a country rests primarily on three resources: its
culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when
they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority). But combining these resources is not always easy. Establishing, say, a Confucius Institute
in Manila to teach Chinese culture might help produce soft power, but it is less likely to do so in a context where China has just bullied the
Philippines over possession of Scarborough Reef. Similarly, Putin has told his diplomats that "the priority has been shifting to the literate use of
soft power, strengthening positions of the Russian language," but as Russian scholar Sergei Karaganov noted in the aftermath of the dispute with
Georgia, Russia has to use "hard power, including military force, because it lives in a much more dangerous world ... and because it has little soft
power -- that is, social, cultural, political and economic attractiveness." Much of America's soft power is produced by civil society -- everything
from universities and foundations to Hollywood and pop culture -- not from the government. Sometimes the United States is able to preserve a
degree of soft power because of its critical and uncensored civil society even when government actions -- like the invasion of Iraq -- are otherwise
undermining it. But in a smart power strategy, hard and soft reinforce each other. In his new book, China Goes Global, George Washington
University's David Shambaugh shows how China has spent billions of dollars on a charm offensive to increase its soft
power. Chinese aid programs to Africa and Latin America are not limited by the institutional or human rights concerns that constrain Western aid.
The Chinese style emphasizes high-profile gestures. But for all its efforts, China has earned a limited return on
its investment. Polls show that opinions of China's influence are positive in much of Africa and Latin America, but
predominantly negative in the United States, Europe, as well as India, Japan and South Korea. Even China's
soft-power triumphs, such as the 2008 Beijing Olympics, have quickly turned stale. Not long after the last international athletes
had departed, China's domestic crackdown on human rights activists undercut its soft power gains. Again in 2009, the Shanghai Expo was a great
success, but it was followed by the jailing of Nobel Peace Laureate Liu Xiaobo and screens were dominated by scenes of an empty chair at the
Oslo ceremonies. Putin might likewise count on a soft power boost from the Sochi Olympics, but if he continues to repress dissent, he, too, is
likely to step on his own message. China and Russia make the mistake of thinking that government is the main
instrument of soft power. In today's world, information is not scarce but attention is, and attention depends on credibility.
Government propaganda is rarely credible. The best propaganda is not propaganda. For all the efforts to turn Xinhua and China
Central Television into competitors to CNN and the BBC, there is little international audience for brittle propaganda. As the Economist noted
about China, "the party has not bought into Mr. Nye's view that soft power springs largely from individuals, the private sector, and civil society.
So the government has taken to promoting ancient cultural icons whom it thinks might have global appeal ."
But
soft power doesn't work that way . As Pang Zhongying of Renmin University put it, it highlights "a poverty of thought"
among Chinese leaders. The development of soft power need not be a zero-sum game. All countries can gain from finding
each other attractive. But for China and Russia to succeed, they will need to match words and deeds in their policies, be self-critical, and unleash
the full talents of their civil societies. Unfortunately, that is not about to happen soon.
Alt Causes to SoftPower
Alt causes to Chinese softpower – no cultural draw
The Atlantic 4/11 (2013, China File, “Can China Do Softpower” http://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/04/can-china-do-softpower/274916/)
Jeremy Goldkorn: Chairman Mao Zedong said that power comes out of the barrel of a gun, and he knew a thing or two about power, both hard
and soft. If you have enough guns, you have respect. Money is the same: if you have enough cash, you can buy guns, and respect. Israel and
Saudi Arabia are examples of the limits of such respect. Both countries are rich and in some ways very powerful, but people in other countries
with no cultural connections don't look at Israel, or Saudi Arabia and think: "Gee, I want to live like that and watch their movies!" But we, the
rest of us, everyone who is not American, we all want to watch American movies. I am from South Africa, and I'll confidently
represent the entire Third World and the rest of the First World assure you that it's true. We
don't want to watch Israeli or Saudi or
Chinese movies, nor buy Chinese sneakers. Nor, with the exception of a few eccentrics such as myself, do we want to live in Chinese cities.
The Saudis and Israelis do not seem to care about this, but China does, hence the endless hand-wringing about
soft power. The essence of Joseph Nye's articulation of of soft power is the power to attract, to co-opt and to seduce. China now has enough
cash to open Confucius Institutes, fund movies, TV stations, and schools, open art zones, buy aircraft carriers and islands, but China has not
made itself an attractive place to live or work or dream. Until Chinese political leaders would rather their
daughters went to Peking University over Harvard, until Chinese people would rather buy Mengniu infant milk formula over
the equivalent brand from New Zealand, until Beijing and Shanghai become as pleasant to live in as New York and L.A., China will find
its soft power ambitions thwarted. As the ancient American saying has it, you can put lipstick on a pig, but it's still a pig --doesn't
matter how much you spend on the lipstick.