Kate Faxon, Dylan Dobrenis, Luke Elion
Mao’s Cultural Revolution:
What did Mao do?
1. Mao tried to purge China of all capitalist elements. He did this by eradicating
“capitalist roaders” (those with politics more conservative than Mao) from
the government and encouraging civilians to target their landlords.1 This
followed the failure of the Great Leap Forward.2
What were Mao’s goals?
1. “Struggle against and crush those persons in authority who are taking the
capitalist road, to criticize and repudiate the reactionary bourgeois academic
authorities.”3
2. Mao’s stated goal was to form the cultural revolutionary groups, committees,
and congresses to keep the Communist party in contact with the masses.
3. Mao also used the Cultural Revolution to spread Maoist thought quickly and
efficiently throughout the provinces of China.4
4. Mao’s true goal was to reestablish himself as the unopposed leader of the
party, silence criticism from the elite, and bring back China’s “revolutionary
spirit.”
5. Mao wanted to ensure that his vision of revolution would survive his death.
How did it help Mao rise to and consolidate power?
1. Mao was able to systematically eliminate capitalist opposition. In reality he
eliminated everyone who threatened his power. This was done though
purges and the promotion of class warfare.
2. Mao reshaped all aspects of Chinese life to reflect Communist ideals. He
replaced store and street names with revolutionary names. For example, East
is Red store. He also wanted to reverse traffic lights so red meant go. 5
Lu Xiuyuan, "A Step Toward Understanding Popular Violence in China's Cultural
Revolution," Pacific Affairs 67, no. 4 (Winter 1994-1995),
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2759573.
2 Spence, Jonathan, and Stanford. "Introduction to the Cultural Revolution." Fall 2007.
http://iis-db.stanford.edu/docs/115/CRintro.pdf.
3 Mao, Zedong. "The Sixteen Points: Guidelines for the Great Proletarian Cultural
Revolution." http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/ps/cup/sixteen_points.pdf.
1
Peter S. H. Tang, "Mao Tsetung Thought since the Cultural Revolution," JSTOR,
section goes here, accessed February 14, 2013, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20098574.
4
Harding, Harry. "Reappraising the Cultural Revolution." The Wilson Quarterly 4, no. 4
(1980): 132-41. Accessed February 11, 2013.
5
3. All schools were closed down and education reflected Maoist ideals and
philosophy. Science and technology were not integrated into education.
China lost about a decade in terms of technological and scientific
advancement because of Mao’s target of intellectuals during the Cultural
Revolution.
What problems arose and what were the weaknesses?
1. China was technologically stagnant for a decade due to Mao’s push for
Maoist reeducation.
2. The current Chinese government has estimated that 100 million people
suffered during the Cultural Revolution.
3. There was a large human cost. Civilians were persecuted, tortured, executed
and jailed.
4. The goal of eliminating the “Four Olds” (old customs, culture, habits and
ideas) led to the destruction of churches and ancient sites.6
5. The Red Guard presence in cities was often split into two factions:
conservative and rebel, between which there was physical violence. The
conservative factions were supported by the Chinese military, and rebel
leaders were arrested and tortured or executed.7
Evidence Bank:
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Cultural Revolution began in 1966 and ended in 1976.
Red Guards were troops of young Chinese people mobilized by Mao during
the Cultural Revolution.
Western embassies were burned, school teachers were beaten and party
officials were humiliated.
China was not on the verge of a capitalist restoration but Mao was paranoid
because economic inequalities were increasing.
The main force of the revolution consisted of the masses of workers,
peasants, revolutionary intellectuals and soldiers.
Mao’s associates describe the cultural revolution as China’s “greatest
contribution to Marxist theory.”
Mao quote:
Lu Xiuyuan, "A Step Toward Understanding Popular Violence in China's Cultural
Revolution," Pacific Affairs 67, no. 4 (Winter 1994-1995): 535,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2759573.
7 Xiuyuan, 536
6
[The Cultural Revolution was a way to] "expose and smash the renegades, enemy
agents, and capitalist roaders" holding positions in the party.”8
Historians:
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Harry Harding  1980, a western historian
o “purposes were distorted by the passions and personal ambitions of
its activists; and its costs far outweighed the benefits of any of its
reform.”9
Article from Stanford University adapted from Jonathan Spence  1968
Harding, Harry. "Reappraising the Cultural Revolution." The Wilson Quarterly 4, no. 4
(1980): 132-41. Accessed February 11, 2013.
9 Harding, Harry. "Reappraising the Cultural Revolution." The Wilson Quarterly 4, no. 4
(1980): 132-41. Accessed February 11, 2013.
8
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o “the Cultural Revolution was not a wrongheaded assault on the
institutions and policies necessary for modernization but rather a
reflection of Mao's belief that bureaucracy and industrialization do
not necessarily lead to an improved quality of life."10
Liu Xiuyan  1995
o “highlighting the popular violence of the Cultural Revolution and
emphasizing the role of Chinese people as active agents in
understanding the fundamental causes of the Cultural Revolution”11
Peter S. H. Tang 1973
o “Mao Tsetung Thought has been the ubiquitous guiding spirit
of national and international life in China, especially since
1966, with the beginning of the Cultural Revolution.”12
Paul J. Hiniker 1983
o “What I shall examine her are the relative explanatory
contributions of these two approaches to understanding
China’s Cultural Revolution in the light of historical evidence
which has accumulated more than a decade after the event.”13
Harding, 134
Lu Xiuyuan, "A Step Toward Understanding Popular Violence in China's Cultural
Revolution," Pacific Affairs 67, no. 4 (Winter 1994-1995): 535,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2759573.
10
11
Peter S. H. Tang, "Mao Tsetung Thought since the Cultural Revolution," JSTOR,
section goes here, accessed February 14, 2013, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20098574
13Paul J. Hiniker, "The Cultural Revolution Revisited: Dissonance Reduction or Power
Maximization," JSTOR, section goes here, accessed February 14, 2013,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/653883.
12