Belief System Continuity and Change in Policy Advocacy Coalitions:
Using Cultural Theory to Specify Belief Systems, Coalitions, and Sources of Change
Hank Jenkins-Smith (corresponding author)
University of Oklahoma
hjsmith@ou.edu
Carol L. Silva
University of Oklahoma
clsilva@ou.edu
Kuhika Gupta
University of Oklahoma
kuhikagupta@ou.edu
Joseph T. Ripberger
University of Oklahoma
jtr@ou.edu
Abstract
This paper evaluates the prospects for application of the "grid/group" cultural theory
(CT), as advanced by Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky, to the Advocacy Coalition
Theory (ACF). CT would seem to be relevant to several key aspects of the ACF: the
content of the core beliefs that provide the “glue” that binds coalitions; the resilience of
core beliefs and associated implications for belief change and learning; and the structure
of coalitions and the mechanisms for coordination and control within them. The paper
considers the compatibility of the ACF's account of deep core beliefs and coalition
structure with that of CT; surveys an array of empirical studies based on variations of CT;
and extends accounts of change in cultural identities from CT to the ACF. In addition, we
highlight some of the ways in which the ACF may offer important theoretical insights for
scholars of CT, potentially clarifying hypotheses concerning the relationships between
basic worldviews, more specific beliefs, and behaviors.
Keywords: Cultural Theory; Advocacy Coalition Framework; Belief Systems
We thank Brenden Swedlow, Matthew Nowlin, Geoboo Song, Mark James, Sarah
Trousset, and the entire Rodmocker group for advice, harassment, and other important
assistance.
Introduction
A signature feature of the advocacy coalition framework (ACF) is that it accords
the belief systems of individuals a central role in the dynamics of policy change and
learning (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993). These hierarchically structured beliefs are
seen as key contributors to the cohesion and durability of the competing advocacy
coalitions that populate mature policy subsystems; they serve to condition the policy
debates and strategies pursued in the dynamic interactions among coalitions; and they
constrain the kinds of belief change and learning that can take place over time. While the
ACF has characterized belief systems in terms of their hierarchical structure, it has had
relatively little to say a priori about the substantive content, scope, and generality of
those beliefs, relying instead on case studies to tease them out.
This paper focuses on the nature and content of the most general layer within
belief systems—the deep core beliefs. After a brief characterization of belief systems
within the ACF, we evaluate how the concept of deep core beliefs has been applied in
ACF research. We contend that while the central emphasis on belief systems has
remained, the operationalization of those beliefs has varied significantly across
applications, with important implications for articulation of the roles of deep core beliefs
in cognition and learning, coalition structure and durability, and mechanisms of coalition
coordination. We then offer a characterization of preferences and beliefs concerning basic
social relationships, grounded in grid/group theory as articulated by Mary Douglas (1986)
and Aaron Wildavsky (1987), as a candidate theory of the nature and content of deep core
beliefs. We argue that grid/group cultural theories (CT) hold considerable promise for
1
enhancing the conceptual coherence and explanatory reach of belief systems within the
ACF.1
After a brief explanation of CT and a description of some of the empirical
findings of relevance to the ACF, we offer a number of theoretical linkages between the
ACF and CT that provide traction for further articulation of the ACF. Our intent is to
stimulate broader interest in the application of CT to the ACF (and to models of the
policy process more generally), and to lay a conceptual groundwork for the kinds of
hypothesis testing required for evaluating the promise of CT as a theory compatible with
the ACF. At the same time, the articulation of hierarchically structured belief systems in
the ACF appears to us to offer some important implications for scholars of CT,
potentially clarifying hypotheses concerning the relationships between basic worldviews,
more specific beliefs, and behaviors. This paper therefore offers a two-way evaluation,
considering what CT has to offer the ACF, and vice versa.
Belief Systems and the ACF
The ACF holds that the dynamics of complex and specialized policy processes
take place within policy subsystems—an expansion of the traditional notion of relatively
autonomous policy “iron triangles” to include not only the relevant executive agencies,
legislative committees and interest groups but also the journalists, analysts, researchers
1
There are significant variants within the family of grid/group cultural theory. See e.g.
the range of conceptualizations in the special issue edited by Swedlow (2011). What they
hold in common is the underlying grid/group basis for shaping fundamental norms of
social relationships.
2
and others who play a sustained part in policy formulation (Heclo 1978; Sabatier and
Jenkins-Smith 1993; Weible and Nohrstedt 2012). The ACF holds that sets of actors
within a subsystem will tend to aggregate into advocacy coalitions – usually thought to
number between 1 and 5 – that will coalesce around shared beliefs and policy
preferences. The ACF posits that the regular actors within policy subsystems (policy
elites) are capable of boundedly rational thinking and behavior (March and Simon 1969;
Simon 1991; Kahneman 2003), and hypothesizes that an individual actor’s belief system
will be hierarchically structured in that more general beliefs will constrain more specific
beliefs (Converse 1964; Peffley and Hurwitz 1985; Hurwitz and Peffley 1987).
The internal structure of belief systems is expected to range from the most general
beliefs to the most specific. The most fundamental and general of these are referred to as
“deep core” beliefs, consisting of normative and ontological axioms that shape an
individual’s beliefs about such things as the fundamental nature of human beings,
appropriate norms for basic social justice, and the ordering of primary values (e.g., liberty
and equality, or societal stability and social change). Deep core beliefs are held to be
quite general, applicable across all policy domains, and are likened to a deeply held
personal philosophy. Deep core beliefs are highly resistant to change, “akin to a religious
conversion” (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993).
The ACF holds that deep core beliefs will constrain those of the “policy core” –
broad policy positions regarding basic strategies for achieving the normative positions of
the deep core. Policy core beliefs apply generally to the policy subsystem in which the
actor specializes and participates (and may apply to other policy issue areas as well).
They include perceptions of the nature of the policy problem and its susceptibility to
3
resolution; the relative priority of the welfare of affected groups; the proper balance of
individual choice and authoritative constraints; the preferred mix of policy instruments
(e.g., reliance on coercion, inducements or persuasion); the proper allocation of authority
within the subsystem (e.g., federal versus state or local; public versus private); and the
orientation toward the substantive policy conflict (e.g., economic development versus
environmental preservation, or individual liberties versus national security). Policy core
beliefs are presumed to be quite resistant to change—but not so difficult as deep core
beliefs. When experiences expose serious anomalies (in the sense that Thomas Kuhn
(1962) used the term) in policy core beliefs, these beliefs may be susceptible to change.
But change that results in dissonance with deep core beliefs is very costly, and policy
core beliefs are buttressed by a formidable array of cognitive defenses that make change
unlikely (e.g., Gilovich, Griffin and Kahneman 2002).
Most specific and accessible are “secondary beliefs” – those instrumental
preferences and beliefs or “facts” necessary to implement the policy core. These may be
about the appropriateness and efficacy of specific tactics for realizing the strategies
derived from the policy core and, more generally, the deep core. Beliefs about specific
programmatic initiatives, appropriateness of budget allocations, or preferences for
appointments to policy positions may all fall into the secondary category. According to
the ACF, these are the beliefs most susceptible to change. Indeed, adjustment of these
beliefs may be necessary to protect deep core and policy core beliefs. For example, the
assumption of agency incompetence in implementation may protect a general preference
for a regulatory oversight in spite of indicators that oversight has not worked as expected.
4
According to the ACF, the primary driver of activity within subsystems stems
from the behavior of actors within policy subsystems attempting to map their beliefs into
public policy. Policies – seen as the aggregate sets of rules, incentives, sanctions,
subsidies, taxes, and other instruments – are measured against belief systems, and actors
seek to mobilize resources to change what is discordant in policies and reinforce what is
not. The most effective way to do this over time is to form coalitions with other actors
who share common policy core beliefs; actors seek out others who share their beliefs and
engage in “non-trivial” degrees of coordination in order to influence the course of public
policy over time.
Shared belief systems, and the drive to encode them into authoritative public
policy, are thus expected to be the catalyst that leads to the formation of coalitions and to
be the glue that holds them together over time. A number of empirical studies have
identified groupings of actors within subsystems who share common policy core beliefs
(e.g., Jenkins-Smith and St. Clair 1993; Sabatier and Brasher 1993; Weible 2007; Sotirov
and Memmler 2012).2 Reinforcement of advocacy coalitions is also expected to result
from shared opposition to those who espouse discordant beliefs; groups and individuals
with opposing belief systems are perceived to be more extreme in their policy positions
than is actually the case, and as threateningly powerful, through a perceptual “devil-shift”
2
An ACF webpage (maintained by Chris Weible and his colleagues) lists published cases
in the application of the Framework, spanning the US, the EU, and many developing
countries. Accessible at:
http://www.ucdenver.edu/academics/colleges/SPA/BuechnerInstitute/Centers/WOPPR/A
CF/Pages/AdvocacyCoalitionFramework.aspx
5
(Leach and Sabatier 2005). The result, in mature subsystems, is that belief systems
provide a dual process of coalition reinforcement, as like belief systems attract and
opposing belief systems repel. Recent research has provided some empirical support for
the ACF contention that competing networks of actors within mature subsystems can be
predicted in part by the degree of belief congruence and dissonance (Henry, Lubell and
McCoy 2011; Henry 2011; for an overview see Jenkins-Smith, Nohrstedt, Weible and
Sabatier, 2014).
While the ACF account of the role of beliefs in coalition formation and
maintenance has received some empirical support, important ambiguities remain (Sotirov
and Memmler 2012). ACF studies have defined and measured deep core beliefs in a
number of different ways, including left-right ideology, environmentalism (Sabatier and
Brasher 1993; Henry, Lubell and McCoy 2011), beliefs about the appropriate distribution
of powers within federal systems (Jenkins-Smith and St. Clair 1993: Sabatier and Brasher
1993), and others. The characterization and measurement of deep core beliefs, as
illustrated by these examples, is inconsistent across cases and based on the focus of a
particular subsystem and/or available data. Recent work has suggested that it is the
congruity of policy core beliefs explains collaboration, while deep core beliefs exert
relatively little influence (Matti and Sandstrom, 2013). But this work – as noted above –
has used a largely ad hoc approach3 for defining both core and policy core beliefs. There
3
We would argue that this approach to identification and measurement of secondary and
policy core beliefs is primarily inductive, in which documentary sources and interviews
are used to “tease out” beliefs relevant to the subsystem. Deep core beliefs, on the other
hand, are more likely to be derived exogenously derived, often consisting of locally
6
is no clear and generalizable way to specify the content of a core, as opposed to policy
core, belief. Our fundamental concern in this paper is this: what counts as a deep core
belief?
The ACF premise that deep core beliefs are applicable across all subsystems does
not, in principle, mean that deep core beliefs must operate in precisely the same manner
across diverse subsystems. However, it is disconcerting that the framework provides only
minimal guidance for identification and measurement of a central conceptual variable.
More importantly, without some degree of theoretical guidance for identification of the
nature and content of core beliefs, the clarity of assignments of actors to coalitions and
the reliability of tests of belief system stability and change will be compromised. Indeed,
Sotirov and Memmler (2012) found quite mixed results from their review of ACF for
both coalition identification and the stability of coalitions over time.
While in practice ACF studies have focused on the policy core components of
belief systems as the basis for aggregation into coalitions (Henry and Dietz 2012; Matti
and Sandstrom 2012), the framework is unclear about why the deep core—which, after
all is expected to constrain the policy core—is of less importance in the generation and
applicable measures of political ideology. This is operationally what Sabatier and
Jenkins-Smith (1993) suggested in their earliest attempts to measure beliefs with respect
to OCS leasing (Jenkins-Smith and St. Clair 1993) and environmental preservation of
Lake Tahoe (Sabatier and Brasher 1993). Note that if the inductively derived (policy
core) component is well grounded in the specific subsystem, but the exogenously derived
(deep core) beliefs are poorly theorized, it should not be surprising to find that the former
explains more variation in coordination than the latter.
7
behavior of coalitions.4 To be clear, we do not mean to assert that deep core beliefs must
play a consistent or dominant role across all policy subsystems in all nations. We expect
that very general beliefs of the sort that occupy the deep core are likely to be
differentially evoked across different countries and substantive issues (e.g., national
security; housing equality; water quality and supply; climactic change), but we would
prefer that the framework offer more guidance for identification of the content of deep
core beliefs, and that it specify a consistent logic for connection of the deep core to the
policy core and secondary beliefs.
More generally, ACF scholars have yet to propose, test, and validate a consistent
conception of the structure and content of deep core beliefs that reflects the breadth and
multi-dimensionality of the concept (Ripberger et al. 2014). It is therefore not surprising
that the literature is somewhat disjointed concerning how one should go about defining
and measuring deep core beliefs. Overcoming this will require that ACF scholars
consider and evaluate more standardized approaches for characterizing and measuring
deep core beliefs. Among other things, this would allow ACF scholars to compare the
results across cases in ways that permit hypothesis testing to be cumulative and more
conducive to theoretical development.
Beyond the need for consistent characterization and measurement, until recently
the ACF has had little about how the substantive content of belief systems (and the deep
core in particular) will be related to cooperation and coordination within coalitions.
Scholars have pointed out that the ACF, as initially formulated, was unclear about how
4
Indeed, as the ACF has been articulated and applied over time, deep core beliefs have
seemed at times to take on a nearly vestigial theoretical quality.
8
advocacy coalitions overcome obstacles to coordination and collaboration such as the
free-rider problem (Schlager 1995; Schlager and Blomquist 1996). While significant
progress has been made in showing that similarities of ideological beliefs promote
coordination within networks (see, e.g., Henry 2011), the ACF as currently articulated
provides no clear connection between the content of belief systems and propensities to
cooperate or coordinate, or to do so in particular ways. For example, one could imagine
that groups that eschew concentrations of authority because of their deep core beliefs and
place a premium on egalitarian modes of organization are likely to have quite different
patterns of coordination and cooperation than are groups whose beliefs are more
compatible with hierarchy and centralized control. Such tensions often operate within
groups, as is evident when “grass roots” activists take group leaders to task for straying
from broader group norms (Moe 1980; 1984; Hamsher 2010). By contrast, organizations
formed by businesses or trade groups that focus on “material” interests such as jobs or
profits may be advantaged by the relatively narrowly defined set of common objectives
that facilitate strategic cooperation and provide greater latitude for variation in other
expressed beliefs and tactics (see, e.g., Jenkins-Smith, St. Clair and Woods 1991;
Jenkins-Smith and St. Clair 1993; Montpetit 2012). Of equal interest would be the
dynamics among members of coalitions that share some policy core beliefs, but diverge
on deep core beliefs; it may be the case that coalitions characterized by heterogeneous
deep core beliefs but homogeneity in the policy core would have distinct obstacles to
cooperation and coordination not faced by those whose broader belief systems are more
compatible. If so, characterization of policy dynamics on the basis of generic advocacy
9
coalitions would miss – and have no theoretical basis for explaining – important
variations in subsystem dynamics.
A final aspect of the characterization of deep core beliefs that we address here is
the manner in which the concept applies to the possibility of belief change and learning.
Since its inception, the ACF has explicitly incorporated a model of the individual
subsystem actor as boundedly rational, with cognitive filters and biases that influence
how individuals acquire information and update beliefs (Simon 1958; Tversky and
Kahneman 1974). The primary import of these concepts for the ACF is that biased
cognition and filtered attention to data serve to defend deeply held beliefs, making
changes in such beliefs extraordinarily difficult (Jenkins-Smith 1990; Jenkins-Smith and
Sabatier 1993). This assumption has also received empirical attention in modeling such
concepts as the “devil shifting” of opponents (Sabatier and Weible 2007). The focus has
largely been on the manner in which policy core beliefs generate defensive cognitions.
The role of deep core beliefs in shaping cognition, however, is underdeveloped. Quite
apart from views of opponents (and their beliefs), how might deep core beliefs condition
understandings of the role of authority in complex decisions? How might such beliefs
influence perceptions of the role of science and technical experts in technical policy
disputes? Absent a more fully articulated conception of deep core beliefs, these kinds of
connections will continue to be treated in an ad hoc manner, with anemic opportunity for
general hypotheses formulation and testing (Jenkins-Smith, Nohrstedt, Weible and
Sabatier, 2014).
In short, while the ACF has provided the basis for a substantial and growing body
of empirical work on the policy process, we remain less than satisfied with its conception
10
of belief systems in general, and deep core beliefs in particular. In what follows we
briefly sketch CT, and explore its application to deep core beliefs. We find that CT
addresses some of the key shortcomings in the ACFs account of the concept.
Cultural Theory
As developed in anthropology (Douglas 1966; 1970) and later introduced into
political science (Wildavsky 1987), cultural theory argues that four distinctive
worldviews or “cultural biases”—egalitarianism, hierarchy, individualism, and fatalism—
serve as the primary combinations of values that guide how individuals formulate both
broad social orientations and derive more specific policy perspectives (Wildavsky 1987).
CT worldviews are derived from the manner in which individuals (and, by aggregation,
groups) position themselves with respect to two distinctive dimensions that characterize
social relations (sometimes referred to as dimensions of sociality). The first is the
“group” dimension, which concerns the degree to which individuals understand
themselves to be incorporated into and defined by bounded units or social collectivities.
Best conceived as a continuum, the group dimension is bounded at the “low-group” end
by the perspective that individuals stand outside group boundaries, completely identified
(by both self and others) as autonomous actors who (for better or worse) are dependent
for survival on their own devices. The “high group” end of the continuum is defined by
those who see themselves as fully defined by their group affiliations, through which
individual preferences and choices are largely subject to group determination. The second
dimension of sociality is “grid,” which refers to the degree to which patterns of
interactions in individuals’ lives are circumscribed by externally imposed prescriptions,
11
like rules, norms, laws, and traditions. At the low end of the grid continuum, individuals
face few (if any) societally imposed limits (and, by the same token, little guidance) on
how relationships are to be understood and transacted. Transactions between and among
individuals will require the establishment (negotiation) of terms, which provides leeway
but may add to transaction costs, uncertainties and (in some cases) lost opportunities. At
the high end, a thicket of externally imposed rules and guidance, constraining and
channeling options while reducing uncertainties, binds interactions with others. When the
group and grid dimensions are overlaid, they produce four quadrants that combine the
relative prescriptions of grid with the relative attachments to group resulting in the four
distinctive worldviews (or “solidarities”) defined by CT: hierarchy, individualism,
egalitarianism, and fatalism (Dake 1991; Rayner 1992; Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky
1990; Wildavsky and Dake 1990; Mamadouh 1999). As explained by Wildavsky, opting
into one or another of the quadrants is a matter of “choosing preferences by constructing
institutions” (1987).5
5
Among CT scholars there has been a vigorous debate over whether cultural orientations
are primarily manifested as individual-level dispositions and preferences or better
understood as attributes of organizations (see, e.g., Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky
(1990) in comparison with Rayner (1986) and (1992)). We see organizational and
individual cultural attributes as interactive, and (as indicated by our emphasis on the
underlying grid group continua) do not expect to find many “pure type” individuals.
However the theory does indicate that the four quadrants exhaust the logically compatible
bundles of value orientations (perhaps except for that of “hermits”), so we expect there to
12
Persons or groups disposed to a hierarchical worldview, with meaningful group
identities and binding prescriptions (high group, high grid), will hold norms that place the
welfare of the group before their own, and will be keenly aware of whether other
individuals are members of the group or outsiders. Hierarchs will prefer that people have
defined roles in society, and will tend to place great value on procedures, lines of
authority, social stability, and maintenance of institutions. By contrast, an individualist
(low group, low grid) experiences little if any group identity, and feels bound by few
structural prescriptions. Individualists dislike constraints imposed upon them by others,
and will tend to expect people by and large to fend for themselves. The kinds of
procedural and relational prescriptions preferred by hierarchs will seem to individualists
(when applied to them) to be cumbersome impediments to the kinds of transactions that
allow one to get ahead in life. In contrast, those disposed to an egalitarian worldview
(high group, low grid) seek strong group identities and prefer minimal external
prescriptions. They prefer a society based on equality within the group, rather than one
variegated by rank or wealth. Egalitarians tend to exhibit a powerful sense of social
solidarity to the group, and vest authority within the community rather than in outside
experts or institutionally defined leaders. Lastly, those disposed to a fatalist worldview
(low group, high grid) consider themselves subject to binding external constraints; yet
they feel largely excluded from membership in the social groupings that shape larger
be some cognitive pressure for consistency and hence a tendency, on the part of
individuals, to opt for one cultural orientation more than another.
13
societal outcomes. Fatalists tend to believe that they have little control over their lives,
and that their lot in life is more a matter of chance than choice.6
The array of attempts to develop and refine replicable individual-level CT
measures spans a wide range of researchers, and has resulted in a number of distinct
measurement strategies and considerable success in applications (Ripberger et al. 2014).
The early efforts to measure worldviews at the individual level focused on identification
and validation of indicators of the fours distinct solidarities (Dake and Wildavsky 1990;
Dake, 1991). Rather than try to measure orientations to grid and group directly, these
indicators employ sets of responses to statements of societal norms and values (e.g., the
world needs a fairness revolution; we need strict and swift punishment for those who
break the rules; people should have to make their own way in life…) to build indices of
affinity to each cultural type. Early work employed these kinds of measures across an
array of studies of risk and public policy (Peters and Slovic 1996; Jenkins-Smith 2001).
This approach to measurement has been slightly modified over time and continues to be
used by multiple research groups (Jones 2011; Ripberger, Jenkins-Smith and Herron
2011; Ripberger et al. 2012; Montpetit 2012). An alternative approach to measurement,
dubbed the cultural cognition approach, undertook in-depth empirical work to refine the
indicators and recast the typology as “hierarchic individualists” and “egalitarian
communitarians” (see, e.g., Kahan et al. 2007; Kahan et al. 2009; Kahan et al. 2011).
Inspired by this work, current efforts have refocused attention on the underlying grid and
6
For a more complete description of these worldviews, see Thompson, Ellis and
Wildavsky 1990 and Mamadouh 1999.
14
group dimensions, in an attempt to tie the measures more closely to the theoretical
framework as articulated by Mary Douglas.7
Despite their variety, CT measures have been used to explain opinion formation
across a number of disparate political domains, ranging from environmental and
economic policy to public health and national security issues.8 Indeed, one of the
remarkable achievements of CT scholarship has been its portability to a wide range of
public policy issue areas. Nevertheless, a number of criticisms and theoretical debates
have surfaced throughout the years (e.g., Boholm 1996; Marris, Langford and O’Riordan
1998).
Of particular interest has been the debate among scholars over the relationship
between CT worldviews and political ideology (Coyle and Ellis 1994). Empirical analysis
led some to argue that particular worldviews (in this case, individualism and
egalitarianism) were merely a restatement of the left-right ideological continuum
7
These efforts are being undertaken by at least two different research teams, one located
at the University of Oklahoma and the other at University of Colorado at Denver.
8
For the application of CT to environmental policy, see Thompson, Ellis and Wildvsky
1990; Schwarz and Thompson 1990; Jenkins-Smith and Smith 1994; Ellis and
Thompson1997; Grendstad and Selle 2000. For a discussion of economic policy and CT,
see Malkin and Wildavsky 1991 and Swaney 1995. For a look at CT and regulatory
policy, see Lodge, Wegrich and McElroy 2010. To see how some have applied CT to
public health issues, see Kahan et al. 2010; and Song 2013. Lastly, for an example of the
application of CT to national security issues, see Jenkins-Smith and Herron 2009; and
Ripberger, Jenkins-Smith and Herron 2011.
15
(Michaud et al. 2009). While this argument hinged on ignoring hierarchs and fatalists and
proved difficult to replicate (see Ripberger et al. 2012), it did raise the important question
of the relationship between particular expressions of political ideology and cultural
worldviews. Recent scholarship (Jackson 2011) has explored a promising explanation, in
which competing worldviews confront societal problems, but necessarily do so through
the institutional arrangements for collective choice in a given society. In the American
context, single-member districts and plurality elections militate strongly toward a twoparty system (Downs 1957)—familiar as Duverger’s Law. As Downs (1957) explained,
the repeated competition between the major parties in a two party system forces multiple
dimensions of conflict onto a single dimension of competition and choice. Thus
competing worldviews are forced by partisan campaigns into temporary alignments, in
which hierarchs have aligned (uneasily) with egalitarians against individualists in the
New Deal formulation of “welfare state liberalism”, but later the individualist and
hierarchic neo-conservatives and tea-partiers have sided up against an egalitarian-leaning
left in which “conservatives” barely contain the stresses that pit fiscal libertarians against
social conservatives. Emergence of new problems and events over time lead to splits and
reformulations of “left” and “right”, but at each formulation political ideology is recast
along the single dimension of dispute imposed by a dominant two-party system. Thus
political ideologies in the American case (and other societies with 2-party electoral
systems) speak in multiple voices as echoes of prior temporary cultural alignments
“processed” through societal institutions of collective choice. If correct, this formulation
suggests that at a given point in time measures of political ideology and cultural
worldview will partially overlap, and both will “explain” some of the variation in policy
16
positions. This is consistent with the findings of the recent literature on the relationship
between mass beliefs and policy positions (Jackson 2011; Ripberger et al. 2012).
In sum, the breadth of applications and the explanatory traction gained in
numerous policy domains suggests that grid/group worldviews may play a theoretically
useful role in understanding policy belief systems more generally. We therefore turn to
potential applications of CT to the model of belief systems as specified by the ACF.9
Application of CT to the ACF
As noted above, deep core beliefs within the ACF are chiefly characterized by
their generality and scope. They encompass deeply held normative and ontological
axioms, which are in principle applicable across all policy subsystems. We argued that
this definition is underspecified, that it results in widely varying approaches to
measurement of deep core beliefs in empirical work, and that it fails provide a basis for
developing theoretical propositions concerning how deep core beliefs are related to
organizations and structure within coalitions. Similarly, it offers only modest traction on
the role of deep core beliefs in conditioning the patterns of belief change and prospects
for learning. In this section we provide an overview of some of the most promising
intersections of CT and the ACF.
As a point of departure, we suggest that the criteria for consideration of an
account of deep core beliefs within the ACF should include that the account be multi9
Our arguments concerning the utility of CT for clarifying the nature and dynamics of
belief systems in the ACF parallel those in the excellent review of the ACF by Sotirov
and Memmler (2012).
17
dimensional, generalizable, and in principle measurable using multiple techniques
(Ripberger et al. 2014). By multi-dimensional, we mean that that the conception of deep
core beliefs should be able to account for packages or bundles of very general beliefs,
rather than discrete or disjoint beliefs one at a time. In keeping with the early articulations
of deep core beliefs in the ACF (Sabatier 1988; Jenkins-Smith 1990; Sabatier and
Jenkins-Smith 1993), an appropriate conceptualization would consist of combinations of
beliefs about broad societal norms concerning the role of government vs. the market in
society, beliefs about the appropriate balance of expertise and centralized authority vs.
communal or consensus-based decision-making, and views about the relative priority of
values such as liberty, equality, and security. Ceteris paribus, a concept of deep core
beliefs that can explain patterns and combinations of broad beliefs about society and
governance is more parsimonious and useful than multiple, separate concepts each of
which captures a single component or dimension of the overall system of beliefs. By
generalizable, we mean that a standardized conception and measure of deep core beliefs
should be applicable in multiple contexts within and beyond U.S. borders. For example,
one-dimensional measures of political ideology work rather well in two-party systems,
but are likely to be less useful in multi-party systems where policy debates are less likely
to be reduced to a single dimension of dispute stretched between two poles. Therefore
political ideology and other measures (like partisanship) that are tied to particular sets of
political institutions and societies are less than ideal candidates for defining and
measuring deep core beliefs for ACF scholarship. Lastly, deep core beliefs should be
subject (at least in principle) to reasonably reliable measurement using a wide variety of
18
research tools, including content analysis, ethnographic studies, organizational analysis,
elite interviews, and survey research.
Deep Core Beliefs as Cultural Worldviews
For a number of reasons, CT worldviews are a viable candidate for understanding
and characterizing deep core beliefs of subsystem actors. They are reasonably consistent
with the characterizations provided by the ACF in that they represent deeply held beliefs
that explain in broad strokes how individuals understand themselves to fit in with society,
and that prescribe how society should be structured. As such, their applicability clearly
spans multiple public policy subsystems, and arguably all conceivable subsystems
(Ripberger et al. 2014). Furthermore, the worldviews of CT bring with them specific
policy content, in that each implies a logically consistent set of propositions (or “myths”)
about the nature of human beings, the fundamental relationship between people and
nature, and a prioritization of the array of societal risks and opportunities—ranging in
origin from social to natural to technological—that motivate a wide array of public
policies.
One relatively familiar example of the implications of cultural orientations for
environmental policy is the “myth of nature” associated with each of the cultural
worldviews, as is depicted in Figure 1 (Grendstad and Selle 2000; Thompson, Ellis and
Wildavsky 1990). The individualists’ myth of “nature benign” holds that nature is robust,
resilient, and therefore largely impervious to human actions, supporting individualists’
preference for few restrictions on their entrepreneurial way of life. In contrast, the
egalitarians’ “nature ephemeral” myth holds that nature is fragile, and that great care and
19
caution are required to maintain the natural equilibrium. By this account, human actions
that threaten that equilibrium—like environmental pollutants produced by profit-seeking
firms—pose substantial dangers to everyone, and are thus seen as justifiably restricted for
the good of all. According to the hierarchs’ “nature tolerant” myth, nature is generally
resilient to well-regulated human actions, but misdirected human intrusion can have large
and disastrous consequences for the natural world. Therefore hierarchs tend to pay close
attention to the cautions raised by the experts sanctioned by their group, and heed the
regulatory restrictions on intrusions into nature imposed by legitimate authorities. Finally,
the fatalists’ “nature capricious” myth holds that both nature’s bounty and disasters occur
largely at random, for which human behavior is irrelevant. Note that each myth captures a
partial social construction of reality—and none encompass the entire range of human
experience (hence they are dubbed myths).
CT worldviews also lead to characteristic myths regarding social institutions. The
logic of the egalitarian worldview, for example, holds that equality without status
distinctions will result in the most appropriate and rewarding social outcomes. This
works because people are presumed to be generally well meaning and beneficent within
such communities, but tend to be all too easily corrupted by the ill effects of hierarchy
and markets. Hierarchs tend to take the opposite stance: people have no inherent
proclivity to goodness, so institutions and norms need to be designed and enforced to
make them so (Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky 1990). Such myths serve to reinforce a
cultural worldview, and to justify and support the identity of individuals and groups who
adopt that worldview (Kahan and Braman 2006; Kahan et al. 2007; Kahan et al. 2010).
20
Applied to the ACF, the myths provide a clear connection between the cultural
orientations, as deep core beliefs, and policy core beliefs (e.g., the myth of nature).
We should note that most, though not all, of the quantitative empirical work
measuring cultural worldviews of individuals has been undertaken at the level of the
mass public in the US, EU countries, and Canada (e.g., Kahan et al. 2010; Kahan,
Jenkins-Smith and Braman 2011; Montpetit 2012). Elite beliefs have been measured
using samples of PhD scientists, engineers and activists, in which indicators of
egalitarianism scaled as predicted, and in which egalitarianism predicted policy
preferences concerning such diverse policy issue areas as global climate change and
radiation protection (Silva and Jenkins-Smith 2007; Silva, Jenkins-Smith and Barke
2007). Thus we have reason to be optimistic that measures of CT worldviews can readily
be applied to policy subsystem actors. Nevertheless, this is an empirical proposition that
we urge ACF researchers to more thoroughly investigate.
CT and Coalition Dynamics
In recent years, ACF scholars have become increasingly interested in the patterns
of interaction and coordination among actors within advocacy coalitions. In particular,
researchers have focused on questions about how actors decide which other actors to
coordinate with (e.g., Henry 2011; Ingold 2011; Matti and Sandstrom 2011) as well as
how these choices interact to influence the internal structure of a coalition (e.g., Henry,
Lubell and McCoy 2011). These questions are critically important because their answers
would help explain the cohesion of an advocacy coalition, which in turn, would help to
21
explain a coalition’s durability, ability to amass resources, and capacity to instigate policy
change.
While important inroads have been made, the use of worldviews by ACF scholars
offers a series of propositions that could connect the concepts of belief systems with
those of subsystem groups and coalitions. For example, we conjecture that individuals
will be more likely to associate with groups and organizations that share their basic
beliefs about social relationships. Egalitarians will prefer to support and join groups that
pursue egalitarian goals, and that have organizational structures consistent with
egalitarian notions of social relations based on strong group boundaries in which status
and pay distinctions are muted. In general, non-profit and NGO organizations that pursue
goals of environmental sustainability or social equality and related conceptions of social
justice would be more consistent with an egalitarian disposition than would be a forprofit firm or hierarchical regulatory agency. We expect that individualists, on the other
hand, would be more attracted to private firms but put off by rule-bound regulatory
agencies. Hierarchs, in turn, would tend toward organizations that place a premium on
expertise, procedural rules, and specialization – such as regulatory agencies. It is also
plausible that group and organizational characteristics will serve to reinforce compatible
cultural orientations among their members.
Note that groups and organizations, like individuals, may approximate the forms
suggested by the distinct worldviews. Some may be blends, as when hierarchy in
structure is seen as necessary to achieve individualist (or egalitarian) objectives. Indeed,
it is likely that every organization contains tensions among the organizational types, as
each brings distinctive organizational strengths and weaknesses. But, while we expect
22
groups to reflect various combinations of social relationships, we also expect that many
will tend toward one or another cultural type, and will disproportionately draw support
and membership from individuals who share that cultural orientation. The orientation of a
group would depend on the objective(s) that it pursues, and how it chooses to pursue that
objective(s). We expect that non-profit groups that pursue egalitarian aims (e.g.,
environmental sustainability) through egalitarian means (e.g., grass-roots education,
agitation and protest) will also tend to have egalitarian organizational processes (run by
internal consensus) and egalitarian-leaning members. Other groups will face greater need
to compromise, such as public agencies who may attract a wide range of employees and
who – though the objectives may have a tilt toward a cultural orientation – must respond
to signals from hierarchically superior executive and legislative leaders.
CT worldviews provide the basis for strong conjectures about how organizations
within the subsystem are likely to be structured. For example, an organization that is
dominated by individualist norms will likely contain a large set of relatively disjointed
dyadic relationships (based upon material objectives or self-interest) that do little to
facilitate mutual trust. Such organizations are likely to coordinate with others only to the
extent that its interests are served – as suggested by the literature of “material”
organizations (Moe 1980; 1984). The role played by individualist-leaning organizations
within coalitions is therefore likely to be distinctive in that stable participation will
depend on enduring common interests, with relative flexibility for independent action
beyond those common interests. If, on the other hand, the organization is dominated by
hierarchic values and norms, it is likely to be structured by a “top-down” internal network
in which norms of coordination are governed by one’s position in the hierarchy. Behavior
23
of these organizations within coalitions is therefore likely to be heavily shaped by leaderto-leader linkages, buttressed by norms and rules that limit and focus the role of
functionaries in their dealings with outside organizations. Finally, organizations
dominated by egalitarian norms are likely to consist of relatively flat networks that are
designed to maximize interaction within the group and therefore facilitate mutual trust
and cooperation. This flat organization will make interaction with other egalitarian
groups comfortable, though coordination will require obtaining consensus within each
group. We expect that interactions between egalitarian and hierarchic organizations
would be somewhat challenging on both sides, as the flat and multiple linkages preferred
by the former would clash with the ordered and centralized linkages preferred by the
latter.
These differences with regard to the structure of a coalition are significant
because they are likely to influence the stability of a coalition over time, which in turn
will directly influence its ability to initiate policy change (or maintain the status quo, if
that coalition is dominant within the subsystem). A loosely knit coalition based on a large
number of disjointed dyads woven together by self-interest rather than the congruence of
beliefs will depend on the duration of the underlying commonality of interest; beyond
that point the coalition may be fragile. A modest restructuring of incentives (be it external
or internal) may be enough to fracture such a coalition. By contrast, a predominantly
egalitarian coalition that is committed to purposive action may be somewhat more stable
in the face of changing incentives, but it too is susceptible to internal conflict and
subsequent fracturing because the distribution of authority within such a coalition is
ambiguous. In addition, as Douglas and Wildavsky (1982) have argued, egalitarian
24
groups (and by extension coalitions egalitarian groups) are prone to schism due to very
low group barriers to entry and exit in combination with the need to maintain group
identity. Hierarchical coalitions, by comparison are likely to be much more stable
because the distribution of authority within the coalition is clearly defined and hierarchic
group members will tend to be committed to the group and its aims. Hierarchic groups
build in organizational defenses to prevent their members from “going native” and
straying from organizational norms and values (Kaufman 2006; Hirschman 1970).
Coalitions of hierarchic groups will have the advantage of stable and clear lines of
communication, and presumably ready capacity for organizing and deploying group
resources in the effort to shape public policy.
We would not expect to find many coalitions made up of organizations that are
entirely of a common cultural type. Each cultural type brings with it signature
organizational and resource strengths and weaknesses. While one can too readily
overgeneralize, we expect that well-functioning egalitarian groups can draw on strong
group identity and participation, and are likely to excel at the kinds of resource
mobilization that consist of persistent grass roots efforts. Hierarchic groups bring
organizational structure and strong capacity for coordination, while individualist groups
may bring entrepreneurial innovation and flexibility. 10 Therefore it is conceivable that
10
A given organization may encompass features of several types – such as an egalitarian-
leaning environmental interest group that takes on features of centralized hierarchy in
order to more successfully “play the game” in Washington. Combinations of cultural
dispositions within a single organization come at a price, of course, as efforts to take
25
advocacy coalitions may include members who share policy core beliefs but do not share
deep core beliefs, and whose member organizations reflect differing cultural norms.
A “hybrid” coalition that is made up of actors or organizations with divergent
deep core worldviews may benefit from the ability to play to different organizational and
resource strengths, but differences in deep core beliefs may create the potential for
coalitional instability as well. As long as the structure of incentives places emphasis for
all coalitions on a shared set of policy core concerns, hybrid coalitions may be relatively
stable and permit the advantage of specialization across distinctive organizational
strengths. But evolving policy issues have the potential to place enormous strains on such
coalitions. The case of oil and gas leasing in the United States provides an example, in
which the onset of the oil crises of the 1970s crises led federal agencies (hierarchies) to
split with environmental groups (egalitarian-leaning organizations) to join with energy
companies and their associated trade associations (individualistic and hierarchic
organizations) (Jenkins-Smith and St. Clair 1993). Other examples of hybrid coalitions
are evident in forest policy (Sotirov 2009) and water policy (Meijerink 2005; Bukowski
2007). Thus a policy core “glue” may dissolve when deep core beliefs differ and the
focus of the policy issue changes over time.
CT, Changes in Beliefs, and Policy-oriented Learning
Policy-oriented learning refers to “relatively enduring alterations of thought or
behavioral intentions that result from experience and/or new information and that are
advantage of one cultural attribute (e.g., coordination and efficiency via hierarchy)
conflict with another (e.g., “grass roots” egalitarian modes of organization).
26
concerned with the attainment or revision of policy objectives” (Jenkins-Smith and
Sabatier 1999: 123). Learning occurs within subsystems when the actors in a coalition
change their beliefs and subsequent behaviors in response to particular stimuli, be it an
experience or new information. Thus, if we want to understand policy-oriented learning,
we have to understand the factors that cause changes within individual belief systems
over time. Doing so, we argue requires a deeper understanding of two things—the
individual-level mechanisms that make beliefs systems resistant to change (i.e., biased
assimilation and motivated reasoning), and the dynamics or strategies that might cause
these mechanisms to relent. In other words, why are actors so committed to their beliefs
and what sort of stimuli might break this commitment? ACF scholars, beginning with the
work of Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993), have borrowed from cognitive and social
psychology to develop a fairly robust answer to the first question. By contrast, they have
offered relatively few answers to the second (and perhaps more important) question.11
Accordingly, we suggest that ACF scholars look to recent research in CT that offers
promising answers to both questions.
Consistent with ACF research, CT scholars argue that individual decision-makers
are prone to a variety of mental heuristics and biases that result in motivated reasoning,
such as the selective processing of information in a way that is congruent with their
11
Until recently, most of the research on policy-oriented learning has focused on the
contextual rather than individual-level variables that foster learning (like the attributes of
the professional forum, the tractability of the issue, and the level of conflict between
coalitions). For a discussion of these factors, see Jenkins-Smith 1990, Meijerink 2005,
and Larsen, Vrangbaek and Traulsen 2006.
27
cultural worldview. Because of this process, the individuals that adhere to each of the
worldviews tend to accept new information if and only if it confirms their cultural
identity and reject information that does not “fit” their worldview. A frequently studied
example involves the debate about global climate change. Because individualists believe
that nature is relatively robust and place a premium on the market (rather than
governmental regulation), they tend to dismiss the growing body of scientific evidence
suggesting that global climate change is real and caused by human activities as
“untrustworthy” (Kahan et al. 2011). Egalitarians, by comparison, are likely to accept this
information because it is congruent with their deeply held beliefs about the fragility of
nature and the importance of regulating the market. This and other mechanisms of
“cultural cognition” make it extremely difficult (and costly) for individuals to reevaluate
and change their beliefs. Nevertheless, CT scholars have started to identify some the
factors or “strategies” that can induce individual-level belief change at all three tiers in
the hierarchy of beliefs—secondary, policy core, and deep core.
According to the ACF, secondary beliefs are the narrowest in scope and generally
involve relatively specific ideas about how a particular problem should be addressed. In
environmental policy, for example, a subsystem participant’s secondary beliefs might
concern the efficacy of, and preferences for, specific mechanisms for reducing industrial
pollution (e.g., the nature of monitoring, and the magnitudes of incentives and sanctions)
or the effectiveness of particular kinds of educational interventions to improve student
performance. Because secondary beliefs are narrow in scope, change can occur without
substantially undermining more general beliefs. And because evidence for them can often
28
be observed and measured, secondary beliefs are (relatively speaking) more susceptible
to change than deep core or policy core beliefs.
CT scholars have identified several factors that might lead someone to change
their secondary beliefs, including public discourse in culturally pluralistic atmospheres
(Kahan et al. 2010) and structured deliberation (Gastil 2008). One explicit “strategy”
involves the distribution of “culturally nuanced” narratives that will prompt individuals to
reexamine their beliefs about a particular policy by framing the narrative around one of
their deep core beliefs (Jones 2014). For example, an egalitarian might change their mind
about mandatory vaccination policies, which they tend to oppose, if the policy is framed
in terms of communal benefits rather than expert recommendations (Song 2013).
Policy core beliefs are broader in scope than secondary beliefs; they include
relatively abstract beliefs, such as those concerning the underlying causes of a problem
within a subsystem, or general strategies for dealing with a class of problems. With
respect to environmental policy issues, a set of policy core beliefs might include views
about the responsiveness of regional weather patterns to mounting greenhouse gasses,
and/or the amount of risk posed by changing weather patterns to human health, safety, or
prosperity. Given the relative depth with which individuals hold these beliefs, and the
cognitive defenses mounted to sustain them, they are likely to be very difficult to change
(Goebbert et al. 2012). One strategy for increasing the likelihood of change in policy core
beliefs involves the development of culturally “clumsy” policy solutions that encourage
people to reconsider their policy core beliefs by offering novel solutions that are
consistent to their preferred way of life (Verweij et al. 2006). In a recent study, Kahan et
al. (2014) suggest that positioning the climate change debate around a solution involving
29
geoengineering, rather than increased levels of governmental regulation, might prompt
individualists to recognize that climate change is a legitimate issue that poses a
significant risk to society. Again, the key point here is that the proposed solution
(geoengineering) does not pose a direct threat to the individualists’ worldview, which
relaxes opposition to the claim that manmade emissions are causing the climate to warm,
thereby increasing the likelihood that individualists will process information that would
previously have been rejected out of hand.
Deep core beliefs, which are the broadest in scope and held with the greatest
conviction, are even more difficult to change; so difficult, that Sabatier and JenkinsSmith describe changes at this level as akin to “religious conversion” (Sabatier and
Jenkins-Smith 1993). These kinds of beliefs are quite consistent with CT’s notion of
worldviews. Change in these kinds of beliefs is likely to be rare. CT scholars have
developed a theory of belief change that explains transitions from one worldview to
another. Briefly put, they argue that the process of cultural change is somewhat similar to
Thomas Kuhn’s account (1962) of scientific revolutions, wherein scientific theories “lose
and gain adherents” based on the “cumulative impact of successive anomalies or
surprises” (Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky 1990: 69). Much the same way, an adherent
to a particular worldview may be confronted with events (or “surprises”) that cast
compelling doubt about the extent to which their worldview matches the way the world
“really works.” As these doubts become more persistent, those individuals approach a
threshold beyond which they can no longer make sense of the world from within their
erstwhile cultural orientation. This may induce adoption of a one of the alternative
30
worldviews that provides a more satisfying fit “with the world as it is” (Thompson, Ellis
and Wildavsky 1990: 69).
If, as we argued at the beginning of this paper, cultural worldviews represent a
coherent combination of deep core beliefs, CT scholars’ “theory of surprise” should offer
some guidance to ACF scholars as to when and why changes might occur at this level in
an actor’s belief system. Changes are most likely to occur when major events fly in the
face of what one’s deep core beliefs lead them to expect. A sufficiently salient collision
between expectations and occurrence may induce individuals to modify their deep core
beliefs. We would expect proponents of competing worldviews to develop strategies to
highlight and amplify such belief-changing collisions. That said, the “theory of surprise”
remains underspecified within the CT literature, and is certain to benefit by way of
collaboration with ACF scholars that are interested similar dynamics.
Potential ACF Contributions to Cultural Theory
Application of CT to understanding ACF belief systems, coalitions, coalition dynamics,
and belief change and learning would also provide an important impetus for creative
conceptual development and empirical testing of aspects of CT. Here we briefly note
several of the more evident areas of theoretical and empirical synergy between the ACF
and CT.
Structure of beliefs. Since its earliest articulation, the ACF has considered policyrelevant beliefs of subsystem members to be roughly hierarchically organized, with
placement in the hierarchy linked to belief resilience and coalition formation. The
ordering and relationships among beliefs in CT has chiefly focused on how grid and
31
group dispositions lead to distinctive worldviews that, in turn, shape preferences and
engage protective cognitions. Though CT offers a clear characterization of the sources of
worldviews, it has less to say about the structure among beliefs within worldviews.
Kahan et al. (2009) have argued that worldviews are differentially engaged over the range
of potential issues with which people are confronted; for some kinds of issues, beliefs are
relatively unaffected by worldviews and more likely to reflect (or at least accept) the
dominant scientific consensus. In other cases cultural identities are invoked, and
solidarity within the reference group generates strong defensive cognitions, entrenched
beliefs and intractable controversy.
For theories of the policy process, however, the individual actors are likely to be
subsystem players; most (if not all) will be steeped in the issue and well versed in the
connections between policy options and cherished values. Worldviews are therefore
likely to be well connected to relevant aspects of policy belief system. For that reason the
structure and relative priority of beliefs, as organized and constrained by worldviews,
would be of considerable theoretical and empirical interest. The experiments described in
Kahan et al. (2014) are indicative of the kind of research that would be of relevance, but
the subjects would be policy elites rather than mass publics. Thus a range of qualitative
and quantitative approaches to understanding the nature and structure of elite beliefs,
motivated by the ACF and drawing on CT, would sharpen both theorizing and hypothesis
testing in ways that would hold significant promise for advancing CT.
Mapping beliefs into policy relevant attitudes, preferences and behavior. The
ACF posits that belief systems are at the center of the policy process because subsystem
actors and coalitions will seek to map their beliefs into public policy. Doing so requires
32
development of strategy, finding and coordinating with coalition partners, mobilizing
resources, and implementing strategies in multiple policy venues. Applications of CT to
the ACF would therefore stimulate the linkage between worldviews and expected (and
observed) behaviors. While some CT scholarship has focused on the links between
worldviews and self-reported policy-relevant behaviors (e.g., Song 2013), very little
systematic empirical work has focused on the beliefs and behaviors of policy elites who
populate subsystems.
While the opportunities for theoretical elaboration are wide ranging, of particular
interest to ACF scholars would be the manner in which worldviews may lead to “broker
behavior” in which subsystem players seek to preserve policy making institutions, rather
than advocate specific policy outcomes. The behavior of players who have hierarchic
orientations, in particular, would seem to be of singular interest as proponents of building
and maintaining the capacity of collective choice institutions to function. While the ACF
posits that brokers will seek to mitigate conflict (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993),
brokers have received scant attention among ACF scholars. Recent brinksmanship in the
US congress, and the attendant policy uncertainties that have resulted, seem to us to
elevate the importance of theoretical and empirical focus on how and when subsystem
players choose to opt for compromise and broker behavior. While the contribution of CT
would be to draw attention to the potentially profound role of belief systems in
institutional maintenance, the contribution of ACF applications for CT scholars would be
33
to motivate exploration of a potentially critical role of hierarchs as anchors and defenders
of the institutions that permit collective choice to function.12
Coalition dynamics and the reinforcement of cultural solidarities. The ACF
argues that policy core beliefs will provide the glue that binds coalitions of actors who
pursue competing policy objectives over time, and that cognitive effects of interactions
with opponents (“devil shifting”) will serve to further solidify that glue (Leach and
Sabatier 2005). CT theorists could investigate how the dynamics of coalition interactions
and the exposure to conflicting beliefs in various policy venues over time reinforce and
solidify worldviews or make adaptation or modification of beliefs more likely. Of
particular interest would be identifying the sets of conditions under which sustained
interactions within subsystems encourages individuals and organizations of different
worldviews to build mixed-type coalitions. As noted above, the policy incentives for
collaborations of this kind could stem from the distinctive resources that groups
representing different worldviews can bring to bear. Empirical tests of the conditions that
make such coalitions more – and less – likely would provide CT scholars with important
comparative theoretical leverage in understanding the dynamics associated with
worldview interactions across an array of distinct policy subsystems.
12
Mary Douglas has noted that the academic treatment of hierarchs has ignored this role,
chiefly referring to people who play critical roles in sustaining social order (such as
police, firemen and soldiers). See her aptly titled article “Being Fair to Hierarchists”
(Douglas 2003). Her conception can readily be expanded to those who seek to preserve
the functioning of collective choice institutions.
34
CT at the individual and organizational level. Applications of CT to subsystem
dynamics would focus attention on the nature of the organizations and individuals who
inhabit subsystems. Empirical studies of the beliefs and behaviors of individuals who
belong to important groups and organizations within subsystems could build on the
seminal work of policy-oriented organizational theorists like Albert O. Hirschman
(1970), Anthony Downs (1967), and Terry Moe (1980; 1984) to understand the role of
worldviews in shaping how individuals are attracted to groups and how organizational
dynamics are in turn constrained by the worldviews of their members. Some of the
questions addressed would be how organizational induction and membership serves to
change individual-level worldviews; how changes in organizational structure and
orientation affects member retention; and how composition of member orientations
affects organizations ability to engage in coordination with like and dissimilar
organizations in pursuit of policy objectives.
The list could go on, and could be readily combined with proposals made by other
scholars struggling with the same kinds of limitations evident in the ACF (Sotirov and
Memmler 2012). Addressing the prospects for belief change and policy learning,
evolution of group and coalition strategy in the face of exogenous subsystem events (e.g.
major electoral change, global crises), and the implications of worldviews for the impact
of internal subsystem events (e.g., subsystem scandals, policy-specific crises) on group
and coalition behavior could all generate important conceptual development and
hypothesis testing. Accordingly, we maintain that grid/group scholars will find
substantial opportunities to expand, elaborate and evaluate CT using applications to the
ACF.
35
Conclusions
We have argued that the ACF conception of deep core beliefs is underdeveloped,
and that CT offers a promising candidate for more fully articulating ACF belief systems,
developing hypotheses, and increasing the reach of the ACF’s account of subsystem
dynamics and policy change. While belief systems in general are central to the ACF’s
account of policy change and learning, the role of deep core beliefs in constraining policy
core and secondary beliefs is incomplete, as is the manner in which deep core beliefs
shape organizational and coalitional composition. Perhaps most significant is the scant
guidance that the current ACF account of belief systems offers for how belief change or
learning can take place.
CT provides a coherent, generalizable and measurable account of beliefs about
how social relationships ought to be structured in its characterization of a distinct and
finite set of internally coherent worldviews. These worldviews identify integrated sets or
bundles of deep core and policy core beliefs that have been measured and validated
across a wide array of policy issue domains. In addition, CT worldviews offer promising
conjectures about the relationship between deep core beliefs and preferences for
organizational membership, organizational form, and – perhaps – even coalitional
structure and coordination. Compelling empirical findings also point to potential for
significant advances in understanding how worldviews constrain belief change, and
indicate when real change is possible. In each of these areas, scholars have been able to
develop and test hypotheses derived from CT using both case studies and individual-level
survey data. While substantial variations exist among CT scholars over the role of
36
methodological individualism and empirical strategies for measuring worldviews, we see
these variations as beneficial in that they provide multiple lenses by which ACF scholars
can consider the role of CT worldviews in policy change and learning.
It is important to note that we are not arguing that CT worldviews will provide an
exhaustive account of deep core beliefs. The extent of CT’s utility to the ACF remains an
empirical question, to be evaluated and tested using appropriate research designs and
measurements. Other kinds of trans-subsystem beliefs, related to CT but distinct (e.g.,
deeply held environmental values, economic conservatism, historical
identities/nationalism, and religion), may be important and resilient parts of shared belief
systems within long-term policy debates (Dunlap, Van Liere, Mertig, & Jones, 2000;
Henry, Lubell, and McCoy 2011; Matti and Sandström 2011; Stern 2000). We do,
however, believe that the track record of CT research provides reason for confidence that
real contributions can be made in applying the theory to deep core beliefs in the ACF. In
short, CT holds considerable promise as a companion theory for the ACF in explaining
policy change and learning over time within subsystems.
At the same time, application of CT to the ACF will help sharpen the focus of CT
in ways that will permit both creative elaboration and empirical testing of CT. Within
subsystems, both players (individuals and groups) and institutions are fair fodder for
evaluation through a CT lens. Identifiable populations of policy elites, groups,
organizations and venues, all implicated in the struggle to influence complex public
policies, will provide a remarkably rich basis for conceptual development, measurement,
and hypothesis testing, and theory building.
37
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Figure 1: Grid/Group Cultural Types and Associated Myths of Nature
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Nature
Tolerant
Nature
Capricious
Nature
Benign
Nature
Ephemeral
49