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Islam and Democracy: The Evolution of Secularism in Egypt and Turkey
Amanda Schmitt
September 20, 2013
“If you don’t have a vision, you’re going to get lost.” Marwan Ezz Al Arab of the World
Bank Cairo explained the perils and promise of Egyptian and Turkish politics: vision.
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Egyptian citizens have grown increasingly adamant and active about their quest for democracy, but without a cohesive vision for the details of that democracy, they will struggle to reach their goal.
Likewise, Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan’s visionary reforms over the past decade have propelled the progress of Turkish democracy, but at what point can vision be abused for the sake of power? Both nations are in need of a balanced, lasting vision of democracy that can only be achieved through collaboration and dialogue.
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With numerous ethnic, religious, and socioeconomic factions of society fighting for their voices to be heard, pluralism may be the next critical factor in a successful vision for Egypt and Turkey.
Of course, the role of religion remains a fundamental, yet highly disputed affair for both states as they push towards their democratic ideal. While Turkey has historically followed a
French laïcité model of secularism separating religious practice from the public sphere, segments of the population argue that Prime Minister Erdogan’s recent seemingly religiously motivated reforms stray from this standard.
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In contrast, Egypt must work to translate its pious history into a relationship between religion and government that embraces rather than marginalizes the minority groups within its diverse religious community.
Evaluating piety in Egypt, treatment of religion in Turkey, and the pseudo-religious institutions of mythology and Kemalism will facilitate a more thorough assessment of their governments’ attitudes and constitutional approaches toward religion. By analyzing government, public, and constitutional attitudes toward religion, along with the role of faith based institutions

2 in civil society, I will evaluate the role religion played in the build-up to the overthrow of
Mohamed Morsi in Egypt and assess the concurrent appreciation yet indignation toward Recep
Tayyip Erdogan in Turkey. In both cases I also aimed to synthesize our interviews along with scholarship and public opinion sources to envision each country’s homegrown understanding of secularism moving forward towards a model of liberal, pluralistic democracy that promotes a sustainable relationship between religion and government while protecting the rights of all of its citizens.
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Piety, Both Religious and Secular
Located in the birthplace of one of the oldest civilizations in the world, Egyptians are extremely proud of their heritage. With Egyptology,
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the myriad of artifacts in museums, and the architectural feats of the pyramids, history is glorified in Egypt. The strong emphasis on divinity and faith inherent in Egyptian mythology also parallels many Muslims’ similar mentality toward
Islam, thus enhancing the population’s respect for history and reinforcing their piety.
Egyptian religiosity looks to the heavens, while Turkey’s secular pseudo-religious ideology, Kemalism, looks to Ataturk. After the fall of the Ottoman Empire, Mustafa Kemal
Ataturk founded the Turkish Republic in 1923 on ideals of equality, nationalism, and secularism.
6 As president, Ataturk instituted drastic reforms to build the Turkish economy and society. As is often the case in extremely religious societies, governance shifted between polar opposites in their approach to religion due to dissatisfaction with the previous status quo. Since the Ottoman Sultans closely linked Islam with the government, Ataturk completely separated the two. Furthermore, he planted the seed for unbridled nationalism through emphasis on the modern
Turkish language and a bountiful display of Turkish flags, creating an aura of deification around
Ataturk, as he represented all that was Turkishness.
7
In his book, Crescent & Star , Stephen

3
Kinzer quotes an interviewee affirming this deification of Ataturk, stating, “In this country it is allowed to say bad things about God, but it is not allowed to say bad things about Ataturk.” 8
Kemalism set the groundwork for Turkey’s emphasis on strict secularism, which instigated the ongoing tension with the religious needs of an almost entirely Muslim population.
9
Affected by this ongoing secularist struggle with religion, the majority of Turkish women choose not to wear head coverings;
10
however, throughout Egypt, the majority of women wear hijabs or niqabs.
11 In both largely Muslim nations, the Call to Prayer echoes from atop the mosque minarets five times per day. The Five Pillars of Islam—belief in one god, Allah
(shahadah), prayer five times each day (salat), fasting during Ramadan (sawm), charity (zakat), and the pilgrimage to Mecca (hajj)—dictate the morals, and often the schedules, of the Muslim populations of Egypt and Turkey.
12
Turkish Muslims range in their observance of Islam, whereas
Egyptian Muslims tend to be more conservative and pious. Turkey’s Muslim women endured a period of repression by their government during which they were banned from wearing headscarves in the public sector, particularly in government jobs and at universities. Provost
Yesim Arat of the Bogazici University Political Science Department explained a central issue behind the ban: “those who were not covered were very much in a majority, and they were imposing their understanding of how religion should be on a group that did not share it.” 13 To many Muslim women, it is a tradition and religious practice, but to secularists, it is a religious infringement on secular public space.
14
On the other end of spectrum, the topic of Islamization of politics further polarizes Egyptian Muslims’ opinions. Some Muslims are proponents of Islamist political parties, such as the Freedom and Justice Party of the Muslim Brotherhood or Al-Nour
Party of the Salafis, while others want the freedom to practice Islam without negotiating its interpretation with the Islamists in power.

4
With around 10% of the Egyptian population practicing Christianity, Islamist lawmakers repress not only fellow Muslims, but Christians and other minorities, as well.
15 A longstanding sectarian battle between Coptic Christians and Muslims has been the root of much violence in
Egypt and a large motivator for Christians to demand more secular policies.
Philosophies of life, whether religious or secular, are intrinsic to the cultures of both
Egypt and Turkey. With Muslim citizens totaling 90% of the Egyptian population and 99% of the Turkish population, prayer, whether overtly or privately, is ingrained in the collective psyche as a demonstration of reverence and devotion to Islam and Allah.
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Egyptians and Turks mirror their dedication to Islam with their reverence of Egyptian mythology and Kemalism respectively
 their respect for the sanctity of the history behind both ideologies sets this tone.
Their dedication to these pseudo-religions extends beyond nationalism to a level equivalent to that of organized religion.
17
The combination of Islam and mythology or Kemalism makes for especially morally-driven and deferential societies. Fostering values of ambition and loyalty,
Ataturk’s Kemalism stood for progress and a sense of national identity.
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Egyptian mythology nurtured values of humility and respect for the past. The capacity that Egyptians and Turks share
 to be able to find pride in their history and develop cultures dedicated to celebrating that history
 parallels and enhances their religious morality and deference.
The Egyptian and Turkish tendency to often refer to or commemorate history, in both secular and religious senses, creates a contagious nostalgia for each nation’s past prosperity.
When looking at history through rose-colored glasses, present hardships seem even more challenging. Nonetheless, this nostalgia acts as a motivator for the citizens, showing them their potential whether romanticized or realistic and catalyzing their protests to enact the change they desire.

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Government Approaches to Religion
Although Turkey and Egypt both have predominantly Muslim populations, their governments’ are at opposite ends of the spectrum in regard to their involvement with religion.
In Turkey, repression of religious expression in the public sphere is the central issue, whereas over-inclusive religious regulation takes place in Egypt; therefore, the debates hinge on the definition of secularism in Turkey and the choice of whether to shift toward secularism in Egypt.
The two main secular models of the relationship between religion and government are the Anglo-
Saxon model, promoting freedom of religion, and the French model, providing freedom from religion.
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The Anglo-Saxon model, employed by the United States, includes all religions in the public sphere, while the French model, found in Turkey, excludes all religions from the public sphere. In dealing with the relationship between religion and government, the bodies in place to interpret law—such as the Supreme Constitutional Court and al-Azhar in Egypt and Prime
Minister Erdogan and the Constitutional Court in Turkey—are as important as the text of the constitutional law itself.
Egypt: Incorporating Religion in Governance
The Egyptian government is an Islamic democracy. In the most recent constitution created under the governance of the Muslim Brotherhood, Article 2 stated that “‘principles of
Islamic Sharia’” were “‘the main source of legislation.’” 20
Sharia law includes definitive rules explicitly defined in the Quran and speculative rules introduced by various scholars. Former
Judge Ahmed Tawfik described how under Muslim Brotherhood leadership, the use and interpretation of Sharia expanded into the realm of speculative rules.
21
The Supreme
Constitutional Court, however, countered this momentum with their own unusual, more liberal perspective on Sharia, to the surprise and dismay of the Salafis.
22

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A second significant article of the constitution was Article 219, which further emphasized the use of Islamic scholarship in governance. Article 219 employed almost exclusively scholarly terminology, stating, “‘The principles of the Islamic Sharia include its adilla kulliya , qawa`id usuli and qawa`id fiqhiyya and the sources considered by the Sunni madhhabs
.’” 23
Adilla kulliya was used to teach jurists how to compute scriptures, such as the Quran, hadith literature, and scholarly records, into Islamic law, and qawa`id fiqhiyya included the “underlying principles” of
Islamic scholarship.
24 Therefore, the article reinforced the use of Islamic scholarship in the interpretation of Sharia law, leading to a more constraining regulation of religious practice through this more conservative approach to religion when creating laws.
The implications therein are best understood through an analysis of the three main approaches to Sharia law. Muslims who believe in the Islamic scholarship and interpretation of various Islamic literature follow the neotraditional approach, often deferring to the knowledge and authority of the religiously moderate al-Azhar university.
25
Conversely, modernists think in a more utilitarian manner, such as those in the Supreme Constitutional Court, creating new interpretations of law directly from scripture.
26
Lastly, the Salafis “share elements of traditionalism and modernism” but defer to the practices of the earliest Muslims.
27
They rely on traditional literature, yet they question the interpretations of non-explicit texts. Evidently,
Islamists and more conservative Muslims, such as the neotraditionalists and Salafis, demand the inclusion of article 2 in the constitution, and non-Islamists are not threatened by this inclusion if the modernist approach of the Supreme Constitutional Court continues.
The Muslim Brotherhood has elements of all three approaches, so their aims during their leadership were more centered around creating a new constitution rather than debating the semantics of religious language.
28
They could rely on the Salafi Al-Nour Party to necessitate the

amount of Islamic language they desired in the constitution. Article 4 of the constitution gave interpretive control to al-Azhar, which also appeased moderate and conservative Muslims.
29
Since the power positions for religious interpretation and regulation lie in al-Azhar, Parliament, the Presidency, and the Supreme Constitutional Court, the Muslim Brotherhood employed an alternative tactic of influence by attempting to slowly shift the makeup of the Supreme
Constitutional Court. Adjusting the age limit in the judiciary from sixty-nine to sixty would mandate the replacement of most of the modernist judges, allowing the Muslim Brotherhood to nominate new, more conservative judges.
30
Fortunately for the modernists, this plan did not come to fruition. Ambassador Aly Maher ElSayed, a foreign affairs official at the Library of
Alexandria, reiterated the concern of many modernist Muslims toward the current system: “I don’t accept that [the Muslim Brotherhood has] the monopoly over explaining what religion is...
Islam in my view is my relationship between myself and God.” 31
A major issue in a religiously affiliated country is the ability to differentiate between a sin and a crime.
32
The limits of a crime can be clearly defined in criminal law, but the extent of what constitutes a sin and the interpretation of the literature’s punishment are fluid. Hakan
Altinay of the Brookings Institution elaborated on this: “With secularism, at the end of the day, you are asking people to put the brakes on their sense of right and wrong, for example,
[convincing] people that not every sin is a crime.” 33
However, in states where religion is integrated in governance, if the two are equated, religious morality becomes state-mandated ethics, and the judicial system is no longer able to arbitrate independently, as decisions become divine in nature. Al Azhar may be considered moderate, but the application of their religious interpretations in a legal context still politicize Islam in a manner unappreciated by many modernist Muslims. Furthermore, if the Muslim Brotherhood had successfully transitioned
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8 judges in the Supreme Constitutional Court, the issue of the line between a sin and a crime would have become a more drastic concern for non-Islamists.
Turkey: Excluding Religion from Governance
In Turkish politics, sins and crimes are completely separate. Secularists have fought long and hard to keep religious language, practice, and influence out of government and the public sphere. The Diyanet is the sole religiously-affiliated bureaucratic department which regulates expenditures for building mosques and paying the salaries of Imams, enabling religious practice without dictating interpretation to the extent controlled in Egypt.
34
However, in the eyes of more observant Muslims, the government stifled religious practice instead of creating more freedom through stringent laws toward public religious practice.
The 1982 constitution, created by a military coup government after a publicly Islamic
Prime Ministership, included a headscarf ban in the public sphere, further strengthened in 1998 when the ban was extended to also include university campuses.
35
According to Didem
Collinsworth of the International Crisis Group, many women stopped working and attending school, setting back the progress of conservative Muslim women.
36
In 2008, an amendment passed in parliament asserting the right to education; however, the Constitutional Court blocked this effort to absolve the headscarf law.
37 It was not until 2010 that the universities lifted the ban on headscarves, creating more freedom and opportunity for observant Muslim women. “Islamic sensitivity” is a more compassionate alternative that would allow Muslim women to wear headscarves, maintaining equal opportunity regardless of religious preference.
38
Beyond this, there is little demand for political Islamic law in the constitution. Professor Hakan Yilmaz described this central challenge as finding a happy medium between religion and modernity, as modernity has always prevailed in Turkey.
39

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Emboldened by his decade of success, Prime Minister Erdogan began crossing this delicate line. He began instituting laws seemingly motivated by religious morals, such as restrictions on abortion and the availability of the morning-after contraceptive pill.
40
The alcohol law was most blatantly contested by the public, although the restrictions were similar to those in
Western countries.
41
While it enacted common restrictions on advertisements of alcohol, it also mandated that alcohol be blurred out in television shows.
42
Furthermore, common limitations on the sale of alcohol at night (after 10 p.m.) or near schools and mosques were included in the law.
43
It exempted establishments with tourist licenses but still constrained average convenience stores.
44
Ferhat Boratav, Editor-In-Chief of CNN Turk, expressed his concern about the realistic implications of how these laws affect the public’s general practices: “Something that starts as an innocent health issue [such as a concern for alcoholism] slowly and slowly turns into some sort of unwritten regulation.” 45 While alcohol is not banned, he argues, these laws create the circumstances under which “alcohol in public doesn’t exist.” 46
Motivated by disliked for the religious undertone to the new laws and Erdogan’s push for progressively greater authority,
Turks decided to take a stand.
Inside the Protests: Gezi Park
Gezi Park was a quiet urban park turned political rallying point, and the adjacent Taksim
Square became the Turkish Tahrir Square. As construction for a mall and Ottoman military barracks began in Gezi Park, environmentalists occupied the area to prevent its destruction.
Momentum built as middle and upper class citizens joined to protest not only the environmental demolition but also Erdogan’s ever-expanding control.
47
While the initial protests were rather small, the excessive use of force by riot police incited masses to gather in Gezi Park and Taksim
Square. The layers of participants in Istanbul began with the initial Generation Y

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Environmentalist, drew in their families and colleagues, incorporated the urban aggravated and excluded, such as the Alevis and anti-AKP protesters, and was surrounded by the more vocal illegal and legal organized groups.
48
While illegal groups were involved in the protests (such as the terrorist group that bombed the US embassy earlier in the year), they were not the majority— simply the most violent and obvious to the media.
49
In Ankara, physically separated from the site in question, the core group of genuine environmentalists was absent from the protests, leaving the political space available for the more violent illegal groups.
50 As corroborated by Osman
Furkan Abbasoglu, who works for a financial institution in Istanbul, many demonstrators were confused in their reasons for protesting—often due to misinformation or group-think—yet they were united by their mistrust of Prime Minister Erdogan’s approach to the protests and increasingly authoritarian leadership.
51
The protesters’ demands began with saving Gezi Park from destruction and ended with removing Prime Minister Erdogan from office; they achieved the former, yet the latter was not a realistic goal. While the main protest site in Gezi Park was cleared by riot police, minor protests and frustration with Erdogan’s leadership continue as of
August 2013.
52
On the non-religious side of legislation, the 1982 constitution was extremely nationalistic to the point of restricting freedom of press and civil protests. Article 301 was put in place to protect Turkish identity by prohibiting attacks on “Turkishness;” however, this allowed too much liberty to the Constitutional Court, restricting civil rights rather than protecting national security.
53
The text was later altered to outlaw attacks on the “Turkish nation” with a shortened prison sentence.
54
The existence of such issues demonstrates the level of restraint still placed on civil rights and the progress Turkey still needs to fully develop its liberal democracy. Hakan
Altinay of the Brookings Institution offered the following analogy: “Turkey’s hardware is

11 moving in the right direction, while its software is moving in the wrong direction.” 55
Turkey’s currently conflict-ridden political climate is working against the economic progress and reforms it has achieved. Erdogan’s increasingly authoritarian and micromanaging methods cause public outcry, and the ongoing debate over the definition of secularism, inclusive or exclusive, continues to dominate the political landscape. Furthermore, the unfortunate irony cannot be lost that the state takes an anti-religious stance, yet CNN Turk’s Editor-in-Chief Ferhat Boratav described how the greatest minority issues in the predominantly Sunni Muslim nation are with the Kurdish and Alevi groups that still represent about fifteen to twenty million citizens (onefifth of the population).
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New Constitutions: Opportunities and Issues
Despite their current challenges, both of the current Egyptian and Turkish governments are in the process of drafting new constitutions. For Egypt, the interim government is drafting the new constitution after the removal of President Morsi, most likely entailing a shift in a less
Islamist direction with fewer mechanisms of religious regulation.
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However, they are creating the constitution under intense time constraints, so the usual debate that promotes greater pluralism will not necessarily be allowed its full progression. AKP’s Vice Chairman of Foreign
Affairs, Erol Adayilmaz, discussed that the Turkish Constitutional Commission has been working on the most recent constitutional draft since 2011, facing many roadblocks due to intense debate over its central issues of the parliamentary versus presidential system alteration and the Kurdish issue.
58
Erdogan is pushing for a new constitution before the 2014 elections, as
AKP hopes to replace the 1982 military constitution with a new civilian constitution.
59
He asserted that he will put up the AKP draft for referendum if the Constitutional Commission does not create their own before the summer Parliamentary recess, which concerns many purist

12 secularists.
60
Yet, keeping the old constitution may be a more prudent option than implementing a rushed constitution that could incite further protests and unrest. Regardless whether or not
AKP’s constitutional draft was approved by a referendum, with the current distrust of Erdogan’s intentions with the Presidential rather than Prime Ministerial system, any version of the constitution not thoroughly debated could be perceived as dubious. Aly Maher ElSayed of the
Library of Alexandria expressed it best that the general Turkish population’s constitutional aim is for a “clearer and more liberal constitution made in democratic manner to make social justice and dignity for all.” 61
Moving forward, both the Egyptian and Turkish governments must carefully and pluralistically scrutinize their constitutional drafts to ensure this vision, as well as the constitutions’ positive reception and effect.
Conclusion: Moving Forward in Egypt and Turkey
Egypt: Reducing Religious Control
The task for Egypt will be finding a way to balance government recognition of their religious connection to Islam while simultaneously reducing the religious restrictiveness and regulation of their previous regime. Article 2 remains a bulwark of the Egyptian constitution that is unlikely to change in the near (or distant) future. Yet, the constitution can be based on Islamic
Sharia law without falling prey to the interpretations of more traditionalist Muslim groups like the Salafis. If Article 2 included the only mention of Islam in the Egyptian constitution, Egypt would continue to respect society’s “Islamic sensitivities” while also allowing the government a more liberal interpretation of Sharia law that promotes religious freedom and tolerance. By eliminating the authority of a religious body to regulate the interpretation of Sharia and therefore
Egyptian civil law (Articles 4 and 219), the government maintains control over civil law and the people maintain control over their individual religious lives. In this model, Article 2 acts as a

13 moral code, leaving no room for conservative religious groups to manipulate the law and religion.
Such religious groups do not usually have malicious intent in their desire to further Islamicize
Egyptian governance; however, as equal citizens, non-practicing Muslims should be able to make their religious decisions independently, and Christian Egyptians should not be subject to
Islamic civil law.
Egypt may not be ready for this model post-2013 Revolution, as their current reform priorities are more economically focused. Religious tolerance and authority over interpretation present critical discussion points in the creation of a new constitution, but in a country where
25% of the population is under the national poverty line, citizens are more concerned with electing an economically-savvy president and aiming at a few civil rights than wholeheartedly targeting social reform.
62
A 2006 Gallup poll asserted that 94% of surveyed Egyptians desired freedom of speech in a new constitutional draft, so protection of rights, which enables dialogue and pluralism, may be a more viable immediate option for inclusion in the constitution.
63
Once
Egypt reaches an improved level of economic stability, such a model may provide the best path towards a democratic future; however, considering the current economic state of the population, it may take ten to twenty years before citizens can afford to prioritize cosmopolitan rights over basic necessities like food and shelter.
From a more realistic viewpoint, short-term goals of religious tolerance should outweigh a more official secular shift. Transitional government officials may create a more pluralistic system of regulating religious interpretation to ensure that liberal Muslim voices are also represented.
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If al-Azhar did not have full authority over interpretation—and the president, or his party, did not have such unconstrained influence over laws, the legislature, and the judiciary—citizens could feel more secure about their religious freedom. Furthermore, the new

14 constitution should include better checks and balances on the executive branch, which include eliminating the president’s exemption from judicial oversight, reinstating the lower house of
Parliament, the People’s Assembly, and creating an independent judiciary. These checks on executive power and pluralistic measures create the political space for dialogue and tolerance.
The 2013 ousting of Morsi leaves Egypt with a blank slate—an opportunity for the people to learn from their mistakes the first time around and take back their revolution. The secular debate is only one of many obstacles that Egypt must overcome before achieving their democratic vision, and both sides must break the poisonous cycle of marginalization in order to foster a pluralistic environment for the future.
Turkey: Loosening the Reigns
After recent protests throughout Turkey, the political climate is sensitive. While
Turkey’s more developed democratic norms and rights would prevent any serious rebellious threat, when compared to that of Egypt, citizens have demonstrated adamant indignation with the response of their government to the protests in Gezi Park. The protests represented civilian distaste for not only the police actions but also the increasingly religious and authoritarian undertones to Prime Minister Erdogan’s leadership style. Citizens are struggling with the juxtaposition of previously upheld Kemalist secular ideology, preventing religious expression in the public sphere, and Erdogan’s more open expression of religion, particularly Islam. The amount of effort if took to bolster adequate support behind annulling women’s headscarf laws demonstrates the domestic debate over this sense of propriety and freedom of (or from) religion.
While the consensus seems to shift toward slightly softening restrictions on public displays of religion to take Islamic sensitivity into consideration, government restrictions on alcohol and birth control were not well received, as they seemed to overcompensate too far in the

15 conservative direction. Given the context of their surrounding region, often home to extreme religious regulation, some Turks may fear the alternative to exclusionary policies toward religion in the public sphere and react to minor infractions on their sense of propriety. Therefore, any changes to this delicate balance must be methodical and deliberated. This discussion would be greatly advanced through the creation of a new political party to increase pluralism. Religious, conservative parties and secular, liberal parties exist, but there is not a group that bridges the gap.
A new liberal party that encourages religious tolerance and Islamic sensitivity would be well received and a critical contributor to the further development of a more liberal democracy in
Turkey.
The Key Factor: Pluralism
Religious and political debates in Egypt and Turkey are currently swayed by a lack of appropriate representation of the variety of opinions. In Egypt, if the liberal, modernist religious supporters largely represented in the revolutionary camp would coordinate themselves to create a more centralized political position and party, they could be an effective and influential player in determining their religious regulation and protection of rights. Likewise, if liberal Turks supporting greater religious tolerance in the public sphere could organize, they could similarly sway the political pendulum away from Erdogan and AKP’s stronghold to force greater concessions to their political goals. Representation is one of the most integral mandates of an effective democracy, and greater pluralism can only increase the ability of the government to serve the needs and desires of its people.
1
Marwan Ezz Al-Arab, interview by Kapil Talwalkar and Steven Weier, World Bank, Cairo,
Egypt, June 6, 2013.
2
We base our argument in Nader Hashemi’s definition of democracy (at its most basic level) as including consent, popular sovereignty, and individual liberty from Nader Hashemi. Islam,

16
Secularism, and Liberal Democracy: Toward a Democratic Theory for Muslim Societies . 2009.
Reprint (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 7.
3
This article, 5.
4
While secularism is often thought of as the complete separation of religion from politics, we argue that there are many understandings of secularism that countries can mold to fit peacefully within the context of their society. We in no way propose that secularism means the absence or destruction of religion, but instead that religion and politics and find some middle ground of coexistence. For more on the definition of secularism as it pertains to this work see the section entitled “The Many Definitions of Secularism,” from pages 19-20.
5
Egyptology is the study of the history, civilization, and culture of ancient Egypt.
6
Ibid, 10-14.
7
Ibid, 12-13, 48-19.
8 Ibid, 34.
9
Semiha Topal, “Everybody Wants Secularism--But Which One? Contesting Definitions of
Secularism in Contemporary Turkey,” International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 25, no. 1-3 (2012).
10 Magali Rheault, “Headscarves and Secularism: Voices From Turkish Women,” Gallup, accessed August 7, 2013, www.gallup.com/poll/104257/headscarves-secularism-voices-fromturkish-women.aspx
.
11
A hijab is a type of headscarf that covers the hair, but not the face; a niqab is another type of covering that covers all of the face except for the eyes.
Michael Slackman, “In Egypt, a New Battle Begins Over the Veil,” New York Times, January
28, 2007, accessed August 7, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/28/weekinreview/28slackman.html
.
12
John L. Esposito, The Future of Islam (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 42-48.
13
Yesim Arat , Provost of the Bogazici University Political Science Department, interviewed by
Alexa Mencia and Melia Albrecht, Istanbul, Turkey, June 17, 2013.
14
Topal, “Everybody Wants Secularism.”
15 “The World Factbook.”
16
"The World Factbook," Central Intelligence Agency, accessed July 15, 2013, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ .
17 Stephen Kinzer, Crescent and Star: Turkey Between Two Worlds (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2001), 33-34.
18 Dr. Ozgur Koca, Professor at Claremont University, Interviewed by Alexa Mencia, Istanbul,
Turkey, June 13, 2013.
19
Nader Hashemi. Islam, Secularism, and Liberal Democracy: Toward a Democratic Theory for
Muslim Societies . 2009. Reprint (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 110-114.
20 Clark Lombardi and Nathan Brown, “Islam in Egypt's New Constitution,” Foreign Policy: The
Middle East Channel, accessed July 12, 2013, http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/12/13/islam_in_egypts_new_constitution .
21
Ahmed Tawfik (LL.B, LL.M), Attorney at Law and International Arbitrator, interview by
Amanda Schmitt and Katelyn Masket, Cairo, Egypt, June 3, 2013.
22 Lombardi, “Islam in Egypt's New Constitution.”
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.

17
25
Ibid.
26
Ibid.
27
Ibid.
28
Ibid.
29
Ibid.
30
Ahmed Tawfik (LL.B, LL.M).
31
Ambassador Aly Maher ElSayed, Library of Alexandria Ambassador, interview by Amanda
Schmitt and Katelyn Masket, Alexandria, Egypt, June 9, 2013.
32
Dr. Hakan Altinay, Chairman of the Open Society Foundation in Turkey, interview by
Amanda Schmitt and Kapil Talwalkar, Boğaziçi University, Istanbul, Turkey, June 16, 2013.
33
Hakan Altinay.
34
Topal, “Everybody Wants Secularism.”
Soner Çağaptay, “The Diyanet and laïcité: new Turkish exports to Europe,” Hurriyet Daily News, accessed August 7, 2013, www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=diyanetand-lacit-new-turkish-exports-to-europe-2010-02-07 .
35
Jonathan Head, “Quiet end to Turkey's college headscarf ban,” BBC, December 31, 2010, accessed July 15, 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11880622 .
36
Didem Collinsworth, International Crisis Group, interviewed by Sarah Cuevs, Istanbul,
Turkey, June 17, 2013.
37 Ibid.
38
Professor Hakan Yilmaz, interview by Steven Weier, Boğaziçi University, Istanbul, Turkey,
June 16, 2013.
39 Ibid.
40
Ibid.
41
Ibid.
42
Peter Kenyon, “Not Everyone Cheers Turkey's Move To Tighten Alcohol Rules,” NPR, June 7,
2013, accessed July 16, 2013, http://www.npr.org/blogs/thesalt/2013/06/07/187334924/noteveryone-cheers-turkeys-move-to-tighten-alcohol-rules .
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
45 Ferhat Boratav, CNN Turk Editor-in-Chief, interviewed by Melia Albrecht, Istanbul, Turkey,
June 18, 2013.
46 Ferhat Boratav.
47 Ferhat Boratav.
48
Ibid.
49
Didem Collinsworth, International Crisis Group, interviewed by Sarah Cueva, Istanbul,
Turkey, June 17, 2013.
50 Ferhat Boratav.
51
Osman Furkan Abbasoglu, Teaching Assistant at the University of Southern California, interviewed by Steven Weier, Istanbul, Turkey, June 14, 2013.
52 “Erdogan retaining support despite protests,” Al Jazeera, accessed August 6, 2013, http://www.aljazeera.com/video/europe/2013/07/201373171635796492.html
.
53
Osman Furkan Abbasoglu.

18
54 “Turkey: Freedom of Expression Still in Danger Despite Article 301 Reform – RSF,” BBC
Monitoring Media, May 05, 2008, accessed July 15, 2013, http://search.proquest.com/docview/452254800?accountid=14749 .
55
Dr. Hakan Altinay.
56
Ferhat Boratav.
57
“Egypt starts on new constitution,” BBC, accessed July 17, 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-23394397 .
58
Erol Adayilmaz, AK Party Head of Foreign Affairs, interviewed by Rebecca Braun, Istanbul,
Turkey, June 14, 2013.
59
Ibid.
60
Tulin Daloglu, “Turkish Parliament Faces Deadline On Draft Constitution,” Al-Monitor: The
Pulse of the Middle East, accessed July 17, 2013, http://www.almonitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/05/turkey-parliament-constitution-draft-deadline.html
.
61 Ambassador Aly Maher ElSayed.
62 “Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty line (% of population),” The World Bank (2011), accessed August 7, 2013, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.NAHC/countries/EG?display=graph .
63
Esposito, John L, and Dalia Mogahed. Who Speaks for Islam?
excerpt. “Do Muslims Want
Democracy and Theocracy?.” Gallup. Accessed August 7, 2013. http://www.gallup.com/poll/104731/Muslims-Want-Democracy-Theocracy.aspx
.
64
These short-term goals to promote the idea of tolerance within the religion of Islam parallel
Hashemi’s claim that religious reformation prompts secularization and democratization. See
Hashemi, Islam and Secularism, 67-102.