Not Protectively Marked
Tactical Operational Guidance
Part One
Initial Attendance
Aide Memoire and Flowchart
Part Two
Detailed Considerations to Assist
Incident Command
Significant Hazards and
Control Measures
Part Three
Incident Review
Incident Review Considerations
Part Four
CBRN(E) Event (Initial Intervention)
Document References
Relevant References
Technical References
Document Overview
Incidents that involve chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear substances
resulting from a suspected deliberate or malicious act.
This document provides guidance for initial FRS resources to carry out immediate
life-saving rescues and/or actions to contain contamination. If mass
decontamination is required the appropriate national guidance should be followed.
“White powder” incidents are subject to separate police protocols (refer to White
Powder Incidents guidance). However, where the release of a harmful substance
is confirmed the guidance in this document should be followed.
Ref no:
P3.0.0
Date of issue:
Version no:
Page 1 of 35
Lead FRS:
West Sussex
Review date:
1
Protective
marking:
NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED
Official
CBRN(E) Event Initial Intervention
Part One – Initial Attendance Aide Memoire
1
Initial considerations
En route
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Turn on EPDs/radiation survey meter
Respond to RVP if nominated
Approach from upwind, upslope
Initial crew briefing
Consider available in-cab information
External prompts/CBRN(E) indicators
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Is there info from Fire Control regarding
any decontamination advice given
Cautious/silent approach
Consider secondary explosive devices;
100m, 200m or 400m cordon
Consider resource management
Start risk assessment process
On arrival
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2
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3
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STEPS protocol
Initial cordon - at least 100m from visual
indicators or signs of contamination
Gather information
Establish joint forward command point
for co-location with police/ambulance
Ensure all relevant risk information is
communicated to form Joint Dynamic
Hazard Assessment (JDHA)
Establish radio cordons if Improvised
Explosive Devices (IEDs) are suspected
Set objectives – balance risk against
benefit
Consider location for RVP
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Agree joint plan of action
Determine whether mass
decontamination will be required
Confirm Tactical Mode
Inform others – assistance/informative
METHANE messages
Initiate actions towards objectives
PPE/RPE inside initial cordon - as a
minimum; full firefighting PPE,
disposable gloves, BA and 1 EPD per
team
Avoid contact with casualties except for
immediate lifesaving rescues
Incident Information
Establish extent and overview

Consider multiple sources of information: 
(NILO/police/ambulance/MDT/owner/
occupier/witnesses/SSRI/FireMet/HMEPA) 
Use DDOOR factors to determine initial
cordon
Alarm from EPD/survey meter
What’s: happened – happening - likely necessary
Share and gain situational awareness
with other responders
Resource Information
Consider PDA/ETA
Initiate a make up if necessary – will
mass decontamination be needed?
Return any resources not required
Consider other agencies - in attendance/
required
Page 2 of 35
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Identify how resources are to be
managed
Establish and maintain safe access and
egress
RVP/marshalling areas
Deployment site plan
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CBRN(E) Event Initial Intervention
4
Risk Information to inform planning
Key Hazards
Key Control Measures
Confirm relevance of key hazards below:
 Exposure to airborne contaminants
 Explosion (secondary device)
 Radiation - contamination/irradiation
 Hazardous materials
 Intimidation and violence
 Structural collapse
 Biohazards
 Fire/products of combustion
 Flammable atmosphere
 Firearms
Other key hazards identified at incident
Identify controls for additional key hazards
(refer to relevant guidance)
Confirm relevance of key control measures
below:
 EPD/Survey meter
 Respond to SHA, MA or RVP, if
designated
 FireMet/CHEMET - approach from
upwind
 Radiation procedures
 Initial cordon
 Controlled use of comms devices
 Search RVP for secondary device
 Decontamination procedures
 Hazmat procedures
 HMEPA/DIM team
 FRS withdrawal to safe place
 Substantial cover
 Establish and maintain cordons
 Advice from NILO
 BA procedures
5
Planning
Common prompts
Ensure plan:
 Is based on relevant information
 Follows a logical sequence
 Is appropriately delegated
 Balances risks and benefit
 Aligns to Tactical Mode
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Is correctly resourced
Is communicated and understood
Flexible
Resilient e.g. ‘plan B’
Regularly reviewed
Be prepared to brief/hand over

Deliberate reconnaissance within
building if necessary: 15 mins max
Improvised/interim casualty
decontamination:
 Dry decon - or non-caustic chemicals
 Wet decon - for caustic, biological or
radiological substances
Monitor casualties for signs/symptoms
Start decision log as soon as possible
Consider effect of ventilation in buildings
/tunnels/underground structures
If incident requires mass
decontamination use appropriate
national guidance
Incident specific prompts
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Declare hot and warm zones as soon as
possible - include DDOOR factors
Reassure and direct affected persons to
safe holding area in warm Zone
Issue disrobe packs from a safe distance
Initiate disrobe procedures as necessary
Establish initial decontamination/safe
undressing area before committing crews
Minimum of full firefighting PPE,
disposable gloves, BA and 1 EPD per
team within warm/hot zone
Immediate lifesaving rescues: 30mins
max
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CBRN(E) Event Initial Intervention
Aide Memoire – Flowchart
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Incident info
Establish extent and
overview
Information sources
(MDT/owner/occupier/
NILO/police/ambulance
/witnesses/SSRI)
What’s: happened –
happening - likely –
necessary
Determine initial
cordon - DDOOR
Share/gain situational
awareness
Ensure all relevant risk
information is
communicated
Consider
In-cab information
External prompt
Cautious/silent
approach
Resource management
Ventilation – buildings/
tunnels/underground
Media impact
Decontamination
Any advice from FRS
Control to casualties
Advice from
HMEPA/NILO/
ambulance
Initial crew decon.
Interim/improvised
casualty decon
Decon options:
o Dry – for non-caustic
chemicals
o Wet – for caustic,
biological or some
radiological
substances
Page 4 of 35
En route

  EPDs/radiation meter on
  Respond to RVP, if declared
  Upwind/upslope approach


On arrival


 Initial crew briefing

 STEPS protocol

 Initial cordon >100m from

signs of contamination

 Gather information

 Forward command point

 Joint Dynamic Hazard

Assessment (JDHA)

 Objectives: risk vs benefit

 Joint plan of action

 Messages:

o Assistance for mass

decon?

o Informative - METHANE

 Confirm Tactical Mode

 Initiate actions towards

objectives

 Declare hot/warm zones

 Affected persons to safe

holding area in warm zone

 Disrobe packs/procedures


Safety critical actions

  Radio cordons if IEDs
 suspected
  Establish decon/safe
 undressing area before
 crews committed
  Min PPE/RPE inside initial
 cordon: BA, disposable
 gloves, 1 EPD per team
  Avoid contact with
 casualties if possible
  Immediate life-saving
 rescues 30mins max
  Deliberate reconnaissance
 15mins max

 As incident develops
 Casualty decontamination
 Monitor casualties
 Start decision log asap
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Resources info
PDA/ETA
Make up - does
incident require mass
decontamination?
Return resources not
required
Other agencies - in
attendance/required
Safe access/egress
RVP/marshalling
Deployment site plan
Key hazards
Exposure to airborne
contaminants
Explosion (secondary
device)
Radiation contamination/
irradiation
Hazardous materials
Intimidation and
violence
Structural collapse
Biohazards
Fire/products of
combustion
Flammable atmosphere
Firearms
CBRN(E) Event Initial Intervention
First Responder flowchart
Apply STEP 123 Plus
Yes
Are there three or
more casualties in
close proximity with
no obvious reason?
Jointly agree hazards JDHA
Work together with other agencies
Control the scene
Identify safe arrival routes, RVP
and additional resources required
No
Follow STEP
1 or 2
Are there casualties
unable to walk requiring
rescue from hazard area?
Yes
Direct walking
casualties to place
of relative safety
(warm zone)
No
Benefits
outweigh
risks
Undertake agency
specific dynamic
risk assessment
Risk Assessment
Undertake rescue (FRS)
Minimum personnel in
most appropriate level of PPE/RPE
informed by JDHA
Evacuate
Communicate and advise
Disrobe
Decontaminate
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Risks
outweigh
benefits
Control
measures
Communicate with public and Multi Agency responders
Hazard Assessment
Report arrival and
location to Control
Identify hazards
Provide situation report
CBRN(E) Event Initial Intervention
Joint Dynamic Hazard Assessment (JDHA)
Flowchart
Review and re-assess
Joint Dynamic Hazard Assessment
Fire & Rescue
Service
identification
of tasks
Police
identification
of tasks
Ambulance
Service
identification
of tasks
Health Care
premises
identification
of tasks
Risk
Assessment
Risk
Assessment
Risk
Assessment
Risk
Assessment
Control
Measures
Control
Measures
Control
Measures
Control
Measures
Integrated Multi-agency Operational Response Plan
Decision log
Page 6 of 35
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CBRN(E) Event Initial Intervention
Part Two – Detailed Considerations to Assist
Incident Command
1
Initial Considerations
1.1
a)
Introduction
This guidance only covers the initial intervention stages at incidents
involving chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear substances, and which
may involve conventional explosives as a propellant. This will enable initial
life-saving actions to be carried out or the containment of contamination.
Where mass decontamination of the public is required, the appropriate
national guidance should be followed.
b)
CBRN(E) incidents should be managed using the following nine key tasks:

1. Command and control

2. Mobilisation

3. Arrival at scene

4. Scene assessment

5. Scene management

6. Deliberate reconnaissance

7. Rescue and triage

8. Decontamination

9. Survivor management
c)
“White powder” incidents are subject to separate police protocols (refer to
White Powder Incidents guidance). However, where the release of a
harmful substance is confirmed the guidance in this document should be
followed.
1.2
En route
a)
Turn on EPDs and radiation survey meters. Reset EPDs to zero. Establish
background radiation reading using survey meter. This should be done
prior to arrival to enable early radiation detection. If an EPD sounds an
alarm or if the survey meter shows readings above background levels,
radiation procedures are to be followed – refer to Radiation TOG.
b)
Respond to Strategic Holding Area (SHA), Marshalling Area (MA) or RVP if
this has been nominated. If no RVP nominated, approach incident from
upwind and avoid driving through plume. Approach from higher ground if
possible and avoid driving through any liquids.
c)
Initial crew briefing appropriate to the predicted risk:

PPE/RPE

Roles delegated/confirmed

Key safety actions

Previous experience sought/shared
Page 7 of 35
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d)
e)
f)
g)
Brief crews regarding the possibility of the presence of secondary explosive
devices:

Check for suspicious packages in areas of FRS activity and
RVP/marshalling areas. If the police are in attendance, they will be
responsible for searching for secondary devices.

Don’t transmit within the following distances:
o
Vehicle Airwave radio – 50m
o
Handheld Airwave radios/Mobile phones/devices including
mobile data terminals (MDT) - 25m
o
Incident ground radios – 10m
Consider available in-cab information:

Turn out information/tip sheet

Radio traffic/Fire Control – advice given to public by Fire Control
regarding decontamination

MDT/consider available operational guidance/Site Specific Risk
Information (SSRI)

Identify possible water supplies
External prompts that may influence planning:

STEPS protocol

Visual indicators of a CBRN(E) event may include all or some of the
following:
o
Dead or distressed people, birds and animals
o
Multiple individuals showing unexplained signs of skin, eye or
airway irritation, nausea, vomiting, twitching, sweating, pinpoint pupils, runny nose, disorientation, breathing difficulties,
convulsions
o
The presence of hazardous materials or unusual materials/
equipment
o
Unexplained vapour or mist clouds
o
Unexplained oily droplets or films on surfaces or water
o
Withered plant life and vegetation

Weather, wind, (use FireMet if available), slope, time of day

Traffic build up

Smoke plume

Unusual smells/sounds

Public reaction
Cautious/silent approach
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h)
Consider resource management

PDA (other resources that are en-route and estimated time of arrival)

Space for specials/ambulance/national assets
i)
Start risk assessment process
j)
Share any approach information with other responders via Fire Control
k)
Observe safe approach distances if an unexploded device or a substance
not yet released is suspected:
Device up to briefcase size
100m
Device up to car size
200m
Device up to Lorry size
400m
1.3
On arrival
a)
Look for visual indicators or signs of CBRN(E) event and approach with
caution
STEPS 1-2-3 plus
One person incapacitated for
no obvious reason
Approach using standard protocols
Two people incapacitated for
no obvious reason
Approach with caution using
standard protocols
Three or more people
incapacitated for no obvious
reason
Use caution
Plus
Follow CBRN(E) First Responder
flow chart to consider what actions
can be undertaken to save life
b)
Position appliances outside initial cordon distance of at least 100m from the
edge of visible signs and symptoms of contamination or detectable
contaminant
c)
Establish initial cordon
d)
PPE – the following are the minimum safe levels:

Full firefighting PPE

Disposable gloves worn under fire gloves

BA must be worn within initial cordon

At least one EPD per team within cordon
e)
Consider chemical protection suits (CPS) if available
f)
Avoid contact with casualties unless undertaking immediate lifesaving
rescues
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g)
h)
i)
Gather initial information:

Establish extent and overview.

Liaise with FRS National Inter-agency Liaison Officer
(NILO)/police/ambulance/Tactical Adviser if in attendance.

Establish a joint forward command point for co-location of
commanders.

Undertake dynamic risk assessment and share with other agencies to
inform a JDHA.

Identify if IEDs are known or suspected to be present. Apply
appropriate radio cordons. Note: any communications device that can
transmit could detonate an IED e.g. radios, mobile phones,
telemetry.

Identify resources required. Mass decontamination may be required
based upon the outcome of the JDHA.
Identify initial incident priorities:

Life critical action

Safety critical action

Action to prevent escalation
Set objectives with:

Clear priorities

Risk balanced against benefit

Sufficient resource availability

An estimated timeline

Supervision

Delegation of tasks

Communications
j)
Develop a working strategy and agree tasks with other agencies in
attendance to form a joint plan of action and ensure shared situational
awareness.
k)
Initiate actions towards objectives with appropriate:

Supervision

Delegation of tasks

Communications
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l)
Inform others:

Confirm Tactical Mode

Make up for resources required and send informative message
declaring suspected/confirmed CBRN(E) incident and include an initial
METHANE message as part of the first informative message –

o
Major incident declared?
o
Exact location
o
Type of incident
o
Hazards - present and potential
o
Access - routes that are safe to use
o
Number, type, severity of casualties
o
Emergency services now present and those required
Other specific instructions to oncoming appliances/resources
m)
Coordination of the joint plan will usually be led by the police
2
Incident information gathering
2.1
Common
a)
As soon as possible, a more detailed and accurate overview should be
established, that should take into account:

b)
Local factors such as:
o
The weather now and predicted (CHEMET/FireMet),
o
The time of day
o
The slope of ground and likely drainage routes etc.
The parameters of the incident - is the incident:

Dynamic or static

Widespread or local
c)
The overview should draw from as many sources of current information as
possible (NILO/police/ambulance/MDT/owner/occupier/witnesses/SSRI/
FireMet).
d)
The IC should liaise with other responders to establish a common
overview, reconciling any differences in situational awareness and resolving
any conflicting priorities.
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2.2
Fires
a)
To inform planning try to establish:

b)
What essential firefighting activities are required to:
o
Allow lifesaving rescues to be undertaken
o
Protect people from fire spread
o
Protect property from fire spread
Identify the presence of building features to protect responders:

Safe access and egress

Engineered fire safety solutions (SSRI)
c)
Sufficient extinguishing media available/en route or required
d)
Impact of fire fighting on the integrity of the building or location
2.3
Rescues
a)
Who requires rescue?
b)
Prioritise saveable lives/those most at risk
c)
How is the rescue best carried out?
d)
Is there a preferable search pattern?
e)
Are there any barriers to overcome?
f)
Are specialist teams/resources required? e.g. HART
g)
Collapse – assess stability and predict further collapse
2.4
Hazardous materials and environmental protection
a)
STEPS protocol
b)
Are Hazmats actually involved:
c)

Visual indicators of a CBRN(E) release

Alarm signal from one or more EPDs or survey meter

Credible information from another agency

Symptoms of exposure to a biological or radiological attack may not
be present within the first minutes and hours of an attack occurring.
Chemical releases are often, but not always, accompanied by a more
rapid onset of symptoms
Use SSRI if available
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d)
Impact of existing and predicted local factors (weather, time of day, slope
etc.) and reflect in plan. Use DDOOR factors to help determine the initial
cordon:

Downwind

Dilution

Obstacles

Oscillation

Retention
e)
HMEPA/specialist advice (consider EA for land and water, Public Health
England for airborne) and utilise information gathered to inform plan
f)
Can contamination of environment be prevented or minimised:
3

Isolate/contain/control leaks and/or spillages

Protect risks (drains, rivers etc.)

Fire/decontamination water run-off and/or smoke plume
Resource requirements
Resources that are available or may be required and arrangements needed to
manage them
3.1
Resources
a)
Consider PDA/ETA and what is:
b)

Already deployed

In attendance but not yet deployed

En route and expected to be available for deployment when
prioritising objectives

Required to meet initial and developing incident priorities, objectives
and contingencies e.g. mass decontamination

Not needed and can be returned
Consider other agencies, what is:

In attendance and how can it be used to assist with the incident

Needed to deal with the incident
c)
FRS resources availability - appliances, personnel, specialists, equipment,
decontamination equipment, consumables (fuel, BA cylinders etc.)
d)
Specialists/tactical advisers
e)
Other agencies - manage traffic/public, specialist equipment, PPE,
decontamination, clean up
f)
Periodically review resource requirements to meet the needs of the plan
and adjust as necessary
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3.2
Resource management
a)
Record resource deployment and availability – site plan
b)
Establish and maintain safe access and egress
c)
Access and space for specials/national assets
d)
Consult SSRI
e)
Support sectors: logistics, water, BA etc.
f)
RVP, marshalling, staging or holding areas with appropriate cordon control
g)
Equipment: pools, recovery arrangements, servicing, repairs and spares,
defect and other recording etc.
h)
Reliefs and welfare arrangements
i)
Consider how to limit and/or reduce the impact on the surrounding
community and ensure the security of resources
j)
Continually review resource management arrangements
4
Risk information
Consider and review significant hazards and appropriate control measures.
The table below identifies the significant hazards and control measures identified
through pre-planning. Utilise this information where relevant and the risk
information gathered at the incident to develop risk assessments appropriate to
the dynamics of the situation.
Significant hazards
Control measures
Exposure to airborne contaminants

Respond to nominated SHA/MA/RVP,
if designated



EPD/Survey meter

Receive information from Fire
Control regarding safe approach to
incident

FireMet/CHEMET information


Hazardous materials and radiation
Before warm zone set up
Page 14 of 35
Radiation procedures
Approach incidents from
upwind/upslope
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Explosion (secondary device)

Deliberate targeting of responders
by use of improvised explosive
devices may result in death or
injury
Contamination /irradiation from
radioactive source



Before warm zone set up
Direct exposure to radiation
sources or contamination from
radioactive particulate matter
Including cross contamination
from casualties evacuating scene
Exposure to hazardous materials


Initial cordon and RVP based on
information gathered at the scene.



Controlled use of comms devices


CCTV











EPD/survey meter

Position appliances at the
nominated/generic cordon distance







Approach upwind/upslope

Police assistance
Before warm zone set up
Chemical or biological
contamination from direct contact
with hazardous materials,
entering the smoke plume or
cross contamination from
evacuating victims
Intimidation/violence from
members of public/affected
persons


Members of public fleeing the
scene who are anxious and
potentially aggressive may
confront firefighters
Page 15 of 35
Minimum personnel in the risk area
Police reconnaissance and search of
RVP
NILO/Tactical Adviser/Explosive
Ordinance Disposal team (EOD)
Radiation procedures
Avoidance route
Hygiene and welfare procedures
Decontamination procedures
Minimum personnel in the risk area
Post incident welfare arrangements
Specialist advice
HMEPA
FireMet/CHEMET information
Radiation identification and
monitoring equipment (DIM team)
Continued use of FireMet/CHEMET
Hazmat procedures
Decontamination procedures
Advice from police
HMEPA/DIM team
Compliance with the FRS violence
and aggression policy/risk
assessment
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CBRN(E) Event Initial Intervention
Use of firearms by perpetrators or
law enforcement officers

Direct targeting or being caught in
the crossfire
Structural collapse

Structures may remain in an
unstable condition following an
explosion or impact from a vehicle
Biohazard - contact with soiled or
contaminated substances

Personnel may be exposed to
disease/infection due to disruption
of foul drainage, air-conditioning
systems etc. following an
explosion or building collapse
Fire/toxic fumes/products of
combustion
Ignition of flammable/explosive
atmosphere

Flammable atmospheres may be
present leading to explosion due
to the release of flammable
vapour/gases either deliberately
or as the result of building
collapse or damage to
infrastructure
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
FRS withdrawal to safe place

Health monitoring systems in place
in conjunction with Occupational
Health provider

Ensure that all PPE is removed as
soon as practicable and is cleaned/
decontaminated appropriately


Advice from Public Health England







BA procedures






Dispersal/containment jet
Substantial cover
Use of specialist teams
Establish and maintain cordons
NILO
Advice from police
CCTV
Establish and maintain cordons
Safety observer
Structural engineer/building control
USAR
Specialist equipment
Strict hygiene procedures
particularly control of eating,
drinking and smoking
Initial cordon based on information
gathered at the scene.
Firefighting media
Dispersal jet
Safety jet
FireMet/CHEMET information
Elimination of ignition sources
Initial cordon based on information
gathered at the scene.
Safety jet
BA procedures
HMEPA
Tactical adviser
Air monitoring/plume prediction/
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CHEMET
Dust

Respiratory illness may result
from ingestion of dust released by
an explosion or building collapse
Environmental conditions

Physiological stress due to
working in extreme heat or cold
Environmental conditions affecting
visibility

The time of day, location and/or
weather conditions can add to the
risk of poor visibility leading to
increased likelihood of injuries
arising from slips, trips and falls
Ground conditions resulting in slips,
trips and falls
Struck by moving vehicles

During the early stages of the
incident there may not be
sufficient cordons/traffic control in
place to protect personnel from
impact with moving vehicles
Critical incident involving multiple
casualties

Exposure to traumatic scenes
may lead to long term
psychological trauma
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
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
Establish and maintain cordons



Crew rotation


Lighting

Establish and maintain cordons



Positioning of vehicles





Establish and maintain cordons

Minimum number of persons
exposed to risk area


Critical Incident Stress Debrief
Damping
Eye irrigation packs
RPE
Eye protection
Air monitoring/plume prediction/
CHEMET
Use of shelter
Welfare arrangements
Clear and designated access/egress
routes
Lighting
Clear and designated access/egress
routes
Emergency traffic management
Lighting
Additional PPE hi-viz clothing
Police attendance for traffic
management
Post incident welfare arrangements
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Sharp and jagged edges from
debris/damaged structures
including glass

May be spread over a wide area
particularly in built environment
where large quantities of glass
may be shattered
Falls from Height
Struck by objects falling from
height


Equipment and building materials
including glass which may plane
some distance
Casualties jumping from buildings
involved in fire
Falls into water
Contact with body fluids

Personnel may be exposed to
communicable diseases whilst
undertaking casualty care
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
Minimum number of persons in risk
area




Establish and maintain cordons








Cover sharp edges


Working at height procedures

Establish and maintain 3m minimum
(risk zone) of waters edge




Safety Observer

Water PPE (relevant for CFOA
Module 1) for work within risk zone


Hygiene procedures

Ensure that all PPE is removed as
soon as practicable and is
cleaned/decontaminated
appropriately

Additional PPE disposable gloves
Lighting
Positioning of vehicles
Clear and designated access/egress
routes
Working at height procedures
Establish and maintain cordons
Safe working platform/ladders
Aerial appliance
Specialist teams
Establish and maintain cordons
Minimum number of persons in risk
area
Safety Observer
Lighting
Use of work restraint equipment
CFOA Module 1 (Water Awareness
Training)
Health monitoring systems in place
in conjunction with Occupational
Health Provider
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Manual handling of equipment
Manual handling of casualties
Exposed utilities - electricity

Damaged electric supplies (high
or low voltages) may result in
exposed cables and/or leakage of
current into other conducting
structures leading to the risk of
electrocution or electric shock and
burns
Exposed utilities - gas

Gas leaking from exposed utilities
may travel considerable distances
and pool in low lying areas
resulting in a flammable or
irrespirable atmosphere
Excessive background and
surrounding noise

Personnel may be unable to hear
warnings/evacuation signals
Arduous working conditions
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
Clear and designated access/egress
routes

Correct use of manual handling
techniques – TILE (Task, Individual,
Load & Environment)

Clear and designated access/egress
routes

Correct use of manual handling
techniques – TILE (Task, Individual,
Load & Environment)






Hazard Area Response Team (HART)

Attendance of electricity supplier rep









Isolation of services


Welfare procedures
Specialist teams
Isolate supply
On site safety brief
Establish and maintain cordons
Cable avoidance tools (CAT) and
other detection equipment
BA procedures
Firefighting jet
Safety jet
Attendance of gas supplier rep
Isolate source
Establish and maintain cordons
Rotation of crews
Hearing protection
Rotation of crews
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Contamination/irradiation from
radioactive source

Including cross contamination
from casualties evacuating scene

Warm/hot zone working
Loss of radio signal leading to
breakdown of command and control

May be due to blind spots or use
of electronic countermeasures
(ECM)
Complex layout leading to
disorientation/trapped/isolated
Page 20 of 35
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
EPD/dosimeter

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
Radiation procedures








Decontamination procedures



BA procedures
Radiation identification and
monitoring equipment
Avoidance route
Hygiene and welfare procedures
Minimum personnel in the risk area
Post incident welfare arrangements
Powered Respirator Protective Suits
or Gas Tight Chemical Protection
Suits
Specialist advice
HMEPA
FireMet/CHEMET information
BA procedures
Evacuation signal
Signal booster
Airwave radios
Communications
Liaison with building management
(plans)
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5
Planning
5.1
Aim, objectives and priorities
CBRN(E) incidents will be multi-agency events that will require joint planning.
From a fire service perspective the following objectives may need to be
considered and prioritised:
a)
b)
c)
Life critical

Save saveable lives

Rescues of those most at risk

Prevent catastrophic event
Safety critical

Public safety

Safety of all responders
Prevent escalation and spread

Protect Critical National Infrastructure and/or local critical
infrastructure

Protection of property
d)
Environmental protection
e)
Preserve scene
f)
Return to new normality
5.2

Operations scaled down

Actions to assist recovery
Initial response activity
The activity during the early stages to support immediate life rescues following
actions on arrival (as outlined in section 1.2) may include the following:
a)
Declare hot and warm zones, as soon as possible taking into account:
Downwind, Dilution, Obstacles, Oscillation, Retention (DDOOR)
factors in built-up environment
b)
Communicate with, reassure and direct affected persons to a holding area
in a place of relative safety within warm zone and initiate disrobe
procedures as necessary, providing disrobe packs.
c)
Establish initial decontamination/safe undressing area and procedures prior
to committing crews inside the initial cordon.
d)
Carry out immediate lifesaving rescues; minimum of full firefighting PPE
with disposable gloves and BA and at least one EPD per team in the hot
and warm zones for a maximum of thirty minutes.
e)
If no living casualties are visible from outside a building, deliberate
reconnaissance may be used, limited to fifteen minutes, to establish if
there are any living casualties inside.
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f)
If gaseous contaminant is heavier than air, evacuate people from the
building via upper floor doors and windows if possible.
g)
Carry out decontamination for casualties as required.


Casualty disrobing
o
This is a critical step in the decontamination process and is
highly effective at reducing exposure to CBRN materials.
o
Ideally, casualties should undress down to underwear.
Undressing should be systematic and consistent with the steps
outlined in the Fire and Rescue Service (FRS) disrobe pack
pictogram.
o
Consideration should be given to ensuring the welfare of
casualties as far as possible.
Decontamination
o
Improvised decontamination is the use of an immediately
available method of decontamination either dry or wet. This
should be performed on all disrobed casualties as a priority
unless medical advice is received to the contrary.
o
DRY decontamination (should be considered the default
process, primarily for chemical incidents) this is the use of dry
absorbent material such as paper tissue or cloths to blot and
rub the exposed skin.
o
WET decontamination (used if there are signs and symptoms of
caustic, or biological or radiological substances have been
identified) this is the use of water from any available source
such as taps, showers, hose-reels, sprinklers etc. Run-off
should be contained if possible. Where on site facilities are not
available for wet decontamination, interim decontamination can
be set up using FRS equipment.
h)
Monitor casualties for signs and symptoms of exposure to the substance.
i)
Start a decision log at the earliest opportunity.
j)
Consider the effect of mechanical ventilation if installed in the building and
air movement/ventilation if the incident involves tunnels or underground
structures.
Decontamination of the public on site is primarily the responsibility of the
ambulance service. FRS may be requested to assist in this process. If the
incident requires mass decontamination the appropriate national guidance should
be followed once the initial lifesaving actions have been carried out.
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5.3
Considerations when managing, monitoring or taking over
a)
When developing a plan the IC is to consider relevant incident prompts.
b)
When reviewing progress against the plan or when monitoring or taking
over an incident, the following will need to be taken into consideration and
regularly reviewed and amended as necessary to ensure the overall aim is
achieved:
c)

Information available (situation, resources and risks)

Are the identified objectives, priorities and tasks appropriate

Does planning apply a reasonable test of risk v benefit

How effective and appropriate are any plans or actions already
underway – actual progress against anticipated timeline

How effective are incident ground organisation/control and
communication arrangements

Confirm the extent of incident (Major Incident etc.)

Have alternative plans been considered, are suitable and sufficient
contingency arrangements in place (‘plan B’ – what if?)
Have any wider potential impacts of the incident been identified,
considered and mitigated, perhaps using the mnemonic PESTLER:

Political – High profile incident; potential for incident outcome to be
linked positively or negatively to political decisions etc.

Economic – Incident affects high value property; response involves
significant costs etc.

Societal – Incident disrupts large school, major employer, high
profile site

Technical – Good or poor performance of equipment, procedure etc.

Legal – Statutory duty not met, incident contains a crime scene etc.

Environmental – Incident affects watercourses or involves Site of
Special Scientific Interest (SSSI) etc.

Reputational – Potential to affect FRS reputation either positively or
negatively
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6
Command and Control
The command structure and incident ground organisation should reflect the
needs, complexity and scale of the incident being dealt with and control the
operational activities necessary to achieve the objectives of the incident plan.
a)
Suitably located joint forward control point established with other agencies
in attendance.
b)
The IC should confirm that the command structure meets the needs of the
plan with:

The appropriate level of incident command

Delegated roles, responsibilities and authority limits that are clearly
understood and within the experience and capability of individuals
within the command team

Manageable spans of control

Sectors (operational and support if required), with coordinated
working

Clearly defined reporting lines established

Clearly defined communication routes/methods appropriate to the
circumstances

Adequate resources
c)
Command support established and command post suitably located and
identified.
d)
Any changes in the command structure and relevant details of the plan are
clearly communicated and known to all on the incident ground.
e)
Effective command is maintained when taking/handing over by
incorporating the previous IC within the new command team.
7
Safety and Welfare
7.1
Safety considerations
a)
Suitable and sufficient DRA/ARA conducted and appropriately reviewed
b)
Joint Dynamic Hazard Assessment carried out with other agencies
c)
Operating practices balance benefit against risk
d)
Safety Observers or Safety Officers with clear briefing regarding areas of
responsibility and clear reporting lines confirmed
e)
Cordons established, controlled/entry records
f)
Holding areas
g)
Safety briefings
h)
Evacuation systems/routes
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i)
Decontamination
j)
Exposure reporting
k)
Strict hygiene procedures – no eating, drinking, smoking in hazards areas
l)
First aid/ambulance service
m)
Exposure to heat, cold, weather limited or mitigated
n)
Safety events recorded/investigation initiated
7.2
Welfare considerations
a)
Crew rotation and reliefs
b)
Hydration, rest, feeding and toilet facilities
c)
Consider concerned relatives/others becoming aware (via news, social
media, mobile phones etc.)
d)
Stress, initial support
e)
Protracted incident
f)
Reliefs for specialists considered
g)
Shelter for responders (out of sight?)
h)
Shelter/support for displaced residents (in consultation with local authority)
i)
Support from voluntary services (Red Cross, St Johns, RVS etc.)
j)
Medical aftercare/occupational health referral
8
Communication
Establish reliable, accurate, timely communications.
8.1
FRS exchange of information
a)
Regular joint command team briefings/updates/relevant information
sharing
b)
Clear briefings by delegated command team/officers to cascade
information
c)
Clear lines of communication established
d)
Confirmation that information passed is received, understood and being
acted upon
e)
Communication format is determined by incident needs (e.g. runners if
poor radio reception)
f)
Communication discipline maintained
g)
Tactical Mode changes/updates broadcast
h)
Changes to the plan are shared
i)
Seek and give regular feedback regarding progress
j)
Messages, e.g. standard messages, METHANE
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k)
Brief senior commanders and interested parties remote from the incident
8.2
Technical considerations
a)
Single link with Fire Control established
b)
Radio channels/talk groups assigned
c)
Appropriate links to other agencies
d)
Specialist communications engineer
e)
Specialist equipment
f)
Repeaters/leaky feeders/aerials
g)
Intrinsically safe equipment
h)
Consider use of local systems
i)
Consider use of Mobile Telephony Priority Access Scheme (MTPAS)
9
Liaison
Effective liaison with external agencies and interested parties to build shared
situational awareness.
Early use of a joint forward command point will enhance the joint dynamic
hazard assessment, planning and shared situational awareness during the early
stages of the incident.
9.1
Who?
a)
Emergency responders
b)
Medical teams
c)
Local authority officers
d)
Structural engineers
e)
Owners/occupiers/on-site knowledge
f)
Experts/specialists/site specialists
g)
Control rooms (e.g. railway, motorway, shopping complexes)
h)
Utilities and other agencies
i)
Public
j)
FRS media department/media
9.2
How?
a)
Formal – Gold, Silver, Bronze
b)
Regular recorded cross-agency meetings
c)
Media briefings
d)
Panel of advisers
e)
Informal – working alongside other agencies
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f)
Liaison with off-site advisers
g)
Inter-agency Liaison Officer
9.3
Why?
a)
Sharing of safety information
b)
Common aims and unity of purpose
c)
Specific responsibilities confirmed
d)
Relevant information sharing
e)
Involve and maximise assistance
f)
Better informed decisions
g)
Address conflicting priorities of other agencies
h)
Supports needs of other agencies
i)
Positive PR/accurate/common media messages
j)
Warning/informing public
10
Closing Stages and Post Incident Considerations
10.1 Scaling down operations
The police will be the lead agency at a CBRN(E) incident and any FRS
involvement in the closing stages of the will be under the direction of their senior
officer.
a)
Community impacts addressed, such as removing cordons as early as
possible
b)
Once operational activity is completed, withdraw personnel and equipment
from risk area
c)
Maintain recording, logging, Tactical Mode
d)
Any appropriate agreed assistance with site clearance
10.2 Safeguarding issues
a)
Noted and passed on to appropriate authorities
10.3 Investigations
a)
Scene preservation
b)
Logging any FRS photo or video evidence
c)
Fire investigation
d)
Accident investigation
e)
Post mortem or Coroner’s hearing considerations
f)
Criminal investigation/litigation considerations
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g)
Public or Judicial Inquiry considerations
h)
Arranging potential joint investigations
i)
Identify key personnel and/or witnesses
10.4 Community safety activity
a)
Community safety activities initiated as appropriate
b)
Additional help summoned
10.5 Equipment recovery
a)
A recovery plan, following guidance from NILO/HMEPA that ensures
equipment is:

Recovered, cleaned and returned, or

Decontaminated or bagged as appropriate, or

Impounded if part of an investigation in accordance with service
procedures

If left in situ, recorded and replaced and/or recovered when
appropriate
10.6 Economic considerations
a)
FRS cost recovery, taking action in accordance with service policy.
b)
FRS cost reduction by returning crews no longer required, particularly
where these reduce overtime or on call costs.
c)
Insurance - if appropriate, provide incident number to people who may
have experienced financial loss.
d)
Adverse financial impact on local businesses should be considered a priority
and actions taken to return to business as usual as soon as possible.
10.7 Incident recording
a)
Gather information for IRS
b)
Gather all incident command paperwork
c)
Decision logs are secured
10.8 Debriefing and post incident welfare
a)
Carry out hot incident debrief (include other agencies if appropriate)
b)
Assess crew welfare issues
c)
Start critical incident debrief procedure as appropriate
d)
Occupational health considered as appropriate
e)
Consider need for formal multi-agency debriefs
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10.9 Handover and site security
a)
Handover with safety brief prepared/undertaken
b)
Handover to appropriate person/authority
c)
Site security considered
d)
Re-inspection considered/organised
10.10
Other issues
a)
Firefighting PPE cleaning and/or re-supply issues
b)
VIP attendance
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Part Three – Incident Review
Incident Review Considerations
Incident specific
1







2












User notes
Initial actions
Was available information/guidance
gathered and considered?
o EPDs set to zero and used?
o Background radiation monitored using
survey meter?
Were DRAs/ARAs completed and acted
upon?
o JDHA undertaken
Did initial actions balance risks and
benefits?
Were initial priorities and sequence of
objectives appropriate?
Were adequate resources secured and
managed?
Were effective command, control and
communication arrangements in place?
o Joint forward command point
considered/set up?
Are remedial actions required?
Incident information
What has happened?
What is happening now?
What is likely to happen?
Who/what is at risk?
Establish the parameters of the incident
o Was situational awareness gained/
shared with other responders?
Are there any immediate risks?
Is immediate action required?
Are local factors understood and being
addressed (weather, time of day, slope of
ground etc.)?
Are the wider impacts understood and
being addressed (PESTLER)?
Are equality and diversity implications
being addressed?
Has SSRI and operational guidance been
consulted?
Are actions in line with operational
guidance?
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Incident specific
3



4



5
User notes
Resources information
Confirm resource requirements, consider:
o FRS (Mass decontamination resources)
o Other agencies (HART)
o Contingencies
Are resources appropriate to plan?
Is resource management adequate?
Hazard and safety information
Are DRA/ARA/pre-planned RA, significant
hazards and control measures
incorporated into incident planning?
Has operational guidance/SSRI been
considered?
Do actions balance risks against benefits?
Planning
5.1 Aim, objectives and priorities


Objectives identified and priorities
appropriate
Incident activity appropriate
5.2 Plan


Is there a plan and is it working?
Will it deliver the actions required to meet
the prioritised objectives of the incident:
o Is it appropriate to the incident type?
o Is it based on relevant information?
o Does it follow a logical sequence?
o Is it appropriately delegated?
o Does it align with the Tactical Mode?
o Is it correctly resourced?
o Is it communicated and understood?
o Is it flexible?
o Is it resilient e.g. ‘plan B’/
contingencies?
o Is it monitored, reviewed, evaluated,
maintained and, if amended,
communicated?
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Incident specific
6
User notes
Command and control
Confirm existing arrangements meet the
needs of the incident, with appropriate:
 Levels of command
 Organisational structure
 Sectorisation (operational and support)
 Roles and responsibilities (clearly defined
and understood)
 Spans of control
 Clear communication routes
 Continuity - initial IC/command team
 Resources
 Shared situational awareness with FRS
and others
 Command support/command post
 Changes communicated to all
7
Safety and welfare
Confirm adequate safety arrangements:
 DRA/ARA conducted and reviewed
 Safety briefings
 Safety Observers/Safety Officers
 Cordons established and controlled
 Holding areas
 Evacuation systems/routes
 First aid/ambulance service
 Safety events recorded/investigation
 Welfare of personnel and others
 Protracted incident
 Crew rotation and reliefs
 Rest, feeding and hydration
 Toilet facilities
 Shelter
 Friends and relatives concerns
 Stress, initial support
 Medical aftercare or occupational health
referral
 Evacuation shelter – local authority
 Voluntary services support (Red Cross
etc.)
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Incident specific
8
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








9
User notes
Communications
Briefings and information exchange/
cascade:
o Between all FRS personnel at incident
o Between FRS and other agencies
Clear lines of communication established
and maintained:
o Between incident and Fire Control
o Between all FRS personnel at incident
o Between FRS and others agencies
Communication format appropriate
Tactical Mode changes/updates are
broadcast
Changes to the plan are shared
Changes in IC/command team are shared
Regular feedback/sit reps
Messages, standard messages, METHANE
Brief senior commanders and interested
parties remote from incident
Technical considerations addressed
Liaison with other agencies and interested parties
Consider and confirm:
Who:
 Emergency responders
 Medical teams
 Local authority officers
 Structural engineers
 Owners/occupiers or on-site knowledge
 Experts/specialists/site specialists
 Control rooms (railway, motorway,
shopping complexes)
 Utilities and other agencies
 Public
 FRS media department/public media
How:
 Formal – Gold, Silver, Bronze
 Regular recorded cross-agency meetings
 Media briefings
 Panel of advisers
 Informal – working alongside other
agencies
 Liaison with off-site advisers
 Inter-agency Liaison Officer
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Incident specific
User notes
Why:
 Sharing of safety information
 Common aims and unity of purpose
 Specific responsibilities confirmed
 Relevant information sharing
 Involve and maximise assistance
 Better informed decisions
 Address conflicting priorities of other
agencies
 Supports needs of other agencies
 Positive PR/accurate information
release/common media messages
 Warning/informing public
10
Closing stages and post incident considerations
 Scaling down operations
 Safeguarding issues
 Investigations







o FRS/criminal/regulatory
o Scene preservation
o Logging photos/video
o Witnesses
Community safety activity
Equipment issues
Economic considerations
o FRS cost recovery
o Owner/occupier loss/insurance
Incident recording
Debriefing and post incident welfare
Handover and site security
o Safety issues/brief
o Re-inspection organised
Other issues
o Potential fire safety breaches
o Firefighting PPE cleaning/re-supply
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CBRN(E) Event Initial Intervention
Part Four – Document References
1.
Relevant References
This incident type is potentially linked to the following other operational guidance documents:
Document Name
Link to Document
To be populated
2.



Technical References
Initial Operational Response to a CBRN Incident – JESIP (2013)
FRS Operational Guidance CBRN(E) (12/08/2009)
CLG New Dimension Programme - Tactical Guidance Document FRS
Response to CBRN Events (17/10/2008)
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