Hypocrisy and the Standing to Blame
Recently it has been argued that whether blame is appropriate or permissible depends not
only on whether the person to be blamed is blameworthy, but also on certain facts about the
person blaming.1 One way to state this claim is that the appropriateness or permissibility of
blame is sensitive to whether or not the person blaming has the standing to blame.2 Whether or
not a person R has the standing to blame another person S depends on what sort of relationship R
has with S and whether it would be hypocritical for R to blame S. In response, Macalester Bell
(2013) has raised objections to these conditions on the standing to blame.
In this paper we develop and defend the following claim: the fact that R’s blaming S for
something A would be hypocritical undermines R’s standing to blame S for A. Call this the
Nonhypocrisy Condition on standing. After explaining how we understand the nature of blame,
we give an account of what makes blame hypocritical and why hypocritical blame is morally
objectionable. In response to one of Bell’s central challenges, we offer an explanation of how the
fact that R’s blaming S would be hypocritical undermines R’s standing to blame S.
1. The Nature of Blame
While there are different accounts of blame, we hold the view that whenever an agent, R,
blames an agent, S, for some item, A, R has a certain kind of belief-attitude pair:
(i) a belief that S acted wrongly or badly in A-ing (or in failing to A) or a belief that A is morally bad.3
(ii) a negative morally reactive attitude towards S on the basis of A (e.g., resentment, indignation,
1
See Smith (2007), Scanlon (2008), and Wallace (2010).
It might be argued that the standing to blame is a necessary condition on the appropriateness or
permissibility of blame. This is not our position. Instead, we maintain that standing is a consideration on the
appropriateness (or permissibility) of blame, such that the fact that one person R lacks the standing to blame
S counts against the appropriateness (or permissibility) of R’s blaming S, though it doesn’t necessarily defeat
it.
3
The claims that we offer in the remainder of this paper are phrased in terms of actions. They should apply equally
well, mutatis mutandis, to omissions. We leave it open that A might be a non-voluntary item, such as a character trait,
an attitude, or a belief.
2
2
disapprobation, and, in cases of self-blame, guilt).
A negative morally reactive attitude is an attitude some agent has in response to the belief that
another has done wrong, has done something bad, or is morally bad in some way.4
Importantly, blame can be private or overt. While private blame involves merely
experiencing some negative reactive attitude toward S on the basis of one’s belief that S is
blameworthy, overt blame involves the manifestation of this attitude in one’s behavior.5 The
attitude may be manifested in a variety of ways, both verbally (e.g., reproach) and nonverbally
(e.g., shunning).6 Because private blame does not involve overt expression of blame, it does not
involve the blamer interacting with the blamed. But overt blame doesn’t always involve the
blamer interacting with the blamed either. Overt blame itself may be directed or nondirected.
Directed blame is a species of overt blame that is directed toward the object of blame (McKenna
2013: 121). Nondirected overt blame is overt blame that is not directed toward the object of
blame. For example, Joe may overtly blame President Obama for the Affordable Care Act by
expressing indignation to his friends at the bar. Joe’s blame is nondirected overt blame. In the
remainder of this paper, our discussion will generally focus on directed blame, though we often
omit this qualifier.
2. The Objectionable Nature of Hypocritical Blame
In order to explain why hypocritical blame is morally objectionable, we must assume
that:
(1) There is something morally objectionable about hypocritical blame.
4
For accounts of blame that differ from our own, see Scanlon (2008), Sher (2006), and Smith (2013). For accounts
of blame that are similar to our own, see Wallace (1994), McKenna (2012), and Bell (2013).
5
We use "merely" here to differentiate private blame and overt blame, as private blame is not overtly expressed but
rather privately experienced. We don't mean to take a stance on whether (i) and (ii) are jointly sufficient for blame.
6
For a nice survey of overt blaming responses, see Bennett (2002).
3
We must be clear, however, that this assumption does not on its own imply that hypocritical
blame undermines one’s standing or that hypocritical blame is inappropriate or impermissible.
We understand (1) as saying that the fact that an instance of blame is hypocritical is a moral
reason that counts against that instance of blame. Before we can offer arguments in favor of (1),
we must first be clear about what it means for blame to be hypocritical.
Suppose that Jack and Kelly are each responsible and blameworthy for cheating on the
LSAT. The fact that Jack is blameworthy for cheating at first suggests that his blaming Kelly for
cheating would be hypocritical, and thus morally objectionable. This might lead one to formulate
hypocritical blame as follows:
H1: R’s blaming S for A, where A is a violation of some type of moral norm, N, is hypocritical when
R is also blameworthy for violating N.7
H1, however, is too simple. Suppose that Jack feels remorse for cheating and blames himself for
what he has done. If Jack recognizes his own fault, blames himself for it, and resolves to change
his ways, then he has addressed his fault, and the charge of hypocrisy no longer has force. What
initially seemed objectionable about his blaming disappears. What makes R’s blame hypocritical
is not the mere fact that R is guilty of a similar fault, but also that R fails to address his own fault.
When R addresses his own fault, R demonstrates that he does not exempt himself from blame for
some norm violation while blaming others for that norm violation.
Instead of H1, then, we understand hypocritical blame as the following:
H2: R’s blaming S for A, where A is a violation of some type of moral norm, N, is hypocritical when
R is also blameworthy for violating N and R exempts himself, but not S, from blame with respect to
some violation of N.
7
We take it that Jack must violate the same moral norm as Kelly, though it is not required that Jack perform the
same wrong action or violate the norm in the same way. For instance, the fact that Jack is blameworthy for stealing
or lying does not bear on whether his blaming Kelly for cheating on the LSAT would be hypocritical. We do not
offer an account of what it takes to be the same type of norm, but instead work with fairly clear cases.
4
We claim that the fact that R’s blaming S for A would be hypocritical in this way makes R’s
blame morally objectionable.
Even if (1) is true, however, it does not follow that what is morally objectionable about
R’s hypocritically blaming S undermines R’s standing to blame S. Notice that there are other
morally objectionable features that an instance of blame may have that do not relate to the
blamer’s standing to blame. For example, the fact that an instance of blame would have terrible
consequences makes that instance of blame morally objectionable in some way; i.e., that this
instance of blame would have terrible consequences is a moral reason that counts against
blaming in this case. In contrast, however, the standing to blame essentially depends upon facts
about the would-be blamer.8
The nature of hypocritical blame as stated in H2 implies that:
(2) What is morally objectionable about hypocritical blame is rooted in facts about the blamer.
R. Jay Wallace aims to give an explanation of what is morally objectionable about hypocritical
blame in terms of (2). For Wallace, what is morally objectionable about hypocritical blame is
rooted in the attitudes that the blamer takes towards others but fails to take towards himself
(2010: 326). He states that we all have an interest in being protected from moral criticism and
blame, so that when one blames others for faults similar to those for which one is also
blameworthy one treats others’ interests as less important than one’s own. In so doing, one
violates the principle of the equality of persons that is fundamental to morality.
We agree with Wallace that (2) should be understood in terms of the blaming attitudes
that the blamer takes towards others but fails to take towards himself. When R is hypocritical,
R’s attitudinal structure is comprised of R’s having (or being disposed to have) blaming attitudes
8
Bell illustrates this point by stating some common responses that call into question the standing of the blamer, such
as “Who are you to judge?” and “Who do you think you are?” (2013: 264).
5
towards S for some violation of some moral norm N while failing to have (or lacking the
disposition to have) blaming attitudes towards himself for a violation of N. Call this structure R’s
differential attitudinal structure (DAS). R’s DAS is fundamental in understanding why
hypocritical blame is morally objectionable.
We also agree that the way to understand what is morally objectionable about these
attitudes fundamentally concerns the equality of persons. One minor criticism of Wallace’s
explanation, though, is that it seems limited to certain cases of overt blame--namely, cases in
which the blamed is impacted by the blame in some way. We do have interest in being protected
from this sort of overt blame. However, as Wallace himself says, even private hypocritical blame
is morally objectionable (324). An explanation of why hypocritical blame is morally
objectionable in both cases of private and overt blame, then, must be grounded in something
more fundamental than our shared interests in protecting ourselves from overt moral criticism.9
To understand this more fundamental explanation, notice that what makes hypocritical
blame objectionable when it is overt or private seems to be that it is an instance of differential
treatment. The hypocrite’s DAS with respect to blame for violations of some norm N is unfair;
this hypocritical blame contravenes the impartiality of persons that is fundamental to morality. It
is unfair for a child to take up attitudes of bitterness or resentment toward his parents when they
justly discipline him. It is also unfair for a child to fail to have attitudes of gratitude or
appreciation to his parents for their love and sacrifice. And having certain attitudes towards one
person but not another can also be unfair. If Laura’s parents are both equally praiseworthy for
raising her, yet she has gratitude towards her mother but not her father, then Laura is being unfair
9
Wallace may think that his explanation can account for what is morally objectionable about private blame as well,
since (he might argue) we have an interest in protecting ourselves from both overt and private forms of blame.
Though this is not entirely implausible, we believe that a more satisfying explanation can be given for why
hypocritical blame is objectionable even when unexpressed.
6
in her attitudes. And she’s not being unfair only because she’s not praising her father when he
deserves it (although this may, on its own, be unfair). There is also unfairness that stems from
the fact that Laura praises her mother in conjunction with the fact that she fails to praise her
father. This kind of unfairness is a matter of the DAS that Laura holds with respect to her mother
and father. This kind of unfairness can also obtain in cases of blame. If two sons are equally
blameworthy for some fault, but a mother scolds the one and not the other, then she is being
unfair. The DAS that she has conveys that she cares for one more than the other.
Now we can see how it would be unfair for one to hold certain blaming attitudes (or to
take up overt blaming responses) towards someone else for A-ing without doing so to oneself
even though one is also blameworthy for A-ing. One’s DAS is unfair, and this is not only
because one doesn’t blame oneself. It's because one blames the other person and not oneself.
Here one is making an exception of oneself, and, assuming all else is equal, the impartiality of
morality does not warrant such an exception.
3. Answering Bell’s Challenge: How Hypocrisy Undermines Standing
Perhaps Bell would accept both (1) and (2). Since she admits that “[h]ypocrisy is a moral
fault,” (275) she might be willing to agree that there is something objectionable about
hypocritical blame and that what is objectionable about hypocritical blame is rooted in facts
about the blamer. But Bell might insist that (1) and (2) are not sufficient to establish that
hypocrisy undermines a blamer’s moral standing. After all, hypocritical blame isn’t special in
being morally objectionable and being rooted in facts about the blamer:
[P]eople may, and frequently do, evince a wide variety of moral faults through their blame: they can
show meanness, pettiness, stinginess, arrogance, and so on. But while people may manifest hypocrisy
and other faults in their critical interventions, there is no reason to conclude that these faults always
undermine a person’s standing to blame. (Bell 2013: 275)
7
If (1) and (2) were sufficient to establish that a blamer’s standing was undermined, then not only
would the hypocritical blamer lack standing, but also the mean blamer, the arrogant blamer, etc.
Yet we do not think that the arrogant or mean blamer lack the standing to blame. Bell’s challenge
for those who accept the Nonhypocrisy Condition is to establish some deeper connection
between hypocritical blame and standing. In doing so, we must explain in what way hypocritical
blame is different from other sorts of morally objectionable blame, such as arrogant or petty
blame.
Bell’s challenge is a strong one. Establishing that hypocrisy is morally objectionable does
not yet show that a hypocrite lacks the standing to blame. Wallace claims that “[h]ypocrites lack
the standing to blame...insofar as their own behavior makes it morally objectionable for them to
adopt the stance of blame” (2010: 320). Although Wallace goes into much detail explaining what
it is that is distinctively morally objectionable about hypocritical blame, it is not clear whether he
has thereby explained how (1) and (2) make it so that hypocrisy undermines standing, especially
given Bell’s challenge. We will try to answer Bell’s challenge by showing precisely why
hypocrisy undermines standing.
In virtue of the equality of persons qua moral agents, each person has certain defeasible
rights, among them the right to expect certain things of other moral agents (e.g., the expectation
to not be unjustly harmed by others) and the right to blame others for violations of moral
expectations and obligations. We can understand R’s moral standing to blame S for A in terms of
R’s having a certain right to blame S for A. Morality is impartial and applies to everyone equally.
When R hypocritically blames S for A, where A is a violation of some norm N, R treats himself
differently from S with respect to blaming for violations of N. This differential treatment is an
implicit rejection of the impartiality of morality with respect to blame for violations of N. Moral
8
impartiality requires consistency, not only with respect to the application of moral norms, but
also with respect to blame for violations of moral norms.10 Since moral norms govern both our
moral expectations of others and our blaming practices, when the hypocrite blames another
person for violating N but does not blame himself for violating N, he is being inconsistent with
respect to the application of blaming for violations of N. It follows from this that he is failing to
be morally impartial with respect to blaming for violations of N. But, the impartiality of morality
is partly constitutive of the equality of persons, and it’s the equal standing of persons that gives
each of us defeasible rights to blame for moral violations. So, in rejecting the impartiality of
morality with respect to blaming for violations of N, one implicitly rejects the equality of persons
that gives one the right to blame another person for violations of N in the first place. Without the
equality of persons to ground R’s right to blame S for A (when A is a violation of N), R lacks the
standing to blame S for A. Thus the fact that R’s blaming S for A would be hypocritical
undermines R’s standing to blame S for A.
First, notice that this explanation of how hypocritical blame undermines standing also
helps elucidate why hypocritical blame is morally objectionable: hypocritical blame contravenes
the impartiality of persons, thereby undermining that which grounds one’s right to blame.
Further, this explanation does not have the result that the mean, petty, or arrogant blamer would
also lack the standing to blame. Mean, petty or arrogant blame as such, for example, needn’t
involve a rejection of the equality of persons with respect to blame for violations of some norm
N. The arrogant blamer, of course, feels morally superior to others in some way. And, although
hypocrisy and arrogance often go hand-in-hand, they are distinct moral faults. When arrogant
10
Of course, this consistency doesn’t simply require that we blame all and only those who violate some norm N,
since there are other considerations that are relevant here (e.g., some may have an excuse for their violation of N, in
which case they are blameless for their violation). It is more accurate to say, then, that consistency requires that we
treat moral agents the same, all else being equal.
9
blame is not also hypocritical, it needn't involve inconsistency with respect to blame for
violations of N. That is, the arrogant blamer needn't have attitudes or behave in such a way that
she makes an exception of herself with respect to blame for violations of N, and this is what
makes it so that hypocrisy undermines standing to blame (more precisely, it is the fact that R's
blaming S would be hypocritical that undermines R's standing to blame S).
We have offered an answer to Bell’s challenge. On one hand, Bell is right to press
advocates of the Nonhypocrisy Condition to say more about how hypocrisy is connected to
standing. On the other, Bell’s motivation for this challenge seems to reflect a fundamental
mistake. After she poses the challenge to bridge hypocrisy and standing, Bell justifies the
challenge:
But while people may manifest hypocrisy and other faults in their critical interventions, there is no
reason to conclude that these faults always undermine a person’s standing to blame. As we have seen,
blame has multiple aims and modes of value. The educational or motivational value of blame is not
undermined by the blamer’s hypocrisy; we can learn from the morally corrupt just as we can learn
from the morally pure. (2013: 275)
Bell’s reasoning here seems to be that hypocrisy doesn’t always undermine one’s standing to
blame since even hypocritical blame may achieve one or more of the aims of blaming and thus
have good consequences. Because the consequences of blame concern blame’s value, however,
the problem with Bell’s reasoning is that it confuses the value of blaming with the standing to
blame. Blame may achieve certain aims and have valuable consequences, and when it does, this
fact counts as a reason in favor of blaming. However, one’s standing to blame does not concern
the consequences or possible consequences of one’s blaming.11 The consequences of blame are
altogether irrelevant to whether one has standing to blame, as the former concerns value, while
11
This understanding of blame is not a mere stipulation on our part. Those who defend standing do so without
appeal to the consequences of blaming (Wallace [2010], Smith [2007: 478-80], Scanlon [2008]). Bell takes herself
to be attacking those who defend that there are conditions on the standing to blame. If she frames standing
differently than the intended targets of her criticism, then she is attacking a straw man.
10
the latter concerns rights and authority. So the fact that an instance of blame is valuable does not
prevent hypocrisy from undermining one’s standing to blame.
Consequently, while Bell is warranted in challenging us for a connection between
hypocritical blame and undermined standing, she is not warranted in translating a defense of the
Nonhypocrisy Condition into talk of value. The value of blame, which may be derived in part
from the consequences of blame, is distinct from having the right or authority to blame, which
concerns the standing to blame. Insofar as Bell’s rejection of the Nonhypocrisy Condition relies
on claims that hypocritical blame might still have value for the blamer or for society, this
rejection misses the mark regarding hypocritical blame and undermined standing.
Conclusion
We have offered an account of what hypocritical blame is and why it is morally
objectionable. In addition, our account allows us to respond to Bell’s challenge to explain how
the fact that R’s blaming S would be hypocritical undermines R’s standing to blame S.
Furthermore, this explanation does not imply that certain other types of morally objectionable
blame also undermine standing. Lastly, we have clarified that the standing to blame is not a
matter of value, but primarily a matter of rights and authority. In this way, the fact that R’s
blaming S for A would be hypocritical undermines R’s standing to blame S for A.
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McKenna, M. 2012. Conversation and Responsibility. New York: Oxford University Press.
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11
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Sher, G. 2006. In Praise of Blame. New York: Oxford University Press.
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