CHAPTER 5 SUMMARY
How can communities participate and collaborate in developing
ideas for change and making decisions about them?
What do we mean by “participate”?
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At a basic level, participation might only mean being told about proposed changes
and being consulted about them, but with no guarantee that any concerns will be
acted on.
At a more intense level, a community might be able to participate actively in decisionmaking or even initiate and control change. Some examples of public participation
methods are discussed below.
How can participation be made worthwhile and effective?
Advocates suggest that participation builds public confidence that good decisions are being
made and so strengthens democracy:
 Through collaboration between the community and government, e.g. in solving
problems that arise from rapid resources development or deciding where limited
funding can best be spent;
 By decentralising decision-making to give those “on the ground” more say in how
reasonable and effective a decision has been and how it might be improved.
Others caution that it won’t work unless good information is provided on which a decision is
to be based and the public has the skills to consider the problems which might require
specialist economic, engineering, environmental or social impact analysis. Furthermore, it
must be considered whether the participation will improve the outcome sufficiently to justify
the delay and cost.
Collaborative governance
Whilst governments frequently talk about better collaboration and acknowledge its value,
they do not often do it well.
EXAMPLE: The Engaged Government Project in Central Queensland
In the context of tension between agricultural land use and mining development, five case
studies were conducted. The study found that government departments and agencies
involved were taking different approaches to the same set of issues, producing confusion
and creating a possible “blind spot”. Concerns also arose from the study that governments
listened to mining companies rather than local communities.
The CALFED project in California, discussed in chapter 5.3 of the full report, sets out some
of the possibilities and limitations of collaborative governance.
Forms of public participation - specific issues, approaches, examples and
questions
Participatory governance can be distinguished from collaborative governance, as it involves
citizens playing an active role in government decision-making. The following are various
participatory governance methods, discussed throughout chapter 5.4 of the full report.
Joint decision-making
EXAMPLE: Habitat Conservation Plans (HCP) in the USA
In the USA many animals are protected by an Endangered Species Act. A group wishing to
develop part of a habitat in which an endangered species lives may set up a steering
committee comprising of not just its own project managers but also representatives from e.g.
government, landowners, environmentalists and relevant community groups. Reports on
some HCPs claim they are very successful because they set out agreed goals, measures for
achieving them and mechanisms for monitoring outcomes.
Involving citizens in budgeting and use of public funds
Governments in some countries, including Australia, have experimented with participatory
budgeting.
EXAMPLE: The citizen’s panel for the City of Canada Bay (in Sydney, NSW)
In Western Sydney, the Council of the City of Canada Bay formed a citizen’s panel made up
of 30 people selected from a random sample of residents to reflect the age and gender
profile of the community. It met five times (April–August 2012) to assess and make
recommendations about the services and preferred funding sources for services to be
provided by the Council for the next five years to 2017.
Citizen juries and boards
Citizen juries or boards bring together a representative sample of citizens with a facilitator, to
deliberate on complex policy issues and either reach a decision or devise a set of
recommendations.
Possible advantages are said to be (1) reaching a wider cross-section of the public; (2)
enabling the government to explain its position and make sure its argument is understood;
and (3) the likelihood that the decisions or recommendations will gain greater acceptance
with the public if they are made by fellow citizens.
Possible problems are said to be (1) where decisions have to be based on highly technical
analysis; (2) where a decision may affect one sector of the community (possibly not
represented or poorly represented on the jury) more than others; and (3) the reluctance of
governments to allow more than advisory power to such a group (after all, governments are
supposed to be democratically elected groups of citizens themselves).
EXAMPLE: the Citizens Jury on Dakota County’s Comprehensive Land Use Plan (1997)
This jury was convened at the request of the local government to determine public opinion
about important land use planning decisions facing the region. Though the local government
was not obliged to implement the jury’s recommendations, the final Land Use Plan reflected
the expectations of the participants and included several of the jury’s recommendations.
Regulatory negotiation
Regulatory negotiation is a consensus building process in which stakeholders in an issue
work together with the government to develop policies or regulations and a method for
resolving their disputes by consultation, mediation and negotiation rather than litigation.
Benefits are said to include: (1) opportunities for governments and other stakeholders to
debate policy and generate new ideas and options; and (2) greater willingness to cooperate
and accept the final decision.
Problems are said to include: (1) stakeholders representing interest groups rather than the
wider public and (2) the cost of bringing technical experts to the location and to smaller
interest groups with limited resources.
EXAMPLE: The USA Environmental Protection Agency Regulatory Negotiation Project.
This project aimed to reach a consensus on seven long-running disputes and after twenty
years, five had been successfully concluded. One involved water management issues in the
Clark Fork River Basin in Montana where, after decades of conflict, miners, ranchers,
municipal officials and environmentalists were able to come together to resolve their dispute.
Subsidiarity: devolving decision-making powers
The principle of subsidiarity originated in the European Union and is the idea that decisions
should be made at the lowest possible level unless it is necessary for the decision to be
made at a higher level. Proponents claim that subsidiarity builds an expectation amongst
citizens that political decisions will be made as close to them as possible, and motivate them
to participate actively, particularly in considering the social and environmental impact of
policies and projects on their community.
EXAMPLES: Legislation in Bulgaria; the Russian Constitution
In Russia and Bulgaria, local authorities demanded greater control over decision-making
processes relating to the proposed construction of oil pipelines and other large infrastructure
projects. The Russian constitution specifically empowers local governments to implement
local budgets and introduce local taxes, meaning that they are less dependent on national
funds than Bulgarian local governments.
However, critics fear the “not in my backyard” reaction: citizens may recognise the
necessary economic or social benefits of a national project, but don’t want it to affect them
directly. A larger criticism is that devolving power can be counterproductive if expectations
are raised unrealistically, as occurred in Mali and Uganda where, in return for the democratic
election of local governments, greater management rights were supposedly granted but
were subsequently allowed only under restrictive conditions.
National governments may therefore be reluctant to allow local communities to have
controlling or veto power, but may recognise the importance of cooperation between
different levels of government. For example, environmental problems may require national
intervention but different strategies in specific areas, since soil, vegetation, groundwater
hydrology, atmospheric conditions and other factors will vary from place to place.
EXAMPLE: The Australian Federal Government “Regional Delivery” Model
The Federal Government has attempted to decentralise responsibility for allocating funds for
natural resource management in regional and remote areas. Critics claim that the large size
of many shires make workable community-based governance difficult. Further, since
Australia’s constitution does not recognise local government, federal authorities face
significant challenges in delegating decision-making power to cities and shires.
Negotiation and dispute resolution mechanisms
Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) is a mechanism for negotiating and resolving disputes
once an issue has already arisen. While this study is primarily focused on mechanisms for
facilitating citizen involvement prior to a dispute arising, ADR is an important mechanism for
resolving land use conflicts.
EXAMPLE: The Conondale Range Rezoning Dispute
ADR was utilised when the Queensland government pledged to double the area of national
park in Queensland. A Zoning Working Group was convened over a six month period with
various stakeholders. The participants stated that the process allowed everyone to maintain
focus and draw together ideas for clarification and testing. After the mediation process, the
parties to the dispute noted that they had an improved relationship and could communicate
better to avoid future conflict.
Another mechanism is to appoint a Community Advisory Committee (CAC) of people with a
wide range of expertise and networks regarding a particular matter, to advise the
government on an issue from the community viewpoint. As CACs advise rather than make
decisions they have been described as illusory participation, however they do have the
ability to influence outcomes through the advice given.
EXAMPLE: California’s Tanner Act
This Act provides for decisions to be made about the location of toxic waste facilities through
local assessment committees who give input into the location decisions. Committees
comprise of seven individuals, chosen by a local agency, to reflect the makeup of the
proposed community that will be affected by the proposed toxic waste site: three community
representatives, two representatives of public interest groups including environmental
interest groups, and two representatives of business or industry that is affected by the site.
The Tanner Act does not have a consistent record of effectiveness, despite the community
involvement in location decisions. Its limited successes appear to be due to the technical
expertise and support from elected officials, but also because the community felt that its
representatives had a voice and influence in the decision-making process.
An important Queensland example of successful negotiation and dispute resolution,
although it did not involve a formal CAC, is what is known as the Delbessie Agreement.
EXAMPLE: the Delbessie Agreement (the State Rural Leasehold Land Strategy) between
the Queensland Government, AgForce Queensland and the Australian Rainforest
Conservation Society.
This is a cooperative land management system through which the Queensland government
collaborates with rural leaseholders. The system established by the Agreement allows
landholders to engage actively through the provision of resources to assist with land
management planning and through the condition assessment process and the negotiation of
land management agreements (LMAs). LMAs are required for all new and renewed leases
over rural leasehold land and are negotiated between the rural leaseholder and the relevant
Government department based on the outcome of an assessment of the condition of the
land. LMAs must establish agreed monitoring and reporting programs, processes to verify
the performance of the landholder and dispute resolution and review processes. By 2011
fifty LMAs had been approved across Queensland. However, one major criticism is the
absence of Indigenous representatives. It is argued that this absence is reflected in the
LMAs which appear to ignore or underestimate the legal effect of native title interests on the
ability to achieve long term leases.
Citations and sources for the above can be found in the full paper, pages 57 - 71.