FEMALE SUBMISSION, RELATIONAL AUTONOMY, AND BELONGING
Ph.D. Thesis – J. Zaslow; McMaster University - Philosophy
THE FEMINIST FEMALE SLAVE:
FEMALE SUBMISSION, RELATIONAL AUTONOMY, AND BELONGING
By JOANNA ZASLOW, B.A. [H], M.A.
A Thesis Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy
McMaster University, Copyright © Joanna Zaslow, July 2015
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Ph.D. Thesis – J. Zaslow; McMaster University - Philosophy
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (2015) (Philosophy)
McMaster University
Hamilton, Ontario
TITLE: The Feminist Female Slave: Female Submission, Relational Autonomy, and
Belonging
Author: Joanna Zaslow B.A. [H] (Carleton University), M.A. (McMaster University)
SUPERVISOR: Dr. Elisabeth Gedge
NUMBER OF PAGES: vi, 163
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Abstract
This project introduces the case of the Feminist Female Slave [FFS], a female submissive
in a BDSM relationship with a male Master. This case is used in order to strengthen
discourse in three main areas: feminist relational autonomy, BDSM theory, and feminist
community politics. I argue that the FFS offers a case in which feminist autonomy
theorists can serve to grow and develop their own approaches in a way that is inclusive of
the diversity of women’s sexual expression, as she challenges our narrow notions of
female subservience and asks us to rethink what it means to express an autonomous
women’s sexuality. In BDSM theory she asks us to reflect upon our reliance upon
superficial notions of consent and the lack of space for a critical dialogue, and finally, in
feminist politics she asks us to consider what it means to belong to feminist communities,
or what it means to feel as if one can lay claim to a feminist identity. Each of these
considerations is brought to light in this project because of the interesting balance that the
FFS’s relationship holds between her feminist identity, sexual politics, and sexual and
romantic practices.
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Acknowledgements
To my supervisor, Elisabeth Gedge: thank you for your unconditional support and
encouragement. You have made me a stronger, more confident academic, and never
sought to limit my academic path. You have supported this unconventional project from
day one, and I always felt that you were in my corner, even when we disagreed. Your
amazing support is what every PhD student deserves and I am incredibly lucky and
honoured to have had the privilege of working with you.
To my readers, Stefan Sciaraffa and Amber Dean: thank you for always encouraging me
to think beyond my comfort zone, and for challenging me. Your support has made this
project far better than it would have been without either of you.
To my friends and family: To Jen for her always-upbeat and positive influence; To my
parents for always encouraging me to dream and shoot for the stars, and for loving me
even when I missed; To my sisters for reminding me how to have fun.
Most importantly, to my husband, Josh: thank you for being in my life and for letting me
be a part of yours. You mean the world to me.
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Ph.D. Thesis – J. Zaslow; McMaster University - Philosophy
Table of Contents
Introduction……………………………………………………………..Page 1
Chapter 1: “Autonomy and Submission”...……………………………..Page 12
Chapter 2: “The Feminist Female Slave”..…………………………...…Page 40
Chapter 3: “Feminist Relational Autonomy and Female Submission”…Page 69
Chapter 4: “Autonomy and Consent in BDSM Theory”……..…………Page 91
Chapter 5: “Autonomy, Belonging, and the Value of Feminism”...........Page 128
Conclusion……………………………...……………………………….Page 153
Bibliography……………………………....………………...…………..Page 159
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Thesis Introduction
“As long as you wear this collar, you are mine to command.
And until I remove it from your neck, I will consider you
my responsibility, my possession, my slave”
-Miss Abernathy, Erotic Slavehood
(10)
This project focuses on the relationship between autonomy and women’s sexual
freedoms, particularly in the case of female sexual submission. Relying on a hypothetical
case, I tell the story of a woman who takes on the role of a “slave” to her male “Master”
in a consensual, long-term, BDSM relationship, with uneven power dynamics. She is
expected to serve her Master, to be at his whims, to put him first in all points in her life.
She derives great pleasure from serving him, from meeting his sexual and emotional
needs before her own (if hers are met at all). What is important to note in this case (and
this case will be outlined with much greater detail in later chapters), is that not only is she
a Female Slave, but she is a Feminist Female Slave [FFS]. She identifies as a feminist,
and holds that her submissive relationship falls in line with her feminist ideals.
Through the use of this case, I aim to show that both our discussions of female
autonomy from a relational account, as well as our discussions of autonomy in BDSM
theory, have a blind spot in regards to the characteristics brought up by the FFS. What
does it mean for a woman to identify as a feminist while consciously taking a submissive
role to their male partner? Does her feminist identification affect our response to her
relationship? Does BDSM theory think any external influence can limit our expression of
autonomy? Does the dominant method of consent in BDSM theory apply well to
relationships like that of the FFS? Does the case of the FFS require us to reconsider our
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current approaches to female submission? In creating this project, I do not aim to
diminish the value or importance of feminist approaches to autonomy, like relational
autonomy, but I instead aim to encourage a more fruitful discussion of women’s
sexuality, one which expands with the growing diversity of women’s sexual lives and
which addresses and acknowledges the real influence of the social sphere in these same
sexual practices.
This project serves a double-purpose: to both defend and strengthen our
engagement with the feminist submissive. I aim to not only provide a defense for feminist
submissives against those who challenge the possibility of their autonomy, but also to
advance criticisms of the philosophical justifications they provide when defending their
relationships. The first part of this project serves to evaluate the way feminist
philosophers have responded to the relationship between autonomy and female
submission. I will show that the representation of female submission within these texts is
quite narrow, thus limiting the depth of our possible discourse. In order to correct this
limitation, I offer the case study of the FFS. This relationship requires the explicit and
continual use of the dominant/submissive power structure and is commonly found in the
BDSM (Bondage and Discipline, Dominance and Submission, Sadism and Masochism)
community1. The Master/slave relationship and the Feminist Female Slave found within it
provide an alternative discussion of female submission that counteracts the portrayal
1
It should be noted that while I refer to the overall population of participants and practices that fall under the umbrella
of BDSM as the “BDSM community”, I do not intend to present it as if this is one, single community in solidarity with
each other. There are many sub-communities and groups within the realm of BDSM, but for the purposes of clarity I
refer to it as a BDSM community.
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Ph.D. Thesis – J. Zaslow; McMaster University - Philosophy
found in contemporary feminist philosophical discussions of female submission and
autonomy.
In the second part of this project, I attempt to strengthen the philosophy that
serves the Feminist Female Slave in her BDSM community. I show that BDSM theory
offers an individualistic account of autonomy, which fails to take into consideration the
concerns raised by feminist philosophers in the first part in their discussion of female
submission. Although I argue that feminist philosophers fail to take into account the
breadth and diversity of the expression of female submission, the concerns that they raise
have not been adequately addressed by contemporary BDSM theories, and remain
valuable and necessary contributions. This means that not only do I offer a defense of a
feminist submissive, showing how her role can be autonomously chosen; I also provide a
way to strengthen her feminist and BDSM philosophy.
Feminist Accounts of Autonomy and Female Submission
Feminist discussions of autonomy and submission frequently make use of case
studies that invoke a traditional housewife, whose duty is to serve her husband and place
his needs before her own.2 These cases are common, whether feminist scholars seek to
defend her freedom to choose such a role, or to chastise her for falling prey to
misogynistic or harmful notions of femininity. Regardless of their conclusions, these
discussions represent submissive women narrowly, such that they all share common
characteristics. As a result, discussions of the relationship between female submission and
2
See Meyers (1987), Friedman (1983), Westlund (2003, 2009), and others
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autonomy have been restricted to examining a singular form of submission, thus limiting
our engagement with the diversity of women’s sexual lives and experiences.
The singular representation of the female submissive in feminist work on
autonomy is quite similar to the depiction of traditional housewives. In these discussions,
the female submissive is often presented as having: (i) some sort of religious affiliation,
(ii) a gendered ideology that all women take (or ought to take) the same subservient role
to their male partners, and a (iii) lack of feminist identification (or are anti-feminist)3. It
would be naïve for me to claim that these characteristics are present in all women who
take submissive roles in their relationships. Women’s expression of submission, as with
all relationships, takes a variety of forms, with different motivations, expressions, and
contexts. However, in spite of diversity in the expression of submission, the
representation of female submission in feminist philosophical discussions about female
submission is quite limited. Against this tendency, I will introduce the case of the
Feminist Female Slave into our discussions of autonomy and submission in order to go
beyond the limiting representation of submission as solely concerned with religious,
traditional housewives.
Although their representation of submission is homogenous, feminist scholars
have varied responses to female submission in general. Sexual and romantic relationships,
where women take a submissive role to more dominant male partners have at times been
characterized in some philosophical works as problematic, harmful, or even abusive.
Texts, including Thomas Hill’s “Servility and Self-Respect”, Sonya Charles’ “How
3
See Charles (2010), Hill, (1973), Meyers (1987), Christman (2009), Snyder-Hall (2008), Chambers
(2008), Westlund (2003).
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Should Feminist Theorists Respond to the Problem of Internalized Oppression?” and
Anita Superson’s “The Deferential Wife Revisited: Agency and Moral Responsibility,”
among others, allege that voluntarily subservient women may be lacking in self-respect,
are victims of social or individual coercion, or are misinformed about their value and
roles as women. It should be noted that even when authors defend the autonomy of
submissive women4, the question of whether submissive or subservient women could be
autonomous raises what I call the problem of female submission: due to the influence of
patriarchy or other sexist and misogynistic influences in women’s lives, the freedom for
women to choose to submit romantically and sexually to a male partner is often distrusted
or disbelieved.
It can be difficult for some scholars to imagine that women could truly desire to
take on such a role without harmful external influences. However, not all feminist
scholars hold this same concern. Authors including Diana Meyers and Andrea Westlund
have defended the female submissive in their work on autonomy. In the process of
establishing the case of the Feminist Female Slave, this project will bring to light the
diversity in response to female submission by feminist scholars. This means that even
though I hold that the representation of feminist submission is limited in these
discussions, the responses by these scholars still vary. I will show that even when
operating from within the same schools of thought, many scholars disagree as to whether
or not women can autonomously submit to their male partners. The problem of female
4
See: my discussion of Meyers and Westlund, in Chapters 2 and 4.
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Ph.D. Thesis – J. Zaslow; McMaster University - Philosophy
submission, then, raises the difficulty scholars have in providing a consistent or clear
response to female sexual submission.
The response by feminist philosophers who find female submission to be
inevitably coerced or influenced by harmful external forces is a troubling response for
submissives like the FFS. For those women who truly desire to be sexually submissive to
their partner, the fear of being labeled as a victim of a romantic or sexual partner is
distressing. This can be especially difficult for those who take a submissive BDSM role,
as even taking a BDSM role is difficult to share with others because it is so far outside
mainstream sexual relationships. Added to this concern is the fear by female submissives
that they will be viewed as the victim of coercion—that their autonomy has been
compromised. This perspective casts suspicion on a woman’s sexual expressions not
because of who she is, but because of the role she has chosen. In response to this problem,
I aim to indicate ways in which feminist discussions of autonomy can be strengthened
through a more thorough engagement with female submission. I argue that examining
cases including the Feminist Female Slave allows for the possibility that women could
legitimately choose to enter into romantic and sexual relationships where they take a
submissive role while their male partner takes a more dominant role. The FFS will assist
in my aim to move away from more traditional representations of submissive women in
order to provide a more nuanced, diverse representation of women who choose to submit.
Primarily, this movement towards a more diverse understanding of female submission
will be accomplished through an examination of feminist relational autonomy theorists,
and their response to the relationship between female submission and autonomy.
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Ph.D. Thesis – J. Zaslow; McMaster University - Philosophy
BDSM Theory and Autonomy
While my primary purpose in this project is to defend a more nuanced
engagement with female submission, I will simultaneously argue for a more nuanced
account of autonomy within BDSM theory. This more nuanced understanding of
autonomy is one that the FFS can use to justify her position as a slave, and I argue that it
can strengthen the use of autonomy within BDSM communities by accounting for the
feminist considerations I outline in Part 1. The Feminist Female Slave is a member of a
primarily heterosexual BDSM community and identifies with a feminist perspective that
is consistent with the liberal thought that is present in BDSM theory. From this theoretical
approach, she defends her role as a slave as one that is consistent with her feminist
identification, claiming that she made the decision to become a slave and that her choice
was a free one. Her reliance on consent, choice, and free sexual expression is consistent
with a broader BDSM approach to sexuality, as well as a liberal approach to sexuality. In
this project I argue that her defense of her autonomy (and from this, the BDSM
community’s defense of sexual autonomy) ought to incorporate greater discussions of the
influence of the social sphere upon our sexual expression, as well as other external
influences, in order to ensure that the requirement for autonomy involves more than a
mere verbal expression of consent. I will show that these considerations are similar to the
feminist accounts of relational autonomy found in Part 1, and will add a much more
nuanced understanding of sexual autonomy than what is currently used by the BDSM
community and the FFS.
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In this project I aim to provide a multi-pronged approach to the discussion on the
relationship between female submission and autonomy. Not only do I aim to problematize
the limited representation of female submission by feminist philosophers, but also to
scrutinize the incomplete philosophy used by BDSM theorists to defend relationships like
that of the FFS. The goal of both arguments is positive: to expand feminist discourse in
order to adequately address the real lives and sexual expressions of female submissives,
and to provide a more philosophically rigorous account of autonomy for BDSM
communities and theories.
Thesis Structure:
In this project I draw upon a diverse body of scholarship in order to address the
often-difficult relationship between autonomy, submission, BDSM, and the influence of
the social sphere. I aim to bring together a variety of approaches to autonomy in order to
show what can be improved for establishing a stronger, more realistic representation of
and engagement with women’s diverse sexual expressions. The goals of this project are
not to discredit relational autonomy, or dismiss the liberal influences of autonomy found
in the BDSM community, but rather to show how these accounts of autonomy can be
strengthened, can learn from each other, and can learn from the different ways in which
women’s sexuality is expressed. It is important for feminist and BDSM communities to
reflect upon the practices they endorse and require, in order to ensure that they are
theoretically robust and do not create unintended harms. As well, through this project, I
aim to establish the value for the FFS to lay a claim to the feminist identity, or for her to
have a sense of belonging in the feminist community.
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Chapter 1 asks whether autonomous submission is possible, particularly given the
influence of harmful social forces on one’s autonomy. Using Natalie Stoljar’s account of
the Feminist Intuition, I argue that harmful norms of femininity must be taken into
account when evaluating the autonomy of submissive women. I will show that relational
approaches to autonomy are much better suited to the reality of women’s lives than
traditional accounts, especially for evaluating the case of the Feminist Female Slave.
Chapter 2 introduces the case of the Feminist Female Slave and provides greater
context to who she is and the structure of her relationship. I will show that the FFS is an
individual who submits to a male Master, identifies as his Slave, and nonetheless holds
that she is an active feminist. While I do not endorse this as a relationship structure that is
suitable for everyone, or claim that this is a relationship structure that all feminists will
endorse, I show within this project that the FFS’s feminist commitments are nonetheless
legitimate and worth serious consideration. In particular, the FFS’s self-understanding of
her sexual life comes from the tradition of liberal feminism5 prevalent in some BDSM
communities.
Chapter 3 presents the ways in which relational autonomy theorists have
previously responded to cases of female submission. I argue that the construction of the
submissive woman in feminist relational autonomy overlooks the crucial case of the FFS.
As a result, the way feminist relational autonomy theorists engage with the submissive
woman has become homogenized. This chapter will show how the case of the FFS
It should be noted that the FFS and others like her refer to their feminism as “sex-positive”, but this is not
interchangeable with the more predominant version of sex-positive feminism found in contemporary
feminist communities. I will therefore refer to it as a liberal sexual feminism because of its focus on
individual freedom, consent, and a diversity of sexual expression.
5
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expands and challenges our understanding of the submissive woman by showing how the
characteristics that she possesses (namely, as a feminist submissive who does not hold
universal or essentialised views regarding her sexual role) conflict with or are in
opposition to the general representation of female submission by relational autonomy
theorists. This chapter, then, brings the work of relational autonomy theorists together
with the case of the Feminist Female Slave to show the gaps in our current approaches to
female submission and to show the way the case of the FFS contributes to our
conversations in this area.
Chapter 4 takes a step away from evaluating the use of autonomy in feminist
circles, and evaluates the use of autonomy and consent in BDSM communities. The
purpose of this chapter is to show that even within the framework used by the FFS and
other female slaves to justify their relationship and their autonomous choice to enter into
it, theoretical problems exist. These problems are represented in the way that the primary
community mantra, “Safe, Sane, Consensual” (SSC), fails to clearly articulate what it
means to consent, does not allow room for a critical dialogue to take place surrounding
practices that have been declared consensual, and employs a structure for consent that is
based on an immediate, episodic account of autonomy which is not truly applicable to the
relationship structure used by the Feminist Female Slave. I also reintroduce Andrea
Westlund’s dialogical account of autonomy in order to show how some of the
components in her account can help to make the use of SSC more realistic and more
fitting to autonomy and consent in BDSM.
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Chapter 5 begins by asking a question that this project began with: is the Feminist
Female Slave autonomous? It also aims to determine why it is so important to establish
the FFS as autonomous, not only to her, but to other women who may benefit from an
increased diversity of possible sexual and romantic relationships for women. Using the
work of Joel Anderson and Judith Butler, I argue that even if the FFS meets the criteria
set out by relational autonomy theorists for autonomy, she nonetheless fails to be
considered an autonomous person by feminist theorists and communities, which restricts
her relationships with and her sense of belonging to feminist communities. This exclusion
has an impact on her relationship with other feminists, as well as her visibility within
these communities. This means that merely meeting the conditions for autonomy is not
enough for the FFS and her relationship to be welcomed by other feminists and that this
has an effect on the expression of her autonomy. Feminist theorists and communities must
begin to expand their understanding of female submission in order to better reflect the
expression of women’s sexuality (even when submissive).
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Chapter 1: Autonomy and Submission
On a basic level, the question of autonomy is straightforward. Being autonomous
generally requires that an individual possess the capabilities to make decisions over their
own actions, develop their own life goals, and lead a life that is of their own volition.
Diana Meyers expands upon this description when she claims that a moral agent is
someone “who is capable of choosing and acting in accordance with judgments about
what is right, wrong, good, bad, worthy, or unworthy. Such individuals are thought to be
free and hence responsible for what they do” (1998, 372). As she notes, questions of
agency invoke discussions of responsibility, particularly when agents make poor
decisions or commit wrong actions.
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the philosophical problem that arises
by the Feminist Female Slave’s [FFS] declaration that she has autonomously chosen her
submissive role. Such a declaration is seen as problematic by some philosophers due to
the conscious submissive role that she takes in her relationship to her male partner6, also
known as her Master. The roles for the FFS and her Master are designated as continuous,
on-going, and have very rigid responsibilities and expressions for each partner7. While I
will go into greater detail in the next chapter about the nature and daily activities of a M/s
relationship, what is important to note at this time is that the Feminist Female Slave is in a
committed romantic and sexual relationship in which she has chosen to take a submissive
6
It should be noted that while women do participate as slaves in Master/slave relationships, the case of the
Feminist Female Slave is hypothetical, and will be more fully elaborated in chapter 2.
7
It should be noted that Master/slave relationships are not restricted to pairings with a male dominant and
female submissive. These relationships can have female Masters (or Mistresses) and male slaves, and can
be same-sex or opposite-sex. For the purpose of this project, I focus solely on the Male/female Master/slave
[M/f M/s] pairing.
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role to her male partner, to such an extent that she views herself as the property of her
partner. It should be noted as well that in this case, the FFS is imagined to be a while
woman8.
To claim to have autonomously chosen a role where one submits so fully to
another person raises a potential tension between what it means to possess autonomy and
to what extent one can follow the will of another while still maintaining that autonomy.
While I argue that the case of the FFS raises new areas of discussion for the problem of
female submission and autonomy, the debate over the relationship between autonomy and
subservience is not new for philosophy. This chapter explores some of the different
approaches that philosophers have traditionally taken in this area, and will also explore
what it means for women to submit autonomously to male partners, and whether it is even
possible to do so given the influence of harmful social conditions that naturalize women
as inferior to men. Throughout this project I refer to this tension as the problem of
autonomous submission.
In this chapter I aim to show that the traditional accounts of autonomy fail to
account for some of the more complex problems that arise from the case of the Feminist
Female Slave and will show that feminist relational approaches to autonomy offer the
most suitable response when evaluating whether the FFS’ decision to become a slave can
be made autonomously notwithstanding the social considerations surrounding such a
decision. I begin this chapter by outlining the problem of oppressive socialization and
how it can have an impact on one’s decision-making capabilities. I do this by introducing
8
It is important to highlight the whiteness of the FFS, as the issue of race, particularly in the BDSM
community, is important. Discussions of race and racialization would complexify this discussion in very
significant ways, but an adequate discussion of it is beyond the scope of this thesis.
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Natalie Stoljar’s concept of the Feminist Intuition to highlight the difficult relationship
between gender, socialization, and autonomy. Next, I introduce various accounts of
autonomy that address the problem of autonomy and submission or obedience. I will
explore accounts of autonomy such as those developed by Thomas Hill Jr, RP Wolff and
Claire Chambers, who provide traditional philosophical responses to the problem of
maintaining autonomy while giving oneself to another. I will show that these accounts fail
to fully consider the problem of pernicious or oppressive socialization, and thus their
responses to the concerns raised by Stoljar are lacking. In contrast, I will show that the
work of Diana Meyers, Marina Oshana, and Sonya Charles explicitly incorporate this
problem into their work on autonomy. This group, alongside other relational autonomy
theorists, provides accounts better capable of responding to these problems.
It should be noted that while I claim that relational autonomy provides the most
appropriate approach to this case, this does not necessarily mean that all relational
accounts of autonomy hold that women can autonomously submit to their male partners.
In fact, several of them may hold that it is not possible to choose to do so autonomously,
or that it could only be done under very rigid conditions. But, it is their explicit
consideration of the social sphere in the analysis of autonomy that is of great importance
to the evaluation of the case of the Feminist Female Slave, and for that reason I argue that
a relational feminist approach is a more appropriate and suitable approach to her case.
The Feminist Intuition:
When we ask whether an action was chosen autonomously, we aim to determine
whether that action was chosen freely—meaning, was this decision free from coercion,
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Ph.D. Thesis – J. Zaslow; McMaster University - Philosophy
force, or some other external influence? To ask whether the man who robbed another did
so autonomously may be straightforward, but when we ask whether his choice was free
when the safety of his family was threatened if he failed to commit this robbery, we add
another layer to our considerations of autonomous choice and action. While this example
shows a very explicit case of coercion or force, when we ask whether someone made an
autonomous choice we also have to ask how we account for subtle, but ever-present
forms of socialization that can alter our behavior or decision-making capabilities.
The Feminist Intuition aims to raise awareness of the problem of socialization and
its effects on women’s autonomy by asking us to consider the role that oppressive
socialization plays in our decision-making processes. At the heart of the Feminist
Intuition is the question: what does it mean if women make decisions that reflect
problematic or harmful notions of womanhood or femininity? For Natalie Stoljar this
dilemma became apparent in her analysis of Kristin Luker’s work on young, pregnant
women in California in the 1970s. Luker interviewed a select group of women in order to
determine why “women who can presumably use freely available methods of
contraception end up having unwanted pregnancies which result in induced abortions”
(Luker in Stoljar, 96). Stoljar notes that the women interviewed were not ignorant of
contraceptives, as many had previously used them. Nonetheless, she found that many of
them had failed to use their contraceptives properly or failed to use them at all before
becoming pregnant (96).
While Stoljar notes that Luker considers her subjects to be rational, Stoljar claims
that they are nonetheless non-autonomous. Luker’s subjects, she claims, rely on
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Ph.D. Thesis – J. Zaslow; McMaster University - Philosophy
oppressive norms of femininity in their decision-making processes, because of which
their decisions should be considered non-autonomous. These oppressive norms became
clear through the interviews, in which the women often justified their failure to use birth
control through claims that pregnancy enhanced their worthiness as a woman, that women
ought not to initiate or plan sex, and that women are only worthwhile partners for
marriage if they can bear children, amongst others (99). For Stoljar, the oppressive
assumptions found in these justifications for misusing or failing to use birth control are at
the heart of the feminist intuition: these norms are not only false, but also reinforce
women’s oppression. Uncritical acceptance of these norms results in an inability for
Luker’s subjects to see that their perspectives on femininity, women’s sexuality, and
reproduction are false. Stoljar claims that this “lack of normative competence” (109) is a
result of the way in which the subjects have been socialized. Luker’s subjects’ inability to
realize that the norms they hold about womanhood, sexuality, and pregnancy are harmful,
and their inability to see the way these norms influence their actions, puts into question
whether their decisions were truly made autonomously.
While Stoljar uses Luker’s subjects as an example of women who fail to satisfy
the conditions for the Feminist Intuition, I think another example could be made, namely
that of women who attend Purity Balls. I argue that women’s participation in such events
fails to satisfy the same conditions for the Feminist Intuition. Purity Balls are formal
dance events attended by fathers and their daughters, in which daughters publicly pledge
their chastity to their fathers (Frank). While many of the attendees are quite young, others
can be as old as those who are in college. It is those women (rather than children who
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may have a more difficult time traversing their authentic desires and the wishes of their
parents) that I focus on in this example.
The Purity Ball requires women to commit their chastity and their virginity to
their fathers, who pledge to protect it (Frank). For many women (if not all), this decision
is closely tied to their devotion to particular kinds of Christianity. While it is possible for
women to commit to a life of celibacy in an authentic manner, the structure of the Purity
Ball fails to satisfy many requirements for the Feminist Intuition, thus calling into
question whether women’s decisions to participate in these balls is autonomous. Their
public vow for celibacy is supposed to reflect their value as young women–by making a
public pledge to remain abstinent, they are publicly reaffirming their role and value as
those who are sexually pure, those who follow the desires of their fathers (or who rely on
their fathers to protect their chastity), and those who follow Christian tenets. This case
offers an example of female sexual expression which would fail to satisfy the Feminist
Intuition: one is concerned that their sexual expression is not the result of their own
autonomous expression, rather it is influenced by oppressive socialization, which places a
restrictive notion of sexuality upon them. It should be noted that in Chapter 3, I will show
how the case of the FFS challenges these assumptions regarding female sexual
submission.
Let’s imagine a young woman, named Candice, decides to attend a Purity Ball
with her father. Perhaps he has not told her that he expects her to attend this Ball, and has
not demanded that she take part in such a ceremony; so, we can imagine that Candice has
come to this decision herself. Were a friend to ask her why she would make such a
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commitment, Candice might respond that women ought to remain sexually pure, and that
such sexual purity is an expression of women’s virtue, or that her sexual purity creates a
better relationship between herself and her father. She could also claim that women’s
sexual purity shows a devotion to her religion. Beyond this engagement with her friend,
Candice fails to question her role in the Purity Ball, as she views it as just what good
women do. What is important to note is that each of these commitments are particular to
women: Purity Balls are only for women committing their chastity to their fathers.
Candice’s participation in the Purity Ball is an expression of what she thinks it
means to be a daughter and to be a young woman, and is greatly influenced by social
norms that place the value of chastity in women’s hands. Women are assumed to not only
be the gatekeeper of sex, but young women’s sexual expressions are considered to be the
property of their fathers (and requires their fathers protection). Her reasons for
participating in the Purity Ball reinforce harmful norms of femininity as they limit
women’s sexuality, demanding an ideal of sexual purity that is limited just to women, and
controlled by men. This case offers a very limited, narrow representation of what a
“proper” expression of women’s sexuality looks like, and failing to live up to this
representation is reflected as a failing of character on such women. Her decision to
participate in the Purity Ball is heavily influenced by these oppressive norms, and she
fails to look outside them or question them. It is for this reason that she fails to satisfy the
Feminist Intuition and is thus non-autonomous.
The Feminist Intuition attempts to determine whether oppressive norms or
socialization, such as we see in the case of Luker’s subjects or in Candice, have been
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perniciously influential in women’s decision-making processes. For Stoljar, the influence
of oppressive norms is so harmful that she argues that decisions made by women that are
influenced by these norms cannot be autonomous. In questioning the autonomy of women
who by many appearances seem to be autonomous, the Feminist Intuition asks us to take
into account the way in which social and cultural norms can influence our lives and the
way we make decisions. The Feminist Intuition thus raises concerns that theories of
autonomy must address when we consider how our accounts of autonomy engage with
the problem of oppressive socialization (if they address it at all).
Traditional Accounts of Autonomy and Submission:
While Stoljar’s feminist intuition asks us to determine the influence that social
norms have upon women’s understanding of femininity, she does not explicitly address
the problem of submission and autonomy (although, as I will show later, other
philosophers have later applied her feminist intuition to this area). In this section, I will
introduce three different ways in which traditional accounts of autonomy have explored
the relationship between submission (or subservience) and autonomy. What will become
clear is that traditional accounts of autonomy (primarily those which are not feministidentified, and mainstream accounts like liberal accounts of autonomy) fail to adequately
consider the feminist intuition regarding the influence of the social sphere and oppressive
norms upon the expression of autonomy. To begin, this section will look at Claire
Chambers’ liberal account of autonomy, R.P. Wolff’s anarchistic account, and Thomas
Hill Jr’s Kantian account of autonomy. Chambers and Wolff both focus on the interaction
between the (potentially) autonomous individual and an institution (the convent and the
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state, respectively). Thomas Hill Jr, on the other hand, evaluates the impact that
subservient or, as he calls it, servile relationships have on individual autonomy. In my
evaluation of these accounts I will show that they are lacking in some important
considerations found in the feminist intuition, and I will then introduce several accounts
of relational autonomy to show how we can incorporate concerns regarding the influence
of the social sphere into our discussions of autonomy and subservience.
Claire Chambers and Liberal Autonomy:
Claire Chambers’ work on autonomy and restricted lives focuses on the role that
individuals have in the decision-making process, as well as the control they have once
these decisions are made. In her chapter “Liberal Perfectionism and the Autonomy of
Restricted Lives” from her book Sex, Culture, and Justice: the Limits of Choice (2008),
Chambers distinguishes between what she calls first and second-order autonomy, a
distinction she shares with other liberal accounts of autonomy, such as those of Joseph
Raz and Marilyn Friedman. First-order autonomy takes place “when one leads a daily life
of active questioning, following only those norms one actively endorses” (233). In
contrast, second-order autonomy occurs “when one chooses one’s overall way of life”
(233).
Chambers notes that one can claim that lifelong obedience is compatible with
autonomy by “ignoring the idea of first-order autonomy and defining autonomy per se as
second-order autonomy” (235). Chambers claims that such a view would allow someone
to live a restricted life, ignoring their daily active questioning, while focusing on the
overall direction of their life. Although liberal accounts of autonomy value both first and
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second order autonomy, they allow that autonomy can persist in the absence of first order
autonomy. What is important in this distinction is the way it allows for one to experience
certain restrictions within one’s daily life while still maintaining their autonomy. One can
follow the will of another while keeping one’s autonomy intact.
Chambers uses the example of a nun living in a convent to show how living a
restricted life does not necessarily conflict with one’s autonomy. She cites the example of
Eva Heymann, a sixty-three year old nun who joined a convent at the age of thirty, and
discovered while living in the convent that her mail was read by the convent leaders
(237). Heymann describes experiencing a great discomfort in having her mail read,
linking it to her previous experience of fleeing Nazi Germany as a Jewish child before her
later conversion to Catholicism. She recounts that “…our letters were opened, and I
thought it was horrendous. The incoming letters were read, and it smacked to me of the
Nazi regime where letters and phone calls were intercepted. The whole business of
somebody invading your life, your person, seemed to me appalling” (Heymann in
Chambers, 237). Chambers uses the distinction between first- and second-order autonomy
to show how Heymann can still be autonomous in her overall decision to become a nun
even if she does not endorse the required practice of having her mail read (238).
Chambers notes that while the first-order wishes of the nun are not satisfied, as her mail is
read against her wishes, we must take note of how her second-order wishes are satisfied.
Other liberal approaches to autonomy claim that both first-and second-order autonomy
can be satisfied by the nun’s convent life, even when she is dissatisfied with particular
rules (238).
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While much of Chamber’s paper is devoted to evaluating the ways in which
different accounts of liberal autonomy justify the choice of the nun to enter the convent, it
is important to take from her paper that the nun provides us with an example of an
individual who submits their will to another (that being a convent, or to serving God),
while still maintaining their autonomy by exercising her second-order autonomy. This
means that, for Chambers, obedience in general can be justified if one’s dedication to
obedience falls in line with the overall direction or path that they wish to take with their
life. One can freely choose to give up their daily freedoms, so long as doing so is in line
with their long-term, deliberately chosen, goals.
R.P. Wolff and Anarchism:
Unlike Chambers’ emphasis on the importance of distinguishing between firstand second-order autonomy for individuals, R.P. Wolff’s work focuses on the relationship
between the individual and the state. Wolff asks whether one can be obedient to the
authority of others while remaining autonomous. In contrast to Chambers, who claims
that one can maintain their autonomy so long as their second-order autonomy is
expressed, Wolff holds that it is never justified for an individual to submit to a greater
authority in any way.
Wolff is concerned with the way the state’s claim to authority interacts with one’s
own individual autonomy. In particular, he is concerned with the question of whether or
not a state can claim legitimate authority over an individual— “a matter of the right to
command, and of the correlative obligation to obey the person who issues the command”
(24, italics in original). For Wolff, this obligation amounts to obedience as someone does
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more than merely follow an order that has been given to them. Obedience itself entails
“doing what he tells you to do because he tells you to do it” (24, italics in original).
Obedience thus requires individuals to follow what is asked of them, putting another’s
wishes first even if they contradict your own, and this is troubling to Wolff because of
how obedience interacts with his understanding of autonomy.
While states require obedience from their citizens for actions such as paying taxes
and following laws, one wonders how the obedience required by such authorities impacts
one’s individual autonomy in general. Wolff views one’s autonomy as deeply integrated
with their moral responsibility. He claims that it is a “fundamental assumption of moral
philosophy that men (sic) are responsible for their actions” (25). The responsible man is
one who is able to not only take responsibility for his own actions, particularly when there
are negative consequences to such actions, but also attempts to determine what makes an
action right (26). What is important to take from this is that, for Wolff, moral
responsibility is deeply connected to one’s autonomy. The autonomous individual makes
their own decisions and can be held accountable for those same decisions. Wolff claims
that the autonomous individual is self-legislating, in that while others may offer advice on
how he ought to act, his actions are ultimately up to him. As Wolff notes, the autonomous
individual learns about moral obligations “in the sense that a mathematician learns from
other mathematicians – namely by hearing from them arguments whose validity he
recognizes even though he did not think of them himself. He does not learn in the sense
that one learns from an explorer, by accepting as true his accounts of things one cannot
see for oneself” (26). The autonomous individual must learn for himself what
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encompasses the right actions, and cannot rely on the authority of others. The selflegislation of the individual—the one who “gives laws to himself”—is that which makes
the individual autonomous and makes them “not subject to the will of another” (26).
The autonomous individual is one who takes responsibility for their actions. But
what about those instances in which we must do what others ask of us? Could there not be
moments where we commit autonomous actions because others have asked or demanded
it of us? Wolff claims that “even after he has subjected himself to the will of another, an
individual remains responsible for what he does. But by refusing to engage in moral
deliberation, by accepting as final the commands of another, he forfeits his autonomy”
(27).
Following the commands of others requires obedience. Obedience goes beyond
merely doing what others ask of you, it requires following the actions of another merely
because they declared such to be the case, not because an individual has thought critically
and determined on their own that such an action was the best to take. Failing to take
responsibility for our actions and deliberations is what nullifies an individual’s autonomy.
As Wolff notes, “the primary obligation of a man is autonomy, the refusal to be ruled”
(29). The primary obligation of man conflicts with how Wolff views the citizen’s
relationship with the state. He claims that an individual’s sense of autonomy necessarily
conflicts with the defining mark of the state, that being “authority, the right to rule” (29).
Wolff does not think that there can be a way to reconcile these two desires in such a way
as to maintain one’s autonomy while succumbing to the authority of the state. He claims
that “insofar as a man fulfills his obligation to make himself the author of his decisions,
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he will resist the state’s claim to have authority over him. That is to say, he will deny that
he has a duty to obey the laws of the state simply because they are the laws” (29, italics in
original).
Wolff’s conception of autonomy requires that an individual function as the sole
moral author of their actions. Thus solely following the will or the deliberations of
another removes one’s autonomy. Wolff sees obedience, deference, or any action that
places one in a subservient position where they follow the demands or desires of another,
as incompatible with autonomy and therefore problematic. This means that in instances
where one must defer to another, especially over a long period of time, such as in the case
of a military soldier, a nun, or any other form of restricted lives, the individual sacrifices
their autonomy. When one fails to have ownership over their own actions, they fail to live
autonomously.
While Chambers and Wolff come to different conclusions, their papers both ask
whether it is possible to maintain one’s autonomy while still serving or following the will
of another. Their concerns about autonomy and obedience focus not on interpersonal
relationships, but on relationships in which the individual gives themselves to a larger
organized group or structure. For Chambers and Wolff this involves the convent and the
state, but their considerations can equally be extended to the military or other groups that
restrict the lives of their followers.
These accounts, while concerned with how autonomy can be potentially hindered
by the decisions we make, fail to take into account the concerns laid out by the Feminist
Intuition and thus are ill-equipped to discuss the problem of the Feminist Female Slave.
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Wolff, with his focus on maintaining authority over your own self above all others, would
never find the FFS to be justified in her decision to submit to her Master. Chambers, on
the other hand, could possibly consider her position justified, so long as the desire to be in
her relationship corresponds with her second-order autonomy. But, even if we were to
declare the FFS autonomous based on Chambers’ approach, it is just not a satisfying
response to this case. When we see a woman being led on a leash by her Master and we
ask whether she is comfortable with this treatment and she responds “why yes, it satisfies
my second-order autonomy. I freely chose this”, I doubt many feminist theorists would be
satisfied with such a cavalier response. The gut response, or the instinctual concern, that
would be raised at this response is where the feminist intuition is borne—do we know that
this decision was truly made autonomously? Or is her apparent satisfaction at such an
explicit form of submission based on something else? Chambers work, while receptive to
justified obedience, fails to take the problem of oppressive socialization into account and
therefore has little to add to the discussion of autonomous submission and the case of the
FFS.
Thomas Hill Jr and Kantian Autonomy:
Thomas Hill Jr’s work differs from Wolff and Chamber’s in that his focus is
directed towards interpersonal relationships and subservience, rather than to the
individual’s relationship to the state or an institution. However, he is similar to Chambers
and Wolff in that Hill’s work also fails to take into account the concerns raised by the
feminist intuition. Although Hill addresses some interesting cases in which individuals act
deferentially to others, he fails to truly get to the heart of the way that oppressive
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socialization can factor into their deferential behaviour. Hill takes a Kantian approach,
focusing on three cases, through which he seeks to establish what he calls “the problem of
deference”. He provides three examples of what he sees as deference in action: the case of
the Uncle Tom, the Deferential Wife, and the Self-Deprecator. Hill claims that none of
these individuals is autonomous, due to their lack of self-respect. In all three cases
individuals view themselves as subservient to others and this is acted out in their daily
lives. The case of the Uncle Tom refers to an extremely deferential black man who
always defers to white men. He holds contempt towards other black people, and feels that
he is owed less than white people due to the colour of his skin (88). The Deferential Wife
is a woman who is devoted to serving her husband, and believes that the proper role of a
woman is to serve her husband. She is aware that equal rights exist for women, but claims
that her rights are not being infringed. She is perfectly happy to take a role that places
herself below her husband (89). Finally, the Self-Deprecator is similar to the Uncle Tom,
in that “he is reluctant to make demands. He says nothing when others take unfair
advantage of him” (88). Unlike the Uncle Tom, the problem for the Self-Deprecator is not
based in an internalization of racism; he merely thinks very little of himself, and feels that
nothing is owed to him due to his apparent inadequacies and failures.
In the three cases, Hill claims that each individual “reflects the attitude which I
call servility. It betrays the absence of a certain kind of self-respect” (89). He claims that
such servility betrays a moral defect. The moral defect is found in that the aforementioned
individuals each possess a “failure to understand and acknowledge one’s own moral
rights” (93). Hill notes that there may be situations in which someone must fall back into
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a servile position in order to save themselves, such as the black man who acts in a
deferential way to “keep the Klan from killing his children, to save his own skin, or even
to buy time while he plans the revolution” (96). This instance presents us with a case of
situational servility where the individual does not fail to understand his own moral rights.
For Hill, the reason why someone is deferential is of great importance. In the instance of
the individual who becomes deferential in order to save himself, he acts in order to
protect himself or others. He can still see himself as a valuable human being, but must
place himself in a certain position for a period of time. For the Deferential Wife, or the
other standard cases that Hill presents, servility comes from individuals thinking very
little of themselves in general. When a servile person either acts from a misunderstanding
of their rights or by placing a low value on their rights, their servility is seen to manifest
in an absence of self-respect and they are thus lacking in autonomy.
Hill’s understanding of servility and the value of self-respect are based within a
Kantian framework of autonomy. He claims that “Kant held that servility is contrary to a
perfect nonjuridical duty to oneself” (97) and that a failure to understand the rights that
one owes oneself can, in fact, result in a failure to “appreciate the rights of others” as they
can either “underestimate the rights of those with whom he classifies himself [or], if he
plays the servile role knowingly, then… he displays a lack of concern to see the principles
of morality acknowledged and respected and the absence of one motive which can move a
moral person to respect the rights of others” (104). Thus, the failure to respect one’s own
value and rights does not simply affect the individual who is servile as it additionally
diminishes their ability to respect the value of others. This is important because it shows
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how Hill views subservience and deference as being not only harmful to the individual
who submits, but affects others as well.
While Hill’s work on servility differs from that of Chambers and Wolff in that he
focuses on interpersonal relationships, he still fails to adequately take into consideration
the way that institutionalized racism, sexism, and other forms of oppressive socialization
permeate our identities and how we feel we are valued, which then impacts how we
respond to others. Hill does reflect upon certain forms of social coercion that could
influence the Deferential Wife, in that she may have few options or may have
experienced “socially fostered ignorance of her own talents” (94). But these
considerations would result in the Deferential Wife being viewed as ignorant and thus
lacking in responsibility for her moral defect, rather than autonomous. It appears as if the
impact of the social sphere on autonomy is all-or-nothing: if one is free of the effects of
oppressive socialization then they are responsible for their actions and are autonomous,
but if they have been affected by such conditions, then they lose that responsibility and, in
turn, their status as autonomous. While this account at least acknowledges some
understanding of the existence of pernicious socialization, it lacks the subtlety and nuance
that is necessary for acknowledging the real influence of oppressive norms on women.
The situation cannot be binary, that we are either influenced by social norms or we are
not, that we are either fully responsible for our actions or not. A theory of autonomy that
addresses social influence must address the push and pull between socialization and
individual desires with greater care and nuance. Hill’s account of autonomy and
deference fails to truly address this, and thus, like Wolff’s and Chambers’, his account of
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autonomy is insufficient for addressing the concerns brought forward by the feminist
intuition.
Relational Autonomy:
In order to effectively understand the case of the Feminist Female Slave, I hold
that this project requires an engagement with feminist relational accounts of autonomy as
they offer a more realistic account of the influence of pernicious socialization than the
traditional accounts previously presented. Relational autonomy was developed as a
response to traditional accounts of autonomy (by which I mean those based in Kantian or
other mainstream approaches) for their assumption that individuals are independent
beings in their decision-making processes. Non-relational accounts are said to be
“atomistic” in that they are “abstracted from the social relations in which actual agents are
embedded” (Stoljar, para. 2, 2013). In response to these concerns, feminists have
attempted to “reconceptualize autonomy from a feminist perspective” (Stoljar, para. 1,
2013). As part of this reconceptualization, feminist theorists began to develop what are
now known as relational accounts of autonomy, which see the self as inherently social,
and, as such, place greater importance on the role of our social interactions in our ability
to make autonomous decisions. Relational accounts of autonomy share the underlying
belief that:
Persons are socially embedded and that agents’ identities are
formed within the context of social relationships and shaped by
a complex of intersecting social determinants, such as race,
class, gender, and ethnicity (Mackenzie and Stoljar, 4).
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This acknowledgement of the social-embeddedness of agents differs from the traditional
accounts of autonomy we already explored, as such accounts often fail to address the
influence of social relationships and power dynamics on agents’ identities. Stoljar and
Mackenzie continue their description of the underlying beliefs of relational autonomy:
Thus the focus of relational approaches is to analyze the
implications of the intersubjective and social dimensions of
selfhood and identity for conceptions of individual autonomy
and moral and political agency (Mackenzie and Stoljar, 4).
It should be noted that while relational autonomy has been developed as a direct
response to the atomism found in traditional, liberal accounts of autonomy, feminist
theorists like Judith Butler have offered their own criticisms of relational autonomy.
While Butler acknowledges the necessary interaction that people have with each other
(“Let’s face it. We’re undone by each other. And if we are not, we’re missing something”
[2004, 19]), she claims that she does not promote a relational view of the self (2004, 19).
She argues that “the term ‘relationality’ sutures the rupture in the relation we seek to
describe, a rupture that is constitutive of identity itself” (2004, 19). Butler’s work
problematizes the ability for individuals to be fully transparent to themselves, to be fully
knowledgeable of their desires, motivations, and reasons for acting (2005, 66). In effect,
she questions whether an authentic self can ever be fully authentic, given our inability to
know everything about ourselves. Butler’s criticism highlights the limitations of some
models of relational autonomy: relying solely on an authentic self as the arbiter of
autonomy can be difficult when it is nearly impossible to disentangle that authentic self
from the influence of the external world. This is an important criticism to make of
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relational autonomy, or of accounts of relational autonomy that rely solely on individual,
internal self-knowledge. However, it is also important to note that the concerns raised by
Butler do not conflict or impact the relational theory that I hold to be the most suitable to
the case of the Feminist Female Slave. In fact, I will show in Chapter 5 how this theory
speaks nicely to Butler’s concerns.
The following section will introduce three specific accounts of relational
autonomy in order to show their suitability for evaluating whether the role of the Feminist
Female Slave is justified, namely, those developed by Marina Oshana, Diana Meyers, and
Sonya Charles. While these accounts differ quite greatly in terms of how they spell out
the conditions of autonomy, what is important is the role of social considerations used by
these accounts in evaluating autonomy.
Marina Oshana and Strong Substantive Autonomy:
Marina Oshana offers an account of autonomy that is quite possibly the most
stringent of the relational accounts to be presented in this chapter. Oshana’s account is
similar to that of Wolff, in that her primary concern for autonomy is that an individual
maintains authority over their actions. For a person to be considered autonomous, she
needs to be considered self-governing, which means she is “in control of her actions
and… that the person’s actions coincide with preferences or values that are her own” (82).
This means that the individual must possess a certain level of control in that they are the
one who has authority over their own actions and that the actions they perform are those
which are in line with their own desires. The autonomous individual is not dependent
upon others, which requires “control over one’s external circumstances” (82), including
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possessing economic and emotional independence, and this independence provides them
with freedom in their decision-making.
Autonomy, according to Oshana’s theory, requires an individual to have some
degree of control over their internal desires as well as the external circumstances in which
they live. She claims that autonomy takes place when an individual “is able to meet her
goals without depending upon the judgments of others as to their validity or importance”
(82) and that “being autonomous is not simply a matter of having values that are
authentic, but of directing one’s life according to those values” (82). Autonomy is thus
determined both by the level of independence one possesses in their daily lives, along
with requirements for certain social conditions.
What differentiates Oshana’s account from the work of Wolff and other traditional
accounts of autonomy is her emphasis on the social conditions that exist outside the
individual. She claims that we can’t just evaluate autonomy based on the individual’s
desires or history (95), as being autonomous is partly based on our social relationships
(95). For Oshana, these social relationships must allow the individual to be in a position
where they are able to “pursue their goals in a context of social and psychological
security” (94). This social and psychological security includes the ability to defend
oneself against physical and psychological harm if necessary, to not be required to take
care of others’ needs unless agreed to, the ability to defend oneself against economic or
civil harms if necessary, and the ability to pursue their own values and interests that may
differ from those who have authority over her (94). As a result, the autonomous
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individual must not only have authority over the overall direction of their life, they must
be socially-positioned such that these choices are secure.
It should be noted that Oshana requires that the individual express critical
reflection and have access to a wide range of possibilities in making decisions as
necessary conditions for autonomy (93, 94), but the most important characteristics in her
account include the procedural independence and the socio-relational security she
encourages. Although Oshana’s work shares characteristics with the traditional accounts
we have seen, her work provides an important transition away from traditional accounts
of autonomy towards relational accounts.
Diana Meyers’ Procedural Relational Autonomy:
In contrast to Marina Oshana, Diana Meyers emphasizes the process that an
individual takes in making their decision while agreeing with Oshana on the impact of
socialization on autonomy. Meyers claims that autonomy is “impossible without
socialization”, and that socialization itself is inescapable (1989, 135). Meyers’ approach
to autonomy thus differs from many traditional accounts at a fundamental level, as the
focus of the latter is directed towards the expression of individual free will. She claims
that, instead, personal autonomy is expressed through living in harmony with one’s true
self, which she sees as not only “compatible with the civilizing influences of
socialization, but it depends on socialization to cultivate the requisite skills” (1989, 20,
emphasis added). Meyers moves away from the idea of a ‘free agent’, such as we have
seen in traditional accounts of autonomy, because she claims that this notion
problematically (and perhaps impossibly) requires an individual who is ‘untainted” by
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socialization (1987, 42). We must then acknowledge the impact and influence of
socialization upon our desires and selves.
While Meyers addresses the realities of socialization, and notes that autonomy is
impossible without it, it is important to note that socialization can work in certain ways to
hinder autonomy, particularly the autonomy of women. Meyers notes that women are
often socialized to be less independent than men, but that this does not necessarily mean
that autonomy is impossible for women (1989, 136). Meyers’ account of autonomy
centers around what she calls autonomy competencies. These competencies, without
which an individual cannot act autonomously, include self-discovery, self-definition, and
self-direction (2004, xvii). Meyers claims that each of these skills must be developed for
an individual to “become aware of their actual affects, desires, traits, capacities, values,
and aims, [and] conceive realistic personal ideals” (2004, xvii). This means that
autonomy requires an individual to be aware of their own wants, needs, goals, and other
desires. The autonomous individual ought to try to become aware of who they are. As
well, she notes that “autonomy competency sets in motion a piecemeal, trial-and-error
process of self-understanding and self-reconstruction that underwrites a provisional
authentic identity” (2004, xvii). The autonomous individual does not always make the
right decisions and may not always immediately know how they ought to respond in
situations. Meyers’ use of autonomy competency shows that the process of becoming
autonomous can be a long one, and isn’t necessarily perfect. As Meyers notes in Self,
Society, and Personal Choice (1989), autonomous people are those who “possess and
exercise skills that maintain a fluid interaction between their traits, their feelings, their
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beliefs, their values, their extended plans, their current possibilities for realizing these
plans, and their conduct” (58). Because these competencies are contextual and
individualized, they allow for a diverse set of beliefs, values, and practices and imply a
wide range of options for various agents to be autonomous.
The final account of relational autonomy that I will present in this chapter is that
of Sonya Charles. Charles’ work is of particular interest because of how she explicitly
builds upon the work of Natalie Stoljar and the feminist intuition in order to determine
whether women’s choices can still be considered autonomous if they express harmful
notions of femininity or internalized oppression. Charles notes in her paper, “How Should
Feminist Autonomy Theorists Respond to the Problem of Internalized Oppression”, that
when Natalie Stoljar first introduced her concept of the feminist intuition, she did not
outline what a theory of autonomy needed to include in order to satisfy the concerns
brought forward by the feminist intuition, except to say that it would have to be a strong
substantive account of relational autonomy. This means that, in order to satisfy the
concerns laid out by Stoljar, the most appropriate approach to autonomy would require
that decisions have a certain external or non-subjective content in order to be
autonomous—content following certain rules or norms that exist outside of the agent
(411). This requirement for non-subjective content is expressed through the claim that an
autonomous decision cannot be influenced by harmful feminine norms.
Charles claims that oppressive socialization can result in internalized oppression
in women, which muddies the water in terms of what it means to make an autonomous
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choice. Internalized oppression is harmful because of the way it “undermines a person’s
sense of self-worth, and thereby makes her complicit in her own oppression” (423). For
Charles, this means that when we ask whether the submissive woman has chosen her role
autonomously, we should ask whether her decision reflects a lack of self-worth, or a
devaluation of the self overall (413). The focus on the value of the self and respect for the
self builds on the work of Hill, as Charles offers the case of the Deferential Wife as an
example of an individual with false beliefs who perpetuates her own oppression (416).
She argues that “false beliefs that rely on subordinating reasoning and perpetuate
oppressive systems are forms of internalized oppression, and therefore decisions that
result from these beliefs should not count as autonomous” (416-7). Charles, then, allows
for the possibility of an individual taking a subservient role autonomously, but it must be
done under certain circumstances: the individual must have made their decision free from
the confines of pernicious socialization, and they must do so while maintaining a sense of
self-worth and self-valuation.
Charles’ account is especially valuable to this project and the question of
autonomous submission because of how she is able to explicitly balance the concerns
raised in the Feminist Intuition alongside the harmful effects of internalized oppression on
our decision-making capabilities, with the individual’s desire to be submissive. Charles
asks us to consider the concerns raised by traditional accounts like Hill’s alongside the
issues brought forward by the feminist intuition. This gives us an interesting insight into
the considerations required to determine whether the Feminist Female Slave can be
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autonomous. We must determine whether her decision to submit to her partner is based
in an internalized oppression that she is unable to or refuses to see.
This section aimed to introduce three separate approaches to relational autonomy
in order to establish that the relational account of autonomy provides a superior approach
to evaluating the autonomy found in the case of the Feminist Female Slave due to its
inclusion of the social sphere in its evaluation. When we ask whether a woman who
submits to a man, to such an extent that she declares herself to be his property, has made
this decision autonomously, we must make fuller considerations of the social conditions
that surround her and influence her decision-making capabilities. The three accounts of
relational autonomy that I laid out in this section have done just that, though their
considerations of what it means to make an autonomous decision differ.
These accounts are valuable because they balance the way in which the social
sphere can influence our decisions without assuming that it solely determines us. Each
account allows us to evaluate the considerations or steps that would need to take place in
order for a woman to justifiably take the submissive role, balancing the influence of
patriarchy with individual choice, to varying degrees. For Oshana, the autonomous
individual must ensure that they maintain the authority over her life, while Meyers is
concerned with the individual’s expression of autonomy competencies and Charles claims
that the autonomous individual is one whose decisions express self-respect and selfvaluation while remaining free of concerns raised by the Feminist Intuition. Beyond these
considerations, each account incorporates an explicit discussion of the role of
socialization and relationships with others into their accounts. This is what differentiates
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them from the traditional accounts of autonomy, for when we evaluate the case of the
Feminist Female Slave, it will be necessary to evaluate her role in relation to oppressive
socialization, the influence of gender norms, and internalized oppression. These relational
accounts of autonomy will be valuable in our later discussions of the FFS.
The primary purpose of this chapter was to outline the requirements for female
submission to be seen as an autonomous choice while simultaneously accounting for
oppressive socialization. It is important for a project such as this one to not merely rely on
simplistic accounts of autonomy, which have a blind spot in terms of how socialization
can potentially impact our decision-making capabilities, as was seen in the work of
Chambers, Wolff, and Hill. However, there is more that can be brought out in our
discussions of autonomy and female submission beyond whether or not a woman can
freely choose to take such a role. What must be considered (and what will be considered
later in this project) is whether or not the role of the female submissive can be seen as
legitimate in the eyes of other members of the feminist community. To declare the choice
to submit to another as a justified one merely allows for it to be seen as a choice that was
made autonomously, one which was made without coercion. But this does not mean that
these same accounts see it as a good choice or a respectable choice. I will explore further
in this project in greater detail what the Feminist Female Slave looks like and how she
lives, how her case differs from the way that we have previously looked at the problem of
autonomous submission, and what she means for feminist engagement with submission
overall.
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Chapter 2: The Feminist Female Slave
In the previous chapter I argued that relational accounts of autonomy provide the
most appropriate approach to autonomy for evaluating whether an individual like the
Feminist Female Slave is autonomous in making her decision to become subservient to
her partner. This survey was not done merely to establish the possibility of autonomous
submission, but to highlight the importance of the social sphere when evaluating cases of
female submission to men in romantic and sexual relationships. While I briefly outlined
the case of the FFS, this chapter will provide a more detailed account of the case,
primarily providing theoretical and historical background for her role and relationship.
The Feminist Female Slave presents a case in which a woman declares that she has
chosen the life of submission to a male romantic and sexual partner; however, she differs
greatly from the cases of female submission that have been explored by feminist
philosophy. For the Feminist Female Slave, the possibility of autonomous submission is
quite important as it implies recognition of her choice in entering into the Master/slave
relationship.
I aim in this chapter to not only outline the case of the FFS but to also provide
context surrounding her role as a slave and the philosophy that subtly influences the
underpinnings of the BDSM community. The chapter aims to flesh out the case of the
FFS after her brief introduction in the previous chapter: I will establish the FFS as a
committed submissive whose daily practices are performed in service to her Master, and
yet she simultaneously identifies as a feminist. I will show how these two commitments
can be theoretically coherent. In particular, I will show that her justifications and
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reasoning for entering into a Master/slave relationship are consistent with common
justifications by female slaves, who are influenced by sex-liberal feminist9 characteristics,
such as the focus on individual sexual liberties. I will also explore other concepts found in
the BDSM community that have been influenced by such sex-liberal characteristics,
including the valuation of diverse sexual practices, the division between public/private or
real/performed sexual acts, as well as the central tenet of Safe, Sane, Consensual. These
components influence the way the FFS views her identity both as a submissive and as a
feminist.
My discussion of the influence of liberal philosophy on BDSM theory and the
feminist identification of the FFS is intended to provide a general overview of how
philosophy has been influential to BDSM tenets and the FFS overall. It is not meant to
provide a critical perspective to these theoretical influences. This discussion will come in
Chapter 4, in which I examine these concepts in order to raise my own concerns about
BDSM’s liberal assumptions and provide my own alternative, grounded in the work of
relational autonomy theorists. This means that this chapter is not intended as an
endorsement of sex-liberal feminism or other concepts found in the BDSM community
and its practices, but is rather meant to provide an overview of the philosophies that are
and have been influential to this community.
It should be noted that I use the term “sex-liberal feminism” to refer to a feminist approach that takes a
liberal perspective on sex and sexual expression. While some women who take the same role as the FFS
refer to themselves as “sex-positive”, I argue that this differs from contemporary sex-positive feminist
philosophy, and thus use “sex-liberal feminism” as a more accurate descriptor.
9
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The Master/slave relationship falls under the umbrella of relationships and
practices found in the BDSM community and requires one partner fully giving themselves
over to another. Thus, these relationships go beyond a merely dominant/submissive
relationship, in which limits are often established before scenes begin and such roles are
removed after the end of such scenes. The Master/slave relationship is long-term,
committed, is not restricted to scenes, and explicitly asks one partner to have ownership
of the other. This chapter begins by providing an overview of the BDSM community and
its beginnings, and then provides a more in-depth explanation of the structure and
expectations of the Master/slave relationship. I outline the components of sex-liberal
feminism, bringing to light some of the broader concepts found in this theoretical
approach, in order to show how its influence is present in the BDSM community. This
discussion will establish the influence that sex-positive feminism has had on the Feminist
Female Slave.
The concept of autonomous submission is important for the Feminist Female
Slave because considering her role to be autonomous opens up the possibility for her to
lay claim to the feminist identity, or belonging to the feminist community. It can be
difficult for BDSM participants to establish that their sexual practices are autonomous to
those who practice more mainstream sexual expressions. This difficulty is exacerbated in
cases where women take roles such as the FFS has taken, as her subservient position
raises concerns regarding the level of influence surrounding her choice. Because of the
role that she has taken, she is often depicted as a victim, rather than that of a free agent.
BDSM Practices and Community:
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In order to have a full understanding of the FFS and her relationship it is
important to possess some knowledge of the BDSM community, including its history and
contemporary structure. This section will provide a background to BDSM concepts, the
development of the BDSM community, as well as the roles and procedures found in the
Master/slave relationship.
BDSM, as a set of practices and sexual acts, came to the attention of sexual
researchers in the Victorian era due to their increased focus on researching human
sexuality (Brame et al, 21). Advances in science and philosophy provided an avenue for
new areas of research in the field of sexuality. At the forefront of this research was
Richard von Krafft-Ebing, who is widely regarded as having first labeled the
identifications of sadism and masochism (SM). While this work was ground-breaking in
that it gave name to specific practices that already took place, Brame et al. note that
Krafft-Ebing’s work on sadomasochism was also laced with moralisms, as “Victorians
appreciated science so long as it supported and confirmed their social ideals" (23).
From the initial development of the concepts of sadism and masochism, these
concepts were conceived of as referring to sexual deviance. According to Brame et. al, for
Krafft-Ebing, this entailed the identification of reproduction as the “benchmark of sexual
normality. Psychiatry was the heir of moral theology. Sex was a biological mechanism
devised by God or Nature to ensure the production of offspring” (24). From this
perspective, any sexual practice that took place outside a merely reproductive context
meant that this sexual act was one that was sinful or deviant.
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Krafft-Ebbing’s work continues to be incredibly influential today, even though his
work was developed during a time with very different understandings of sexual practices.
As quoted in Brame et al. “‘Krafft-Ebing provides testimony for his view that unbridled
sex can undermine the health and honour of individuals as well as the very foundations of
society… He gives the overall impression that all sex is dangerous’” (Frayser in Brame et
al. 24). Sadomasochism, along with homosexuality (another medicalized sexual term that
he coined), functions as one of the ‘dangerous’ manifestations of human sexuality. As
Michel Foucault claims in The History of Sexuality: An Introduction, Volume 1, “For a
long time, the story goes, we supported a Victorian regime, and we continue to be
dominated by it even today. Thus the image of the imperial prude is emblazoned on our
restrained, mute, and hypocritical sexuality” (3). Victorian sexual culture was one that
outwardly expressed approval for heterosexual, procreative sex, and looked down upon
whatever fell outside of it. It was in this environment that an initial academic interest in
SM was born, and against which much of the current SM community has structured itself
in response.
In “Psychopathis Sexualis” Krafft-Ebbing introduces his research on the practice
of sadomasochism. He differentiates between two separate modes of sadomasochism: the
sadist and the masochist. The sadist is the one who finds the pain of others to be sexually
pleasurable. While Krafft-Ebing claims that certain forms of pain can be pleasurable for
many (he provides the example of wrestling between “young married couples” and other
forms of horseplay), they can take on a sadistic tone, and are described as “the most
monstrous acts of destruction of the consort’s life” (25). He claims sadism is actually a
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common occurrence, that entails an “experience of sexual [sic] pleasurable sensations
(including orgasm) produced by acts of cruelty, bodily punishment inflicted on one’s own
person or when witnessed in others….” (25). He counts this orientation as “among the
primitive anomalies of the sexual life. It is a disturbance (a deviation) in the evolution of
psychosexual processes sprouting from the soil of psychical degeneration” (26). The
sadist is one whose cruelty extends to his sexual life.
In contrast to sadism, Krafft-Ebbing developed the category of masochism to
describe those who “wish to suffer pain and be subjected to force” (27). He describes the
masochist in greater detail:
By masochism I understand a peculiar perversion of the
psychical sexual life in which the individual affected, in
sexual feeling and thought, is controlled by the idea of
being completely and unconditionally subject to the will of
a person of the opposite sex; of being treated by this person
as by a master, humiliated and abused. (28)
While the sadist is one who enjoys humiliating and causing pain to others, the masochist
enjoys experiencing such pain. Masochists completely succumb to the will of the sadist
and are submissive to their power and their influence.
Krafft-Ebing’s work functions as the foundational scientific examination of the
sadomasochistic identity and what he, and others, view as the problematic expressions of
sadomasochism in general. Even though his influence continues through the terms he
coined, and in the fact that his work is still seen as the starting point for examining
sadomasochism, aspects of his work are now regarded as problematic due to their
medical, pathologizing nature. For some scholars, Krafft-Ebing’s focus on
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sadomasochism is regarded as being “constructed out of medical discourse as a method of
social control. Each word was meant to categorize, and thus pathologize, aspects of
human sexual experience that had been eternally known” (Thompson, xiv). Even though
her book aims to move individuals away from SM, in her introduction to Against
Sadomasochism: A Radical Feminist Analysis, Robin Ruth Linden acknowledges this
history when she claims that the diagnostic criteria used by Krafft-Ebing “cannot be
value-free or objective: they are constructed by the psychiatrists who have explicit
interests and commitments of their own which are reflected in their professional
judgments” (6). Krafft-Ebing’s research was meant to pathologize non-normative sexual
expression.
The contemporary usage of ‘sadomasochism’ as a sexual categorization has
undergone a vast transformation since Krafft-Ebing’s publications were released. Modern
participants in sadomasochism have come to view it as a sexual identity willingly, if not
enthusiastically, adopted, and consider themselves to be part of a greater BDSM
community rather than a medically ascribed categorization. BDSM, in its contemporary
usage, describes a range of practices and activities that are performed by individuals, both
on their own and in a community setting. It is an umbrella term that can include bondage
(tying people up, using restraints), discipline (spanking), dominance and submission
(power play, where one partner takes a much stronger role than the other), and
sadomasochism (where partners derive pleasure from either giving or receiving pain).
Many of these designations overlap, in that individuals may use multiple forms of BDSM
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within one scene, or event. This project, however, focuses on one specific component of
the wider range of BDSM practices: Dominance and submission (or,
Dominance/submission, D/s). Dominance and submission is characterized primarily by
what is known as “power play”— the focus of the interaction is not necessarily based on
physical sensations (such as the feeling of being bound in bondage, or the sensation of
physical pain in sadomasochism), but is centred on a psychological interaction, that being
an uneven distribution of power.
Classifications and identities in this community can include both BDSM identities
with sexual orientation, “relationship style or dynamics, and interests” (Weiss, 11).
BDSM orientations include designations such as “top”, “bottom”, “switch”,
“dom(inant)”, and “sub(missive).” This means someone can identify as a ‘bi poly
switch’–they identify as bisexual, as polyamourous or open to multiple sexual partners,
and as willing to switch between dominant and submissive roles, or as a ‘bondage
bottom’— they are interested in bondage and have the activities performed on or to them
(Weiss, 11). While gender and sexual orientation still have value in these communities
(i.e. a person could identify with a combination of the three, such as a switch bisexual
woman, or a submissive gay man) it is not merely one’s gender or sexual orientation that
determines how one will act in a sexual situation. For D/s a hierarchy of power or an
inequality between players is a necessary component, where the roles that participants
enact are in no way equal. As Miss Abernathy describes, D/s takes place in a “consensual
arrangement in which one partner takes the lead and the other follows the lead” (12). The
complementary, but inegalitarian, roles of the person leading and the other following are
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such an integral part of a D/s relationship that without them, “the D/s aspect of the scene
[loses] its meaning entirely, leaving [participants] without a clear sense of how, or even
whether, to proceed” (Newmahr, 70). Without explicit power roles that give one power
over the other, D/s participants cannot act and do not know how to perform their scenes.
As the uneven distribution of power holds such high value for those who assume
the roles of D/s, this relationship structure can at times extend beyond the confines of a
scene. With most BDSM activities, a scene has a specific beginning and an ending agreed
to by the partners. An example of this can include a bondage scene in which one partner
acts as a pirate and the other acts as their captured prisoner who is bound and gagged.
Once the scene ends, both parties go back to the roles they held before their role-playing
began (presumably, as a non-pirate and a non-prisoner). These roles can be repeated and
played more than once, but they generally only exist while participating in SM scenes. In
contrast, for D/s, roles tend extend beyond the confines of a specific scene and can
sometimes carry over into daily or community events. As Newmahr states, the
construction of these roles holds such importance that at times “the dynamics that players
create and maintain through these strategies during play are carried through to community
interaction” (70). The concretization and extension of these chosen roles isn’t necessarily
reflected in the expression of purely bondage or sadomasochistic roles.
While D/s can and does include bondage and SM at times, there is an emotional
and psychological element that must be present in order for the scene to have an impact.
As Miss Abernathy describes, D/s is like a kind of brain play:
Unlike S/M or B/D, D/S is essentially a question of mind
over matter. No elaborate dungeons or sex-toy collections
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are necessary. Instead, both the dominant and the
submissive bring their intelligence and will into play.
Submission depends on the individual’s ability to align his
will with that of the dominant and to use his intelligence to
fulfill her wishes gracefully and efficiently. The dominant,
for her part, must be ready and able to direct the
submissive’s will with her own (13).
Dominance and submission operates as a form of BDSM that intentionally creates an
uneven power structure between participants. Its activities primarily include
psychological components, though it can also incorporate physical ones, and these
activities are generally confined to being expressed during scenes, or previously agreedupon times and settings.
Master/slave:
Some D/s participants may choose to engage in what is known as “lifestyle D/s”
or “24/7 D/s”, in which the roles that are enacted within sexual scenes are extended and
maintained throughout all aspects of one’s relationship (Brame et al. 165). This is often
known in the community as a Master (or Mistress)/slave [M/s] relationship and one
partner is declared the “owner” of the other. A good way to think about the difference
between D/s and M/s is that D/s often incorporates role-play into its activities, whereas
M/s enacts these roles into one’s daily life. Because Master/slave incorporates explicit
forms of ownership and control and maintains very rigid roles (i.e. parties will not
“switch”— one partner is always the Master/Mistress and the other is always the slave),
Master/slave is seen to embody a serious level of commitment by both the involved
parties and the larger BDSM community. While many BDSM practitioners may
participate in activities that use general expressions of dominance and submission for a
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set length of time (for example, for one event or one scene), it is important to note that the
Master/slave relationship extends to all facets of one’s life. The present project focuses on
this specific relationship found in the D/s community, and in particular the question or
concern over whether women can autonomously choose to enter into slavehood with a
male Master.
Master/slave is an interesting relationship because of the way in which ownership
of the individual is handed over to another. In M/s, the submissive party is expected (as
outlined through previous negotiation between both parties) to fulfill the desires and
duties that are laid out by their dominant partner. These activities can include performing
certain sexual acts, or even performing household duties, or other daily tasks as
demanded by the Master/Mistress. Frank W. (a Master) details some of the practices that
he and his slave, Lisa W, partake in. He claims that their D/s play takes place “out of the
bedroom but not the front door” (171), meaning that it is not merely confined to the
bedroom but also does not take place in fully public spaces. He describes their practices,
stating that “I’ll have her undress in the evenings, and she’ll wear the collar and a leash,
and she’ll sit or kneel at my feet when we’re answering the messages on CompuServe [a
computer messaging program]. Or we will go out for a walk in the woods [and] bring
along a leash; we’ll stop and cut a switch, and I’ll tie her to a tree” (171). Bambi Bottom,
in another interview, claims that her practices as a slave require her to serve her Master,
getting him food and drink at the end of the night, but also require her to wear her collar
to bed, asking permission to eat and use the restroom and make purchases. She is also
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required to exercise in order to keep in shape and her sex life is controlled and determined
by her Master (181).
Miss Abernathy, an author of instructional BDSM guides, describes the roles of
Master and slave as focusing on the role of service. She claims that the Master not only
enjoys the “simple act of commanding obedience, but also has specific needs. Floors to be
swept. Meals to be prepared. Boots to be polished, or worshipped, or both” (13, 14). She
also describes the process that one ought to take in finding a Master or a slave. Of
particular importance is that Miss Abernathy describes the negotiation process between
Master and slave as being almost like an interview; this process is used to determine
whether or not the Master and slave are suited to each other before embarking on what
she describes as a training process. She claims that the Master ought to ask their potential
slave about medical conditions, emergency contacts or any other necessary information in
case of emergency, psychological limitations (such as a history of abuse), as well as any
fantasies or desires that the slave has, along with their understanding of what slavehood
and service entails (16, 17). This process is done in order to ensure that both parties are
well-suited to each other, as well as to ensure that they are both well-informed of what
their partnership will entail. Once interviews have been conducted successfully, a contract
(whether verbal or written) will be made between both parties. Entering into a
Master/slave relationship is seen as a thorough process, in which both parties must be
open and honest about their expectations, and both partners must be satisfied with the
conditions that will be laid upon them once the relationship begins. Negotiation is a
necessary part of this process, ensuring that both Master and slave are satisfied.
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As M/s is a more serious and committed form of D/s, submissives will often wear
symbols in order to indicate their relationship to others within the community. The use of
the collar or some other symbol not only indicates to the Master that the slave has entered
into a relationship and has become their property. It also “alerts other players [in the
community] that the slave is unavailable and that the dominant should be approached
before any contact is made with the slave” (Abernathy, 31). The collar is not only an
indication of when a player is unavailable for play, but also can be used to indicate when
a relationship has ended. As Miss Abernathy notes “Should the slave choose to lay aside
the collar without warning or explanation, the dominant may reasonably assume that the
slave has broken the contract and no longer wishes to be in service” (32-3). The returning
of the collar as an expression of leaving their relationship indicates that the Master/slave
relationship, while allowing one partner to have ownership over the other, also allows for
the submissive partner leave the relationship when they are no longer satisfied by it.
The specific practices of Master/slave can vary from relationship to relationship.
Some Masters require their slaves to perform a variety of household in addition to sexual
tasks (for example, a slave may be required to serve meals to their Masters at a set time,
to clean after their Master, to provide sexual services when asked, to wear certain outfits
or costumes). What is important to note is that the common element of this relationship
style is the subservience of one partner to another, where one agrees to follow the will
and the desire of the dominant partner. In the case of the Feminist Female Slave, she has
agreed to enter into such a relationship and explicitly takes a subservient role to her
sexual and romantic partner.
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It should be noted that although both parties are given equal value within the M/s
relationship (as one cannot exist without the other), they would never have equal power
or consideration within the confines of that relationship. While the partners both have
equal say in negotiating the terms of their relationship before it begins, once the
relationship commences one becomes the clear servant of the other. They are expected to
follow orders otherwise they face punishment. The M/s relationship will never be a sexual
structure in which both partners have equal roles. But practitioners argue that this does
not mean that it is a relationship where the submissive party is a victim, is an unwilling
partner, or is misguided in their value as a human being. The slave possesses the power to
enter into the relationship, to negotiate with her partner about what the relationship will
look like, as well as to leave it if she chooses. Although both partners are necessary for
the relationship, and they are each able to end it, their roles will never be interchangeable.
Sex-Liberal Feminism and BDSM
The BDSM community has changed drastically since Krafft-Ebing first coined the
terms sadism and masochism. In addition to moving from a forced, medicalized
categorization to a self-identification with community membership, as the BDSM
community developed, it has (intentionally or unintentionally) incorporated influences
from other sexual theories and philosophies into its own central tenets. This section will
introduce components of sex-liberal feminism in order to show how influences from this
approach, in particular, are reflected in BDSM community structures, practices, and
justifications used by participants. This is done in order to establish how the FFS can
coherently identify both as a feminist and as a slave.
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This section will outline several foundational components of sex-liberal feminism,
primarily those which have become enshrined in BDSM practices. This will include a
broad overview of what I characterize as sex-liberal feminism, including a brief history of
its development and predominant characteristics such as an emphasis on individual
freedom in sexual expression, the distinction between the public and private spheres, the
transgressive power of BDSM, and the therapeutic value of BDSM practices. Each of
these components will be outlined in this chapter in order to give a full account of the
feminist philosophy that is followed by and influences the FFS.
It should be noted that within this section I will explore an approach to feminism
which has been given multiple names by feminist theorists, but shares similar concepts.
These different labels include sex-positive feminism (Dymock), the pro-sex movement
(Weiss), liberal feminism (Chancer, Weiss), libertarian feminism (Zita), and even sex
radicalism (Queen). In my discussion, I am not conflating these approaches, but
attempting to illustrate the underlying assumptions shared by many of these theoretical
commitments. These assumptions, I argue, are rooted in a liberal individualism applied to
sexual practice and sexual identity. When describing the feminism that has been most
influential to BDSM practices and regulations, I employ the term "sex-liberal" because
the approach used by the FFS and other women in similar relationships involves an
individualistic focus on expression and diversity, maintains a distinction between the
public and the private, and views consent as being of paramount value, and is primarily
focused on sexual practice. These components all come together in the FFS’ view on
sexual expression: a valuation of diverse sexual expression, of individual choice in sexual
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expression, of sexual practices that take place within a scene or in the private sphere, and
of the requirement for informed consent to such sexual practices.
History of BDSM and Feminist Politics:
The development of a positive feminist approach to BDSM began in the 1970s
and 1980s, when lesbian feminist sadomasochists opposed the predominant feminist
thought (known as the radical feminist perspective) at the time. According to this theory,
BDSM practices necessarily perpetuated violence and oppression, particularly against
women. At the Barnard Conference in 1982, a now-notorious feminist conference, it
became clear that some feminists "regarded sadomasochistic practices as inseparable from
patriarchal hierarchies based on relations of dominance and subordination" (Chancer, 79).
The radical feminist perspective held that the practices found in BDSM, even when
practiced by lesbian couples, continued to perpetuate violence due to their reliance on
uneven power between partners. However, those who practiced BDSM were unhappy
with their characterization as either victims or perpetrators of violence, and argued that
the radical feminist position characterized women as disempowered actors and failed “to
see women as sexual subjects in their own rights” (Glick, 20). In response to these
dismissals, feminist lesbian sadomasochists formed groups such as Samois, in order to
publish books such as Coming to Power: Writing and Graphics on Lesbian S/M. This
book offered the space for women to write on their positive experiences of S/M and to
express their disillusionment or discomfort with radical feminist approaches or
understandings of S/M. Pat Califia, a transgender man who formerly identified with and
wrote extensively about lesbian sadomasochism, wrote that:
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The women’s movement has become a moralistic force, and
it can contribute to the self-loathing and misery experienced
by sexual minorities. Because sexual dissenters are already
being trampled on by monolithic, prudish institutions, I
think it is time the women’s movement started taking more
radical positions on sexual issues” (1996, 231).
Califia was not alone in his concern with the radical feminists’ response to S/M and other
sexual practices, as many other feminists were frustrated by what they saw as an attempt
to “deny the possibility of individual or collective resistance through sexuality, even as
they prescribe the parameters for a properly ‘feminist’ sexuality” (Glick, 22). Queen notes
in her paper “Sex Radical Politics, Sex-Positive Feminist Thought, and Whore Stigma”
the dismay she felt when encountering a feminist account of sexuality that failed to
include or reflect her own understanding of sexuality: “I had now learned that a key point
in my understanding of feminism – that it is my and all women's right to explore and
define our own sexuality – was not universally accepted in the community of women who
called themselves feminist" (Queen, 127). While radical feminists viewed their approach
as part of an attempt to raise awareness of the overarching influence of social power, sexliberal feminists were dissatisfied with such an understanding. As a result, sex-liberal
feminists developed their own approach, emphasizing the importance of sexual freedom
for women.
There is an obvious tension between the radical and sex-liberal accounts of
feminism and sexuality at a fundamental level, as both sides view the operation of power
in very different ways. This differing perspective greatly influences how both feminist
philosophies approach women’s sexuality in general. In a very basic sense, for radical
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feminists, power cannot be avoided or separated from our interactions: it influences or
affects all facets of our lives, including our sexual practices. In contrast, for sex-liberal
feminism, power is limited in the crucial sense that our exercise of autonomy and
freedom can overcome the constraints placed upon us by social structures.
Many BDSM practitioners, or practitioners of non-normative sexualities, found
sex-positive feminism to be well suited to their practices due to its focus on freedom in
sexual expression. As Queen notes:
I learned that there is indeed a community of people who
are sex-positive, who don't denigrate, medicalize, or
demonize any form of sexual expression except that which
is not consensual. In our general society -- where sex is
sniggered at, commodified, and guiltily, surreptitiously
engaged in -- being outspokenly sex-positive is sex radical
indeed, for even those of us who love sex are usually
encouraged to find someone else's preferred sexual
expression abhorrent (Queen, 127).
Over time, due to the compatibility between sex-liberal feminism and the BDSM
community, sex-liberal attitudes have become enshrined in BDSM practices as well as in
the justifications provided by BDSM practitioners. What this section has established is
that there is a history of feminist activists and BDSM practitioners working within
feminist frameworks to defend their ability to participate in BDSM as autonomous
beings, not as victims or perpetrators. As well, it establishes the development of a
theoretical and political approach to sexuality, which allows for the freedom to participate
in BDSM. The next section will outline the relationship between sex-liberal feminism and
the liberalism of BDSM theory, including its approach to autonomy and consent, its
valuation of transgressive sexualities, and its approach to power, showing how the
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components of sex-liberal feminist philosophy are consistent (if not overlapping) with the
defining theoretical components of BDSM as a whole.
Feminism, BDSM, and Liberalism:
While sex-liberal feminism emphasizes the value of choice in one’s sexual life, it
is important to note how the feminism found in sex-liberal feminism has interacted with
BDSM. In interviews with BDSM practitioners it appears that there is a discomfort felt by
female submissives in their attempts to reconcile their feminism with their sexual
practices. Many female submissives thought there was a difficulty for women to
simultaneously operate as a feminist and a BDSM practitioner, and some female
submissives struggled with resolving this tension (Weiss, 163-4). On the face of it, sexliberal feminism offers women (and other participants) a way to justify their practices, as
it emphasizes individual autonomy and respect for diverse sexual practices. In a sense,
sex-liberal feminism provides a way for BDSM practitioners to comfortably identify as a
member of the BDSM community as well as a feminist.
In Brame et al’s book Different Loving: The World of Sexual Dominance and
Submission, the authors conducted interviews with numerous BDSM participants,
describing their practices, motivations for participating in BDSM, and their involvement
in BDSM communities. In some of the interviews with female slaves, the participants
described a tension between their feminist beliefs and their response from the feminist
community overall. In the interview with “Bambi Bottom”, a permanent slave to her
husband, Bambi describes the conflict she feels as both a feminist and a slave:
I used to consider myself to be a [committed] feminist… I
[now] consider myself to be a true feminist. I have made
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my own choices about my life. I have chosen what I know
and believe makes me the most happy… If someone
chooses to see this as giving in to the patriarchal society,
she is seeing me on a superficial level and is being
purposely obtuse (179).
Bambi’s narrative describes the way that sex-liberal feminists attempt to resolve the
issues raised by radical feminists: they, as individuals, have made the free choice to
participate in BDSM and for that reason it is not oppressive, and it is not the result of
oppressive social forces. For others to claim that her choice has been unduly influenced is
both insulting and belittling to her agency. As Victoria notes in the same book, “For me,
feminism is extremely important, but the word that we use most in feminism is choice.
I’m choosing to submit to a man because I want to. When I stop wanting to, I can walk
out the door. I can tell him to go sit on it and rotate if I want to” (54). Both interviewees
see their roles in these relationships as the result of their own, individual choice,
independent of anything that takes place outside of their BDSM communities. As the
authors of Different Loving note, “our female interviewees agreed that real sexual
freedom implies freedom of choice: One should be free to decide for oneself what kind of
sexual activity affords the maximum of sexual pleasure” (54). Brame et al’s interviews
bring forward the important characteristics of feminism for feminist BDSM practitioners:
choice, freedom, and individuality.
The tension between differing feminist beliefs is not only found in Brame et al.’s
interviews. In her paper “Thoughts on Rope, Submission, and Feminism,” Madison
Young argues that sexual freedom is a necessary component of many kinds of feminism,
such as sex-positive feminism, and because of this feminism and submission are
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compatible. She claims that this is because sex-positive feminism “bases itself on the idea
that sexual freedom is an essential component of women’s freedom” (55). Although she
uses the phrase “sex-positive”, Young’s account falls in line with what I call sex-liberal,
due to its focus on individual choice and individual sexual freedoms. She views her role
as a submissive not as one where she is a victim, but rather as a true expression of taking
control and embracing her sexuality (55). Young doesn’t see herself as falling in line
with normative requirements for women’s sexuality, but rather sees her sexual
relationships as an expression of her authentic self. Similar to Brame’s interviewees,
Young emphasizes the importance of individual and sexual freedom as a necessary part of
feminism.
In her research, Margot Weiss also acknowledges the difficulty some women face
reconciling their feminist politics and BDSM practices, and how they often rely on liberal
political components in order to justify their positions: “the majority of my interviewees
resolved any potential conflict between feminism and BDSM with a liberal analysis,
arguing that SM is consensual, that SM practices and roles are freely chosen, and that SM
is empowering, and thus compatible with feminism” (164). Her own interview with
Teramis, a female slave, reveals the same logic: “I see no conflict at all between being a
slave and being a feminist. Slave is about choice. Feminism is about choice” (164). The
pattern that emerges from these interviews and research is the incorporation of a sexliberal logic into a feminism that is commonly articulated by female slaves. Such an
approach to feminism and sexuality allows their roles as female submissives to not be
seen as necessarily in conflict with their feminism, even in cases where they submit to
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male dominants, so long as the submissive role is one that they truly desire and have
freely chosen through an expression of their individual autonomy.
Safe, Sane, Consensual
The justifications that we have seen used by many female submissive BDSM
practitioners are expressions of the sex-liberal logic that defends the freedom of
individual choice, and the freedom of sexual expression. Sex-liberal feminism, then, aims
to provide a freedom for women to choose their own sexual expression. It does not wish
to rely on heteronormative scripts, and it does not wish to provide rigid ideals of feminist
sexualities, as is claimed to be found in radical feminism. Rather, sex-liberal feminism
focuses on the value of consent and negotiation, which coincides with the BDSM
community mantra of Safe, Sane, Consensual.
Safe, Sane, Consensual [SSC] is quite possibly the most important mantra found
within the BDSM community and is described as the “philosophical core” of BDSM
practices (Brame et al, 49). The mantra was designed in order to ensure that BDSM
practices do not cause unnecessary or unwanted emotional and physical pain. ‘Safe’
refers to the use of safe words or the discussion of limitations for both or all participants.
These are negotiated before the event begins, with all parties coming to a full agreement.
Safe words are words or phrases that are used by the submissive to indicate that the play
has gone beyond the limits of participants’ comfort (Brame et al, 50). It is the phrase that
forces the play to stop immediately.
‘Sane’ refers to the fact that the activities are “done for the pleasure of everyone
involved. Erotic play should not cause emotional anguish; it should not abuse the
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submissive’s vulnerability or subject a submissive to unreasonable risk. And a submissive
should not have to worry that the dominant will exceed his or her personal limits” (Brame
et al, 51). Limits are incredibly important for BDSM practitioners and it is important that
these practitioners negotiate them in advance of play in order to ensure the happiness of
all involved. Going beyond these negotiated limits can lead to trauma and other kinds of
harm and thus it is very important that all practitioners respect them (Brame et al, 51).
Sane also is seen as referring to a knowledge of all the potential risks and harms that
could come from the activities: “activities are considered sane when participants are
informed of the risks and in full control of their faculties when making the decision to
take them” (Newmahr, 146).
It is often claimed that consent is that which differentiates violence from BDSM.
As Brame et al note, “clear, informed, and verbalized consent is the moral dividing line
between brutality and D&S” (52). There is a common thread that runs through SSC which
requires that parties are fully informed of the practices taking place, are in a space where
they are able to make reasonable decisions regarding their own actions, and do not feel
pressured into agreeing to certain practices. SSC allows parties to make decisions for
themselves about what they wish to do, what their limitations are, and allows them to
have the ultimate authority over practices they participate in. SSC possesses the same
liberal logic that Brame’s interview subjects mentioned, as it emphasizes individual
choice, individual freedom, and individual agency as foundational and necessary for good
sexual practice. SSC gives the individual, even the individual in a submissive position,
the power to decide what practices to participate in or to be a part of. They are not
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powerless, but agents who choose to give their power up to another under circumstances
that are thoroughly negotiated in advance.
Scenes and the Public/Private Divide
BDSM theory and sex-liberalism share a similar perspective on the way in which
the public and private are used in BDSM. These approaches both view the operation and
expression of BDSM as taking place within specific, concrete locations, known as
‘scenes’. Scenes are specific in that they have an explicit beginning and ending, and
concrete in that they take place in particular locations (such as a BDSM party, community
event, or bedroom). These scenes allow for BDSM practices to take place in a context
that is supposed to be insulated from larger social forces and isolated from public
consumption. Robin Bauer notes in his paper “Transgressive and Transformed Gendered
Sexual Practices and White Privileges: the Case of the Dyke/Trans BDSM Communities”
that the existence of a separate, safe space is what gives BDSM communities the
opportunity to transgress and transform social taboos and boundaries (234), and Margot
Weiss reinforces this when she notes that this reliance on a separation between the public
and private means that “all private (coded as consensual) decisions have no effects on
others or on the social world” (166). The separation between public and private creates a
separation that practitioners feel grants them the freedom to act out certain sexual
practices that may not be acceptable (or are seen as taboo) in public forums. The private
sphere grants participants the freedom to express their sexual desires without fear of
judgment.
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The scene is of the utmost importance for the practice of BDSM. It is both the
primary form of expression for BDSM practitioners, as well as the primary moment of
analysis for those who write on BDSM. The scene offers a unique location, as it is not
only treated as separate from the real world: it is also viewed as that which is pure
fantasy. As Hopkins claims:
The use of the term ‘scene’ exposes a critical, central aspect
of SM culture. SM is constructed as a performance, as a
staging, a production, a simulation in which participants are
writers, producers, directors, actors, and audience.
Importantly, this is a simulation recognized as such.
Participants know they are doing a scene. They have sought
out other performers (123).
Weiss also emphasizes the distinction between the public and private that exists
for many BDSM members. She notes that the way in which BDSM communities justify
themselves emphasizes the role of “consent, negotiation, and free choice”, which then
come together to create “an unbreachable boundary between the private, consensual
scene, and the public, social world” (166). The use of scenes as a requirement for SM
activities implies that these actions do not take place in the “real world” – they instead
occur in a separate location where patriarchal violence does not exist in the same way that
it does in the broader social sphere.
The separation between the scene and the general world reinforces SM’s location
as a site of fantasy, rather than reality. Pat Califia advances this thesis when he claims:
The key word to understanding S/M is fantasy. The roles,
dialogue, fetish costumes, and sexual activity are part of the
drama or ritual... A sadomasochist is well aware that a role
adopted during a scene is not appropriate during other
interactions and that a fantasy role is not the total sum of
her being (Califia, 1996, 232).
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The words used to describe S&M activities reinforce the separation that exists between
the BDSM world and the “real world”. Fantasy cannot exist (or be acted out) in all facets
of one’s life, otherwise it ceases to exist as fantasy. Califia’s representation of BDSM
utilizes a kind of containment for these practices. While a female slave might not feel
comfortable going grocery shopping in her collar, it does not mean that the part of her
being which identifies with BDSM is not present or not represented (for example, perhaps
her Master tells her what to buy, or what to wear, or gives some other order that is still
based in the power imbalance of their relationship). For Califia, though, BDSM is
restricted to the scene and particular events and does not belong elsewhere. As Weiss
notes: “In this fantasized split between the ‘real world’ and the scene, SM’s paradigmatic
theatricality becomes important: sexual encounters are called ‘scenes’; one ‘plays’ with
one’s SM partners; and roles, costumes, and props are a crucial part of SM play” (17).
The scene gives SM practitioners a specific location where their actions and activities are
confined – the practices are said to not extend beyond the scene, and power imbalances
enacted by performers within this scene are consciously created and maintained by them
for a specific period of time. The scene operates as a site of ultimate freedom in which
one can act in ways they have only dreamed of, and without judgment.
The Feminist Female Slave
The diverse concepts from this chapter come together to give context to the case
of the Feminist Female Slave. But it is still important that, as we outline the theories and
concepts that surround the FFS, we also describe her and her particular relationship. We
can imagine that the Feminist Female Slave is a woman who discovered the BDSM
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community on her own. It is through this community that she developed a relationship
with the man who became her Master. What is important about this component of her
case is that the FFS had previously discovered the BDSM community before being part of
her relationship. She was not introduced to the community through her Master, but rather
discovers him through her community. This pursuit shows that the FFS was not
indoctrinated into taking on her slave role through her relationship with her Master, rather
she discovered her own desire for that particular relationship style outside of the
relationship she has with her Master. This is not meant to imply that she is necessarily
autonomous because she had a previous interest in Master/slave, rather it is meant to
emphasize the individual desire and interest she held in this relationship before meeting
her Master. It should be noted that even if he had entered the community through her
Master, it does not necessarily mean she is non-autonomous, but I think if that were the
case it would cast another layer of concern on her by other feminist community members
regarding the influence of others on her choice to become a slave.
The FFS’ duties with her Master require household tasks, such as cleaning and
preparing meals, and also those that are sexual in nature. While she is required to perform
tasks to please her Master, he also ensures that she receives pleasure in those tasks as
well. She is expected to perform all tasks as he demands, and faces punishments for
failure to perform them. These punishments can include light spankings, or some other
sexualized discipline.
The FFS identifies as a feminist in the same way that many of the slaves in this
chapter have done. She feels that she has made the autonomous choice to enter into her
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relationship, and that it reflects who she truly is, and does not feel that she is oppressed by
her Master. She also feels that her relationship might not be best for all women, and that
she, in fact, thinks that everyone ought to follow the sexual relationship that suits them
best, so long as it is consensual. She believes in a sexual freedom that allows sexual
expression for all, regardless of gender, sexual orientation, and kink orientation. Her
feminist identification is quite in-line with a liberal perspective on sexuality, and fits in
quite nicely with the predominant philosophy of the BDSM community. Her viewpoint is
quite feminist in nature because she acknowledges how dominant social forces, like
misogyny or sexism, can limit women’s sexual expressions, but is adamant that her
sexual relationship has not limited her and is rather an expression of her sexual freedom.
The Feminist Female Slave, then, found her role as a slave after coming to be a part of the
BDSM community on her own, holds no predominant religious affiliation, and views her
role as expressive of her feminist beliefs in a wide range of sexual diversity and sexual
freedoms for individuals.
This chapter has aimed to introduce the community and philosophy surrounding
the Feminist Female Slave, in order to provide greater context to her case.
Philosophically, the case of the Feminist Female Slave centres on the use of sex-liberal
feminism, as its tenets find expression in the BDSM community both in its practices as
well as its foundational tenets. Sex-liberal feminism, as an account of autonomy,
however, has tensions with the relational accounts of autonomy described in the previous
chapter, due to its emphasis on individual choice and freedom as being separate from the
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external world. This tension will be explored more fully in the next chapter. As we saw in
the way that the female submissives, such as Bambi Bottom, justified their chosen roles
as submissives, their justification is based within a sex-liberal approach to autonomy,
whereby individual choice is of the utmost importance, and the justification does not take
into account the operation of social powers in the way that relational autonomy does. This
leads to a tension between the two feminist approaches to autonomy, which we will see
when we compare their responses to the problem of the Feminist Female Slave.
The Feminist Female Slave, as briefly introduced in this chapter, provides
feminist accounts of autonomy with a problematic case not merely because she aims to
submit autonomously to another, but because she aims to submit autonomously to a man
while within the confines of a romantic and sexual relationship. The uneven power
structure between partners, with the woman in this relationship on the bottom, is
discomforting for many feminist accounts of autonomy, and raises particular concerns for
relational autonomy (especially the Feminist Intuition), as the interaction between social
power structures, such as patriarchy, and women’s autonomy is of concern for them. This
tension will be explored in the next chapter, as we look at the way in which relational
autonomy theorists respond to the problem of female autonomous submission, and
provide a much more detailed outline of the case of the FFS, showing how she challenges
the assumptions found within those accounts of autonomy.
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Chapter 3: Feminist Relational Autonomy and Female Submission
To this point, this project has aimed to establish: 1) that feminist relational
accounts of autonomy offer the most suitable approach when evaluating women’s claims
to submitting autonomously to male partners, and 2) the case of the Feminist Female
Slave, a woman who simultaneously identifies as a feminist and as the submissive partner
in a Master/slave BDSM relationship. In this chapter I provide an overview of the way
feminist discussions of autonomy frame the problem of autonomous submission—
whether an individual can maintain their autonomy while submitting to another. I argue
that even though their responses to these cases may differ greatly, feminist relational
accounts of autonomy often rely on a similar, limited, representation of the submissive
woman in their discussions. I will establish that there is a tendency to view submissive
women as possessing similar characteristics, particularly regarding their religious or
community affiliations, their endorsement of restrictive and essentialist gender roles, and
their relationship with feminism. These common characteristics, I argue, result in a
representation of female submission as largely homogenous, and thus ignore the diversity
of women’s sexual lives and expressions.
As noted in Chapter 1, “relational autonomy” is a broad term, which encompasses
a variety of approaches to autonomy that acknowledge the social-embeddedness of
persons. It is not my purpose to declare that any particular form of relational autonomy
covered in this chapter is more valuable or appropriate than the others. I do not endorse
one form of relational autonomy to the exclusion of others. Rather, the purpose of this
chapter is to establish a pattern in how these accounts represent female submission and to
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show that they rest on assumptions that limit their engagement with female submission in
general.
It should also be noted that by claiming that there is homogeneity in the
representation of female submission, I do not imply that the cases of female submission
used by relational autonomy theorists are entirely interchangeable. These authors I
discuss do no discuss identical cases. However, I argue that the underlying characteristics
of these cases are similar enough that their engagement with female submission has failed
to move substantially beyond the considerations and concerns first outlined by Thomas
Hill Jr. in the 1970s. The cases that I present in this chapter often offer a combination of
some of the following characteristics: the submissive woman is often described as
following a restrictive religious or community order, she views her role as following a
particular gendered ideology, she is viewed as a puppet of men rather than an agent in her
own right, and there is a failure to consider her as either following feminist ideals, or she
is decidedly against what she views as feminist values. For the sake of brevity, I will refer
to this general description of the female submissive in these cases as the Relational
Autonomy Female Submissive (RAFS). It could be argued that these characteristics are
necessary to include in our discussions of women’s autonomy because these
characteristics are what really gave rise to many feminist debates regarding the
insufficiency of non-feminist accounts of autonomy. For that reason, these cases are quite
valuable. However, they still fail to provide a full story of female submission and for that
reason discussions of the RAFS cannot exhaust our discussions of female submission and
autonomy.
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I introduce the case of the Feminist Female Slave (FFS) as an instance of female
submission to challenge the assumptions found in the general framework provided by
relational autonomy theorists. I argue that through the FFS’ participation in the BDSM
community, she challenges each of the assumptions found in the case of the RAFS: the
FFS identifies as a sex-positive feminist, she pursues non-normative sexual expressions,
and she discourages gender essentialist or universalized gender expressions. The
representation of a self-identified feminist and proponent of diverse gender and sexual
expression directly challenges the contemporary representation of female submission in
feminist discussions of autonomy. The Feminist Female Slave advances discussions of
female sexuality by encouraging a wider representation of a variety of women’s sexual
lives.
Relational Autonomy and Female Submission
While theories of relational autonomy have common concerns regarding the
influence of the social sphere on individuals’ autonomy, each responds differently to the
possibility of autonomous submission in general. The work of Diana Meyers, introduced
in Chapter 1, is categorized as a procedural account of autonomy. This means that on her
account, actions are considered autonomous if they result from a particular decisionmaking process. This means that, for her, questions of autonomy are not determined by
the content of the decision. The focus is rather on the process undertaken by an individual
in making the decision. Meyers’ proceduralism can be seen in her identification of selfdiscovery, self-definition, and self-direction as necessary competencies in autonomous
decision-making. In contrast, the procedural account provided by Andrea Westlund
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requires autonomous individuals to partake in a dialogical reflection: they must possess
the skills to respond to critical feedback from others. John Christman’s work focuses on
the history of the individual agent and requires that an individual not feel alienated from
decisions that they make.
While this is a very brief overview and does not do justice to the subtleties of the
theories developed by Meyers, Westlund, and Christman, it is important to establish that
these theories, though varied in the requirements they set for autonomy, each focus on the
importance of the underlying procedure to be taken in autonomous decision-making
rather than the particular content or results of the decision-making process. This means
that procedural accounts of autonomy could be amenable to declaring an individual’s
submission as autonomous, so long as one follows the proper procedure. For example, if a
submissive woman were to submit while satisfying Meyers’ requirements for selfdiscovery, self-definition, and self-direction, her submission could be considered
autonomously chosen. Procedural accounts of autonomy do not declare female
submission to be non-autonomous merely because of the kind of relationship it entails.
In contrast to the proceduralism found in the work of Meyers’, Westlund, and
Christman, other relational autonomy theorists like Marina Oshana, Sonya Charles, and
Natalie Stoljar endorse what is known as a strong substantive account of relational
autonomy. This form of relational autonomy requires that a decision possess a specific
characteristic or satisfy an external criterion—i.e., a criterion that is not based in the
internal deliberations of the agent—in order to be considered autonomous. One prominent
example, introduced in Chapter 1, is Natalie Stoljar’s Feminist Intuition. According to
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this criterion, to be autonomous, one’s decisions must be free from the influence of
oppressive norms of femininity. Hers is an explicit case of strong substantive autonomy,
as the process taken in one’s deliberation is not relevant to considering questions of
autonomy: the focus is instead on the content of the decision made—on what kind of
decision is being made. As a further example of strong substantive autonomy, Marina
Oshana argues that autonomy requires an individual make decisions as an independent
individual. This means that they should not have been influenced by social, psychological
or physical restraints which would limit the realization of their goals, and that their
decisions can be made without relying on both the “judgment and the will of others” (95).
Sonya Charles builds upon the work of Natalie Stoljar and her notion of the Feminist
Intuition in arguing that autonomy requires that we ensure that our decisions are not
influenced by internalized oppression.
Unlike proceduralist accounts, which allow for a variety of expressions of
autonomous actions, strong substantive accounts of autonomy are more restrictive in
which actions are considered autonomous. This means that the theories developed by
Oshana, Charles, and Stoljar may not necessarily consider female submission to male
partners to be autonomous, regardless of whether that same decision would meet the
requirements for autonomy set out by procedural theorists.
It is important to introduce this brief overview of the terrain in feminist relational
approaches to autonomy because it needs to be made clear that while many theories fall
under the same umbrella of relational autonomy, and even though they share the same
commitments of incorporating social-embededness into discussions of autonomy, they do
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not necessarily respond to questions of autonomy in the same manner. This is especially
true in the case of female submission. These theories emphasize different components
when evaluating questions of autonomy, which means that different theories of relational
autonomy can result in conflicting responses when evaluating the same cases. Although I
have briefly sketched some of the differences above, these will become more pronounced
as I present the case studies. My purpose in providing these explanations is not to declare
one theory as superior to others, but to highlight the theoretical distinctions found in
similar case studies in spite of the similar frameworks they construct of the female
submissive. Rather than presenting either strong substantive or procedural accounts of
relational autonomy as superior, I hold that they are both guilty of overlooking
considerations of the female submissive that go beyond the standard representation of
female submission. I build on this by introducing the Feminist Female Slave in order to
expand the characteristics attributed to female submissives.
The Gendered Role of Men and Women:
One of the more predominant characteristics of the representation of female
submission by relational autonomy theorists is the reliance on separate (though not
necessarily unequal) roles for men and women in their family lives, interpersonal
relationships, and social interactions. Women are represented as puppets of men, whereby
their role exists primarily to support them, rather than as agents in their own right. This
gendered ideology is predominantly represented in case studies developed by John
Christman and Sonya Charles.
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John Christman introduces the case of Faiza X in The Politics of Persons:
Individual Autonomy and Socio-Historical Selves, in order to highlight feminist responses
to what he claims is a voice amongst the moral landscape. Faiza’s role as a submissive
woman is heavily based on a cultural prescription of very particular and rigid roles for
men and women. As is described in her case, Faiza X is a North African woman whose
attempt to apply for French citizenship failed based on her subservient religious practices.
These practices are based in a “particularly rigid form of Islam (Salasm), in which she
dresses in full-body veil, obeys her husband and other male members of her family in all
important matters, and rarely leaves the house except to bring her children to school”
(176). Ultimately, Faiza X was unsuccessful in her attempt to gain French citizenship as
the court considered her to have “adopted a radical practice of her religion incompatible
with the essential values of the French community, notably with the principle of equality
of the sexes” (176). As Christman notes, the French court claims that Faiza’s life was one
in which she lived almost as a recluse, where “‘she lives in total submission to the men in
her family… and the idea of contesting this submission doesn’t even occur to her’”
(Associated Press in Christman, 176). Christman notes that this lack of reflection may
mean that she fails to satisfy the requirements for autonomy, but he argues that accounts
of autonomy themselves must also include a wide variety of capacities for “care,
intimacy, social interaction, and the like that will be crucial for socially embedded
persons to flourish” (177).
Given that she is so dependent upon the male members of her family, Faiza’s role
both inside and outside the house are very different from those of her husband and other
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male family members. Decisions regarding her dress, her actions, and other matters in her
life are left up to her husband and other male family members, and this very rigid
gendered division of responsibilities and expressions is what resulted in the denial of
Faiza X’s application for French citizenship. These requirements and restrictions are
placed on her because of her gender, which is seen as violating the equality of the sexes
espoused by the French government, and thus limiting her ability to assimilate into
French culture (176). Faiza’s role as a woman requires that she work to support or follow
the men in her life, rather than following her own unique desires and needs.
Sonya Charles builds upon the work of strong substantive theorists who hold that
normative, or external, conditions should be present within one’s decision in order for it
to be considered autonomous. In her paper “How Should Feminist Autonomy Theorists
Respond to the Problem of Internalized Oppression?” Charles uses the case of the
Surrendered Wife to elaborate Natalie Stoljar’s Feminist Intuition (409). As described in
Chapter 1, the Feminist Intuition claims that decisions that are influenced by oppressive
norms of femininity cannot be autonomous. The Surrendered Wife is part of an organized
movement for women, which claims more than 100 000 women in their program (417).
The Surrendered Wife movement claims, “‘the control women wield at work and with
children must be left at the front door of any marriage to revitalize intimacy’” (Doyle in
Chambers, 417). Laura Doyle, who developed the Surrendered Wife movement in her
book of the same name, claims that surrendering is not necessarily about subservience,
but about giving up “control (specifically of the finances and her opinions) and learn[ing]
to trust her husband” (417). Couples have described their practices as including wives
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drawing their husband’s baths, “having him approve her list of daily chores, [and] giving
him complete control over when they have sex” (417).
The roles that are expressed by the Surrendered Wives differ greatly from their
husbands. Surrendered Wives are expected to provide a supportive role to their husbands
when in the home, ensuring that husbands maintain control. As in the case of Faiza X, the
division between partners is not based on individual skills or preferences; rather rules are
rigidly prescribed for all, based on gender. The role of the female submissive in both
cases is not negotiated, but rather is embedded in the universalized, gendered vision of the
practice. The women in these cases are expected to enact roles that support or serve their
male spouses, or other male family members, whereby they act as agents of these men,
rather than agents in their own right.
All Women Should be Submissive:
Along with separate roles for men and women, female submissives in relational
accounts of autonomy are often presented as advocating that the role of a female
submissive is not merely correct for the individual women that are the focus of these case
studies, but that all women ought to take these same roles. They follow a particular
gendered ideology that prescribes roles for all men and women, and thus assume that
other women should act the same way. This is similar to the previous characteristic, in
that there is an explicit ascription for submissive roles based on gender, but it also builds
on the previous example by showing how the role of the female submissive is seen as the
proper role that all women ought to take.
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Thomas Hill Jr’s Deferential Wife offers an example of a submissive woman who
views her role as universal for women. While the focus of this paper is primarily directed
towards feminist relational accounts of autonomy and their responses to female
submission, it would be remiss of me not to include Thomas Hill Jr’s work on the
Deferential Wife in this discussion. Hill’s case study has been very influential, and
feminist philosophers have been engaging with it since its publication in the early 1970’s
(see: Superson 2011, Charles 2010).
Hill’s work on female submission and autonomy come together in his discussion
of the Deferential Wife. Hill describes the Deferential Wife as a woman who “is utterly
devoted to serving her husband. She buys the clothes he prefers, invites the guests he
wants to entertain, and makes love whenever he is in the mood” (italics in original, 89).
She puts her husband’s interests and career desires before her own, as she “willingly
moves to a new city in order for him to have a more attractive job, counting her own
friendships and geographical preferences insignificant by comparison” (89).
The Deferential Wife responds to concerns outlined by feminists by asserting her
belief that the submissive role of women is universal. As Hill describes her, the
Deferential Wife: “readily responds to appeals from Women’s Liberation that women are
mentally and physically equal, if not superior, to men. She just believes that the proper
role for a woman is to serve her family” (89) She is capable of responding to the concerns
raised by feminists about her choices, but these do not change her perspective, as “no one
is trampling on her rights, she says, for she is quite glad, and proud, to serve her husband
as she does” (89).
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The Deferential Wife’s role as submissive to her husband is one that is seen by her
as having a universal applicability. She does not defend her role as one that suits her best,
although she claims she is quite happy in her role, rather she holds that she takes this role
because it is the right one for women to take. The range of options for women’s lives is
thus quite narrow and limited. This universalization of submission is also seen in the
work of the Surrendered Wives, as the expression of the wife drawing her husband’s bath
and giving up control to him in the home is seen as the ‘proper’ role of women. These
perspectives on subservience are not represented as suitable for the individual female
submissive, but are presented as the proper expression of womanhood, of what it means
to be a wife, of what it means to be a woman. The universalization of female submission
is presented as either explicit in, or as an undertone to many of these cases.
The Submissive Woman as Religious:
Religious devotion is a common element in the case studies of female submission
used by relational autonomy theorists. It should be noted that this does not mean that
religious involvements or affiliations necessarily prescribe restrictive roles for women,
but merely that some religious communities offer precise roles for women and that
submission is frequently religiously motivated in case-studies presented. The women’s
communities are often presented as belittling the intelligence of women, limiting their
opportunities for growth and independence, and potentially limiting their ability for a
fulfilling life. For Faiza X, religion appears to play an integral role in influencing the
structure of both her daily life and overall life path. Faiza X leads an extremely restricted
life because her religious community prescribes it. In cases such as these, religion is
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presented as the predominant guiding source for submission and for how this submission
ought to be expressed. The women’s submission is not presented as a choice they have
made; rather their subservience is part of the prescribed role for women in their particular
religion.
Diana Meyers’ introduces the case of the Housewife in “Personal Autonomy and
the Paradox of Feminine Socialization”. The Housewife is described as a traditional
woman who “summons the courage to demand that her child’s teacher show respect for
values she cherishes” (625). The traditional woman, in this case, is one who is a
Christian fundamentalist who is angered by the teacher’s glib
dismissal of creationism, and [who] is a fundamentalist preacher’s
poorly educated daughter who has never been exposed to less
benighted theological doctrines and who has never questioned her
faith. Plainly, her conduct is heteronomous to the extent that it
voices beliefs that she regards as immune to criticism (626).
Meyers’ traditional woman is one who was raised in a religious household and expressed
her autonomy through the defense of her beliefs against those who are dismissive of
them. The role of religion in her life is quite influential, as it is the source of her belief in,
and defense of, creationist doctrines. Unlike the case of Faiza X it is not clear how the
religion of the Housewife has influenced her role within her family. However, it is clear
that her rigid religious upbringing has influenced her beliefs and has limited her in some
way, such as with regard to her education and her lack of critical self-reflection.
The Taliban Woman is a fictional case developed by Marina Oshana to
demonstrate that just because an individual endorses their role, does not mean they are
autonomous. The Taliban Woman “has embraced the role of subservience and the
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abdication of independence that it demands, out of reverence, a sense of purpose, and an
earnest belief in the sanctity of this role as espoused in certain passages of the Qu’aran”
(104). We are told that she was not always so devoted to her religious community in this
way, as she “had previously enjoyed a successful career as a physician” (104). Since then,
however, she has chosen to devote herself to her religion, and with that come certain
requirements for how her religious devotion ought to be practiced and the impact that it
has on her life. As Oshana notes, the Taliban woman “can no longer practice
medicine…She is not permitted to support herself financially. She has no voice in the
manner and duration of any schooling that her children, particularly her daughters
receive” (104). The Taliban Woman is also subject to punishment when she breaks rules,
as “she knows that any transgression, any show of independence counts as heretical
defiance and invites punishment both swift and harsh” (104). However, she nonetheless
endorses and values her life-choices, as they are “consistent with [her] spiritual and social
values, [and] provide her with a sense of worth, and satisfy her notion of well-being”
(104).
We can gather, from Oshana’s description, that the Taliban Woman and her
dedication to her role in her community and family are heavily based in religious
tradition. This is similar to the case of Faiza X and Meyers’ Housewife, where religion
plays a major role in the practices and lives of these women. It is important to note,
though, that in these cases the influence of religion serves to limit women’s options for
their romantic and sexual relationship structures. Religion is not viewed as providing
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greater opportunities to submissive women, rather it endorses rigid gendered ideologies
that are viewed as limiting women’s agency.
The Submissive Woman is not a Feminist:
The most significant similarity amongst the cases used by relational autonomy
theorists is that there is no recognition or acknowledgement of the possibility that the
female submissive could be a feminist or could even be committed to feminist ideals. Of
the cases presented in this paper, Westlund’s Anti-Feminist case offers us the most
explicit reference to the issue, but Westlund fails to explicitly outline why her female
submissive is averse to feminist principles.
In “Selflessness and Responsibility for Self: Is Deference Compatible with
Autonomy?” Andrea Westlund focuses on what she calls self-abnegating deference.
Westlund argues that this kind of deference is suspect, because it “expresses an attitude
that is more intuitively self-undermining – to abnegate oneself is, in some sense, to deny
or to efface oneself” (italics in original, 486). Rather, Westlund claims that individuals are
able to “function interpersonally as autonomous agents” through responsibility for self.
This takes place when one is able to hold themselves as “answerable, for one’s
endorsements, to external critical perspectives” (495). She introduces the case of the
Deferential Wife as an example of a self-abnegating individual, but notes that it is not
merely the Deferential Wife’s subservient position that renders her non-autonomous.
Rather, Westlund claims that it is her inability to respond to the criticism of others that is
more deeply problematic.
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In explaining that it is not the case that submissive women are necessarily lacking
in autonomy, Westlund introduces the case of the extreme Anti-Feminist (the AF). Like
the Deferential Wife, the Anti-Feminist believes that “women ought to put their own
interests last and defer to their husbands in all matters relevant to their joint lives” (512).
While Westlund doesn’t explicitly outline her religious or community affiliations, she
does note that the AF “may place herself within a religious community whose creed she
shares and whose lifestyle she values, or she may gesture toward some other, secular
account of women’s proper role in the family” (512). As well, Westlund claims she might
not be particularly intelligent, as “we needn’t imagine that she is especially sophisticated
or subtle” (512).
Unlike the Deferential Wife, the Anti-Feminist is able to engage in some
“justificatory dialogue about her deference. She is capable of engaging in a form of such
dialogue with herself, moreover, and tends to do so in moments of doubt. She exercises,
both inter- and intra-personally, a capacity for holding herself answerable to external
critical perspectives on her choices and conduct” (512). The Anti-Feminist is able to
respond to the concerns and considerations of others. She may not find that such a
dialogue sways her resolve, but it is her participation in such discussions that allows her
to express her autonomy.
Westlund hints that the Anti-Feminist’s role is influenced by normative
representations of gender, whether they are based in religious or sexual community
traditions, but fails to give an exact description of the motivating factors for the AntiFeminist. We can be quite certain that she does not identify with feminist considerations,
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due to her name, and can see that her dedication to her role is of a universal nature,
meaning that she imagines it ought to apply to all women.
Hill’s Deferential Wife is one of the few cases, like Westlund’s Anti-Feminist, to
acknowledge feminism. However, the Deferential Wife distances herself from feminist
concerns. Although Hill claims that the Deferential Wife is aware of the work of
feminists, who want to educate her about her worth, she feels that the role she has taken is
the one that is best for her and other women. Implicit in this is the belief that her role or
viewpoints may be incompatible with feminist commitments (89). Although the
Deferential Wife may not be actively opposed to feminism, she sees it as irrelevant to
herself. Faiza X’s case also presents a view that sees men and women as expressing very
different, fixed roles based on gender. These cases fail to acknowledge the possibility that
the female submissive could be committed to any feminist ideals, such as a strong voice
and desire for women’s rights and freedoms, including pursuing individual choices for
one’s life path. Instead, these cases often present the female subject as operating in
opposition to those ideals. In short, none of these cases offers a representation of a female
submissive that identifies as a feminist.
As we can see in the above cases, the female submissive as represented in
relational autonomy is not necessarily a monolithic being. Case studies that engage with
female submission are not interchangeable, and often offer different considerations of the
female submissive’s motivations, desires, and the context surrounding her submission.
However, when looking at the characteristics that are most prominent in the
representation of the female submissive in relational autonomy, it becomes clear that
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there are common threads in her representation. Her dedication to religion, her
essentialization of female submission, her endorsement of separate gender roles, and her
disinterest in or her rejection of feminism come together to present a similar
representation of female submission. In the next section I re-introduce the Feminist
Female Slave in order to show how her motivations and relationship to her submissive
role directly challenges the representation of female submission in relational autonomy.
The Feminist Female Slave
While the FFS takes a very specific and fixed role in her relationship with her
Master, this does not necessarily mean that she views this relationship structure as one
that others ought to follow, nor does she claim that it is universal. The FFS views her
relationship as suitable for her, but not necessarily suitable for all. This position reflects
the FFS’s dedication to individual choice; she sees her role to be the result of her own
expression of choice, a choice of sexual expression that ought to be offered to all women.
Her position is consistent with the BDSM community’s perspective on choice in sexual
roles and expression. Her membership in the BDSM community offers her a wide variety
of relationship and sexual structures and expressions, as women are not required or
expected to take submissive roles or to participate in heterosexual relationships merely
because she is a woman. From this she is not required to take a role as a slave in order to
maintain membership in the BDSM community. While several of the theorists provide
examples of female submission in which her religious commitments include a rigid
understandings of women's roles (especially in marriage) the BDSM female slave is not
under those same restrictions because of her own community membership. The Feminist
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Female Slave could have been the Feminist Female Dominant or the Feminist Female
Sadist while maintaining the same role and value within her community.
As well, the Feminist Female Slave does not subscribe to gender essentialism. As
she does not belong to any communities that dictate rigid gender roles or gender
expressions (it is, in fact, quite the opposite), she views her role as one choice among
many as she can freely express herself, sexually and romantically. It was not her “natural
path” to take a submissive role to her partner, and nor does she think this is her only
available option. To her, this does not mean that it is a better choice than the one that the
previous cases made, merely that this was a choice that she either sought out or made
later in life. She was not confined by an upbringing that taught that she (or women in
general) ought to become slaves.
It might be difficult for some to imagine that a feminist identification could be
compatible with female submission, particularly in the explicit sense employed by the
FFS. However, many female submissives in the BDSM community do explicitly identify
as feminists, viewing their sexual practices as an expression of the sexual freedom
encouraged by many forms of feminism. As we saw in Chapter 2, interviews with BDSM
participants, such as with Bambi Bottom, reveal that many female submissives identify as
both submissives and as feminists. As the authors of Different Loving noted after their
research, “our female interviewees agreed that real sexual freedom implies freedom of
choice: One should be free to decide for oneself what kind of sexual activity affords the
maximum of sexual pleasure” (54). In her paper “Thoughts on Rope, Submission, and
Feminism,” Madison Young claims there ought to be no conflict between feminism and
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submission as her account of feminism “bases itself on the idea that sexual freedom is an
essential component of women’s freedom” (55). Her role as a submissive is not as a
victim, but is truly an expression of taking control and embracing her sexuality (55).
Female submissives see themselves as expressing feminist sexualities, in that they are
making decisions about what is the best sexual expression for their own self rather than
relying on dominant gendered scripts about how they ought to express their sexuality.
The FFS challenges the construction of the RAFS. The FFS reflects common
elements found in the BDSM community’s understanding of sexuality and gender. As
was mentioned in Chapter 2, BDSM offers a range of practices that are not based in
gender. Men and women can equally take dominant and submissive roles, they can
participate in a range of kinky practices, such as bondage or some kind of fetishistic
practice. Roles are not ascribed based on gender, but are rather available to all. It is
hoped, then, that the FFS partakes in her practices of female submission not because she
was raised to become a female submissive, and not because her religion or ideology
prescribed it to her, but because after participating in a community where a wide range of
options for sexual practices was made available to her, this one role felt best.
Importantly, this is the one role which felt best for her. Just as the FFS did not
follow this role because it was set out as the only role for her, she recognizes that this role
is not one which may be most suitable to other women. She does not expect other women
to become female slaves, and is happy for her friends and family when they also follow
sexual and romantic roles that seem best for them.
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A question that we might ask is: what difference does it make if we consider the
Feminist Female Slave in our discussions of female submission? The answer is that it
challenges the fundamental ways in which we view the female submissive. While the
female submissive's explicit commitment to feminism does not in and of itself mean that
she is autonomous in her decision to become a submissive, it does add another layer of
complexity missing from non-feminist cases. Her feminist background indicates some
understanding of the concept of patriarchy, as well as some awareness of the way in
which gender (and its roles) can restrict others. She might not possess a comprehensive
knowledge of feminism, but she has gained some of its tools regarding gender and sex,
and she feels able to draw on these in her pursuit of her submissive role. I think that such
tools will allow her to challenge some concerns outlined by some of the above case
studies.
While the case studies discussed in this chapter have focused on women who had
taken roles that were either determined for them or fell in line with how they thought
women ought to act in general, the FFS follows merely one of many options for a sexual
and romantic relationship. The FFS offers us a case where an individual was able to
choose from a range of possibilities, chooses to participate in such a relationship not
because it was what was expected of her, but because she felt it was that which best suited
her, and is not necessarily right for everyone. She holds that men and women are equal
and that it is not the proper role of women to submit to men, but that it is up to each
individual and couple to determine how their relationship should function.
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Taking seriously the case of the Feminist Female Slave expands our discussion of
female submission. For feminist philosophers to engage solely with one kind of female
submissive, regardless of how the philosopher evaluates such submission, ignores the
way in which women lead their sexual lives. To declare submission to either be
autonomous or non-autonomous based on a limited representation of submission leaves
her in a position where she is unacknowledged as a ‘proper’ kind of submissive or her
agency is called into question. From a feminist perspective, the case studies of female
submission are not terribly sympathetic—these are women who could be described as
naïve, indoctrinated, or just completely unaware of how they are confined by their roles.
When we fail to consider the representation of female submission outside of these cases,
when we fail to consider what it would look like for women to choose submission while
still identifying as a feminist, we reinforce the negative stereotypes and thus apply them
to all submissive women.
Many of the BDSM interview subjects in Chapter 1 acknowledged the frustration
they feel due to the monolithic representation of female submission by feminists. They
often claim they have to defend their relationships, making clear that they chose to
become slaves, that they do identify as feminists, and that they are happy in their
relationships. Because of the way we respond to these cases of female submission, the
female slave is on the defensive merely by taking the role that she does. I don't think this
provides an adequate representation of female sexuality and for feminist philosophy to
reinforce such a stereotypical representation of female submission is problematic. But this
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can be corrected through the inclusion of the Feminist Female Slave within our
discussions of female submission and autonomy.
I do not offer the Feminist Female Slave as normative for all female submission,
and I do not presume that all accounts of relational autonomy will find that her case
fulfills their account of autonomy. However, including her within our discussions of
women’s autonomy and female sexual submission is valuable because it broadens our
engagement with the topic of female submission and allows us to move beyond a
restricted engagement to offer a more realistic and representative account of female
submission.
The purpose of this chapter was to expose some of the assumptions found in
feminist literature on women’s autonomy in order to provide a counter-example that
offers a more diverse representation of female submission. The cases above, while only a
sampling, fall short of being inclusive. The failure to provide a comprehensive
representation of women’s romantic and sexual relationships has serious consequences
for women’s status as agents. First, to fail to address diverse relationship structures leads
us to commit oversights in both our theoretical and political engagements with women’s
autonomy. For some relationships to be overlooked in our work on autonomy, risks
rendering the women in these relationships invisible to all. We must continue to develop
the theoretical tools to address the reality of women’s lives. The case of the FFS provides
us with a first step in that direction.
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Chapter 4: Autonomy and Consent in BDSM Theory
In the preceding chapters I argued that relational theories of autonomy lack
diversity in their presentation and treatment of female submission. This, I contend, is
problematic because of the way it limits our engagement with women’s sexual
expression. Despite my concerns with the representation of submission in general in this
approach, my purpose is not to declare relational autonomy as insufficient. I contend that
relational autonomy provides important challenges to assumptions found in mainstream
accounts of autonomy, and provides a viable alternative to these. This chapter aims to
identify the features of relational autonomy that make it particularly well-suited to
addressing problems found in the BDSM community’s approach to autonomy.
In this chapter I argue that the current approach to autonomy used by many in the
heterosexual BDSM community10 possesses severe theoretical gaps, which renders it
philosophically inadequate. In order to provide an adequate account of autonomy, the
BDSM community must address challenges directed towards its liberal assumptions,
particularly as these are considered foundational to the community itself and embedded in
the way that BDSM events are structured and the way participants identify as autonomous
and evaluate the autonomy of others. Without addressing these concerns, the BDSM
community runs the risk of endorsing a practice that is insufficiently theorized, open to
abuse, and fails to apply to all members of the practicing community. This chapter will
10
It should be noted that while I speak of the BDSM community in this chapter, I focus on the heterosexual
BDSM community in which the FFS is a member. I do not claim that all BDSM communities are
interchangeable, and that many different BDSM communities may have different viewpoints and
perspectives on autonomy, consent, and other important areas. I focus solely on the BDSM community that
the FFS is a member of.
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highlight these areas of concern, showing how it is the BDSM community’s commitment
to a liberal account of autonomy that results in its theoretical gaps, and the effect that it
has on the BDSM community and its practices. My argument builds upon many of the
characteristics of autonomy in BDSM highlighted in Chapter 2. Finally, I will show how
important features of relational accounts of autonomy can address these concerns and can
be used to supplement this community’s approach to autonomy in order to make it more
nuanced and realistic.
In this chapter I make two major claims regarding the use of autonomy in the
BDSM community. First, I argue that the approach to autonomy used by many BDSM
communities relies on problematic assumptions about individual autonomy that fail to
account for the breadth of practices used in BDSM communities, fail to provide sufficient
room for critical discussion of concepts central to BDSM such as consent, and do not
address the influence of the social sphere upon BDSM practitioners and practices. I will
show that these limitations are expressed through the foundational BDSM practice of
Safe, Sane, Consensual as well as the liberal notion of autonomy endorsed by the BDSM
community. Second, I argue that in light of these problems, BDSM communities ought to
adopt or incorporate a relational approach to autonomy, as it offers a more nuanced
approach to cases of the long-term, romantic relationship with explicitly uneven power
dynamics such as the Master/slave relationship, acknowledges the influence of the social
sphere, and it offers room for critical engagement of concepts like consent and autonomy.
I will show how Diana Meyers’ and Andrea Westlund’s relational accounts of autonomy
are able to incorporate the freedom of sexual expression and value of the individual that is
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important to BDSM communities, while still addressing the influence of pernicious
socialization and the way relationships with others affect our autonomy. I will conclude
by discussing how the characteristics found within relational autonomy can deepen the
theory and practice of BDSM.
BDSM and Autonomy
BDSM communities have been rightly concerned with ensuring the autonomy and
consent of all their participants. Responding to accusations that their practices were
harmful or abusive, BDSM communities have explicitly incorporated discussions of
consent into their community events and practices. The criterion they use is known as
Safe, Sane, Consensual [SSC] and has become a general mantra for the community, with
many members viewing this standard as a necessary requirement for safe and healthy
BDSM. Safe, Sane, and Consensual11 is seen as the “basic moral guideline for
contemporary D&S [Dominant and Submissive] relationships” (Brame et al, 49).
As Brame et al note from their research on dominance and submission,
“[c]onsensuality is really the first law of the D&S communities – and with good reason.
Our interviewees incessantly emphasized the consensual nature of D&S, no doubt
because of extreme sensitivity over the popular perceptions of sadomasochists” (52). In
order to ensure that practices are consensual, BDSM communities advocate rigorous
negotiation practices, in which individuals articulate their desires, as well as the practices
that make them uncomfortable or that they find undesirable. The goal of this negotiation
11
It should be noted that some BDSM practitioners use RACK (risk-aware consensual kink), rather than
SSC, due to the perception that SSC sanitized BDSM (Taormino, 21, 22). Regardless of whether a
practitioner subscribes to RACK or SSC as a guiding principle for BDSM practices, my overall concern
with the practice of consensuality in BDSM remains the same, as neither practice appears to unpack the
meaning of consent beyond allowing practices to be applied to oneself and their body.
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process, along with continuous oversight by participating actors, is to ensure that BDSM
practices do not harm individuals in an unintended way, i.e. in a way to which they have
not consented. It should be noted that consent and autonomy in BDSM theory can often
become conflated: whereby a practice is autonomous if one has consented to it. This
means that while discussions may primarily focus on the presence of consent in BDSM,
autonomy is still relevant and intertwined with the discussion.
Consent is a common theme in BDSM-educational books and is often seen as the
starting point for BDSM activities. It is a continuous and always-present component in
discussions of safe BDSM play, but what consent means (beyond voluntarily allowing a
practice to take place) is not explicitly questioned or unpacked. Texts such as Brame et
al’s Different Loving, Tristain Taromino’s The Ultimate Guide to Kink, and Miss
Abernathy’s Erotic Slavehood, present consent as an “explicit, informed, verbal approval
after negotiation, a confident and secure “Yes!”” (Taormino, 16). Consent requires
individuals to have discussed limitations, detailed what the BDSM practices themselves
will involve, and make explicit any concerns that partners may have (ibid). Importantly,
Taormino notes that the process of giving consent in BDSM is one which gives
individuals a time to speak freely, for “when you give consent, you do so willingly,
without pressure, coercion, or reservation. You agree to play, communicate during the
scene, and stop if you need to” (Taormino, 16). Madison Young, in her paper “Thoughts
on Rope, Submission, and Feminism”, views consent as giving legitimacy to kinky sexual
practices. She notes “BDSM is based around power and sensation play with a strong
emphasis on communication and consent. Submissives engaging in this kind of
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consensual sexual activity are validating their sexuality through the act of their
submission” (55). Miss Abernathy notes that the “distinction between BDSM and
barbarism can be summed up in one word: consent” (12). She claims that many roles
found in BDSM, particularly in role play where participants may play as “the plantation
owner and black slave or the Greek prince and captive barbarian warrior,” are “chosen”
(12). The expression of choice is the “key word” for Abernathy (12), who argues that in
the instance of BDSM role-play and expression “we are talking about consenting adults
making rational, informed decisions about their own lives” (13). Consent is clearly seen
as the dividing line between abuse and free action for BDSM practitioners.
Margot Weiss’s ethnography of the San Francisco BDSM scene addresses the
practice or ritual of negotiation in BDSM practices and the arduous lengths to which it
asks participants to conform. She notes that due to the widespread use of SSC as a
foundation for BDSM practices, the practice of negotiation can be a lengthy process, but
it is seen to reaffirm the consensual nature of the BDSM practices that take place after the
negotiation process. SSC requires a high level of intimate interaction in order to achieve
the community standard for consent. This process is taken as demonstrative of how
BDSM practices are consensual, as so much effort is put into communicating one’s
desires and limitations.
Weiss describes the general process of negotiation in her book, drawing upon the
popular SM guidebook SM 101. She claims that individuals are expected to explain their
comfort level regarding the persons involved in the activity, along with the “place; how
long the scene will last; emotional and physical limits; presence and kind of sex and safe95
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sex procedures; presence and kind of bondage and pain; what, if any, marks can be left;
and safewords” (Weiss, 81). To articulate one’s desires, limitations, concerns, and
curiosity for sexual expression occupies a large component of the BDSM understanding
of consent. To engage in these negotiation practices ensures that participants are in touch
with their inner selves and participating in actions that they truly want, and thus are
participating in consensual acts.
In the work of Abernathy, Taormino, Brame, and other BDSM scholars, consent
appears to mostly be informed by the process of negotiation. BDSM practitioners are said
to be aware of their sexual and emotional desires as well as their limitations and able to
articulate them clearly to another. The dialogue that takes place between individuals
reinforces that these practices are truly desired by those who perform them. However,
relying on negotiation and dialogue as the ultimate indicator of autonomy and consent
fails to address certain areas of concern, namely the role of the social sphere in
negotiation, and the failure of SSC to apply to all BDSM practices. I will show in the
following sections how these assumptions, and others, lead to a severe weakness in
BDSM discussions of autonomy and consent12.
Concerns With The Use of Consent in BDSM:
In response to arguments that their practices are abusive, BDSM communities and
theorists often argue that their practices are explicitly consensual and thus cannot be
abusive. Practices that may seem harmful at first glance are rendered acceptable solely
because of the presence of consent. The man who gets lashed by their partner is not
12
For more information on the problematic nature of consent and its historical roots, which is outside the
scope of this chapter, see Jeffrey Weeks’ The Language of Sexuality (2011).
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viewed as the victim of physical abuse because he has consented to being struck. This
section will isolate some characteristics found in BDSM communities’ approaches to
autonomy which result in vital theoretical gaps. The theoretical gaps in the use of consent
highlights the insufficiency of this use of autonomy and consent, which, in extreme cases,
could actually be used to hide abuse rather than serve to eliminate it. In this section I
introduce the work of Meg Barker to establish concerns that have been raised regarding
the application of consent in the BDSM community. While Barker and I make different
arguments regarding how the practice of consent ought to be amended or altered, we both
are concerned with the way in which consent in BDSM is solely the domain of the
individual, with little room for critical engagement.
In her paper “Consent is a grey area? A comparison of understandings of consent
in Fifty Shades of Grey and on the BDSM blogosphere”, Barker compares the simplistic
use of consent found in the book series Fifty Shades of Grey to discussions of consent in
BDSM blogs and practices. While her paper raises some very interesting criticisms of
consent in BDSM discourse, it is also very valuable in the way it identifies norms of
consent within the BDSM community. Barker claims that most community literature
reflects “the kind of sexual consent negotiations presented in Fifty Shades”, despite the
attempts from the BDSM community to distance itself from the Fifty Shades phenomena
(900). The component she identifies as most important is its emphasis on the individual.
The individual is wholly responsible for giving and withdrawing consent (897). Barker
claims that in Fifty Shades, and, relatedly, in the larger BDSM community, “consent
remains located internally, within the individuals concerned, without the potential for any
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collective element to consent decisions” (898). She identifies the source of this approach
to be the result of BDSM communities’ acceptance of “neoliberal understandings of
consent whereby those consenting [are] equal and free to do so without constraint” (908).
Barker’s arguments are similar to ones laid out by Margot Weiss (2011), who
notes that consent and autonomy in BDSM are considered to be individual acts and fail to
take into account the very real power imbalances that take place in the social sphere.
Barker’s text takes an interesting approach in that it addresses the effects of the failures
found in this kind of consent and how it has lead to instances of abuse. Barker describes
the abusive practices as follows: “[when] saying ‘no’ or safewording were not respected,
[when]dominants used toys or engaged in practices which [she] had not consented to
and/or explicitly stated that she did not want, and [where] dominants had continued with
play after a scene had ended” (902). In her survey of articles written by other BDSM
bloggers on issues of abuse within the community, Barker notes that many take issue with
the reliance on consent as the “veneer under which people actually assume that anything
is fine so long as the other person enjoys it or doesn’t complain” (904).
Barker notes that these bloggers, in order to address their concerns, have proposed
incorporating collective responsibility into the notion of consent. This, they feel,
challenges the argument that abuse does not take place in BDSM as well as the
representation of what abuse looks like. Such bloggers propose that this notion of
collective responsibility requires:
acknowledging that abuse happens within BDSM
communities, including in situations with people who are
well-respected or leaders themselves and in various
different dynamics; listening to survivors, providing them
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with resources where possible and respecting their choices;
taking responsibility for calling people out – and potentially
excluding them or listing their names – when they behave
non-consensually; providing education – particularly to
people new to communities and people who have engaged
in non-consensual behaviour (903-4).
Such suggestions are helpful for challenging the silencing and erasure of abuse within
BDSM communities. However, the solutions offered by Barker’s paper fail to address
some of the larger concerns that I hold with BDSM theory.
While I applaud the work done by Barker and other BDSM bloggers to raise
awareness of the prevalence of abuse in BDSM communities, and support many of her
suggested amendments to community education on consent, our work has different
purposes. Barker wants to eliminate practices that lead to abuse in BDSM, and I aim to
encourage a more theoretically rigorous account of autonomy that takes greater care in
addressing the influence of pernicious socialization, which then effects the process taken
in acquiring consent. Barker’s suggestions for collective responsibility fail to fully
address the effect that the social sphere, power differentials, and interpersonal
relationships can have on our autonomy. Thus, this proposal fails to fully address the
impact that the social sphere has on our ability to give consent. As well, when BDSM
practices take place outside of community events (such as is the case of many
Master/slave relationships), the BDSM community cannot just rely on the group to ensure
that practices are not abusive. An account of autonomy must be developed or adopted by
the BDSM community that balances the dedication and commitment to individual choice
in sexual expression, while still acknowledging the very real power and social
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stratifications and relationships that influence our choices. In the next section I will
outline how theoretical issues found in contemporary BDSM theories of autonomy and
consent hinder the efficacy of these approaches and then suggest ways in which relational
autonomy may bridge these gaps.
Consent and Autonomy:
As was mentioned, consent is seen as “the moral dividing line between brutality
and D&S” in BDSM, whereby one must give “clear and informed” consent in order to
participate in BDSM practices (Brame et al. 52). But what does the practice of consent
entail? What does it mean to consent to BDSM practices, particularly when some BDSM
practices can cause (both intended and unintended) harm? Unfortunately, many texts on
BDSM, beyond outlining the steps that ought to be taken in order to give consent, fail to
offer any further explanation as to what consent entails, or what could diminish one’s
ability to consent beyond mental or emotional incapacitation. Some authors, like Weiss,
have aimed to describe consent beyond its legitimating role. She claims that in BDSM
practices, consent “means more than free from coercion; consent becomes, in these rules,
a way to insist on the voluntary participation in, and thus participant’s own responsibility
for, SM play” (94). Weiss’ attempts to break down the meaning of consent are far from
the norm, as many other authors like Staci Newmahr, engage with the topic of consent
only so far as to claim that it is a necessary component of BDSM in general. Such a
representation of the relationship between BDSM and consent makes it difficult to
problematize consent in BDSM, as all BDSM practices are defined as inherently
consensual (18). Newmahr’s incorporation of consent in BDSM defines SM as “the
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collection of activities that involve the mutually consensual and conscious use… of pain,
power, perceptions about power, or any combination thereof, for psychological,
emotional, or sensory pleasure” (18). Newmahr shares this approach with Abernathy and
other prominent BDSM writers, who consider BDSM to be inherently consensual.
For consent to be established as an inherent part of BDSM insulates BDSM from
practices that may cross the line and may cause moral or political trouble for the BDSM
community and practitioners in general. Nonconsensual events are easily separated from
the BDSM community, as they can be described as abusive and thus not truly BDSM.
Consent is thus the dividing line between BDSM and abuse, as it separates and
encourages good BDSM practices, while simultaneously distancing these from unsavoury
or abusive, non-BDSM activities. What is troubling about this approach is that while
consent is seen as the necessary component for BDSM, very little has been said about it.
Beyond describing it as a discussion of limits that take place immediately prior to BDSM
events, consent has failed to be unpacked by mainstream BDSM scholars. Of particular
concern is the failure of BDSM theories to explore what it means for an individual to be
autonomous when consenting to these practices.
Failure to Provide Room for Critical Analysis:
As detailed in Chapter 2, BDSM communities are influenced by liberal thought,
primarily in its use of an individualistic approach to autonomy. The influence of liberal
thought on BDSM communities is also reflected in the community’s understanding of
what it means to consent to a practice, what conditions are required in order to give
consent, and in how the BDSM community itself responds to practices that have been
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deemed consensual. In her paper, “Sex, Law, and Consent”, Robin West argues that
liberal perspectives on sex can serve to insulate practices from critical engagement. While
outlining the value attributed to consensual sex in libertarian legal theory, Millian
liberalism, and liberal feminism, she claims that in these approaches “consent to sex
renders the sex that follows victimless, central to autonomy and identity… and
emblematic of the equal worth of she who gives it” (223). West claims that for liberals,
consensual sex “ought to be left alone: by law, by the community, by various would-be
moral censors, and by politically motivated interrogators” (223). The role of consent in
sex, according to these accounts, is what renders it legitimate and legitimate sexual acts
are those which ought to be free from external scrutiny. Such freedom results in the
insulation of consensual BDSM acts from critical engagement. I argue that this insulation
is harmful and ought to be reconsidered
One of the ways in which liberal thought has influenced the BDSM community’s
use of consent in sexual practices is found in how consent renders sexual practices free
from moral and political critique. This can be seen in Ritchie and Barker’s study of
feminist BDSM practitioners and their responses to sexual practices that they find
troubling. Laura, one participant, when asked which BDSM practices might be deemed
anti-feminist, claimed that 24/7 female submissive relationships (such as the case of the
Feminist Female Slave) might not necessarily be anti-feminist, but that she still finds this
relationship structure to be somewhat problematic. She hesitates with this position,
though, claiming that “if it’s negotiated, consensual, and everything, I don’t know if I can
really say ‘no, sorry, that’s anti-feminist’, if that woman has chosen to be a 24/7
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submissive…” (16, italics in original). Laura’s discomfort at labeling a practice that she
felt could be harmful because it met the BDSM community’s requirements for consent
falls in line with West’s analysis of liberal perspectives on sex, where it is claimed that
consensual sexual activities ought to be free from moral and political critique. Laura
knows that she finds something about 24/7 submission to be disconcerting, but she cannot
truly offer a sufficient criticism of this practice because it meets the requirement for
consent. She has no additional grounds on which to problematize this relationship.
Laura’s response to 24/7 submission verbalizes the way in which liberal notions of
consent functions in BDSM communities to insulate practices from critique by other
community members and outsiders. Other participants in Ritchie and Barker’s study
echoed Laura’s position by claiming that choice was key to BDSM practices (16-18).
However, this position is problematic because not only is it naïve to claim that practices
that have gone through a process of negotiation could not be abusive, it is a faux pas to
question the validity of consent once it has been established (as defined by the
community).
The liberal approach to sex, while valuable in its attempt to ensure that individuals
have a freedom of sexual expression free from fear of legal or political persecution, also
has other effects which hinder the ability for critical engagement with BDSM sexual
practices. Dorchen Leidholt, in a very strongly worded criticism of sexual liberals, claims
that this line of liberal thought views sexuality as being “so fragile, that any analysis,
criticism, or attempt at change threatens not only the existence of human sexuality but
everyone’s freedom” (ix). She claims that there is an underlying position that liberal
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sexual thought distances itself from criticism or critical analysis because such analysis
would have a detrimental effect upon sexuality as a whole. This falls in line with West’s
representation of liberal sexuality, where sex that takes place between individuals, and
anything that is consensual, should be free from critique. This attempt to distance
consensual sex from moral and political outrage, also serves to remove it from moral and
political critique (223), and from this, the consensual sex is then legitimized (224).
The focus on ensuring that BDSM practitioners are informed in their consent to
such practices is a laudable practice. However, this does not mean these practices cannot
be critiqued, improved, or strengthened. Critical engagement with community practices or
regulations does not necessarily mean one is attempting to prove them to be harmful or
that one wants them to be removed. Critical engagement serves to make practices better,
to ensure that their expression meets the desired effect. Especially in the realm of sexual
practice, critical reflection on one’s individual actions and larger community practices
ought to be encouraged rather than discouraged and silenced. A valuable account of
sexual autonomy ought to allow for space for critical reflection and critical engagement
with others. The liberal account of autonomy found in BDSM fails to allow for that to
take place.
SSC does not fit all Relationships:
The practice of negotiation between partners, required to take place before a
scene, highlights the centrality of consent in BDSM. However, it is unclear what role this
practice ought to take when BDSM events exist outside of the rigid structure of
community events. Many guides to BDSM and discussions on Master/slave relationships,
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including ones that we have explored in this project, highlight the requirement that
partners make contracts before entering into such relationships, but given that the
Master/slave relationship offers a different structure from more general BDSM events,
does the standard for consent for BDSM practices still apply to the Master/slave
relationship? How does consent operate after the contract has been signed?
In this section I argue that Safe, Sane, Consensual as a general community mantra
is representative of what Diana Meyers calls ‘episodic autonomy’, as they are both
concerned with autonomous expression at a particular time in the immediate future. In
general BDSM practices, events have clear beginnings and ends, and partners may
participate in events together for the first time. SSC aims to ensure that partners fully
negotiate before an event takes place, ensuring that both partners are aware of each
other’s limitations and desires, even when they are unfamiliar with each other. However,
SSC’s expression of autonomy is quite short-term, as events often last for a few minutes,
a few hours, or for an evening. Because of this, I argue that the process of negotiation
found in SSC is not well-suited to long-term relationships or partnerships, such as the M/s
relationship. This means that SSC is not suited to all relationship structures found in
BDSM and is thus fails as a universally valid standard for BDSM practices. This is
especially important, as BDSM often defends its practices as legitimate due to its
consensual nature. If the account of consent used to evaluate these relationships cannot
apply to all of them, is it truly a sufficient account?
For Meyers, autonomy is not an “all or nothing” concept. She claims that
autonomy may be expressed in a variety of ways, including what she calls “episodic” and
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“programmatic” autonomy. These are two distinct dimensions of autonomy, and are
expressed at different times and play different roles in an individuals’ life. Episodic
autonomy takes place when individuals ask themselves how they wish to proceed in a
particular moment. In contrast, programmatic autonomy is present when that person is
able to pose and answer questions like “how do I want to live my life?” (8). Both episodic
autonomy and SSC treat autonomy as taking more immediate form than accounts of
autonomy which focus on broader issues of life-aspirations and choices. I will show in
this section that SSC exemplifies episodic autonomy in its focus on short-term goals and
desires. I should note that my concern with the focus on the episodic nature of SSC
argues that episodic autonomy has shortcomings only if it is separated from programmatic
autonomy. The purely episodic nature of SSC provides a weakness of the BDSM account
of autonomy due to its inability to apply to long-term expressions of BDSM practices.
An account of autonomy that is used to apply to a variety of short-term and long-term
sexual and romantic relationships, as SSC is presented as doing, ought to incorporate both
episodic and programmatic components in order to address the full range of dimensions
of autonomy in the BDSM community. Understanding and articulating long-term goals
is as important as articulating short-term and immediate goals, particularly when
relationships like Master/slave are a commonly accepted component of the BDSM
community, thus showing a need for long-term instances of autonomy.
In Chapter 3, I described Meyers’ use of the Traditional Housewife. Meyers uses
this case to show how, in her attempt to defend her creationist beliefs to her daughter’s
teacher, she may possess “pockets” of autonomy, even though she may not have control
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over the “basic direction” of her life (8). However, while the overall direction of her life
is decided by others, she still is able to express her autonomy at certain times, such as in
the case in point. Episodic autonomy can be found in these moments. Meyers notes that
the expression of episodic autonomy does not encompass the formulation of a “long-term
plan or setting a policy to be applied in other circumstances,” rather the expression of
episodic autonomy is “confined to a single action” (8), such as the discussion between the
Traditional Housewife and her daughter’s teacher. While one might wonder how one can
express autonomy through individual actions, Meyers notes that in this instance:
[A]utonomy is enhanced to the extent that the convictions and
attitudes entering into the decision have been previously
examined and endorsed. Yet, people can gain a measure of
autonomy by addressing situation-specific questions that
occasion introspective reflection. For they get to know
themselves better, and they give greater expression to their own
beliefs and desires than someone who mindlessly apes
convention or caves in to others’ wishes (8-9).
Episodic autonomy has value, as it enables individuals to learn more about themselves
and the things or paths they desire. However, cases of episodic autonomy do not
necessarily imply an overarching expression of autonomy, as they are confined to
particular moments, and thus reflect a situational expression of autonomy, although it is
important to note that they still have value as autonomous actions.
As an example of how SSC is reflective of episodic autonomy, consider the steps
outlined by Tristain Taormino on how to approach events or scenes:
Negotiation creates a space for everyone to talk about their
needs, wants, limits, fantasies, and fears before they play.
One way to begin the negotiation process is to identify what
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role or roles you will take on: top/bottom/switch,
Dominant/submissive, sadist/masochist. Together you can
go through some possible activities; for each one, you can
decide if you are interested in doing it and whether you
want to give or receive or both…
In addition to negotiating your wants, needs, desires, or
limits for BDSM, you should also decide if there will be
sexual activity as part of your play… Will there be genital
contact and stimulation? Masturbation, How about
penetration, oral sex, sex toys, ejaculation?...
Now is the time to tell your partner all relevant information
he or she should know about you. Is there anything in your
medical history that is serious or will affect the type of play
you do?... You should talk about medications you take, a
sensitivity to hot or cold, if you’re prone to dizziness or
fainting, how well you can see without your glasses…
This is important information to know as you decide if
you’re going to play with someone, what you’re going to
do, and how to construct a scene (16-17, 19, 20).
The excerpts outlined here express some components of the discussion that is encouraged
to take place between partners before a scene begins. The purpose of negotiation is to
ensure that partners are able to give informed consent, in that they have informed the
other party of all important and necessary concerns, desires, and interests that are relevant
to the event. This method of giving informed consent, as we have said, is pursued in such
an explicit way in an attempt to distance BDSM practices from abuse and to ensure that
partners are autonomous in their decision to take part in such practices. One must ensure
that both partners desire the practice that they are about to engage in, and that they are in
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the right space for it (for example, not in a state of anxiety or some other state which may
not respond well to certain activities).
When expressing the tenets of Safe, Sane, Consensual, and when engaging in
negotiation with another, BDSM practitioners follow the same kind of situational
autonomy as Meyers’ Traditional Housewife – the individual asks themselves what they
want to do in that moment, what they want to perform or experience in that scene, and
then act upon it after their own deliberation and deliberation with others. BDSM
participants are able to participate in self-reflection when considering what practices they
wish to engage with (and those that they do not) as well as their limitations and new areas
they may wish to explore. While BDSM practitioners might seem to possess a heightened
understanding of autonomy (in that BDSM theorists present practitioners as able to
understand and articulate their true sexual desires) the expression of autonomy in BDSM
events and scenes, in fact, is quite situational. The question of what an individual wishes
to do on a Friday night at a play party may not be reflective of what they wish to do on
other days or in other situations or even in future events with the same partner.
It therefore seems that the BDSM commitment to SSC require nothing more than
episodic autonomy in its practices. While this might be sufficient for participating in
many facets of BDSM life (“Do I want to play as a bottom tonight?” or “Do I want to try
needle play?”), the momentary nature of episodic autonomy does not appear to be
applicable to all forms of BDSM practices. One must ask, how does Safe, Sane,
Consensual, as the guiding practice of consensuality and its expression of episodic
autonomy, apply to long-term relationships like that of the Master/slave? The
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Master/slave relationship is very different from the general practices of the BDSM
community, where events may differ (for example, an individual may play as a bottom at
one event and a top at another), where they have an explicit start and end point, and
where events are confined to BDSM practices.
Some Master/slave participants have already voiced their concerns with the rigid
nature of consent in Safe, Sane, Consensual. Frustrated with having to negotiate before
each event, some BDSM participants have developed what is known as “consensual nonconsent”:
…[it’s]an oxymoron and [an] impossibility by legal
definitions, but a concept that makes perfect sense to those
who subscribe to it. The idea behind consensual nonconsent
is that partners don’t want to go through a list and map out
each and every thing that will happen or consent to
activities individually. Rather, they want to state their
limits, turn their will over to a Dominant, top, or sadist, and
trust in where a scene goes. They want to waive their right
to revoke their consent or stop in the middle of a scene. In
fact, they agree in advance that something might happen
that they don’t want or enjoy, or they may be forced to do
something beyond their comfort zone and they’re okay with
that (italics in original, Taormino, 24)
While I do not claim that all Master/slave relationships explicitly adhere to
consensual non-consent, this approach to consent does fall in line with the relationship
structure. For example, when many female slaves describe their roles within their
relationship, they rarely (if ever) note that they had negotiated with their Masters
beforehand. Rather, they are given roles and rules from their Masters, trusting that their
Masters know what is best, know what their limits are, and knowing that their purpose as
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a slave is to please their Master. As Bambi Bottom outlines the level of control in her
Master/slave relationship:
I have no rights in this relationship. I don’t have safe words.
I’m not permitted to leave him, no matter what, unless I
clearly and honestly think that I am in danger. I own no
property anymore, except for a black leather rose he gave
me… I’m told when to wake up in the morning. I’m told
when to go to sleep. When I’m not working, he gives me
my orders for the day. I’m allowed to make suggestions
about what I’d like to get done, but I can’t insist. The final
decision about what I do on any day is up to him. But often
my suggestions are accepted.
In the evening I prepare his bed, get him water to drink,
turn off lights, shut the windows… I have to ask permission
to eat, to drink anything except water, to use the bathroom,
to make purchases. I carry no money except what he gives
me…
My sex life is completely controlled by him. I’m not
allowed to touch myself without his permission. And he
gives [it] rarely. I used to masturbate three or four times a
day – that was my routine. Not anymore. We do the things
that he likes to do and I give my input. He controls what we
do during [sex], but the most powerful aspect of that control
is the control over my orgasms. If he gives me permission
at a time when I’m not particularly in the mood, I [still]
must come (italics in original, Brame et. al, 181).
Bambi and her Master do not pause before each sexual event in order to negotiate
boundaries. If they did, it would be incredibly time-consuming as their relationship seeps
into all facets of their lives – from their sexual activities, to the running of their
household, to their finances, to her career decisions. To negotiate each of these
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components continuously would take over their lives. Instead, Bambi trusts in her Master
to know what is best for her. Describing her relationship and what drew her to it, Bambi
states that a Master/slave relationship can be difficult as it requires quite a bit of trust. She
says “I’m an extremely suspicious person. I have a hard time trusting men in particular. I
was raped as a child, and to this day I haven’t gotten over this… My Master is an
exceptional man, and it is through his personality only that I am able to trust him to the
degree that I do, which is almost absolute” (Brame et al, 180). Bambi may not always be
comfortable or willing to participate in the activities that have been laid out for her by her
Master, but she trusts that he knows what is best for her, and she views herself as having
consented to him having control over her. This means that an episodic account of
autonomy doesn’t fit with the normal expression of autonomy in the Master/slave
relationship – the way in which such practices are carried out fails to meet the
requirements for episodic autonomy, and to do so would be quite arduous and timeconsuming for both partners.
It would appear that the most appropriate approach to autonomy for the
Master/slave relationship is found in what Meyers calls “programmatic autonomy”, as it
focuses on the overall path of one’s life. Entering into an M/s relationship is a serious
commitment, and its effects are spread to all facets of life, much more so than a casual or
single BDSM participant may experience. The requirements for programmatic autonomy
differ greatly from the requirements set for episodic autonomy. One may argue that the
practice of negotiation that is used in creating the Master/slave contract would be enough
to satisfy the programmatic perspective of autonomy. This would mean that negotiating
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the formal contract between Master and slave, including the responsibilities, the
requirements, and the best way to end the relationship, would need to satisfy the
requirements for an overarching life path. However, I do not think that the considerations
made through this process of negotiation necessarily satisfy the requirements set out by a
programmatic approach to autonomy. It could be possible that some Master/slave
relationships have negotiations that include components that could be described as similar
to programmatic accounts of autonomy, but it does not appear to be necessary for the
negotiation13. Individuals who participate in M/s may, on their own, practice selfreflection in the way that Meyers’ sets out, including the possession of autonomy
competencies, but the community mantra of SSC fails to incorporate these components.
There is no requirement for an ongoing, reflexive practice of ‘checking in’ in order to
ensure that both parties still wish to participate in such a practice. While many long-term
commitments fail to incorporate such a reflexive practice (for example, marriage only
requires that a person consent to the marriage at the time of the wedding but does not
require any other reflection afterwards), given the nature of the Master/slave relationship,
I think there is a benefit for the BDSM community to attempt to incorporate long-term
reflection and check-ins into long-term practices and relationships. To encourage longterm consent as a standard for Master/slave relationships helps to break down some of the
problems that currently exist in the structures of autonomy and consent found in the
BDSM community. Such changes would challenge the way in which autonomy and
As an example, see the sample slave contract included in Miss Abernathy’s Erotic Slavehood. Miss
Abernathy notes that it is not advisable for individuals to have contracts that last more than a year due to the
fact that individuals do change (60).
13
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consent are currently structured to respond to momentary BDSM events, rather than longterm life goals.
This section, in showing that the focus of consent in the BDSM community is
directed towards episodic rather than programmatic autonomy is not meant to diminish
the sense of autonomy or fulfillment that the FFS (and others in a similar situation) feel in
their partnerships, or to declare them non-autonomous. Rather, is intended to show that
the use of consent in BDSM as focused on immediate expression fails to address the
realities of long-term M/s relationships and thus does not seem to be a sufficient method
of evaluating autonomy.
BDSM Fails to Incorporate the Social Sphere:
While this chapter has already addressed some areas of concern regarding the use
and understanding of autonomy and consent in BDSM communities, of primary
importance for my argument is how the liberal ideal of the individual as free and
independent has reinforced the failure to incorporate considerations of the social sphere
into BDSM’s understanding of consent and autonomy. Margot Weiss’s Techniques of
Pleasure: BDSM and the Circuits of Sexuality challenges several foundational
conceptions of BDSM. In particular, she problematizes their understanding of what it
means to say that BDSM practices are performed, and challenges the BDSM
community’s claim that its practices offer a separation between the public and private and
the social and economic spheres (6, 7). Part of Weiss’ challenge to the BDSM status quo
is her assertion that BDSM practices and practitioners often falsely present themselves as
existing outside of the social sphere. As she notes: “BDSM performances produce the SM
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community just as they produce SM practitioners, but not in a ‘safe, sane, consensual’
vacuum – rather, in relation to economic, social, and cultural regimes and embedded
systems of privilege and power” (20). There is a common insistence that BDSM practices
are not necessarily linked to the events that they parody or represent. However, Weiss
argues that there is an explicit link between the performance of BDSM and the structures
of power that exist outside of that event. As she realized during her research “I began to
understand SM performance as material… [R]ather than allowing for a kind of freedom
from racial, gendered, and sexual hierarchies, such spectacular performances work within
the social norms that compel subjectivity, community, and political imagination” (6).
Weiss views relationships within the BDSM community as a kind of social relationship,
which links individuals through “socioeconomics (social hierarchies, communities, and
relations of inequality)” (6).
As an example to the social relationships and influences within BDSM, Weiss
describes her viewing of a slave auction at a BDSM community event. Weiss claims that
many BDSM practitioners view their activities and performances as “set apart” from the
rest of the world, where the “real world” of their daily lives is wholly separate from the
BDSM scene or event (17). But while the separation between BDSM play and the “real
world” may be perceived as a real separation by BDSM practitioners, it is not clear
whether individuals can actually detach themselves from the world beyond the event or
scene. Weiss describes her viewing of a slave auction, in which individuals were
auctioned off for the chance to “negotiate with that person for a scene later, at the play
party following the auction” (3). Numerous community members were auctioned off
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(about eighty in total). Weiss describes her laughter and enjoyment during several of the
auctions, but one appeared to have made both her and the audience uncomfortable:
A young African American woman with a round face and
closely cropped hair was led up to the stage by a tall,
severe-looking white man who held the leash attached to
her collar. She was the only person to appear on the stage
with someone else, so the man explained that he needed to
tell us, the audience, a few things about his slave. As she
stood there, back straight, staring straight ahead, her master,
addressing us in a tight, steely voice, said that she was fit.
As he spoke, he yanked up her dress to display her shaved
genitals, and he then turned her around. Still holding her
dress above her waist, he smacked her ass so hard she
pitched forward; the leash attached to the collar around her
neck stopped her fall. Turning her back around, he said she
was very submissive and guaranteed to make us happy. As
he finished speaking, he stroked her head, petting and
smoothing back her short blond hair. The audience was
quiet throughout this display. When the bidding started, it
was reserved; she did not sell for a lot of money. I was
uncomfortable during this scene, and I felt sure that the rest
of the crowd was, too. I strained to read the woman’s
expression, to see if she was all right at the front of the
stage, but I couldn’t tell” (3-4).
The discomfort felt by Weiss and other audience members expresses the inability for the
BDSM community sphere to truly function as the safe space it presents itself as being.
Weiss claims that “the fantasy of the scene as separate, as set off or bracketed from the
real world, acts as an alibi that enables practitioners to dramatize – while also disavowing
– social hierarchies and institutionalized systems of domination, especially those of race,
class, gender, sexuality, and imperialism” (17). But, as the experience of Weiss and other
community members at the slave action shows, we cannot simply declare ourselves to be
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insulated from these institutionalized systems of domination because we are in a
community, or private, space. The shared discomfort of watching a white Master treat his
black slave roughly as he auctions her off makes apparent that we cannot just recreate
scenes that incorporate social power differentials while assuming that we are not
impacted by those same components.
While there is some value in the use of a liberal account of autonomy in BDSM in
the way that it encourages a diverse expression of sexual and gender practices, and fosters
a sense of sexual freedom, the way in which the scene and the events that take place in
BDSM are presented as separate from the ‘real world’ overlooks the ways in which social
powers operate. While I think there are ways in which BDSM can meaningfully critique
and play with power, to claim that such practices cannot reinforce or perpetuate power
differentials because their practices aren’t real, or are just performance, shows a naïve
understanding of power and oppression. What the BDSM account of autonomy needs is a
way to engage with the operation of social power while still giving room for such
practices to take place. Otherwise, the BDSM community runs risk of reinforcing such
power differentials in spite of their transgressive intentions.
Up to this point, this chapter has aimed to raise several concerns found in the
expression of autonomy and consent in the BDSM community. While none of these
concerns on its own is severe, when combined, the approach to consent and autonomy by
BDSM practitioners does not appear to be adequate. To remedy this shortcoming, I argue
that BDSM accounts of autonomy ought to rely less on the liberal account of autonomy it
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has adopted. While liberal accounts of autonomy are valuable because of the defense they
can provide for a wide variety of sexual expressions, the narrow focus on individualism
makes it difficult to engage critically with BDSM and overlooks some problematic areas
that can impact BDSM practitioners. In the next section I argue that feminist accounts of
relational autonomy offer an important understanding of autonomy and the influence of
relationships and can better address many of the concerns that I have raised in this chapter
while still allowing for the individual self-expression that is so important to the BDSM
community.
Relational Autonomy and BDSM:
This chapter has aimed to raise concerns with the way that consent and autonomy
are expressed and theorized within BDSM practices and theories. While the BDSM
community has made explicit the importance of ensuring that practices are consensual in
order to ensure that practices are not abusive, theoretical weaknesses remain within their
account of consent and autonomy. While some BDSM theorists like Meg Barker have
raised valid concerns regarding abuse in BDSM communities, other areas of concern also
need to be addressed. In particular, I have argued that there remains a failure to integrate
an understanding and appreciation of the influence of social stratification and power
differentials into their analysis of consent, and there is little room for critically engaging
with the practice of consent itself within BDSM practices. Finally, the way that consent
is used in BDSM is not well-suited to cases of Master/slave relationships. For these
reasons, the use of consent and autonomy in BDSM practices and theory ought to be
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strengthened with an account of autonomy which takes these considerations into account.
I think that relational autonomy provides grounds for addressing each of these concerns.
I should begin by noting that not all accounts of relational autonomy are equally
suited to strengthen the BDSM account of autonomy. Particular theories, such as those
developed by Marina Oshana or Natalie Stoljar may not necessarily interact well with
BDSM practices, due to the rigidity of their strong substantive approaches (see chapter 1).
However, proceduralist accounts, such as those developed by Diana Meyers and Andrea
Westlund, along with the general tenets and commitments of relational autonomy are
suitable to the BDSM community, its practices, and theoretical commitments. I will show
how both Meyers and Westlund’s accounts are suitable to the BDSM account of
autonomy, but, I argue that Westlund offers the best approach. Meyers’ account is helpful
because of its emphasis on the importance of developing competencies, such as selfknowledge and self-reflection in one’s development of individual autonomy, as well as its
acknowledgement of both the beneficial and harmful effects that socialization has on
autonomy. However, I don’t think that this account provides sufficient grounds to satisfy
all of the concerns laid out by the Feminist Intuition; namely, that feminist theorists can’t
always trust that female submissives are not dupes of patriarchy. I argue that Westlund’s
procedural account offers the best account of autonomy for the BDSM community,
because of its internal evaluation along with its external engagement with others, which
provides the individual with the ultimate say in whether they are autonomous (like
Meyers), but also allows for external checks on their autonomy, through dialogue with
others.
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Diana Meyers’ Competencies:
Diana Meyers’ procedural account of autonomy is one of the foundational
contributions to relational autonomy. Meyers’ procedural account encourages individuals
to cultivate three competencies, and incorporates the influence of socialization into its
understanding of autonomy. As I described in Chapter 1, for Meyers, personal autonomy
“is not only compatible with the civilizing influences of socialization, but it depends on
socialization to cultivate the requisite skills” (20). Her account of personal autonomy
focuses on “living in harmony with one’s true self” (20) but also requires the uses of
competencies, including self-definition, self-direction, and self-discovery (2004, vxii).
Meyers’ approach not only acknowledges the influence of socialization upon one’s
individual autonomy, but also claims that socialization is necessary to the development of
autonomy. Her approach, along with that of other relational autonomy theorists, positions
the individual not as a solitary person in the world, but as someone whose relationships
help to cultivate skills and develop their person.
This account thereby challenges the foundational theoretical assumptions of
BDSM theory, as the individual found in relational autonomy theory acknowledges the
causal nature of their relationships with others, meaning that relational autonomy does
more than just acknowledge that individuals have relationships with others. Such an
acknowledgement would not be new for BDSM theory, as many components in the
BDSM community, such as identities (including Dom and sub), require relationships with
others. What separates relational autonomy from merely acknowledging relationships
with others is that it acknowledges the way these relationships impact our autonomy, our
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participation in the world, and show that these can both help and hinder the expression of
our autonomy.
Incorporating components of relational autonomy might not necessarily eliminate
accusations of racism or sexism from the BDSM community, but acknowledging the role
of our relationships in the development of our autonomous selves implies a fundamental
shift away from the individualism found in BDSM theory. As well, it might be difficult to
incorporate the use of competencies into the BDSM community practices, but the
underlying structure of relational autonomy and of Meyers’ proceduralist account offers a
distinct shift from the current expression of autonomy in BDSM. However, her work fails
to satisfy those who view BDSM practices as problematic, because it fails to allow others
to view the expression of autonomy in that much of the deliberation is internal.
Westlund’s account addresses this problem while still holding many of the same
commitments as Meyers’ account. Meyers’ foundational contributions to this area are still
incredibly valuable, particularly in her development of programmatic accounts of
autonomy, and ought to find some larger, more general incorporation into the BDSM
account of autonomy.
Andrea Westlund’s Dialectical Autonomy:
On the face of it, Andrea Westlund’s dialectical account of autonomy might
appear to be similar to the use of SSC. As was mentioned in Chapter 3, Westlund’s
account of autonomy is one that requires that the individual engage with another in a
dialogue in order to determine whether their choice was autonomous. One could argue
that the practice of negotiation required for SSC possesses the same dialogical
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component, but I argue that the kind of dialogue required for Westlund’s theory is quite
different from the kind of dialogue required for SSC.
Westlund’s dialogical account of autonomy requires that an individual be able to
declare why they are participating in certain actions. Westlund’s account of autonomy
aims to challenge what she calls self-abnegating deference, that which takes place when
one participates in “the systematic subordination of oneself to another whose interests,
needs, and preferences are treated as pre-emptively decisive in one’s own practical
reasoning” (485). She argues that this kind of deference “compromises autonomy by
rendering the agent insusceptible to a special sort of dialogical reflectiveness about her
action-guiding commitments” (485).
Westlund’s account of relational autonomy differs from those of Meyers’ and
Christman, who also share procedural approaches, but take into account the history of the
individual in evaluating the legitimacy of the decision and also rely on an internal
decision-making process in their pursuit and development of autonomy. Westlund instead
claims that critical reflection is not used for establishing the coherence of one’s decision
with their personal history or their authentic self, but rather that this reflection is required
when taking responsibility for the self (494). She argues that individuals “function
interpersonally as autonomous agents” through taking responsibility for their
commitments, as responsibility requires that an individual hold themselves answerable,
“for one’s endorsements, to external critical perspectives” (495). Responsibility for
oneself requires that an individual open themselves up to, and are “willing to be engaged
in a form of potentially open-ended justificatory dialogue about one’s action-guiding
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commitments” (495). Particularly in the case of self-abnegating deference, Westlund sees
the “lack of readiness” to engage with such critical dialogue regarding one’s
commitments to imply that their autonomy has been compromised (492). Instances of
autonomy require an interpersonal interaction, whereby an individual is required to
engage with critical perspectives, where they are able to assert a defense of themselves,
which requires an understanding and reflexivity with oneself and the decisions one has
made. The ability to reflect upon and answer for one’s decisions, even if the interlocutor
does not agree, is how an individual can demonstrate that they have taken responsibility
for their actions. In other words, to be autonomous, one must respond to critical
perspectives and be prepared to engage with them. Making oneself answerable in this way
gives the individual a dimension of autonomy, as “someone who functions interpersonally
as her own representative is someone who has a clear grip on her own answerability, and
who has a standing disposition to be engaged in defense and/or advocacy of herself”
(498). This account of autonomy allows for individuals to stand as their own
representatives, and requires individuals to possess and express self-reflexivity and seeks
to ensure that they can meet their own requirements for choosing the right relationship or
sexual expression.
The dialogical engagement outlined in Westlund’s account differs greatly from the
process of negotiation found in Safe, Sane, Consensual. In SSC, individuals are asked to
articulate their limitations and desires. To articulate whether comfortable participating in
a certain practice is not the same as being asked to be held responsible for their decision
to participate in BDSM activities in general.
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The process of SSC actually prevents individuals from engaging in a critical
dialogue as the liberal influence upon the BDSM community prevents individuals from
asking questions such as “was this action really consensual?”, “is this activity
appropriate?”. The insulation of BDSM activities from critical engagement, even within
the community itself, removes exposure to critical dialogue. While individuals might go
through the steps outlined by Westlund and find that they do satisfy her requirements for
autonomy, it is important for individuals to continue to maintain a responsibility for self
and for their actions, and to encourage the justificatory dialogue as a community practice.
As well, while Westlund does not require a consistency in long-term commitments in
order to determine autonomy in the manner that Christman and others do (503), she does
require that individuals be “in charge” of their practical reasoning and to take
responsibility for it on an ongoing basis (505). One doesn’t merely engage in dialogue
with another at one instance and thereafter declare oneself to be autonomous; one must
continuously hold oneself responsible and accountable in the same way as if one were
engaging with another over time. And while some interlocutors will necessarily be
satisfied by the answers they receive from others while participating in Westlund’s
approach, her approach at least gives additional room for (and encourages) critical
engagement between individuals in the BDSM community. The ability to critically
engage with concepts such as consent is currently lacking in contemporary BDSM theory.
Westlund’s account of relational autonomy provides BDSM theory and practices
with a way for individuals to be held responsible for their actions, as well as provide a
venue for a critical discussion of BDSM practices and procedures. Westlund’s account
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reminds us that we are not isolated beings, and that our autonomy is expressed through
our ongoing interaction with others. Her work allows individuals to make decisions for
themselves—allowing them to choose which practices are of greatest interest and desire
to them—but nonetheless provides room for other parties to be part of the process of
ensuring that parties are responsible for their action-guiding commitments. Westlund’s
account of autonomy might not require the FFS to participate in a critical dialogue every
day, but it does require that she make herself responsible for her actions by preparing for
such a dialogue. This can be done through a genuine self-reflection when contemplating
new practices with her Master, or just by checking in with herself regularly. Westlund’s
account is quite appropriate, particularly in the case of Master/slave relationships, where
individuals participate in a long-term commitment, but which are unsuited for the
contemporary use of consent found in SSC.
The purpose of this chapter has been twofold: 1) to highlight some areas of
concern found within BDSM theory, primarily with respect to its accounts of consent and
autonomy, and 2) to show how procedural relational accounts of autonomy, primarily
those developed by Meyers and Westlund, offer superior approaches to autonomy which
could help the BDSM community. The BDSM community has explicitly heralded the use
of consent in order to protect itself from accusations that the community engages in
violent or abusive practices. However, in their attempts to concretize the use of consent in
BDSM practices, the community itself has left little room for critical engagement with the
concepts it relies on. As Meg Barker’s work has shown, even with the mantra of SSC in
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place, abuse nonetheless remains a problem in the BDSM community. In order to try to
prevent the abuse that Barker outlines, the BDSM community must begin to ask what it
means to consent to a practice, what role the community has in ensuring that consent has
been given, and what steps an individual must take in order to be able to give consent
legitimately.
I also aimed to show how relational autonomy may be helpful to BDSM theory in
order to cultivate a more nuanced and realistic approach to autonomy and consent.
Meyers, amongst other relational autonomy theorists, holds that socialization is a
necessary component of autonomy as it helps us to cultivate our autonomy competencies.
But, socialization can also import biases and misinformation, which, in turn, generates
inauthentic desires. These harmful effects of socialization can affect both programmatic
and episodic autonomy, but the accounts of both Meyers and Westlund show how we can
heighten our awareness of socialization and can begin to remedy these problems.
The expression of SSC (and other foundational components of BDSM theory)
both in theory and in practice has flaws that need to be corrected. Incorporating a
relational account of autonomy can begin to correct these issues while maintaining a
commitment to sexual and gender expression that is so necessary to the BDSM
community. As is evidenced in the work of Weiss and Baker, current approaches to
autonomy in BDSM theory are not able to protect everyone. The BDSM community
ought to take a critical eye to the way in which their theory can help and hurt their
practitioners, and I believe their construction of autonomy and consent is a valuable
starting point.
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The accounts of autonomy developed by Westlund and Meyers serve to address
the influences of pernicious socialization though the recursive expression of the dialogical
exchange or the development of individual competencies. The incorporation of the
relational approach to autonomy as seen in the works of Meyers and Westlund into the
BDSM community’s approach to autonomy would change the way that BDSM theory
views the individual; individuals would no longer be seen as separate from the social
sphere when participating in BDSM practices, but would still exist in relation to those
forms of social stratification and power differentials. This may seem, in practice, to be a
subtle change, but it would truly be a fundamental theoretical shift.
Incorporating the use of dialogical engagement provides new avenues of critical
analysis to take place between BDSM participants while still respecting the decisionmaking capabilities of the individual. Such a process serves to not only concretize the
autonomous decisions made by individuals but also to encourage thoughtful selfreflection and self-reflexivity for those in the community. While this chapter only
evaluated the impact that these two relational theories of autonomy could have on BDSM
theory and practices, I think that a much stronger account of consent and autonomy could
be developed for the BDSM community by incorporating components from other
procedural relational approaches to autonomy into this community.
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Chapter 5: Autonomy, Belonging, and the Value of Feminism
This project began by arguing that relational autonomy provides a superior
approach for evaluating the autonomy of women like the FFS over traditional accounts of
autonomy due to its acknowledgement of the influence of pernicious socialization and
interpersonal relationships. Although I highlighted the problems of the limited
representation of female submission in the case studies examined by relational
autonomists in Chapter 3, I nonetheless consider relational autonomy to offer the best
overall approach to evaluating the autonomy of the FFS. In Chapter 4, I argued that
relational autonomy also offers valuable considerations for the way in which autonomy is
theorized and practiced by the FFS and her BDSM community in general. What remains
to be seen is what, precisely, is required for the FFS to be autonomous. Up to this point, I
have focused on ensuring that the relational accounts of autonomy are sufficient and
theoretically sound. However, in addition to this, it is important that we determine what it
would take for the FFS herself to be autonomous. Can she meet the requirements set out
by relational accounts of autonomy, particularly those that I have explored and sometimes
advocated in previous chapters? Can she satisfy their concerns about whether her choice
to become submissive was truly autonomous? In this chapter I will evaluate the case of
the Feminist Female Slave using Andrea Westlund’s dialogical account of autonomy, as
outlined in Chapter 4.
In addition to determining whether or not she is autonomous, there is another
component that is of great importance for a full account of the Feminist Female Slave: the
sense of belonging or relationality that she desires with other feminists. In the second part
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of this chapter, I argue that beyond meeting certain requirements for autonomy, it is also
important for the FFS to feel as if she can belong as a feminist. In particular, it is
important that she feel she is able to lay claim to a feminist identity, as it is so influential
to her sexual expression and politics. As I touched upon in Chapters 2 and 3, many female
submissives and slaves feel that their relationships have excluded them from feminist
membership, despite their explicit identification with feminism. Women like the FFS do
not feel as if they belong as feminists, and when speaking about their feminist
membership often qualify what it means to be a feminist because of the way in which
they have been previously excluded from claiming feminist membership.
Using the work of Judith Butler and Joel Anderson, I will argue that perception
plays an integral role in the expression of autonomy, as the full expression of one’s
autonomy requires that others treat you as such. While other female slaves might view the
FFS as autonomous, feminists may not consider the FFS to be autonomous, even on
procedural grounds, due to preconceptions regarding female submission. The failure of
feminists to view the FFS as autonomous, even if she is able to satisfy Westlund’s
requirements for autonomy, only serves to restrict the participation and inclusion of the
FFS in larger feminist communities. This means that the FFS needs to do more than just
meet the requirements for procedural accounts of autonomy in order to have others
acknowledge her autonomy.
With the (perceived or real) exclusion of the Feminist Female Slave, and other
feminist submissives like her, from the feminist community, one might ask why she
desires to be a part of a larger feminist community at all. I will argue that the feminist
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identity is incredibly important to the FFS, as it has greatly influenced her sexual
expression, her dedication to sexual freedom, and her rejection of gendered sexual scripts,
making it essential to the FFS’ identity and sense of self. Further, her perceived exclusion
from feminist identity and relations with other feminists because of her relationship
creates a harm for the FFS, in that she feels rejected from a community in which her
membership plays an integral role to her sense of self and her own identity. This section
will highlight the importance that the feminist identity holds for the FFS and what a
relationship like that of the FFS means for feminism overall. This chapter, therefore, aims
to bring together the theoretical considerations outlined in the first four chapters in order
to show how the case of the FFS responds to them, and then aims to show what
importance this case (and this project) has for feminism overall.
What is required for the FFS to be autonomous?
In this section, I argue that Westlund’s dialogical account of autonomy, as seen in
Chapter 4, offers the best approach to autonomy for evaluating cases like the Feminist
Female Slave. In the previous chapter, I presented Westlund’s account as an alternative to
the use of Safe, Sane, Consensual in the BDSM community. While I argued that her
account offered a valuable use of dialogue and required a certain level of self-knowledge
and self-reflection, it must still be determined whether the Feminist Female Slave meets
those necessary requirements.
In Chapter 1, I outlined the problem of autonomous submission14 -- whether it is
possible for women to submit autonomously to men in romantic and sexual relationships
14
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given the influence of social conditions that naturalize women’s inferiority to men. I
argued that relational autonomy provides the best approach to engaging with questions of
female submission and autonomy because it accounts for these social conditions and
acknowledges other relationships in its evaluation. The problem of autonomous
submission is clearly present in the case of the Feminist Female Slave as she has taken
this submissive role to her male Master, yet claims, although aware of the influence of
oppressive gender norms, her relationship has not been determined by these. She claims
that her choice is autonomous despite the existence and influence of gendered scripts that
claim women’s proper role is to be subservient to their male partners, and she insists that
her subservient role, in fact, falls in line with her feminist political and philosophical
commitments. What must be determined is what would be required for her to be
autonomous: what criterion must she meet in order to straddle this difficult line of
expressing an autonomous choice to participate in a relationship of her choosing, while
still balancing (and not being overly influenced by) the social sphere which claims that it
is natural, or the proper role of women to take a subservient role to their husbands or male
partners. In what follows, I will show how the FFS can meet these requirements by
drawing on Andrea Westlund’s procedural account of relational autonomy.
In this chapter I primarily rely on Andrea Westlund’s dialogical account of
autonomy because it offers a relational account of autonomy that is both proceduralist (in
that it focuses on the procedure one takes in making one’s decision, rather than the
content of that decision), as well as intersubjective in that it requires (or prepares for) an
interaction with others (or a possible interaction with others) in order to ensure one’s
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autonomy. The procedural nature of her account is quite valuable in that she will not be
deemed non-autonomous merely because she is a submissive, in contrast to strong
substantive accounts of autonomy. Rather, this determination is to be made based on how
well the FFS is able to articulate her submissive commitments to another, were she
confronted with critical feedback. This account also provides her with the opportunity,
and encourages her, to explain her relationship to others in a way that clearly articulates
her commitments and how this relationship fits into the life she truly desires.
The dialogical interaction is incredibly important to the FFS as it provides a venue
in which she can differentiate her relationship from those that are genuinely nonautonomous to feminists and feminist accounts of autonomy, such as the case of the
Deferential Wife. Westlund’s account grants a certain amount of freedom of possible
actions, due to its focus on procedure, while additionally ensuring that the account is not
purely internalist, i.e. an account in which all deliberations for autonomy take place
internally, as we may see in the work of Meyers and Christman15. While internalist
accounts are quite valuable for autonomy, I argue that in the particular case of the
Feminist Female Slave, an intersubjective expression of autonomy is necessary for her to
be seen and recognized as autonomous and for her own self-worth.
Andrea Westlund’s dialogical account suggests that we consider whether the
Feminist Female Slave takes responsibility for her actions through her attempt to respond
These accounts are “internalist” in the sense that they do not require an interaction with others in order to
establish autonomy. While Meyers claims socialization is necessary in order to learn the skills for
autonomy, her focus on competencies and internal deliberation do not require interaction with others.
Christman’s focus on the ensuring that one’s actions fall in line with their historical sense of self also has
this same approach. I do not claim that these accounts are less valuable because of this, but I do not think
they offer the same impact as Westlund’s does for this particular case.
15
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to criticisms or critical feedback she receives regarding the commitments that guide her
decision to be a slave. So long as she is able to articulate her reasons for entering into
such a relationship, which, for her require articulating the feminist underpinnings of her
position in order to justify her submission, then she would seem to satisfy Westlund’s
requirements. It should be noted that in her dialogue with another the FFS does not need
to necessarily convince those who question her that her decision is correct (for example,
she doesn’t need to convince anyone that her relationship is necessarily autonomous),
instead she must be open to the possibility of having to engage in a justificatory dialogue
about her commitments in order to be held responsible for them. It is the process of
evaluating one’s commitments by engaging in a critical dialogue (or preparing oneself for
that dialogue) that aims to ensure an individual takes responsibility for their own actions
and thus ensures that they are autonomous under this account.
Given that BDSM does not fall within the realm of a mainstream sexual
expression (and it should be noted that Master/slave relationships compose a small group
within the small group of BDSM practitioners), it would be fair to imagine that it could
be the case that were she to share details of her relationship with a close friend or a family
member, that they may not necessarily agree with or understand her relationship and
could pose some critical questions to her. Perhaps the FFS told a close friend about her
Master/slave relationship, and that friend expressed some concern regarding it. When the
friend asks questions of the FFS, such as “how can you find pleasure in such a harmful
relationship?’ and “isn’t he just abusing you?” the FFS is able to take responsibility for
her role in her relationship by describing her motivations, the fulfillment she receives in
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her relationship, the role that she played in ensuring that her partner and their relationship
structure met her needs, and the way in which her relationship coincides with her feminist
beliefs. She is able to articulate how her commitments to feminism and to her BDSM
identity influence the actions that she takes in her relationship and her life with her
Master. Her ability to critically reflect upon her beliefs and the way they influence her
actions, along with her accountability, ensures the expression of her autonomy.
If her friend responds by asking how this relationship is not abusive, the FFS
might answer that she understands how the relationship looks problematic, but that she
pursued her participation in the BDSM community on her own and found a partner that
she wished to become her Master. She may outline the process of negotiation that she
took before signing a contract with him, claiming that she was able to address areas of
concern, and that she is granted the freedom to check in with her Master throughout the
relationship to ensure that she is still comfortable and desiring of their practices. She may
claim that she feels fulfilled by the relationship in that it fits her needs for stability and
support, and that she finds the sexual practices to be very satisfying for her. She may also
assert that she understands that this relationship is not for everyone, that she knows it is
well-suited to her own unique desires, and that she does not suggest that it is the proper
role for women to be submissive to their male partners. Whatever particular details she
offers in defense of her relationship, the FFS is able to reflect upon what her relationship
means to her, and can delve into her motivations and how her relationship either fulfills
them or meets her expectations. These responses would indicate a level of responsibility,
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where she is able to articulate her active participation in the pursuit, development, and
expression of her relationship, while addressing the concerns that her friend has.
Perhaps her friend then asks, “How do you know that your desire is authentic and
not just the product of socialization,” or “Don’t you worry that your desires betray a
feminist understanding that we have to abandon culturally normative roles for women?”.
Such questions are valid, and are likely to come from feminist communities or feministidentified friends. She may claim that she has had the desire for a Master/slave
relationship for quite a while, pursued the relationship herself, and that she has reflected
long and hard on her motivations for entering into the relationship and feels that she has
satisfied her own concerns that she is not merely a dupe of patriarchy. She may also claim
that her feminist commitments encourage women to take all roles that they feel are
authentically chosen, even if they fall in line with culturally normative roles for women.
In the end, the FFS may not be able to provide an answer that fully satisfies her friend.
Perhaps she attempts to articulate a reason that the FFS feels is sufficient and takes
responsibility for her actions, but her friend remains unconvinced. It is important to reassert that she does not have to convince her friend, but has to participate in the
justificatory dialogue in order to take responsibility for her action-guiding commitments.
Were the FFS to merely provide a superficial response to her friend, such an
insufficient response would be evidence that she is not autonomous. Were she to respond
to her friend’s concerns by merely stating that she is fulfilling a woman’s rightful role, or
that her relationship is not abusive simply because she chose to be a part of it, her failure
to truly respond or to truly engage with the question would fail to assuage her friend’s
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concerns. Indeed, Westlund notes that in such an instance, a deferential woman “who
simply repeats pat responses will not release us from our uncertainty [about her
autonomy] in this way, but will instead reinforce it” (513). This means that the way the
FFS articulates her commitments (or attempts to) has a great impact on the way in which
we gauge her level of responsibility for self. And given the background of the FFS in her
independent pursuit of a BDSM relationship, and the self-reflection that she has engaged
in in her pursuit of her relationship, I argue that it is unlikely that she would only provide
superficial responses to her friend and thus that she would be able to meet the
requirements set out by Westlund for autonomy.
It is important to note that Westlund’s account of autonomy appears to be
consistent with the concerns raised by Judith Butler on the shortcomings of relational
autonomy that were mentioned in chapter 1: that one cannot truly be transparent and fully
authentic to one’s own self. While some accounts, like Meyers, could be argued to require
the development of an authentic self, this is not necessary for Westlund. Westlund merely
requires that one takes responsibility for their action-guiding commitments, not that one
have a relationship with one’s true self (which Butler also problematizes). Westlund
claims that her account differs from those made by Frankfurt and Dworkin, which she
views as “marking the boundaries of the self through the endorsement of some motives
and the rejection of others” (35). Rather, Westlund’s account focuses on “important
conceptual links among responsibility, accountability, and answerability” (35). The focus
on being responsible for one’s actions is quite different from an account of autonomy that
requires one to lead an authentic life.
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Westlund’s account encourages us to attempt to explain our relations, or actions,
through dialogue in a way that is similar to giving an account of onseself. Butler describes
the process of giving an account as “a kind of showing of oneself, a showing for the
purpose of testing whether the account seems right, whether it is understandable by the
other” (2005, 131). The FFS’s conversation with her friend is similar to giving an
account: she engages with her friend in an attempt to test whether her account of her
relationship seems right, she shows herself and her relationship through this dialogue, and
her friend’s presence is necessary for her to give her account (Butler, 2005, 67). While the
FFS’s answers may not always satisfy her friend, it is the act of the dialogue, or the way
in which the FFS prepares for the dialogue, that establishes the responsibility that the FFS
takes for her actions, and thus establishes her capacity for an autonomous life (Westlund,
2009, 28). This means that while Butler raises some valuable criticisms of relational
accounts of autonomy that rely on the authentic self as a measuring stick for autonomy,
Westlund’s account does not rely on those same conditions and can coexist with Butler’s
arguments about what it means to give an account of oneself.
I think it is important to note that the FFS, in order to meet the requirements for
autonomy set out by Westlund, must give a more detailed and more nuanced account of
herself than is currently required by the BDSM community itself. In many of the
narratives of female submission used in this project, the justificatory dialogue focuses on
the use of choice in establishing that the Master/slave relationship is not abusive. Such a
justification is sufficient for the BDSM community, in that choice, individual freedom,
and consent are of the highest value. Weiss notes that focusing on these characteristics, in
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particular, the consensuality, free choice, and empowerment of BDSM are often used to
make BDSM and feminism compatible (164). However, it is important to note that these
responses, even though they are common amongst feminist slaves, are not necessarily
sufficient for meeting Westlund’s requirements for autonomy – to justify an action by
claiming that it was a choice does not necessarily indicate that one has taken
responsibility for one’s actions. This, again, highlights some of the concerns found in the
BDSM community’s approach to autonomy and consent – defending an action as
autonomous because one made the choice to take said action fails to address any concerns
related to that choice and fails to offer any sufficient justification for the commitments
that underscore or guide that action. Just in the way that a submissive woman defending
her submission because it is what the Bible tells her to do raises concerns for feminist
scholars, so too should the justification that one’s submission is autonomous simply
because one chose it. Both answers fail to truly engage with what makes us want to be
submissive, and incorporating accounts of autonomy like Westlund’s offers a step in the
right direction where women can begin to articulate these reasons, and in turn can
develop a responsibility for self that goes beyond the current requirements in the BDSM
community.
Even though it is possible for the FFS to provide inadequate reasons for her
relationship, I think the FFS would be able to engage in a dialogue with others who offer
a critical perspective on her relationship. She would be able to give answers beyond ones
that focus on individual choice, or gender norms, and would be able to articulate how the
relationship has meaning for her and falls in line with her desired life path and individual
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needs. It is because of her level of self-reflection that the FFS satisfies Andrea Westlund’s
dialogical account, along with other procedural accounts of relational autonomy, such as
those developed by Diana Meyers and John Christman16. It is important, given the role
that the FFS has played in this project, to lay out the requirements that she would need to
meet in order to be autonomous, and to show that she could, in fact, meet them. This
would mean, then, that the FFS could be considered autonomous in the decision she made
to enter her current relationship. However, I argue that meeting this criterion is not
necessarily enough for the FFS to feel like a legitimate member of the feminist
community, or to feel as if her autonomy is respected. In this next section, I will argue
that it is not only the autonomy of the FFS that is important to her, but also establishing
the importance of recognition of her autonomy by others.
Why does it matter to belong?
Along with the desire for the FFS to be recognized as autonomous by other
feminists comes the desire to merely belong. One might ask why it is so important for the
Feminist Female Slave to want to be a part of a feminist identity, particularly when some
feminists have not been very welcoming to her: why does it matter if feminist accounts of
autonomy, or feminist scholars and activists themselves, view her as autonomous? Isn’t it
enough that she thinks it of herself? While it is important that the FFS is able to reflect
upon her relationship and to evaluate whether or not the choices she made are right for
16
I also argue that the FFS would be able to satisfy some strong substantive accounts, including that of the
Feminist Intuition, so long as she was able to show her submissive role was not due to an oppressive
understanding of femininity. I think that her commitment to non-essentialist gender roles and desire to not
prescribe universal gender roles would indicate that it could be possible to make that argument (and I think
an interesting discussion could develop from this claim). However, she would fail to satisfy Oshana’s
strong substantive account merely because of the structure of her relationship.
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her, there is still an additional value in having her role recognized by others. It should be
noted that in many of the first-hand accounts of female slaves found in this project, they
address the tension between feminist ideals and their relationships, noting that they feel
excluded or belittled by them due to their submissive roles. As Bambi Bottom, a Female
Slave interviewed in Different Loving describes,
I’ve read lots of things written by feminists against S&M
and women submissives in particular. They don’t like the
fact that some women choose to give their power
completely to another person. That makes me very angry. It
seems that some feminists are saying that I must choose
their path instead of my path. I have a certain bitterness
toward [politically correct] feminists…(179).
Bambi’s troubled relationship with feminism is not unique to her position – while many
female slaves identify as feminists, and view their relationships as expressing their
feminist political beliefs, there remains a sense of discord between the female slaves and
the greater feminist political community. I do not claim that the discord felt between
feminists and female slaves is one which is intended to demean the female slaves, but it
still is one which makes them feel as if they are outside of the feminist community,
despite their feminist identifications.
I argue that there is value for the FFS to feel like a member of the feminist
community, both in terms of its political and individual value. Politically, it is beneficial
to the FFS to be seen as part of the feminist community by other feminist scholars and
activist because it grants her and her relationship a sense of respect in larger feminist
circles. She, and other feminist slaves, can be viewed as members of the feminist
community and thus feel a sense of solidarity with others who share their feminist
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identity. It can also grant feminist slaves a chance to help change the politics of feminist
communities, in order to expand their understanding of certain political issues, or to just
make it more welcoming to non-normative sexualities. Her voice has value. As an
individual, to be seen as autonomous grants the Feminist Female Slave a sense of
belonging with other women. Her opinions as an autonomous submissive woman have
greater weight than those expressed by a non-autonomous, submissive woman. Her
relationship structure might differ greatly from other feminists, but to be seen as
autonomous grants her a certain stature in the eyes of the feminist community. She will
matter to others. Whether it is as a group of feminist submissive slaves (such as in the
case of political recognition) or as an individual FFS, it is difficult to deny that being
viewed by other feminists as autonomous has a value to that individual. The FFS desires
to belong to the community with which she so strongly identifies, but this cannot happen
if she is viewed as non-autonomous.
Judith Butler:
Judith Butler’s “Beside Oneself: On the Limits of Sexual Autonomy” investigates
gay and lesbian human rights, offering a valuable discussion of autonomy and sexual
rights and recognitions. While her paper focuses on international recognition for the
rights of gays and lesbians, her description of the necessity of recognition falls in line
with the dissatisfaction of feminist slaves in their relationship with feminism as a whole.
While there is a wealth of discussion on the meaning of recognition, as well as feminist
challenges to it, my purpose in this section is merely to establish the value that exists for
those whose lives and relationships are merely seen, or seen as possible, by others. What I
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argue in this section, is that the lack of recognition, or acknowledgement, of the FFS’s
autonomy by feminist communities further results in her inability to belong to those same
communities. This harm serves to isolate her from feminism, making it difficult for her to
claim a feminist identity. Butler and Anderson’s work serves to establish the important
influence that being acknowledged as either living a “possible” life (in the case of Butler)
or as an autonomous person (in the case of Anderson) has on the way in which the
individual is received by others. In the case of the FFS, this dramatically affects the way
they are treated and received by other feminists.
In her discussion of non-normative sexualities, Butler notes that those whose
relationships fall outside a particular framework, that is, those in non-monogamous and
non-marital relationships, are considered to be “unreal”, as their relationships are denied
“reality and truth” (26-27). She claims that in developing new understanding of gender
complexity, we aim for the “possible”. The purpose of this is not to ascribe new norms or
restrictions, but rather that:
the normative aspiration at work here has to do with the
ability to live and breathe and move and would no doubt
belong somewhere in what is called a philosophy of
freedom. The thought of a possible life is only an
indulgence for those who already know themselves to be
possible. For those who are still looking to be possible,
possibility becomes a necessity (31).
To live a life that is a possible life grants a sense of freedom for living in a way
that is understood by others, that is viewed as “real”. The role of recognition works in
such a way as to affect how we are received and viewed by others: “norms of recognition
function to produce and to deproduce the notion of the human” (31-32). While Butler’s
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argument is intended to apply to lesbian and gay human rights (32), it also applies to the
way in which women such as the FFS are viewed as human or recognized as “real” by
other feminists. There is a necessary relationship whereby the value of an individual is
dependent upon the way in which they can be read, or recognized, or even understood by
those who are exterior to them. Butler furthers this interpersonal, or social, process of
recognition when she claims that:
We come into the world on the condition that the social
world is already there, laying the groundwork for us. This
implies that I cannot persist without norms of recognition
that support my persistence: the sense of possibility
pertaining to me must first be imagined from somewhere
else before I can begin to imagine myself. My reflexivity is
not only socially mediated, but socially constituted. I cannot
be who I am without drawing upon the sociality of norms
that precede and exceed me. In this sense, I am outside
myself from the outset, and must be, in order to survive,
and in order to enter the realm of the possible.
To assert sexual rights, then, takes on a specific meaning
against this background. It means, for instance, that when
we struggle for rights, we are not simply struggling for
rights that attach to my person, but we are struggling to be
conceived as persons (32, italics in original).
The struggle to be conceived as a person, to be seen by others, requires that others view
one as a person. This is the crux of one’s desire for acknowledgment of one’s belonging
within any given community: it is a need to be seen by others as a person, a need to just
be seen by others. Butler argues that it is even our “sense of personhood [that] is linked to
the desire for recognition, and that desire places us outside ourselves, in a realm of social
norms that we do not fully choose” (33). We are at the mercy of others in order to attain
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such recognition, to attain the position of personhood. We are necessarily bound to others
in order to be seen as something or someone.
Butler uses this argument to transition into discussions of international, legal
recognitions for gays and lesbians, but even in the case of the Feminist Female Slave the
need to be viewed as a person by other feminists, to be viewed as a person by other
feminists drives a very powerful motivation for the need for recognition. For many female
slaves feel they are not seen, as they are viewed as lacking in agency, thus removing their
status as human, as autonomous, and removing their ability to belong as feminists. When
they are seen, it is not as they feel they are: rather than being viewed as the autonomous
women they see themselves as, they are viewed as dupes of patriarchy, which further
creates a harm; they are not only seen as outsiders to amongst communities of feminists
but their agency is also erased by that same community they desire to belong to. There is
a failure to imagine the possibility of the autonomous feminist slave, which means that
female slaves are reduced to being compared to problematic cases of female submission
(such as the common theme of female submission that I outlined in Chapter 3). The FFS
and others like her feel they are quite different from the submissives in the problem cases,
different in motivations, desires, and commitments in their relationships. While the FFS
and other feminist slaves are not fighting for particular rights in the way that gay and
lesbian communities are, there remains a strong desire to be seen, to be seen by feminists,
and to be seen as expressing legitimate, autonomous sexual desires. In response to this
lack of belonging, many female slaves have moved away from feminist communities,
thus reinforcing their lack of recognition from feminists.
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Joel Anderson:
One of the most important reasons for the FFS to desire to be viewed as
autonomous by other feministsis that it allows the FFS to be viewed by others as one who
is not manipulated by her relationship, who is not oppressed by her relationship, and who
was able to make a reasonable decision to become a slave. The process of achieving that
acknowledgement is one which necessarily requires that others view her as possessing
certain competencies in order to be autonomous, as it is not enough for the FFS to merely
claim that she is autonomous in order to be seen as such by others. Joel Anderson’s
“Autonomy and Vulnerability Entwined” articulates a necessary link between individual
autonomy and recognition, where he claims that an individual cannot be seen as
competent unless they are taken as such by others. This necessary acknowledgement is
what grants individuals a sense of autonomy, for one must be viewed as competent in
order to be treated as autonomous. In the case of the Feminist Female Slave, for her to be
viewed as autonomous by other feminists requires that others, including feminist
theorists, see her as possessing particular competencies and skills.
Anderson argues that autonomy and vulnerability are intertwined, whereby “the
acquisition and maintenance of autonomy rely on interpersonal relations in which
vulnerability plays a vital role” (135). We are vulnerable in discussions of autonomy
because our label as autonomous is reliant upon our relationships with others. Autonomy,
for Anderson, is intersubjective as individual autonomy not only requires that we are able
to view ourselves “positively by being recognized in [our] interactions with others” (138)
but also that there are domains in which “to put it bluntly, one needs a certain level of
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competence as an entry ticket into significant social practices, especially practices within
which autonomy is exercised” (139). Anderson categorizes this as a participationaffording competence ascription. He claims that “as in the case of being a chess player,
being autonomous is intersubjective in that, for a certain range of autonomy competences
at least, one has the competence only if one is taken to have it” (139). This means that
even if one were to possess the required skills and competencies for autonomy, unless
another takes you to have those competencies, your autonomy will not be recognized as
such. Therefore, we are made less capable of exercising our autonomy if others do not
acknowledge our decisions or actions as autonomous.
For Anderson, autonomy “is bound up with the availability of a sociocultural
context within which my actions and choices are recognized as the actions and choices of
an autonomous agent” (138). In order to establish the experience of an intersubjective
recognition of autonomy, Anderson uses the example of linguistic competence. He
explains:
Take, once again, the case of a conversation in German (or
any other language). It is a necessary condition for you and
me to have a conversation in German that each of us takes
the other to be able to speak and understand German.
Otherwise, we are engaging in a different practice, say,
playfully exchanging German-sounding noises with each
other, as I sometimes do with my daughter. For a genuine
conversation, genuine language skills are required. If you
refuse to take me as a German speaker, then the social
practice of a conversation in German becomes impossible.
This refusal to ascribe competence may be legitimate or
illegitimate, but however pernicious illegitimate exclusions
are, it is the de facto exclusion that suspends the practice
(146).
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For Anderson, one’s individual autonomy depends upon how one is perceived by
others, as does one’s admission into certain intersubjective domains and practices. While
the Feminist Female Slave may satisfy certain conditions as found in proceduralist
accounts of autonomy, there remains a sense of distrust in certain feminist philosophical
circles, because of discomfort with the kind of submission found in the case of the FFS.
From this, it is difficult for women like the FFS to feel like they are part of the feminist
circle. This is seen in many of the first-hand accounts of female slaves used in this
project, which have highlighted the way in which female slaves do not feel as if their
choice to enter into their relationships are recognized as autonomous or respected by
other feminist communities. Anderson’s account of intersubjective autonomy addresses
how the failure to see the other person as autonomous excludes them from being
recognized as autonomous, regardless of whether or not they possess certain autonomy
competencies. This means that even if one were to satisfy Meyers’ or Westlund’s
procedural accounts of autonomy, they will, in a sense, be rendered non-autonomous if
their autonomy is not recognized. For Anderson, recognition of autonomy is important
not only for an individual to feel good about themselves and to possess a sense of
belonging, but also to have their autonomy reinforced by others and to feel like someone
who matters.
For the Feminist Female Slave, in taking a romantic and sexual role that is often
viewed by feminists as problematic or the result of manipulation, to be recognized as
autonomous requires more than just a declaration that she has fulfilled procedural
accounts of autonomy. As valuable as these accounts of autonomy are, it is not always the
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case that merely because one declares themselves as autonomous they are recognized as
such. Anderson’s account addresses the reality of the interpersonal nature of autonomy: in
order to be fully autonomous one must first have their autonomy acknowledged by others.
Butler’s and Andersons’ work offer differing accounts of the importance of
having one’s life or autonomy acknowledged by others. Each of them offers something of
value to the case of the FFS in highlighting and explaining the necessity of the
recognition of her autonomy by other feminist theorists and activists. This is not meant to
claim that strong substantive feminists like Oshana must view the FFS as autonomous,
but merely that the FFS’s establishing her position as autonomous, particularly in a
feminist community, requires more than just meeting the procedural requirements and
being happy in her own skin that she satisfies those requirements. As many of the
interviews with feminist BDSM practitioners in this work have shown, there appears to be
a separation between the female BDSM practitioner and feminist communities. This is
reflected in the somewhat defensive position that many of these women take in their
justification of their roles. To feel unwelcome in a feminist community, to feel that one is
not seen as autonomous, separates and isolates women from their feminist community
and identity. There is a necessary interpersonal dimension to autonomy, whereby one
must be viewed as autonomous by another, or even just viewed at all, in order to
participate in a particular community as an autonomous individual, in order to belong.
Why does it matter that she is a feminist?
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One could ask why belonging to feminist communities or holding a feminist
identity is so important to the Feminist Female Slave, given the tenuous relationship she
has with that community, particularly when she is already a part of another community
that is more accepting of her relationship structure. Her relationship with her BDSM
community in general does not seem to be problematic (even though some BDSM
practitioners have noted that they are distrustful of the 24/7 M/s relationship, as explored
in Chapter 4), and it is assumed that they would recognize her relationship as
autonomous, given that she has fulfilled their requirements for entering into the
relationship, such as the use of the contract and negotiation before becoming a slave.
However, both holding a feminist identity and belonging to those communities has a
particular value for the FFS and for other women like her, as there is a special connection
between the FFS and her feminist identity. On top of this, incorporating the FFS and a
more nuanced understanding of female submission into the feminist community has an
effect on feminism itself – her relationship with her partner and her relationship with
feminist politics can have a great impact on what feminism means in general.
Feminism as an identification offers not only a political philosophy, but also
offers a sense of solidarity with other women. To be a feminist, to be part of a feminist
community, allows women to feel connected with other women, to feel connected with
those who have also felt excluded or confined in their lives due to their gender, and to feel
as if their lives are of value. While feminism and feminist political philosophies are quite
diverse and varied, at a very basic level, the feminist commitment to women’s lives
serves to embolden women, to make them feel more confident in their choices, and to feel
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that they are not alone. For the FFS, and other women like her, to identify with the
commitment to women’s lives, but to simultaneously feel excluded from larger
community participation, almost feels like a betrayal. To receive the acknowledgement of
having autonomously entered into a relationship that at first glance appears to be
problematic for many feminists, grants a great amount of value to the FFS, for she then
has the potential to be included in the community that she feels ought to understand her.
For the FFS, feminism encourages women to seek lives that suit them, rather than
following particular gender scripts. For her to feel excluded by other feminists due to her
relationship, which she feels was autonomously chosen, feels like a mis-application of
feminism, particularly from a community that the FFS feels ought to have respected her
decision.
In terms of the feminist community itself, what it can gain from a greater
inclusion of the FFS and other women like her, is a more nuanced understanding of the
wealth of diverse sexual expressions that women partake in. As feminist philosophy
evolves, so too does the way in which women express their sexual desires; women may
negotiate new roles with a feminist perspective, which impacts the motivating reasons
why they express their sexuality in a certain way, what roles they take on, as well as the
level of reflection they partake in while enacting those roles. The increased diversity of
women’s sexual roles and expressions creates a more nuanced expression of sexuality,
where we cannot assume merely based on the outward expression of the actors that
certain acts are necessarily non-autonomous. It is important to note that such a position
does not mean that women in these roles are necessarily autonomous merely because they
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identify as feminist. Rather, if we are to evaluate women’s autonomy based on sexual or
romantic practice, we have to use greater nuance and care when doing so. We cannot
necessarily exclude women’s participation as fully autonomous or as truly feminist based
on certain assumptions about submission, joined to awareness of oppressive norms.
This chapter aimed to bring together several major components from this project
in order to show the value that the FFS has in not only strengthening feminist philosophy
and BDSM accounts of autonomy, but in establishing why feminist identification and
recognition matters so much to the FFS herself. I argued that Westlund’s dialogical
account provides an interesting, proceduralist account of autonomy that requires an
intersubjectivity (or, at the very least, an imagined intersubjectivity) in order to establish
autonomy. I argued that the case of the FFS would satisfy these requirements, due to her
self-reflexivity and critical engagement with her own relationship. However, I further
argued that for the FFS to meet the requirements for autonomy set out by Westlund was
not enough to necessarily ensure that she would then be viewed as autonomous by other
feminists. From this, I claimed that we must also understand the importance of
acknowledging that women like the FFS as autonomous, that their sense of belonging
within feminist communities plays an important role in the expression and maintenance of
her autonomy.
The relationship between feminist-identified women and the feminist community
in general is an important one. A feminist identification is highly personal, as it affects
the way in which one views themselves, views their politics, and views the world. For the
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FFS, to feel misrepresented by feminist accounts of autonomy, and to feel excluded by
the larger feminist community, has a great impact on her sense of self. While I do not
argue that the feminist community ought to necessarily include her or welcome her with
open arms merely because she is a feminist, I think it is time for feminist communities
(and philosophy) to rethink what it means to be submissive, to rethink what a feminist
looks like, and to rethink what a feminist sexuality must necessarily look like. The FFS
asks us to reflect and to think critically about how we view women’s sexuality and how it
may exclude them from being viewed as autonomous and from inclusion within our
feminist politics and communities.
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Conclusion
In this project I introduced the case of the Feminist Female Slave to bring to light
some of the concerns and considerations that must be made in discussions of women’s
sexual autonomy. From both a feminist relational autonomy perspective and as a part of
BDSM communities, discussions of women’s sexual autonomy do not always take into
consideration the reality and diversity of women’s sexual lives. This project has aimed to
encourage a greater nuance in how we approach women’s sexual submission, as well as a
more realistic approach to consent and autonomy in BDSM sexual practices and
communities.
In Chapter 1 I introduced the connection between autonomy and oppressive
socialization. Using Natalie Stoljar’s Feminist Intuition, I argued that feminist accounts of
relational autonomy are rightfully concerned with the impact that oppressive socialization
has on our expression of autonomy. Using the work of Chambers, Wolff, and Hill, I
claimed that some mainstream accounts of autonomy failed to fully take into account this
socialization, particularly when evaluating the relationship between autonomy and
submission. I argued that in order to properly evaluate the case of the Feminist Female
Slave, a woman who submits to her male sexual and romantic partner, that pernicious
socialization must be included in our evaluation of her autonomy. The most suitable
approach to evaluating her autonomy, then, I argued, was by using relational autonomy, a
feminist account of autonomy which takes into consideration the role that socialization
plays in our development and expression of autonomy.
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In Chapter 2 I outlined the case of the Feminist Female Slave. The FFS offers an
interesting case of submission (more so than that of the nun or the Deferential Wife as
seen in Chapter 1) because of the way in which she submits: her submission is explicit,
can require the use of practices which may be uncomfortable to others, and relies on nonnormative sexual expressions. A sexual relationship which explicitly gives power to the
male partner and places the female partner as subservient to him, while potentially using
physical or emotional discipline and practices, can be uncomfortable to many. For the
female submissive in such a relationship to explicitly declare herself to be a feminist and
that this relationship is an extension of such an identity can also be troubling to some
feminists. She relies on what I called a sex-liberal account of feminism, which is
consistent with the foundational tenets and practices of BDSM communities and is used
to establish her relationship with a feminist identity and philosophy. This chapter
established the practices, commitments, and philosophy of the FFS in order to see how
her case disrupts representations of female submission in relational autonomy and BDSM
accounts of autonomy and consent.
In Chapter 3 I argued that feminist accounts of relational autonomy failed to
provide a comprehensive representation of women’s romantic and sexual relationships. I
outlined the similarities and limitations found in the way female submission has been
represented by these theories in order to establish how the case of the FFS challenged
them. I argued that consequences arise from failing to include a comprehensive
representation of women’s romantic and sexual relationships in discussions of female
submission. Often, this means we overlook particular expressions of female autonomy
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and potentially results in the invisibility or exclusion of women like the FFS from
feminist discourse. I argue that we must continue to develop the theoretical tools to
address the reality of women’s lives and that the case of the FFS provides us with a first
step in that direction.
In Chapter 4 I made two separate arguments: the first claimed that the use of
autonomy and consent in BDSM theory is insufficient in its theoretical rigor. The second
argument claimed that the work of Diana Meyers and Andrea Westlund could resolve
some of these problem areas. In the first part I argued that even though BDSM theory has
explicitly heralded the use of consent in order to ensure that its practices are not abusive,
its attempts to concretize the use of consent in BDSM practices has left little room for
critical engagement with the concepts it relies so heavily upon. I introduced the work of
Meg Barker to show that even while incorporating SSC as a necessary component of
healthy BDSM practices, abuse remains a problem within BDSM communities. I argued
that in order to work to combat the abuse that Barker outlines, BDSM communities must
begin to ask what it means to consent to a practice, what role the community has in
ensuring that consent has been given, and what steps an individual must take in order to
be able to give consent legitimately.
In the second part of Chapter 4 I aimed to show how relational autonomy may be
helpful to BDSM theory in order to cultivate a more nuanced and realistic approach to
autonomy and consent. I argued that the work of Diana Meyers, amongst other relational
autonomy theorists, offers a helpful approach to autonomy as she claims that socialization
is a necessary component of autonomy as it helps us to cultivate our autonomy
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competencies. However, BDSM communities can also use relational autonomy in order
to address how socialization may import biases and misinformation, which, in turn,
generates inauthentic desires. These harmful effects of socialization can affect both
programmatic and episodic autonomy, but the accounts of both Meyers and Westlund
show how we can heighten our awareness of socialization and can begin to remedy these
problems.
In Chapter 5 I brought together several major components of this project in order
to show the value that the FFS has in not only strengthening feminist philosophy and
BDSM accounts of autonomy, but also in explaining why the feminist identification and
inclusion within feminist communities matters so much to the FFS. I argued that
Westlund’s dialogical account of autonomy provides an interesting account of autonomy
that requires an intersubjectivity (or, at the very least, an imagined intersubjectivity) in
order to establish autonomy. I argued that the FFS would satisfy these requirements, due
to her self-reflexivity and critical engagement with her own relationship. However, I
further argued that the FFS’s meeting the requirements for autonomy set out by Westlund
was not enough to necessarily ensure that she would then be viewed as autonomous by
other feminists, or that she would feel as if she belonged to these communities. From this,
I claimed that we must also understand the importance of acknowledging women like the
FFS as autonomous, and that their sense of belonging within feminist communities plays
an important role in the expression and maintenance of their autonomy.
This project has not necessarily aimed to make the FFS autonomous by merely
introducing her case and claiming that she perfectly meets some kind of requirement for
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autonomy. Rather, this project has brought out the roadblocks that prevent her from
establishing her autonomy. From arousing the suspicions of those who think she violates
the Feminist Intuition, to failing to conform to more general representations of female
submission in romantic relationships, and to the perception that she does not belong in
feminist communities, the FFS has a difficult path in her attempt to establish her
autonomy to others. Rather than using this difficult experience to retreat from her feminist
identity, or to retreat from her pursuit of autonomy, I argue that the FFS offers a case in
which feminist autonomy theorists can grow and develop their own approaches in a way
that is inclusive of the diversity of women’s sexual expression. The FFS represents a case
in which feminist identity is quite central to her own individual identity, and one in which
a subject aims to take a submissive role without becoming subsumed by it. Within
feminist philosophy, the FFS challenges our narrow notions of female subservience and
asks us to rethink what it means to express an autonomous women’s sexuality. In BDSM
theory the FFS asks us to reflect upon our reliance upon superficial notions of consent
and the lack of space for a critical dialogue. In feminist politics she asks us to consider
what it means to belong to feminist communities, or what it means to feel as if one can
lay claim to a feminist identity. Each of these considerations is brought to light because of
the interesting balance that the FFS’s relationship holds between her feminist identity,
sexual politics, and sexual and romantic practices.
This project hopes to encourage growth and inclusion in both feminist and BDSM
theories and communities. While I doubt that women like the FFS are excluded from
either grouping in a malicious manner, the exclusion that women like the FFS experience
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creates a sense of loss of community and identification and results in a real harm. While I
doubt all feminists, relational autonomy theorists, and others would consider the FFS to
be autonomous, the way in which she is currently overlooked in discourse and excluded
from community identification does little to develop a dialogue with her and others like
her. We must begin to consider these cases in order to speak to the way in which
women’s sexuality is expressed, and to engage with women’s varied identifications with
feminism and other community memberships.
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