MASTERS THESIS
State Identity,
democratization, and the
democratic deficit in the
Muslim World
Supervised by: Prof. Dr. Gamal Soltan
Reader: Prof. Dr. Oliver Schlumberger
Reader: Prof. Dr. Nadine Sika
Ahmed Maati
[Pick the date]
Table of Contents
Part I: Qualitative assessment ...................................................................................................... 2
Chapter 1: Introduction: State Identity, Islam, and Democracy .................................................. 2
Is Islam hindering democracy? A critique of essentialism ...................................................... 5
Chapter 2: State Identity and cohesion: explaining Democratiztion and Democratic stability in
light of consensus on state identity............................................................................................ 11
i)
The Structure of Cleavages and stability of Democracy ............................................... 12
ii)
Identity, social cohesion, and democratization .............................................................. 15
iii) Consociationalism ......................................................................................................... 18
Chapter 3: cohesion and Statehood in explaining Democracy: the case of State Identity......... 25
i)
Why state identity? ........................................................................................................ 29
ii)
Statehood and Democracy: The three dimensional State .............................................. 32
iii) Methodology: .................................................................................................................... 42
i)
Objectives: ..................................................................................................................... 43
Part 2: Empirical tests and Results: .......................................................................................... 46
Chapter 4: Cohesion and Statehood: in light of State Identity .................................................. 46
i)
Consensus on Identity in measuring social and political cleavages .............................. 46
ii)
State identity affects other state dimensions.................................................................. 55
Chapter 5: Consensus on identity, Statehood, and Democracy ................................................. 61
i)
Statehood is a requisite for democracy: ......................................................................... 61
ii)
Consensus on identity and Democracy: in light of cohesion and Statehood ................. 68
Chapter 6: Conclusion What is different in Muslim Countries: Direction for further research: 83
A) What is the difference in Muslim countries................................................................... 84
B)
Bridging Agency and Structural approaches to Democratization ................................. 88
Bibliography: ............................................................................................................................... 92
1
Part I: Qualitative Assessment
Chapter 1: Introduction: State Identity, Islam, and Democracy
The third wave of democracy had un-doubtfully escaped the MENA region. This
has historically generated interest in examining what some scholars named the
persistence of authoritarianism in this region. It did not escape scholarly attention that
one of the common characteristics among countries of this region is that Islam is the
primary religion of either the state, the majority of the population, or both. This
commonalty fevered an ongoing interest of the relation between Islam and democracy,
even though authoritarianism is not limited to Muslim societies. However, the prevalence
of authoritarianism in countries where Islam is the prevalent religion fosters the interest
in studying reasons behind the democratic deficit in those polities. The most recent
developments sweeping across the Middle East, a region that constitutes the heart of the
Muslim World, have renewed interest in studying the relationship between Islam and
democracy. The outcomes of the waves of popular protests that swept the region are far
from settled; their outcomes range from prolonged conflict such as the case in Syria, to
the resilience of authoritarianism in Egypt. Despite this variation in preliminary
outcomes, authoritarianism remains the prevalent form of governance in these countries.
A lot of scholars attempt to address the reasons that render Islamic polities
undemocratic. This research will argue that the democratic deficit in Muslim societies is
not about the compatibility of Islam and democracy. I argue that some factors are
important in explaining the likelihood of democracy in any given polity, regardless of the
religious identity of the population. In doing so, I argue that consensus on state identity is
instrumental in the development and maintenance of democracy. 1 Consensus on state
identity contributes to democratization and democratic stability on two grounds; first, I
propose that lack of such consensus results in a lack of political and social cohesion.
Literature on democratic consolidation and stability suggest that political and social
1
I define consensus on State Identity to be the extent to which citizens agree on the formal identity of the
State; this agreement is manifested in two ways. First, it is reflected in the acceptance of different groups
to the official conception of the nation state, as well as the latter’s legitimacy; second, it is manifested in
the State’s inclusion of different groups into its citizenship corps. This definition is consistent with the
empirical data used in this research. Chapter 4 highlights on the operationalization of consensus on state
identity in the BTI data.
2
cohesion are necessary for democracy. However, contrary to the literature’s emphasis on
ethnic, religious, and linguistic cleavages, I argue that it is the lack of agreement
regarding state identity constitutes a social and political cleavage that obstructs
democratic transition. Second, state identity is a central dimension of Statehood- a
definitional attribute of modern democracy; highlighting on literature engaging with the
state-democracy nexus, I emphasize the academic agreement on the centrality of the state
to democracy, albeit different views regarding the causal sequence of this relation 2 .
Moreover, I show that consensus on state identity is not only a dimension of the state, but
that it also affects other dimensions of Statehood. Through these effects, consensus on
state identity, argues this paper, explains both, the general democratic status in
developing countries, and the democratic deficit in the Muslim World.
In this way, this research contributes to two different debates, attempting to forge
a link between them. The first is the debate that examines democracy in the Muslim
World; the second is the debate regarding factors that explain the likelihood and extent of
democracy in any given polity, regardless of its religious identity. The first debate comes
in light of the undemocratic color that shades most Muslim countries. The second comes
in light of debates concerning the importance of cohesion and Statehood as factors that
signal democracy. Accordingly, this paper argues that agreement on state identity is
central to the emergence and consolidation of democracy because it constitutes social
and political cohesion, and consolidates Statehood. In light of this argument, I explain
authoritarianism in the Muslim World by lack of consensus on state identity and the
resulting fragmentation and state deficit.
The paper is divided into two parts; the first is a qualitative part that lay the
ground for the empirical analysis conducted in part 2. Part one includes three chapters;
the following two chapters constitute part 2. Chapter one introduces the research puzzle
and research hypotheses. After that, it teases out the inadequacy of literature dealing with
Muslim countries and democracy, and argues for the inspection of authoritarianism in the
Muslim World beyond the question of Islam’s compatibility with democracy. Chapter 2
2
This paper maintains that there is a difference between requisites to democracy and pre-requisites for
democracy. I dedicate a section to the discussion of the importance of statehood to democracy, and I
conceptualize the state to be central to democracy, whether conceptualized as a requisite or a prerequisite to democracy
3
discusses the literature on social and political cleavages and their effects on democratic
stability and democratization; it sheds light on present disagreement within this literature
on the effect of diversity and democracy, arguing that this literature has mistakenly
focused on the ethnic, religious, and linguistic cohesion in explaining prospects of
democracy. In this way, different scholars disagree on whether the aforementioned
diversities are conducive or alien to democracy. Chapter 3 presents the theoretical
framework in which I argue that consensus on state identity constitutes the cohesion
necessary for democracy. In fact, I assert that ailments of fragmentation, discussed in
literature tackling cleavages, only exist as a result of a lack of consensus on state identity,
and not as a result of ethnic, linguistic, or religious diversity. Moreover, the chapter
discusses the centrality of Statehood to democracy, arguing that, regardless of the
sequence in which both phenomena occur, the state remains instrumental in signaling the
degree of democracy present in any polity 3 . In this way, consensus on state identity
becomes important for democracy not only as cohesion, but also as a critical dimension
of Statehood. The final section of chapter three introduces the methodology and derives
from my qualitative analysis four empirically testable hypotheses.
The second part is dedicated to the empirical analysis of these hypotheses. I use
data from the Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2014; the exact variables tested are to
be presented at the beginning of each section. In all empirical tests regarding consensus
on identity and democracy and/or its different components, I compare the results of
Muslim countries- defined as countries that are members of the [O]rganization of
[I]slamic [C]onference- to those of the whole population of countries examined, as well
as to those of countries that are not members of the OIC. Chapter four tests the relation
between consensus on state identity and different manifestations of fragmentation; it,
moreover, shows that state identity is a central definitional dimension of Statehood,
arguing that it, moreover, affects the other dimensions of Statehood. Finally, the chapter
ultimately argues that, empirically, consensus on state identity produces cohesion, and
exponentially affects Statehood. Chapter 5 tests the centrality of Statehood to democracy,
articulating on the statistical effects of different state dimensions on democracy.
3
The definition of democracy is a matter of controversy in democratic theory; I articulate on my
conceptualization of democracy in chapter five. I adopt the definition of constitutional democracy present
in the codebook of the Bertelsmann Transformation Index Data that is used in this paper.
4
Moreover, I test for the effect of state identity on different specific democratic
dimensions that are hypothesized to be directly affected by Statehood and/or cleavage. It
concludes by shedding light on the statistical differences of identity’s impact on
democracy between Muslim and non-Muslim countries. Chapter 6 concludes by a
discussion on the findings in light of the statistical comparison between OIC and nonOIC countries; moreover, it infers direction for further research in both Muslim and nonMuslim countries.
Is Islam hindering democracy? A critique of essentialism
Huntington argues that the new world order is divided along civilizational fault
lines where differences in cultural values become the main cause for conflict. Among the
non-Western civilizations, Islamic values are the most different from Western democratic4
values. There are three elements to the Huntington’s thesis 5 . The first is that culture
matters; Huntington defines culture as a composite of language, history, religion,
customs, institutions, and the subjective self-identification of people 6 . It is, however,
important to note that, in Huntington’s conception, religion is the primary contributor and
definer of culture 7 . In light of this understanding of culture, the second element of
|Huntington’s argument is that there exist a sharp rift between core values of Islam and
those of the West. Finally, that this rift leaves both civilizations in a state of inevitable
conflict. Bernard Lewis maintains a similar view; he argues that Islam is built on the idea
that god’s words, revealed and explained by his prophet Mohamed, is the only sources of
law. This, accordingly, leaves no room for democratic values of compromise, consensus
building, pluralism, and tolerance to emerge. Moreover, Lewis argues that the Muslims’
conception of umma inherently challenges the notion of the modern nation-state8; the
importance of the state to democracy is of special importance to this paper; it is however
enough to highlight in this section that western representative democracy is rested on the
4
Samuel Huntington. 1996. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World
Order.NewYork
5
Pippa Norris, and Ronald Inglehart. 2011. Sacred and secular: Religion and politics worldwide. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 135.
6
Huntington 1996, 28.
7
Norris and Ingelhart 2011, 135.
8
Bernard Lewis. 1987."Introduction." In Islam, From the Prophet Muhammad to the Capture of
Constantinople, Vol. 1: Politics and War, edited and translated by B. Lewis, pp. xiii-xxiii. New York: Oxford
University Press., 485. See Also Islam and the West 1993.
5
conception of the modern nation state. In light of this understanding, the Islamic concept
of umma is seen as an impediment to the emergence of democracy. Lewis complements
this conclusion in another work in which he argues that the limited number of
democracies in the Middle East is telling of the unreceptive nature of Islam to
democracy9. This lack of democracy is attributed to Islam defined as a “political identity
and allegiance, transcending all others” 10 . In this line of thought, Islam becomes a
unitary transcendent culture that is built on the idea of a single source of law manifested
in one unit where the church and the state become one unitary entity, and where the
scriptural holy Islamic teachings is the single source of law. This understanding of Islam
allows no room for democratic values and practices to flourish; hence the lack of
democracy in the Muslim World, according to Lewis, is a function of the spread of
Islamic culture. As will be discussed in a later section, this understanding of Islam
overlooks the different interpretations and practices of Islam.
Another similar line of thought is rather a slight modification, or more accurately,
a wider conceptualization of the essentialist stance. Modernization theory maintains that
there exist linear progressions of human societies that starts with a traditional society and
ends with a modern high consumption society11. This progress is manifested not only in
the economic sphere, but also in the societal values and means of organization. In his
book The End of History and The Last Man, Fukuyama articulates on the triumphant of
modernism, Liberalism, and capitalism that they signal the end of history, that is, the last
societal configurations of mankind12. In light of his argument, Islam’s traditional values
are incompatible with liberalism, democracy, and more generally, modern societal
configurations13. Other students of modernization theory theorize differently in regards to
the impact of Islam on democracy, and more generally, on societal values. Ingelhart
empirically tests these relations and finds that Islam does not account for any difference
in regards to the support of democracy; rather, it accounts for the difference in gender
9
Bernard Lewis. 1994. The Shaping of the Modern Middle East, rev. ed. New York: Oxford University Press.
Bernard Lewis. 1993. Islam and The West, 4-5.
11
W.W. Rostow. 1960.”The Five Stages of Economic Growth.” In The Stages of Economic Growth, a NonCommunist Manifesto. England: Cambridge University Press, 4-16.
12
Francis Fukuyama. 1993. The End of History and the Last Man. New York: Avon Book.
13
Ibid.
10
6
inequality14. This, concludes Ingelhart, is a result of the delayed modernization in Islamic
societies. Moreover, he maintains that Islam is the reason behind such delay in
modernization because Islamic law is inherently against gender equality. In another work,
he argues that homosexuality and gender equality lie at the heart of the difference
between Islam and the West. He argues that the process of individualization, which is an
integral component of the modernization process, account for such difference as they are
more obvious among younger generations. This is primarily because younger generations
in the west have been the products of post-industrial modernization as opposed to young
generations in the Islamic countries15. Similarly, Ciftci tests for different explanations for
public attitudes towards democracy in 10 countries with Muslim majority; his results
show that levels of modernization, measured in terms of income, education…etc. still has
a strong explanatory power in regards to support for democracy, especially when
compared to other theories of social capital and religious values16.
On a conceptual level, this understanding of Islam's impact on societal and
political values as a function of its impact on the modernization process is both
historically inaccurate and analytically superficial. Dietrich Jund and his colleagues argue
that Muslims today are products of the continuous reconstruction of the “modern
Muslim”; since the 19th century, this construction has been in continuous interaction with
the claim to authenticity 17 . In this understanding, all Muslims, although in different
manners, could be described as modern. Furthermore, a lot of Islamist movements are
affected by and integrated in the modernization process, even if they publicly claim to
have an authentic doctrine that spaces them from other, specifically western cultures; one
example would be the Muslim Brothers in Egypt, Tunisia, and Turkey. Similarly, a lot of
radical Islamists have crafted their means of organization, communication, and
sometimes even their indoctrination within modernity. Here I agree to Fukuyama’s
assertion that Radical Islamic ideology is best seen “as a manifestation of modern identity
14
Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris.2003. Rising Tide: Gender Equality and Cultural
Change Around the World. New York: Cambridge University Press.
15
Norris and Ingelhart 2011, 149.
16
Sabri ciftci . 2010. Modernization, Islam, or social capital: What explains attitudes toward democracy in
the Muslim world? Comparative Political Studies 43 (11): 1442-70.
17
Dietrich Jung, and Marie Juul Petersen. "Islamic Reform and the Construction of Modern Muslim
Subjectivities." In Politics of Modern Muslim Subjectivities: Islam, Youth, and Social Activism in the Middle
East. New York : Palgrave Macmillan, 37.
7
politics rather than an assertion of traditional Muslim culture”18. That is not to say that
those movements produce a modern citizen in the sense that modernization theory means;
rather, it is to highlight that modernization is neither a linear process nor it is a
dichotomized variable that only allows for the traditional and the modernist.
On the empirical level, the modernization view has been undergoing considerable
vigorous criticisms; for example, Mildarsky empirically tests for a relationship between
percentages of Muslim population and three different indicators for democracy. The
findings suggest that there is no clear correlation between the percentages of Muslims in
the population and the extent of rights offered in their respective polities; however, it
indicates a clear relationship between the former and the extent to which democracy is
institutionalized 19 . The justification behind the choice of percentage of Muslim
population as indicative of Islam is rested on the grounds that the percentage of Muslims
signals the likelihood of Islamic law governing a polity20. This finding suggest that there
is not a certain clear way in which Islam, as an all-encompassing variable, affects
democracy; rather, that some aspects of Islam affect some components of democracy.
Halliday takes similar results a step further to argue that there is no universal
interpretation and practice of Islam; accordingly, it becomes absurd to treat Islamic
culture (if such thing exists) as unitary stagnant entity that transcends various and
different human understanding of their faith21.
On a similar conceptualization of Islam, Asef Bayat argues that the question
should be under what conditions do Muslims make Islam alien or compatible with
democracy, rather than whether Islam is compatible with democracy22 23. In this stance,
Bayat voices his ardent criticism to Huntington’s argument that emphasizes the essential
link, or rather lack of, between Islam and democracy. Similarly, in two of his works,
Esposito highlights the different trends and interpretations within Islam, criticizing any
18
Fukuyama, Francis. 2006. Identity, immigration, and liberal democracy. Journal of Democracy 17 (2): 9.
Manus Mildrasky 1998. Democracy and Islam: Implications for civilizational conflict and the democratic
peace. International Studies Quarterly 42 (3): 504.
20
Ibid., 493
21
Fredd Halliday. 1996. Islam and the myth of confrontation: Religion and politics in the Middle East. New
York: I.B. Tauris.
22
Asef Bayat. 2007. Islam and democracy: What is the real question?.Vol. 8. Amsterdam: Amsterdam
University Press, 10.
23
John L. Esposito, and Dalia Mogahed. 2007. Who speaks for Islam?: What a billion Muslims really think.
New York, NY: Gallup Press.
19
8
essential link between Islam and democracy 24 . Some others highlight the role of
individual Islamic theorists and politicians who advanced the democratic interpretation of
Islam25 26.
Other
scholarship
takes
the
challenge
of
utilizing
this
constructivist
conceptualization of Islam to empirical testing; this scholarship rightly emphasizes the
different impacts of Islam on various components of democracy. Mark Tessler carries out
the challenging task of examining the different ways in which Islam affects democracies
in different contexts27. The work comparatively considers the cases of Morocco, Egypt,
Algeria, and Palestine. Tessler Focuses on two different definitions of Islam: personal
piety and support for religious guidance in political and social matters; in doing so, he
presents inconsistent findings in regards to the impact of each measure of Islam on public
support for democracy. In Palestine, support for democracy decreases with the increase in
personal piety; in contrast, Morocco and Algeria experience no significant relation
between those variables 28 ; however, there remains a strong inverse relation between
democracy and support for Islam's integration in political and social affairs. In Egypt, on
the other hand, there had been a significant inverse relation between personal piety and
support for democracy, but no relation between the latter and the support of Islam's
integration in political and social affairs. For Morocco and Algeria, the results are only
significant as a function of the support of religion in politics in regards to economic
matters; moreover, the support for religious integration in political matters did not have a
statistically significant impact for support to democracy. Furthermore, interestingly
enough, those results are statistically significant for women and not for men. Those
empirical findings contradict arguments that advocate an essential link between Islam and
democracy, they, moreover, assert the unstatic non-universal nature of Islam. Juxtaposed
by the conceptual problematic generated by essentialist linear understanding of the link
between Islam and democracy, those findings drive our inquiry into examining which
24
John L. Esposito 2010. The Future of Islam. New York: Oxford University Press.
Abdelwahab El-Affendi. 2003. The elusive reformation. Journal of Democracy 14 (2): 34-9.
26
Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr. 2005. The rise of "Muslim Democracy". Journal of Democracy 16 (2): 13-27.
27
Mark Tessler. 2002. Islam and Democracy in the Middle East: the impact of religious orientations on
attitudes towards democracy in four Arab countries. Comparative Politics.34(I): 337-354.
28
Ibid., 345.
25
9
configurations in the Islamic world that affect democracy, rather than whether the religion
of Islam is alien, or not, to democracy.
This paper, nevertheless, admits to the general democratic deficit in countries in
which Islam is the primary religion; in other words, it recognizes that despite its
understanding of Islam as a non-static religion that has been interpreted in different
manners, it realizes that the Muslim world today still suffers a general authoritarian hue29.
This research argues that this democratic deficit should be treated beyond the question of
Islam’s impact on democracy; it argues that, for the past years, the general engagement
with the prospects of democratization has overlooked the centrality of consensus on state
identity, and generally stateness, to the emergence and consolidation of democracy. The
following section discusses literature dealing with the question of cleavages and
democracy, pinpointing the disagreement within this literature on the definition of
cleavages and the way in which they affect democracy. I will then propose my own
understanding of cleavages and highlight that the degree of consensus on state identity
signals the extent of cohesion and Statehood in a polity, and in turn, signals the extent of
democracy present in this polity.
29
M. Steven Fish. 2002. Islam and authoritarianism. World Politics 55 (1): 4-37.
10
Chapter 2: State Identity and Cohesion: Explaining Democratization and
Democratic Stability in Light Of Consensus on State Identity
This paper defines social and political cohesion as consensus on state identity. I
will first review literature on cohesion and democracy. In doing so, I will argue that i)
literature on social cohesion and democracy mistakenly consider social diversity and
differences to antagonize cohesion; I argue that differences in themselves do not
constitute cleavages that hinder democracy; rather, it is the meanings associated to these
differences that render them divisive, and in turn, jeopardize democracy. It is in light of
this argument that I propose consensus on state identity as a measure of the divisiveness
of social and political differences in a society, and in turn, as a definition of social and
political cohesion. I conclude by articulating that lack of consensus on state identity
negatively affects democracy in two ways: first it is a divisive cleavage that obstacles
elite bargain, and, second, that it threatens statehood, and in turn, democracy. The
impact of consensus on state identity on statehood deserves a lengthy discussion in which
I show that consensus on state identity is not only crucial for stateness, but also that its
interaction with other dimensions of the state facilitates the inclusive democratic
mitigation of differences within a polity. Furthermore, I argue that contrary to the
reviewed literature, social and political cleavages exist regardless of the ethnic, religious,
and linguistic homogeneity; the absence of a consensus regarding the identity of the state
could occur as a function of state formation experience or other factors, and serves as
cleavage that hinders prospects of democracy even in ethnically homogenous societies;
however, a detailed analysis of these factors is beyond the scope of this paper. I,
moreover argue that ii) literature tackling this question is over-focused on the relationship
between lack of cohesion and democracy through the likelihood of the former to induce
civil violence; this understanding of the dynamics that relate fragmentation to democracy
through violence undermines cases where factionalism itself hinders the emergence of
democratic dynamics. Actually, state identity is one of the divisive issues that qualify to
create irreconcilable cleavages that could take place in the absence of violence, yet in
turn, endangers democracy. I follow this discussion by my conceptual understanding of
cleavages and their impact on democracy.
11
i)
The Structure of Cleavages and Stability of Democracy
In the literature dealing with political stability and democratic consolidation, there
is a lot that has been said in regards to the importance of addressing social and political
divisions. Lipset argues that “the character and content of the major cleavages affecting
the political stability of a society are largely determined by historical factors which have
affected the way in which major issues dividing society have been solved or left
unresolved over time”. 30 Similarly, Zuckerman maintains that “there seems to be general
agreement that cleavage-membership perceptions that are highly intense will result in a
polarized cleavage system and thereby in violent political conflict”. 31 Dahl argues that
conflicts concerning sub-cultures within a polity are impossible to solve within
democratic procedures.32 This comes in light of these issues’ explosive nature and ability
to halt democratic procedures.33 Rae and Taylor argue that there are three fundamental
types of cleavages; ascriptive (race, ethnicity…etc.), attitudinal concerning opinion and
ideology, and behavioral cleavages that manifest themselves in voting and other political
procedures 34 . Bartolini and Mair identified similar types of cleavages; however, they
argue that cleavages are not simply social differences. Rather, there should be a
combination of all three elements of cleavages so that they result in “social closure”.35
Deegan Kraus takes this argument a bit to its moderate face, arguing that the combination
of at least two of the three differences form different types of cleavages with varying
political and social significance; their total overlap constitutes an ideal type of cleavage
and social closure.36 It is important to note here that Kraus asserts that cleavages that are
ideological are the least serious in impeding democracy; although he did not explicitly
30
Martin Lipset 1959, 91.
Alan Zuckerman. 1975. 'Political Cleavage: A Conceptual and Theoretical Analysis'. Brit. J.
Polit. Sci. 5 (02): 238.
32
Robert A. Dahl. 1966. Political Oppositions in Western Democracies. New Haven: Yale
University Press, 385-6.
33
Ibid
34
Douglas W. Rae,and Michael Taylor. 1970. The analysis of political cleavages. New
Haven:Yale University Press, 1.
35
Stefano Bartolini, and Peter Mair. 2007. Identity, Competition and Electoral Availability.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 215.
36
Kevin Deegan-Kraus. 2004. 'Slovakia'. In The Handbook of Political Change In Easter Europe,
ed., 255-288. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 256.
31
12
situate identity in any category of his typology of cleavages, it is clear that he gives
primary importance to ascriptive differences, and their effect on cleavage system.
This debate concerns itself with the content and dimensions of cleavages in
society. Another scholarship occupies itself with studying the structure of cleavages in
society. Nicholas Miller argues that all societies are divided among one or the other lines
that leave their individuals in different sets; those sets have different preferences and
orientations in regards to public policy. Some large and complex societies are divided “by
a pluralism of cleavages that are often related to one another in a cross-cutting rather than
reinforcing patter”.37 In such society, two individuals who belong to different sets have
conflicting views in regards to some issues but also agree on many issues. This idea of
pluralistic identification and cross-cutting affiliations is highlighted in contradistinction
to reinforcing cleavages; those kind of polarized reinforcing cleavages are characterized
by the lack of individual membership in overlapping sets. Accordingly, in those societies
two individuals are likely to have conflicting views in regards to many aspects of political
and social life, showing little agreement on any single or set of issues.38
Having highlighted this difference, the significance of this structural difference in
the nature of cleavages existing in society becomes significant for democracy because in
so far as members of a society affiliate with cross-cutting memberships, resolving issues
of conflict becomes more likely to take place within a democratic dynamic. Lipset and
Rokkan argue that the stability of democratic regimes often depends on salient,
crosscutting cleavages where individuals’ various memberships and identifications with
groups create cross-allegiances to different political positions or support for catchall,
large political parties. However, if cleavages are reinforcing rather than cross-cutting, the
probability of mass conflict and political instability increases. 39 If cleavages are deeply
polarized to the point where the winning of one faction is regarded as the total
annihilation of the other in a zero sum game, it becomes hard for conflict issues to be
resolved within a democratic dynamic.
37
Nicholas Miller. 2003. 'Pluralism and Social Choice'. In The Democracy Sourcebook, ed.
Robert Dahl. Cambridge: MIT Press, 134.
38
Ibid
39
Craig J. Calhoun. 2002. Dictionary of the Social Sciences. New York: Oxford University Press.
13
The political game inherently produces losers and winners; the question of
political stability is how to convince losers “to continue to play the political game, to
continue to work within the system rather than throw it”.40 Losers in a democratic game
would think to wait till the next elections if they believe that there is a prospect for
producing different outcomes; 41 this belief naturally arises from the assertion that
political preferences change over time. However, in a society where cleavages are
reinforcing rather than cross-cutting, preferences change slowly overtime. In pluralistic
societies where cleavages are cross cutting, there is more reason to believe that the next
election would produce different results.42 I argue here that this argument holds for the
emergence of democracy as much as it does for the maintenance and consolidation of a
stable democratic system. In other words, I argue that without this understanding on part
of all factions that in a potential democratic game the loss of one faction does not entail
its total annihilation, it becomes impossible for different factions to seek or establish a
democratic dynamic.43 If reinforcing cleavages are divisive to the point where different
factions regard their democratic loss as their total political loss in a zero-sum game
dynamics, it becomes unlikely for these political actors to consciously resort to the
institutionalization of their differences in a democratic configuration. The following
Diagram presents this argument:
40
Miller 2003, 138.
139.
42
ibid
43
Rustow A. 1970. Transitions to democracy: Toward a dynamic model. Comparative Politics 2
(3): 355.
41
14
ii)
Identity, Social Cohesion, and Democratization
There exists, however, a strand of literature that speaks to the centrality of
cohesion to prospects of democratization. The problem with this literature is twofold;
first, it over-focuses on ethnic, religious, and linguistic cleavages, leaving the consensus
on identity hardly examined. Second is the emphasis on factionalism as a facilitator to
violent conflict, and in turn, to democracy; this, however, overlooks cases where
factionalism itself, even in the absence of violence, serves as an impediment to the choice
of political actors to resort to democracy in solving their disputes.
Generally, literature engaging with the relation between cohesion and prospects of
democracy is divided between two views; both views mistakenly equate ethnic, religious,
and linguistic diversity with factionalism, and homogeneity with cohesion. The first holds
that a homogenous polity is necessary and conducive to the emergence of democracy; for
example, Bingham Powel argues that there exists a negative relationship between ethnic
factionalism and government stability, civil peace, and prospects of democracy. 44
Similarly, John Stewart Mill states that “free institutions are next to impossible in a
country made up of different nationalities”. 45 With a slight change of focus from
democracy as the dependent variable to conflict, which is understood as being
detrimental to the prospects for democracy, Gabriel Almond argues that the likelihood of
conflict increases with diversity. 46 In light of these works, factionalism either directly
hinders democracy, or is bridged by an intervening variable (on this case violence) that in
turn hinders democracy. In one of the seminal works on democratization theory, Rustow
argues that the only pre-condition for the emergence of democracy is national unity. 47 He
articulates that the emergence of democracy takes several phases; the “preparatory phase”
that is characterized by polarization and “the rising of new elite that arouses a depressed
and previously leaderless social groups into concerted action”. 48 The “decision-making”
44
G. Bingham Powell. 1982. Contemporary democracies: Participation, stability, and violence.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 44-46.
45
John Stuart Mill. 1958. Considerations on representative government. Vol. no. 71. New York:
Liberal Arts Press, 230.
46
Gabriel A. Almond. 1956. Comparative political systems. The Journal of Politics 18 : 391-409.
See also Gabriel A. Alond, G. Bingham Powell, and Robert J. Mundt. 1993. Comparative
politics: A theoretical framework. New York, NY: HarperCollins College Publishers.
47
Ibid.
48
Ibid.
15
phase in which political leaders take the conscious decision to institutionalize diversity,
an example of which is Sweden’s great concession of 1907. 49 Finally, the “habituation
phase” in which common citizens’ belief in democracy is enhanced when they find that it
resolved major social and economic issues.50 On another front, politicians would not only
confirm their belief in democracy, but also new generations of politicians who are ardent
believers of democracy would emerge. Finally, the citizens at large would “be fitted into
the new structure by forging effective links of party organization that connect the
politician in the capital with the mass electorate throughout the country”. 51 We can
conclude from Rustow’s argument that a) democratization depends on a deliberate elite
decision, and b) a successful democratization relies on the ability of the democratic
system to address stressing socio-economic issues. The coming sections highlight on how
consensus on state identity is instrumental in signaling points a and b.
The second view holds that, in fact, diversity and heterogeneity facilitate the
emergence of democracy. For instance, Benjamin Reilly maintains that the success of the
democratic experience in New Guinea is a result of the cultural diversity of its population
which hinders any single faction a monopoly over political power. 52 In a similar fashion
Robert Hardgrave maintains that a similar situation exists in India where diversity was
conducive to the emergence of a democratic experience.53 In contrast to the view that
holds diversity to invoke civil violence, James Fearon and David Laitin argue that, unlike
common belief, diversity does not increase the likelihood of civil war. 54 This line of
argumentation is taken further by Steven Fish; occupied by the challenge of statistically
testing for the impact of cleavages on conflict and democracy, Fish asserts that there is no
relationship between factionalism, defined in its ethnic, religious, or linguistic
49
Rustow 1979, 355.This process has also been coined (the grand bargain) in later transitology
literature.
50
Rustow 1979, 358.
51
Rustow 1979, 360.
52
Benjamin Reilly. 2000. Democracy, ethnic fragmentation, and internal conflict. International
Security 25 (3): 168.
53
Hardgrave, Robert L. 1993. India: The dilemmas of diversity. Journal of Democracy 4 (4): 7185.
54
James D. Fearon, and David D. Laitin. 2003. Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war. American Political
Science Review 97 (1): 75-90. See also Fearon, James D., and David D. Laitin. 1996. Explaining interethnic
cooperation. The American Political Science Review 90 (4): 715-35.
16
constitution, on the one hand, and democracy and civil violence on the other. 55
Nevertheless, he maintains that there is a statistically significant negative relationship
between civic violence and democracy.56 Despite this research’s disagreement with Fish’s
conceptualization of cleavages, his findings support my conceptualization of cleavages;
in fact, Fish did not find any relation between diversity and democracy and/or violence.
Rather, he found a statistically significant relation between one political manifestation of
diversity, violence, and democracy. Some scholars argue that polarization not diversity is
what hinders the emergence of democracy and induce violence. 57 Fish, however,
maintains that, even after running his statistical tests substituting diversity with
polarization as the independent variable, there remains no statistically significant relation
between polarization and violence or democracy.58 Fish dissects three types of cleavages:
ethnic, linguistic, and religious; he, moreover, argues that in some cases, polarization
could facilitate democracy. For example, he argues that, statistically, the polarization of
language facilitates the emergence of democracy in Bulgaria 59 , articulating on some
possible ways polarization could facilitate the emergence of democracy. 60 The conclusion
taken out from his statistically loaded work is that “If ethnic diversity ever encourages
conflict and blocks democratization, there must also be cases where it reduces conflict
and aids democratization”.
61
The next chapter articulates extensively on my
conceptualization of cleavages and the way in which they affect democracy; it is,
however, important to sum up this section by stating that: 1) ethnic, religious, or
linguistic diversity serve as social ingredients that might, in some cases, be utilized to
constituted lack of agreement regarding identity, and in turn, affect prospects of
democracy. 2) Nevertheless, the mere existence of such differences does not, in itself,
55
Steven Fish, M., and Matthew Kroenig. 2006. Diversity, conflict and democracy: Some
Evidence from Eurasia and east Europe. Democratization 13 (5): 829.
56
Ibid.
57
Paul Collier, and Anke Hoeffer. 1998. On economic causes of civil war. Oxford Economic
Papers 50 (4): 571. Also see Donald L. Horowitz. 1985. Ethnic groups in conflict. Berkeley:
University of California Press.
58
Fish 2006, Diversity Conflict and Democracy, 832.
59
836.
60
838.
61
Ibid.
17
constitute a political or social cleavage that hinders democracy. 3) Further research is
needed to tease out circumstances under which such utilization of differences takes place.
The coming chapter introduces this research’s theoretical framework that highlights
differences between the discussed works and mine, highlighting my disagreement with
the conceptualization of cleavages present in this literature. Before I present this paper’s
conceptual framework and its position vis-à-vis the discussed literature, I dedicate a
section to a strand of literature on democratization that openly maintains that ethnic,
religious, and linguistic fragmentation is not only conducive to democracy, but also that,
in some cases, facilitates its emergence. I argue that this literature on consociational
democracy strengthens, rather than, questions my hypotheses. In fact, consociational
democracies assert that cohesion is not the result of ethnic and other ascriptive
homogeneity; rather, that it is a result of agreement on the identity and nature of the state.
iii)
Consociationalism
A) Consociationalism: and Acknowledgement of the Ailments of
Fragmentation:
In 1969 Lijphart published his work consociational democracy in which he argues
that Gabriel Almond’s classification of homogeneous stable democracies, and unstable
democracies that operate in fragmented societies characterized by degree of immobilism,
misses an important third category; this category includes countries that are characterized
by an obvious degree of fragmentation, yet manage to maintain a stable democratic
system.62 Through a close inspection of the way consociational democracy presents itself,
it is clear that it admits to the ailments of fragmentation; moreover, it stresses the
importance of elite consensus on an agreed-upon framework to mitigate differences. I
argue that this elite consensus is consensus on state identity. Consensus on state identity
entails that different political actors agree on the social boundaries of the state; this
entails a mutual understanding among different groups on their collective identity
represented in the state. In consociational democracies, the content of this agreement is
the acknowledgement and tolerance of differences. Consociational democracies are
polities characterized by deep ethnic, linguistic, or religious cleavages; those cleavages
serve as obstacles in the way of democracy. Nevertheless, those polities manage to
62
Arend Lijphart. 1969. Consociational democracy. World Politics 21 (2): 207-211.
18
achieve “a degree of political stability quite out of proportion to its social
homogeneity”.63 It is important to note here that the framing of this degree of stability as
“out of proportion to [those countries’ degrees of] social homogeneity” indicates the
acknowledgement that “homogeneity” is important for democracy. Similarly, Lijphart
argues that “The formation of a grand coalition cabinet or an alternative form of elite
cartel is the appropriate response to the internal crisis of fragmentation into hostile
subcultures”64; by framing consociationalism as a “solution for a fragmented system”,
Lijphart acknowledges the threat of fragmentation to democracy”65. Principally, Lijphart
maintains that consociational democracy rests on elite accommodation and their
commitment to the maintenance of the system and improvement of its “cohesion and
stability”.
66
Similarly, Boynton and Kwon state that “Implicit in politics by
accommodation is the idea that there is something that is problematic”; this problematic
is the unfortunate existence of cleavages that would hinder democracy. 67 In addition,
Lijphart argues that “Fragmented societies have a tendency to immobilism, which
consociational politics are designed to avoid”.68 In doing so, Lijphart follows Almond and
Rustow in arguing that immobilism threatens democracy; in 1969 he argues that the
immobilism in continental European democracies that exits as a consequence of the
latter’s fragmentation, threatens “a lapse into totalitarianism”.69 In 1996, he argues that
the weakness of power sharing in post 1969 India that resulted in the threatening of the
democratic experience came in light of increasing immobilism. 70 This shows that
consociationalism does not conceptualize diversity, in itself, as the problem; rather, that
the absence of homogeneity is likely to produce fragmentation among relevant political
actors, and in turn, jeopardizes democracy. Accordingly, fragmentation that is framed as
an “internal crisis” for democracy is the inability of elites to craft agreement on a
63
Ake, Claude. 1967. A theory of political integration. Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press,
113.
64
Lijphart 1969, Consociational Democracy, 215.
65
Lijphart 1969, 213.
66
Lijphart 1969, 216.
67
G. R. Boynton, and W. H. Kwon. 1978. An analysis of Consociational democracy. Legislative
Studies Quarterly 3 (1): 15.
68
Lijphart 1969, 218.
69
Lijphart 1969, 208.
70
Arend Lijpart. 1996. The puzzle of Indian democracy: A Consociational interpretation. The
American Political Science Review 90 (2): 258-68.
19
framework. This inability, in the eyes of consociational theory, is a function of diversity
that renders fragmentation likely, and, therefore, the extent of democracy in
consociational democracies is framed as “out of proportion” in relation to the degree of
diversity.
It is important to highlight here that, similar to Lijphart’s assertion that
immobilism threatens democracy, Rustow’s final stage of democratization- the
habituation phase- is similarly contingent on the ability of democracy to address stressing
socio-economic problems; therefore, both Rustow and Lijphart agree that immobilism
obstacles democracy. I have elaborated earlier that Rustow’s “decision making” and
“habituation” phases are dependent on national unity, the only precondition for
democracy, as Rustow envisions. Here, I argue that consensus on state identity is also
central to the emergence of consociational democracy. In fact, Boynton and Kwon argue
that “elite commitment to maintaining the national society” is one of the most important
success factors to the elite accommodation in Consociational politics”. 71 Whether this
process exists in all consociational democracies or not is not the subject of this section;
nevertheless, Lijphart highlights that consociationalism depends on a consensus among
political elites to sustain an environment of accommodation and consensual decision
making. For the purposes of this thesis, this consensus is necessarily manifested in
consensus on identity; in other words, if elites have to develop this common
understanding of the nature of politics and decision making, they should necessarily settle
disputes regarding the state identity of the community. The content of this settlement
could be the realization and acknowledgment of differences and the agreement on
maintaining a state identity tolerant of all factions.
B) Conditions conducive to Consociationalism : a limitation to its
applicability
There exist a set of special structures that pave the way for the emergence of
consociationalism; I argue that these special structures are not characteristics of the
general order found in pluralistic societies. Accordingly, even if another reading of
consociational democracy envisions that various conceptions of state identity constitute
the diversity that aids the emergence of democracy, it remains unable to present itself as a
71
Boynton, and Kwon. 1978, 14.
20
general configuration applicable to a wide variety of cases in which this diversity occurs.
Moreover, I highlight that consociational theory itself acknowledges the peculiarity of
structures needed for its emergence and admits that, in the absence of these specific
structures, consociationalism cannot take place. Lijphart argues that widespread approval
of the principle of governing by elite cartel is among the cornerstones of
consociationalism.72 He summarizes the role of the elite in the following statements:
Consociational Democracy requires 1) that elites have the ability to accommodate
divergent interests and demands of the subcultures. 2) This requires that they have the
ability to transcend cleavages and to join in a common effort with the elites from rival
subcultures. 3) This in turn depends on their commitment to the maintenance of the
system and to the improvement of its cohesion and stability. 4) Finally, all of the above
requirements are based on the assumption that elites understand the perils of political
fragmentation73.
Another factor conducive to consociational democracy is cohesion within each
subculture; in this way, political elites are able to represent their sub-cultures as they
enjoy support of their rank and file memberships 74 . Accordingly, distinct clear-cut
cleavage lines are essential for consociationalism 75 ; these clear-cut divisions between
factions, consequently, allow elites to form coalition government that is based on
principles of cooperation and non-competition 76 . Those principles are emphasized in
contradistinction to the common majoritarian dynamics of competition in majoritarian
democracies. Lijphart pinpoints other structural factors in signaling the likelihood of
consociationalism; he argues that the existence of an external threat, the mutual balance
of power among sub-cultures, and the success of reducing strain on the system by
adequately addressing social and economic issues, are pillars that pave the way for the
emergence of a consociational democracy77.
These dynamics specific to the emergence of consociational democracy are far
from common among divided societies; wide spread approval on elite led politics,
72
Lijphart 1969, 221-222.
Lijphart 1969, 216.
74
Lijphart 1969, 219, and 224. Also see Lijpset 1996, The Puzzle of Indian Democracy, 260, 261.
75
Ibid.
76
Lijphart 1996, 260-265.
77
Lijphart 1969, 217-218.
73
21
distinct cleavage lines, clear elite-non-elite distinction, and cohesion within the
subcultures, are all difficult to find in divided societies. Those structures are likely to
exist only in small states; in fact, Lehmbruch argues that “politics found in consociational
democracies “seem to work in small states only”78. The likelihood of consociationalism
to work in small states is also a result of the reduced general strain on the system. As
discussed earlier, the success of consociational democracy is partially dependent on the
success of elites, through cooperation, to address major socio-economic issues; in light of
this logic, states with small population size are easier to administer in a way that tackles
economic and social issues.
Nevertheless, it is common to find among divided societies friction between the
different sub-cultures in a way that does not conform to consociational theory’s model of
“cultural autonomy”79. In addition, a clear-cut division between elite and non-elite within
a single group is hardly a common characteristic of any society, let alone divided ones;
Boynton and Kwon add that consociationalism assumes that “[T]he elites of each bloc are
relatively independent of the non-elites of their bloc” 80 . In contrast, mass non-elite
mobilization within the “subcultures” is a common characteristic that pressures elites,
even in consociational setting; for example, Lijphart argues that mass mobilization is one
of the key causes to the weakening of power sharing and the resulting instability in 1970s
India81. Similarly, the many times in which the consociational experience in Lebanon
came under the threat of mobilization or elite incoherence, serve as another evidence that
societal characteristics that render consociationalism possible do not commonly exist in
divided societies. The reason these examples are taken from consociational democracies
is to show that, even in societies that qualify for consociationlaism, the requisites of this
type of democracy are hard to maintain. Of course, some of my arguments are clearer in
big divided societies, for example, in those in which mass mobilization is a characteristic
of their political dynamics. It is in light of this understanding I argue that consociational
democracy does not refute the fact that social cohesion is a crucial pillar of democracy.
78
Lehmbruch, Gerhard. 1993. Consociational democracy and corporatism in Switzerland. Publius
23 (2): 44. Also Lehbruch 1967, 9.
79
Lijphart 1996, 262.
80
Boynton and Kwon 1978, 15.
81
Lijphart 1996, 266.
22
In reviewing the literature addressing social and political cleavages on one hand
and democracy on the other, I encounter two contradictory views regarding the matter:
some authors argue that the existence of differences is conducive to democracy and
others argue that those differences jeopardize social cohesion, and in turn, endanger
democracy. I disagree with both views in regards to their understanding of cleavages and
their over-focus on violence as the causal link between fragmentation and democracy.
Moreover, this discussion concludes that, despite consociational theory’s seeming
disagreement with the thesis of this paper, it actually strengthens my argument on two
main grounds; 1) by closely examining consociational theory, it becomes clear that it
constructs itself as a peculiar solution to the ailments of fragmentation; it, therefore,
assumes that diverse societies are more prone to fragmentation than homogenous ones.
However, consociational theory maintains that in those societies, this likelihood of
fragmentation that would obstacle democracy is treated by elite consensus on a shared
framework in which diversity is utilized in a way that does not result in a cleavage that
hinders democracy. Having said this, consociational democracy, thus, does not equate
diversity to political or social cleavages; rather, it falls in line with my conceptualization
of cleavages, asserting that fragmentation, i.e. cleavages, occurs in cases where elites fail
to arrive at a consensus that mitigates differences into a cohesive framework. In light of
this reading of consociational democracy, I argue that this consensus among elite is best
conceptualized as consensus on state identity; it is only when elites agree on a shared
understanding of state identity, even if this understanding is the acknowledgement of
differences, that they are able to mitigate their diversities The second ground on which
consociational theory strengthens my argument is that, after all, even if another reading of
consociationalism asserts that diversity regarding the interpretation of state identity is the
facilitator of consociational democracy, 2) it maintains a self-proclaimed limitation on its
scope of applicability. The theory’s assumptions regarding polities in which it functions
are, in themselves, controversial and hardly representative of conditions commonly found
in divided societies. This limitation is acknowledged by literature on consociational
democracy; in fact, it presents itself as a peculiar solution to diversity that is only
applicable under certain circumstances.
23
Finally, the importance of cohesion is crucial for democracy on two grounds;
first, it is important in providing the conditions under which democracy becomes
structurally possible and desirable by different actors. The second is that, after the
emergence of a democratic experience, cohesion becomes instrumental in maintaining
and consolidating democracy. In this chapter, I highlighted different authors who
articulate on the importance of addressing cleavages in the emergence and consolidation
of democratic systems. Nevertheless, more accurate definition of cleavage as well as a
more in-depth articulation on the different types of cleavages is needed for empirical and
conceptual precision. Do all social divisions constitute cleavages as such? What are the
different types of cleavages that could exist in society? Is the mere division on a political
issue serves as a cleavage that halt democratic procedures? What is the threshold beyond
which a division is considered a cleavage that has the ability to halt democratic dynamic?
There is, unfortunately, no ready answer to these questions as they have been the subjects
of heated debates in democratic theory and theories of democratic consolidation and
stability. In the next chapter, I articulate my position vis-à-vis works presented in this
chapter; in doing so, I present this paper’s conceptualization of cohesion defined by
consensus on state identity. Moreover, I introduce another dynamic through which state
identity affects democracy: Statehood.
24
Chapter 3: Cohesion and Statehood in Explaining Democracy: The Case of State
Identity
The exact operational definition of cohesion is a matter of disagreement that has
been discussed earlier in this paper. Social and/or political cohesion are phenomenon that
requires further research to tease out its components and working dynamics.
Nevertheless, in light of the literature discussed, there seems to be an acknowledgement
that there are polities that are more “cohesive” than others. Having said this, I
conceptualize cohesion and cleavages as degrees of consensus on state identity; my aim
is to highlight that consensus on state identity enjoys wide validity in debates regarding
the meaning of cohesion and the dynamics through which it affects democracy. As
articulated in the previous chapter, there are two competing views regarding the effect of
cohesion on democracy. I argue that both views are bridged if we define cohesion as
consensus on state identity; the first view that holds cleavages to alienate democracy is
accurate in as long as cleavages are not defined by the sheer diversity of society. The
second view, which holds that diversity facilitates democracy, is divided between two
shades of the argument. The first treats diversity to positively affect democracy, and thus,
falls in the same trap, as the first view does, of defining cohesion in terms of ascriptive
distribution of people in a society. The second shade of the same argument concerns
consociationalism; as I showed in the previous chapter, consociationalism differentiates
between ethnic, linguistic, and religious diversity, and the elite consensus that could
mitigate them under a democratic framework. In this way, if we define cohesion by
consensus on identity, the ailments of lack of cohesion presented by the first view would
not be refuted by the second view. Since diversity is no longer the definition of cohesion,
the second view’s assertion that diversity could enhance democratic prosperity becomes,
at least theoretically, not alien to the first argument asserting lack of cohesion to alienate
democracy. Similarly, since consociationalism admits that diversity could be
accompanied by elite consensus that facilitates democracy, if this elite agreement is
consensus on state identity, consociationalism would complement, rather than challenge,
the view that lack of cohesion, defined by consensus on state identity, alienates prospects
of democracy.
25
In this chapter, I highlight points of agreement and disagreement with literature
treating the question of cleavages and democracy to highlight this research understanding
of cleavages; then, I present five points justifying my choice of consensus on state
identity to define cohesion. The last of these points asserts consensus on state identity as
one dimension of the “state”, and that the state is central to democracy; accordingly, I
dedicate a section to highlight the former’s centrality to statehood, and a chapter to
expand on the importance of both to democracy.
Fish’s findings, presented earlier, seem to contradict this paper’s hypothesis that
cohesion is instrumental for the emergence and maintenance of democracy; nevertheless,
this paper understands division and social cohesion differently. Fish measures cohesion
by the numerical distribution of citizens among different religious, linguistic, and ethnic
lines. He concludes that there is no significant relation between diversity, what he
mistakenly conceptualizes as lack of cohesion, and democracy. Moreover, he asserts that
there is a negative relation between violent conflict and democracy; yet, he proves a nonsignificant relation between diversity and conflict. A deeper insight into Fish’s measures
and conceptualization of diversity and polarization is noteworthy to highlight points of
disagreement between my work and Fish’s; moreover, in doing so I shall also highlight
points of disagreement with the wider literature on cohesion, factionalism and
democracy. First, Fish measures polarization using data from the World Fact Book;
according to his operationalization, a society is polarized when a group constitutes more
than 49 percent and another group constitutes more than 7 percent of the population. If
only one group exceeds 49 percent without another group that passes the 7 percent
threshold, the society becomes not polarized, rather dominated by a single faction.
Finally, if there is no dominating group, and the population is divided among different
lines, the situation becomes one of dispersion rather than polarization. This paper argues
that the problem in such conceptualizations of diversity and polarization is that they
reduce those societal and political phenomena to mere numbers. It is logical to believe
that divisions exist in all societies of the world to one or the other degree; the question,
thus, becomes not to what extent, in numbers, is a polity diverse/ polarized; rather, it
becomes what do members of the concerned polity make out of their differences? What
psychological and political meaning do they construct and attribute to these differences?
26
Here I will have to problematize, agreeing with the earlier discussed literature, the
difference between societal and political cleavages and, in turn, bring to the fore
questions regarding the nature of divisions and whether there exist a necessity to a
division’s location-whether in the political or in the social realm-for it to constitute a
cleavage capable of impeding democracy.
Again, these questions have no ready answer and are a matter of academic
disagreement; nevertheless, I argue that, as far as cohesion’s impact on democracy is
concerned, consensus on state identity is the relevant definition of both social and
political cohesion. In doing so, I assert that this definition invokes agreement among
different views on the nature of cleavages, and the latter’s effect on democracy, within the
concerned literature. In other words, the first disagreement between my work and the
discussed works is that whereas the discussed works consider the existence, or nonexistence, of divisions as the independent variable, I measure the manifestation of these
divisions in a way that constitutes a cleavage relevant to the emergence and maintenance
of democracy: consensus on state identity. I also take the over-emphasis on violence as
the only way through which cleavages could affect democracy to be, at least theoretically,
flawed. The existence of deep cleavages regarding the identity of the state could hinder
the emergence of democracy without incidents of violence.
The second disagreement between my work and the discussed works, and that
also speaks to my choice of consensus on state identity, is that it seems that literature
engaging with the question of factionalism/cohesion/divisions and democracy either
overlooks the divisive potential of disagreement on state identity, or understands the latter
to be the consequence of ethnic, religious, and linguistic divisions82. In both the literature
dealing with cohesion and democratization on the one hand, and the earlier discussed
literature focusing on cohesion and democratic stability and consolidation on the other,
the division on the issue of identity is either overlooked, or understood to come as a result
These works have been discussed earlier. Benjamin Reilly’s argument that “diversity” in New
Guinea was conducive to democracy, and Hardgrave’s similar argument regarding India, are
perfect examples of the over emphasis on the sheer existence of diversity and not on cleavages.
Laitin and Fearon argument exemplify the relationship between diversity, whether qualified to be
cleavages or not, and democracy through the former’s impact on the likelihood of violence.
Steven Fish’s work empirically exemplifies both pillar of a conceptualization that my paper
refutes.
82
27
of other cleavages (religious, ethnic, linguistic). This paper argues that identity cleavages
do not necessarily stem out of differences in religion, ethnicity, or language; there are
cases where a homogenous polity develops a disagreement on the nature of its identity.
Since this research is for a great extent concerned with the Muslim World, let us consider
the case of Egypt as a brief example; the Egyptian population is for the most part
homogenous; most of the population is Sunni Muslims and there exist nearly no clear
ethnic or linguistic divisions. Despite the fact that there exist a sizeable Coptic
population, the nature of disagreement on the state identity does not come in light of a
Muslim-Coptic division; rather, it is clear that the identity cleavage comes in light of a
different dynamic in which a number of identities exist within society. The ordering and
prioritization of those identities form the identity fabric of the Egyptian state;
consequently, the identity cleavage is a result of the different views on the ordering and
prioritization of those different identities, and in turn, on formal state identity. The post
“Arab Spring” setting, especially in Egypt and Tunisia, is telling of the divisive potential
of the identity issue beyond its racial, tribal, and linguistic components; this polarization
over the question of identity in all countries that witnessed the “Arab Spring” is
instrumental in explaining the failure of many of those polities to take a step closer to
democracy. Unlike elsewhere, division in Egypt and Tunisia stemmed out of an identity
question that entails a disagreement regarding the position of religion in the state and was
primarily fought among Muslims rather than between Muslims and non-Muslims. This
division, despite its lack of religious, racial or linguistic factionalism, remains
instrumental in explaining difficulties in democratic transitions in many Muslim and nonMuslim polities. It is partially for these reasons that I choose to define cohesion by
consensus on state identity.
Nevertheless, this paper does not propose an understanding of cleavages that is
solely focused on identity, refuting any ethnic, linguistic, or religious bases to cleavages;
in fact, it is logical to conclude that linguistic, ethnic, and religious divisions are among
key dimensions that motivate identity divisions. However, I argue that whereas ascriptive
divisions could serve as social ingredients that facilitate the construction of identity
cleavage, their mere existence does not necessarily entail lack of cohesion, and their nonexistence does not automatically entail cohesion. The problem here becomes that the
28
literature’s overlooking of identity cleavages that evolve without clear ethnic, religious,
or linguistic divisions, forces the former to fall in a trap of essentializing a link between
certain social distributions and identity. In other words, in this way the literature assumes
that if X group of people share the same ethnicity, religion, and language, they have to
necessarily share the same view in regards to their identity, and vice versa.
Few points need to be restated:
1) This paper maintains that, in all ways, it is not accurate to measure cohesion by
assessing the percentages of people that belong to different ethnicities, religions,
or linguistic communities; differences in themselves do not constitute cleavages;
it is the meaning assigned to those differences that construct those differences as
cleavages.
2) Lack of cohesion does not necessarily stem from ascriptive differences of race,
religion…etc.
3) Identity cleavages whether stemming from ascriptive difference or not, are in
themselves divisive enough to constitute societal division that hinders the
emergence of democratic dynamics; the disagreement among ethnically
homogenous societies regarding state identity is no less divisive, as far as
democracy is concerned, than that of ethnically or linguistically diverse societies.
In light of point “3”, I agree with Bingham Powel that there “does seem to be something
distinctive about severe ethnic conflicts, however, and they seem particularly hard to
resolve within purely democratic bounds”.83 Nevertheless, I argue that the particular thing
about ethnic conflict is that it usually entails division on the question of identity, and
more usually, state identity.
i)
Why State Identity?
I propose five concrete points that motivate this research to consider consensus on
state identity as the definition of cohesion. First, as discussed, consociational democracy
does not refute the idea that social cohesion is important to democracy; this paper
understands this within its suggested operationalization of social cohesion: consensus on
state identity. The previous chapter highlights that consociational democracy is a special
type of democracy applicable to limited cases, and that it does not contradict that
83
G. Bingham Powell 1982,43.
29
fragmentation is detrimental to democracy. I consider my operationalization for social
cohesion logically consistent with dynamics envisioned in a consociational democracy.
As discussed, some scholars overtly argue that maintaining a national image is part of
elite strategy of accommodation; moreover, the dynamics of consensus among elites
requires a consensus on the content of state identity, even if the content of such consensus
is the acknowledgement of fragmentation and to work on counteracting the perils of
fragmentation. In fact, one of the prominent conflict fields in divided societies is the
identity of the state. The content of this identity formulates the logic on which the state
would act in several fields including foreign policy and the allocation of resources.
Second, identity serves as a perfect example of the kind of cleavage which results
in a perception of a zero-sum game between factions. Since the wider theme of this paper
is democratization in the Islamic World, let us assume that, for example, a group of
people in country X believe that it is primarily Islamic; another group emphasizes its
independent territorial character. Now, if this division is rooted to the point that there is
no consensus or a synthesis regarding the identity of the state, the question becomes how
would the different political agendas of both factions be mitigated through democratic
dynamics? Third, lack of agreement on identity is both a societal and political cleavage;
identity is inherently social and is hard to think about identity cleavage as such without a
political manifestation. This political manifestation needs not to necessarily be a political
party questioning the identity of the state. Rather, as will be discussed in the later
empirical chapters, the data measuring consensus on state identity measures both the
questioning of state identity and the exclusion of some factions from formal citizenship.
Fourth, history teaches us that cleavages resulting from lack of agreement on identity,
and specifically state identity, are explosive in nature and are the hardest to peacefully
resolve. The case of the disintegration of the Yugoslavian state, the case of post 2003
Iraq, and the current situations in Libya and Yemen and arguably across the Middle East
remind us that those identity cleavages impede the possibility of democracy and put the
very existence of the state in question. All these cases entail an ethnic component to their
conflicts, and they were all undemocratic before conflict. However, it was not until the
weakening of the state’s formal identity, and the resulting competition among different
identities, that different ethnic groups adopted violence as a means of settling the dispute.
30
In a lot of those, among other, cases lack of consensus on state identity questioned the
very existence of the state.
This leads to the fifth point which is that consensus on state identity partially
explains the existence of the state. Fundamentally, Statehood is crucial for the emergence
and consolidation of democracy; there is no way of thinking about modern democracy
without statehood. In fact, democracy, capitalism, and the modern nation state have been
regarded as either causing one another or that they are mutually constitutive 84 . The
importance of statehood to democracy is worth more in depth discussion to tease out
ways in which the existence of the state is crucial for democracy; moreover, I will
attempt to highlight the ways in which consensus on state identity is central to the
maintenance of the state, and in turn, necessary to the existence of democracy. The
following section will highlight on those dynamics.
It is important to highlight that in light of my argument, social and political
cohesion, defined as consensus on state identity, is not understood to be the total
homogeneity of a society in terms of ethnic, linguistic, or religious composition. As I
have discussed earlier, it is not the existence of these divisions that matter; rather, it is
whether they are regarded and utilized to generate conflict regarding state identity.
Furthermore, I equally try to avoid an operationalization of state identity to mean that all
factions in society agree that a certain component of identity (religion, ethnicity…etc.) is
the official identity of the state. Whereas this could be the case, there could be other cases
where the content of the consensus is, rather, diversity or a consensus on addressing the
cleavage within an agreed on framework. The most obvious example (outside the realm
of consociational democracy) is that of the United States; there is a sense of patriotism
and a sense of “American” identity that exist in U.S. state identity. Nevertheless, there is
an equal sense of diversity and multiculturalism that exist in this “American” identity.
The importance of consensus on state identity here becomes not the uniformity of state
identity; rather, that the agreement among different factions on the diverse multicultural
identity of the state is regarded as a strong case of consensus on state identity.
84
See earlier section discussing Weber, Fukuyama, and Rostow. For the argument of mutual
constitution see Nadir Hashemi.
31
ii)
Statehood and Democracy: The Three Dimensional State
This section highlights that there are two views in regards to the relationship
between state and democracy. One argues that the state is a pre-requisite for democracy85;
the other argues that democracy could give birth to the state86. Both views are perfectly
articulated in a recent article by Muck and Mazzuka in which they map out the different
views regarding the issue 87 . I engage with both views to show how, despite their
disagreement in regards to the causal mechanism between the state and democracy, they
agree on the centrality of the state for democracy. In other words, I maintain that whether
the state renders democracy possible or that democratic deliberations give birth to the
state, a democratic system could not function and/ or be maintained without the state. In
fact, the state is accepted as a definitional attribute to a democratic system88. In other
words, this research maintains that both views regarding the sequencing of the state and
democracy are valid; in doing so, it articulates on the agreement between the two views
on the centrality of Statehood to a functioning democracy.
This paper understands the state to have three different dimensions: The territorial
dimension, the administrative bureaucratic dimension, and identity dimension.89 In fact,
in a recent issue of the Journal Democratization especially dedicated to examine the
state-democracy nexus, Andersen, Moller and Skaaning highlight that in mapping
different definitions and conceptualizations of the state, they found that “all extant
definitions of stateness include one or more of [those] three defining attributes” 90 .
Moreover, they warn scholars from testing the relationship between a holistic definition
of the state and democracy; rather, they suggest that each dimension of the state should
85
Jack L. Snyder. 2000. From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict. New York:
Norton.; Myron Weiner. 1971. Political participation: Crisis of the political process. In Crises and
Sequences in Political Development. See also, Rustow 1979, “Transition to Democracy”.
86
David D. Laitin. 2007. Nations, states, and violence. New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, ch.5;
Laitin 1995. “Transitions to democracy amd territorial integrity.” In Sustainable democracy., ed. Adam
Przeworski.
87
Sebastián L. Mazzuca, and Gerardo L. Munck. 2014. State or democracy first? alternative perspectives
on the state-democracy nexus. Democratization 21 (7): 1221-43.
88
Ibid, 1222.
89
I deliberately avoid using the term “nation-ness” as it implies a sense of homogeneity that does not
necessarily exist in citizenship agreements. National identity is just one form of state identity.
90
Svend-Erik Skaaning, David Andersen, and Jørgen Møller. 2014. The state-democracy nexus:
Conceptual distinctions, theoretical perspectives, and comparative approaches. Democratization 21 (7):
1205.
32
be thoroughly examined in relation to its impact on democracy 91 . Following their
suggestion, after reviewing literature dealing with the other dimensions of the state and
democracy, I examine the relationship between state identity and democracy.
The territorial state corresponds to the Webarian definition on the monopoly on
the use of force within the bound of a defined territory92. One view of the relationship
between the territorial state and democracy holds the catchy proposition “no state, no
democracy” 93 . In this view, emergence of political rights is one manifestation of the
evolution of the territorial state and taxation94. A lot of literature that tackles this issue is
concerned with the impact of state formation on democracy; the aim was to differentiate
conditions under which sate formation, primarily in Europe, facilitated the emergence of
democracy from those under which democracy did not emerge95. Whereas it is valid to
argue that the territorial state facilitated the emergence of democracy in some parts of the
old continent, it is conceptually and empirically invalid to universalize this relationship to
entail other projects of state building that took place under different domestic and
international contexts96.
The other view concerning the territorial dimension of the state and its relation to
democracy holds that democracy is a pacification mechanism 97 that facilitates the
emergence of the state. The logic in this line of thought is that, on a stateless territory
that has the potential to become a state, different groups are faced with the choice of
91
Ibid., 1207-8.
Munck and Mazzuka. State or Democracy First?; Skaaning et al. The State-Demoracy Nexus. For more on
this correspondence see Journal Democratization 2014.
93
Ibid.
94
Margaret Levi. 1999.”Death and taxes: Extractive equality and the development of democratic
institutions”; Charles Tilly. 1990. Coercion, Capital, and European Etates, AD 990-1990. See also Myron
Weiner. 1971. “Political participation: Crisis of the political process.” In Crises and sequences in political
development., eds. Leonard Binder et al, 177.
95
Some scholars attribute conditions that facilitated democracy in the course of European state
formation to the strength of medieval legacy and the checks the latter imposed on the absolutist power.
For example, Brian M. Downing. The Military Revolution and Political Change: Origins of Democracy and
Autocracy in Early Modern Europe, ch.2; Thomas Ertman. 1997. Birth of the leviathan: Building states and
regimes in medieval and early modern Europe, 19-25. Some others argue that the commercial density
provided ingredients for democratization with the formation of states; for example see Tilly 1990.
Coercion, Capital, and European States. On the other hand, other works highlight the different courses of
state formation in Latin American and Africa. For more on this line of thought check Jeffrey Herbst. 2000.
States and power in africa
96
Muck and Mazuka, State or Democracy First, 1224.
97
Robert A. Dahl 1989. Democracy and its critics. See also Joseph Alois Schumpeter. 1942. Capitalism,
Socialism, and Democracy
92
33
whether to accept the emerging power center or to fight it. The group that represents this
new power center may want to arrive at an agreement with other groups regarding power
distribution in the new order in return of the latter’s acceptance of the new power center.
In light of this view, “the territorial state and democracy, or order and electoral
competition, are the joint product of an agreement among potentially violent groups to
stop or prevent fighting”98. In a nutshell, this alternative view constructs itself against the
traditional one that necessitates the existence of the state before democracy; this
alternative suggests that “the Democratization of a fully developed territorial state is not
the only path to democratic order. State and democracy can co-evolve, also under certain
circumstances” 99 . Those two views differ in their causal arguments in answering the
question “which comes first, state or democracy?” Nevertheless, as far as my argument is
concerned, both views maintain that the territorial state is important to democracy. In
both views, democracy does not exist without the territorial state; it is either that
democracy develops in a territorial state, or that both democracy and the territorial state
co-evolve to materialize in a democratic state.
The administrative bureaucratic state is also instrumental for democracy.
Common logic suggests that an effective administration is necessary for democracy to
function; if the state is not capable of executing decisions taken by the ruler, it becomes
nearly impossible for democracy, or any other political order, to function. In fact,
administrative effectiveness has been attributed to the survival of autocratic regimes. For
this reason, I do not argue that the existence of the effective administrative state
necessarily signals democracy; effective administration helps to maintain the state,
regardless of its regime type100. However, I hold that democratic states are more likely to
depend on effective administration for survival than its autocratic counterpart. Autocratic
regimes may have more access to other forms of survival (direct coercion, control over
media and information…etc.). In contrast, democracies rely on the effectiveness of the
system - its ability to address stressing economic and social issues – in its survival101. In
98
Mazzucka and Munk 2014, Democracy or State first, 1225.
Ibid., 1226.
100
Jan Teorell. 2010. Determinants of democratization: Explaining regime change in the world, 1972-2006.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 6, and 14-145.
101
Martin Lipset, Some Social Requisites to Democracy, 86. See also, Juan J. Linz, and Alfred C. Stepan.
1996. Problems of democratic transition and consolidation, 11.
99
34
fact, Mazzuka and Munck argue that the view that holds “no state, no democracy”
maintains that ineffective bureaucracy jeopardizes legitimacy and compromises the
democratic system102.
Again, we are confronted by two views regarding the sequencing of the
administrative state and democracy; nevertheless, both admit the centrality of the former
to the latter. The first view holds that for an effective state to emerge, and in turn facilitate
democracy, a strong bureaucracy needs to exist before democracy103. The rationale is that
the emergence of bureaucracy before democracy shields the former from politicians’
attempts to “raid the bureaucracy for patronage 104 . If those attempts are otherwise
successful, the bureaucracy becomes a patrimonial one that is loyal to the party ruling the
state; Furthermore, patrimonial bureaucracy facilitates the “use of public resources for
partisan advantage”, jeopardizing the core element of equal opportunity in democracy105.
In light of this view, in so far as an effective system is central to the endurance of
democracy, this view stresses that the existence of the administrative aspect of the state
before democracy paves the way for the latter to emerge.
The other view holds that the existence of an autonomous professional
bureaucracy before democratization is not necessary. As I argued earlier, effective
administration could halt democratization by giving legitimacy to authoritarian regimes.
In addition, the existence of a professional autonomous bureaucracy could resist attempts
at democratization as much as it could facilitate it106. The autonomy of the bureaucracy
means autonomy from external pressures; those pressures could be pressures at
patrimonial-izing the bureaucracy, but could also mean pressures for democratizing it to
make or subject to the control of elected government. Moreover, Geddes, Kitschelt, and
Wittman, argue that democracy poses pressures on the administrative structure to
abandon clientlism, and in turn, facilitates bureaucratic effectiveness107. There is enough
102
Munck and Mazzuka 2014, 1228.
Martin Shefter. 1994. Political Parties and the State: The American Historical Experience. Princeton N.J:
Princeton University Press.
104
Ibid., 14-15.
105
Munck and Mazzuka 214, 1235.
106
Myron Weiner. 1971. Political participation: Crisis of the political process. In Crises and sequences in
political development, 180.
107
This exact dynamics of this process is highlighted in a lot of works. For example, Barbara Geddes. “A
Game Theoretical Model of Reform in Latin American Democracies.” American Political Science Review 85
103
35
evidence from new democracies that supports this view; Muck and Mazzuka maintain
that new democracies have, for the most part, developed democracy before an effective
administrative state 108 . These two views disagree on the sequencing of effective
administration and democracy. Nevertheless, they both agree on the importance of an
effective administrative bureaucracy to democracy. In other words, whereas democracy
could give birth to an effective administration, it is unlikely for the former to survive
without the latter.
The third dimension of statehood that is important for democracy, and the primary
concern of this paper, is identity. Zoe Lowery holds that from ancient Athens till the
modern times, there has been a dilemma of “defining the demos” 109; identity of the state
is important because it determines the social and territorial boundaries that the state
represents. Different terms have been used to delineate state identity: Nation-ness,
national identity, and citizenship agreement. In previous sections I argued that lack of
consensus on state identity does not only induce civil strife, but also obstacles democratic
dynamics by crafting a political setting characterized by a zero sum game between
different factions. Here I add two points; first, lack of consensus on state identity is likely
to jeopardize the other components of statehood. Second, lack of consensus, in itself,
compromises a dimension of statehood that is crucial for democracy.
A) The Effect of State Identity on the Other Dimensions of the State:
Consensus on state identity is likely to jeopardize the other two dimensions of
statehood. This is not to say, however, that a lack of consensus on state identity
necessarily means a weak territorial or administrative state; rather, it means that the lack
of this consensus signals the likelihood of groups questioning the territorial basis of the
power center, and threatens the overall effectiveness of the system. Rokkan argues that
states which are characterized by consensus on state identity, or in his own words”
citizenship agreement”, are likely to have a monopoly on the use of legitimate force110.
Similarly, O’Donnel argues that if citizens cannot agree on who are the members of the
(1991): 371-392. See also, Herbert Kitschelt. "Citizens- Politician Linkages: An Introduction." In Patrons,
Clients, and Policies: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition
108
Muck and Mazzuka, 1235-6.
Zoe Lowery. 2015. Democracy. Chicago: Britannica Educational Publishing, 37.
110
Stein Rokkan. 1975. “Dimensions of state formation and Nation Building.”, 578-9.
109
36
state, they leave questions regarding the territorial boundaries undecided, and in turn,
render the state weaker 111 . In the same way, consensus on identity is likely to affect
bureaucratic effectiveness; lack of consensus on state identity renders the administration
ineffective as long as the bureaucracy does not know whose welfare it is working
towards. I disagree with Francis Fukuyama in regards to the deterministic link he
maintains between state identity and performance112; nevertheless, I agree that in some
cases “national identity is critical to state performance because officials of the state need
to be loyal to the broad public interest that it represents, rather than the narrower interests
of their region, ethnic group, tribe, or family”113.
As I argued earlier, lack of consensus on identity is not necessarily a function of
ethnic, linguistic, religious, or family differences. In fact, the existence of those
differences in itself does not signal lack of consensus on identity. As we have seen,
consociational democracies serve as perfect examples of pluralistic societies in which the
concept of state identity stretches to tolerate this diversity. Highlighting this point,
Andersen et al argue that “citizenship agreement”114 does not necessarily mean a strong
national identity; the authors add that there is an important difference between “nation
states” and “state-nations” 115 . Nation-states are states which territorial boundaries fit
ethnic, religious, or linguistic lines; on the other hand, state-nations are diverse; they are,
however, able to “engender strong identification and loyalty from [their] citizens,
typically through political integration”116. The crafting of national identity is a result of
two processes; the first is a bottom up process that entails works by artists, poets,
philosophers, musicians, and social groups. The second is a top-down process by a state
structure which do things “like decree national languages, modify borders, move
Guillermo O’Donnell. 2010. Democracy, Agents, and the State: Theory with Comparative Intent.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 70-82.
112
Francis Fukuyama. 2014. States and democracy. Democratization 21 (7): 1332.
113
Ibid.
114
Their definition of citizenship agreement fit perfectly to my operationalization of consensus on state
identity. In fact, my measure of consensus on state identity takes in consideration two different yet
overlapping characteristics: 1) whether there are groups that question the legitimacy of the power center
(the state), and 2) whether the state does not give citizenship rights to groups within its territory.
115
Seven-Erik Skaaning et al. The State Democracy Nexus, 1209-10. For more on this argument check
Mostafa Rejai, and Cynthia H. Enloe. 1969. Nation-states and state-nations. International Studies
Quarterly; and
Alfred Stepan, and Juan Linz. 2011. Crafting state-nations: India and other multinational democracies.
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
116
Seven-Erik Skaaning et al., 2014, 1209-10.
111
37
populations, and set education policies for how history is taught”117. Fukuyama argues
that there are four ways for the state to build identity: 1) defining political borders to fit a
population, 2) ethnic cleansing, 3) cultural assimilation into the dominant culture, and 4)
the modification of the concept of national identity to reflect the diverse reality in a given
polity118. The first 3 ways are clearly conflicting with democratic values; accordingly, in
new states that seek democracy, the fourth way is adequate to build consensus on state
identity. Consequently, this means that newly established states that are truly committed
to democracy are likely to resort to point number four in building national identities.
To sum up, in modern times, state identity is likely to facilitate effective
administration and a monopoly on the use of violence. Nevertheless, there is a lot of
historical evidence that a strong state existed before consensus on state identity;
nevertheless, with the coming of modernity, nationalism, and the idea of the nation-state,
these states were faced by the task of building identity. In most Western Europe, practices
of cultural domination and ethnic cleansing took place before the modern practices of
toleration and inclusiveness. The sad history of national identity building in Europe and
elsewhere need not to be restated; it is important, however, to state that: whereas the other
dimensions of the state existed before consensus on identity, the state was forced to deal
with the question of identity in its transformation to either the modern nation-state, or its
emergence as the modern state-nation. Throughout this transformation, the territorial
integrity and bureaucratic effectiveness of states relied increasingly on the ability of
states to settle the question of state identity. In many cases, the crafting of an identity
came in light of practices that are not in line with democratic principles; nevertheless, the
consolidation of consensus on identity in these countries was instrumental for the
emergence and consolidation of democracy.
B) State Identity: A State Dimension Affecting Democracy
The other way in which the identity dimension of statehood affects democracy is,
rather, more direct. I expand two views; the first holds that consensus on identity is a prerequisite to democracy; the other maintains that democratic deliberations create
consensus on identity. Both views could be summarized as follows: whereas one asserts
consensus on state identity is a precondition for successful democratization, the other
117
118
Francis Fukuyama 2014, 1335.
Ibid.
38
maintains that democratic dynamics could solve identity problems, and thus, consensus
on identity becomes a requisite and a corollary for democracy. In other words, both views
maintain the importance of state identity in signaling a functioning democratic system.
Earlier, I highlighted Rustow’s argument in which he asserts that national unity is the
only precondition to democracy. Here, it is important to highlight that national unity, to
use Rustow’s terminology, is crucial for both the decision making phase and the
habituation phase, as envisioned by Rustow. As highlighted earlier, if political actors are
divided on the issue of identity membership of the polity, it becomes hard to 1) define
actors included in the political game, and 2) to convince different groups to accept the
potential loss in the democratic game. In other words, if there is a lack of national unity, it
is hard for different actors to craft a system that is not characterized by a zero sum
dynamics, and thus, they become unlikely to submit to a game in which the losers’ loss
signals their total expulsion from the political game. The habituation phase is dependent
on national unity in two ways; first, it is inherently dependent on the decision making
phase in which actors resort to democracy. And since the decision making phase is
dependent on national unity, the habituation phase, in turn, becomes dependent on
national unity.
The second way is, rather, a more direct impact of national unity on the
habituation phase. Since it is clear in Rustow’s argument that the democratization’s
success relies also on the ability of the system to address stressing socio-economic issues,
the habituation phase becomes directly reliant on national unity; if there is confusion
regarding membership composition in a polity, it is unlikely that democratic dynamics
would adequately address stressing socio-economic issues; this is particularly because
one would expect that, among the stressing issues, the question of resource distribution
among different groups and dynamics of mitigating differences are key issues that need
quick settlement. Otherwise, the political system would be characterized by immobility
and may threaten the resort to authoritarianism. In fact Rustow warns that the preparatory
phase of democracy, characterized by polarization and conflict, could lead to the
resilience of authoritarianism is worth noting. 119 This polarization and conflict, if not
119
Rustow 1970, 355.
39
deliberately mitigated by elites in the decision making process, democracy could hardly
emerge.
Other scholars build on Rustow’s conception of the precondition to democracy;
they allow for the possibility of democratic dynamics to emerge without a pre-existing
consensus on identity; however, they argue those dynamics are doomed to failure without
such consensus. For example, Snyder argues that democracy that attempts to emerge in a
context of unfinished nation-building “redirect popular political participation into a
lengthy anti-democrati detour” and “may make subsequent efforts to democratize more
difficult and more violent than they would otherwise be”120. Similarly, Bates claims that
in a context of lack of consensus on national identity, electoral competition may arouse
ethnic conflict 121 ; if there is no consensus on identity, ethnic differences become
politicized and, in turn, threaten democracy. In fact, it is not only ethnic conflict that
arises in this context; other differences that trigger conflict arise if political actors do not
agree on state identity. Whereas ethnic, linguistic, and religious differences may become
politicized and could induce conflict, non-ascriptive differences may, equally, emerge;
ideological differences, such as the role of religion in the state and society, the
prioritization of loyalty towards neighboring communities…etc. may also emerge as a
consequence the confusion regarding state identity.
The other view, though less prominent, maintains that national unity, or more
precisely consensus on identity, could emerge as a result of democracy. The pathdependent theorization of Rustow, Snyder, and others regarding democratization is
refutable on many grounds; the experiences of late democratizers highlight that there is
no single path towards democracy122. Furthermore, the conventional view of Rustow and
others is a problematic prescription to states that are latecomers to democratization; its
suggestion to address the problem of identity before democracy, justifies minority
suppression and ethnic cleansing as practices of crafting national unity123. Consequently,
this alternative view argues that, in some cases, consensus on state identity emerges out
120
Jack L. Snyder. 2000. From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict, 20. See also,
Edward D. Mansfield, and Jack L. Snyder. 2007. The sequencing "fallacy". Journal of Democracy 18 (3): 6-7.
121
Robert H. Bates. 2008. When things fell apart: State failure in late-century Africa. New York: Cambridge
University Press.
122
Munck and Mazzuka. State or Democracy first, 1232.
123
Ibid.
40
of democratic deliberations; in the process of democratization, different factions within a
polity engage in a process of renegotiating political and social boundaries, and in this
process, consensus on identity emerges 124. In some other cases, such as that of South
Korea, the problematic of identity has been postponed without halting the
democratization process 125 . In sum, this view questions the path dependency of the
traditional view, and asserts the necessity of developing a theory that takes in
consideration other experiences of democratization in which the question of identity is
solved within the evolution of democracy.
This research attempts to bridge both views; it is important to stress here that I
maintain a clear difference between democratic deliberations and a functioning
democratic system; effective deliberations exist even in autocratic regimes. There is
overwhelming literature concerned with informal democracy that emerges in the context
of state-building and in the context of authoritarian rule126. Nevertheless, what is meant
by democracy in this paper is a functioning democratic system; I understand this system
to be a set of institutions and ethos of understanding among population in a polity127.
Since the empirical part of this research deals with a data set that gathers data from
countries that are yet to achieve full democratic status, I understand their democratic
status as the extent to which they successfully incorporated formal democratic institutions
and procedures.
In light of this view, I argue that both views regarding the sequencing of state
identity and democracy agree that, for a system to be called a democratic system, it needs
to settle the issue of state identity. In cases which democratization starts without
previously settling this issue, the success of democratization relies, among other factors,
on the successful addressing of the identity question; this alternative view does not argue
that consensus on identity is not important for democracy. It, rather, argues that
124
Discussed in all work by Laitin cited in this paper.
Munck and Mazzuka 2014, 1230.
126
For more on dynamics of informal democracy check Lisa Wedeen Peripheral Visions. See also works in
the tradition of Charles Tripp. For more on informal democracy in the Muslim World, see works by Shery
Berman and Amaney Jamal.
127
The exact definition of constitutional democracy present in the BTI codebook is utilized and expanded
on in the next chapter.
125
41
agreement on identity is in fact important to democracy, and thus, one of the tasks
democracy faces is to create shared identity.
Finally, it is important to note that there are cases in which consensus on state
identity, and more generally Statehood, exists without an equivalent high democratic
status; the complexity of dynamics that give birth to democracy cannot be reduced to the
existence of cohesion and Statehood. In other words, I do not propose a view that
supposes the existence of identity consensus to automatically result in democracy. Rather,
I understand consensus on state identity to craft ingredients that are conducive and
necessary for both the emergence and maintenance of democracy. In light of this
conceptualization, consensus on state identity becomes directly related to democracy; the
stronger the consensus on state identity, the more likely a polity enjoys higher democratic
status. The following diagram summarizes this thesis theoretical grounding; after that, I
present the methodological grounding of this research’s empirical analyses.
Cohesion
Consensus on
State Identity
Likelihood of
actors resorting
to Democracy
Dimension of
Statehood
Statehood
Impacts other
Statehood
dimensions
iii)
Methodology:
This research uses data from the Bertelsmann transformation index (BTI) to
evaluate its hypotheses. Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) is large N study on 129
countries; the index is constituted by two main indexes: Status Index and Management
Index. The status index measures structural components that signal the democratic status
of a given polity. The Management index measures the ability of a given polity to steer its
current condition towards a democratic transformation. The Status index is divided into
two main components: Market Economy and Democracy. This comes in light of the
42
BTI’s envision of democratic values under the rules of a market economy as its measure
to status. The democracy part is the one this research is concerned with; the democracy
variable is in itself a composite variable of the following: Statness, Political Participation,
Rule of Law, Stability of Democratic Institutions, and Political and Social Integration. It
is noteworthy here that BTI’s conceptualization of democracy is in line with that of this
paper; in fact, “Stateness”- the degree to which the state exist as a legitimate power
center- is one constituent variable to democracy, signaling the centrality of statehood to
democracy. In addition, the dimensions that add up to constitute “Stateness” in BTI are in
line with my conceptualization of the three dimensions of the state; nevertheless, there
remains a single additional dimension BTI considers to contribute to “Stateness”:
interference of religious dogma in the state’s legal and institutional order. The BTI
envisions such interference as detrimental to statehood; I argue that the sheer interference
of religious dogma in the state does not negatively affect statehood unless it affects one,
or more, of the three main components of the state. I argue that this component affects
statehood by affecting state identity.
The Management Index measures the ability of political actors to manage policy
and resources towards transformation. The Management Index is a composite variable of
the following: Level of Difficulty, Steering Capability, Resource Efficiency, Consensus
Building, and International Cooperation. Each of those variables is a composite variable
of other variables that sum up to constitute each of those composite variables. This
research is concerned with one constituent variable from “Consensus Building”:
Cleavage/Conflict Management. Moreover, I use one component relevant to my
hypothesis from the composite variable “Level of Diffiulty”, namely, “Conflict Intensity”
which measures the intensity of social, ethnic, and religious conflicts.
i)
Objectives:
In order to clearly tease out the objective of the statistical tests in this paper, I detail my
testable hypotheses as follows, arguing that these hypotheses apply equally to members
of OIC and to the wider population of countries:
Hypothesis 1: consensus on state identity is an adequate measure of successful
mitigation of social and political cleavages, whether stemming from ascriptive or other
differences.
43
Hypothesis 2: consensus on state identity, as a dimension of statehood, affects the
likelihood of the other two dimensions of statehood: monopoly on the use of violence,
and the administrative state. This relation holds in all countries, and in the OIC.
Hypothesis 3: all dimensions that constitute the state, more generally the degree
of stateness, are requisites for democracy, and thus, are positively related to higher
degrees of democracy, both in Muslim and non-Muslim countries.
Hypothesis 4: consensus on state identity, as a measure of both cleavages and
statehood, signals the likelihood of democracy, regardless of the religious identity of a
polity.
This paper uses “State Identity”- the measure of consensus on state identity- to
measure two things: the degree of cohesion as understood in this paper, and as a
component measure of statehood 128. Consequently, chapter 4 tests for the relationship
between “State Identity”, and different components of democracy present in the BTI, to
show that agreement on identity is associated with democratic effects. Accordingly, a
special section is devoted to the relation between consensus on identity on one hand and,
“Political and Social Integration”, “Intensity of Conflict”, and Cleavage/Conflict
Management” on the other, to test hypothesis 1. Since “Stateness” is a composite variable
of its constituents, I test for the impact of consensus on identity on the other constituent
components of the composite variable “Stateness” to test hypothesis 2.
In addition, chapter 5 examines the statistical relation between the composite
variable “Stateness” and different components of democracy; in doing so, I attempt to
show the relation between each state dimension and “Democracy” to test hypothesis 3;
Finally, I examine the relation between consensus on identity and different components of
democracy, to test the significance of the former on components of democracy that are
hypothesized to be affected by cohesion, and/or Staethood. I use findings from all tests to
qualitatively assess hypothesis 4. All the tests in chapter 5 are run three times; once on all
the data available, a second time on members of OIC, and a third time on all countries
excluding OIC, in order to test for any special relation in the OIC countries. Moreover, I
will attempt to control for other variables that affect the likelihood of democracy. For
128
Statehood should not be understood as a binary dichotomized variable; my understanding of
Statehood is in line with BTI’s conceptualization of stateness as a scale composite variable. This degreeism
regarding statehood was first used by: Nettl 1968
44
example, I will run regression using a set of independent variables including consensus
on state identity, among other measures discussed, level of socio-economic development,
and membership in OPEC in an attempt to test whether my hypotheses as such are
statistically significant in explaining the likelihood of democracy deficit in all the 129
countries in the BTI. After that, I apply the same controls on members of the OIC to see
whether the same relation maintains and whether there is a difference in the statistical
significance to any of the independent variables in relation to the dependents. Findings
will allow me to prove/falsify the centrality of consensus on state identity to democracy
and whether there is any peculiarity to the Islamic world in regards to this relation.
45
Part 2: Empirical tests and Results:
Chapter 4: Cohesion and Statehood: in Light of State Identity
i)
Consensus on Identity in Measuring Social and Political Cleavages
In previous chapters, I defined cohesion to be consensus on state identity. This
section is dedicated to prove that state identity is an adequate measure of social and
political cleavages. I previously articulated that without such cohesion, different actors
are likely to resort to violence and conflict in settling their competing interests.
I
hypothesize that cohesion, defined as consensus on state identity, reduces the likelihood
of intense conflict and facilitates the management of conflict issues among different
political factions; if different groups fail to agree on their collective identity, they
perceive the political game as a zero-sum game in which the gain of one faction
constitutes a direct irreversible loss to other groups, and perhaps a threat to their very
existence. In this setting, competing groups are likely to resort to violence and conflict
based politics in settling their different interests. On the other hand, if they agree on their
collective identity, different political actors are better equipped to successfully mitigate
and manage their differences.
Furthermore, I hypothesize that consensus on state identity enhances the level of
trust among different political actors; in a zero sum game in which there is no agreement
on identity, collaboration between competing factions is unlikely to occur in light of an
atmosphere of distrust and polarization. As highlighted in earlier chapters, if a society is
characterized by reinforcing cleavages, which I argue to be identity disagreement, it is
unlikely that two individuals from different factions would collaborate to further common
interest; two or more factions might form temporary coalitions to further a common
political interests that other groups resist; however, to craft a political system based on
collaboration, a degree of cohesion is necessary among different groups. If different
actors agree on state identity, they are likely to collaborate in furthering common
interests, and peacefully deliberate to mitigate competing ones. Finally, I assert that in
light of my conceptualization of fragmentation, i.e.: lack of consensus on state identity
and its effects on the political system, cohesion facilitates the wide-range representation
of competing interests in society; if the political system is characterized by divisive
46
cleavages, it becomes unlikely that political and social groups represent the different
interests in society; moreover, in a political setting characterized by distrust and
fragmentation, the few dominant interests are likely to marginalize, if not totally restrict,
the representation of other interests. Consensus on state identity, accordingly, does not
necessarily mean the strong representation of competing interests in society; however, its
absence necessarily entails the capitulation of such representation.
To sum up, I argue that if my hypothesis stating that cohesion is consensus on
state identity is true, the latter should explain these manifestations of cohesion: 1) degree
of conflict present in a polity, 2) the polity’s capacity to manage conflict, 3) the degree of
trust between different groups, and 4) the ability of different groups to compete and
collaborate in representing different interests in society. Accordingly, I empirically test
the relation between the variable “State Identity” and available variables that measure
these dynamics that this paper hypothesized to be manifestations of cohesion. Those
variables are “Intensity of Conflict”, “Conflict/Cleavage Management”, “Interest
Groups”, and “Social Capital”. The following diagram visually summarizes the
argument; moreover, it presents the variables used to measure each of the hypothesized
manifestation of consensus on state identity (cohesion).
Consensus on State
Identity
Less violent conflict
“Intensity of Conflict”
More conflict
Management
“Conflict/Cleavage
Management"
Trust
“Social Capital”
Representation of
different societal interest
“Interest Groups”
Cohesion
State identity is a scale variable from 1 to 10; “1” signals that the legitimacy of
the nation state is fundamentally questioned and that different population groups compete
for hegemony and deny citizenship to one another. “10” signals that the majority of the
population accepts the nation state as legitimate and that all social groups enjoy right at
47
citizenship without discrimination. Thresholds at “4” and “7” exist where “4” means that
the legitimacy of the state is frequently questioned and that significant aspects of
citizenship is denied to an entire population group. “7” indicates that the legitimacy of the
state is rarely questioned and that some groups are denied full citizenship rights. Here is it
is note-worthy that consensus on state identity is a component of a composite variable
that measures “Stateness”, and that “Stateness” is one component of another composite
variable “Democracy”.
The variable “Conflict Intensity” measures the seriousness of social, ethnic, and
religious conflicts; it also asses the use and spread of violence, and the extent to which
society is polarized and fragmented among one or the other cleavage lines; I argued in
this paper that differences in themselves do not constitute cleavages unless they are
utilized and politicized in a way that associates confrontational meanings to such
differences. I ultimately argued that the lack of agreement on state identity constitutes
such a cleavage. It is worth restatement here that this research does not understand ethnic,
religious, or any ascriptive difference to be the only sources of such cleavage;
nevertheless, those differences serve as ingredients awaiting their politicization to
become cleavages. In this way, the intensity of conflict serves as an accurate
manifestation of this understanding of cleavages as it does not measure differences;
rather, it measures conflict, whether stemming from ascriptive or non-ascriptive
difference. It is also important to highlight that this thesis does not argue that lack of
consensus on state identity is the only cause of conflict and determinant of conflict
management; other factors including, among many others, the state’s capacity to repress
conflict, and actors’ willingness to use violence are instrumental in signaling the
likelihood of conflict intensity and the ability to manage it. Nevertheless, I assert that the
other factors play out as a function of lack of cohesion; it is only when there is a
disagreement regarding state identity that possibility of conflict arises. Other issuespecific political disagreements do not constitute conflicts; if a society is cohesive, it is
unlikely that policy disagreements would produce conflicts and fragmentation. For
example, disagreement regarding education policy or healthcare policy does not qualify
to constitute conflict. On the other hand, conflicts, especially violent ones, are products of
irreconcilable disagreements that assign a zero sum dynamics to the outcome. For
48
example, disagreement on electoral laws that dictate voting rights on the basis of a certain
definition of citizenship might constitute an issue of conflict. Clearly, such disagreement
is only possible if there is a corresponding disagreement regarding the identity of the
state. Previous chapters expanded on the dynamics through which consensus on state
identity constitutes cohesion, and how lack of this agreement constitutes fragmentation.
In this section, I statistically test for the relation between consensus on identity and
variables that reflect manifestations of cohesion.
In light of this argument, I run simple regression between “State Identity” and
“Conflict Intensity” to test whether the former has power in explaining the latter. Similar
to tests ran earlier, I swap both variables to test whether the relation maintains when
identity becomes the dependent variable; in other words, I attempt to test whether the
lack of conflict impacts unanimity on identity. Results are presented in figure 1A; since
Conflict Intensity has scores, like that of all variables in BTI, that range from 1 to 10
where “10” signals civil war, the scores have been inversely recoded so that “10” signals
the absence of violence. Threshold at “7” indicates that there are only few incidents of
violence as radical political actors have limited success in mobilization; nevertheless,
society remains divided along different cleavage lines. “4” indicates that violence is fairly
spread and that society and elite are deeply split along cleavage lines. As figure 1A
elaborates, identity has a strong predictive value and a high significance in regards to the
intensity of conflict. Moreover, the intensity of conflict and polarization has an equal
significance in predicting consensus on identity. Nevertheless, the coefficient of change is
higher when state identity is treated as the predictor variable. Since the variable “Conflict
Intensity” measures both “the confrontational nature of politics” and “the polarization
and split of society”129the exponentially high coefficient present when state identity is
used to predict the intensity of conflict asserts my confidence that consensus on identity
is negatively related to conflict resulting from fragmentation, and positively related to
peace.
Table 1A:
Linear Regression on State Identity and Conflict Intensity
129
BTI, 36.
49
Conflict Intensity
State Identity
Independent Variable
.884***
Dependent Variable
.522***
Note: Higher coefficient when State Identity is the predictor. ***p< 0.001
In a similar fashion, consensus on state identity is associated with the ability of
the political actors to moderate conflict and differences; “Cleavage/conflict management”
measures the extent to which the political leadership is able to moderate cleavage-based
conflict.130 Consequently, I test for the statistical effect of both variables “State Identity”
and “Cleavage management” on each other. As show in tables present in figure 1B, the
degree of agreement on state identity is positively related to the extent to which
successful conflict management occurs. Again, the relation is significant in both
directions, yet is more powerful when state identity is utilized as the independent variable
to predict conflict management.
Table 1B
Linear Regression on State Identity and Cleavage/Conflict Management
Cleavage/Conflict
Management
State Identity
Independent Variable
.734***
Dependent Variable
.506***
Note: Higher coefficient when State Identity is the predictor. ***p< 0.001
To test for the relation between identity consensus and the ability of competing
groups to represent different societal interests as well as the extent to which these groups
are able and willing to collaborate, I test for the impact between the variable “State
Identity” and “Interest Groups”. The latter measures the extent to which groups that are
able to mediate between society and the political system exist. Consequently, it signals
the extent to which differences, that would otherwise impede such mediation, are
adequately addressed to allow for these groups to have “the capacity to incorporate all
130
Ibid., 42.
50
[competing] social interests and to avoid the dominance of few strong interests” 131 ;
moreover, the variable measures the degree of cooperation between different interest
groups132. The ability of interest groups to represent different interests, yet maintain a
degree of cooperation and a sense of balance means that the society is cohesive and
harmonious enough to tolerate such settings. As highlighted earlier, if a society is
fragmented on the issue of state identity, it becomes hard for groups representing
competing interests to cooperate as it is likely that some of these interests are jeopardized
by triumph of one or the other views regarding identity; accordingly, actors are likely to
perceive the winning of one interest as a direct threat to the existence of other interests.
Similar to all constituent variables in BTI, the highest available score for this variable is
10 and the lowest 1 with thresholds at 1, 4, 7, and 10; “1” means that a large number of
social interest remain unrepresented, the ones that exist remain uncooperative in isolated
social segments, and are poorly balanced; “4” signals a narrow range of interest groups,
polarization, interest underrepresentation, and only few players dominate; “7” shows an
average range of interest groups reflecting most societal interests, but few strong interests
dominate. And finally, “10” is that broad range of competing interests is represented and
cooperate balancing one another.
Finally, the variable “Social Capital” measures the degree of trust among citizens,
attempting to answer the question “To what extent have social self-organization and the
construction of social capital advanced?”; this trust “fosters cooperation and [voluntary]
mutual support for purposes of self-help, rather than primarily to further political
objectives”133. Clearly, if a society is fragmented, levels of trust are expected to be low;
moreover, one would neither expect different groups to foster non-political interests, nor
to voluntarily cooperate and work collaboratively towards mutual support. If groups are
divided in regards to the identity of the state, such collaboration and trust is not only
illogical to envision, but is also threatening to the very existence of those groups. This
variable has scores from 1 to 10; 1 signals the least level of trust and cooperation, and 10
signal the highest.
131
BTI, 23.
Ibid.
133
BTI, 24.
132
51
Figure 1C presents correlations between “State identity” and the variables
“Interest Groups”, and “Social Capital”.
The results show that consensus on state
identity is positively associated to each of those variables and that the relation is
statistically significant. Moreover, I test for the direction of this relation by running
simple regression tests on each variable and the variable “State Identity” twice, once
treating “State identity” as an independent variable, and the other as a dependent variable.
Findings presented in table 1D show that the relationship is positive and significant
whether State Identity is the independent or the dependent variable; nevertheless, the
slope of the relation is higher when State Identity is treated as the independent variable;
this finding is consistent in all tests employed in this section; the only exception is that,
when tested against the variable “Social Capital”, the power of the relation is not
substantially affected when State Identity is treated as the dependent. Consequently, I
assert from these findings a) the validity of the two previously elaborated views regarding
the sequencing of this process; as highlighted; one view suggests that consensus on state
identity produces less conflict, better ability to manage divisions, more trust, and
effective collaboration; the other suggests that democratic deliberations give birth to these
dynamics, and in turn, to consensus on state identity, i.e.: cohesion. b) That whereas both
views are qualitatively and statistically valid, there is more statistical support to the view
which holds state identity to cause the other variables.
Table 1C:
Pearson’s Correlations on state identity and each of the hypothesized variables
State Identity
Social Capital
.551**
Interest groups
.488**
Note: ***p< 0.001
52
Table 1D
Linear Regression on State Identity and the dependent variables as hypothesized
State Identity
Social Capital
Independent
(Predictor)
.561***
Dependent
(Predicted)
.541***
Interest groups
.618***
.385***
Note:***p< 0.001
Whether agreement on identity is the dependent or the independent variable is a
causal controversy that deserves treatment on a case to case basis. Nevertheless, we can
infer that it is obvious that some of the constituent variables are very unlikely to emerge
without consensus on identity; for example, a representative harmonious and competitive
network of interest groups is very unlikely to emerge without consensus on state identity
both as cohesion and as a dimension of Statehood; despite the existence of groups that
represent different interests in fragmented non-state settings, “Interest Groups”, as
envisioned by the BTI data, measures the existence of a “network of cooperative
associations or interest groups to mediate between society and the political system” to
assess the “representation of societal interests in the political system” 134 . First, the
cooperation between such groups is unlikely without cohesion; similarly, the
representation of all competing societal interests without allowing for the dominance of
strong interests is only likely in a cohesive society in which competing groups do not fear
the representation of the others. Moreover, mediating between society and the political
system is hard to imagine in non-state setting; the existence of a political system
distinguishable from society (so that mediating groups can step in) is a function of the
modern state system and is hardly imaginable in non-state settings. In fact, despite the
clear statistical relation and significance in treating “State identity” as the dependent
variable predicted by each of the other variables, the coefficient of the relations when
“State Identity” is held as the independent variable is, with the exception of “Social
Capital, higher. In other words, the increase in consensus on state identity causes a
134
BTI codebook, 23.
53
change on each of the values of the other variables greater than the change predicted by
other variables on state identity.
It is clear that the exact contribution of “State Identity” to “Interest Groups” and
“Social Capital” is not clear without introducing controls. The most adequate controls to
introduce in measuring this contribution in regards to each of these variables is the other
variable: for example, the best alternative explanation for the existence of a functioning
network of association is the existence trust among different groups. Nevertheless, as a
result of the way BTI data is formulated, it is not adequate to employ these controls.
Consider the following example; let us assume that I assess the impact of “State Identity”
on “Interest Groups” while controlling for “Social Capital”; it is as if I assess the impact
of “State Identity” on the effectiveness of Interest groups without allowing for the
existence of Social Capital to serve as an intervening dynamic through which such impact
takes place. In fact, we can infer from BTI’s grouping of those variables together, each
equally contributing to the composite variable “Political and Social Integration”, that they
are related and that the existence of one renders the others likely. Figure 1E shows the
strong correlations between the constituent variables of “Political and Social Integration”;
these strong correlations justify the inability of this section to introduce these variables as
controls because consensus on identity could affect one of them through the others.
Table 1E
Pearson’s Correlations between the constituent variables of the composite “Political and
Social Integration”
Social Capital
Interest Groups
Social Capital
--
.847***
Interest Groups
.847***
--
Note: ***p<0.001
This section shows that consensus on state identity is not only strongly correlated
to indications of cleavages, but also that the former has a strong predictive value to the
latters. In other words, the lack of agreement on state identity explains conflict, and
violence; on the other hand, its existence signals trust, adequate representation of interest,
collaboration, and the ability of the political leadership to mitigate differences. Both
views, discussed earlier, regarding the sequencing of democracy and consensus on state
54
identity are, statistically, supported; clearly, the findings here suggest that both views are
statistically relevant; however, state identity remains more powerful in its predictive
capacity in relation to the other variables than that of those variables in predicting
consensus on identity. Furthermore, the strong correlation between trust (Social Capital)
and harmonious collaborative representative mechanisms (Interest Groups), highlights
the importance of each of those variables to the others; in this way, I could not test for the
exact impact on state identity on each of the variables while controlling for the others. If
it was possible, findings of such test would allow us to further infer some of the exact
causal mechanisms between identity and each of the variables. Consequently, I conclude
that the best that we can infer from these measures is that consensus on state identity
statistically predicts the dependent variables tested in this section and that, on the other
hand, those variables, albeit with weaker power, predicts that there is an agreement on
state identity.
ii)
State Identity Affects Other State Dimensions
I argued that the state is constituted by three main dimensions: the monopoly over
use of violence (territorial state), the administrative and state identity. The next chapter
elaborates on the centrality of the three dimensions for democracy and democratization.
This section shows that consensus on state identity, i.e.: the identity dimension of the
state, affects the other dimensions of the state. This comes in light of my earlier assertion
that consensus on state identity affects democracy and democratization in two ways: 1) as
a measure of cohesion and the adequate mitigation of differences and cleavages, and 2) as
a crucial component of Statehood, a definitional aspect of democracy. Furthermore, I
attempt to test whether this relation is different among OIC member countries. The data
in BTI asserts my conceptualization of state dimensions; in fact, “Stateness” is a
composite variable that is constituted by the three dimensions of the state plus an
additional variable that measures the interference of religious dogma in the state. First, I
argue that the interference of religious dogma in the state affect statehood by affecting
state identity, and thus, could be considered as part of the identity dimension of the state.
The variable “No Interference of Religious Dogmas” has scores from 1 to 10; 10
indicates a secular state, 1 indicates a theocracy; thresholds at “4” and “7” indicate
conflict between secular and religious norms, and a secular state yet with considerable
55
religious influence, respectively. Figure 2A shows the correlation between religious
dogma and state identity; moreover, the associated graph highlights the slope and the
direction of the relation. Second, I use simple regression to test the prediction power of
the identity dimension on each of the other dimensions of Stateness: the monopoly on the
use of force, and administrative capacity beyond the maintenance of law and order.
2A:
Pearson’s correlations between State Identity and Religious dogma
Religious Dogma
.543**|*
State Idenitty
Note: ***P< 0.001
Consensus on State identity
12
10
8
6
Series1
4
Linear (Series1)
2
0
0
5
10
15
No Religious Dogma
As clear in table 2A, there is a statistically significant positive relation between
consensus on state identity and the degree to which religious dogmas are isolated from
the state structure. Moreover, the graph visually presents the slope of this relation; the
non- interference of religious dogma is positively related to consensus on state identity.
Having highlighted the interrelation between both variables, I maintain that there are only
three dimensions to the state as the literature rightfully emphasizes: the territorial, the
administrative and state identity. The variable “Basic Administration” measures the
56
extent to which basic administrative structures exist 135 ; moreover, in line with the
conceptualization of the administrative state in this paper, it measures the administrative
capacity of the state beyond the basic function of insuring security. The scores range
from 1 to 10 where 1 signals that non-existence of functions beyond maintaining law and
order and 10 indicates that the state has a differentiated administrative structure over its
territories. Cutting points at “4” and d”7” indicate that the state provides services beyond
security yet limited in its territorial scope, and that the state provides basic functions
beyond security throughout the territory yet with limited efficiency, respectively. The
same tests are run after singling out countries that are members of the OIC; the reason is
to test whether the same relation, if any, exist in the OIC. Findings are presented in table
2B.
As presented in table 2B, findings suggest that, in all countries, consensus on state
identity is significant and positively related to the administrative capacity of the state.
Moreover, similar findings exist in OIC member countries; nevertheless, in OIC
countries, the predictive value of consensus on identity in signaling the state’s
administrative capacity is slightly weaker than that present in the whole population of
countries. This means that, in OIC countries, state identity facilitates the state’s
administrative capacity to a lesser extent that it does on the general population of
countries.
Table 2B:
Linear Regression on State Identity and Basic Administration
State Identity
All Countries
Muslim Countries
.738***
.580**
Note: State Identity is the independent variable predicting the dependent Basic
Administration. ***P< 0.001; **p< 0.02
The other dimension of state that is affected by state identity is the monopoly on
the use of violence. I discussed in this paper two views , 1) the monopoly on the use of
violence gives birth to consensus on identity, and 2) that consensus on identity facilitates
the state’s monopoly on the use of violence. I hypothesized that in all ways, state identity
135
BTI, 17.
57
remains central to the state’s capacity to claim the monopoly on the use of force, despite
of the sequence in which this relation occurs. In other words, I argue that in the case
where the monopoly on the use of force occurs before consensus on state identity, the
new territorial entity attempts to craft this consensus, sometimes by means in line with
democracy, and some other times by undemocratic practices like ethnic cleansing. This
circumspection to instill an identity among citizens affirms the centrality of consensus on
identity for the maintenance of the territorial state. The following Table 2C presents the
effect of consensus on identity on the monopoly on the use of force in all countries and
on OIC members after singling them out, respectively. Additionally, I test for this relation
using state identity as the dependent variable to test point view “2”, and to test whether
the monopoly on the use of force has an explanatory value in signaling consensus on
identity. The variable “Monopoly on the Use of Violence” ranks from 1 to 10 where 1 is
the lack of monopoly on the use of violence and 10 is the lack of other groups’
competition with the state over the use of violence. “4” and “7” indicate that come areas
are controlled by paramilitary forces, and that the state’s monopoly on violence is
established over the territory in principle, yet challenged by other forces, respectively.
In all countries, both views are valid; both the monopoly on the use of force and
consensus on state identity have an explanatory power in predicting each other.
Nevertheless, the coefficient power is greater when consensus on identity is used as the
independent variable. In other words, change in the value of “State Identity” results in
change in the value of “Monopoly on the Use of Force”; this change is greater than that
caused by the monopoly on the use of violence when testing for its effect on “State
Identity”. In OIC countries, a similar significant relation exists; nevertheless, the relation
is stronger when state identity is used as the predictor of the monopoly on the use of
violence, and weaker when the former is used as the dependent variable. These findings
suggest that, in OIC members, the identity dimension of the state has a unique
explanatory value in predicting the capacity of the state to assert its monopoly on the use
of violence. Moreover, they assert that despite the positive relation between both
variables when state identity is treated as the dependent variable, the relation is weaker
when compared to that of the whole population. To sum up, we can infer from these
findings that 1) state identity is central in explaining the monopoly on the use of violence,
58
2) In the whole population of countries and in the OIC, the relation is significant both
when treating state identity as the dependent and the independent value; 3) nevertheless,
the relation is weaker when the monopoly on the use of force is used to predict consensus
on state identity, and final, 4) In OIC, when compared to the whole population, the
relation is more powerful when state identity is treated as the independent variable, and
weaker when it is used as the dependent variable. This signals the centrality of state
identity in signaling the monopoly on the use of force in OIC countries.
Table 2C:
Linear Regression on State Identity and The Monopoly on The Use Of Force
All Countries
Muslim Countries
Independent Variable
.794***
.865***
Dependent Variable
.441***
.386***
State
Identity
In part one of this research, I argue that state identity is important for democracy
because: 1) it is a measure of the successful mitigation of societal and political cleavages,
and 2) it affects Statehood, a definitional aspect of a functioning democracy. In the
previous section, I statistically highlight that consensus on state identity is a measure of
social and political cleavages. This section shows that, in all 129 countries, state identity
has a substantial impact on the other dimensions of the state; moreover, it indicates that
this relation is slightly different in Muslim countries; in OIC countries, state identity is
weaker in explaining Basic Administration, yet more powerful in explaining the
monopoly on the use of force, when compared to the general population. In light of these
findings, I assert my argument that state identity contributes to Statehood not only as a
dimension of the state, but also as a dimension that positively affects the other
dimensions of the state. The next chapter expands on the relation between Statehood on
the one hand, and different dimensions of democracy on the other. Moreover, it
highlights the centrality of consensus on identity in signaling democracy, both in Muslim
and non-Muslim countries. The significance of the peculiar relation between identity and
59
other state dimensions in Muslim countries is analyzed, after testing for further
peculiarities in next chapter, in chapter 6.
60
Chapter 5: Consensus on Identity, Statehood, and Democracy
i)
Statehood is a Requisite for Democracy:
The BTI collects data on “countries that are yet to achieve a fully consolidated
democracy”136.This paper ultimately argues that 1) consensus on state identity explains
the democratic status of all those polities, and 2) that having been part of the developing
polities, Muslim countries’ democratic deficit could be explained by lack of consensus on
state identity. In previous chapters, I showed that consensus on state identity is both a
measure of cohesion, and a central dimension explaining the extent to which the state
exists in a polity. I, moreover, argue that Statehood and cohesion are instrumental in the
emergence and maintenance of democracy, and hence, that consensus on state identity
affects democracy. This section is dedicated to empirically test the impact of Statehood
on democracy. The following section examines the effect of agreement on state identity
on specific components of democracy that are hypothesized to be affected by Statehood
and/or social and political cleavages.
This paper understands democracy not to be a dichotomous characteristic that exists
or does not exist; there are degrees to which democracy could exist in any polity.
However, there are polities that we can call democracies- polities which achieved a
degree of democratic consolidation that receives little controversy among scholars; on the
other hand, there are polities that, despite the existence of some democratic dynamics, are
generally accepted as non-democracies. There are, moreover, variances among
democracies and among non-democracies; there are also cases that are classified as
hybrid regimes137, and those that are a matter of controversy among different scholars and
definitions of democracy. Accordingly, In contrast to the minimalist definitions of
democracy, I use BTI’s definition of constitutional democracy. This definition is in line
with this paper’s understanding of the dynamics through which identity affects
136
BTI., 4.
For an overview on Hybrid Regimes see Mikael Wigell. 2008. Mapping 'hybrid regimes': Regime types
and concepts in comparative politics. Democratization 15 (2): 230-50. See also, Matthijs Bogaards. 2009.
How to classify hybrid regimes? defective democracy and electoral authoritarianism. Democratization 16
(2): 399-423.
137
61
democracy; moreover, it reflects BTI’s general understanding of democracy, and hence,
on the variables used in this paper to measure democracy.
In chapter three, I elaborated on the centrality of the state to democracy; I, moreover,
emphasized three dimension of the state: the monopoly on force, the administrative state,
and state identity. In light of this argument, I hypothesize that there is a positive relation
between Satehood and democracy; the more consolidated the state is in a polity, the more
likely that it enjoys higher levels of democracy. Whether the state is a pre-requisite to
democracy, or that it co-evolves with democracy is a matter of controversy; however, as
previously expanded, in both ways, the state remains instrumental for democracy, and
thus, is hypothesized to correlate with democracy. The variable “Stateness” in the BTI
data is a composite variable of the three central dimensions of Statehood plus one extra
dimension: The interference of religious dogma. In the previous chapter, I statistically
showed that religious dogma affects Statehood by affecting State Identity; there is no
reason to believe that the sheer existence of religious dogma in the state’s legal and
institutional order jeopardizes statehood; however, as highlighted in chapter 4, the
interference of religious dogma is associated with less consensus on state identity, and in
turn, affects Statehood.
Furthermore, some specific and important dimensions of democracy are directly
affected by Statehood. One of the central components of democracy is free and fair
elections; in fact, the whole notion of democracy is rested on electoral representation. I
argue that free and fair elections are reliant on all state dimensions; it relies on the
administrative capacity of the state to organize elections; it equally relies on the state’s
monopoly on the use of violence on its territories; if other groups challenge the state’s
rule over the territories, they can either obstruct the electoral process or jeopardize true
fairness and competitiveness. Finally, consensus on state identity is crucial for such an
electoral process; if different groups disagree regarding the identity of the state, it
becomes a) unlikely that they resort to democracy, b) likely to motivate conflicting
groups to use violence and challenge the state’s monopoly on violence, and c) challenges
administrative efficiency of the electoral process; for example, identity disputes invoke
conflicts regarding voting rights as well as other administrative issues.
62
In light of these arguments, I test for correlation between the three dimensions of the
state and both, the composite variable “Democracy”, and the variable “Free and Fair
Elections”. The latter measures the extent to which competitive and unrestricted elections
periodically occur in a polity; the lowest possible score “1” indicates the total lack of
elections, or that they are total unfree and unfair; the highes score “10” indicates that
there are no constraints on free and fair elections. Table 3A presents the findings.
Table 3A:
Correlation of state Dimensions and democratic dimensions affected by Statehood as
hypothesized
State
Identity
Basic
Admin.
Monopoly
on Force
Free and Fair Elections
.465***
.450***
.242***
Democracy
.605***
.652***
.484***
Note: Pearson’s correlation between the three state dimensions two constituent variables
of the composite “Democracy. ***p<0.001
The results show that, in all 129 countries, there is a significant correlation
between all state dimensions and the composite variable “Democracy”. Furthermore,
results indicate a statistically significant correlation between the three state dimensions
and the free and fair elections. These findings assert this paper’s hypothesis that,
generally, Statehood is associated with democracy. In chapter three, I argued that each of
the state dimensions contribute to democracy; I articulated that the monopoly on the use
of force, administration, and consensus on identity explain the level of democracy present
in a society. Accordingly, I complement these findings by constructing a model using
multivariate regression to tease out the explanatory power of each state dimension to
democracy in 1) all countries, 2) Muslim countries, and 3) non-Muslim countries.
Moreover, I control for other variables that are likely to affect democracy; it is widely
accepted in democratization and democratic consolidation literatures that a flourishing
economy is associated with higher levels of democracy138. Consequently, I take scores of
“Output Strength” from the BTI data, to control for economic prosperity. This variable
138
Valerie Bunce. 2000. Comparative democratization: Big and bounded generalizations. Comparative
Political Studies
63
measures quantitative indicators of the economic status including GDP, GDP per capita,
PPP, GDP growth. Similarly, it is widely argued in the literature on Rentierism that states
that have access to large amounts of natural resources are resistant to democratization in
light of many dynamics that prevent the evolution of democracy. One central tenet to
these dynamics is the ability of Rentier states to avoid taxing their populations, and in
turn, escape the latter’s pressures for democratic accountability139. To account for this
effect, I introduce membership to OPEC as an independent variable in the regression
model. Since the BTI data lacks this variable, I code all countries in BTI into a new
dichotomous variable that distinguishes OPEC and non OPEC members. Table 3B
presents the model 1 on the following: all 129 countries, Muslim, and non-Muslim
countries
Table 3B:
Regression Model I on State dimensions and Democracy
Muslim countries
(OIC)
All
Non-Muslim (NonOIC)
State Identity
.552**
.468**
.300**
Basic Administration
.132
.511**
.619**
Monopoly on force
-.167
-.282**
-.279*
Economic Status
.188
.205**
.246*
OPEC
-.936
-1.436**
-.756
Note: the dependent Variable is Composite Variable “Democracy”. *p<0.05; **p<0.2
Findings indicate that consensus on identity is positively related to democracy in
all samples; it is the second most powerful in signaling democracy when tested in all
countries in the data, and on non-OIC members. The significance of this relation is
almost equal when tested on the whole population of countries and countries of the OIC,
and remains significant, albeit with a slight drop, when tested for non-OIC countries.
Basic administration is the most powerful state dimension that explains democracy when
tested in all countries and in non-OIC countries. On the contrary, the relation becomes
139
Michael L. Ross. 2001. Does oil hinder democracy? World Politics 53 (3): 325-61.
64
insignificant when tested in OIC countries. Moreover, all controls are in line with their
hypothesized effects on democracy in all countries and in non-Muslim countries; the only
exception is that OPEC membership is statistically insignificant in explaining democracy
in non-Muslim countries.
In OIC countries, state identity is the only state dimension, and the only
independent variable that is statistically significant in explaining the likelihood of
democracy. In Muslim societies, democracy is predominantly reliant on cohesion. The
administrative capacity of the state, which is the most powerful state dimension in
explaining democracy in all 129 countries, and equally in non-Muslim countries,
becomes totally insignificant in explaining democracy in Muslim societies. Similarly, the
economic status of Muslim societies is, contrary to its effects in all countries and in nonMuslim countries, insignificant in signaling democracy. These findings suggest that there
is a peculiar relation between consensus on state identity and democracy in Muslim
societies; it seems that cohesion, among factors tested in this thesis, is the only
determinant for democracy. Chapter 6 expands on this discussion, highlighting possible
research directions for such finding.
Another surprising finding is that the monopoly on the use of violence is
negatively, related to democracy when controlling for the other variables; this relation is
not statistically significant in OIC countries. Further research is required to pinpoint the
exact dynamics through which the state’s monopoly on violence affects democracy.
Nevertheless, one possible answer is that, as discussed earlier in this paper, the monopoly
on the use of violence does not necessarily signal democracy; sometimes, the monopoly
on the use of violence sustains authoritarian regimes as it shields the latter from attempts
of destabilization by political and social actors. Possibly, the sheer repressive capacity of
the state is not to signal higher levels of democracy unless it is accompanied by the other
two state dimensions.
I recall here my earlier argument regarding two views linking the territorial state
to democracy. The first suggests that the evolution of the territorial state necessitates
taxation, and in turn, representation. Second, democratic deliberations serve as
pacification mechanisms that motivate different actors to accept the territorial state as the
legitimate power center, and in turn, pave the way for the emergence of the territorial
65
state. These democratic deliberations cannot, thus, evolve into democracy without
crafting the state. In both ways, the territorial state affects democracy by affecting, or
making possible, one of the other state dimensions. In the first case, the ability of the
state to tax its citizens, and to provide rights in return, is dependent on both the
administrative capacity of the state, and the definition of the demos who are going to be
taxed; in the second case, if pacification mechanisms give birth to the territorial state, it
necessarily entail a settlement and an agreement on the state identity question.
In light of this view, I refer to results from the earlier section that tests the
relation between different state dimensions140 to argue that the territorial state- the state
capacity to claim the monopoly on the use of force- is positively related to democracy if
we do not control for the other state dimensions. In other words, the territorial state is
positively related to democracy if we allow the former to have this impact through the
other state dimensions. Table 3C presents the same regression model I after removing the
administrative and identity dimensions of the state from the list of independent variables;
Since the monopoly on the use of force was, to begin with statistically insignificant in
Muslim countries, I replicate the same on OIC countries to test whether monopoly on
force remains insignificant.
Table 3C:
Linear Regression on The Monopoly on the use of force and Democracy after removing
other state dimensions
All Countries
Muslim Countries
(OIC)
Non-Muslim
(non-OIC)
Monopoly on Force
.222**
.073
.375**
Economic Status
.476**
.321*
.524***
OPEC
-1.908**
-1.201
-1.304
Note: *p< 0.05, and **p< 0.02
140
In Chapter 4 section ii, I present findings that elaborate on the relation between state dimensions. I
hypothesized the state identity positively affects the other dimension. The findings presented in this
section fortify my view regarding the matter; it is not only that state identity signals the liklehood on the
state’s capacity to enjoy the monopoly of the use of violence, but also that the latter’s impact on
democracy is negative unless such effect takes place.
66
The results assert that, as argued, the monopoly on the use of violence is
positively affects democracy; the relation is statistically significant when the relation is
tested in all countries and in non-Muslim countries. Nevertheless, the relation maintains
its insignificant status in OIC countries. These findings affirm that the identity dimension
remains the only significant state dimension in signaling democracy in Muslim countries;
in other words, at the time being, the identity dimension remains the central dimension in
explaining degrees of democracy in the predominantly autocratic context of Islamic
countries. So far, we can make the following inferences:
1) Generally, Statehood explains the likelihood of democracy in all countries
examined.
2) Different state dimensions have varying effects on democracy when the
relation is tested on different groups of countries: all countries present in BTI, OIC
countries, and non-OIC countries.
3) The territorial dimension of the state negatively affects democracy if it is not
accompanied by agreement on state identity; this, however, necessitates further research
to tease out the exact context in which the monopoly on violence alienate, or rather
facilitate, democracy.
4) There are indications that dimensions of Statehood have a different relation to
democracy in OIC countries; State identity is the only state dimension that is significantly
related to democracy. Additionally, since economic status does not explain democracy in
OIC countries, identity remains the only independent variable that explains democracy.
Moreover, the administrative state, although the most powerful dimension in signaling
democracy in the general population of countries, and specifically in non-OIC countries,
remains statistically insignificant in OIC countries.
5) The significance of agreement on state identity in explaining democracy in all
countries examined, and its particular impact in OIC countries, supports this paper’s
ultimate hypothesis: consensus on state identity, both as the extent of cohesion and as a
dimension of Statehood, signals the likelihood of democracy in all countries, and explains
the democratic deficit in the Islamic countries.
To further qualify my hypothesis, I examine in the following section the
relationship between state identity and components of democracy that are hypothesized to
67
be directly affected by either Statehood, social and political cleavages, or both.
Furthermore, I attempt to further reveal the dynamics of and the extent to which state
identity is peculiar in OIC countries.
ii)
Consensus on Identity and Democracy: in Light of Cohesion and Statehood
In this section, I specifically tests for the relation between state identity and some
components of democracy that are hypothesized to be directly affected by Statehood
and/or social and political cleavages. In previous chapters, I have already presented
findings that assert consensus on state identity to be a measure of i) the extent to which
cleavages are successfully mitigated, and ii) as a central dimension of the state. In light of
these findings, I employ the variable “State Identity” in this section as a measure of two
related, yet different things: an important state dimension, and the extent of cohesion that
exists in any polity. It is also important to note that, as the previous section proves,
identity has a peculiar effect in OIC countries; among all state dimensions, it remains the
only statistically significant in signaling democracy. In fact, it remains the only
independent variable significant in explaining the composite variable “Democracy”. In
this section, I show similar findings by testing all state dimensions against specific
democratic components that this research hypothesizes to be directly affected by
Statehood and/or cleavages. Findings in this section add that, in non-OIC, state identity is
not statistically significant in directly signaling dimensions of democracy hypothesized to
be affected by identity; administrative capacity, on the other hand, is the most powerful in
explaining democracies in non-Muslim countries. Since in chapter 3 and 4 I articulated
that state identity is not only a state dimension but also that it positively predicts other
state dimensions, I show that in non-OIC countries, state identity affect democracy
through its effect on the administrative capacity of the state.
I argued in previous sections that government efficiency is central to democracy and
that the success of any democratic experience relies heavily on the ability of the system
to effectively address socio-economic issues. I, moreover, presented another view that
holds democracy to cause immobilism and to impede effective governance. In addition, I
showed how consensus on state identity is shown to reflect two things: extent of
Statehood, and the mitigation of social and political cleavages. In light of this
conceptualization, I argue that consensus on state identity is likely to facilitate
68
government efficiency; an agreement on the identity of the state renders it likely that
different interest are characterized by a degree of harmony, that in turn, mitigates them
peacefully into coherent government policies. In fact, the mitigation of cleavages among
different political actors paves the way for consensus on goals, including democracy, and
results in less immobility of governance. On a structural level, the more consolidated the
state is, the more likely it will have the power to govern effectively; if the citizens of the
state are clear on their collective identity, their agreement on goals and objectives
becomes easier to occur.
Moreover, I argue that free and fair elections, a central dimension of democracy, are
unattainable without consensus on state identity. I have presented a view that
conceptualizes democracy as a pacification mechanism that, in turn, gives birth to the
state’s monopoly on the use of violence, i.e. the territorial state; I also emphasized that,
a) regardless of the sequence in which democracy and state evolve, the state remains
central for the functioning of democracy. And b) that democratic dynamics, to some
extent, exist in non-democratic politics and could, in fact, facilitate the emergence of
some state dimensions, yet the state remains central in the evolution of these dynamics to
materialize in a functioning democratic system. In light of this understanding of the state
and its relation to democracy, free and fair elections signals the willingness of political
actors to resort to fair democratic procedures in deliberating their different interests; this,
in turn, necessitates that a) the identity dimension of the state is settled in a way that
fairly define the demos in a way that does not motivate any group to fear the potential
loss in the democratic game, b) that the state claims an extent of monopoly on the use of
force that guarantees the procedure of this electoral process, and c) that democratic
procedures, as pacification mechanisms, are successful in motivating political actors to
mitigate their differences, formulating a consensus on identity. This consensus, in turn,
consolidates the identity dimension of the state, and, as stated in “a”: the identity
dimension of the state further consolidates this mitigation of differences to produce
consensus on identity. This cyclical relationship between consensus on identity when
treated as a structural factor, and when it is used as dynamic through which actors
mitigate their differences, crystallize an interaction between structural and agency
approaches to democratization. In chapter 6, I conclude this research by the potential
69
contribution of this research to bridging structural and agency factors in explaining
democracy.
No zero-sum game:
No fear of the
potential loss in a
democratic game. Less
likely that there is a
challenge to state
monopoly on the use
of force
Consensus on Identity
Peaceful mitigation of
interests
Free and Fair elections
Furthermore, freedom of expression, and association rights are likely to occur in a
context of clear consensus on state identity. If different factions in a society do not agree
on the identity of the collective, the ruling faction or coalition is likely to constrain
freedom of association and/or freedom of speech. In this context, freedom of association
threatens the ruling faction because any power given to outside groups is regarded as an
existential compromise; the zero sum game that characterizes this context facilitates
undemocratic practices by any group that reaches power. Since the slightest compromise
is regarded as an invitation for opponents to claim more power and influence, the faction
in power fears granting compromises to outsiders; outsider groups, in turn, attempt to
maximize their influence vis-à-vis the dominant group. In doing so, they grant few, if
any, compromises, and sometimes, await the right time to totally expel the dominant
group from the power center.
Having said this, I consider the following constituent variables of the composite
variable “Democracy” to test for its relation with consensus on state identity: 1) the
composite variable “Political Participation”; I also pay special attention to 2) two of its
70
constituent variables in light of their centrality to democracy: Free and Fair Elections and
Association/Assembly Rights. The variable “Political Participation” is a composite
variable constituted by the equally weighted scores of the following: Free and Fair
Elections, Effective Power to Govern, Association/Assembly Rights, and Freedom of
Expression. Each of these constituent variables has a minimum possible score of 1 and a
maximum of 10. “1” indicates the total lack of the measured variable; “10” indicates its
perfect existence. The following model (Model II) presents empirical findings on this
analysis; it is constructed three times in the same manner as that of Model1, yet with
different constituent variables of the composite “Democracy” as dependents. Moreover,
the same control variables are initially introduced; economic status, OPEC membership,
and each state dimension are hypothesized to affect each aspect of democracy tested in
this section. Table 3D presents the results on dependent variable “Political Participation”.
Table3D:
Model II Linear Regression on State Identity and Political Participation in light of
hypothesized controls
All Countries
Muslim Countries
Non-Muslim
(OIC)
Countries (nonOIC)
State Identity
.594***
.767**
.332
Basic
.576***
-.043
.755***
Monopoly on Force
-.538***
-.367
-.531**
Economic Status
.250
.255
.302
OPEC
-1.550**
-.750
-.780
Administration
Note: Linear Regression on the list of independent variables and the dependent
composite variable “Political Participation”. ***p<0.001; **p< 0.02; *p< 0.05
71
Findings articulate that, when considering all countries, all state dimensions have
results similar to that when they were tested against the composite variable “Democracy”.
State Identity and Basic Administration signal more political participation; Moreover,
economic status is not significant in explaining the likelihood of democracy; and OPEC
membership is, as hypothesized, negatively related to political participation. This signals
that, generally, consensus on identity both as a measure of cleavages and as a state
dimension, explains political participation.
In OIC countries, the only significant relation is that of State Identity, which is
positively related to the composite variable “Political Participation”. This finding is
consistent with findings in section I; in Muslim societies, consensus on identity is the
only predictor of both democracy, and political participation. This asserts my earlier
observation regarding the peculiarity of this relation in the Muslim World; in fact, it
solidifies that, unlike the case in other countries, democracy in Muslim societies is
predominantly reliant on identity agreement. In other words, unlike the case in all
countries present in the BTI, free and fair elections, efficient governing, rights of
association, and freedom of speech in Muslim societies are not affected by the strength of
administration or the monopoly on the use of force. On the contrary, in non-OIC
countries, the administrative dimension of the state is the most powerful in explaining,
and the only positively related to, the dependent variable. State identity, however, is
positive yet insignificant in explaining democratic attributes measured by “Political
Participation”.
It is important to note here that the variable “State Identity” measures two things
in this paper: Statehood and cleavages; also it is important to recall that the previous
section proves all dimensions of Statehood to be positively related to democracy.
Moreover, state identity’s relation to Statehood is twofold; first, it constitutes, in itself, a
dimension of Statehood; second, it affects other state dimensions. In this way, there are
two possibilities through which state identity affects political participation in any group
of countries. The first is that identity impacts Statehood and, in turn, participation. The
second is that consensus on identity, as a state dimension in itself, signals lack of
cleavages, and in turn, facilitates political participation. It could also be that through
those ways, together, that state identity affects participation; after all, the ways in which
72
state identity is related to Statehood and cleavages are different, yet overlapping. For
example, state identity as both a measure of cleavages and Statehood, signals the
likeability of effective governance. This is either a result of the government, having been
clear on the identity it represents, becomes more focused and coherent on its policies and
decisions. Or, as result of the citizens, having mitigated their divisive differences,
development of a clear framework of tolerance, and not only competing, but also shared
interests and goals, and in turn, facilitate effective governance.
In light of this view, I argue that, since consensus on state identity does not
directly impact “Political Participation” as a state dimension in non-Muslim countries, it
remains worth examining whether it positively impacts the dependent via its effect on the
administrative capacity of the state, which is the only independent variable explaining the
dependent. For this purpose I recall earlier findings presented in this paper; in chapter 4, I
showed that state identity is not only a Statehood dimension, but also that it affects other
dimensions of the state. Accordingly, I argue that it is through this effect that consensus
on state identity affect each of the dynamics hypothesized to be affected by identity. To
do so, I replicate the same regression model after removing “Basic Administration” from
the list of independent variables. I argue that removing the contribution of the state’s
administrative capacity allows us to examine the possible effect of identity through its
already established effect on the administrative capacity. To further support this
hypothesis, I run the same test on OIC countries. To further elaborate, if Basic
Administration has a positive impact on the dependent variable, and if State Identity
positively affects the dependent variable through its effect on Basic Administration, the
value and significance of State identity increases when administration is removed from
independent variables. On the other hand, if “Basic Administration” is insignificant to the
dependent variable, and if “State Identity” positively affects the dependent variable
through other dynamics – other than the former’s effect on “Basic Administration”, the
value and significance of identity is expected to either drop, or remain the same. Findings
are illustrated in complementary figure 3D.1.
Table 3D.1:
Model II Linear Regression on State identity and Political Participation after removing
other state dimensions from the independent variables
73
Muslim Countries(OIC)
Non-Muslim (non-OIC)
After Removing
Before
After Removing
Before
Basic Administration
removing other
other state
removing other
state
dimensions
state
dimensions
dimensions
State Identity
.772**
.767**
.422*
.332
Monopoly on
-.390*
-.367
-0.19
-.531
.405***
.255
.581***
.302
-1.687**
-.750
-1.567
-.780
force
Economic
Status
OPEC
Note: ***p< 0.001; **p< 0.02; *p< 0.05
After removing state’s administrative capacity from the list of independent
variables, and hence allowing for state identity to affect participation through
administration, identity becomes significant and positive in explaining political
participation in non-OIC countries. Since the administrative capacity of the state is not
significant in explaining participation in the OIC group, the significance value of “State
Identity” remains unaffected. This, in turn, means that in OIC, consensus on identity
affects participation in a different manner than it does in non-OIC countries. It is definite
that in OIC, State Identity does not affect participation by affecting another dimension of
the state; moreover, we can confidently conclude from the first section that other state
dimensions are, generally, insignificant in explaining democracy in OIC. Accordingly,
this effect of state identity in OIC might be the result of two things: 1) the effect of State
identity as a state dimension in itself, and in turn participation, and 2) the successful
mitigation of cleavages, and in turn, participation. In non-OIC countries, consensus on
identity affects participation by 1) affecting another state dimension “Basic
Administration”, and by signaling the successful mitigation of divisions.
74
To further solidify these findings, I construct the same model on two constituent
variables of “Political Participation” that are especially central to democracy: free
elections and assembly rights. Both dimensions are not only crucial to the very core of
democracy, but they are also very unlikely without consensus on state identity. As
previously stated, free elections and association rights are possible in light of identity
agreement among different groups in a society; moreover, they are both hard to envision
without a state. Table 3E presents the findings on the dependent variable “Association/
Assembly Rights”; table 3F presents findings on “Free and Fair Elections”.
Table 3E:
Model II Linear Regression on State Identity and Association/Assembly Rights
All Countries
Muslim Countries
Non-Muslim
Countries
State Identity
.544***
.619*
.324
Basic Administration
.586**
-.177
.786***
Monopoly on Force
-.585***
-.355
-.585**
Economic Status
.184
.283
.218
OPEC
-1.210
-.411
-.546
Note: ***p< 0.001; **p<0.02; *p<0.05
The result in all 129 countries asserts that State Identity and Basic Administration
positively predict the dependent variable; to the contrary, “Monopoly on the Use of
Force” is negatively associated to assembly rights. Moreover, economic status and OPEC
membership have no statistical significance in signaling the dependent. In OIC, similar to
earlier results, State Identity remains the only statistically significant predictor for the
dependent variable. On the other hand, in non- OIC, “Basic Administration” is the only
positive predictor for the “Association/Assembly Rights”. By replicating complementary
tests that were run earlier on political participation, table 3E.1 elaborates that 1) in nonOIC countries, State Identity remains significant in signaling the dependent variable if we
75
remove Basic Administration from the list of independent variables, and 2) that in OIC
countries, since Basic Administration is not significant for the dependent, the coefficient
value of State Identity remains largely unaffected in explaining the dependent variable
after removing Basic Administration from the list of independents.
Table 3E.1:
Model II Linear Regression on State Identity and Association/Assembly Rights after
removing Basic Administration from the independent variables
Muslim Countries(OIC)
Non-Muslim (non-OIC)
After Removing
Before
After Removing
Before
Basic Administration
removing other
other state
removing other
state
dimensions
state
dimensions
dimensions
State Identity
.639*
.619*
.417*
.324
Monopoly on
-.390*
-.355
-.049
-.585**
.405***
.283
.514**
.218
-1.687**
-.411
-1.365
-.546
force
Economic
Status
OPEC
Note: ***p< 0.001; **p< 0.02; *p< 0.05
In a similar fashion, State identity remains the only state dimension signaling free
elections in Muslim countries; the relation has an exponentially high coefficient, yet loses
its direct significance in non-Muslim countries. On the other hand, Basic Administration”
remains the strongest predictor in non-OIC countries. Moreover, contrary to the case in
testing for assembly rights, the economic status positively predicts democracy in nonMuslim countries. These findings, assert that in Muslim societies, free and fair elections
are dependent on the extent to which there is consensus on the identity of the state; the
high statistical coefficient confirms that the increase in the level of identity consensus
76
produces an almost equal increase on the extent to which free and fair elections are
efficiently carried out (the coefficient is almost 1). In non-Muslim countries, consensus
on state identity impacts free and fair elections via its impact on the state’s administrative
capacity; these results are presented in table 3F.1.
Table 3F
Model II Linear Regression State Identity and Free/Fair Elections
All Countries
Muslim Countries
Non-Muslim
Countries
State Identity
.645***
.928**
.334
Basic Administration
.656***
-.052
.890***
Monopoly on Force
-.655***
-.472
-.661**
Economic Status
.264
.293
.309*
OPEC
1.317
-.588
-.381
Note: State Identity for non-Muslim countries is barely significant at the 0.05 level (0.058
sig level). Moreover, Economic Status is almost significant in “All Countries” at the 0.05
level (0.056 sig level). ***p< 0.001; **p< 0.02; *p< 0.05
Table 3F.1
Model II Liner Regression on State Identity and Free/Fair Elections after removing Basic
Administration from the list of independent variables
Muslim Countries(OIC)
Non-Muslim (non-OIC)
After Removing
Before
After Removing
Before
Basic Administration
removing other
other state
removing other
state
dimensions
state
dimensions
77
dimensions
State Identity
.934**
.928**
.440*
.334
Monopoly on
-.499**
-.472
-.055
-.661**
. .270
.293
.645***
.309*
-.590
-.588
-1.309
-.381
force
Economic
Status
OPEC
Note: in non-OIC countries, the significance of State Identity after removing
administration is almost significant at the 0.02 level (0.027 Sig Level). However, It has
been marked by “*” for statistical precision. ***p< 0.001; **p< 0.02; *p< 0.05
In addition to previous dimensions of democracy, I argue that consensus on state
identity enhances commitment to democracy. As highlighted in this thesis, the
willingness of political actors to resort to democracy in mitigating their difference
interests is dependent on consensus on state identity. If a society lacks such cohesion, it
becomes unlikely that competing actors would accept the potential loss in the democratic
game; this comes in light of the irreconcilable defeat that such a loss would entail.
Accordingly, the extent of commitment to democratic institutions signals the willingness
of actors to resort to democracy; this reflects a true intention of relevant political actors to
institutionalize the mitigation of different interests in a democratic system.
Moreover, I hypothesize that consensus on state identity facilitates the equal
access to resources for political actors, regardless of their ethnic, religious, and
ideological affiliations. If there is agreement on the social boundary that the state
represents, the ruling group/coalition is unlikely to restrict equal access to different
political and social actors. Moreover, if identity agreement exists, individuals are unlikely
to informally restrict equal access to different groups in society. This, again, comes in
light of the absence of the zero- sum dynamic that lack of cohesion produces. To test for
these effects, I use the variable “Commitment to democratic Institutions” as dependent
variable. “Commitment to Democratic Institutions” measures the extent to which
different actors are committed to democracy; moreover, it asserts that, unlike the case in
78
informal democracy, actors are willing to institutionalize the democratic dynamics. Table
3G presents findings:
Table 3G:
Model II Linear Regression on State Identity and Commitment to Democratic Institutions
All Countries
Muslim
Countries
Non-Muslim
countries
State Identity
.705***
.847**
.447*
Basic Administration
.654***
.055
.815***
Monopoly on Force
-.516**
-.339
-.502**
Economic Status
.275
.240
.343*
OPEC
-2.376**
-1.473
-1.620
Note: Economic Status in non-Muslim countries is barely significant on the 0.05 level
(p=0.044; however, it is marked “*” for presentational precision. ***p< 0.001; **p<
0.02; *p< 0.05
In Muslim countries, State Identity remains the only significant predictor of the
dependent variable. Basic Administration, on the other hand, remains the most powerful
predictor of the dependent variable in non-OIC countries; in testing for its impact on the
dependent in non-OIC countries, state identity becomes relevant without removing
administrative capacity from the list of independents. This indicates that in both Muslim
and non-Muslim countries consensus on state identity directly explains the extent of
commitment to democracy; whereas it remains the only predictor in Muslim countries, it
is aided by the state’s administrative capacity in non-Muslim countries. Similar to tests
ran earlier, I test for the explanatory value of identity consensus after removing “Basic
Administration” from the list of independents to test for the impact of consensus on
identity through its impact on the other significant state dimension: the state’s
administrative capacity.
79
In non-OIC countries, when Basic Administration is taken out from the
independent variables, State Identity becomes more powerful predictor of the dependent
variable “Commitment to Democratic Institutions”. In OIC countries, when Basic
Administration is taken out, the significance and power of State Identity are either
unaffected, or reduced. These findings, presented in Table 3G.1, re-assert earlier findings
in this section; they suggest that in non-Muslim societies, consensus on state identity
affects the dependents via its effect on the administrative capacity of the state. In Muslim
societies, consensus on state identity affects the dependents directly. This, in turn,
solidifies my observation regarding the peculiar centrality of consensus on identity and
democracy in Muslim societies.
Table 3G.1
Model II linear Regression on State Identity and Commitment to Democratic Institutions
after removing Basic Administration from the list of independent variables
Muslim Countries(OIC)
Non-Muslim (non-OIC)
After Removing Basic
Before
After Removing
Before removing
Administration
removing other
other state
other state
state
dimensions
dimensions
dimensions
State Identity
.841**
.847**
.544**
.447*
Monopoly on
-.310
-.339
.053
-.502**
.264
.240
.650***
.343*
-1.470
-1.473
-2.469
-1.620
force
Economic
Status
OPEC
Note: ***p< 0.001; **p< 0.02; *p< 0.05
This chapter is dedicated to test the impact of consensus on state identity on
democracy within the wider effect of Statehood on democracy in all 129 countries,
80
Muslim countries, and non-Muslim countries. I hypothesized the following to be affected
by consensus on state identity and Statehood:
i)
Constitutional democracy as measured by the composite variable
“Democracy” (tested in section I)
ii)
Free/ Fair elections, government efficiency, freedom of expression, rights
of free assembly and association measured by the variable “Political
Participation”. Moreover, a separate analysis performed on the variables
“Free/ Fair Elections” and “Association/Assembly Rights” for their
centrality to the democratic process.
iii)
The degree of actors’ commitment to democratic institutions in light of a
non-zero sum game dynamics. This effect is measured by the variable
“Commitment to Democratic Institutions”.
These Findings Affirm My Earlier Findings In This Chapter; To Sum Up, I Argue
That:
1) State Identity is not only significant in predicting democracy, but also
significant in signaling dimensions of democracy that are hypothesized to be directly
affected by State Identity in all groups of countries.
2) In regards to these specific dimensions of democracy, the effect of state
identity differs significantly between members and non-members of the OIC; in Muslim
countries, consensus on identity remains the only predictor of dimensions of democracy
tested in this section. In non-Muslim countries, consensus on state identity explains these
dimensions through its effect on the administrative capacity of the state.
This, in turn, fortifies that 3) since the three dimensions of Statehood are
significant in explaining the composite “Democracy” in non-OIC; therefore, the indirect
effect of agreement on state identity in explaining the specific dimensions of democracy
in this section is consistent with earlier findings in this chapter. Section I elaborates that
in non-Muslim societies, all state dimensions explain the wider conceptualization of
democracy. Since identity is one, among other, dimensions signaling democracy in nonMuslim societies, its effect on the specific democratic dimensions in this section is
through its interaction with another state dimension, namely the administrative
dimension.
81
. Having said this, I propose that lack of consensus on state identity explains the
democratic deficit in Muslim Societies; this explanation is consistent with the effect of
consensus on state identity on democracy in the wider grouping of countries, and in nonMuslim countries. The only peculiarity to Muslim societies is that State Identity remains
the only state dimension that affects the composite variable “Democracy”; consistent
with this earlier finding, consensus on state identity directly affects the specific
dimensions of democracy tested in this section. In fact, consensus on state identity has,
consistently, been the only independent variable in explaining both the wider
conceptualization of democracy and its specific dimensions tested in this section.
Cohesion, defined as consensus on state identity, is, thus, the only significant dimension
in explaining all tested measures of democracy in this paper when tested in Muslim
countries
This last point is further discussed in the concluding chapter of this research;
however, it is enough to state here that empirical findings prove that consensus on
identity is instrumental in signaling democracy in all 129 countries examined, OIC
countries, and non-OIC countries. However, the statistical centrality of State Identity in
directly signaling dimensions of Democracy in OIC countries, compared to its effects in
non-OIC which are mediated by another state dimension, suggests that there is some
peculiar relation between identity and democracy in OIC countries. In this section, all
tests on non-OIC countries proved State Identity to be indirectly significant by
strengthening Statehood, or one component of it. In OIC countries, this impact on
democracy is not mediated, and thus, could be attributed to the direct effect of consensus
on Identity as a dimension of the state, and as a measure of cleavages. I present
complementary figures that replicate the tests after taking out Basic Administration
82
Chapter 6: Conclusion what is Different in Muslim Countries: Direction for Further
Research:
The concluding chapter of this thesis aims to pave the way for further research by
highlighting on its own findings. Moreover, it places its contribution within wider debates
on democratization, and especially, in the Muslim World. In this paper, I attribute two
meanings to state identity. First, I define cohesion by consensus on state identity; I argue
that a society is cohesive, and thus conducive to democracy, when individuals agree on
their collective identity expressed in the state. Second, I use state identity as one
dimension of Statehood. The modern “state” is a social construction that describes a
complex set of institutions and governing dynamics; I conceptualize the state to have
three different but related dimensions: the territorial, the administrative, and identity. In
this way, the two meanings attributed to state identity, cohesion and state dimension, are
conceptually different yet practically related.
Statehood is a structural setting that makes democracy possible; as statistically
elaborated, the three dimensions of the state explain the degree of democracy present in
all 129 countries of the Bertelsmann Transformation Index data. The best way to imagine
the impact of the three state dimensions on democracy is a matrix in which the three
dimensions interact to create the social construction we call “the state”. State identity,
however, is central to Statehood on two grounds; first, it is one dimension in this matrix;
second, its strength consolidates the other dimensions. Consensus on identity increases
the territorial integrity of the state; moreover, it crafts conditions under which the state
administration is clear on the social boundaries it serves. When there is agreement on the
identity of the state, rules and dynamics of administration are concretely crafted to serve
this social boundary.
Cohesion, on the other hand, is a societal characteristic that incline political actors
to resort to democracy in mitigating their different interests. All societies are divided
among one or the other lines; division lines do not necessarily rise from ethnic, linguistic,
or religious differences; in fact, lack of consensus on state identity appears in ethnically
homogenous societies. Consensus among different groups in society regarding their
collective identity facilitates democracy because a) lack of such consensus results in the
perception of a zero sum game, and in turn, the unwillingness of any group to accept the
83
potential loss in the democratic game. b) It decreases the readiness of any group to resort
to violence in settling political or social disputes.
In this way, I assert consensus on state identity to affect democracy in all
countries that are yet to achieve democracy; I moreover argue that the democratic deficit
in Muslim countries, having been part of these “yet to democratize” countries, is
explained by lack of consensus on state identity. This, however, is not to say that the
existence of cohesion and Statehood automatically results in democracy; as previously
discussed, this thesis problematizes the sequencing of Statehood and democracy.
Additionally, the existence of cases where a strong consensus on state identity is not
accompanied by an equivalent democratic status is telling of the non-path-dependent
relation between consensus on state identity and democracy. Consequently, this paper
suggests that the existence of consensus on state identity predicts the likelihood of higher
democratic status in any given polity; whether the existence of cohesion and Statehood
make democracy possible, or that democracy co-evolves with cohesion and Statehood,
the existence of identity consensus predicts an increased likability of democracy.
Nevertheless, statistical findings show that consensus on state identity maintains a
peculiar position in explaining democracy in Muslim countries, compared to non-Muslim
countries. Whereas in non-Muslim countries state identity signals democracy both
through its impact on the administrative capacity of the state and as one among other
Statehood dimensions; in Muslim countries, state identity remains the only predictor of
democracy. The next section expands on this point; in doing so, I delineate possible
direction of future research.
A) What is the Difference in Muslim Countries
This thesis critiques any essential link between religion and democracy; I follow
Stepan in criticizing any “assumption of univocality”, that is, a static view of religion that
does not consider the different voices within a single religion, and the different human
interpretations of their faiths141. As this thesis suggests, consensus on state identity affects
the level of democracy in all democratizers, regardless of the religious identity of their
141
Stepan, Alfred C. 2000. Religion, democracy, and the "twin tolerations". Journal of Democracy 11 (4):
40-42.
84
populations. Nevertheless, there seems to be a specific power and significance to the
relation between state identity and democracy in the Muslim World. Among all
Statehood dimensions, identity is the only predictor of democracy in the Muslim world;
despite that the administrative capacity of the state is similarly affected by consensus on
state identity in all countries and in the Muslim World, it remains insignificant in
signaling the status of democracy in Muslim societies. Moreover, the monopoly on the
use of force is negatively related to democracy if we control for all other state
dimensions; I suggest that the repressive capacity of the state is, thus, negatively related
to democracy if it does not reflect/ not accompanied by consensus on identity and
efficient administration. Indeed, the state’s capacity to use violence remains one of the
main tactics for the survival of authoritarianism. Interestingly, this relation is
insignificant in Muslim countries; this, in turn, further crystallizes the peculiarity of
conditions signaling democracy in these societies.
Free and fair elections, association rights, and more generally political participation
on one hand, and equal access to resources among actors, and commitment to democratic
institutions on the other, are all characteristics of democracy and are all likely to find in
cohesive societies within a consolidated state. In non-Muslim societies, the administrative
capability of the state is the strongest predictor of each of those dimensions of
democracy. State identity, thus, indirectly predicts those processes via its effect on the
ability of the state to carry out its administrative functions on a clearly defined territory.
If, on the other hand, consensus on identity is not accompanied by a strong
administration, it becomes insignificant in signaling those dimensions of democracy,
albeit being significant in signaling the more complete measure of democracy reflected in
BTI’s composite variable “Democracy”. The administrative capacity of the state is,
however, not solely the effect of consensus on identity; despite the fact that consensus on
identity indicates the likelihood of a strong administrative state, it remains a partial
explanation for such strength; in fact, efficient administration is affected by many
processes, only one of which, is consensus on identity.
In light of this argument, I assert that all ways in which consensus on state identity is
hypothesized to affect democracy apply to non-Muslim countries: 1) cohesion signals
democracy, 2) Statehood affects democracy, 3) state identity is a dimension of Statehood,
85
and thus, affects democracy, and 4) identity affects other dimensions of Statehood (Basic
Administration), and in turn, democracy. In testing for the impact of identity consensus
on the specific dimensions of democracy, the relation between state identity and these
dimensions in non- Muslim countries is as follows: 1) cohesion affects administration,
and in turn, dimensions of democracy, 2) Statehood affects democracy through its
administrative dimension 3) state identity, as a state dimension, affects administrative
capacity, and in turn, Statehood and dimensions of democracy.
In Muslim countries, other dimensions of Statehood seem insignificant in signaling
democracy and identity remains the only predictor of both the composite measurement of
democracy and the specific dimensions tested in this thesis. This means that the
democratization process is primarily dependent on agreement on identity; in Muslim
societies, the administrative capacity of the state does not lead to higher levels of
democracy. Unlike non-Muslim countries, the challenge to democracy in Muslim
countries does not entail weak administrative state structures; also, it does not stem from
the problematic of the state’s repressive capacity; in fact, anecdotal evidence from the
Arab heartland of Muslim World suggests that weak state administration and monopoly
on violence hardly explain the democratic deficit in these countries. Moreover, almost all
challenges to state authority comes in light of disputes regarding the identity of the state.
Years of electoral difficulties in countries like Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, recently
electoral experiences in Congo, and others, revolve around identity disputes. Even when
the state lacked the monopoly on the use of force or the administrative capacity to run
elections, it was a direct manifestation of identity disputes that motivated political actors
to resort to violence and diluted the state’s capacity to govern. Similar dynamics apply to
other tested dimensions.
This peculiarity does not suggest an essential link between Islam and identity
disputes; nevertheless, it fuels academic interest in examining the potential relation of
certain interpretations of Islam and identity. In fact, many scholars are occupied by
examining the role of Islam in identity formation, and in state building.142 These works,
142
See William L. Cleveland, and Martin P. Bunton. 2013. A history of the modern middle east. refer also
to: Nader Hashemi. Islam, Secularism, and Liberal Democracy toward a Democratic Theory for Muslim
Societies. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. For more on Islam and identity see: Kemal H. Karpat.
86
however, lack the conceptual linking between the different roles of Islam in identity and
state formation, their relation to identity consensus, and in turn, to democracy. On the
contrary, literature tackling democratization in the Muslim World focuses on the
receptivity of Islam to democracy. As discussed at the opening chapter of this thesis,
some scholars advocate an understanding of Islam as a non-static religion that is open to
human interpretation.
On this notice, scholars attempt to take the question regarding Islam’s relation to
democracy to another level of conceptualization. I follow Bayat’s suggestion to consider
under which conditions Muslims make Islam receptive/alien to democracy. Like all
societies, Muslim societies sometimes enjoy characteristics conducive to democracy, and
some other times alien to democracy. I have proved that, similar to the case in all other
democratizing countries, lack of consensus on state identity explains democratic deficit in
Muslim countries. Nevertheless, since identity is the only state dimension that explains
the democratic status of Muslim countries, I can confidently assert that, currently,
democratization in Muslim societies is primarily dependent on addressing problems
regarding consensus on state identity and cohesion. Since the Muslim World remains
primarily autocratic, more research is needed to investigate whether prevalent forms of
Islam are responsible for the agreement-on-identity deficit in the Muslim World.
These investigations are, moreover, needed in light of 1) the historical trajectory of
identity disputes in Muslim societies, and 2) in light of the current situation in the Arab
World, the heartland of Muslim societies. In many episodes in the historical trajectories
of Muslim countries, Islam has been an important faction in identity disputes; in the Arab
World, Islam remains one of the major fields on which identity battles are fought. In fact,
most groups questioning state identity in Arab countries are groups that proclaim Islam as
an identity. Again, this is not to say that there is a necessary link between Islam and
identity disputes; neither is it to put forth a policy recommendation suggesting that the
elimination of “Islamic” groups in the region is a requisite for democratization. In fact,
identity politics in the Arab World is among the most complicated academic and policy
issues in the region. Accordingly, this thesis, rather, asserts that there are statistical and
2001. The Politicization of Islam Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and Community in the Late Ottoman
State. New York: Oxford University Press.
87
anecdotal evidences that fuels interest in examining the relation, if any exists, between
current strands of Islam and identity disputes in a cross-national comparative analyses.
The second reason for the ardent need of these investigations comes as a consequence
of the current situation in the post-”Spring” Arab World. In the aftermath of the Arab
Spring, identity politics surfaced the battles of transition. In Egypt and Tunisia, the
identity dispute is, as conceptualized in this thesis, beyond the scope of religious or ethnic
differences; lack of consensus on state identity in those countries primarily revolves
around the role of religion in public, social, and political spheres. On the contrary, in
Syria, Bahrain, and Libya, the identity dispute remains a combination of sectorial
disputes among Sunni-Shi’a lines, and disputes regarding the acknowledgement of the
state as the legitimate power center. The last point is complicated further by the existence
of extremist groups that question the very conceptual and territorial bases of Statehood.
In all Arab countries, the lack of identity agreement remains one of the central
challenges to democratization on two grounds in line with the hypotheses of this thesis.
The first is the challenge to Statehood, the second is a polarized political game
characterized by a zero sum dynamics in which, for example, the winning of the Muslim
Brothers in Syria results in a direct irreconcilable loss for Al Assad regime and the Shi’ite
population. A wide variety of literature tackles the identity manifestation of Islam’s
evolution in different societies; some strands of these works are found in post-colonial,
state building, modernization, and historical analyses literatures on Muslim countries.
Nevertheless, what is missing is the linkage between Islam’s effect on identity, and its
consequent effect on democracy in light of findings presented in this paper.
B) Bridging Agency and Structural Approaches to Democratization
Literature on democratization has been divided along structural and agency
approaches to the understanding of the process of democratic transition and
consolidation. On the structural side, some scholars highlight the impact of economic
trajectories on the emergence of democracy. For example, Barrington Moore examines
the structure of transformation on part of the peasantry and aristocracy and different paths
eight societies took in the transformation from agrarian to industrial societies.
Democracy, in his view, is explained on the basis of the social and political structural
transformations that were led by key collective actors (Land-lords) in crafting the
88
dynamics of democracy143. Stephens et al argue that contrary to what Moore maintains, it
is the weakening of the landed upper class and the strengthening of the subordinate
classes and worker that resulted in the development of democracy 144 . In this view,
democracy was the outcome of the contradictory nature of capitalism; it was not the
capitalist class that crafted democratic dynamics; rather it is the working classes that put
forward the vehicle of democratic transitions. Slightly drifting away from the narrow
causality between economic development and democracy, Tatu Vanhanen emphasizes
that democracy takes place when the economic resources are widely distributed that it
produces power dispersion. This power dispersion is not only a function of economic
dispersion, but also a function of intellectual and educational dispersion and
urbanization145. Other scholars emphasize the structural requisites of democracy; Lipset
argues that there exist social requisites for democracy; those requisites do not necessarily
rule out the existence of deviant cases; nevertheless, he argues that that structural
requisite commonly exists with democracy146. Economic development, industrialization,
and urbanization are among key configurations that appear with democracy. Other
scholars, as extensively discussed in this paper, emphasize the importance of Statehood
structure in the emergence of democracy147. This thesis, in fact, verifies the centrality of
the state for the emergence and consolidation of democracy.
In contradistinction to literature dealing with structural explanations of democracy,
agent-based explanations to democracy focus on actors’ choices and dynamics of
deliberation between political actors in explaining democratization. Some scholars focus
143
Barrington Moore. 1969. Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the making
of the Modern World. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.
144
Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber, and John D. Stephens Ph.D. 1992. Capitalist Development and
Democracy. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 272-3. For another alternative view of economic explanations for
democracy check Michael Ross. 2001. Does Oil Hinder Democracy. World Politics.
145
Tatu Vanhanen. 1997. Prospects Of Democracy. New York: Routledge. For more on the economic
explanations for democracy check Anthony Downs. 1957, An Economic theory of Democracy. Also check
Stephens and Kaufmann. 1995. The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions, Princeton University
Press.
146
Martin Lipset. 1959. "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political
Legitimacy." The American Political Science Review 53: 72-75. For more on structural factors, see Barbara
Geddes. 1999. What Do We Know About Democratization after Twenty Years?. Annual Review of Political
Science.
147
Check earlier discussion on Statehood and democracy. scholars like Snyder emphasize the state as a
prerequisite to democracy.
89
on the negotiation between opposition and incumbents that result in democratization148.
Others investigate the process of democratization by constructing a game-theoretic model
to investigate under which conditions different actors negotiate democratization 149 . In
some of their works, scholars such as Prezworski and Nancy Bermeo argue that whereas
structural factors are important in democratic transition, they are not to be regarded as
determinants to the outcome; they, rather, emphasize the role of perception on part of
relevant groups in the transition process. In their view, elite choices are instrumental in
signaling a successful transition; consequently, they investigate under which conditions
different actors perceive democracy as a desired outcome150. In this thesis, I articulate
that lack of cohesion, defined as lack of consensus on state identity, motivates different
actors to perceive democracy as an existential threat in political settings characterized by
a zero sum dynamic. In this way, findings equally contribute to actor based approaches in
signaling democracy.
One of the seminal works to this thesis is that of Dankwart Rustow. In Transition to
Democracy, Rustow strikes a middle ground between agent-based and structural
explanations to democratization. He argues that the only structural precondition to
democracy is national unity. In cases where this precondition is met, actors’ deliberate
choices to resort to democracy in mitigating different interests become the driving force
of the democratization process. This research deliberately employs a dual understanding
of consensus on state identity: cohesion and Statehood dimension; in this fashion, I argue
that consensus on state identity is bridges structural and actor based approaches to
democratization. Cohesion, defined as consensus on state identity, motivates actors to
resort to democracy in mitigating their different interests. Statehood, on the other hand, is
a structural factor that facilitates the emergence of democracy.
Having said this, my suggestion for further research of Muslim countries should take
in consideration this dual role of consensus on state identity. Moreover, further research
on democratization, in Muslim and non-Muslim countries, is eagerly needed to tease out
the effects of cohesion (actors decision) and Statehood (Structure) in light of consensus
148
Alfred Stepan. 1997. Democratic Opposition and Democratization Theory. Government and Opposition.
An example to this line of theorization is found in Josep Colomer. 2000. Strategic Transitions. Game
Theory and Democratization.
150
Nancy Bermeo. 1997. Myths of Moderation. Comparative Politics. Adam Prezworski. 1986. “Some
Problems in the Study of Transition”.
149
90
on state identity. Finally, this thesis is concerned with formal democracy and agreement
on identity as manifested in the state; this comes in light of the importance of statehood to
formal democracy. More research is needed to test the effect of consensus on identity,
whether manifested formally in consensus on state identity, or informally in tacit identity
agreements, on both formal democracy, and informal democratic deliberations.
91
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