When you write your paper, make sure you have a strong thesis statement. Your introduction should
include the thesis statement and a brief explanation of how you want to argue for it. Since the main
issue in this paper is whether or not a robot can have a mind, it might be a good idea to consider how
you stand on this question. If you think machines can’t have minds, then that’s your thesis: “No, I don’t
believe a robot like David has a mind”. Or, you might believe that indeed he does; then that’s your
thesis.
Once you have decided where you stand, you have to explain why. That is, you have to give your
reasons. This is the most difficult part of the paper, because you have to present a coherent argument.
Here is one way to approach it:
Take a look at what you thought about the mental capabilities listed on p. 127 and how you answered
the questions about David in the AI movie. The way you answered those questions will to some extent
determine where you stand on the issue.
Look at the different theories of minds we have discussed so far. Which ones of these are compatible
with the idea that machines could have minds? Go back to the part of chapter six that deals with
dualism and check it out. Do Cartesian substance dualists believe that machines can be conscious? No,
the part of human beings that has consciousness is not the body or the grey matter that is the brain; it’s
the soul or the mind. Human beings are the only machines that are conjoined with a mind. Humans are
machines + mind. A machine that has not been endowed with a mind by the creator is just a machine.
However, also notice that this position means that animals don’t have minds. Is this consistent with your
beliefs about animals?
Then check the identity theory. According to the identity theory the mind and the brain is the same
thing. Since David doesn’t have a brain, he can’t have a mind either.
That leaves behaviorism and functionalism. Since behaviorists believe that having a mind simply
amounts to being disposed to certain behavioral responses when being submitted to specific stimuli, it
seems David could conceivably have a mind. Since functionalists believe that having a mind is basically
to have specific input/output or cause/effect relations between environmental input, mental states, and
behavioral output in a cognitive system; it is entirely possible that such a system can be implemented in
a machine. If the system simulates the functional states of the human mind, then the machine has a
mind. The machine is running the “mind-program”. So, in order to defend your thesis that a robot can’t
have a mind you have to show that behaviorism and functionalism are false. How do you do that?
You go back to the book and look for arguments that are supposed to refute behaviorism and
functionalism. Check out the part of chapter six that discusses behaviorism, maybe you can find some
strong objections to behaviorism. In class, we talked about somebody who is incapable of feeling pain
because of a neurophysiologic condition, but has meticulously learned how to mimic pain behavior in
the situations when normal people feel pain. You can use this case to construct the following modus
tollens argument:
1) IF behaviorism were true, THEN it would be impossible for somebody to have a disposition for
pain behavior without being in pain.
2) The Pain Pretender shows that this is indeed conceivable.
3) Therefore: behaviorism is false
If you are skeptical about David having a mind, this experiment probably speaks to one of the worries
you have: he could very well be constructed to display all the outwards signs of being in pain, but not
feel anything at all.
Functionalism might face similar difficulties. Look at page 148 in the book under “Arguments against
functionalism.” One of the arguments concern “Problems With Qualia. The argument deploys a thought
experiment concerning an inverted spectrum. The point of the thought experiment is to make it clear
that even if two cognitive systems (minds) where in the exact same functional state (similar
input/output relations between states of the system) they could experience the world in vastly different
ways, or not experience any qualia at all. The thought experiment could be used in this argument:
1) IF functionalism were true, then anything that has similar functional organization would have
identical minds.
2) But as the inverted spectrum shows, it is not the case that anything that has the same functional
organization would have identical minds.
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Therefore: Functionalism is false
Now you have shown that the remaining two candidates, behaviorism and functionalism, won’t suffice
(a third option could be eliminative materialism). You could then add additional support for your
position by endorsing one of the arguments on p. 148. So, even if David behaves the right way and all
the circuits in his chips are functionally equivalent to the mental states in a person, for all that, David is
not a conscious being because he doesn’t feel anything. He is, as the ringmaster at the Flesh Fair
proclaims, a simulator, a tinker toy, a living doll. Therefore, you should bite the bullet and admit that
destroying David might be wasteful or distasteful, but beyond that there is nothing morally wrong with
the Flesh Fair.
The structure of your paper would look like this:
Intro: I will argue that machines can’t have minds because both dualism and identity theory denies it
and there are compelling counterexamples to behaviorism and functionalism.
1st paragraph: dualism and identity theory are incompatible with machines being conscious
2nd paragraph: behaviorism is false.
3rd paragraph: functionalism is false.
4th paragraph: explain why you endorse, for example, argument 3 on p. 148
Conclusion: David the robot is a mindless machine. Therefore, it is not a person and it’s not immoral to
destroy it.
If, on the other hand, you wish to defend AI, or the idea that a robot could have a mind, then you would
have to explain how dualism and the identity theory fall short and how functionalism, behaviorism, or
eliminative materialism can account for the mental capabilities of a robot. Finally, you would have to
explain why the arguments on p. 148 against AI are unsound and why the Flesh Fair is morally
repugnant.
The structure of the paper would be:
Intro: I will argue that machines can have minds because either functionalism or behaviorism support it
and there are compelling counterexamples to identity theory and substance dualism.
1st paragraph: functionalism and behaviorism are compatible with machines being conscious
2nd paragraph: substance dualism is false.
3rd paragraph: identity theory is false.
4th paragraph: explain why the arguments on arguments on p. 165 are unsound.
Conclusion: David the robot has enough mental capabilities to be considered a person and it’s immoral
to destroy it.