CHURCHLAND 3:
FUNCTIONALISM (317-321)
FUNCTIONALISM:
MIND =
INFORMATION PROCESSING
FUNCTIONALISM
1] Metaphysical basis of
Cognitive Science
2] Functional objects/concepts:
chair, heart, wing, Beethoven’s 5th
3] Main metaphor (from computing):
mind/brain = software/hardware
translation: mind relates to brain
as software relates to hardware
1. Heir to Behaviorism
(p. 317,see pp. 309-11 for behaviorism)
Behaviorism:
1) Stimulus 2) Response
Functionalism:
1) environmental effects [stimulus]
+ 2)other mental states 
3) bodily behavior
2. Functional Isomorphism (pp317-18)
[Functionalism accommodates
Multiple Instantiation]
Animal, alien (or computer) made of
different substance than we are could
have same mental state/s as us, if
s/he (it) has state/s with same
function.
[Think of chairs/stoves/etc. made of very
different materials with different designs.]
3. Essence of mental (p. 318 top left)
What makes a mind a mind is
its function—not its substance.
[Core idea:
each type of
mental state/process/ability/etc.
is some sort of
information state/process/ability/etc.]
4. Token Identity Materialism (p. 318)
[type/token = kind/instance]
Type identities:
H2O = water
mind = brain;
consciousness = brain process
Token identities: that chair = steel structure
this mind = this brain
that mind = that computer
this pain = this brain process
that pain = that hydraulic process
5. Methodological Autonomy (p. 318)
Just as Software Engineering
(design and construction of software)
is distinct from Computer Engineering
(design and construction of computer)
So too
Psychology (study of brain function)
is distinct (hence autonomous) from
Neuroscience (study of brain biology,
chemistry, physics, etc.)
Arguments against Functionalism
1. Inverted Qualia Argument (318-19)
Qualia = qualities of consciousness
Red may look to me like green looks to
you, etc., though we both call red
“red” (are functionally identical).
Different qualia may have same
function, so functionalism is
incomplete: it does not tell us what
each other’s experience is like.
Arguments against Functionalism
2. Absent Qualia Argument (319-20)
If we built a robot that was functionally like a
human, how do we know it has any qualia
at all?
Suppose, for instance, the robot was
controlled by a building full of experts via a
radio link—are we really to think that
somehow the robot (+ experts) actually has
(have) consciousness?
“ZOMBIES”
Arguments against Functionalism
3. Species Specific Identities (320-21).
Temperature is a single property that is
instantiated differently in a solid, a liquid, a
gas, or a vacuum. BUT there are still type
identities:
e.g, temp in a gas =
mean kinetic molecular energy
By Analogy: perhaps
Consciousness in a human = brain process