Fourth World Congress for Middle Eastern Studies, Ankara, Turkey
Panel: Youth and Political Participation
Politics of the Middle East: "Youth and Political Generations"
Zeyad Mohamed Elkelani
August 21, 2014
14:30 – 16:30, FZ09
"Political Generations in Post-Revolutionary Egypt:
Inter/Intra Generational Differences"
Since the fall of the Soviet Union, democratic form of governance has
prevailed to be the faultless political system that ought to be followed everywhere.
Regardless of the subsequent worldwide sweeping wave of democratization, the
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) mystified scholars resisting any prospect for
change. The Arab Spring however proved the faultiness of the predominant
conceptions on the region's anomaly. Thus, an overwhelming wave of scholarly
review occupied Middle East theorists with a special interest in Arab politics. For the
failure of methodological lenses offered by conventional social procedures of inquiry,
a rising shift towards "low-politics" is taking place since the 2011 historic events.1
Moreover, the 2011 Uprising gave a special attention to the uniqueness of
youth who triggered such unprecedented change. It was for Tarik Yousef and Navtej
Dhillon in 2009 who first criticized the predominant "dichotomies of MENA studies"
that focused on democratization, anomaly of its Islamic culture, and economic
hardships, while less attention was assigned to discover the evolving generational
puzzle in the region who at the same timing mobilized the Arab Uprisings
1
Fawaz Gerges, "Introduction: A Rupture," The New Middle East: Protest and Revolution in the Arab
World, Fawaz Gerges (editor), first edition, New York, Cambridge University Press pp.20-21.
2
afterwards.2 In late 2009, Fahmy Hweidy on the light of a hostile sports competition
between Egypt and Algeria noted that a new generation of Egyptians is apearing.
3
Hewidy inducted the concept of "Neo-Egyptians" representing young Egyptians who
hold a different value system in regard to older Egyptians. Regardless of his negative
understanding of the shared attitudes among Neo-Egyptians and not predicting the
prospects of mass uprising afterwards, the study of new generations in the region was
far under researched at that time.

Abstract:
In the light of such "milestone event", new venues for fieldwork and data-
collection are opening away of the censorship of Arab authoritarian institutions such
as the Central Agency for public mobilization and Statistics (CAPMS) in Egypt.4
Similarly, Mark Tessler in Public Opinion in the Middle East showed that empirical
survey research is the missing dimension in studying the MENA for many years 5.
Now, scholars can be in the actual habitat of their interest to study people's attitudes
and orientations without barriers. Accordingly, this paper is one part of it. It aims the
scientific accumulation of knowledge on "the youth" of MENA focusing on Egypt
who catalyzed the fall down of Mubarak. It tracks trends of change/ stability among
political generations' attitudes in more than two decades starting in 1988 until the
2
Navtej Dhillon and Tarik Yousef, "Introduction," Generation in Waiting: The Unfulfilled Promise of
Young People in the Middle East, Navtej Dhillon and Tarik Yousef (eds.)Washington, DC: The
Brookings Institution, 2009, pp. 1-10.
3
Fahmy Hewidy, Neo-Egyptians, Aljazeera Website, January 5th 2010,
http://www.aljazeera.net/opinions/pages/10e96716-7fee-452c-9491-bc715381150f, retrived April 27,
2014.
4
Professor Dr. Bahgat Korany coined the Concept of "milestone events" as reference to the 2011
Uprisings.
5
Mark Tessler, "Introduction: Public Opinion Research in the Arab and Muslim Middle East," Public
Opinion in the Middle East: Survey Research and the Political Orientations of Ordinary Citizens,
Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 2011, pp. 1-2.
3
Arab Uprising of 2011. This complicated task is done through utilizing different data
sets with inter-mixed methodologies to identify the public's attitudes that might help
to ultimately the direction of transition in Egypt and MENA in general.
Building on the earlier enumeration of the limited conception of "HighPolitics" in Middle East politics inquiry, this paper is trying to shed the light on
ground interactions of "Low-Politics" that triggered the 2011 milestone events. It
considers the "individual" as its focal base of inquiry, focusing on attitudes as its main
unit of analysis. Moreover, this paper is based on the enduring history of euro-centric
scholarship of generational attitudes among sociological and psychological
investigation that aims to explain social and political evolution.
Accordingly, this paper is employing the "impressionable years" hypothesis
that stress on the existence of a certain political generations among birth cohorts who
witness the same political salient events in their "formative years" between the ages of
(18-25). Such attitudes remain identifiable regardless any later political effects. This
hypothesis assumes the stability of attitudes among the same generation based on their
formative experience they had. This can help scholars of MENA to test the special
consideration they assume of youth.
Consequently, this paper aims at detecting the inter/intra generational
differences with regard to changing socio-economic and political settings in the last
two decades prior to the Egyptian uprising of 2011 and after wards. It starts by
identifying the validity of the "generations" as a conceptual unit of analysis with its
underlying limitations. Moreover, the nature of salient events that shaped generations
in Egypt. In addition, this paper identifies statistically the generational replacements
within two decades in Egypt regarding attitudes on political preferences, religion,
4
democracy, social values, and trust in institutions. Finally, this paper provides a
comparative overview of generations in MENA as a whole.

Generations in Theory:
-
Youth as Analytical Tool:
In the attempt to understand the distinctiveness of the current youth in MENA,
a theoretical question needs to be posted on the validity of the "Youth Category" as a
unit of analysis and its relation to age cohorts and generations. Recent literature on the
region holds dissimilar standpoints regarding the convenience of such theoretical lens.
Bahgat Korany and Rabab El Mahdi in The Arab Spring: Revolution and Beyond
noted the importance of the youth phenomenon adopting a social movements theory
(SMT) which encompasses mobilization, political opportunity structure (POS), and
framing.6 Similarly, Emma Murphy in Problematizing Arab Youth argued that the
"Youth" could be best understood through the "generations," which is a basic
manifestation of the failed Arab states, while regarding them as distinct category from
older age cohorts for their ability to network and express their opinions through new
means of technology.7 On the other hand, John Chalcraft rejected the "exclusive"
linkage between Arab Uprisings and category youth, while undermining the role of
new forms of social media such as "Facebook" in agitating these mass uprisings.8 In
the same line, Kastrinou Theodoropoulou in A Different Struggle for Syria argued that
using youth as analytical unit is of no theoretical significance as it renders different
6
Bahgat Korany and Rabab El-Mahdi , "Introduction," Arab Spring in Egypt: Revolution and Beyond,
Bahgat Korany and Rabab El-Mahdi (editors), Cairo and New York, The American University in Cairo
Press, 2012, pp. 10-13.
Emma Murphy, “Problematizing Arab Youth: Generational Narratives of Systemic Failure,”
Mediterranean Politics Vol. 17, No. 1, 2012, pp. 7-9.
7
John Chalcraft, "Egypt’s 25 January Uprising, Hegemonic Contestation, and the Explosion of the
Poor," The New Middle East: Protest and Revolution in the Arab World, Op.Cit., pp. 161-165.
8
5
types of resistance and struggle into a nominal holistic building unit.9 Despite of the
earlier conceptions on youth, scholars agreed on the distinct nature of the young in
relation to earlier cohorts in terms of international exposure and usage of technology.
Thus, this paper argues for the value of the category "youth" as unit of analysis that
can help in understand the political phenomenon in MENA.
-
Generation, Age, and Time:
The dispute over the specific age bracket that includes the category of youth is
far from reaching a solution. According to international institutions working in
MENA such as Population Council which conducted the Survey of Young People in
Egypt (SYPE), defines this ambiguous category to include those between the ages of
(15-29).10 On the Other hand, this paper follows Mannheim's conception of the
youth's formative years to be between the ages of (18-25), whereas the individual
transcends to the adulthood phase, and starts facing reality. Another important
connotation is the role of time in understanding generations in MENA. This paper
argues in the same line with Lisa Wedeen's commencement on "Abstract Time" that is
characterized by its homogenous nature to be universal in the face of any specific
events, which is different from concrete time of the normal clock watch.11
More importantly, generations are not only function of time. Generations as
defined age brackets indicate the relative importance of particular context that the
abstract time serves describe it, manifesting socio-political developments with
Kastrinou Theodoropoulou, “A Different Struggle for Syria: Becoming Young in the Middle East,”
Mediterranean Politics Vol. 17, No. 1, 2012, pp. 60-61.
9
10
SYPE 2009 Final Report, The population Council Website,
www.popcouncil.org/uploads/pdfs/2010PGY_SYPEFinalReport.pdf, Retrived April 27, 2014.
11
Lisa Wedeen, "Introduction," Peripheral Visions: Publics, Power, and Performance in Yemen,
Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2008, pp. 7-8.
6
remarkable effects on one's perception of reality.
12
Moreover, generations and
generational differences can be only understood in relations to other age cohorts and
in the abundance of a time-series data over long period of time, since age and time are
abstractly indistinguishable at any historical moment.13
Furthermore, the role of generations and age is related to socialization and
political learning.14 Cultural theories attribute generational attitudes to early life
socialization, regarding such premier experiences to shape later phases of one's life.
On the other hand, institutional theory questions the cultural assumption of the
exclusivity of epochs to a creation cohort, as institutional theorist argues that major
formal changes and decisions to affect different generations, not only those who
witnessed it. Other theorists, argues that individuals vary even if they belong to the
same age cohort based on different stratifiers such as economic interests, membership
to a certain group or class, thus there is no fixed generations attitudes.
-
The Impressionable Years Hypothesis:
Karl Mannheim in his seminal article "The problem of Generations" on
generational singularity argued that political generations came to existence through
historical-social process of socialization.15 He proposed that generation units hold
similar attitudes and values through the exposure to salient events during their
formative years. This hypothesis was further coined by the efforts of Theodore
12
William Mishler and Richard Rose, "Generation, Age, and Time: The Dynamics of Political
Learning during Russia’s Transformation," American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 51, No. 4,
October 2007, p. 823.
13
Conclusion derived from a discussion with Professor Dr. Bahgat Korany.
14
William Mishler and Richard Rose, Op. Cit., pp. 824-825.
15
Karl Mannheim, "The Problem of Generations," in Paul Kecskemeti, ed., Essays on the sociology of
Knowledge, London, Rutledge and Kegan Paul, 1952, pp. 281-310.
7
Newcomb and Norman Ryder based on Mannheim's earlier explanation.16 Newcomb
and Ryder argued that individuals of the same birth cohorts aging between 18 and 25
years old in their formative years are most likely to share potentially the same
political attitudes if witnessed a salient political event. Thus, this particular age cohort
represents a distinctive political generation, and probably differs than other
generations.
Regardless the importance of this proposition, criticism was raised regarding
the underlying rationale of the continuity of the age cohort attitudes throughout its
member's life span. Howard Schuman and others conclude the role of generations in
attitudes' analysis holding it to fluctuate during youth time, then enters stability stage
afterwards, thus not completely supporting the earlier proposition on attitudes stability
among birth cohorts.17 Accordingly, Ronald Inglehart and Wayne Baker stress on the
weight of attitudes and memories on salient political events in early adulthood that is
likely to persist after fluctuations to form certain characteristics of a given political
generation.18
-
Salient Events:
Empirical research does fully not to support the "Impressionable years"
hypothesis. David Sears and Nicholas Valentino argued that the cohort attitudes are
products of complicated factors related to socialization and environment, where
16
Norman B. Ryder, "The Cohort as a Concept in the Study of Social Change," American Sociological
Review, 30, 1965, pp. 849-855.
17
Howard Schuman and Amy D. Corning, "Collective Knowledge of Public Events: The Soviet Era
from the Great Purge to Glasnost," American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 105, No. 4 (Jan., 2000), pp.
933-946.
18
Ronald Inglehart and Wayne E. Baker , "Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persistence of
Traditional Values, "American Sociological Review, Vol. 65, No. 1, (Feb., 2000), pp. 19-34.
.
8
political events might not be that influential in shaping groups' attitudes.19 In the same
line, Michael Shanahan suggests that various environmental conditions such as race,
religion and economic status, lead to "intra-cohort" changes within the same
generation.20 Other studies limit the probability of the cohort effects to actually frame
individuals' attitudes over life span, suggesting the lifelong openness model to explain
the non-uniformity among political generation attitudes owing it to the minimal effect
of political events per se on attitude-shaping.
Moreover, other scholars noted that such significant political events that can
shape generational attitudes are actually historically rare. Nicholas Danigelis and
others found that not all political events could be recognized as salient to actually add
to the coining of political attitudes among certain age cohorts.21 In the same line, Kent
Jennings tackled the nature of salient political events, relating its effect on its
"visibility" for a certain birth cohort in their formative years.22. Therefore, Inglehart
and others highlighted the need for careful cross-sectional analysis with intergenerational analysis as inter-cohort differences is more present in advanced countries
more than the developing countries, due to the unstable political circumstances they
pass through leaving no space for salient political events, as many can be considered
so.23
19
David O. Sears and Nicholas A. Valentino, "Politics Matters: Political Events as Catalysts for
Preadult Socialization, "The American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 1 (Mar., 1997), pp. 4855.
20
M. Kent Jennings, Political Knowledge Over Time and Across Generations," The Public Opinion
Quarterly, Vol. 60, No. 2 (Summer, 1996), pp. 228-252.
21
Nicholas L. Danigelis, Melissa Hardy and Stephen J. Cutler , "Population Aging, Intracohort Aging,
and Sociopolitical Attitudes," American Sociological Review, Vol. 72, No. 5 (Oct., 2007), pp. 812-825.
22
M. Kent Jennings, "Residues of a Movement: The Aging of the American Protest Generation," The
American Political Science Review, Vol. 81, No. 2 (Jun., 1987), pp. 367-372.
23
Ronald Inglehart and Wayne E. Baker , Op. Cit. pp. 30-34.
9

-
Research Puzzle:
Research Questions:
The paper's research questions are developed within the limited variables
derived from the available data sets. Research questions and hypotheses treat age
cohorts as a focal explanatory function of political, religious, and social attitudes of
Egyptian generations within the scope of research:
-
Is there an emerging political generation in post-revolutionary Egypt that
represents a separation from earlier generations?
-
What is the degree of "consistency" versus "fragmentation" in such emerging
generation, if exists?
-
How political generations in Egypt differ in direction and magnitude?
-
To what extent political generations are homogenous or heterogeneous in the
MENA region?
-
Research Hypotheses:
According to the "Impressionable Years" thesis, a political generation to come
to existence when shared events are witnessed at formative years of the audience
between the age of 18 and 25. Other, there is the "lifelong openness model"
suggesting that attitude change is a primary function occurs during different life
stages due to complex circumstances.24 In addition, the fact of shared attitudes among
a certain birth cohort is contested, that a generational divides or "intra-generational
difference" might occur perceiving the same salient political event. In addition,
following generations who witness altered events share not the same attitudes that
compose "inter-generational replacements." This paper is trying to examine such
propositions thoroughly. This paper adopts the following hypotheses:
24
Mark Tessler, Op. Cit., P. 76.
10
1- The impressionable years hypothesis: "same attitudes over time"
H.o: The collective attitudes and orientations of a certain birth cohort remain the same
over time.
Age cohort (18-25) at 1988 = Age Cohort (41-48) at 2011
2- Intra-generational difference: "change in attitudes"
Age Cohort (18-25) at 1988 differs from Age Cohort (41-48) at 2011
H.1: Collective attitudes and orientations change due to external and internal
conditions for the same birth cohort.
3- (Inter-Generational Replacements): "different attitudes"
Age Cohort (18-25) at 1988 ≠ Age Cohort (41-48) at 2011
H.2: Change in orientations and attitudes occur among different cohorts at the same
point of time due exposure to different salient events.

Data and its Limitations:
The proposed hypothesis are examined at two points of time (1988 and 2011)
to increase the confidence in the statistical operations done. Mark Tessler of and
Jamal Al-Suwaidi collected such date in Egypt and Kuwait in mid-1980.25 The
method of collecting data is face-to-face interviews providing individual–level
variables on issues of religion and politics. The Egyptian sample includes 295 adults
in Cairo representing the nature of the Egyptian society with respect to gender,
education, and socio-economic status. It includes Muslim men and women
25
"Carnegie Middle East Governance and Islam Dataset, 1988-2010", The Association of Religion
Data Archives, http://www.thearda.com/Archive/Files/Descriptions/CARNEGIE.asp, retrieved May 1,
2014.
11
representing active, adult, and urban population. This dataset is part of the Carnegie
Middle East Governance and Islam Dataset, 1988-2010 published in 2012.26
The second and most recent dataset carried out by Professor Gamal Soltan and
Ahmed Nagy Qamha of Al-Ahram Center of Political and Strategic studies in Cairo
as a part of the second wave of the Arab Barometer project in collaboration with the
Arab Reform Initiative conducted in 11 different Arab Countries.27 It was conducted
in June 2011 across 22 different Egyptian governorates including 1220 respondents.
The results were weighted carefully with margin of error ranging between (+3 and -3).
-
Limitations:
The paper is restricted by the limited available variables in the two datasets in
possession. Thus, limited numbers of questions are repeated across the surveys over
time. Moreover, the number of cases is not unified over the two datasets, as 295 at
1988 and 1220 at 2011; therefore, a margin of error is likely to be present. Moreover,
the age bracket in the 1988 data set are already assigned by the conductors of the
survey to be (less than 20) and between (20-29), thus a shift in the 2011 age category
is made to keep the 20 years difference to be between (41-48). Finally, the wording of
questions is different between the two datasets except in few cases that actually have
the same wording used over this period.

Methodology:
Holding the age cohorts (18-25) and (41-48) as an independent variable in
both datasets, this paper aims to identify the plausibility of change/stability if any
26
Mark Tessler, "Carnegie Middle East Governance and Islam Dataset, 1988-2010," ICPSR-32302-v2.
Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium, for Political and Social Research,
doi:10.3886/ICPSR32302.v2, retrived May 1, 2014.
"Egypt: Country Profile", Arab Barometer Second Wave Data, The Arab Barometer Website
http://www.arabbarometer.org/content/arab-barometer-ii-egypt, and
http://www.arabbarometer.org/?q=node/105, Retrived May 1, 2014.
27
12
among Egyptians in more than two decades in the light of the impressionable years
hypothesis; while the (political, values, and social attitudes) as dependent variables.
A set of statistical operations are done to test these hypotheses and address the
research questions mentioned above. A set of regression models to test the effect of
independent variables on the outcome under investigation. Moreover, conducting
reliability tests if needed to assess the inter-connectedness among the related
variables. In addition to a method of assessing (intra-inter) cohort replacements
following William Mayer's method in Political Generations and Shifts in Public
Opinion by expecting the outcome in following time frames based on the primary
responses in a given survey, thus identifying the total generational change and intragenerational change within.28 Such inferences are done through SPSS v.19 to detect
the major trends among the tested age cohorts.

Political Generations in Egypt:
Results are presented in this section aim to identify the validity of the
proposed hypotheses. It is important to note that the controlling criteria for presenting
this results is not only the theoretical questions posed, but also the level of statistical
reliability presented within the data in hand.
-
Intra- Generational Differences:
1- Gender Tolerance:
In this particular comparison, the paper use two different variables across the datasets.
In 1988, 21.3% of the age cohort (20-29) showed support for equal job opportunities
based on gender differences with Pearson Chi-Square of 2.534 at of 0.04 level of
significance.
28
William G. Mayer, "Political Generations and Shifts in Public Opinion," The Public Perspective,
Volume7,1992, pp. 10-12.
13
Men and women should have equal
Total
job opportunities and wages.
Agree
Age for Egypt 1988
Less than 20 years old
Count
% of Total
20-29 years old
Count
% of Total
Total
Count
% of Total
Disagree
22
13
35
7.7%
4.5%
12.2%
61
61
122
21.3%
21.3%
42.7%
145
141
286
50.7%
49.3%
100.0%
While in 2011, 8.7% of the age cohort (41-48) supported equal job opportunities
between men and women at Pearson Chi-Square of 12.186 at 0.0431 level of
significance.
Women and men should be equal in job opportunities
Strongly Agree
Agree
Disagree
Total
Strongly
disagree
Age 2011
21-28
Count
% of Total
41-48
95
89
56
17
257
7.8%
7.3%
4.6%
1.4%
21.2%
51
54
46
16
167
4.2%
4.5%
3.8%
1.3%
13.8%
387
430
293
101
1211
32.0%
35.5%
24.2%
8.3%
100.0%
Count
% of Total
Total
Count
% of Total
The results showed a (-2.04 intragenerational change) in equal job opportunities based
on gender from 1988 to 2011.
(20-29) at 1988
(41-48) at 2011
Expected
Actual
Total
percentage
Percentage
Change
8.7 %
0.87-
n=
% of
n=167/1211
% of
21.3*0.137=
122/286
Yes=
=0.137
Yes=8.7
29.1%
=0.42
21.3
2.91=
-2.04
2- Distrusting Institutions:
In this particular comparison, the paper use two different variables across the datasets
while noting the different wording of the questions.
14
In 1988, 35.4% of the age cohort (20-29) believes that pubic officials pursue their
own interests at 2.485 Pearson Chi-Square at 0.478 level of significance.
Do you agree/disagree with the
Total
following statement? Public
officials pursue their own interests.
Agree
Age for Egypt 1988
Less than 20 years old
Count
% of Total
20-29 years old
20
5
25
7.7%
1.9%
9.6%
92
21
113
35.4%
8.1%
43.5%
206
54
260
79.2%
20.8%
100.0%
Count
% of Total
Total
Count
% of Total
Disagree
In 2011, 2.5% of the age cohort (41-48) shows low level of trust in the government at
39.72 Pearson Chi-Square at 0.0 level of significance.
Trust the government
Total
I trust it to a
I trust it to a
I trust it to a
I absolutely
great extent
medium
limited extent
do not trust it
extent
Age 2011
21-28
Count
% of
94
99
22
37
252
8.0%
8.4%
1.9%
3.1%
21.3%
82
52
14
15
163
6.9%
4.4%
1.2%
1.3%
13.8%
540
425
112
105
1182
45.7%
36.0%
9.5%
8.9%
100.0%
Total
41-48
Count
% of
Total
Total
Count
% of
Total
The results showed a (+0.495 intra-generational change) in distrusting institutions
from 2008 to 2011.
(18-25)at 1988
(21-28) at 2011
n=
% of
n=252/1182=
% of
442/2823
Yes= 6
0.21
Yes=5
=0.42
Expected
Actual
Total
percentage
Percentage
Change
6*.21= 0.5%
5%
0.5-0.005=
0.495
15
-
Inter-generational differences:
In this section, the aim to assess the inter-generational differences among
attitudes in 2011 based on different constructed summed variables.
1- Attitudes Towards Voting:
Here, "voting behavior" is treated as dependent variable through adding two
variables of Cronbach Alpha =0.503, to explain the role of age categories in their
variations. In such regression model, the R-Square is 0.011 with p-value of 0.05 at
95% level of confidence.
Coefficients
Model
Unstandardized Coefficients
Standardized
t
Sig.
Coefficients
B
(Constant)
Std. Error
3.501
.036
18-25
.126
.059
26-40
.030
41-48
-.118-
Beta
96.041
.000
.072
2.160
.031
.047
.022
.633
.527
.063
-.060-
-1.863-
.063
a. Dependent Variable: voting
This model shows there is a significant (inter-generational) difference in terms
of voting inclination, where the age category of (18-25) is of 0.072 explanatory power
at p-value 0.031 while holding other categories constant in relation to older than 48
years generation. While, the age category of (41-48) is negatively related with -0.06
explanatory power at p-value 0.063 while holding other categories constant in relation
to older than 48 age bracket.
2- Religious Piety:
The "religious piety" dependent variable is constructed out of seven variables
with Cronbach Alpha of 0.641, while holding the dummy age categories as the
16
previous variable. This model reached a 0.012 R-Square with p-value of 0.011 at 95%
level of confidence.
Coefficients
Model
Unstandardized Coefficients
Standardized
t
Sig.
Coefficients
B
1
(Constant)
Std. Error
13.455
.228
18-25
.945
.354
26-40
.894
41-48
.513
Beta
59.009
.000
.101
2.674
.008
.290
.121
3.084
.002
.399
.047
1.287
.199
a. Dependent Variable: Religious Piety
This model shows there is a significant (inter-generational) difference in terms
of piety where the age category of (18-25) is of 0.101 explanatory power at p-value
0.008 while holding other categories constant in relation to older than 48 years
generation. While, the age category of (41-48) is of less explanatory power with 0.047
at p-value 0.199 while holding other categories constant in relation to older than 48
age bracket.
3- Democracy:
The Democracy dependent variable is constructed out of five variables in a
reversed meaning, thus it refers for those who do not support democracy, with
Cronbach Alpha of 0.811, while holding the dummy age categories as the previous
variable. This model reached a 0.003 R-Square with p-value of 0.383 at 95% level of
confidence.
17
Coefficients
Model
Unstandardized Coefficients
Standardized
t
Sig.
Coefficients
B
1
(Constant)
Std. Error
15.018
.199
18-25
-.482-
.312
26-40
-.210-
41-48
.045
Beta
75.361
.000
-.055-
-1.543-
.123
.254
-.031-
-.825-
.409
.345
.005
.132
.895
a. Dependent Variable: Bad Democracy
This model shows there is a significant (inter-generational) difference in terms
of rejecting democracy where the age category of (18-25) is negatively related of (0.055) explanatory power at p-value 0.123 while holding other categories constant in
relation to older than 48 years generation. While, the age category of (41-48) is of
0.005 explanatory power at p-value 0.895 while holding other categories constant in
relation to older than 48 age bracket.

Discussion on Generational replacements in Egypt:
Results mentioned above showed the variations within Egyptian generations
(Intra-differences) and (Inter-generational) replacements within the given the limited
variables based on the 1988 and 2011 data.
Results propose that there is a general trend of growing sense of conservative
and dissatisfaction of formal institutions in the Egyptian society since 1988. The level
of support for equal job opportunities for women in Egypt decreased over the last two
decades. The age cohort of (20-29) at 1988 changed their attitudes significantly
negatively with 20.4% when they reached (41-48) in 2011 regarding women.
Similarly, the degree of distrusting state institutions has increased marginally over the
last two decades. With an increase of 4.95% of intra-generational change for those
18
who reached (41-48) at 2011 regarding institution's legitimacy. Such results question
the basic attitudes' stability hypothesis that this paper is relying on.
Other, results of generational attitudes after the uprising of 2011 show
significant difference regarding the urge to vote among Egyptian generations. Those
who are between (18-25) who witnessed the uprising are more willing to vote than the
older generation of (41-48) who are holds negative connotations towards voting as a
necessary act. Similarly, young people of (18-25) are less skeptic of democracy to
older generations with explanatory power of -0.05 with 88 % level of reliability. On
the other hand, older generation of (41-48) is less confidence about the role of
democracy as the perfect tool of governance with 10% level of confidence. Thus, with
the confines of such data, formative experiences shaped generations differently,
leaving a significant inter-generational difference regarding democracy and
participation.
Surprisingly, the age cohort of (18-25) is more pious with 0.101 explanatory
power at 90% level of confidence in relation to older generations, while those who are
(41-48) are less pious than those who are more than 48 with 80% level of reliability in
the results. Such result supports the paper's claim that there is a growing conservative
tendency among the Egyptian societies including the youth, and those who are more
than 48, while leaving the middle cohort in between. This raises question on the role
of salient events in the 1980s to shape people's attitudes.

Youth in MENA: Comparative Perspective
Youth as referred in this paper in terms of "generation" believed to be a vital
player in the Arab Uprisings. This paper tried to trace the distinctiveness about this
current generation in MENA and Egypt in particular that agitated such change. Based
on the "impressionable years" hypothesis of Mannheim, generational stability in
Egypt seems to be problematic. As the results showed a significant level of Intra-
19
generational change in people's attitudes in the last two decades, the question of
salient events in Egypt during the 1980s is in need for further investigation. On the
other hand, formative years were explicitly valid in terms of inter-generational
differences after the Egyptian mass uprising in terms of favoring democracy and the
willingness to participate in the political process. Thus, this paper does not refute the
formative years hypothesis; rather it supports the concern posed by other scholars on
the decisive criteria for salient events to have such effect on generational stability.
Generations in the region are under-researched in terms of Large-N fieldwork
analyses of attitudes, however there is a "socio-economic correlates" that transcends
the national borders of each of the Arab states. Such factors are manifested in the lack
of modern education, high level of unemployment and the limited capacities for
family formation in the region. As Yousef and others noted that, the youth of MENA
are facing the same pressures with specifications related to each country. 80 % of
Egyptian graduates in 2009 are unemployed, while most of the trained graduates of
Syria and Lebanon immigrate outside of their country. Similarly, women are
unrepresented fairly in their societies, with women late marriage age in Yemen and
Egypt as well.
The population pyramid of the MENA countries -Egypt in particular- is
skewed towards the youth, which is predicted to be the case until 2045 as showed in
expectations' reports. However, little attention is assigned to their underlying values
and attitudes. This emerging generation is marginally different than earlier ones, as
noted to hold different values according to the results of this paper. Moreover, the
data sets in hand are not reliable enough to generalize its results on the fragmentation
and steadiness of youth categories among and within Arab states. The concluding
remark of this paper is that now is the perfect and necessary timing for more
20
systematic understanding of the nature of this opaque generational category that will
shape the region's future over the next 30 years at least.
21

Bibliography
Danigelis, Nicholas L. Melissa Hardy and Stephen J. Cutler , "Population Aging,
Intracohort Aging, and Sociopolitical Attitudes," American Sociological
Review, Vol. 72, No. 5 (Oct., 2007), pp. 812-825.
Dhillon, Navtej and Tarik Yousef, "Introduction," Generation in Waiting: The
Unfulfilled Promise of Young People in the Middle East, Navtej Dhillon and
Tarik Yousef (eds.)Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2009, pp. 110.
Gerges, Fawaz. The New Middle East: Protest and Revolution in the Arab World,
Fawaz Gerges (editor), first edition, New York, Cambridge University Press
pp.20-165.
Hewidy, Fahmy Neo-Egyptians, Aljazeera Website, January 5th 2010,
http://www.aljazeera.net/opinions/pages/10e96716-7fee-452c-9491bc715381150f, retrived April 27, 2014.
Inglehart, Ronald and Wayne E. Baker , "Modernization, Cultural Change, and the
Persistence of Traditional Values, "American Sociological Review, Vol. 65,
No. 1, (Feb., 2000), pp. 19-34.
Jennings, Kent M. Political Knowledge Over Time and Across Generations," The
Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 60, No. 2 (Summer, 1996), pp. 228-252.
Jennings, Kent M. "Residues of a Movement: The Aging of the American Protest
Generation," The American Political Science Review, Vol. 81, No. 2 (Jun.,
1987), pp. 367-372.
Korany, Bahgat and Rabab El-Mahdi , Arab Spring in Egypt: Revolution and Beyond,
Cairo and New York, The American University in Cairo Press, 2012, pp. 1013.
Mannheim, Karl. "The Problem of Generations," in Paul Kecskemeti, ed., Essays on
the sociology of Knowledge, London, Rutledge and Kegan Paul, 1952, pp.
281-310.
Mayer, William G. "Political Generations and Shifts in Public Opinion," The Public
Perspective, Volume7,1992, pp. 10-12.
Mishler, William and Richard Rose, "Generation, Age, and Time: The Dynamics of
Political Learning during Russia’s Transformation," American Journal of
Political Science, Vol. 51, No. 4, October 2007, p. 823 – 825.
Murphy, Emma. “Problematizing Arab Youth: Generational Narratives of Systemic
Failure,” Mediterranean Politics Vol. 17, No. 1, 2012, pp. 7-9.
Ryder, Norman B. "The Cohort as a Concept in the Study of Social Change,"
American Sociological Review, 30, 1965, pp. 849-855.
22
Schuman, Howard and Amy D. Corning, "Collective Knowledge of Public Events:
The Soviet Era from the Great Purge to Glasnost," American Journal of
Sociology, Vol. 105, No. 4 (Jan., 2000), pp. 933-946.
Sears, David O. and Nicholas A. Valentino, "Politics Matters: Political Events as
Catalysts for Preadult Socialization, "The American Political Science Review,
Vol. 91, No. 1 (Mar., 1997), pp. 48-55.
Tessler, Mark. Public Opinion in the Middle East: Survey Research and the Political
Orientations of Ordinary Citizens, Bloomington, Indiana University Press,
2011, pp. 1-76.
Theodoropoulou, Kastrinou. “A Different Struggle for Syria: Becoming Young in the
Middle East,” Mediterranean Politics Vol. 17, No. 1, 2012, pp. 60-61.
Wedeen, Lisa. "Introduction," Peripheral Visions: Publics, Power, and Performance
in Yemen, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2008, pp. 7-8.
.